270 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Florestavs.Ubiadas
*
A.M.No.RTJ031774.May27,2004.
(FormerlyAMOCAIPI00895RTJ)

PROV. PROSECUTOR DORENTINO Z. FLORESTA,

complainant, vs. Judge ELIODORO G. UBIADAS, Regional Trial
Court,OlongapoCity,Branch72,respondent.

CourtsJudgesAdministrativeComplaintsThe proper recourse of a

partyaggrievedbythedecisionofajudgeistoappealtothepropercourt,
not to file an administrative complaint Only in cases where the error is
grossorpatent,deliberateandmalicious,orincurredwithevidentbadfaith
may administrative sanctions be imposed.On innumerable occasions this
Courthasimpresseduponjudgesthat,asmandatedbytheCodeofJudicial
Conduct,theyoweittothepublicandthelegalprofessiontoknowthevery
lawtheyaresupposedtoapplytoagivencontroversy.Theyarecalledupon
toexhibitmorethanjustacursoryacquaintancewithstatutesandprocedural
rules, to be conversant with the basic law, and to maintain the desired
professional competence. The propriety of the dismissal, on motion of the
accused,ofCrim.CaseNo.21297onjurisdictionalgroundsis,however,a
matterforjudicialadjudicationandtheproperrecourseofapartyaggrieved
by the decision of a judge is to appeal to the proper court, not file an
administrativecomplaint.For,asamatterofpublicpolicy,intheabsenceof
fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity
are generally not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are
erroneous. Only in cases where the error is gross or patent, deliberate and
malicious,orincurredwithevidentbadfaithmayadministrativesanctionsbe
imposed.Thereisnshowingthatthiswasthecasehere.
SameSame Same Gross Inefficiency Article VIII, Section 15(1) of
the 1987 Constitution and Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct direct judges to dispose of their cases promptly and within the
prescribed periods, failing which they are liable for gross inefficiency.
WhethertheaccusedinCrim.CaseNo.21297werealreadyreleasedat

_______________

*THIRDDIVISION.
 271

VOL.429,MAY27,2004 271

Florestavs.Ubiadas

the time of the filing of the motion for reconsideration did not relieve
respondentfromresolvingitasinfactheevenissuedanorderstatingthatit
was submitted for resolution. Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987
ConstitutionandCanon3,Rule3.05oftheCodeofJudicialConductdirect
judgestodisposeoftheircasespromptlyandwithintheprescribedperiods,
failingwhichtheyareliableforgrossinefficiency.
SameSameBailWhetherbailisamatterofrightordiscretion,and
even if no charge has yet been filed in court against a suspectdetainee,
reasonablenoticeofhearingisrequiredtobegiventotheprosecutor,orat
leasthisrecommendationmustbesought.Whetherbailisamatterofright
or discretion, and even if no charge has yet been filed in court against a
respondentsuspectdetainee, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be
given to the prosecutor, or at least his recommendation must be sought. So
Fortuna v. PenacoSitaca instructs: [A]dmission to bail as a matter of
discretion presupposes the exercise thereof in accordance with law and
guided by the applicable legal principles. The prosecution must first be
accordedanopportunitytopresentevidencebecausebytheverynatureof
decidingapplicationsforbail,itisonthebasisofsuchevidencethatjudicial
discretionisweighedagainstindeterminingwhethertheguiltoftheaccused
is strong. In other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally
and within the confines of procedural due process, that is, after the
evaluationoftheevidencesubmittedbytheprosecution. Any order issued
in the absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of
whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness. (Italics in the original italics
boldsupplied)
SameSameSameWhere the petition for bail was filed only the day
before, at close to noontime, it cannot be said that the prosecution was
afforded reasonable notice and opportunity to present evidence after it
received a copy of the petition minutes before it was filed in court
Reasonable notice depends, of course, upon the circumstances of each
particularcase,takingintoaccount,interalia,theoffensecommittedandthe
imposable penalties, and the evidence of guilt in the hands of the
prosecution. True, a hearing of the petition for bail was conducted in
Crim.CaseNo.27199onJanuary4,2000at8:30a.m.Giventhefilingof
the petition only the day before, at close to noontime, it cannot be said that
the prosecution was afforded reasonable notice and opportunity to present
evidenceafteritreceivedacopyofthepetitionminutesbeforeitwasfiledin
court. It bears stressing that the prosecution should be afforded reasonable
opportunitytocommentontheapplicationforbailbyshowingthatevidence
ofguiltisstrong.WhileinSection18ofRule114onapplicationsforbail,
no period is provided as it merely requires the court to give a reasonable
notice of the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to submit his
recommendation, and the general rule on the requirement of a threeday
noticeforhearingofmotionsunderSection4ofRule15allowsacourtfor
goodcause

272

272 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Florestavs.Ubiadas

to set the hearing on shorter notice, there is, in the case of Mangohig, no
showing of good cause to call for hearing his petition for bail on shorter
notice.Reasonablenoticedependsofcourseuponthecircumstancesofeach
particularcase,takingintoaccount,interalia,theoffensecommittedandthe
imposable penalties, and the evidence of guilt in the hands of the
prosecution.
SameSameSameA judge is called upon to balance the interests of
theaccusedwhoisentitledtothepresumptionofinnocenceuntilhisguiltis
proven beyond reasonable doubt, and to enable him to prepare his defense
withoutbeingsubjecttopunishmentpriortoconviction,againsttherightof
the State to protect the people and the peace of the community from
dangerous elements.In Crim. Case No. 27199, Mangohig was arrested
for violation of Sec. 5(b), Art. III of R.A. 7610, which is punishable by
reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, and subsequently indicted for
statutoryrapequalifiedbyrelationshipwhichispunishablebydeath.Under
the circumstances, by respondents assailed grant of bail, the prosecution
wasdeprivedofdueprocessforwhichheisliableforgrossignoranceofthe
laworprocedurewhichisaseriouschargeunderSec.8ofRule140ofthe
RulesofCourt.Thechargecarriesthepenaltyofdismissalfromtheservice
with forfeiture of all or part of the benefits or suspension from office
withoutsalaryandotherbenefitsformorethan3butnotexceeding6months
orafineofmorethanP20,000butnotexceedingP40,000.ThisCourttakes
thisoccasiontoreiteratetheinjunctionthatajudgeiscalledupontobalance
the interests of the accused who is entitled to the presumption of innocence
until his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt, and to enable him to
preparehisdefensewithoutbeingsubjecttopunishmentpriortoconviction,
against the right of the State to protect the people and the peace of the
communityfromdangerouselements.
Same Same Ombudsman The Ombudsman is authorized to call on
prosecutors or lawyers in the government service for assistance.In the
exercise of his power to investigate and prosecute on its own or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee,officeoragency,whensuchactoromissionappearstobeillegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient, the Ombudsman is authorized to call on
prosecutors or lawyers in the government service for assistance. Section 31
of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides: Designation of Investigators and
ProsecutorsThe Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his office
and/or designate or deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the
government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in
the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or
deputizedtoassisthimashereinprovidedshallbeunderhissupervisionand
control.

273

VOL.429,MAY27,2004 273

Florestavs.Ubiadas

SameSameSameRespondentJudgesOrdershowshisignoranceof
theprovisionoftheOmbudsmanActwhichdoesnotrequirethepresenceof
a special reason for the designation or deputization by the Ombudsman of
any prosecutor or government lawyer to assist him.Respondents
December17,1999Orderwhichstates,interalia, as follows: The Officer
inChargeoftheCityProsecutorsOfficeisherebydirectedtodesignateany
oftheAssistantProsecutorsoftheCityProsecutorsOfficetotaketheplace
of Provincial Prosecutor Dorentino Z. Floresta. While Prosecutor Floresta
appearstohavebeendeputizedbytheOfficeoftheOmbudsmantoprosecute
thiscase,nospecialreasonwasgivenforsuchauthority.Instead,itappears
that such designation was merely based on the premise that the offense
chargedwascommittedinSubicmunicipalityaserroneouslyindicatedinthe
original Information filed with this Court. Inasmuch as the Information as
amended, upon the initiative of Prosecutor Floresta himself, shows that the
place of the commission of the offense charged is in Olongapo City, the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor does not have the authority to continue
prosecutingthiscaseforthePeopleofthePhilippines(Section2,Rule117,
1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure). For this reason, the Office of the City
Prosecutor should take his place inasmuch as the Office of the City
ProsecutorofOlongapohasterritorialjurisdictionovertheoffensecharged.
(Italics supplied) shows that he was not only aware of complainants
designation,hence,belyinghisexplanationthathemusthaveoverlookedthe
same. It also shows his ignorance of the abovecited provision of the
OmbudsmanActwhichdoesnotrequirethepresenceofaspecialreasonfor
the designation or deputization by the Ombudsman of any prosecutor or
governmentlawyertoassisthim.

ADMINISTRATIVEMATTERintheSupremeCourt.Gross
IgnoranceoftheLaw,GraveAbuseofAuthorityandViolationsof
theCodeofJudicialConduct.

ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
CARPIOMORALES,J.:
1
By a Sworn Complaint dated January 24, 2000, then Provincial
Prosecutor, now Regional Trial Court Judge Dorentino Z. Floresta
(complainant) administratively charged Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas
of the Olongapo City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72 with
gross ignorance of [the] law, grave abuse of authority and
violationsoftheCodeofJudicialConduct.

_______________

1Rolloatpp.161.

274

274 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Florestavs.Ubiadas

Complainant faults respondent for dismissing 2

for lack of
jurisdiction, on motion of the accused, by Order of July 9, 1997,
Crim.CaseNo.21297,PeopleofthePhilippinesv.ChiaSayChaw,
etal.,forillegalentry.
Complainant alleges that by dismissing Crim. Case No. 21997
[d]espite . . . the provision of P.D. 1599 which established the
ExclusiveEconomicZoneofthePhilippinesand[theapprehension
of the accused] within the 200 nautical miles of the . . . Zone,
respondent Virtually surrender[ed] our 3
sovereignty and criminal
jurisdictiontotheChinesegovernment.
Complainantlikewisefaultsrespondentforfailuretoresolve,as
he has yet to resolve, the Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Clarification of the abovesaid Order of July 9, 1997, despite the
lapseofmorethantwoyearssincethefilingofthemotion.Bysuch
failure, complainant charges respondent with violation of Canon 3,
Rule3.05oftheCodeofJudicialConductwhichenjoinsjudgesto
disposeofthecourtsbusinesspromptlyanddecidecaseswithinthe
required periods, and of SC Circular No. 13 (July 1, 1987) which
requireslowercourtstoresolvecasesormattersbeforethemwithin
threemonthsorninetydaysfromdateofsubmission.
Complainantfurthermorefaultsrespondentforgranting,without
giving notice to the prosecution, the petition for bail of Jose
Mangohig,Jr.whowasarrestedbyvirtueofawarrantissuedbythe
Municipal Trial Court of Subic, Zambales which found probable
causeagainsthimforviolationofSection5(b),Art.IIIofRepublic
ActNo.7610(SpecialProtectionofChildrenAgainstChildAbuse,
4
ExploitationandDiscriminationAct).

_______________
 2Id.,atpp.79.

3Id.,atp.3.

4Rep.Act7610,Art.III,Sec.5(b)provides:

Sec.5.Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.Children whether male or female, who
formoney,profit,oranyotherconsiderationorduetothecoercionorinfluenceofanyadult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be
childrenexploitedinprostitutionandothersexualabuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposeduponthefollowing:
xxxx

275

VOL.429,MAY27,2004 275
Florestavs.Ubiadas

Finally, complainant faults respondent for disqualifying him

(complainant) from appearing in Crim Case No. 63499, People v.
EsmaneDiaz,despitehis(complainants)designationtohandlethe
prosecutionofthecasebytheOmbudsman. 5
By Second IndorsementComment of March 20, 2000,
respondentcontendsthatpetitionerhasnopersonalitytoinitiatethe
complaint against him as he is not a party to the cases subject
thereof.
Onthemeritsofthecharges,respondentcountersthatterritorial
jurisdictionovertheareawheretheaccusedinCrim.CaseNo.212
97 were arrestedwithin the vicinity of Scarborough Shoalhas
not yet been established by controlling jurisprudence, given the
conflicting claims thereover by the Philippines and China and the
absence of an intercountry agreement determining
6
the common
boundariesoftheExclusiveEconomicZone.
AstohisfailuretoresolvetheMotionforReconsiderationofhis
July 9, 1997 Order dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction, Crim. Case
No. 21297, respondent points out that said motion was filed after
theaccusedwerealreadyreleasedfromdetention.Hefurtherpoints
outthatduringthependencyofsaidmotion,representatives

_______________

(b) Thosewhocommittheactofsexualintercourseorlasciviousconductwitha
childexploitedinprostitutionorsubjectedtoothersexualabuse:Provided,
Thatwhenthevictimisundertwelve(12)yearsofage,theperpetratorsshall
beprosecutedunderArticle335,paragraph3,forrapeandArticle336ofAct
No. 3815, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious
conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious
conductwhenthevictimisundertwelve(12)yearsofageshallbereclusion
temporalinitsmediumperiod(Italicssupplied).
 5Rolloatpp.6367.

6 P.D. No. 1599, Establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone and for Other
Purposes,(1978),Sec.1provides,Thereisherebyestablishedazonetobeknownas
theexclusiveeconomiczoneofthePhilippines.Theexclusiveeconomiczoneshall
extendtoadistanceoftwohundrednauticalmilesbeyondandfromthebaselinesfrom
which the territorial sea is measured: Provided,That, where the outer limits of the
zone as thus determined overlap the exclusive economic zone of an adjacent or
neighboringstate,thecommonboundariesshallbedeterminedbyagreementwiththe
state concerned or in accordance with pertinent generally recognized principles of
internationallawondelimitation.

276

276 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Florestavs.Ubiadas

oftheDepartmentofForeignAffairs(DFA)informedhimthatsaid
office was not interested in setting aside the order of7dismissal but
that it was suggesting an amendment of the order. Respondent
explains though that since the accused had already been released
from detention and had left the Philippines, and the interest of the
DFA was merely for the amendment of the order of dismissal, the
motionhadalreadybecomeacademic.
Astothesecondcharge,respondentinformsthatthepetitionfor
bail of Mangohig who was then under preliminary investigation,
which motion was filed on January 3, 2000 on which same date a
copyofsaidpetitionwasfurnishedthepublicprosecutor,wasasset
byMangohigheardonthemorningofJanuary4,2000duringwhich
there was no appearance from the Prosecutors Office and that as
theoffenseforwhichMangohigwaschargedisordinarilyabailable
offense,respondentgrantedhimbail.
As for his order disqualifying complainant in Crim. Case No.
63499, respondent explains that he had already
8
reconsidered the
samethroughhisFebruary10,2000Order, hehavingearlierfailed
toseepetitionersdesignationbytheOmbudsman.
9
In its August 16, 2002 Report, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) found, as to the first charge, that it was not
shown that respondent acted with malice, oppression or bad faith
sufficienttofindhimguiltyofgrossignoranceofthelaw,ithaving
appeared that respondent based his dismissal order on his
interpretationofaprovisionoflaw.TheOCAthusconcludedthatas
respondentsconclusionsinhisassailedorderarenotwithoutlogic
or reason,
10
and unattended by fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad
faith, he could not be faulted for gross ignorance of the law. The
OCA hastened to add, however, that respondent is nonetheless
requiredtoactonthemotionforreconsideration.
As to the second charge, the OCA stressed that the Rules of
Courtrequiresamovanttoservenoticeofhismotiononallparties
concerned at least three days before the hearing thereof, hence,
respondenterredingrantingthepetitionforbailwithouthearingthe
prosecutionsside.

_______________

7Rolloatpp.6465.

8Id.,atp.70.

9Id.,atpp.113119.

10Id.,atp.118.

277

VOL.429,MAY27,2004 277
Florestavs.Ubiadas

Finally, on the third charge, the OCA found that respondents

explanations were fraught with inconsistencies since his allegation
that he failed to see complainants designation as Ombudsman
ProsecutorinCrim.CaseNo.63499isbeliedbyhisDecember17,
11
2000 Order wherein he noted that complainant was deputized by
the Office of the Ombudsman to prosecute said case. The OCA in
fact noted that respondents subsequent February 10, 2001 Order
reconsidering his December 17, 2000 Order was issued only after
thelatterorderhadattainedfinalityandtheinstantcasewasfiled.
The OCA accordingly recommended that respondent be FINED
intheamountofTwentyThousand(P20,000.00)Pesos.
12
ByResolutionofFebruary26,2003, thisCourtnotedtheOCA
ReportandrequiredthepartiestoMANIFESTwithintwenty(20)
daysfromnotice,whethertheyaresubmittingthecaseonthebasis
ofthepleadings/recordsalreadyfiledandsubmitted.
13
By Manifestation dated April 1, 2003, complainant proffered
additional charges against respondent and submitted in support
thereof,amongotherthingsanadministrativecomplaintfiledbyone
Dr. Reino Rosete against respondent and photocopies of orders
issuedbyrespondent.Dr.Rosetescomplaint,whichwasaddressed
tothenCourtAdministratorAlfredoBenipayo,isbothundatedand
unsigned, however. In the same Manifestation, complainant
submittedthecasefordecision.
On May 9, 2003, the Docket and Clearance
14
Division of this
Courtreceivedanundatedmanifestation ofrespondentstatingthat
he was submitting the case on the basis of the pleadings/records
alreadyfiledinthecase.

ThisCourtsFindings

I.OnthedismissalofCrim.CaseNo.21297
On innumerable occasions this Court has impressed upon judges
that,asmandatedbytheCodeofJudicialConduct,theyoweittothe
publicandthelegalprofessiontoknowtheverylawtheyare

_______________

11Id.,atpp.5960.

12Id.,atp.121.

13Id.,atpp.122185.

14Id.,atp.187.

278

278 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Florestavs.Ubiadas
15
supposedtoapplytoagivencontroversy. Theyarecalleduponto
exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules, to be conversant with the 16
basic law, and to
maintainthedesiredprofessionalcompetence.
The propriety of the dismissal, on motion of the accused, of
Crim. Case No. 21297 on jurisdictional grounds is, however, a
matter for judicial adjudication and the proper recourse of a party
aggrievedbythedecisionofajudgeistoappealtothepropercourt,
17
notfileanadministrativecomplaint.
For, as a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud,
dishonestyorcorruption,theactsofajudgeinhisjudicialcapacity
are generally not 18subject to disciplinary action, even though such
actsareerroneous. Onlyincaseswheretheerrorisgrossorpatent,
deliberate and malicious, or incurred 19
with evident bad faith may
administrative sanctions be imposed. There is n showing that this
wasthecasehere.
WithrespecttothenonresolutionoftheprosecutionsMotionfor
ReconsiderationoftheorderofdismissalofCrim.CaseNo.21297
noresolutionofwhichhasbeenissued,complainant,inhisReplyto
theCommentofrespondent,refutesrespondentsexplanationinthis
wise:

When the said motion was filed in Court on July 11, 1997, the Chinese
fishermenwerenotyetreleasedfromdetention. It was during the pendency
ofthemotionthattheChinesefishermenwereallowedtoleavebytheChief
ofPoliceofSubic,Zambalesdespiteourrepresentationthattheyshouldnot
be released from jail as another case for illegal fishing was still pending
investigation. . . . The representatives from the Foreign Affairs merely
wantedtoconveytoJudgeUbiadastheseriousimplicationsofhisOrderof
dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the territorial integrity
and national security of our country. In fact, Foreign Secretary Domingo
Siazon publicly denounced the Order of dismissal issued by Judge Ubiadas
asevidencedofanarticlewhichappearedintheJuly13,

_______________

15Paduav.Molina,346SCRA592,599(2000).

16VideDayawonv.Badilla,339SCRA702,707(2000).

17 Philippine Geriatrics Foundation, Inc. v. Layosa, 364 SCRA 287, 292 (2001). Vide
Dionisio v. Escao, 302 SCRA 411, 422 (1999) Santos v. Orlino, 296 SCRA 101, 106
(1998).
18Daracanv.Natividad,341SCRA161,175(2000),Santosv.Orlino,supraHeirsofthe

LateNasserD.Yasinv.Felix,250SCRA545(1995).
19PhilippineGeriatricsFoundation,Inc.v.Layosa,supra.

279

VOL.429,MAY27,2004 279
Florestavs.Ubiadas

1997 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer. Copy of said article is hereto
attachedasAnnexAandmadeintegralparthereof.
There is no truth that they told Judge Ubiadas that they are no longer
interestedinthesettingasideofhisOrderofdismissal.Infact,theMotion
for Reconsideration of the said Order of dismissal was already filed in his
Court and he even issued an Order dated 18 July 1997 submitting the said
Motion for resolution. Copy of said Order dated 18 July 1997 is hereto
attachedasAnnexBandmadeintegralparthereof.SincethesaidMotion
forReconsiderationofhisOrderofdismissalwasalreadyconsideredbyhim
as submitted for resolution as of 18 July 1997,
20
Judge Ubiadas should have
resolvedonewayortheother,thesaidmotion. (Italicssupplied)

Whether the accused in Crim. Case No. 21297 were already

released at the time of the filing of the motion for reconsideration
didnotrelieverespondentfromresolvingitasinfactheevenissued
anorderstatingthatitwassubmittedforresolution.
ArticleVIII,Section15(1)ofthe1987ConstitutionandCanon3,
Rule3.05oftheCodeofJudicialConductdirectjudgestodispose
of their cases promptly and within the prescribed
21
periods, failing
whichtheyareliableforgrossinefficiency.
To thus ensure that the mandates on the prompt disposition of
judicialbusinessarecompliedwith,thisCourtlaiddownguidelines
22
in SC Administrative Circular No. 13 which provides, inter alia,
that:

Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII,

Section 15, of the Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all
casesormatterssubmittedintheircourts.Thus,allcasesormattersmustbe
decided or resolved within twelve months from date of submission by all
lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a period of
threemonthstodoso.(Italicssupplied)

_______________

20Recordatpp.7475.

21Heirs of Crisostomo Sucaldito v. Cruz,336 SCRA 469, 474 (2000) Re: Judge

DaniloM.Tenerife,255SCRA184 (1996) Cabahug v. Dacanay,A.M. No. MTJ03

1480,September10,2003,410SCRA413.
22 SC Circular No. 1387, Guidelines in the Administration of Justice (July 1,

1987).

280

280 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Florestavs.Ubiadas
23
ThisinjunctionisreiteratedinSCAdministrativeCircularNo.399
which requires all judges to scrupulously observe the periods
prescribedintheConstitutionfordecidingcases,failuretoobserve
whichisaseriousviolationoftheconstitutionalrightoftheparties
24
tospeedydispositionoftheircases.
Having failed to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration,
respondentisliableforunduedelayinrenderingadecisionororder
which is a less serious charge under Section 9 of Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court and which carries the penalty of suspension from
officewithoutsalaryandotherbenefitsfornotlessthanone(1)nor
morethanthree(3)monthsorafineofmorethanP10,000butnot
exceedingP20,000.

II.OnthegrantofbailtotheaccusedinCrim.CaseNo.27199
Whetherbailisamatterofrightordiscretion,andevenifnocharge
has yet been filed in court against a respondentsuspectdetainee,
reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to25 the
prosecutor, or at least his
26
recommendation must be sought. So
Fortunav.PenacoSitaca instructs:

[A]dmissiontobailasamatterofdiscretionpresupposestheexercisethereof
in accordance with law and guided by the applicable legal principles. The
prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence
becausebytheverynatureofdecidingapplicationsforbail,itisonthebasis
of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against in determining
whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In other words, discretionmust
be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due
process, that is, after the evaluation of the evidence submitted by the
prosecution. Any order issued in the absence thereof is not a product of
soundjudicialdiscretionbutofwhimand
_______________

23SCAdministrativeCircularNo.399,StrictObservanceofSessionHoursofTrialCourts

andEffectiveManagementofCasestoEnsureTheirSpeedyDisposition,(January15,1999).
24Re:JudgeFernandoP.Agdamag,254SCRA644,650(1996).

25Caedav.Alaan,374SCRA225,229(2002)Comiav.Antona,337SCRA656(2000)

Chinv.Gustillo,247SCRA175(1995).VideRule114,sec.18ofthe1985RulesofCriminal
Procedure,reiteratedinRule114,sec.18ofthe2000RulesofCriminalProcedure.
26Fortunav.PenacoSitaca,358SCRA615(2001).

281

VOL.429,MAY27,2004 281
Florestavs.Ubiadas

caprice and
27
outright arbitrariness. (Italics in the original italics bold
supplied)

True,ahearingofthepetitionforbailwasconductedinCrim.Case
28
No.27199onJanuary4,2000at8:30a.m. Giventhefilingofthe
petitiononlythedaybefore,atclosetonoontime,itcannotbesaid
thattheprosecutionwasaffordedreasonablenoticeandopportunity
to present evidence after it received a copy of the petition minutes
before it was filed in court. It bears stressing that the prosecution
should be afforded reasonable opportunity to comment on 29
the
applicationforbailbyshowingthatevidenceofguiltisstrong.
While in Section 18 of Rule 114 on applications for bail, no
period is provided as it merely requires the court to give a
reasonablenoticeof the hearing to the prosecutor or require him
to submit his recommendation, and the general rule on the
requirement of a threeday notice for hearing of motions under
Section4ofRule15allowsacourtforgoodcausetosetthehearing
onshorternotice,thereis,inthecaseofMangohig,noshowingof
goodcausetocallforhearinghispetitionforbailonshorternotice.
Reasonable notice depends of course upon the circumstances of
each particular case, taking into account, inter alia, the offense
committedandtheimposablepenalties,andtheevidenceofguiltin
thehandsoftheprosecution.
InCrim.CaseNo.27199,Mangohigwasarrestedforviolation
30
ofSec.5(b),Art.IIIofR.A.7610, whichispunishablebyreclusion
temporal to reclusion
31
perpetua, and subsequently indicted for
statutory rape qualified by relationship which is punishable by
death.
Under the circumstances, by respondents assailed grant of bail,
the prosecution was deprived of due process for 32
which he is liable
for gross ignorance of the law or procedure which is a serious
chargeunderSec.8ofRule140oftheRulesofCourt.Thecharge
_______________

27Id.,atp.621(citationsomitted).

28Rolloatp.65.

29Gov.Bongolan,supraCaedav.Alaan,374 SCRA 225, 229 (2002) Comia v.

Antona,supra.
30Videnote4.

31VideInformation,Rolloatp.29B.

32Depamaylov.Brotarlo,265SCRA151(1996).

282

282 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Florestavs.Ubiadas

carriesthepenaltyofdismissalfromtheservicewithforfeitureof

all or part of the benefits or suspension from office without salary

andotherbenefitsformorethan3butnotexceeding6monthsora
33
fineofmorethanP20,000butnotexceedingP40,000.
This Court takes this occasion to reiterate the injunction that a
judge is called upon to balance the interests of the accused who is
entitled to the presumption of innocence until his guilt is proven
beyondreasonabledoubt,andtoenablehimtopreparehisdefense 34
withoutbeingsubjecttopunishmentpriortoconviction, againstthe
right of the State to protect the people
35
and the peace of the
communityfromdangerouselements.

III. On the failure to recognize complainants special designation

fromtheOmbudsmaninCrim.CaseNo.63499
ThebrushingasidebytheOCAofrespondentsexplanationonthe
matteriswelltaken.
Intheexerciseofhispowertoinvestigateandprosecuteonits
own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act 36
or
omissionappearstobeillegal,unjust,improperorinefficient, the
Ombudsman is authorized to call 37on prosecutors or lawyers in the
government service for assistance. Section 31 of the Ombudsman
Actof1989provides:

DesignationofInvestigatorsandProsecutorsTheOmbudsmanmayutilize
the personnel of his office and/or designate or deputize any fiscal, state
prosecutororlawyerinthegovernmentservicetoactasspecialinvestigator
or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases.
Those designated or deputized to assist him as herein provided shall be
underhissupervisionandcontrol.

ItisonthebasisoftheabovequotedprovisionoflawthatDeputy
OmbudsmanforLuzonJesusGuerreroendorsedCaseNo.
_______________

33 Vide Panganiban v. CupinTesorero, 388 SCRA 44 (2002) Depamaylo v.

Brotarlo,supra.
34Cortesv.Catral,279SCRA1,11(1997).

35Gov.Bongolan,311SCRA99,110(1999).

36Rep.ActNo.6770,otherwiseknownasOMBUDSMANACTOF1989,(1990),

sec.15,par.1.
37Lastimosav.Vasquez,243SCRA497,505(1995).

283

VOL.429,MAY27,2004 283
Florestavs.Ubiadas

OMB1982418 (Chan v. EsmaneDiaz) to complainant with 38

the
instruction to file the Information and to prosecute the case. The
indorsement included an order to submit a monthly report to the
Office of the Ombudsman of any actions taken in relation to the
case. 39
RespondentsDecember17,1999Order whichstates,interalia,
asfollows:

The OfficerinCharge of the City Prosecutors Office is hereby directed to

designateanyoftheAssistantProsecutorsoftheCityProsecutorsOfficeto
take the place of Provincial Prosecutor Dorentino Z. Floresta. While
Prosecutor Floresta appears to have been deputized by the Office of the
Ombudsman to prosecute this case, no special reason was given for such
authority.Instead,itappearsthatsuchdesignationwasmerelybasedonthe
premise that the offense charged was committed in Subic municipality as
erroneouslyindicatedintheoriginalInformationfiledwiththisCourt.
Inasmuch as the Information as amended, upon the initiative of
Prosecutor Floresta himself, shows that the place of the commission of the
offensechargedisinOlongapoCity,theOfficeoftheProvincialProsecutor
does not have the authority to continue prosecuting this case for the People
ofthePhilippines(Section2,Rule117,1997RulesofCriminalProcedure).
For this reason, the Office of the City Prosecutor should take his place
inasmuch as the Office of the City40Prosecutor of Olongapo has territorial
jurisdictionovertheoffensecharged. (Italicssupplied)

shows that he was not only aware of complainants designation,

hence, belying his explanation that he must have overlooked the
same.Italsoshowshisignoranceoftheabovecitedprovisionofthe
Ombudsman Act which does not require the presence of a special
reasonforthedesignationordeputizationbytheOmbudsmanofany
prosecutororgovernmentlawyertoassisthim.
It would appear though from respondents abovequoted
December 17, 1999 Order that he was of the belief that it was the
City Prosecutor, rather than the Provincial Prosecutor, who had
territorialjurisdictionovertheoffense.Itisinthislightthatheis
given the benefit of the doubt, absent any showing that he was
motivatedbymaliceorbadfaith.

_______________

38Rolloatp.61.

39Id.,atpp.5960.

40Id.,atp.59.

284

284 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Florestavs.Ubiadas

With respect to the charges raised against respondent in

complainants April 1, 2003 Manifestation, by which complainant
submittedanunsignedandundatedcomplaintbyacertainDr.Reino
Rosete and copies of respondents other assailed decisions: While
Section1ofRule140oftheRulesofCourt,asamended,allowsthe
institution of administrative proceedings upon an anonymous
complaint,theveracityofRosetescomplaintisdoubtfulasitdoes
notbearhissignature.Itisclearlynotintendedtobeananonymous
complaint.
Finally,ontherestofthechargesagainstrespondent,thisCourt
is unable to pass upon them as complainant merely submitted
photocopies of respondents assailed orders without stating clearly
andconciselytheallegedactsandomissionsconstitutingviolations
of standards of conduct prescribed for judges by law, the Rules of
CourtortheCodeofJudicialConduct.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas,
Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 72, Olongapo City, is found
GUILTY of undue delay in resolving a motion and of gross
ignoranceofthelaworprocedureingrantinganapplicationforbail
without affording the prosecution due process. He is accordingly
FINED in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P20,000.00),withWARNINGthatrepetitionofthesameorsimilar
actsshallbedealtwithmoreseverely.
SOORDERED.

Vitug (Chairman), SandovalGutierrez and Corona, JJ.,

concur.

RespondentmetedaP20,000fineforunduedelayinresolvinga
motionandgrossignoranceofthelaworprocedure,withwarning
againstrepetitionofsimilaracts.
 Notes.A judge who acts on a motion to lift the warrant of
arrestwithoutduenoticetotheprosecutionandproceedstoliftthe
warrant of arrest, releasing the accused from custody, deliberately
throws overboard the laws and rules on preliminary investigation,
thereby making himself liable for misconduct or grave abuse of
authority or dereliction of duty. (Sandoval vs. Manalo, 260 SCRA
611[1996])
Failure to decide cases within the reglementary period, without
strongandjustifiablereason,constitutesgrossinefficiencywar

285

VOL.429,MAY27,2004 285
Bernardovs.CourtofAppeals

ranting the imposition of administrative sanction on the defaulting

judge. (Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in Branch 34,
RegionalTrialCourt,IrigaCity,324SCRA397[2000])

o0o

Copyright2017CentralBookSupply,Inc.Allrightsreserved.