288 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

RadiowealthFinanceCompanyvs.DelRosario
*
G.R.No.138739.July6,2000.

RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY, petitioner, vs. Spouses

VICENTEandMA.SUMILANGDELROSARIO,respondents.

Actions Demurrer to Evidence Pleadings and Practice Defendants

whopresentademurrertotheplaintiffsevidenceretaintherighttopresent
their own evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them, but if the trial
court agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate court disagrees with
bothofthemandreversesthedismissalorder,thedefendantslosetheright
to present their own evidence Demurrer aims to discourage prolonged
litigations.In other words, defendants who present a demurrer to the
plaintiffsevidenceretaintherighttopresenttheirownevidence,ifthetrial
courtdisagreeswiththemifthetrialcourtagreeswiththem,butonappeal,
theappellate court disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal
order, the defendants lose the right to present their own evidence. The
appellatecourtshall,inaddition,resolvethecaseandrenderjudgmentonthe
merits,inasmuchasademurreraimstodiscourageprolongedlitigations.
SameSameRemandofCasesWheretheCourtofAppealsreverseda
demurrertoevidencerenderedbyatrialcourt,itshouldrenderjudgmenton
thebasisoftheevidencesubmittedbyplaintiffinsteadofremandingthecase
forfurtherproceedings.ApplyingRule33,Section1ofthe1997Rulesof
Court, the CA should have rendered judgment on the basis of the evidence
submitted by the petitioner. While, the appellate court correctly ruled that
the documentary evidence submitted by the [petitioner] should have been
allowed and appreciated x x x, and that the petitioner presented quite a
numberofdocumentaryexhibitsxxxenumeratedintheappealedorder,we
agreewithpetitionerthattheCAhadsufficientevidenceonrecordtodecide
the collection suit. A remand is not only frowned upon by the Rules, it is
alsologicallyunnecessaryonthebasisofthefactsonrecord.
ObligationsandContractsTheactofleavingblanktheduedateofthe
firstinstallmentdoesnotnecessarilymeanthatthedebt

_______________

*THIRDDIVISION.
 289

VOL.335,JULY6,2000 289

RadiowealthFinanceCompanyvs.DelRosario

orsareallowedtopayasandwhentheycould.Respondents,ontheother
hand, counter that the installments were not yet due and demandable.
Petitioner had allegedly allowed them to apply their promotion services for
its financing business as payment of the Promissory Note. This was
supposedly evidenced by the blank space left for the date on which the
installments should have commenced. In other words, respondents theorize
that the action for immediate enforcement of their obligation is premature
because its fulfillment is dependent on the sole will of the debtor. Hence,
they consider that the proper court should first fix a period for payment,
pursuant to Articles 1180 and 1197 of the Civil Code. This contention is
untenable. The act of leaving blank the due date of the first installment did
notnecessarilymeanthatthedebtorswereallowedtopayasandwhenthey
could.Ifthiswastheintentionoftheparties,theyshouldhavesoindicated
in the Promissory Note. However, it did not reflect any such intention. On
thecontrary,theNoteexpresslystipulatedthatthedebtshouldbeamortized
monthly in installments of P11,579 for twelve consecutive months. While
thespecificdateonwhicheachinstallmentwouldbeduewasleftblank,the
Noteclearlyprovidedthateachinstallmentshouldbepayableeachmonth.
SameThe fact that an acceleration clause and a late payment penalty
isprovidedforshowstheintentionofthepartiesthattheinstallmentsshould
bepaidatadefinitedate.Italsoprovidedforanaccelerationclauseanda
latepaymentpenalty,bothofwhichshowedtheintentionofthepartiesthat
theinstallmentsshouldbepaidatadefinitedate.Hadtheyintendedthatthe
debtorscouldpayasandwhentheycould,therewouldhavebeennoneedfor
these two clauses. Verily, the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the
partiesmanifesttheirintentionandknowledgethatthemonthlyinstallments
would be due and demandable each month. In this case, the conclusion that
theinstallmentshadalreadybecomedueanddemandableisbolsteredbythe
fact that respondents started paying installments on the Promissory Note,
evenifthechecksweredishonoredbytheirdraweebank.Weareconvinced
neitherbytheiravowalsthattheobligationhadnotyetmaturednorbytheir
claimthataperiodforpaymentshouldbefixedbyacourt.
AppealsA party who did not appeal cannot obtain affirmative relief
other than that granted in the appealed decision.As for the disputed
documentssubmittedbythepetitioner,theCArulingin

290
290 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

RadiowealthFinanceCompanyvs.DelRosario

favor of their admissibility, which was not challenged by the respondents,

stands.Apartywhodidnotappealcannotobtainaffirmativereliefotherthan
thatgrantedintheappealeddecision.
Interests Where payment of interest is not expressly provided in the
Promissory Note, then it shall be deemed included in the stipulation for a
latepaymentpenalty.Petitioner,initsComplaint,prayedfor14%interest
per annum from May 6, 1993 until fully paid. We disagree. The Note
alreadystipulatedalatepaymentpenaltyof2.5percentmonthlytobeadded
to each unpaid installment until fully paid. Payment of interest was not
expresslystipulatedintheNote.Thus,itshouldbedeemedincludedinsuch
penalty.
Damages Where the Promissory Note provides for a late payment
penaltyof2.5percentmonthlyattorneysfeesequivalentto25percentofthe
amount due in case a legal action is instituted and 10 percent of the same
amountasliquidateddamages,saidliquidateddamagesshouldnolongerbe
imposedforbeingunconscionable.TheNotealsoprovidedthatthedebtors
would be liable for attorneys fees equivalent to 25 percent of the amount
dueincasealegalactionwasinstitutedand10percentofthesameamount
as liquidated damages. Liquidated damages, however, should no longer be
imposed for being unconscionable. Such damages should also be deemed
included in the 2.5 percent monthly penalty. Furthermore, we hold that
petitionerisentitledtoattorneysfees,butonlyinasumequalto10percent
oftheamountduewhichwedeemreasonableundertheprovenfacts.

PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourtof
Appeals.

ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
Singson,Valdez&Associatesforpetitioner.
RomeoR.Bringas&Associatesforprivaterespondents.

PANGANIBAN,J.:

Whenademurrertoevidencegrantedbyatrialcourtisreversedon
appeal, the reviewing court cannot remand the case for further
proceedings.Rather,itshouldrenderjudgmenton

291

VOL.335,JULY6,2000 291
RadiowealthFinanceCompanyvs.DelRosario
the basis of the evidence proffered by the plaintiff. Inasmuch as
defendants in the present case admitted the due execution of the
Promissory Note both in their Answer and during the pretrial, the
appellatecourtshouldhaverenderedjudgmentonthebasesofthat
Noteandontheotherpiecesofevidenceadducedduringthetrial.

TheCase

BeforeusisaPetitionforReviewonCertiorarioftheDecember9,
1 2
1997 Decision and the May 3, 1999 Resolution of the Court of
AppealsinCAGRCVNo.47737. The assailed Decision disposed
asfollows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed order (dated November

4,1994)oftheRegionalTrialCourt(BranchXIV)intheCityofManilain
Civil Case No. 9366507 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the
recordsofthiscaseberemandedtothecourtaquoforfurtherproceedings.
3
Nopronouncementastocosts.

The assailed Resolution

4
denied the petitioners Partial Motion for
Reconsideration.

TheFacts

The facts of this case are undisputed. On March 2, 1991, Spouses

Vicente and Maria Sumilang del Rosario (herein respondents),
jointly and severally executed, signed and delivered in favor of
RadiowealthFinanceCompany(herein

_______________

1 Rollo, pp. 2330. Promulgated by the Third Division composed of J. Ramon

Mabutas,Jr.,ponenteJJ.EmeritoC.Cui,Divisionchairman,andHilarionL.Aquino,
member,bothconcurring.
2Rollo,p.20.InthisResolution,J.CuiwasreplacedbyJ.CoronaIbaySomera.

3AssailedDecision,p.7rollo,p.29.

4Rollo,p.20.

292

292 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
RadiowealthFinanceCompanyvs.DelRosario
5
petitioner),aPromissoryNote forP138,948.Pertinentprovisionsof
thePromissoryNoteread:

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, on or before the date listed below, I/We

promise to pay jointly and severally RadiowealthFinanceCo. or order the
sumofONE HUNDRED THIRTY EIGHT THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
FORTYEIGHTPesos(P138,948.00) without need of notice or demand, in
installmentsasfollows:

P11,579.00 payable for 12 consecutive months starting on ________ 19 __ until the

amountofP11,579.00isfullypaid.Eachinstallmentshallbedueevery___dayofeach
month. A late payment penalty charge of two and a half (2.5%) percent per month
shallbeaddedtoeachunpaidinstallmentfromduedatethereofuntilfullypaid.

xxxxxxxxx
It is hereby agreed that if default be made in the payment of any of the
installmentsorlatepaymentchargesthereonasandwhenthesamebecomes
due and payable as specified above, the total principal sum then remaining
unpaid,togetherwiththeagreedlatepaymentchargesthereon,shallatonce
becomedueandpayablewithoutneedofnoticeordemand.
xxxxxxxxx
IfanyamountdueonthisNoteisnotpaidatitsmaturityandthisNoteis
placed in the hands of an attorney or collection agency for collection, I/We
jointly and severally agree to pay, in addition to the aggregate of the
principal amount and interest due, a sum equivalent to ten (10%) per cent
thereof as attorneys and/or collection fees, in case no legal action is filed,
otherwise, the sum will be equivalent to twentyfive (25%) percent of the
amount due which shall not in any case be less than FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS(P500.00)plusthecostofsuitandotherlitigationexpensesand,in
addition, a further sum of ten per cent (10%) of said amount which in no
case shall be less than
6
FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00), as and for
liquidateddamages.

_______________

5AnnexCrollo,p.31.

6AnnexCrollo,p.31.

293

VOL.335,JULY6,2000 293
RadiowealthFinanceCompanyvs.DelRosario

Thereafter, respondents defaulted on the monthly installments.

Despiterepeateddemands,theyfailedtopaytheirobligationsunder
theirPromissoryNote. 7
OnJune7,1993,petitionerfiledaComplaint forthecollection
of a sum of
8
money before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 14. During the trial, Jasmer Famatico, the credit and
collection officer of petitioner, presented in evidence the
respondentscheckpayments,thedemandletterdatedJuly12,1991,
the customers ledger card for the respondents, another demand
letterandMetropolitanBankdishonorslips.Famaticoadmittedthat
he did not have personal knowledge of the transaction or the
execution of any of these pieces of documentary evidence, which
hadmerelybeenendorsedtohim.
On July 4, 1994, the trial court issued9an Order terminating the
presentationofevidenceforthepetitioner. Thus,thelatterformally
offereditsevidenceandexhibitsandresteditscaseonJuly5,1994. 10
RespondentsfiledonJuly29,1994aDemurrertoEvidence for
allegedlackofcauseofaction.OnNovember4,1994,thetrialcourt
11
dismissed thecomplaintforfailureofpetitionertosubstantiateits
claims,theevidenceithadpresentedbeingmerelyhearsay.
Onappeal,theCourtofAppeals(CA)reversedthetrialcourtand
remandedthecaseforfurtherproceedings.
12
Hence,thisrecourse.

_______________

7Rollo,pp.3234.

8PresidedbyJudgeInocencioD.Maliaman.

9AppellantsBriefbeforetheCA,p.4rollo,p.48.

10Rollo,pp.3738.

11Rollo,pp.4041.

12ThiscasewasdeemedsubmittedfordecisionuponreceiptbythisCourtonApril

28,2000ofthepetitionersMemorandumsignedbyAtty.AllanB.GeptyofSingson
Valdez&Associates.RespondentsMemorandum,signedbyAtty.EduardoV.Bringas
ofRomeoR.Bringas&Associates,wasreceivedearlier,onApril3,2000.

294

294 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
RadiowealthFinanceCompanyvs.DelRosario

RulingoftheCourtofAppeals

According to the appellate court, the judicial admissions of

respondents established their indebtedness to the petitioner, on the
grounds that they admitted the due execution of the Promissory
Note, and that their only defense was the absence of an agreement
onwhentheinstallmentpaymentsweretobegin.Indeed,duringthe
pretrial, they admitted the genuineness not only of the Promissory
Note,butalsoofthedemandletterdatedJuly12,1991.Evenifthe
petitionerswitnesshadnopersonalknowledgeofthesedocuments,
they would still be admissible if the purpose for which [they are]
produced is merely to establish the fact that the statement or
documentwasinfactmadeortoshowitstenor[,]andsuchfactor
13
tenorisofindependentrelevance.
 Besides,Articles19and22oftheCivilCoderequirethatevery
person mustin the exercise of rights and in the performance of
dutiesactwithjustice,giveallelsetheirdue,andobservehonesty
and good faith. Further, the rules on evidence are to be liberally
construedinordertopromotetheirobjectiveandtoassisttheparties
inobtainingjust,speedyandinexpensivedeterminationofanaction.

Issue

Thepetitionerraisesthisloneissue:

The Honorable Court of Appeals patently erred in ordering the remand of

this case to the trial court instead of rendering judgment on the basis of
petitionersevidence.

For an orderly discussion, we shall divide the issue into two parts:
(a)legaleffectoftheDemurrertoEvidence,and(b)thedatewhen
theobligationbecamedueanddemandable.

_______________

13 Memorandum for the Petitioner, p. 4 rollo, p. 96. Original written in capital

letters.

295

VOL.335,JULY6,2000 295
RadiowealthFinanceCompanyvs.DelRosario

TheCourtsRuling

The Petition has merit. While the CA correctly reversed the trial
court,iterredinremandingthecaseforfurtherproceedings.

ConsequencesofaReversal,on
Appeal,ofaDemurrertoEvidence

Petitioner contends that if a demurrer to evidence is reversed on

appeal,thedefendantshouldbedeemedtohavewaivedtherightto
presentevidence,andtheappellatecourtshouldrenderjudgmenton
thebasisoftheevidencesubmittedbytheplaintiff.Aremandtothe
trialcourtforfurtherproceedingswouldbeanoutrightdefianceof
Rule33,Section1ofthe1997RulesofCourt.
Ontheotherhand,respondentsarguethatthepetitionerwasnot
necessarilyentitledtoitsclaim,simplyonthegroundthattheylost
theirrighttopresentevidenceinsupportoftheirdefensewhenthe
DemurrertoEvidencewasreversedonappeal.Theystressthatthe
CA merely found them indebted to petitioner, but was silent on
whentheirobligationbecamedueanddemandable.
TheoldRule35oftheRulesofCourtwasrewordedunderRule
33ofthe1997Rules,buttheconsequenceonappealofademurrer
toevidencewasnotchanged.Asamended,thepertinentprovisionof
Rule33readsasfollows:

SECTION1.Demurrertoevidence.Aftertheplaintiffhascompletedthe
presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the
ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief.Ifhismotionisdenied,heshallhavetherighttopresentevidence.If
the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal14is reversed he
shallbedeemedtohavewaivedtherighttopresentevidence.

_______________

14IntheoldRules,thesameprovisioniswordedinSection1ofRule35asfollows:

296

296 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
RadiowealthFinanceCompanyvs.DelRosario

Explainingtheconsequenceofademurrertoevidence,theCourtin
15
VillanuevaTransitv.Javellana pronounced:

The rationale behind the rule and doctrine is simple and logical. The
defendant is permitted, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the
eventthathismotionisnotgranted,tomoveforadismissal(i.e.,demurto
theplaintiffsevidence)onthegroundthatuponthefactsasthusestablished
andtheapplicablelaw,theplaintiffhasshownnorighttorelief.Ifthetrial
court denies the dismissal motion, i.e., finds that plaintiffs evidence is
sufficientforanawardofjudgmentintheabsenceofcontraryevidence,the
case still remains before the trial court which should then proceed to hear
andreceivethedefendantsevidencesothatallthefactsandevidenceofthe
contendingpartiesmaybeproperlyplacedbeforeitforadjudicationaswell
asbeforetheappellatecourts,incaseofappeal.Nothingislost.Thedoctrine
isbutinlinewiththeestablishedproceduralpreceptsintheconductoftrials
thatthetrialcourtliberallyreceiveallprofferedevidenceatthetrialtoenable
ittorenderitsdecisionwithallpossiblyrelevantproofsintherecord,thus
assuring that the appellate courts upon appeal have all the material before
them necessary to make a correct judgment, and avoiding the need of
remandingthecaseforretrialorreceptionofimproperlyexcludedevidence,
withthepossibilitythereafterofstillanotherappeal,withalltheconcomitant
delays.The rule, however, imposes the condition by the same token that if
his demurrer is granted by the trial court, and the order of dismissal is
reversed on appeal, the movant losses his right to present evidence in his
behalf and he shall have been deemed to have elected to stand on the
insufficiency of plaintiffs case and evidence. In such event, the appellate
courtwhichreversestheorderofdismissalshallproceedtorenderjudgment
onthemeritsonthebasisofplaintiffsevidence.(Italicssupplied)

_______________

SECTION1.Effectofjudgmentondemurrertoevidence.Aftertheplaintiffhascompleted
thepresentationofhisevidence,thedefendantwithoutwaivinghisrighttoofferevidencein
theeventthemotionisnotgranted,maymoveforadismissalonthegroundthatuponthefacts
andthelawtheplaintiffhasshownnorighttorelief.However,ifthemotionisgrantedandthe
orderofdismissalisreversedonappeal,themovantloseshisrighttopresentevidenceinhis
behalf.

1533SCRA755,761762,June30,1970,perZaldivar,J.

297

VOL.335,JULY6,2000 297
RadiowealthFinanceCompanyvs.DelRosario

Inotherwords,defendantswhopresentademurrertotheplaintiffs
evidence retain the right to present their own evidence, if the trial
courtdisagreeswiththemifthetrialcourtagreeswiththem,buton
appeal,theappellatecourtdisagreeswithbothofthemandreverses
thedismissalorder,thedefendantslosetherighttopresenttheirown
16
evidence. The appellate court shall, in addition, resolve the case
andrenderjudgmentonthemerits,inasmuchasademurreraimsto
17
discourageprolongedlitigations.
Inthecaseatbar,thetrialcourt,actingonrespondentsdemurrer
toevidence,dismissedtheComplaintonthegroundthattheplaintiff
had adduced mere hearsay evidence. However, on appeal, the
appellatecourtreversedthetrialcourtbecausethegenuinenessand
thedueexecutionofthedisputedpiecesofevidencehadinfactbeen
admittedbydefendants.
ApplyingRule33,Section1ofthe1997RulesofCourt,theCA
should have rendered judgment on the basis of the evidence
submittedbythepetitioner.Whiletheappellatecourtcorrectlyruled
thatthedocumentaryevidencesubmittedbythe[petitioner]should
have been allowed and appreciated x x x, and that the petitioner
presentedquiteanumberofdocumentaryexhibitsxxxenumerated
18
in the appealed order, we agree with petitioner that the CA had
sufficientevidenceonrecordtodecidethecollectionsuit.Aremand
is not only frowned upon by the Rules, it is also logically
unnecessaryonthebasisofthefactsonrecord.

DueandDemandableObligation
Petitionerclaimsthatrespondentsareliableforthewholeamountof
their debt and the interest thereon, after they defaulted on the
monthlyinstallments.

_______________

16Siayngcov.Costibolo,27SCRA272,284,February28,1969Tisonv.Courtof

Appeals,276SCRA582,599600,July31,1997.
17Atunv.Nuez,97Phil.762,765,October26,1955Arroyov.Azur,76Phil.493.

18CADecision,pp.45rollo,pp.2627.

298

298 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
RadiowealthFinanceCompanyvs.DelRosario

Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the installments were

notyetdueanddemandable.Petitionerhadallegedlyallowedthem
to apply their promotion services for its financing business as
paymentofthePromissoryNote.Thiswassupposedlyevidencedby
the blank space left
19
for the date on which the installments should
have commenced. In other words, respondents theorize that the
action for immediate enforcement of their obligation is premature
because its fulfillment is dependent on the sole will of the debtor.
Hence, they consider that the proper court should first fix a period
forpayment,pursuanttoArticles1180and1197oftheCivilCode.
This contention is untenable. The act of leaving blank the due
dateofthefirstinstallmentdidnotnecessarilymeanthatthedebtors
were allowed to pay as and when they could. If this was the
intention of the parties, they should have so indicated in the
PromissoryNote.However,itdidnotreflectanysuchintention.
On the contrary, the Note expressly stipulated that the debt
shouldbeamortizedmonthlyininstallmentsofP11,579fortwelve
consecutive months. While the specific date on which each
installmentwouldbeduewasleftblank,theNoteclearlyprovided
thateachinstallmentshouldbepayableeachmonth.
Furthermore,italsoprovidedforanaccelerationclauseandalate
paymentpenalty,bothofwhichshowedtheintentionoftheparties
that the installments should be paid at a definite date. Had they
intended that the debtors could pay as and when they could, there
wouldhavebeennoneedforthesetwoclauses.
Verily, the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties
manifesttheirintentionandknowledgethatthemonthlyinstallments
wouldbedueanddemandableeach

_______________

19RespondentsAnswer,p.1rollo,p.35.
 299

VOL.335,JULY6,2000 299
RadiowealthFinanceCompanyvs.DelRosario
20
month. Inthiscase,theconclusionthattheinstallmentshadalready
become due and demandable is bolstered by the fact that
respondents started paying installments on the Promissory Note,
even if the checks were dishonored by their drawee bank. We are
convinced neither by their avowals that the obligation had not yet
maturednorbytheirclaimthataperiodforpaymentshouldbefixed
byacourt.
Convincingly, petitioner has established not only a cause of
action against the respondents, but also a due and demandable
obligation.Theobligationoftherespondentshadmaturedandthey
clearly defaulted when their checks bounced. Per the acceleration
clause,thewholedebtbecamedueonemonth(April2,1991)after
the date of the Note because the check representing their first
installment bounced. As for the disputed documents submitted by
the petitioner, the CA ruling in favor of their admissibility, which
wasnotchallengedbytherespondents,stands.Apartywhodidnot
appealcannotobtainaffirmativereliefotherthanthatgrantedinthe
21
appealeddecision.
Itshouldbestressedthatrespondentsdonotcontesttheamount
oftheprincipalobligation.Theirliabilityasexpresslystatedinthe
22
PromissoryNoteandfoundbytheCAisP13[8],948.00 whichis
payableintwelve(12)installmentsatP11,579.00amonthfortwelve
(12)consecutivemonths.As

_______________

20Article1371oftheCivilCodeprovidesthat[i]nordertojudgetheintentionof

the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be

principallyconsidered.
21 Lagandaon v. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 330, May 21, 1998 Dio v.
Concepcion,296SCRA579,September25,1998.FilflexIndustrial&Manufacturing
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,286 SCRA 245, February 12,
1998 Philippine Tobacco FlueCuring & Redrying Corporation v. National Labor
RelationsCommission,300SCRA37,December10,1998QuezonDevelopmentBank
v.CourtofAppeals,300SCRA206,December16,1998.
22 There was a typographical error in the CA Decision. As reflected in the
PromissoryNote,theamountshouldbeP138,948,not,P130,948.

300

300 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
RadiowealthFinanceCompanyvs.DelRosario
correctlyfoundbytheCA,theambiguityinthePromissoryNote
23
isclearlyattributabletohumanerror.
Petitioner,initsComplaint,prayedfor14%interestperannum
fromMay6,1993untilfullypaid.Wedisagree.TheNotealready
stipulatedalatepaymentpenaltyof2.5percentmonthlytobeadded
toeachunpaidinstallmentuntilfullypaid.Paymentofinterestwas
not expressly stipulated in the Note. Thus, it should be deemed
includedinsuchpenalty.Inaddition,theNotealsoprovidedthatthe
debtorswouldbeliableforattorneysfeesequivalentto25percent
of the amount due in case a legal action was instituted and 10
percent of the same amount as liquidated damages. Liquidated
damages, however,
24
should no longer be imposed for being
unconscionable. Suchdamagesshouldalsobedeemedincludedin
the 2.5 percent monthly penalty. Furthermore, we hold that
petitionerisentitledtoattorneysfees,butonlyinasumequalto10
percent of the
25
amount due which we deem reasonable under the
provenfacts.
The Court deems it improper to discuss respondents claim for
moral and other damages. Not having appealed the CA Decision,
they are
26
not entitled to affirmative relief, as already explained
earlier.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The appealed
Decision is MODIFIED in that the remand is SET ASIDE and
respondentsareorderedTOPAYP138,948,plus2.5percentpenalty
charge per month beginning April 2, 1991 until fully paid, and 10
percentoftheamountdueasattorneysfees.Nocosts.
SOORDERED.

_______________

23CADecision,p.5rollo,p.27.

24 Article 2226 of the Civil Code provides that [l]iquidated damages, whether

intendedasanindemnityorapenalty,shallbeequitablyreducediftheyareiniquitous
orunconscionable.
25LawFirmofRaymundoA.Armovitv.CA,202SCRA16, September 27, 1991

Pascualv.CA,300SCRA214,December16,1998.
26Seenote21.

301

VOL.335,JULY6,2000 301
RadiowealthFinanceCompanyvs.DelRosario

Melo(Chairman),Vitug,PurisimaandGonzagaReyes,JJ.,
concur.

Petitiongranted,judgmentmodifiedandsetaside.
 Notes.Whoever avails of a demurrer to evidence gambles his
righttoadduceevidence.(Quebralvs.CourtofAppeals,252SCRA
353[1996])
The rule embodied in Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court
thatifademurrertoevidenceisgrantedandtheorderofdismissalis
reversedonappeal,themovantloseshisrighttopresentevidencein
hisbehalfcontemplatesagroundpertainingtothemeritsofthecase
andnotwherethedismissalisprincipallyfocusedonthecourtslack
ofjurisdiction.(PhilippineAmusementandGamingCorporationvs.
CourtofAppeals,275SCRA433[1997])
Inanelectionprotestproceeding,whichisasummaryone,andin
whichtheperiodsareshortandfatal,andtrialsrapidandpreferential
astheperemptorynatureofthelitigationsorequires,themotionfor
dismissal at that stage of the proceeding must be considered as a
demurrer to the evidence presented by the protestant, with implied
waiverbytheprotesteetopresenthisevidence,whatevermaybethe
ruling,whetheradverseorfavorable,eitherinthefirstinstanceoron
appeal, the court of origin or appellate court having the power to
definitely decide the protest. (Enojas, Jr. vs. Commission on
Elections,283SCRA229[1997])
Where a court denies a demurrer to evidence, it should set the
date for the reception of the defendants evidence in chief and not
proceedtogranttheplaintiffsclaims.(Northwest Airlines, Inc. vs.
CourtofAppeals,284SCRA408[1998])

o0o

302

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