G.R. No. 204117.July 1, 2015.

* (761 scra 238)

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. CITY TREASURER OF
MANILA, respondent.
Appeals; Jurisdiction; The failure to perfect an appeal as required by the rules has
the effect of defeating the right to appeal of a party and precluding the appellate
court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case.Time and again, it has been held
that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by
law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. The failure to perfect an appeal as
required by the rules has the effect of defeating the right to appeal of a party and
precluding the appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. At the risk
of being repetitious, the Court declares that the right to appeal is not a natural right
nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.
Same; Same; Taxation; Local Taxation; With the passage of Republic Act (RA) No.
9282, the authority to exercise either original or appellate jurisdiction over local tax
cases depended on the amount of the claim.Clearly, with the passage of R.A. No.
9282, the authority to exercise either original or appellate jurisdiction over local tax
cases depended on the amount of the claim. In cases where the RTC exercises
appellate jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that there must be a court capable of
exercising original jurisdiction otherwise there would be no appeal over which the
RTC would exercise appellate jurisdiction. The Court cannot consider the City
Treasurer as the entity that exercises original jurisdiction not only because it is not a
court within the context of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, but also because, as
explained above, B.P. 129 expressly delineates the appellate jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts, confining as it does said appellate jurisdiction to cases
decided by Metropolitan, Municipal, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Verily, unlike
in the case of the CA, B.P. 129 does not confer appellate jurisdiction on the RTC over
rulings made by nonjudicial entities. The RTC exercises appellate jurisdiction only
from cases decided by the Metropolitan, Municipal, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
in the proper cases. The nature of the jurisdiction exercised by these courts is
original, considering it will be the first time that a court will take judicial cognizance
of a case instituted for judicial action.

Clark Investors and Locators Association, Inc. vs. Secretary of Finance

G.R. No. 200670.July 6, 2015.*
761 scra 586
Same; Same; Declaratory Relief; Regional Trial Courts; The special civil action of
declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts
(RTCs).Accordingly, this petition must fail because this Court does not have
original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law
are involved. The special civil action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. The Rules of Court is explicit that such
action shall be brought before the appropriate Regional Trial Court. Section 1, Rule
63 of the Rules of Court provides: SECTION 1. Who may file petition.Any person
interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in
the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
Same; Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; Although the Supreme Court (SC), the Court of
Appeals (CA) and the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) have concurrent jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of
choice of court forum.Although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional
Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not
give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. In Heirs of
Bertuldo Hinog v. Hon. Melicor, 455 SCRA 460 (2005), citing People v. Cuaresma,
172 SCRA 415 (1989), we held: This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and
with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be
taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained
freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is
after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of
appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy
most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against
first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those
against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme
Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there
are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of the
Courts docket. The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (1) it would be an imposition
upon the precious time of this Court; and (2) it would cause an inevitable and
resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some
instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum
under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because
this Court is not a trier of facts.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) affirms the judicial policy that it shall
not entertain a direct resort to it unless the remedy cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of
national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the
extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari.We thus affirm the judicial policy that we
shall not entertain a direct resort to this Court unless the remedy cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances,
such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment
of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari.

G.R. No. 209331, April 24, 2015

Department of Finance vs. Dela Cruz
768 scra 73
Jurisdiction over the Petition
The CSC has jurisdiction over all employees of government branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters. 5 The CSC is the sole arbiter of controversies
relating to the civil service. 6 The rule is that disciplinary cases and cases involving
personnel actions, including "appointment through certification, promotion, transfer,
reinstatement, reemployment, detail, reassignment, demotion, and separation," are
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CSC. 7 This rule is embodied in Section 1, Rule
V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other
Pertinent Civil Service Laws (Omnibus Rules) which states:
SECTION 1.x x x. As used in these Rules, any action denoting movement or progress
of personnel in the civil service shall be known as personnel action. Such action
shall include promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, detail,
secondment, reassignment, demotion and separation, x x x.
Under Section 8, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules, "[a] detail is the movement of an
employee from one department or agency which is temporary in nature, which does
not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and does not require the issuance of
another appointment." CPO 189-2013 is an order detailing personnel from the BOC
to CPRO under the DOF. A reading of the petition filed before the RTC shows that
respondents were questioning their mass detail and reassignment to CPRO.
According to respondents, their detail was carried out in bad faith and was meant to
remove them from their permanent positions in the BOC. The action appears to be a
personnel action under the jurisdiction of the CSC. However, the petition went
beyond questioning the detail of respondents. Respondents further assailed the
validity and constitutionality of CPO 189-2013. Respondents alleged that CPO 189-
2013 was issued even before EC) 140, pursuant to which CPO 189-2013 was issued,
became effective. Respondents alleged that CPO 189-2013 was issued to beat the
deadline of the Commission on Elections' ban on personnel movement from 28
September 2013 to 20 October 2013 due to the scheduled barangay elections.
When respondents raised the issue of validity and constitutionality of CPO 189-
2013, the issue took the case beyond the scope of the CSC's jurisdiction because
the matter is no longer limited to personnel action. Thus, the RTC did not abuse its
discretion in taking cognizance of the action.
Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Petitioners allege that respondents failed to exhaust their administrative remedies
before filing the case with the RTC. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies allows administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge
their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective
competence.8 The doctrine entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier
resolution of controversies.9
Therefore, direct recourse to the trial court, when administrative remedies are
available, is a ground for dismissal of the action. The doctrine, however, is not
without exceptions. Among the exceptions are: (1) where there is estoppel on the
part of the party invoking the doctrine; (2) where the challenged administrative act
is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (3) where there is unreasonable
delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (4) where
the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and
oppressive; (5) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have
to be decided by the courts of justice; (6) where judicial intervention is urgent; (7)
where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (8)
where the controverted acts violate due process; (9) where the issue of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies had been rendered moot; (10) where there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (11) where strong public interest is
involved; and (12) in quo warranto proceedings. 10
In this case, respondents allege that CPO 189-2013 is contrary to law and
unconstitutional. Respondents assail CPO 189-2013 as patently illegal, arbitrary,
and oppressive. This case clearly falls within the exceptions where exhaustion of
administrative remedies need not be resorted to by respondents.

The Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 205728.January 21, 2015.*
Supreme Court; Jurisdictions; Subject Matter Jurisdiction; Words and Phrases; The
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (SC) over the subject matter is determined from
the allegations in the petition. Subject matter jurisdiction is defined as the authority
to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in
question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the
court and defines its powers.The jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter
is determined from the allegations in the petition. Subject matter jurisdiction is
defined as the authority to hear and determine cases of the general class to which
the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority
which organizes the court and defines its powers. Definitely, the subject matter in
this case is different from the cases cited by respondents. Nothing less than the
electorates political speech will be affected by the restrictions imposed by
COMELEC. Political speech is motivated by the desire to be heard and understood,
to move people to action. It is concerned with the sovereign right to change the
contours of power whether through the election of representatives in a republican
government or the revision of the basic text of the Constitution. The zeal with which
we protect this kind of speech does not depend on our evaluation of the cogency of
the message. Neither do we assess whether we should protect speech based on the
motives of COMELEC. We evaluate restrictions on freedom of expression from their
effects. We protect both speech and medium because the quality of this freedom in
practice will define the quality of deliberation in our democratic society.
Same; Same; During elections, the Supreme Court (SC) has the power and the duty
to correct any grave abuse of discretion or any act tainted with unconstitutionality
on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.During elections, we
have the power and the duty to correct any grave abuse of discretion or any act
tainted with unconstitutionality on the part of any government branch or
instrumentality. This includes actions by the COMELEC. Furthermore, it is this courts
constitutional mandate to protect the people against governments infringement of
their fundamental rights. This constitutional mandate outweighs the jurisdiction
vested with the COMELEC.
Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of
courts was created by the Supreme Court (SC) to ensure that every level of the
judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner.The
doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court
to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an
effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do not only determine the facts from the
evaluation of the evidence presented before them. They are likewise competent to
determine issues of law which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or
even an executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. To effectively perform
these functions, they are territorially organized into regions and then into branches.
Their writs generally reach within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they
mostly perform the all-important task of inferring the facts from the evidence as
these are physically presented before them. In many instances, the facts occur
within their territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the actual case that
makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such action. The
consequences, of course, would be national in scope. There are, however, some
cases where resort to courts at their level would not be practical considering their
decisions could still be appealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of
Appeals.
Same; Court of Appeals; The Court of Appeals (CA) is primarily designed as an
appellate court that reviews the determination of facts and law made by the trial
courts. It is collegiate in nature.The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an
appellate court that reviews the determination of facts and law made by the trial
courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more standpoints in the review
of the actions of the trial court. But the Court of Appeals also has original
jurisdiction over most special civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have
a nationwide scope. It is competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on
constitutional issues that may not necessarily be novel unless there are factual
questions to determine.
Same; Hierarchy of Courts; The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad
rule.The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court has full
discretionary power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil
actions for certiorari . . . filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or
if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the
petition.
Supreme Court; Jurisdiction; Suspension of the Rules; Time and again, we have held
that the Supreme Court (SC) has the power to relax or suspend the rules or to
except a case from their operation when compelling reasons so warrant, or when
the purpose of justice requires it, [and when] [w]hat constitutes [as] good and
sufficient cause that will merit suspension of the rules is discretionary upon the
court.Time and again, we have held that this court has the power to relax or
suspend the rules or to except a case from their operation when compelling reasons
so warrant, or when the purpose of justice requires it, [and when] [w]hat constitutes
[as] good and sufficient cause that will merit suspension of the rules is discretionary
upon the court. Certainly, this case of first impression where COMELEC has
threatened to prosecute private parties who seek to participate in the elections by
calling attention to issues they want debated by the public in the manner they feel
would be effective is one of those cases.

G.R. No. 163928.January 21, 2015.*

MANUEL JUSAYAN, ALFREDO JUSAYAN, and MICHAEL JUSAYAN, petitioners,
vs. JORGE SOMBILLA, respondent
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; The rule is settled that the jurisdiction of
a court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of
an action.The rule is settled that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of an action. In 1980, upon the
passage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act), the Courts of
Agrarian Relations were integrated into the Regional Trial Courts and the jurisdiction
of the Courts of Agrarian Relations was vested in the Regional Trial Courts. It was
only on August 29, 1987, when Executive Order No. 229 took effect, that the
general jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts to try agrarian reform matters was
transferred to the DAR. Therefore, the RTC still had jurisdiction over the dispute at
the time the complaint was filed in the RTC on June 30, 1986.

G.R. No. 204796.February 4, 2015.*

REICON REALTY BUILDERS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. DIAMOND
DRAGON REALTY AND MANAGEMENT, INC., respondent.
Same; Jurisdiction; Conditional Appearance; In ordinary civil cases, a conditional
appearance to object to a trial courts jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
may be made when said party specifically objects to the service of summons, which
is an issuance directed by the court, not the complainant. If the defendant,
however, enters a special appearance but grounds the same on the service of the
complainants initiatory pleading to him, then that would not be considered as an
objection to the courts jurisdiction over his person.In ordinary civil cases, a
conditional appearance to object to a trial courts jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant may be made when said party specifically objects to the service of
summons, which is an issuance directed by the court, not the complainant. If the
defendant, however, enters a special appearance but grounds the same on the
service of the complainants initiatory pleading to him, then that would not be
considered as an objection to the courts jurisdiction over his person. It must be
underscored that the service of the initiatory pleading has nothing to do with how
courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in an ordinary civil
action. Rather, it is the propriety of the trial courts service of summons same as
the CAs service of its resolution indicating its initial action on the certiorari petition
which remains material to the matter of the courts acquisition jurisdiction over
the defendants/respondents person.
Same; Same; In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy, 588 SCRA
612 (2009), it was rules that [a]s a general proposition, one who seeks an
affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.In
Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy, 588 SCRA 612 (2009), it
was ruled that [a]s a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule
that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for
additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift
order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission
to the courts jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional
appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge,
among others, the courts jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have
submitted to its authority.

G.R. No. 169343.August 5, 2015.*

SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC., petitioner, vs. BF HOMES, INC.,
respondent.
Housing; Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board; Presidential Decree (PD) No. 957
dated July 12, 1976 conferred exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade
and business upon the National Housing Authority (NHA); Per Executive Order (EO)
No. 648 dated February 7, 1981, the powers of the NHA were transferred to the
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), which, pursuant to EO No. 90
dated December 17, 1986, was subsequently renamed as Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB).Presidential Decree No. 957 dated July 12, 1976
conferred exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business upon
the National Housing Authority (NHA). Presidential Decree No. 1344 dated April 2,
1978 expanded the quasi-judicial powers of NHA by providing as follows: Section 1.
In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in
addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National
Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the
following nature: A. Unsound real estate business practices; B. Claims involving
refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer
against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and C. Cases
involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by
buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman. (Emphases ours) Per Executive Order No. 648 dated February 7,
1981, the powers of the NHA were transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission, which, pursuant to Executive Order No. 90 dated December 17, 1986,
was subsequently renamed as HLURB. In Siasoco v. Narvaja, 315 SCRA 144 (1999),
the Court highlighted the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB over complaints for
specific performance in certain real estate transactions: Under the Executive Order
creating it, the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of
unsound real estate business practices; claims involving refund filed against project
owners, developers, dealers, brokers, or salesmen; and cases of specific
performance. Accordingly, in United Housing Corporation v. Dayrit, we ruled that it
is the HLURB, not the trial court, which has jurisdiction over complaints for specific
performance filed against subdivision developers to compel the latter to execute
deeds of absolute sale and to deliver the certificates of title to buyers. (Emphases
supplied) The Court reiterated in Bank of the Philippines Islands v. ALS Management
and Development Corporation, 427 SCRA 564 (2004), that: [T]he jurisdiction of the
HLURB over cases enumerated in Section 1 of PD No. 1344 is exclusive. Thus, we
have ruled that the board has sole jurisdiction in a complaint of specific
performance for the delivery of a certificate of title to a buyer of a subdivision lot;
for claims of refund regardless of whether the sale is perfected or not; and for
determining whether there is a perfected contract of sale. (Emphases supplied) It is
clear from the plain language of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1344 and
aforecited jurisprudence that the HLURB had exclusive jurisdiction over the
complaint for specific performance filed by SMPI against BF Homes for the delivery
of the remaining 20 TCTs.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction;
Pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot or will not
determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services
of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact,
and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory
statute administered.Pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts
cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise
of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters
of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the
regulatory statute administered. However, said doctrine is not an absolute or
inflexible rule. The Court recognized several exceptions in Republic v. Lacap, 517
SCRA 255 (2007), viz.: [T]he doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
the corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound public policy
and practical considerations, are not inflexible rules. There are many accepted
exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking
the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official
inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount
involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e)
where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided
by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its
application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted
acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo
warranto proceedings.

G.R. No. 167838.August 5, 2015.*

TOLEDO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Jurisdiction; It is axiomatic that what
determines the nature of the action and which court has jurisdiction over it are the
allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.It is axiomatic
that what determines the nature of the action and which court has jurisdiction over
it are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.
G.R. No. 181284.October 20, 2015.*
Unduran vs. Aberasturi
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; The nature of an action, as well as which court or body
has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the
complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.In resolving the pivotal
issue of which between the RTC and the NCIP has jurisdiction over the respondents
amended complaint, foremost in the Courts mind is the principle in that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by
the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate
facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as
which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations
contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff
is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments
in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of
the claims asserted therein.
Same; Same; Same; Parties; Regional Trial Courts; Under Section 19 of Batas
Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129, as amended (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil
actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation,
and in all civil actions which involve title to, possession of, real property or any
interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein
exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such assessed value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).Under
Section 19 of B.P. 129, as amended (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), the RTC
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the subject of
the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and in all civil actions which
involve title to, possession of, real property or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value exceeds
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
Indigenous Cultural Communities; National Commission on Indigenous Peoples;
Jurisdiction; The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), through its
regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights
of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs).The NCIPs
jurisdiction is defined under Section 66 of the IPRA as follows: Sec. 66. Jurisdiction of
the NCIP.The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs; Provided, however, That no such
dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies
provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued
by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the
dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition
precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP. On the matter of NCIPs
jurisdiction and of procedures for enforcement of rights, NCIP Administrative Order
No. 1, 1998, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (NCIP-IRR) of the IPRA, Rule IX,
Section 1 states: Section 1. Primacy of Customary Law.All conflicts related to the
ancestral domain and lands, involving ICCs/IPs, such as but not limited to the
conflicting claims and boundary disputes, shall be resolved by the concerned parties
through the application of customary laws in the area where the disputed ancestral
domain or land is located. All conflicts related to the ancestral domain or lands
where one of the parties is non-ICC/IP or where the dispute could not be resolved
through customary law shall be heard and adjudicated in accordance with the Rules
on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure before the NCIP to be adopted hereafter. All
decisions of the NCIP may be brought on Appeal by Petition for Review to the Court
of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order or Decision.
Same; Same; Indigenous Peoples Rights Act; A careful review of Section 66 shows
that the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall have jurisdiction
over claims and disputes involving rights of Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) only when they arise between or among
parties belonging to the same ICC/IP.A careful review of Section 66 shows that the
NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only
when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. This can
be gathered from the qualifying provision that no such dispute shall be brought to
the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their
customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of
Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same
has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing
of a petition with the NCIP. The qualifying provision requires two conditions before
such disputes may be brought before the NCIP, namely: (1) exhaustion of remedies
under customary laws of the parties, and (2) compliance with condition precedent
through the said certification by the Council of Elders/Leaders. This is in recognition
of the rights of ICCs/IPs to use their own commonly accepted justice systems,
conflict resolution institutions, peace building processes or mechanisms and other
customary laws and practices within their respective communities, as may be
compatible with the national legal system and with internationally recognized
human rights.
rules, usages, customs and practices traditionally and continually recognized,
accepted and observed by respective Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous
Peoples (ICCs/IPs).Section 3(f) of the IPRA defines customary laws as a body of
written and/or unwritten rules, usages, customs and practices traditionally and
continually recognized, accepted and observed by respective ICCs/IPs. From this
restrictive definition, it can be gleaned that it is only when both parties to a case
belong to the same ICC/IP that the above said two conditions can be complied with.
If the parties to a case belong to different ICCs/IPs which are recognized to have
their own separate and distinct customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders, they
will fail to meet the above said two conditions. The same holds true if one of such
parties was a non-ICC/IP member who is neither bound by customary laws as
contemplated by the IPRA nor governed by such council. Indeed, it would be
violative of the principles of fair play and due process for those parties who do not
belong to the same ICC/IP to be subjected to its customary laws and Council of
Elders/Leaders.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; When such claims and disputes arise between or
among parties who do not belong to the same Indigenous Cultural
Community/Indigenous People (ICC/IP), i.e., parties belonging to different ICC/IPs or
where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP, the case shall fall under the jurisdiction of
the proper Courts of Justice, instead of the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP).Pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction
over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between
or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. When such claims and disputes arise
between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP, i.e., parties
belonging to different ICC/IPs or where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP, the case
shall fall under the jurisdiction of the proper Courts of Justice, instead of the NCIP. In
this case, while most of the petitioners belong to Talaandig Tribe, respondents do
not belong to the same ICC/IP. Thus, even if the real issue involves a dispute over
land which appear to be located within the ancestral domain of the Talaandig Tribe,
it is not the NCIP but the RTC which shall have the power to hear, try and decide this
case. There are, however, exceptional cases where the NCIP shall still have
jurisdiction over such claims and disputes even if the parties involved do not belong
to the same ICC/IP.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) declares Rule IX, Section 1 of the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act-Implementing Rules and Regulations (IPRA-IRR), Rule
III, Section 5 and Rule IV, Sections 13 and 14 of the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) Rules as null and void insofar as they expand the
jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA to include such disputes where
the parties do not belong to the same Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous
Peoples (ICC/IP).Considering the general rule that the jurisdiction of the NCIP
under Section 66 of the IPRA covers only disputes and claims between and among
members of the same ICCs/IPs involving their rights under the IPRA, as well as the
basic administrative law principle that an administrative rule or regulation must
conform, not contradict the provisions of the enabling law, the Court declares Rule
IX, Section 1 of the IPRA-IRR, Rule III, Section 5 and Rule IV, Sections 13 and 14 of
the NCIP Rules as null and void insofar as they expand the jurisdiction of the NCIP
under Section 66 of the IPRA to include such disputes where the parties do not
belong to the same ICC/IP. As the Court held in Padunan v. DARAB, 396 SCRA 196
(2003), [j]urisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or the
law and rules of procedure yield to substantive law. Otherwise stated, jurisdiction
must exist as a matter of law. Only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and
administrative agencies; rules of procedure cannot. In the above said exceptional
cases where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP or does not belong to the same
ICC/IP, however, Rule IV, Section 14 of the NCIP Rules validly dispenses with the
requirement of certification issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated
in the failed attempt to settle the dispute according to the customary laws of the
concerned ICC/IP.