Doctrine: The purpose of the constitutional provisions against unlawful This is a petition asking asking for the annulment

nulment of the order issued by

searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in
person and property and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home,
by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to
give remedy against such usurpations when attempted. But it does not
prohibit the Federal Government (now the Philippine Government) from
taking advantage of unlawful searches made by a private person or
under authority of state law.
respondent judges to return to him the document presented by the
prosecution alleging that even the seizure of documents by means of a
search warrant legally issued, constitutes a violation of the rights
guaranteed in the Constitution, and, consequently, when their seizure
cannot be justified by the corresponding search warrant. The Court
upheld the legality of the seizure and the validity of the documents as
evidence.

Alvero vs. Dizon Facts:

In 1945, while the battle for Manila was raging, soldiers of the US Army
accompanied by men of Filipino Guerillas Forces, placed peititioner
AURELIO S. ALVERO, petitioner, under arrest, having been suspected with collaboration with the enemy,
vs. and seized and took papers from his house. Petitioner was accused of
ARSENIO P. DIZON, ET AL., respondent. treason and he filed a petition demanding the return of such papers
seized and taken from his house. He also filed a petition for bail, at the
hearing of which the prosecution presented papers which were admitted
as part of its evidence but this petition was denied. At the trial of the
G.R. No. L-342 case on the merits, the prosecution again presented said papers which
were admitted also as part of its evidence. However, petitioner had
May 4, 1946 failed to object properly to these presentations and thus practically
waived his objection to their admissibility. Moreso, petitioner had failed
DE JOYA, J. to identify satisfactorily the documents now in question and his
ownership thereof. In his petition for reconsideration, he himself also
admitted the legality of the seizure and at the hearing on his petition for
bail, he himself called for some of the documents in question.
Nature of the case:

Petition for certiorari

Issue:
Whether the seized documents are legal and thus could be admitted as
evidence.

Brief: Held:
Yes, the seizure was legal.
Ratio:
The right of the officer and men of the US Army to arrest the petitioner
as a collaborationist suspect, and to seize his personal papers without
any search warrant, in the zone of military operations, is unquestionable
PEOPLE v. MARTI
(Regulations relative to the Laws and Customs of War on Land of the
January 18,1991 | Bidin, J. | Appeal from RTC decision |
Hague Conventions of 1907).
Constitutional Prohibitions: State Action Requirement
The purpose of the constitutional provisions against unlawful searches
and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and
SUMMARY: Marti was going to ship marijuana to Switzerland. Job
property and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home, by officers
Reyes, proprietor of the packing and exporting shop, inspected the
of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to give
packages and discovered the drugs, and summoned the NBI. Marti was
remedy against such usurpations when attempted. But it does not
charged with violation of the Anti-Dangerous Drugs Act. He contended
prohibit the Federal Government from taking advantage of unlawful
that the evidence was obtained in violation of the prohibition against
searches made by a private person or under authority of state law. As
illegal search and seizure. The SC held that the constitutional
the soldiers of the US Army, that took and seized certain papers and
prohibition did not apply.
documents from the residence of petitioner, were not acting as agents
or on behalf of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines;
DOCTRINE: An act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of
and that those papers and documents came in the possession of the
appellants constitutional rights, cannot be invoked against the
authorities of the Commonwealth Government, through the Office of the
State in the absence of governmental interference. The immunity
CIC of the US Army in Manila, the use and presentation of said papers
against unreasonable search and seizure is a restraint upon the
and documents, as evidence for the prosecution against petitioner, at
government, not on private citizens.
the trial of his case for treason, cannot be legally attacked on the ground
of unlawful or unreasonable searches and seizures, or on any other
FACTS:
constitutional ground.
1.On 14 Aug 1987 Andre Marti and his common-law wife went to the
Manila Packing and Export Forwarders in the Pistang Pilipino
Complex, carrying four gift-wrapped packages. Marti informed the
Supreme Court Ruling: proprietress, Anita Reyes, that he was sending the packages to a
friend in Zurich, and he filled the contract necessary for the
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the petition for certiorari with transaction, writing his name, passport number, date of shipment,
injunction, filed in this case, is absolutely without merit, and it is, consignees name Walter Fierz, and consignees address.
therefore, hereby denied and dismissed with costs. So ordered.
2.Anita asked to inspect the packages. Marti refused, assuring that
they contained books, cigars and gloves; so Anita no longer
insisted on inspecting the packages, which were sealed in a box for
shipment.

3. Before delivery to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of

Posts, Anitas husband, Job Reyes, following standard operating
procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. A strange odor
was emitted. He squeezed a
bundle supposedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside.
Opening one, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from one of
the gloves. He made an opening on a wrapper and took several grams
of the contents, and reported the shipment to the NBI, requesting a lab
exam of the samples.
4.Job, three NBI agents and a photographer went to Reyes
office. Job brought out the box and in the agents presence
opened it, removed the Styrofoam and took out the cellophane
wrappers from the gloves, which were revealed to contain dried
marijuana leaves. The package allegedly containing books was also
opened and found to contain bricks of dried marijuana-leaves, and
the package containing cigars had dried marijuana leaves
underneath the cigars. The agents made an inventory and took charge
of the box and its contents after signing a receipt. Information
was filed against Marti for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
5.Marti contended, among others, that the evidence was obtained in
violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search
and seizure and privacy of communication, and hence should be
inadmissible.
ISSUE/S: WoN the evidence was illegally obtained and inadmissible -NO
RULING: Judgment affirmed.
RATIO:
1. Evidence obtained through defective search and seizure is
inadmissible. In cases where the Court strictly adhered to the
exclusionary rule, evidence was procured by the State acting
through its law enforcers or authorized government agencies. Here,
the evidence was discovered and obtained by a person acting privately
and without State intervention and participation.
2.The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual
and the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals. What it
does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere
inaccessible to any
power holder. An act of a private individual, allegedly in violation
of appellants constitutional rights, cannot be invoked against the
State in the absence of governmental interference. The
constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure refers
to the immunity of ones person, whether citizen or alien, from
interference by government. Burdeau v McDowell held that the
Fourth Amendment, which our constitutional guarantee against
search and seizure was based on, was intended as a restraint upon
the activities of sovereign authority, and was notintended to be a
limitation upon other than governmental authorities. The same was
reiterated in several other cases.
3.In the instant case, Job Reyes was the one who made the
search and inspection, which was reasonable and SOP as a
precautionary measure before delivery to the Bureau of Customs or
Bureau of Posts. It was he who opened the box, took the samples to the
NBI, summoned them to his place of business, opened the rest of the
shipment, and entrusted the same to the agents care and custody.
Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an
illegal one. Their mere presence did not controvert the search into a
warrantless search and seizure, as mere observation of that which
is in plain sight is not a search. Where the contraband articles are
identified without trespass on the part of the arresting officer,
there is no constitutionally prohibited search.
4. The argument that 1987 Constitutions modified phraseology
expressly declared inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of
the prohibition against constitutional search and seizure and that
therefore it does not matter whether it was procured by authorities
or private individuals is untenable. The modifications were only to the
issuance of a search warrant or a warrant of arrest vis--vis the
judges responsibility. The restraint
stayed with the State and shifted to no one else. Such argument would
result in serious legal complications and absurd interpretations.
Doctrine:
"(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." (Art. III, Sec. 1, Constitution.)
"SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall
not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
"No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.

"SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. The judge or justice of the

peace must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine on oath or
affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and
take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in
addition to any affidavits presented to him." (Rule 126, Revised Rules of
Court.)
Bache vs. Ruiz

BACHE & CO.INC. and FREDERICK SEGGERMAN, Petitioners, v.

HON. JUDGE VIVENCIO M. RUIZ, et.al, Respondents

G.R. No. L-32409

February 27, 1971

Villamor, J.

Nature of the case:

An action for certiorari prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for a writ
of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction

Brief:

Petitioner and its President pray this Court to declare null and void a
search warrant issued by respondent Judge on to order respondents to
desist from enforcing the same and/or keeping the documents, papers
and effects seized by virtue thereof, as well as from enforcing the tax
assessments on petitioner corporation alleged by petitioners to have
been made on the basis of the said documents, papers and effects, and
to order the return of the latter to petitioners. The Court gave due
course to the petition but did not issue the writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for therein.
Facts:
Respondent Vera, CIR Commissioner, wrote a letter addressed to
respondent Judge Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant
against petitioners for violation of Section 46(a) of the National Internal
Revenue Code, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof,
particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue
Examiner Rodolfo de Leon, one of herein respondents, to make and file
the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter.
In the the following day, respondent De Leon and his witness,
respondent Arturo Logronio, went to CFI Rizal. They brought with them
the following papers: respondent Veras aforesaid letter-request; an
application for search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by
respondent De Leon; an affidavit of respondent Logronio subscribed
before respondent De Leon; a deposition in printed form of respondent
Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but not yet
subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished but still
unsigned by respondent Judge.
At that time respondent Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means
of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions
of respondents De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned,
respondent Judge was informed that the depositions had already been
taken. The stenographer, upon request of respondent Judge, read to him
her stenographic notes; and thereafter, respondent Judge asked
respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his
deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be
charged for perjury. Respondent Judge signed respondent de Leons
application for search warrant and respondent Logronios deposition,
Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was then sign by respondent Judge and
accordingly issued.
Three days later, which was a Saturday, the BIR agents served the
search warrant petitioners at the offices of petitioner corporation on
Ayala Ave., Makati, Rizal. Petitioners lawyers protested the search on
the ground that no formal complaint or transcript of testimony was
attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with their
search which yielded six boxes of documents.
On March 3, 1970, petitioners filed a petition with the CFI Rizal praying
that the search warrant be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory writs of injunction be issued, that
the search warrant be declared null and void, and that the respondents
be ordered to pay petitioners, jointly and severally, damages and
attorneys fees. The respondents, thru the Solicitor General, filed an
answer to the petition. After hearing, the court, presided over by
respondent Judge, issued an order dismissing the petition for dissolution
of the search warrant. In the meantime, the Bureau of Internal Revenue
made tax assessments on petitioner corporation in the total sum of
P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on the documents thus
seized. Petitioners came to this Court.
Issues:
1. Whether respondent Judge has failed to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses
2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.
3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be
seized.
Held:
1. Yes, no personal examination at all was conducted by respondent
Judge of the complainant (respondent De Leon) and his witness
(respondent Logronio).
2. Yes, the search warrant in question was issued for at least four
distinct offenses under the Tax Code:
Sec. 46(a), Sec. 72 and Sec. 73 (the filing of income tax returns)
Sec. 53 (withholding of income taxes at source)
Sec. 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or occupation
Sec. 209 (failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business or
gross value of output actually removed or to pay the tax due
thereon)
3. Yes, the search warrant does not particularly describe the things to
be seized.
Ratio:
1. The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to
the issuance of Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening
to the stenographers readings of her notes, to a few words of warning
against the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to the
complainant and his witness. This cannot be consider a personal
examination. If there was an examination at all of the complainant and
his witness, it was the one conducted by the Deputy Clerk of Court. But,
as stated, the Constitution and the rules require a personal examination
by the judge.
2. "Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection
with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to
amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that a search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense. Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added
thereto a paragraph, directing that no search warrant shall issue for
more than one specific offense."
3. A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be
seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances
will ordinarily allow, or when the description expresses a conclusion of
fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in
making the search and seizure; or when the things described are limited
to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is
being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). The herein
search warrant does not conform to any of the foregoing tests. The
description contained in the herein disputed warrant should have
mentioned, at least, the dates, amounts, persons, and other pertinent
data regarding the receipts of payments, certificates of stocks and
securities, among others, enumerated in the warrant.
Supreme Court Ruling:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is granted. Accordingly, Search
Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by respondent Judge is declared null and
void; respondents are permanently enjoined from enforcing the said
search warrant; the documents, papers and effects seized thereunder
are ordered to be returned to petitioners; and respondent officials the
Bureau of Internal Revenue and their representatives are permanently
enjoined from enforcing the assessments mentioned in Annex "G" of the
present petition, as well as other assessments based on the documents,
papers and effects seized under the search warrant herein nullified, and
from using the same against petitioners in any criminal or other
proceeding. No pronouncement as to costs.
STONEHILL v. DIOKNO
June 19, 1967 | Concepcion, C.J. | Certiorari, Prohibition |
Protected Interests in Liberty: Unlawful Search and Seizure
SUMMARY: Petitioners contested search and seizure of their
corporations offices and their personal residence based on certain
warrants. Warrants were found null and void due to general nature and
lack of probable cause, and the searches and seizures made pursuant to
the same illegal.
DOCTRINE: The right of the people to be secure in their
persons,houses,papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures...shall be inviolable, and no warrants shall
issue except upon probable cause to be examined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized
FACTS:
1. Respondent-judge issued 42 warrants to respondent
prosecutors against petitioners and/or their corporations for the
search of their persons and premises and the seizure of certain
personal properties, Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts,
balance sheets and related profit and loss statements, which were
effected upon the petitioners offices and residences.
2.Petitioners alleged that the warrants are null and void and
unconstitutional and contrary to the RoC because: (1) they do not
particularly describe the things to be seized; (2) cash, not mentioned in
the warrants, was seized; (3) they were fishing for evidencein
deportation cases filed against petitioners; (4) the searches and
seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the items seized
were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be
disposed of according to law.
3.Respondent-prosecutors alleged: (1) the warrants are valid and
issued in accordance with law; (2) any defects were cured by
petitioners consent; and (3) the effects seized are admissible
evidence against petitioners regardless of illegality of the searches and
seizures.
ISSUES:
1.WoN petitioners have cause of action to assail the legality of exclusionary rule which prevents the admission of evidence obtained
the warrants and seizures PARTIALLY. through illegal search and seizure is essential to the right to privacy;
2.WoN the warrants violated the Constitution and the RoC-YES. without it, the right against illegal search and seizure would be of no
3.WoN the evidence seized pursuant to the warrants was admissible NO value. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality withhold its
privilege and enjoyment. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter
RULING: Moncado doctrine abandoned. Warrants for residences null to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only
and void; searches and seizures therein illegal; writ of preliminary effectively available wayby removing the incentive to disregard it. The
injunction made permanent; writs prayed for granted insofar as effects constitutional guaranty must not remain an empty promise, to be
seized in the residences. revocable at the whim of any police officer. If the applicant for a search
warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause, there is no
RATIO: reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirement of the
1.The things seized under the warrants are split into two groups: a. fundamental law.
Those found and seized in corporate offices Petitioners have no cause
of action to assail the warrants and seizures since corporations have
separate and distinct personalities from the petitioners
personalities. A seizures legality can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired thereby, and the right to object is
purely personal. b. Those found and seized in the petitioners
residences Petitioners have cause of action since it affects their
constitutional rights as their property was seized and the privacy of their
homes disturbed.

2. It is required that warrants (1) are issued only upon probable cause;
and (2) particularly describe the things to be seized. The contested
warrants did not comply with these. They were issued upon applications
stating the cause as a violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and
CustomsLaws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.
No specific offense was alleged, thus no probable cause could have
been found. They also authorized the search and seizure of records
pertaining to all business transactions of
petitioners, whether legal or illegal, and thus were general in nature.

3. The Moncado doctrine, relied on by respondents, that the effects

unlawfully seized may still be admitted as evidence should be
abandoned. The doctrine evolved from the American common law rule
that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely because the
constable has blundered. The theory was that there were means other
than the exclusion of evidence for protecting the prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures, such as an action for damages
against the officers who participated in the illegal search (officer who
procured the warrant, executed the illegal search).

4.However, most jurisdictions have given up this approach, realizing that

the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction. The

Doctrine:
Property may be searched even if its occupants are not reasonably
suspected of a crime.
Zurcher vs. Stanford Daily
Us Case
May 31, 1978
Facts:
A special edition of the Stanford Daily, a student newspaper published at
Stanford University, carried articles and photographs devoted to the
hospital protest and the violent clash between demonstrators and
police. The photographs carried the byline of a Daily staff member and
indicated that he had been at the east end of the hospital hallway where
he could have photographed the assault on the nine officers. The next
day, the Santa Clara County District Attorney's Office secured a warrant
from the Municipal Court for an immediate search of the Daily's offices
for negatives, film, and pictures showing the events and occurrences at
the hospital on the evening of said clash. The warrant issued on a
finding of "just, probable and reasonable cause for believing that:
Negatives and photographs and films, evidence material and relevant to
the identity of the perpetrators of felonies, to wit, Battery on a Peace
Officer, and Assault with Deadly Weapon, will be located [on the
premises of the Daily]." The warrant affidavit contained no allegation or
indication that members of the Daily staff were in any way involved in
unlawful acts at the hospital.
The search pursuant to the warrant was conducted later that day by four
police officers and took place in the presence of some members of the
Daily staff. The Daily's photographic laboratories, filing cabinets, desks,
and wastepaper baskets were searched. Locked drawers and rooms
were not opened. The officers apparently had opportunity to read notes
and correspondence during the search; but, contrary to claims of the
staff, the officers denied that they had exceeded the limits of the
warrant. They had not been advised by the staff that the areas they
were searching contained confidential materials. The search revealed
only the photographs that had already been published and no materials
were removed from the Daily's office.
A month later the Daily and various members of its staff, respondents
here, brought a civil action in the US District Court for the Northern
District of California seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under 42
U.S.C. 1983 against the police officers who conducted the search, the
chief of police, the district attorney and one of his deputies, and the
judge who had issued the warrant. The complaint alleged that the
search of the Daily's office had deprived respondents under color of
state law of rights secured to them by the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution.
The District Court denied the request for an injunction but, on
respondents' motion for summary judgment, granted declaratory relief.
353 F. Supp. 124 (1972). The court did not question the existence of
probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed and to
believe that relevant evidence would be found on the Daily's premises. It
held, however, that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments forbade the
issuance of a warrant to search for materials in possession of one not
suspected of crime unless there is probable cause to believe, based on
facts presented in a sworn affidavit, that a subpoena duces tecum would
be impracticable. Moreover, the failure to honor a subpoena would not
alone justify a warrant; it must also appear that the possessor of the
objects sought would disregard a court order not to remove or destroy
them. The District Court further held that where the innocent object of
the search is a newspaper, First Amendment interests are also involved
and that such a search is constitutionally permissible "only in the rare
circumstance where there is a clear showing that (1) important materials
will be destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction; and (2) a restraining
order would be futile." Id., at 135. Since these preconditions to a valid
warrant had not been satisfied here, [436 U.S. 547, 553] the search of
the Daily's offices was declared to have been illegal. The Court of
Appeals affirmed per curiam, adopting the opinion of the District Court.
Issue:
Is a state prevented by the Fourt and Fourteenth Amendments from
issuing a warrant to search for evidence because the owner or possessor
of the premises to be searched is not reasonably suspected of criminal
conduct?
Held:
No, property may be searched even if its occupants are not reasonably
suspected of a crime.

Ratio:
The crucial element in a reasonable search is not that the property
owner is suspected of crime but there is reasonable cause to believe
that the items to be searched for are located on the property to which
entry is sought. So, in this case, the search is allowed.

The District Court's new rule denying search warrants against third
parties and insisting on subpoenas would undermine law enforcement
efforts since search warrants are often used early in an investigation
before all the perpetrators of a crime have been identified; and the
seemingly blameless third party may be implicated. The delay in
employing a subpoena duces tecum could easily result in disappearance
of the evidence. Nor would the cause of privacy be served since search
warrants are more difficult to obtain than subpoenas.

Supreme Court Ruling:

We accordingly reject the reasons given by the District Court and
adopted by the Court of Appeals for holding the search for photographs
at the Stanford Daily to have been [436 U.S. 547, 568] unreasonable
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and in violation of the First
Amendment. Nor has anything else presented here persuaded us that
the Amendments forbade this search. It follows that the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed.
So ordered.
 Petition for certiorari

Facts:

In early 1992, the Attorney General of the United States approved

Operation Gunsmoke, a special national fugitive apprehension
program in which United States Marshals worked with state and local
police to apprehend dangerous criminals. One of the dangerous fugitives
identified was Dominic Wilson, one who violated his probation on
previous felony charges of robbery, theft, and assault, and the son of
petitioners Charles and Geraldine Wilson.
Upon determination of the police officers of Wilsons parents address in
Doctrine: Rockville, Maryland, three warrants of arrests were issued for each of his
charges as enumerated above.
Presence of reporters during lawful arrest is unlawful.

In early morning of April 16, 1992, a Gunsmoke team assembled to

execute the Dominic Wilson warrants accompanied by the Marshals to
Wilson vs. Layne accompany them on their mission as part of a Marshals Service ride-
along policy.
In the effect of the warrants, the Gunsmoke team tried to restraint the
parents of Dominic Wilson in order to look for him freely in the house.
Wilson, et. Al, petitioner, The photographer even took numerous pictures. The print reporter was
also apparently in the living room observing the confrontation between
vs. the police and Charles Wilson.
Layne, Deputy US Marshall, respondent. Based on this actuations, petitioners sued the law enforcement officials
in their personal capacities for money damages. They contended that
the officers actions in bringing members of the media to observe and
record the attempted execution of the arrest warrant violated their
US Case Fourth Amendment rights.

May 24, 1999

Respondents argued that the presence of third parties could serve the
law enforcement purpose of publicizing the governments efforts to
combat crime, and facilitate accurate reporting on law enforcement
Nature of the Case: activities.
Issue:
Whether the presence of reporters during the service of warrant of
arrests were lawful.
Held:
No.
Ratio:
In the Semaynes case, it was held that the house of every one is to
him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defence against injury and
violence, as for his repose.
No one could gainsay the truth of these observations, or the importance
of the First Amendment in protecting press freedom from abridgment by
the government. But the Fourth Amendment also protects a very
important right, and in the present case it is in terms of that right that
the media ride-alongs must be judged.
The possibility of good public relations for the police is simply not
enough, standing alone, to justify the ride-along intrusion into private
home. And even the need for accurate reporting on police issues in
general bears no direct relation to the constitutional justification for the
police intrusion into a home order to execute a felony arrest warrants.
They were not present for protecting the officers, much less the Wilsons.
A private photographer was acting for private purposes, as evidenced in
part by the fact that the newspaper and not the police retained the
photographs. Thus, although the presence of third parties during the
execution of warrant may in some circumstances be constitutionally
permissible, the presence of these third parties was not.
Supreme Court Ruling:
We hold that it is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for police to bring
members of the media or other third parties into a home during the
execution of a warrant when the presence of the third parties in the
home was not in aid of the execution of the warrant.
Doctrine: No search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized
Burgos vs. Chief of Staf
JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO AND J.
BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES, INC.,petitioners,
VS.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE
CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER,
PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE
GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. NO. L-64261
DECEMBER 26, 1984
Facts : On December 7, 1982 two search warrants were issued by
respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of
First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the premises known as
No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were
searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia,
motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and
distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the
possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of
the "We Forum" newspaper which have been allegedly used, and are
being used as instruments and means of committing the crime of
subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended, were seized. The
search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of
Col. Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom. The
application was accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M.
Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, members of the Metrocom Intelligence
and Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a surveillance
of the premises prior to the filing of the application for the search
warrants.
The petitioner herein then assailed the validity of the search
warrants contending that the abovementioned documents could have
not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of probable cause upon
which a warrant may be validly issued in accordance with Section 3,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution .
Issue : Whether or not the search warrant was validly issued upon
probable cause.
Ruling : We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And
when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper
publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive
materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting
affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the
alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish.
Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col.
Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his
control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications
and other documents which were used and are all continuously being
used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable
under Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." is a mere conclusion of
law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of
such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable
cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search
warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so.
Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is
the statement contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez
and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered and collated by our unit
clearly shows that the premises above- mentioned and the articles and
things above-described were used and are continuously being used for
subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of,
illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for
Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement."
Another factor which makes the search warrants under
consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature
of general warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to
be seized in this wise:
1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment,
typewriters, cabinets, tables, communications/recording equipment,
tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the
printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents
communication, letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE
FORUM" newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other
publication to promote the objectives and piurposes of the subversive
organization known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire
Movement and April 6 Movement; and,
3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM"
and other subversive materials and propaganda.
The description of the articles sought to be seized under the
search warrants in question cannot be characterized differently. In view
of the foregoing, the search warrants issued by respondent judge on
December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly
set aside.
Chandler vs. Miler [520 US 305, 15 April 1997] Ginsburg (J): 6
concur, 1 filed separate dissenting opinion.
Facts: The Libertarian Party nominated Walker L. Chandler for the office
of Lieutenant Governor, Sharon T. Harris for the office of Commissioner
of Agriculture, and James D. Walker for the office of member of the
General Assembly. In May 1994, about one month before the deadline
for submission of the certificates required by 21-2-140, Chandler,
Harris, and Walker filed an action in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia. They asserted, inter alia, that the drug
tests required by 21-2-140 violated their rights under the First, Fourth,
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, naming
Governor Zell D. Miller and two other state officials involved in the
administration of 21-2-140, as defendants. Chandler, et .al. requested
declaratory and injunctive relief barring enforcement of the statute. In
June 1994, the District Court denied Chandlers' motion for a preliminary
injunction. The provision in the statute of the State of Georgia required functions, including antidrug law enforcement efforts; and undermines
candidates for designated state offices to certify that they have taken a public confidence and trust in elected officials) are real and not simply
drug test and that the test result was negative. Chandler, et. al. hypothetical for Georgia's polity. Further, Georgia's certification
apparently submitted to the drug tests, obtained the certificates requirement is not well designed to identify candidates who violate
required by 21-2-140, and appeared on the ballot. After the 1994 antidrug laws; nor is the scheme a credible means to deter illicit drug
election, the parties jointly moved for the entry of final judgment on users from seeking election to state office. What is left, after close
stipulated facts. In January 1995, the District Court entered final review of Georgia's scheme, is the image the State seeks to project. By
judgment for Miller, et. al. A divided Eleventh Circuit panel, relying on requiring candidates for public office to submit to drug testing, Georgia
the US Court's precedents sustaining drug testing programs for student displays its commitment to the struggle against drug abuse. The need
athletes, customs employees, and railway employees, the United States revealed, in short, is symbolic, not "special," as that term draws
affirmed and judged the Georgia's law to be constitutional. meaning from our case law. Thus, however well meant, the candidate
drug test Georgia has devised diminishes personal privacy for a
Issue: Whether the suspicionless searches, required in Georgias drug symbol's sake. The Fourth Amendment shields society against that state
testing for candidates for public offices, is reasonable. action. In fine, where the risk to public safety is substantial and real,
blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as
Held: Georgia's drug testing requirement, imposed by law and enforced "reasonable." But where, as herein, public safety is not genuinely in
by state officials, effects a search within the meaning of the Fourth and jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment precludes the suspicionless search, no
Fourteenth Amendments. (Collection and testing of urine to meet matter how conveniently arranged.
Georgia's certification statute "constitutes a search subject to the
demands of the Fourth Amendment"). As explained in Skinner,
government ordered "collection and testing of urine intrudes upon
expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable."
(Skinner and Von Raab, 489 U.S., at 617). To be reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, a search ordinarily must be based on individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing. But particularized exceptions to the main rule
are sometimes warranted based on "special needs, beyond the normal
need for law enforcement." When such "special needs"--concerns other
than crime detection--are alleged in justification of a Fourth Amendment
intrusion, courts must undertake a context specific inquiry, examining
closely the competing private and public interests advanced by the
parties. In limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated
by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental
interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a
requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable
despite the absence of such suspicion. Our precedents establish that the
proffered special need for drug testing must be substantial--important
enough to override the individual's acknowledged privacy interest,
sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal
requirement of individualized suspicion. Miller, et. al.'s defense of the DOCTRINE:
Section 2, Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution:
statute rests primarily on the incompatibility of unlawful drug use with
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
holding high state office; but notably lacking therein is any indication of against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
a concrete danger demanding departure from the Fourth Amendment's purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
main rule, and nothing in the record hints that the hazards Miller, et. al., issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
broadly describe (i.e. the use of illegal drugs draws into question an after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
official's judgment and integrity; jeopardizes the discharge of public
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 128222
June 17, 1999
Ponente: DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
NATURE OF CASE:
An automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659.
BRIEF
This is a prayer for acquittal and the reversal of the judgment e Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 66, finding the accused guilty of
transporting, without appropriate legal authority, the regulated substance
methamphetamine hydrochloride, in violation of Section 15, 1 Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as
further amended by R.A. No. 7659, 2 and sentencing him to "die by lethal
injection."
FACTS
In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband,
Jim Lagasca Cid, as Chief of Police of the Bacnotan Police Station, of La Union
began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While monitoring the
coastal area of Barangay Bulala on 29 March 1995, he intercepted a radio call at
around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite of Barangay
Tammocalao requesting police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the
latter had spotted, which looked different from the boats ordinarily used by
fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. Cid and 6 of
his men led by his Chief Investigator, SPO1 Reynoso Badua, proceeded forthwith
to Tammocalao beach, conferred with Almoite, and observed that the speedboat
ferried a lone male passenger. When the speedboat landed, the male passenger
alighted, and using both hands, carried what appeared a multicolored strawbag,
and walked towards the road. By this time, Almoite, Cid and Badua, the latter
two conspicuous in their uniform and issued side-arms, became suspicious of the
man as he suddenly changed direction and broke into a run upon seeing the
approaching officers. Badua, prevented the man from fleeing by holding on to
his right arm.
Although Cid introduced themselves as police officers, the man appeared
impassive. Speaking in English, then in Tagalog, and later in Ilocano, Cid then
requested the man to open his bag, but he seemed not to understand. Cid then
resorted to "sign language," motioning with his hands for the man to open the
bag. The man apparently understood and acceded to the request. A search of
the bag yielded several transparent plastic packets containing yellowish
crystalline substances. As Cid wished to proceed to the police station, he
signaled the man to follow, but the latter did not comprehend. Hence, Cid placed
his arm around the shoulders of the man and escorted the latter to the police
headquarters. At the police station, Cid then "recited and informed the man of
his constitutional rights" to remain silent, to have the assistance of a counsel,
etc.
Eliciting no response from the man, Cid ordered his men to find a resident of the
area who spoke Chinese to act as an interpreter. In the meantime, Badua
opened the bag and counted 29 plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline
substances. The interpreter, Mr. Go Ping Guan, finally arrived, through whom the
man was "apprised of his constitutional rights." When the policemen asked the
man several questions, he retreated to his obstinate reticence and merely
showed his ID with the name Chua Ho San printed thereon. Chua's bag and its
contents were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Diego Silang, Carlatan,
San Fernando, La Union for laboratory examination. In the meantime, Chua was
detained at the Bacnotan Police Station. Later, Police Chief Inspector and
Forensic Chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid (wife of Cid), conducted a
laboratory examination of 29 plastic packets, adn in her Chemistry Report D-
025-95, she stated that her qualitative examination established the contents of
the plastic packets, weighing 28.7 kilos, to be positive of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug. Chua was initially charged with illegal
possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride before the RTC (Criminal Case
4037).
However, pursuant to the recommendation of the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of San Fernando, La Union, the information was subsequently
amended to allege that Chua was in violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425
as amended by RA 7659 (illegal transport of a regulated drug). At his
arraignment on 31 July 1995, where the amended complaint was read to him by
a Fukien-speaking interpreter, Chua entered a plea of not guilty. Trial finally
ensued, with interpreters assigned to Chua (upon the RTC's direct request to the
Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in the Philippines, after its failure to acquire
one from the Department of Foreign Affairs).
Chua provided a completely different story, claiming that the bags belong to his
employer Cho Chu Rong, who he accompanied in the speedboat; that they
decided to dock when they were low on fuel and telephone battery; that the
police, with nary any spoken word but only gestures and hand movements,
escorted him to the precinct where he was handcuffed and tied to a chair; that
the police, led by an officer, arrived with the motor engine of the speedboat and
a bag, which they presented to him; that the police inspected opened the bag,
weighed the contents, then proclaimed them as methamphetamine
hydrochloride. In a decision promulgated on 10 February 1997, the RTC
convicted Chua for transporting 28.7 kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride
without legal authority to do so. Chua prays for the reversal of the RTC decision
and his acquittal before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE OF THE CASE: prohibited drug on the date in question. Chua was not identified as a drug
Whether persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to
contraband articles, Chua's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically
fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, Chuas illegal entry mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense. The search cannot
into the Philippines, Chuas suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when therefore be denominated as incidental to an arrest. To reiterate, the search was
he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which Chua can return not incidental to an arrest.
to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas,
constitute "probable cause." There was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not fall under the
exemptions allowed by the Rules of Court as already shown. From all indications,
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS the search was nothing but a fishing expedition. Casting aside the regulated
No. Enshrined in the Constitution is the inviolable right to privacy of home and substance as evidence, the same being the fruit of a poisonous tree, the
person. It explicitly ordains that people have the right to be secure in their remaining evidence on record are insufficient, feeble and ineffectual to sustain
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures Chuas conviction.
of whatever nature and for any purpose. Inseparable, and not merely corollary or
incidental to said right and equally hallowed in and by the Constitution, is the SUPREME COURT RULING:
exclusionary principle which decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of
said right is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The Constitutional
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures does not, of course,
forestall reasonable searches and seizure. This interdiction against warrantless Branch 66, San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 4037 is hereby
searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN
and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence. is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged, the evidence not being sufficient to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests
in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of escaped
prisoners. The prosecution and the defense painted extremely divergent
versions of the incident, but the Court is certain that Chua was arrested and his
bag searched without the benefit of a warrant.
There are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of Chuas
participation in an ongoing criminal enterprise that could have spurred police
officers from conducting the obtrusive search. The RTC never took the pains of
pointing to such facts, but predicated mainly its decision on the finding that
"accused was caught red-handed carrying the bagful of shabu when
apprehended."

In short, there is no probable cause. Persistent reports of rampant smuggling of

firearm and other contraband articles, Chua's watercraft differing in appearance
from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas,
Chuas illegal entry into the Philippines, Chuas suspicious behavior, i.e. he
attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by
which Chua can return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch
towards the high seas, do not constitute "probable cause."

None of the tell-tale clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of
marijuana or other prohibited drug, 20 confidential report and/or positive
identification by informers of courier(s) of prohibited drug and/or the time and
place where they will transport/deliver the same, suspicious demeanor or
behavior and suspicious bulge in the waist accepted by the Court as sufficient
to justify a warrantless arrest exists in the case. There was no classified
information that a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing

DOCTRINE:
Section 3(2), Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution:
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures
be carried out in a reasonable fashion that is, by virtue or on the
strength of a search warrant predicated upon the existence of a
probable cause.
To sanction disrespect and disregard for the Constitution in the name of
protecting the society from lawbreakers is to make the government itself
lawless and to subvert those values upon which our ultimate freedom
and liberty depend.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NASARIO MOLINA y MANAMA @ "BOBONG" and GREGORIO MULA y
MALAGURA @ "BOBOY", accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 133917
February 19, 2001
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
NATURE OF CASE:
An automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659.
BRIEF
For automatic review is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 37,264-96, finding accused-appellants Nasario
Molina y Manamat alias "Bobong" and Gregorio Mula y Malaguraalias "Boboy,"
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8, of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and
sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of death.
FACTS
Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) detailed at Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City,
received an information regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana pusher
in Davao City. The first time he came to see the said marijuana pusher in person
was during the first week of July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his
informer when a motorcycle passed by. His informer pointed to the motorcycle
driver, Gregorio Mula y Malagura (@"Boboy"), as the pusher. As to Nasario
Molina y Manamat (@ "Bobong"), SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him
prior to 8 August 1996.
At about 7:30 a.m. of 8 August 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information
that the alleged pusher will be passing at NHA, Maa, Davao City any time that
morning. Consequently, at around 8:00 a.m. he called for assistance at the PNP,
Precinct 3, Matina, Davao City, which immediately dispatched the team of SPO4
Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon), and SPO1 Pamplona, to proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon where they would wait for the alleged pusher to pass by. At around
9:30 a.m., while the team were positioned in the house of SPO1 Paguidopon, a
"trisikad" carrying Mula and Molina passed by. At that instance, SPO1
Paguidopon pointed to Mula and Molina as the pushers.
Thereupon, the team boarded their vehicle and overtook the "trisikad." SPO1
Paguidopon was left in his house, 30 meters from where Mula and Molina were
accosted. The police officers then ordered the "trisikad" to stop. At that point,
Mula, who was holding a black bag, handed the same to Molina. Subsequently,
SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked Molina to open
the bag. Molina replied, "Boss, if possible we will settle this." SPO1 Pamplona
insisted on opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside.
Thereafter, Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the police officers.
On 6 December 1996, the accused Mula and Molina, through counsel, jointly
filed a Demurrer to Evidence, contending that the marijuana allegedly seized
from them is inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in violation of
their constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
demurrer was denied by the trial court. A motion for reconsideration was filed by
the accused, but this was likewise denied. The accused waived presentation of
evidence and opted to file a joint memorandum. On 25 April 1997, the trial court
rendered the decision, finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and
sentenced both to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. Pursuant to
Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule 122, Section 10 of the Rules of
Court, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review.
ISSUE OF THE CASE:
Whether Mula and Molina manifested outward indication that would justify their
arrest, and the seizure of prohibited drugs that were in their possession.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried
out in a reasonable fashion that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search
warrant predicated upon the existence of a probable cause. Complementary to
the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined under Article III,
Section 3, paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not without exceptions.

Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained
therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a
lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of
customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused
himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6)
stop and frisk situations (Terry search). The first exception (search incidental to a
lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an
equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede the search. Still, the law
requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made the
process cannot be reversed.

Herein, Mula and Molina manifested no outward indication that would justify
their arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, they could not be said to be
committing, attempting to commit or have committed a crime. It matters not
that Molina responded "Boss, if possible we will settle this" to the request of
SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such response which allegedly reinforced the
"suspicion" of the arresting officers that Mula and Molina were committing a
crime, is an equivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute
probable cause to effect an in flagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it not for
SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, Mula and Molina could not be the subject of any DOCTRINE:
suspicion, reasonable or otherwise. Further, it would appear that the names and
addresses of Mula and Molina came to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only The effect of the quashal of the warrant on the ground that no offense
after they were arrested, and such cannot lend a semblance of validity on the has been committed is to render the evidence obtained by virtue of the
arrest effected by the peace officers. Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of warrant "inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding," including the
Mula and Molina does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, preliminary investigation. Section 3 (2), Article 3 of the Constitution
the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the provides:
marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
against them. section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

SUPREME COURT RULING: Nevertheless, the inadmissibility of the evidence obtained through an
illegal warrant does not necessarily render the preliminary investigation
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, academic. The preliminary investigation and the filing of the information
may still proceed if, because of other (admissible) evidence, there exists
in Criminal Case No. 37, 264-96, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of
"sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
evidence to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellants been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and
Nasario Molina y Manamat alias "Bobong" and Gregorio Mula y should be held for trial.
Malagura alias "Boboy", areACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from
confinement unless they are validly detained for other offenses. No costs.
The finding by the court that no crime exists does not preclude the
authorized officer conducting the preliminary investigation from making
his own determination that a crime has been committed and that
probable cause exists for purposes of filing the information.
SOLID TRIANGLE SALES CORPORATION and ROBERT
SITCHON, petitioners,
vs.
THE SHERIFF OF RTC QC, Branch 93; SANLY CORPORATION, ERA RADIO
AND ELECTRICAL SUPPLY, LWT CO., INCORPORATED; ROD CASTRO,
VICTOR TUPAZ and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents
G.R. No. 144309
November 23, 2001
KAPUNAN, J.:
NATURE OF CASE:
An automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659.
BRIEF
The petition at bar stems from two cases, Search Warrant Case No. Q-3324 (99)
before Branch 93 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC), and Civil Case
No. Q-93-37206 for damages and injunctions before Branch 91 of the same
court.
FACTS
Both Sanly and Solid Triangle sell genuine Mitsubishi products. Solid Triangle
acquires its goods from Japan on the basis of its exclusive distributorship with
Mitsubishi Corporation. While Sanly buys its goods from Hongkong, claiming it is
a parallel importer (one which imports, distributes, and sells genuine products in
the market, independently of an exclusive distributorship or agency agreement
with the manufacturer), not an unfair competitor. On 28 January 1999, Judge
Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 93, Quezon City, upon
application of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), issued
Search Warrant 3324 (99) against Sanly Corporation (Sanly), for violation of
Section 168 of RA 8293 (unfair competition).
By virtue of Search Warrant, EIIB agents seized 451 boxes of Mitsubishi
photographic color paper from Sanly. Forthwith, Solid Triangle, through Robert
Sitchon, its Marketing and Communication Manager, filed with the Office of the
City Prosecutor, Quezon City, an affidavit complaint for unfair competition
against the members of the Board of Sanly and LWT Co., Inc. (LWT) [IS 1-99-
2870], alleging that ERA Radio and Electrical Supply (ERA), owned and operated
by LWT, is in conspiracy with Sanly in selling and/or distributing Mitsubishi brand
photo paper to the damage and prejudice of Solid Triangle, which claims to be
the sole and exclusive distributor thereof, pursuant to an agreement with the
Mitsubishi Corporation.
On 4 February 1999, Solid Triangle filed with Judge Bruselas' sala an urgent ex
parte motion for the transfer of custody of the seized Mitsubishi photo color
paper stored in the office of EIIB. On 8 February 1999, Sanly, LWT and ERA
moved to quash the search warrant which was denied by Judge Bruselas in an
order dated 5 March 1999. Sanly, LWT and ERA filed a motion for reconsideration
which was granted by Judge Bruselas on 18 March 1999, where the latter hekd
that there is doubt whether the act complained of (unfair competition) is
criminal in nature. Solid Triangle filed a motion for reconsideration contending
that the quashal of the search warrant is not proper considering the pendency of
the preliminary investigation in IS 1- 99-2870 for unfair competition wherein the
seized items will be used as evidence. On 26 March 1999, Judge Bruselas issued
an order denying Solid Triangle's motion for reconsideration. Meanwhile, on 29
March 1999, Solid Triangle filed with Branch 91 of the same Court, presided by
Judge Lita S. Tolentino-Genilo (Civil Case Q-99-37206) for damages and
injunction with prayer for writs of preliminary injunction and attachment against
Sanly, LWT and ERA. On 31 March 1999, Judge Genilo denied Solid Triangle's
application for a preliminary attachment on the ground that the application is
not supported with an affidavit by the applicant, through its authorized officer,
who personally knows the facts.
Meanwhile, on 20 April 1999, Judge Bruselas issued an order, directing the (1)
EIIB, Sitchon and Solid Triangle to divulge and report to the court the exact
location of the warehouse where the goods subject of the proceeding were kept
within 72 hours from receipt thereof; (2) Sitchon and Solid Triangle to appear
and show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court for failure to
obey a lawful order of the court at a hearing for the purpose on 12 May 1999 at
8:30 a.m.; (3) the Deputy Sheriff of the Court to take custody of the seized
goods and cause their delivery to the person from whom the goods were seized
without further loss of time. Solid Triangle filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals on 26 April 1999, and the latter issued a temporary restraining
order to prevent Judge Bruselas from implementing the Order dated 20 April
1999. On 6 July 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment initially granting
certiorari, and held that the quashing of the warrant deprived the prosecution of
vital evidence to determine probable cause. Upon motion by Sanly, etc.,
however, the Court of Appeals reversed itself.
In its "Amendatory Decision," the appellate court held that there was no
probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant, and accordingly, held
that the evidence obtained by virtue of said warrant was inadmissible in the
preliminary investigation. Hence, the petition by Solid Triangle.
ISSUE OF THE CASE:
Whether the court that issued the warrant may resolve the motions to suppress
evidence while a preliminary investigation is ongoing.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
The proceedings for the issuance/quashal of a search warrant before a court on
the one hand, and the preliminary investigation before an authorized officer on
the other, are proceedings entirely independent of each other. One is not bound
by the other's finding as regards the existence of a crime. The purpose of each
proceeding differs from the other.
The first is to determine whether a warrant should issue or be quashed, and the
second, whether an information should be filed in court. Section 14, Rule 126,
expressly provides that a motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress
evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court
where the action has been instituted. Under the same section, the court which
issued the search warrant may be prevented from resolving a motion to quash
or suppress evidence only when a criminal case is subsequently filed in another
court, in which case, the motion is to be resolved by the latter court.

It is therefore puerile to argue that the court that issued the warrant cannot
entertain motions to suppress evidence while a preliminary investigation is
ongoing. Such erroneous interpretation would place a person whose property
has been seized by virtue of an invalid warrant without a remedy while the
goods procured by virtue thereof are subject of a preliminary investigation.

Nevertheless, the evidence presented before the trial court does not prove
unfair competition under Section 168 of the Intellectual Property Code. Sanly
Corporation did not pass off the subject goods as that of another. Indeed, it
admits that the goods are genuine Mitsubishi photographic paper, which it
purchased from a supplier in Hong Kong. Assuming that the acts of Sanly, etc. to
make "it appear that they were duly authorized to sell or distribute Mitsubishi
Photo Paper in the Philippines" constitutes a crime, there is no proof to establish
such an allegation.

The court, thus, ordered Solid Triangle and EIIB to return to Sanly Corporation
the 451 boxes of Mitsubishi photographic color paper seized by virtue of Search
Warrant 3324 (99) issued by the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 93.

SUPREME COURT RULING:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED IN PART. The Amendatory Decision of the

Court of Appeals dated March 31, 2000, as well as its Resolution dated August 4,
2000, is AFFIRMED insofar as it holds that (1) the Quezon City Regional Trial
Court, Branch 93, has the power to determine the existence of a crime in
quashing a search warrant and, (2) the evidence does not support a finding that
the crime of unfair competition has been committed by respondents; and
REVERSED insofar as it holds that (1) there are no grounds to warrant the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and (2) petitioners are guilty of
contempt.
DOCTRINE:
The case is remanded for further proceedings to the courts of origin, namely,
Branch 91 of RTC, Quezon City for resolution of the application for a writ of Under the "plain view doctrine," unlawful objects within the "plain view" of an
attachment, and Branch 93 of the same court for resolution of the application to officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to
cite petitioners for contempt. seizure and may be presented in evidence. For this doctrine to apply, there must
be: (a) prior justification; (b ) inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and (c)
Petitioners are ordered to return to respondent Sanly Corporation the 451 boxes immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the police.
of Mitsubishi photographic color paper seized by virtue of Search Warrant No.
3324 (99) issued by the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 93.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 133254-55
April 19, 2001
MENDOZA, J.:
NATURE OF CASE
Appeal from the RTC Decision.
BRIEF
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96,
Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of violation
of Sec. 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him
accordingly to suffer imprisonment ranging from six (6) months of arresto
mayor,as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, and of Sec. 8 of the same law and sentencing him for
such violation to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P700, 000.00.
Charges against accused-appellant for violations of R.A. No. 6425 were filed.
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the information alleged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly possess and/or use 11.14 grams of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (Shabu) a regulated drug, without the necessary license
and/or prescription therefor, in violation of said law.
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the information charged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused not being authorized by law to possess or
use any prohibited drug, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control
1,254 grams of Marijuana, a prohibited drug.
FACTS
Facts: On 26 December 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariias, Cavite, to search the residence of
Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as
his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was
able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from Salanguit. The sale took place in
Salunguit's room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by Salunguit from a
cabinet inside his room. The application was granted, and a search warrant was
later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol. At about 10:30 p.m. of said
day, a group of about 10 policemen, along with one civilian informer, went to the
residence of Salunguit to serve the warrant.
The police operatives knocked on Salanguits door, but nobody opened it. They
heard people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then
forced the door open and entered the house. After showing the search warrant
to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started searching the
house. They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a
white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline
substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana
wrapped in newsprint having a total weight of approximately 1,255 grams. A
receipt of the items seized was prepared, but Salanguit refused to sign it. After
the search, the police operatives took Salanguit with them to Station 10, EDSA,
Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had seized. PO3 Duazo
requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated evidence. The white
crystalline substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those contained in a
small box with a total weight of 8.37 grams were found to be positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other hand, the two bricks of dried
leaves, one weighing 425 grams and the other 850 grams, were found to be
marijuana. Charges against Roberto Salanguit y Ko for violations of Republic Act
(RA) 6425, i.e. for possession of shabu and marijuana, (Criminal Cases Q-95-
64357 and Q- 95-64358, respectively) were filed on 28 December 1995.
After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, convicting Salanguit in
Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358 for violation of Section 16 and 8,
respectively, RA 6425, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate sentence
with a minimum of 6 months of arresto mayor and a maximum of 4 years and 2
months of prision correccional, and reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P700,000.00, respectively.
Salanguit appealed; contesting his conviction on the grounds that (1) the
admissibility of the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence
against him on the ground that the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid; (2)
the admissibility in evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Salanguit to
the "plain view" doctrine; and (3) the employment of unnecessary force by the
police in the execution of the warrant.
ISSUE OF THE CASE:
Whether the warrant was invalid for failure of providing evidence to support the
seizure of drug paraphernalia, and whether the marijuana may be included as
evidence in light of the plain view doctrine.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
The warrant authorized the seizure of "undetermined quantity of shabu and drug
paraphernalia." Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the
existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The fact that there was
no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug
paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void.
This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the
police.
The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all,
therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of
drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine
hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to
its existence. In sum, with respect to the seizure of shabu from Salanguit's
residence, Search Warrant 160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded
on probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation
of the deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the things to be seized.
With respect to, and in light of the "plain view doctrine," the police failed to
allege the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or
contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was
recovered on Salanguit's person or in an area within his immediate control. Its
recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted after the shabu
had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his
deposition, was invalid.
Thus, the Court affirmed the decision as to Criminal Case Q-95-64357 only.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko
guilty of possession of illegal drugs under 16 of R.A. No.6425, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer a prison
term ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and ordering the
confiscation of 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride is AFFIRMED .
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the same court finding
accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of prohibited
drugs under 8 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of Pl00,000.00 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused- appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged. However, the confiscation of the 1,254 grams of marijuana, as well as
the 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, and its disposition as
ordered by the trial court is AFFIRMED.
DOCTRINE:
No search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
NATALIO P. AMARGA, provincial fiscal of Sulu, Petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE MACAPANTON ABBAS, as Judge, of the Court of First
Instance of Sulu, Respondent.
G.R. No. L-8666
March 28, 1956
PARAS, C.J.:
NATURE OF CASE
Petition for certiorari and mandamus
FACTS
Natalio P. Amarga, the Provincial Fiscal of Sulu, filed in the Court of First Instance
of Sulu an information for murder (criminal case 1131, People of the Philippines
vs. Madpirol, Awadi, Rajah, Sali, Insa and Maharajah Bapayani). At the foot of the
information, Amarga certified under oath that "he has conducted the necessary
preliminary investigation pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 732."
As the only supporting affidavit was that of Iman Hadji Rohmund Jubair, to the
effect that the latter "was told that the deceased was shot and killed by three
persons named: Hajirul Appang, Rajah Appang and Awadi Bagali," and Amarga
had failed or refused to present other evidence sufficient to make out a prima
facie case, Judge Macapanton Abbas (CFI of Sulu) issued an order, dismissing the
case without prejudice to reinstatement should the provincial fiscal support his
information with record of his investigation which in the opinion of the court may
support a prima facie case. Amarga instituted a petition for certiorari and
mandamus before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE OF THE CASE:
Whether the preliminary investigation conducted by Amarga dispenses with the
judges duty to determine probable cause exists before issuing the
corresponding warrant of arrest.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution provides that "no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce." The question whether "probable cause" exists or not must
depend upon the judgment and discretion of the judge or magistrate issuing the
warrant. If he is satisfied that "probable cause" exists from the facts stated in
the complaint, made upon the investigation by the prosecuting attorney, then
his conclusion is sufficient upon which to issue the warrant for arrest. He may,
however, if he is not satisfied, call such witnesses as he may deem necessary
before issuing the warrant. The issuance of the warrant of arrest is prima facie
evidence that, in his judgment at least, there existed "probable cause" for
believing that the person against whom the warrant is issued is guilty of the
crime charged. The preliminary investigation conducted by Amarga under DOCTRINE:
Republic Act 732 which formed the basis for the filing in the Court of First If the fiscal is not at all convinced that a prima facie case exists, he
Instance of Sulu of criminal case 1131 does not dispense with the judge's duty to
simply cannot move for the dismissal of the case and, when denied,
exercise his judicial power of determining, before issuing the corresponding
refuse to prosecute the same. He is obliged by law to proceed and
warrant of arrest, whether or not probable cause exists therefor. The
prosecute the criminal action.
Constitution vests such power in the judge who, however, may rely on the facts
stated in the information filed after preliminary investigation by the prosecuting
Once a complaint or information is filed in Court, any disposition of the
attorney.
case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in
the sound discretion of the Court.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
STA. ROSA MINING COMPANY, petitioner
Wherefore, the petition is granted and the Respondent Judge ordered to proceed vs.
with criminal case No. 1131 in accordance with law, it being understood that, if ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL FISCAL AUGUSTO ZABALA, in his capacity as
within ten days after notice by the Respondent Judge, the Petitioner still fails or OFFICER-IN-CHARGE of the Provincial Fiscal's OFFICE of Camarines
refuses to present other necessary evidence, the dismissal will stand for lack of Norte, and GIL ALAPAN et. al., respondents.
prosecution. Without costs.
G.R. No. L-44723
August 31, 1987
BIDIN, J.:

NATURE OF CASE
Petition for mandamus.

FACTS
On 21 March 1974, Sta. Rosa Mining Company filed a complaint for attempted
theft of materials (scrap iron) forming part of the installations on its mining
property at Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte against Romeo Garrido and Gil
Alapan with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Norte, then headed
by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre. The case was assigned to third Assistant
Fiscal Esteban P. Panotes for preliminary investigation who, after conducting said
investigation, issued a resolution dated 26 August 1974 recommending that an
information for Attempted Theft be filed against Garrido and Alapan on a finding
of prima facie case which resolution was approved by Fiscal Ilustre. Garrido and
Alapan sought reconsideration of the resolution but the same was denied by
Fiscal Ilustre in a resolution dated 14 October 1974.
 the trial court, is no justification for the refusal of the fiscal to prosecute the
On 29 October 1974, Fiscal Ilustre filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of case. Once a complaint or information is filed in Court, any disposition of the
Camarines Norte an Information dated 17 October 1987 (Criminal Case 821), case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
charging Garrido aand Alapan with the crime of Attempted Theft. sound discretion of the Court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do
with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive
In a letter dated 22 October 1974, Garrido and Alapan requested the Secretary jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal
of Justice for a review of the Resolutions of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal should he addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same.
dated 26 August 1974 and 14 October 1974. On 6 November 1974, the Chief It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused
State Prosecutor ordered the Provincial Fiscal by telegram to "elevate entire or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the
records PFO Case 577 against Garrido et al., review in five days and defer all Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
proceedings pending review."
SUPREME COURT RULING:
On 6 March 1975, the Secretary of Justice, after reviewing the records, reversed
the findings of prima facie case of the Provincial Fiscal and directed said
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby GRANTED. Public respondent or any other
prosecuting officer to immediately move for the dismissal of the criminal case.
The Company sought reconsideration of the directive of the Secretary of Justice person who may be assigned or appointed to act in his place or stead, is hereby
but the latter denied the same in a letter dated 11 June 1975. ordered to continue prosecuting Criminal Case No. 821 until the same is
terminated.
A motion to dismiss dated 16 September 1975 was then filed by the Provincial
Fiscal but the court denied the motion on the ground that there was a prima
facie evidence against Garrido and Alapan and set the case for trial on 25
February 1976. Garrido and Alapan sought reconsideration of the court's ruling
ARREST AND SEIZURE
but in an Order dated 13 February 1976, the motion filed for said purpose was
Art. 3, Section 8, 1987 Philippine Constitution
likewise denied. Trial of the case was reset to 23 April 1976.
Section 2.
Thereafter, Fiscal Ilustre was appointed a judge in the CFI of Albay and Fiscal
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
Zabala became officer-in-charge of the Provincial Fiscal's Office of Camarines
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
Norte. On 19 April 1976, Fiscal Zabala filed a Second Motion to Dismiss the case.
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
This second motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court in an order dated 23
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
April 1976. Whereupon, Fiscal Zabala manifested that he would not prosecute
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
the case and disauthorized any private prosecutor to appear therein. Hence, the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
Company filed a petition for mandamus before the Supreme Court.
and the persons or things to be seized.
ISSUE OF THE CASE:
Doctrine:
Whether the fiscal can refuse to prosecute the case if the Secretary of Justice
Without the proper search warrant, no public official has the right to enter the
reversed the findings of prima facie case by the fiscal.
premises of another without his consent for the purpose of search and seizure. It
does not admit of doubt therefore that a search or seizure cannot be stigmatized
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
as unreasonable and thus offensive to the Constitution if consent be shown. For
If the fiscal is not at all convinced that a prima facie case exists, he simply
this immunity from unwarranted intrusion is a personal right which may be
cannot move for the dismissal of the case and, when denied, refuse to prosecute
waived either expressly or impliedly.
the same. He is obliged by law to proceed and prosecute the criminal action. He
cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. At least what he can do is to
continue appearing for the prosecution and then turn over the presentation of G.R. No. 88919 July 25, 1990
evidence to another fiscal or a private prosecutor subject to his direction and
control. Where there is no other prosecutor available, he should proceed to PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
discharge his duty and present the evidence to the best of his ability and let the
court decide the merits of the case on the basis of the evidence adduced by VS.
both parties. The mere fact that the Secretary of Justice had, after reviewing the
records of the case, directed the prosecuting fiscal to move for the dismissal of
the case and the motion to dismiss filed pursuant to said directive is denied by
HONORABLE ENRIQUE INTING , PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT , BRANCH 38, DUMAGUETE CITY, OIC MAYOR DOMINADOR
REGALADO JR. Respondents
FACTS
Does Preliminary investigation conducted by provincial election supervisor
involving election offenses have to be coursed throught the provincial fiscal now
provincial prosecutor , before the regional trial court make take cognizance of
the investigation and determined whether or nor probable cause exists?
Facts: On 6 February 1988, Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against
OIC-Mayor Dominador S. Regalado Jr. of Tanjay, Negros Oriental with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), for allegedly transferring her, a permanent
Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very remote
barangay and without obtaining prior permission or clearance from COMELEC as
required by law. Acting on the complaint, COMELEC directed Atty. Gerardo
Lituanas, Provincial Election Supervision of Dumaguete City:
(1) To conduct the preliminary investigation of the case;
(2) To prepare and file the necessary information in court;
(3) To handle the prosecution if the evidence submitted shows a prima facie
case and
(4) To issue a resolution of prosecution or dismissal as the case may be.
After a preliminary investigation of Barba's complaint, Atty. Lituanas found a
prima facie case. Hence, on 26 September 1988, he filed with the Regional Trial
Court (Branch 38. Dumaguete City) a criminal case for violation of section 261,
Paragraph (h), Omnibus Election Code against the OIC-Mayor. In an Order dated
30 September 1988, the court issued a warrant of arrest against the OIC Mayor.
It also fixed the bail at P5, 000.00 as recommended by the Provincial Election
Supervisor. However, in an order dated 3 October 1988 and before the accused
could be arrested, the trial court set aside its 30 September 1988 order on the
ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to determine probable cause
pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The court stated that it
"will give due course to the information filed in this case if the same has the
written approval of the Provincial Fiscal after which the prosecution of the case
shall be under the supervision and control of the latter." In another order dated
22 November 1988, the court gave Atty. Lituanas 15 days from receipt to file
information charging the same offense with the written approval of the Provincial
Fiscal. Atty. Lituanas failed to comply with the order. Hence, in an order dated 8
December 1988, the trial court quashed the information. A motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence, the petition.
Issue: Whether the approval of the Provincial Fiscal is necessary before the
information filed by the Provincial Election Supervisor may be given due course
by the trial court.
Held: As to the constitutional mandate that "xx no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge xx," (Article III, Section 2, Constitution) the determination of probable
cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor or
for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone
makes this determination. On the other hand, the preliminary inquiry made by a
Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to make the
determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the
Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutor's certification of probable
cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the Transcripts of
stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the
Prosecutors certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his
determination. Thus, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the
preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains
whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two
inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there
should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable
cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary
investigation proper - whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that
the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not be
should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is the
function of the Prosecutor. Preliminary investigation should be distinguished as
to whether it is an investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for
the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the determination of a
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of
preliminary investigation is executive in nature.
It is part of the prosecution's job. The second kind of preliminary investigation
which is more properly called preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is
lodged with the judge.
The order to get the approval of the provincial fiscal is not only superfluous but
unwarranted.
Wherefore, the instant petition is granted/ the questioned orders dated oct. 3,
1988, Nov. 22, 1988 and dec. 8, 1988 are reversed and set aside. The
respondent trial courts ordered to proceed hearing the case with deliberate
speed until its termination. So Ordered.
.

ARREST AND SEIZURE
Art. 3, Section 8, 1987 Philippine Constitution
Section 2.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
Doctrine:
Without the proper search warrant, no public official has the right to enter the
premises of another without his consent for the purpose of search and seizure. It
does not admit of doubt therefore that a search or seizure cannot be stigmatized
as unreasonable and thus offensive to the Constitution if consent be shown. For
this immunity from unwarranted intrusion is a personal right which may be
waived either expressly or impliedly.
Paderanga vs. Drilon [GR 96080, 19 April 1991]
En Banc, Regalado (J): 14 concur
Facts: On 16 October 1986, an information for multiple murder was filed in the
Regional Trial Court, Gingoog City, against Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar
Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe and Richard Doe, for the
deaths on 1 May 1984 of Renato Bucag, his wife Melchora Bucag, and their son
Renato Bucag II. Venue was, however, transferred to Cagayan de Oro City per
Administrative Matter 87- 2-244. Only Felipe Galarion was tried and found guilty
as charged. The rest of the accused remained at large.Felipe Galarion, however,
escaped from detention and has not been apprehended since then. In an
amended information filed on 6 October 1988, Felizardo Roxas, alias "Ely Roxas,"
"Fely Roxas" and "Lolong Roxas," was included as a co-accused. Roxas retained
Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga as his counsel. As counsel for Roxas, Paderanga filed,
among others, an Omnibus Motion to dismiss, to Quash the Warrant of Arrest
and to Nullify the Arraignment on 14 October 1988. The trial court in an order
dated 9 January 1989, denied the omnibus motion but directed the City
Prosecutor "to conduct another preliminary investigation or reinvestigation in
order to grant the accused all the opportunity to adduce whatever evidence he
has in support of his defense." In the course of the preliminary investigation,
through a signed affidavit, Felizardo Roxas implicated Atty. Paderanga in the
commission of the crime charged. The City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City
inhibited himself from further conducting the preliminary investigation against
Paderanga at the instance of the latter's counsel, per his resolution dated 7 July
1989. In his first indorsement to the Department of Justice, dated 24 July 1989,
said city prosecutor requested the Department of Justice to designate a state
prosecutor to continue the preliminary investigation against Paderanga. In a
resolution dated 6 September 1989, the State Prosecutor
Henrick F. Gingoyon, who was designated to continue with the conduct of the
preliminary investigation against Paderanga, directed the amendment of the
previously amended information to include and implead Paderanga as one of the
accused therein. Paderang a moved for reconsideration, contending that the
preliminary investigation was not yet completed when said resolution was
promulgated, and that he was deprived of his right to present a corresponding
counter-affidavit and additional evidence crucial to the determination of his
alleged "linkage" to the crime charged. The motion was, however, denied by
Gingoyon in
his order dated 29 January 1990. From the aforesaid resolution and order,
Paderanga filed a Petition for Review with the Department of Justice. Thereafter,
he submitted a Supplemental Petition with Memorandum, and then a
Supplemental Memorandum with Additional Exculpatory/Exonerating Evidence
Annexed, attaching thereto an affidavit of Roxas dated 20 June 1990 and
purporting to be a retraction of his affidavit of 30 March 1990 wherein he
implicated Paderanga. On 10 August 1990, the Department of Justice, through
Undersecretary Silvestre H. Bello III, issued Resolution 648 dismissing the said
petition for review. His
motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied, Paderanga then filed
the petition for mandamus and prohibition before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether there is no prima facie evidence, or probable cause, or sufficient
justification to hold Paderangato a tedious and prolonged public trial.
Held: A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the
purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well
founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be
held for trial. The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation
is such evidence sufficient to "engender a well founded belief" as to the fact of
the commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof. A
preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display
of the parties' evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may
engender a well grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that
the accused is probably guilty thereof. Preliminary investigation is
Generally inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons
who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his
complaint or information.
It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of
determining whether a crime has been committed and whetherthere is probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the
person against whom it is taken in jeopardy. The institution of a criminal action
depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He has the quasi-judicial
discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court.
Hence, the general rule is that an injunction will not be granted to restrain a
criminal prosecution. The case of Brocka, et al. vs. Enrile, et al. cites several
exceptions to the rule, to wit:
(a) To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
(b) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions;
(c) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice;
(d) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
(e) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
(f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
(g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
(h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
(i) Where the Charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance; and
(j) When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion
to quash on that ground has been denied. A careful analysis of the
circumstances obtaining in the present case, however, will readily show that the
same does not fall under any of the aforesaid exceptions.
Wherefore the instant petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.. So ordered.
ARREST AND SEIZURE
Art. 3, Section 8, 1987 Philippine Constitution
Section 2.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
Doctrine:
Without the proper search warrant, no public official has the right to enter the
premises of another without his consent for the purpose of search and seizure. It
does not admit of doubt therefore that a search or seizure cannot be stigmatized
as unreasonable and thus offensive to the Constitution if consent be shown. For
this immunity from unwarranted intrusion is a personal right which may be
waived either expressly or impliedly.
Pita vs. Court of Appeals [GR 80806, 5 October 1989]
En Banc, Sarmiento (J): 10 concur, 3 concur in result, 1 on leave
Facts: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated
by the Mayor of the City of
Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group,
Auxiliary Services Bureau,
Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and
confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along
Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading materials believed
to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials
in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence
of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various student
organizations. Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy
Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by Leo Pita. On 7 December 1983,
Pita filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of
Western Police District of the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin and or restrain
Bagatsing, Cabrera and their agents from confiscating his magazines or from
otherwise preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine
is a decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and
that the publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of
speech and of the press. On 12 December 1983, Pita filed an Urgent Motion for
issuance of a temporary restraining order against indiscriminate seizure,
confiscation and burning of plaintiffs "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines, pending
hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction in view of Mayor Bagatsing's
pronouncement to continue the Anti-Smut Campaign. The Court granted the
temporary restraining order on 14 December 1983. On 5 January 1984, Pita filed
his Memorandum in support of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction,
raising the issue as to "whether or not the defendants, and or their agents can
without a court order confiscate or seize plaintiff's magazine before any judicial
finding is made on whether said magazine is obscene or not." The restraining
order lapsed on 3 January 1984, Pita filed an urgent motion for issuance of
another restraining order, which was opposed by Bagatsing on the ground that
issuance of a second restraining order would violate the Resolution of the
Supreme Court dated 11 January 1983, providing
for the Interim Rules Relative to the Implementation of Batas Pambansa 129,
which provides that a temporary restraining order shall be effective only for 20
days from date of its issuance. On 11 January 1984, the trial court issued an
Order setting the case for hearing on 16 January 1984 "for the parties to adduce
evidence on the question of whether the publication 'Pinoy Playboy Magazine'
alleged (sic) seized, confiscated and or burned by the defendants, are obscence
per se or not." On 3 February 1984, the trial court promulgated the Order
appealed from denying the motion for a writ of preliminary injunction, and
dismissing the case for lack of merit. Likewise, the Appellate Court dismissed the
appeal, holding that the freedom of the press is not without restraint, as the
state has the right to protect society from pornographic literature that is
offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the author,
publishers and sellers of obscene publications; and that the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures recognizes certain exceptions, as when
there is consent to the search or seizure, or search is an incident to an arrest, or
is conducted in a vehicle or movable structure. Pita filed the petition for review
with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the Mayor can order the seizure of obscene materials as a
result of an anti-smut campaign.
arrest, and the arrest must be on account of a crime committed. Here, no party
has been charged, nor are such charges being readied against any party, under
Article 201, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code. There is no "accused" here
to speak of, who ought to be "punished". Further, to say that the Mayor could
have validly ordered the raid (as a result of an anti-smut campaign) without a
lawful search warrant because, in his opinion, "violation of penal laws" has been
committed, is to make the Mayor judge, jury, and executioner rolled into one.
Thus, the court made a resume, to wit:
(1) The authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a
judge, if in their opinion, an
obscenity rap is in order;
(2) The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be
seized are
"obscene", and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough
to warrant State interference and action;
(3) The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed "obscene:"
the question is to be
resolved on a case-to-case basis and on His Honor's sound discretion.
(4) If, in the opinion of the court, probable cause exists, it may issue the search
warrant prayed for;
(5) The proper suit is then brought in the court under Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code; and
(6) Any conviction is subject to appeal. The appellate court may assess whether
or not the properties seized are indeed "obscene." The Court states, however,
that "these do not foreclose, however, defenses under the Constitution or
applicable statutes, or remedies against abuse of official power under the Civil
Code or the Revised Penal code."

Held: The Court is not convinced that Bagatsing and Cabrera have shown the
required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for
which mandatory injunction had been sought below. First ofall, they were not
possessed of a lawful court order:
(1) Finding the said materials to be pornography, and
(2) Authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search
warrant. The fact that the formerMayor's act was sanctioned by "police power" is
no license to seize property in disregard of due process. Presidential Decrees
960 and 969 are, arguably, police power measures, but they are not, by
themselves, authorities for high-handed acts. They do not exempt our law
enforcers, in carrying out the decree of the twin presidential issuances, from the
commandments of the Constitution, the right to due process of law and the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures, specifically. Significantly, the
Decrees themselves lay down procedures for implementation. It is basic that
searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial warrant; otherwise,
they become unreasonable and subject to challenge. The Court finds greater
reason to reprobate the questioned raid, in the complete absence of a warrant,
valid or invalid. The fact that the present case involves an obscenity rap makes
it no different from Burgos vs. Chief of Staff AFP, a political case, because
speech is speech, whether political or "obscene." Although the Court is not ruling
out warrantless searches, the search must have been an incident to a lawful

ARREST AND SEIZURE
Art. 3, Section 8, 1987 Philippine Constitution
Section 2.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
Doctrine:
Without the proper search warrant, no public official has the right to enter the
premises of another without his consent for the purpose of search and seizure. It
does not admit of doubt therefore that a search or seizure cannot be stigmatized
as unreasonable and thus offensive to the Constitution if consent be shown. For
this immunity from unwarranted intrusion is a personal right which may be
waived either expressly or impliedly.
Abdula vs. Guiani [GR 118821, 18 February 2000]
Third Division, Gonzaga-Reyes (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 24 June 1994, a complaint for murder (IS 94-1361) was filed before
the Criminal Investigation Service Command, ARMM Regional Office XII against
Mayor Bai Unggie D. Abdula and Odin Abdula and 6 other persons in connection
with the death of a certain Abdul Dimalen, the former COMELEC Registrar of
Kabuntalan, Maguindanao. The complaint alleged that the Abdulas paid the 6
other persons the total amount of P200, 000.00 for the death of Dimalen. Acting
on this complaint, the Provincial Prosecutor of Maguindanao, Salick U. Panda, in
a Resolution dated 22 August 1994, dismissed the charges of murder against the
Abdulas and 5 other respondents on a finding that there was no prima facie case
for murder against them. Prosecutor Panda, however, recommended the filing of
information for murder against one of the respondents, a certain Kasan Mama.
Pursuant to this Resolution, information for murder was thereafter filed against
Kasan Mama before the sala of Judge Japal M. Guiani. In an Order dated 13
September 1994, the Judge ordered that the case (Criminal Case 2332), be
returned to the Provincial Prosecutor for further investigation. In this Order, the
judge noted that although there were 8 respondents in the murder case, the
information filed with the court "charged only 1 of the 8 respondents in the
name of Kasan Mama without the necessary resolution required under Section 4,
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court to show how the investigating prosecutor
arrived at such a conclusion." As such, the judge reasons, the trial court cannot
issue the warrant of arrest against Kasan Mama. Upon the return of the records
of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for Maguindanao, it was
assigned to 2nd Assistant Prosecutor Enok T. Dimaraw for further investigation.
In addition to the evidence presented during the initial investigation of the
murder charge, two new affidavits of witnesses were submitted to support the
charge of murder against the Abdulas and the other respondents in the murder
complaint. Thus, Prosecutor Dimaraw treated the same as a re-filing of the
murder charge and pursuant to law, issued subpoena to the respondents named
therein. On 6 December 1994, the Abdulas submitted and filed their joint
counter-affidavits. After evaluation of the evidence, Prosecutor Dimaraw, in a
Resolution dated 28 December 1994, found a prima facie case for murder
against the Abdulas and 3 other respondents. He thus recommended the filing of
charges against the Abdulas, as principals by inducement, and against the 3
others, as principals by direct participation. Likewise in this 28 December 1994
Resolution, Provincial Prosecutor Salick U. Panda, who conducted the earlier
preliminary investigation of the murder charge, added a notation stating that he
was inhibiting himself from the case and authorizing the investigating prosecutor
to dispose of the case without his approval. The reasons he cited were that the
case was previously handled by him and that the victim was the father-in-law of
his son. On 2 January 1995, an information for murder dated 28 December 1994
was filed against the Abdulas and Kasan Mama, Cuenco Usman and Jun Mama
before Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City, then the sala of
Judge Guiani. This information was signed by investigating prosecutor Enok T.
Dimaraw. A notation was likewise made on the information by Provincial
Prosecutor Panda, which explained the reason for his inhibition. The following
day, the judge issued a warrant for the arrest of the Abdulas. Upon learning of
the issuance of the said warrant, the Abdulas filed on 4 January 1995 an Urgent
Ex-parte Motion for the setting aside of the warrant of arrest on 4 January 1995.
In this motion, the Abdulas argued that the enforcement of the warrant of arrest
should be held in abeyance considering that the information was prematurely
filed and that the Abdulas intended to file a petition for review with the
Department of Justice. A petition for review was filed by the Abdulas with the
Department of Justice on 11 January 1995. Despite said filing, the judge did
not act upon the Abdulas' pending Motion to Set Aside the Warrant of Arrest. The
Abdulas filed the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the judge may rely upon the findings of the prosecutor in
determining probable cause in the issuance of search or arrest warrant.

Held: The 1987 Constitution requires the judge to determine probable cause
"personally," a requirementwhich does not appear in the corresponding
provisions of our previous constitutions. This emphasis evincesthe intent of the
framers to place a greater degree of responsibility upon trial judges than that
imposed under previous Constitutions. Herein, the Judge admits that he issued
the questioned warrant as there was "no reason for (him) to doubt the validity of
the certification made by the Assistant Prosecutor that a preliminary
investigation was conducted and that probable cause was found to exist as
against those charged in the information filed." The statement is an admission
that the Judge relied solely and completely on the certification made by the
fiscal that probable cause exists as against those charged in the information and
issued the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutor's
findings and recommendations. He adopted the judgment of the prosecutor
regarding the existence of probable cause as his own. Clearly, the judge, by
merely stating that he had no reason to doubt the validity of the certification
made by the investigating prosecutor has abdicated his duty under the
Constitution to determine on his own the issue of probable cause before issuing
a warrant of arrest. Consequently, the warrant of arrest should be declared null
and void.
ARREST AND SEIZURE
Art. 3, Section 8, 1987 Philippine Constitution
Section 2.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
Doctrine:
Without the proper search warrant, no public official has the right to enter the
premises of another without his consent for the purpose of search and seizure. It
does not admit of doubt therefore that a search or seizure cannot be stigmatized
as unreasonable and thus offensive to the Constitution if consent be shown. For
this immunity from unwarranted intrusion is a personal right which may be
waived either expressly or impliedly.
Pasion Vda. de Garcia vs. Locsin [GR 45950, 20 June 1938]
First Division, Laurel (J): 6 concur
Facts:
On 10 November 1934, Mariano G. Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usury Board,
obtained from the
justice of the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac, a search warrant commanding any officer of
the law to search the person, house or store of Leona Pasion Vda. de Garcia at
Victoria, Tarlac, for "certain books, lists, chits,receipts, documents and other
papers relating to her activities as usurer." The search warrant was issued upon
an affidavit given by the said Almeda "that he has and there is just and probable
cause to believe and he does believe that Leona Pasion de Garcia keeps and
conceals in her house and store at Victoria, Tarlac, certain books, lists, chits,
receipts, documents, and other papers relating to her activities as usurer, all of
which is contrary to the statute in such cases made and provided." On the same
date, Almeda, accompanied by a captain of the Philippine Constabulary, went to
the office of Pasion de Garcia in Victoria, Tarlac and, after showing the search
warrant to the latter's bookkeeper, Alfredo Salas, and, without Pasion de Garcia's
presence who was ill and confined at the time, proceeded with the execution
thereof. Two packages of records and a locked filing cabinet containing several
papers and documents were seized by Almeda and a receipt therefor issued by
him to Salas. The papers and documents seized were kept for a considerable
length of time by the Anti-Usury Board and thereafter were turned over by it to
the provincial fiscal Felix Imperial, who subsequently filed, in the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Tarlac, 6 separate criminal cases against Pasion de Garcia for
violation of the Anti-Usury Law. On several occasions, after seizure, Pasion de
Garcia, through counsel, demanded from the Anti-Usury Board the return of the
documents seized. On January 7, and, by motion, on 4 June 1937, the legality of
the search warrant was challenged by Pasion de Garcia's counsel in the 6
criminal cases and the devolution of the documents demanded. By resolution of
5 October 1937, Judge Diego Locsin (CFI) denied Pasion de garcia's motion of
June 4 for the reason that though the search warrant was illegal, there was a
waiver on the latter's part. A motion for reconsideration was presented but was
denied by order of 3 January 1938. Pasion de Garcia registered her exception.
Issue: Whether the lack of personal examination of witnesses renders the
warrant void.
Held:
Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right
and for a search warrant to be valid,
(1) It must be issued upon probable cause;
(2) The probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the
applicant or any other person;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath
or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce;
and
(4) The warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and
persons or things to be seized.
These requirements are complemented by the Code of Criminal Procedure,
particularly with reference to the duration of the validity of the search warrant
and the obligation of the officer seizing the property to deliver the same to the
corresponding court. Herein, the existence of probable cause was determined
not by the judge himself but by the applicant. All that the judge did was to
accept as true the affidavit made by agent Almeda. He did not decide for
himself. It does not appear that he examined the applicant and his witnesses, if
any. Even accepting the description of the properties to be seized to be sufficient
and on the assumption that the receipt issued is sufficiently detailed within the
meaning of the law, the properties seized were not delivered to the court which
issued the warrant, as required by law. Instead, they were turned over to the
provincial fiscal and used by him in building up cases against Pasion de Garcia.
Considering that at the time the warrant was issued there was no case pending
against Pasion de Garcia, the averment that the warrant was issued primarily for
exploration purposes is not without basis. The search warrant was illegally
issued by the justice of the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac. In any event, the failure on
the part of Pasion de Garcia and her bookkeeper to resist or object to the
execution of the warrant does not constitute an implied waiver of constitutional
right. It is, as Judge Cooley observes, but a submission to the authority of the
law. As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of
the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting
an officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead
they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or
an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy
of the law.
ARREST AND SEIZURE
Art. 3, Section 8, 1987 Philippine Constitution
Section 2.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
Doctrine:
Without the proper search warrant, no public official has the right to enter the
premises of another without his consent for the purpose of search and seizure. It
does not admit of doubt therefore that a search or seizure cannot be stigmatized
as unreasonable and thus offensive to the Constitution if consent be shown. For
this immunity from unwarranted intrusion is a personal right which may be
waived either expressly or impliedly.
Yee Sue Koy vs. Almeda [GR 47021, 15 June 1940]
Laurel (J): 3 concur, 1 concurs in result
Facts:
In response to a sworn application of Mariano G. Almeda, chief agent of the
Anti-Usury Board, dated 5 May 1938, the justice of the peace of Sagay,
Occidental Negros, after taking the testimony of applicant's witness, Jose
Estrada, special agent of the Anti-Usury Board, issued on the same date a search
warrant commanding any peace officer to search during day time the store and
premises occupied by Sam Sing & Co., situated at Sagay, Occidental Negros, as
well as the person of said Sam Sing & Co., and to seize the documents,
notebooks, lists, receipts and promissory notes being used by said Sam Sing &
Co. in connection with their activities of lending money at usurious rates of
interest in violation of law, or such as may be found, and to bring them forthwith
before the aforesaid justice of the peace of Sagay. On the same date, at 10:30
a.m., search was accordingly made by Mariano G. Almeda, Jose Estrada, 2
internal revenue agents and 2 members of the Philippine Army, who seized
certain receipt books, vales or promissory notes, chits, notebooks, journal book,
and collection list belonging to Sam Sing & Co. and enumerated in the inventory
receipt issued by Mariano G. Almeda to the owner of the documents, papers and
articles seized. Immediately after the search and seizure thus effected, Mariano
G. Almeda filed a return with the justice of the peace of Sagay together. With a
request that the office of the Anti-Usury Board be allowed to retain possession of
the articles seized for examination, pursuant to section 4 of Act 4109, which
request was granted. Under the date of 11 March 1939, Godofredo P. Escalona,
counsel for Sam Sing & Co. filed a motion with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Occidental Negros praying that the search warrant and the seizure effected
thereunder be declared illegal and set aside and that the articles in question be
ordered returned to Sam Sing & Co., which motion was denied in the order dated
24 July 1939. A similar motion was presented to the justice of the peace of
Sagay on 27 October 1939 but was denied the next day. Meanwhile, an
information dated 30 September 1939 had been filed in the CFI Occidental
Negros, charging Yee Fock alias Yee Sue Koy, Y. Tip and A. Sing, managers of Sam
Sing & Co., with a violation of Act 2655. Before the criminal case could be tried,
Yee Sue Koy and Yee Tip filed the petition with the Supreme Court on 6
November 1939. The petition is grounded on the propositions (1) that the search
warrant issued on 2 May 1938, by the justice of the peace of Sagay and the
seizure accomplished thereunder are illegal, because the warrant was issued
three days ahead of the application therefor and of the affidavit of the Jose
Estrada which is insufficient in itself to justify the issuance of a search warrant,
and because the issuance of said warrant manifestly contravenes the mandatory
provisions both of section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and of
section 97 of General Orders 58, and (2) that the seizure of the aforesaid articles
by means of a search warrant for the purpose of using them as evidence in the
criminal case against the accused, is unconstitutional because the warrant
thereby becomes unreasonable and amounts to a violation of the constitutional
prohibition against compelling the accused to testify against themselves.
Issue: Whether the application of the search warrant is supported by the
personal knowledge of the witness, besides the applicant, for the judge to
determine probable cause in issuing the warrant.
Held: Strict observance of the formalities under section 1, paragraph 3, of
Article III of the Constitution and of section 97 of General Orders 58 was
followed. The applicant Mariano G. Almeda, in his application, swore that "he
made his own personal investigation and ascertained that Sam Sing & Co. is
lending money without license, charging usurious rate of interest and is keeping,
utilizing and concealing in the store and premises occupied by it situated at
Sagay, Occidental Negros, documents, notebooks, lists, receipts, promissory
notes, and book of accounts and records, all of which are being used by it in
connection with its activities of lending money at usurious rate of interest in
violation of the Usury Law." In turn, the witness Jose Estrada, in his testimony
before the justice of the peace of Sagay, swore that he knew that Sam Sing &
Co. was lending money without license and charging usurious rate of interest,
because he personally investigated the victims who had secured loans from said
Sam Sing & Co. and were charged usurious rate of interest; that he knew that
the said Sam Sing & Co. was keeping and using books of accounts and records
containing its transactions relative its activities as money lender and the entries
of the interest paid by its debtors, because he saw the said Sam Sing & d make
entries and records of their debts and the interest paid thereon.
As both Mariano G. Almeda and Jose Estrada swore that they had personal
knowledge, their affidavits were sufficient for, thereunder, they could be held
liable for perjury if the facts would turn out to be not as their were stated under
oath. That the existence of probable cause had been determined by the justice
of the peace of Sagay before issuing the search warrant complained of, is shown
by the following statement in the warrant itself, to wit: "After examination under
oath of the complainant, Mariano G. Almeda, Chief Agent of the Anti-Usury
Board, Department of Justice and Special Agent of the Philippine Army, Manila,
and the witness he presented, . . . and this Court, finding that there is just and
probable cause to believe as it does believe, that the above described articles,
relating to the activities of said Sam Sing & Co. of lending money at usurious
rate of interest, are being utilized and kept and concealed at its store and
premises occupied by said Sam Sing & Co., all in violation of law."
ARREST AND SEIZURE
Art. 3, Section 8, 1987 Philippine Constitution
Section 2.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
Doctrine:
Without the proper search warrant, no public official has the right to enter the
premises of another without his consent for the purpose of search and seizure. It
does not admit of doubt therefore that a search or seizure cannot be stigmatized
as unreasonable and thus offensive to the Constitution if consent be shown. For
this immunity from unwarranted intrusion is a personal right which may be
waived either expressly or impliedly.
Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas [GR 45358, 29 January
1937]
First Division, Imperial (J): 4 concur
Facts:
On 3 June 1936, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the
Department of Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David then
presiding over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, an affidavit alleging that
according to reliable information, Narciso Alvarez kept in his house in Infanta,
Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in
connection with his activities as a moneylender, charging usurious rates of
interest in violation of the law. In his oath at the end of the affidavit, the chief of
the secret service stated that his answers to the questions were correct to the
best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his statements
upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him
from a reliable person. Upon the affidavit the judge, on said date, issued the
warrant which is the subject matter of the petition, ordering the search of the
Alvarez's house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and
documents and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in
accordance with the law. With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury
Board entered Alvarez's store and residence at 7:00 p.m. of 4 June 1936, and
seized and took possession of the following articles: internal revenue licenses for
the years 1933 to 1936, 1 ledger, 2 journals, 2 cashbooks, 9 order books, 4
notebooks, 4 check stubs, 2 memorandums, 3 bankbooks, 2 contracts, 4 stubs,
48 stubs of purchases of copra, 2 inventories, 2 bundles of bills of lading, 1
bundle of credit receipts, 1 bundle of stubs of purchases of copra, 2 packages of
correspondence, 1 receipt book belonging to Luis Fernandez, 14 bundles of
invoices and other papers, many documents and loan contracts with security
and promissory notes, 504 chits, promissory notes and stubs of used checks of
the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). The search for and
seizure of said articles were made with the opposition of Alvarez who stated his
protest below the inventories on the ground that the agents seized even the
originals of the documents. As the articles had not been brought immediately to
the judge who issued the search warrant, Alvarez, through his attorney, filed a
motion on 8 June 1936, praying that the agent Emilio L. Siongco, or any other
agent, be ordered immediately to deposit all the seized articles in the office of
the clerk of court and that said agent be declared guilty of contempt for having
disobeyed the order of the court. On said date the court issued an order
directing Siongco to deposit all the articles seized within 24 hours from the
receipt of notice thereof and giving him a period of 5 days within which to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court. On 10 June,
Attorney Arsenio Rodriguez, representing the Anti-Usury Board, filed a motion
praying that the order of the 8th of said month be set aside and that the Anti-
Usury Board be authorized to retain the articles seized for a period of 30 days for
the necessary investigation. On June 25, the court issued an order requiring
agent Siongco forthwith to file the search warrant and the affidavit in the court,
together with the proceedings taken by him, and to present an inventory duly
verified by oath of all the articles seized. On July 2, the attorney for the
petitioner filed a petition alleging that the search warrant issued was illegal and
that it had not yet been returned to date together with the proceedings taken in
connection therewith, and praying that said warrant be cancelled, that an order
be issued directing the return of all the articles seized to Alvarez, that the agent
who seized them be declared guilty of contempt of court, and that charges be
filed against him for abuse of authority. On September 10, the court issued an
order holding: that the search warrant was obtained and issued in accordance
with the law, that it had been duly complied with and, consequently, should not
be cancelled, and that agent Siongco did not commit any contempt of court and
must, therefore, be exonerated, and ordering the chief of the Anti-Usury Board in
Manila to show cause, if any, within the unextendible period of 2 days from the
date of notice of said order, why all the articles seized appearing in the
inventory should not be returned to Alvarez. The assistant chief of the Anti-Usury
Board of the Department of Justice filed a motion praying, for the reasons stated
therein, that the articles seized be ordered retained for the purpose of
conducting an investigation of the violation of the Anti-Usury Law committed by
Alvarez. On October 10, said official again filed another motion alleging that he
needed 60 days to examine the documents and papers seized, which are
designated on pages 1 to 4 of the inventory by Nos. 5, 10, 16, 23, 25-27, 30-31 ,
34, 36-43 and 45, and praying that he be granted said period of 60 days. In an
order of October 16, the court granted him the period of 60 days to investigate
said 19 documents. Alvarez, herein, asks that the search warrant as well as the
order authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury Board to retain the articles seized,
be declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the articles in question be
returned to him.
Issue: Whether the search warrant issued by the court is illegal because it has
been based upon the affidavit of agent Almeda in whose oath he declared that
he had no personal knowledge of the facts which were to serve as a basis for the
issuance of the warrant but that he had knowledge thereof through mere
information secured from a person whom he considered reliable, and that it is
illegal as it was not supported by other affidavits aside from that made by the
applicant.
Held: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97 of
General Orders 58 require
that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant
but that the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by
oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense,
an oath includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is
bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is
sometimes defined as an outward pledge given by the person taking it that his
attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to
God. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to
convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and
seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true
test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is
whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged
thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. The affidavit, which
served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally
defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore,
the search warrant and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and
other papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the
affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted
that the judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively
upon the affidavit made by agent Almeda and that he did not require nor take
the deposition of any other witness. Neither the Constitution nor General Orders
58 provides that it is of imperative necessity to take the depositions of the
witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the
affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of
depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the
existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or
complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses.
Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his knowledge of
the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to
require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the
existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant.
When the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts
within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied
that there exists probable cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is
mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal
knowledge of the facts is necessary. Thus the warrant issued is likewise illegal
because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal
knowledge of the facts.

Mata vs. Bayona
G.R. No. L-50720, 26 March 1984
ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES > Examination of witnesses (See
Doctrine on highlighted text below)
FACTS: Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as
amended by PD 1306, the information against him alleging that Soriano Mata
offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by selling illegal tickets
known as Masiao tickets without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai &
Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities concerned. Mata
claimed that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from
the records of the said case could be found the search warrant and other
pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to
inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry Judge
Josephine K. Bayona, presiding Judge of the City Court of Ormoc replied, it is
with the court. The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached
them to the records. This led Mata to file a motion to quash and annul the search
warrant and for the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among
others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was
denied by the Judge on 1 March 1979, stating that the court has made a
thorough investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and
Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police
District II INP; that in fact the court made a certification to that effect; and that
the fact that documents relating to the search warrant were not attached
immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no moment, considering that
the rule does not specify when these documents are to be attached to the
records. Matas motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been
denied, he came to the Supreme Court, with the petition for certiorari, praying,
among others, that the Court declare the search warrant to be invalid for its
alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of
Court, and that all the articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as
evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on the matter.
ISSUE: WON the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on
oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take
their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any
affidavits presented to him?
HELD:YES. Under the Constitution no search warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer
as may be authorized by law after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce. More emphatic and detailed is
the implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, The Rules provide that
the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath
or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and
take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in
addition to any affidavits presented to him. Mere affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining
Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is
necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the
existence or nonexistence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the
person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. We,
therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of
the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in
writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.
Olaez vs. People of the Philippines [GR 78347-49, 9 November
1987]
First Division, Cruz (J): 4 concur
Facts: Adolfo Olaes and Linda M. Cruz were charged for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. Olaes and Cruz filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction, challenging the admission by
Judge Alicia L. Santos (in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 73) of evidence seized by virtue of
an allegedly invalid search warrant and of an extrajudicial confession
taken from them without according them the right to assistance of
counsel; and thus seek to restrain further proceedings in the criminal
case against them and ask that they be acquitted with the setting aside
of the questioned orders (the facts do not provide the disposition of the
said orders). Olaes and Cruz claim that the search warrant issued by the
judge is unconstitutional because it does not indicate the specific
offense they are supposed to have committed. There is, therefore,
according to them, no valid finding of probable cause as a justification
for the issuance of the said warrant in conformity with the Bill of Rights.
Issue: Whether the lack of specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act
renders the caption vague, and negate the claim that the specific
offense was committed to serve as basis for the finding of probable
cause.
Held:
No. The search warrant issued does not come under the strictures of the
Stonehill doctrine. While in the case cited, there was a bare reference to
the laws in general, without any specification of the particular sections
thereof that were alleged to have been violated out of the hundreds of
prohibitions contained in such codifications, there is no similar ambiguity
herein. While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that
it is in connection with "Violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Acts of 1972," it is clearly recited in the text thereof
that "There is probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias 'Debie'
and alias 'Baby' of No. 628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City,
has in their possession and control and custody of marijuana dried
stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and
exempt narcotics preparations which is the subject of the offense stated
above." Although the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not
pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific offense alleged to
have been committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause. The
search warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of
Rights of the particularity of the description to be made of the
"place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
NEMESIO PRUDENTE vs Hon Judge ABELARDO M. DAYRIT
G.R. No. 82870 December 14, 1989
FACTS:
The Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Manila, Judge Abelardo Dayrit, for the issuance
of Search Warrant for violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of
Firearm, etc). In the deposition of witness (P/Lt. Florencio C. Angeles), it
was made mentioned of result of our continuous surveillance conducted
for several days. We gathered information from verified sources that the
holders of said firearms and explosives as well as ammunitions arent
licensed to possess said firearms and ammunition. Further, the premises
is a school and the holders of these firearms are not student who were
not supposed to possess firearms, explosives and ammunitions.
Person to be searched in Nemesio Prudente at the Polytechnic University
of the Philippines, Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, has in his control or
possession firearms, explosives hand grenades and ammunitions which
are illegally possesses at the office of Department of Military Science
and Tactics and at the office of the President.
Petitioner moved to quash the Search Warrant. He claimed that:
Petitioners, had no personal knowledge of the facts The examination of
the said witness was not in form of searching questions and answers
Search warrant was a general warrant Violation of Circular No. 19 of the
Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege under oath that
the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday, urgent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search and seizure was valid?
HELD:
Search Warrant annulled and set aside.
RATIONALE:
Valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to
be determined personally by the Judge, after examination under oath
and affirmation of the complainant, and that witnesses he may produce
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
and things to be seized. The probable cause must be in connection with
one specific offense and the Judge must, before issuing Search Warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, In
writing and under oath, the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce, on facts personally known to them and attach to the record
their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.
Probable Cause for a valid search warrant, has been defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that
objects sought in connection which the offense are in the place sought
to be searched.
 This probable case must be shown to be personal knowledge and of
the complainant and witnesses he may produce and not based on mere
hearsay.
PARTICULARITY
For violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) while the
said decree punishes several offenses, the alleged violation in this case
was, qualified by the phrase illegal possession of firearms etc.
Reformed to ammunitions and explosives. In other words, the search
warrant was issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of
firearms and explosives. Hence, the failure of the Search Warrant to
mention the particular provision of PD1-866 that was violated is not of
such gravity as to call for the invalidation of this case
Chia vs. Acting Collector of Customs [GR L-43810, 26 September 1989]
First Division, Grino-Aquino (J): 4 concur
Facts:
Acting on a verified report of a confidential informant that assorted electronic
and electrical equipment and other articles illegally imported into the Philippines
by a syndicate engaged in unlawful "shipside" activities (foreign goods are
unloaded from foreign ships in transit through Philippine waters into motorized
bancas and landed on Philippine soil without passing through the Bureau of
Customs, thereby evading payment of the corresponding customs duties and
taxes thereon) were found inside "Tom's Electronics" and "Sony Merchandising
(Philippines)" stores located at 690 and 691 Gonzalo Puyat corner Evangelista
Street, Quiapo, Manila, a letter-request dated 23 April 1976 was addressed to
the Collector of Customs by the Deputy Director of the Regional Anti-Smuggling
Action Center, Manila Bay Area (RASAC-MBA) for the issuance of warrants of
seizure and detention. After evaluation, the Collector of Customs issued
Warrants of Seizure and Detention 14925 and 14925-A, directing the Anti-
Smuggling Action Center to seize the goods mentioned therein, i.e. various
electronic equipments like cassette tape recorders, car stereos, phonograph
needles (diamond), portable TV sets, imported long playing records, spare parts
of TVs and radios and other electrical appliances. A RASAC team was formed and
given a mission order to enforce the warrants, which it implemented with the
assistance of: (1) the National Customs Police (augmenting the team with 2
members), (2) the Detective Bureau of the Manila Western Police District
Headquarters (with 3 detectives), as well as, (3) Precinct 3 of the Manila Western
Police District which exercised jurisdictional control over the place to be raided.
The intended raid was entered in the respective police blotters of the police
detective bureaus. On the strength of the warrants of seizure and detention, the
raid was conducted in the afternoon of 25 April 1976 at the 2 stores of Tomas
Chia. ASAC team leader Gener Sula, together with his agents Badron Dobli,
Arturo Manuel, Rodolfo Molina and Servillano Florentin of Camp Aguinaldo,
Quezon City, assisted by two customs policemen, Val Martinez and Renato
Sorima, and Manila policemen Rogelio Vinas and John Peralta, recovered from
the stores, assorted electronic equipment and other articles, the customs duties
on which allegedly had not been paid. They were turned over to the Customs
Auction and Cargo Disposal Unit of the Bureau of Customs. On 17 May 1976, in
the afternoon, the hearing officer of Acting Collector of Customs Alfredo
Francisco conducted a hearing on the confiscation of the goods taken by Gener
Sula and his agents. 2 days later, Chia filed the petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus before the Supreme Court to enjoin the Collector of Customs
and/or his agents from further proceeding with the forfeiture hearing and prayed
that the search warrants be declared null and void, that the latter be ordered to
return the confiscated articles to Chia, and to pay damages.
Issue: Whether the warrants issued by the Collector of Customs partakes the
nature of a general warrants, and thus are invalid.
Held: Not only may goods be seized without a search and seizure warrant under
Section 2536 of the Customs and Tariff Code, when they (the goods) are openly
offered for sale or kept in storage in a store as herein, but the fact is that Chia's
stores "Tom's Electronics" and "Sony Merchandising (Phil.)" were searched
upon warrants of search and detention issued by the Collector of Customs, who,
under the 1973 Constitution, was "a responsible officer authorized by law" to
issue them. Sections 2208 and 2209 of the Tariff and Customs Code provide
when a search may be made without a warrant and when a warrant is necessary.
Section 2208 provides that "For the more effective discharge of his official
duties, any person exercising the powers herein conferred, may at any time
enter, pass through or search any land or inclosure or any warehouse, store or
other building, not being a dwelling house. A warehouse, store or other building
or inclosure used for the keeping or storage of articles does not become a
dwelling house within the meaning hereof merely by reason of the fact that a
person employed as watchman lives in the place, nor will the fact that his family
stays there with him alter the case." On the other hand, Section 2209 provides
that "A dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued
by a Judge of the court or such other responsible officers as may be authorized
by law, upon sworn application showing probable cause and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized." The
warrants issued by the Collector of Customs in this case were not general
warrants for they identified the stores to be searched, described the articles to
be seized and specified the provision of the Tariff and Customs Code violated.
Upon effecting the seizure of the goods, the Bureau of Customs acquired
exclusive jurisdiction not only over the case but also over the goods seized for
the purpose of enforcing the tariff and customs laws. Further, a party dissatisfied
with the decision of the Collector may appeal to the Commissioner of Customs,
whose decision is appealable to the Court of Tax Appeals in the manner and
within the period prescribed by law and regulations. The decision of the Court of
Tax Appeals may be elevated to the Supreme Court for review. Since Chia did
not exhaust his administrative remedies, his recourse to this Court is premature.
20th Century Fox Film v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76649-51, August
19, 1988
THE FACTS
Petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation sought the assistance of the
NBI in conducting searches and seizures in connection with the NBIs anti-film
piracy campaign. Petitioner alleged that certain videotape outlets all over Metro
Manila are engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films
in violation of PD No. 49 (the old Intellectual Property Law).
The NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets
pinpointed by the petitioner and subsequently filed three (3) applications for
search warrants against the video outlets owned by the private
respondents. The lower court issued the desired search warrants. The NBI,
accompanied by the petitioner's agents, raided the video outlets and seized the
items described in the three warrants.
Private respondents later filed a motion to lift the search warrants and
release the seized properties, which was granted by the lower court. Petitioners
motion for reconsideration was denied by the lower court. The CA affirmed the
trial court.
ISSUE
Did the judge properly lift the search warrants he issued earlier?
THE RULING
[The Court DISMISSED the petition and AFFIRMED the questioned
decision and resolution of the CA.]
YES, the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued
earlier.
The lower court lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in the
absence of probable cause that the private respondents violated P.D. 49. NBI
agents who acted as witnesses during the application for search warrant did not
have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony, which was the
alleged commission of the offense of piracy by the private respondents. Only the
petitioners counsel who was also a witness during the application stated that he
had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the private
respondents were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the
petitioner. The lower court lifted the warrants, declaring that the testimony of
petitioners counsel did not have much credence because the master tapes of
the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court during the application.
The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films, from which the
pirated films were allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search
warrants against those who have in their possession the pirated films. The
petitioner's argument to the effect that the presentation of the master tapes at
the time of application may not be necessary as these would be merely
evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether or not a probable cause
exists to justify the issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious. The court
cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced
from master tapes that it owns.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial
similarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the
applicant must present to the court the copyrighted films to compare them with
the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine
whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage of
the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the
copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano, 132 SCRA 152 (1985)
FACTS:
Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia Nolasco by the
Constabulary Security Group (CSG). Milagros had been wanted as a high ranking
officer of the CPP. The arrest took place at 11:30 a.m. of August 6, 1984. At noon
of the same day, her premises were searched and 428 documents, a portable
typewriter and 2 boxes were seized. Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Pao issued a
search warrant to be served at Aguilar-Roques leased residence allegedly an
underground house of the CPP/NPA. On the basis of the documents seized,
charges of subversion and rebellion by the CSG were filed by but the fiscals
office merely charged her and Nolasco with illegal possession of subversive
materials. Aguilar-Roque asked for suppression of the evidence on the ground
that it was illegally obtained and that the search warrant is void because it is a
general warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity the
things subject of the search and seizure, and that probable cause has not been
properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the
applicants witness.
ISSUE: WON the search warrant was valid?
HELD:
NO. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. It also
specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the things to be seized.
It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of
personal properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all-
embracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does
not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals
not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to
enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite
guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus
giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize
as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes.
It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the
constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the things to
be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar
description were considered null and void for being too general.
PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs JUDGE
MAXIMO ASUNCION
FACTS:
On 25 January 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a
search warrant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 104, of Quezon City,
stating "(1) that the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the
Philippines, located at PICOP compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur,
represented by its Sr. Vice President Ricardo G. Santiago, is in possession or has
in its control high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which are the
subject of the offense, or used or intended to be used in committing the offense,
and which are being kept and concealed in the premises herein described; (2)
that a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to take
possession and bring to this Honorable Court the following described properties:
'Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal. 5.56, ten (10) M16 US rifles, two (2) AK-47
rifle[s], two (2) UZI submachinegun[s], two (2) M203 Grenade Launcher[s] cal
40mm., ten (10) cal. 45 pistol[s], ten (10) cal. 38 revolver[s], two (2) ammunition
reloading machine[s], assorted ammunitions for said calibers of firearms and ten
(10) handgrenades.'" The joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2
Cecilio T. Morito, as well as a summary of the information and the supplementary
statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno were attached to the application.
After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion
issued the contested search warrant. On 4 February 1995, the police enforced
the search warrant at the PICOP compound and seized various firearms and
ammunition. Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search
unreasonable, Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, Evaristo M.
Narvaez Jr., Ricardo G. Santiago, Roberto A. Dormendo, Reydande D. Azucena,
Niceforo V. Avila, Florentino M. Mula, Felix O. Baito, Harold B. Celestial,
Elmedencio C. Calixtro, Carlito S. Legacion, Albino T. Lubang, Jeremias I. Abad
and Herminio V. Villamil filed a "Motion to Quash" 16 before the trial court.
Subsequently, they also filed a "Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash"
and a "Motion to Suppress Evidence." On 23 March 1995, the RTC issued the
Order which denied PICOP, et. al.'s motions. On 3 August 1995, the trial court
rendered its Order denying their Motion for Reconsideration. PICOP, et. al. filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
ISSUE:
Whether the Search Warrant is Valid?
HELD:
No, petition for Certiorari and prohibition is hereby granted and Search Warrant
No. 799 accordingly declared null and void, TRO permanent.
RATIONALE:
There is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts.
Main Issue: Validity of Search Warrrant (Article III, Section 2, 1987, 1987
Constitution & Rule 126, Sections 3&4 of Rules of Court).
Requisites of Valid Search Warrant are:
1. Probable Cause is present
2. Such presence is determined personally by the Judge
3. The complainant and the Witnesses he or she may produce are personally
examined by the Judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation
4. The applicant and the Witnesses testify on facts personally known to them
5. The Warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and things to
be seized
a. Present case, the Search Warrant is INVALID because
i. The Trial Court failed to examine personally the complainant and the
other dependents
ii. SP03 Bacolod had no personal knowledge that petitioners were not
licensed to possess the subject firearms
iii. The place to be searched was not described with particularity
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses does are thus not sufficient.
The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce and attached them to the record.
Particularity of the Place to be searched:
The belief to value privacy of home and person and to afford it constitutional
protection against the long reach of government is no less than to value human
dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding
social need and then only under stringent procedural safeguards.
The aforementioned premises, did not specify such premises. The warrant
identifies only one place and that is Paper Industries Corporation of the
Philippines, located at PICOP compound. However; it was made of 200 offices /
building, 15 plants, 84 staffs houses, airstrip, 3 piers / wharves, and 23
warehouses.
Jurisprudence: People vs CA
What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the
warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented
in the proofs they submitted to the Court issuing the warrant.
- It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be
searched, even if not delineated in the warrant
- The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may
properly be done by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to
the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.
Yousef Al Ghoul vs. Court of Appeals
GR No.126859, September 4, 2001
Facts:
Judge Geronimo S. Mangay, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch 125, Kalookan City, issued search warrants 54-
953 and 55-954 for the search and seizure of certain items in Apartment No. 2 at
154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City. On April 1, 1995, the
police searched Apartment No. 8, in the same compound and found one (1) .45
caliber pistol. Found in Apartment No. 2 were firearms, ammunitions and
explosives. Petitioners were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan
City accusing them with illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and
explosives, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1866.6 Thereafter, petitioners
were arrested and detained. Petitioners contend that the search and seizure
orders violated Sections 2 and 3 of the Bill of Rights as well as Section 3 of Rule
126 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure because the place searched and
articles seized were not described with particularity. They argue that the two-
witness requirement under Section 10 of Rule 126 was ignored when only one
witness signed the receipt for the properties seized during the search, and said
witness was not presented at the trial.
ISSUE: W/N the items described in the warrant were sufficiently described with
particularity.
HELD: As held in PICOP v. Asuncion, the place to be searched cannot be
changed, enlarged nor amplified by the police. Policemen may not be restrained
from pursuing their task with vigor, but in doing so, care must be taken that
constitutional and legal safeguards are not disregarded. Exclusion of unlawfully
seized evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Hence, we are
constrained to declare that the search made at Apartment No. 8 is illegal and
the .45 caliber pistol taken thereat is inadmissible in evidence against
petitioners.
Now, in contrast, the search conducted at Apartment No. 2 could not be similarly
faulted. The search warrants in question specifically mentioned Apartment No. 2.
The search was done in the presence of its occupants, herein petitioners, in
accordance with Section 7 of Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court. Petitioners allege
lack of particularity in the description of objects to be seized pursuant to the
warrants. That the articles seized during the search of Apartment No. 2 are of
the same kind and nature as those items enumerated in the search warrant
appears to be beyond cavil. The items seized from Apartment No. 2 were
described with specifity in the warrants in question. The nature of the items
ordered to be seized did not require a technical description. Moreover, the law
does not require that the things to be seized must be described in
precise and minute details as to leave no room for doubt on the part of
the searching authorities, otherwise, it would be virtually impossible
for the applicants to obtain a search warrant as they would not know
exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Substantial similarity
of those articles described as a class or species would suffice.
The case of Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Ruiz , 37 SCRA 823, 835
(1971), pointed out that one of the tests to determine the particularity
in the description of objects to be seized under a search warrant is
when the things described are limited to those which bear direct
relation to the ofense for which the warrant is being issued. A careful
examination of the Search Warrants shows that they were worded in such a
manner that the enumerated items to be seized could bear a direct relation to
the offense of violation of Section 1 and 3 of Presidential Decree No.1866, as
amended, penalizing illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives.

People v. Omaweng [GR 99050, 2 September 1992] Third Division,
Davide (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: In the morning of 12 September 1988, PC constables with the Mt.
Province PC Command put up a checkpoint at the junction of the roads, one
going to Sagada and the other to Bontoc. They stopped and checked all vehicles
that went through the checkpoint. At 9:15 a.m., they flagged down a cream-
colored Ford Fiera (ABT-634) coming from the Bontoc Poblacion and headed
towards Baguio. The vehicle was driven by Conway Omaweng and had no
passengers. The Constables (Layong, et.al.) asked permission to inspect the
vehicle to which Omaweng acceded to. When they peered into the rear of the
vehicle, they saw a travelling bag which was partially covered by the rim of a
spare tire under the passenger seat on the right side of the vehicle. They asked
permission to see the contents of the bag to which Omaweng consented to.
When they opened the bag, they found that it contained 41 plastic packets of
different sizes containing pulverized substances. The constable gave a packet to
his team leader, who, after sniffing the stuff concluded that it was marijuana.
The Constables thereafter boarded the vehicles and proceeded to the Bontoc
poblacion to report the incident to the PC Headquarters. The prohibited drugs
were surrendered to the evidence custodian. The PC Forensic Chemist at Camp
Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet conducted 2 chemistry examinations of the
substance contained in the plastic packets taken from appellant and found them
to be positive for hashish or marijuana. Omaweng was indicted for the violation
of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended, in
a criminal complaint filed with the MTC Bontoc, Mountain Province on 12
September 1988. Upon his failure to submit counter-affidavits despite the
granting of an extension of time to do so, the court declared that he had waived
his right to a preliminary investigation and, finding probable cause against
Omaweng, ordered the elevation of the case to the proper court. On 14
November 1988, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Mountain Province filed an
Information charging Omaweng with the violation of Section 47 Article II of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended (Crim Case 713). After his motion for
reinvestigation was denied by the Provincial Fiscal, Omaweng entered a plea of
not guilty during his arraignment on 20 June 1989. During the trial on the merits,
the prosecution presented 4 witnesses. Omaweng did not present any evidence
other than portions of the Joint Clarificatory Sworn Statement, dated 23
December 1988, of prosecution witnesses Joseph Layong and David Fomocod.
On 21 March 1991, the trial court promulgated its Judgment convicting
Omaweng of the crime of transporting prohibited drugs (Section 4, Article II of
RA 6425, as amended). Omaweng appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Omaweng was subjected to search which violates his
Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Held: Omaweng was not subjected to any search which may be stigmatized as a
violation of his Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
He willingly gave prior consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to have it
conducted on his vehicle and travelling bag. The testimony of the PC Constable
(Layung) was not dented on cross-examination or rebutted by Omaweng for he
chose not to testify on his own behalf. Omaweng waived his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures when he voluntarily submitted to a search
or consents to have it made in his person or premises. He is precluded from later
complaining thereof right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every
right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.
Since in the course of the valid search 41 packages of drugs were found, it
behooved the officers to seize the same; no warrant was necessary for such
seizure.
People vs. Correa [GR 119246, 30 January 1998] En Banc, Martinez (J):
12 concur
Facts: A week before 18 June 1994, Leonardo Dulay was placed under
surveillance by the Police Operatives from the Drug Enforcement Unit of the
Western Police District Command (DEU-WPDC) on account of confidential and
intelligence reports received in said Unit about his drug trafficking around
Bambang Street, Tondo, Manila. The police surveillance brought forth positive
results and confirmed Dulay's illegal drug trade. On 17 June 1994, operatives
were alerted that Dulay would transport and deliver a certain quantity of drugs
that night on board a owner-type jeep (FMR948). Thereafter, the operatives,
together with the informer proceeded to A. Bonifacio Street on board 3 vehicles,
and inconspicuously parked along the side of North Cemetery and waited for the
suspect. The police informant spotted Dulays vehicle at 3:00 am. The
operatives tailed the subject jeepney until they reached Bambang extension and
Jose Abad Santos Avenue, where they accosted the passengers of said jeepney.
The team inspected a cylindrical tin can of El Cielo Vegetable Cooking Lard,
about two feet high, loaded in the vehicle of the appellants. The can contained 8
bundles of suspected dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped in pieces of paper
and plastic tapes. The team seized the suspected contrabands and marked each
bundle consecutively. The 3 suspects were brought to the police headquarters at
DEU-WPDC for investigation. The packages of suspected marijuana were
submitted to the NBI for laboratory analysis to determine their chemical
composition. The tests confirmed that the confiscated stuff were positive for
marijuana and weighed 16.1789 kilograms. The defense, however, contends
that the 3 accused were arrested without warrant in Camarin D, Caloocan City,
enroute to Dulays house to get the things of his child allegedly rushed
previously to the Metropolitan Hospital, for an alleged charge of trafficking on
'shabu,' and were brought to the WPDC headquarters at U.N. Avenue, where
they were detained. On 12 July 1994, an Information was filed with the RTC
Manila (Branch 35) indicting Antonio Correa y Cayton @ "Boyet," Rito Gunida y
Sesante @ "Dodong," and Leonardo Dulay y Santos @ "Boy Kuba" for having
violated Section 4, Article II of RA 6425, as amended. When arraigned, the 3
accused pleaded not guilty. After trial and on 3 March 1995, the lower court
found the appellants guilty as charged and were sentenced to death and a fine
of P10 million.
Issue: Whether the accused are precluded from assailing the warrantless search
and seizure, due to waiver on their part.
Held: Antonio Correa y Cayton @ "Boyet," Rito Gunida y Sesante @ "Dodong,"
and Leonardo Dulay y Santos @ "Boy Kuba" are precluded from assailing the
warrantless search and seizure when they voluntarily submitted to it as shown
by their actuation during the search and seizure. They never protested when the
police officer opened the tin can loaded in their vehicle, nor when he opened
one of the bundles, nor when they, together with their cargo of drugs and their
vehicle, were brought to the police station for investigation and subsequent
prosecution. When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it
made on his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof
The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be
waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly." Further,
they effectively waived their constitutional right against the search and seizure
by their voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, when they
entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and by participating in the trial.
People v. Ramos [GR 85401-02, 4 June 1990] Third Division, Gutierrez Jr.
(J): 3 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: On 29 November 1982, a civilian informer came to the Narcotics
Command Office in Olongapo City and reported that a cigarette vendor by the
name of "Mama Rose" (Rosalinda Ramos) was selling marijuana at the corner of
3rd Street and Rizal Avenue in Olongapo City. Tests buys were made using
marked money. The Narcotics Command (NARCOM) team proceeded to the place
where appellant was selling cigarettes, and arrested the latter for illegal
peddling of marijuana. Ramos was requested to take out the contents of her
wallet. The four marked five-peso bills used in the test buys were found among
her possessions and were confiscated after the serial numbers were confirmed.
Search of Ramos stall yielded 20 sticks of marijuana cigarettes in a trash can
placed under the small table where Ramos displayed the wares she was selling.
Ramos was thereafter brought to the station. At the station, Ramos executed a
statement confessing to her crimes which she swore to before Assistant City
Fiscal. The marijuana sticks confiscated were sent to the Philippine Constabulary
Crime Laboratory (PCCL) for analysis, and thereafter were confirmed to be
marijuana. The defense contends however that she assented to the invitation of
the NARCOM operatives for investigation, after search of her buri bags (which
she stores the fruits that she sells) were fruitless. She claimed that she was
forced to affix her signature on the four 5-peso bills by one Sgt. Sudiacal,
purportedly to be the same money which was used to buy marijuana from her,
but which she insists was her money being saved for the rentals. She was later
brought to the Fiscals Office after investigation, where she signed a document.
She claimed she was not assisted by any counsel during the investigation,
neither during the time she signed the document at the Fiscals Office. Two
informations were filed against Ramos, one for sale (Criminal Case 5991) and
the other for possession of marijuana (Criminal Case 5990). After trial, the RTC
Olongapo City (Branch 73) found her guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal
Case 5990 for violating Section 8 of RA 6425 and sentenced her to imprisonment
of 6 years and 1 day and a fine of P6,000. She was likewise found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt in Criminal Case 5991 for violating Section 4 of RA 6425 and
was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000. Ramos sought
reversal of the decisions with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Ramos waived her right against the warrantless search of the
trash can, where illegal drugs were found, under her control.
Held: The trash can (where the contraband were found) was found under the
table where her legitimate wares were being sold. Ramos he was the only
person who had access to the trash can. The same was under her immediate
physical control. She had complete charge of the contents of the trash can under
the table to the exclusion of all other persons. In law, actual possession exists
when the thing is in the immediate occupancy and control of the party. But this
is not to say that the law requires actual possession. In criminal law, possession
necessary for conviction of the offense of possession of controlled substances
with intent to distribute may be constructive as well as actual. It is only
necessary that the defendant must have dominion and control over the
contraband. These requirements are present in the situation described, where
the prohibited drugs were found inside the trash can placed under the stall
owned by Ramos. In fact, the NARCOM agents who conducted the search
testified that they had to ask Ramps to stand so that they could look inside the
trash can under Ramos' papag. The trash can was positioned in such a way that
it was difficult for another person to use the trash can. The trash can was
obviously not for use by her customers. Therefore, the twenty sticks of
marijuana are admissible in evidence and the trial court's finding that Ramos is
guilty of possession is correct.
People v. Barros [GR 90640, 29 March 1994] Third Division, Feliciano
(J): 3 concur
Facts: On 6 September 1987, M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan, both
members of the P.C. Mountain Province Command, rode the Dangwa Bus bearing
Plate ABZ-242 bound for Sabangan, Mountain Province. Upon reaching
Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, the bus stopped and both M/Sgt. Yag-
as and S/Sgt. Ayan, who were seated at the back, saw Bonifacio Barros carrying
a carton, board the bus and seated himself on seat 18 after putting the carton
under his seat. Thereafter, the bus continued and upon reaching Sabangan,
M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan before they alighted, it being their station, called
C2C [Fernando] Bongyao to inspect the carton under seat 18. After C2C Bongyao
inspected the carton, he found out that it contained marijuana and he asked the
passengers who the owner of the carton was but nobody answered. Thereafter,
C2C Bongyao alighted with the carton and S/Sgt. Ayan and C2C Bongyao invited
Barros to the detachment for questioning as the latter was the suspected owner
of the carton containing marijuana. Upon entering the detachment the carton
was opened in the presence of Barros. When Barros denied ownership of the
carton of marijuana, the P.C. officers called for the bus conductor who pinpointed
to Barros as the owner of the carton of marijuana. Barros was charged with
violating Section 4 of RA 6425, as amended (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).
After trial, the trial court convicted Bonifacio Barros of violation of Section 4 of
RA 6425 as amended and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P20,000.00. Barros appealed.
Issue: Whether the failure of the carton bearer to object to the search made in
the moving vehicle, resulting to his warrantless arrest, constitutes a waiver.
Held: The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through
or with a judicial warrant; otherwise such search and seizure becomes
"unreasonable" within the meaning of Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The evidence secured thereby i.e., the "fruits" of the search and
seizure will be inadmissible in evidence "for any purpose in any proceeding."
The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying
out of a search and seizure is, however, not absolute. There are certain
exceptions recognized in our law, one of which relates to the search of moving
vehicles. Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles
automobiles, trucks, etc. without need of a warrant, it not being practicable to
secure a judicial warrant before searching a vehicle, since such vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be
sought. In carrying out warrantless searches of moving vehicles, however, peace
officers are limited to routine checks, that is, the vehicles are neither really
searched nor their occupants subjected to physical or body searches, the
examination of the vehicles being limited to visual inspection. When, however, a
vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless
search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that
either the motorist is a lawoffender or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or
have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal
offense. The Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a
judicial warrant an extensive search of moving vehicles in situations where (1)
there had emanated from a package the distinctive smell of marijuana; (2)
agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the Philippine National Police
("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers that a sizeable volume
of marijuana would be transported along the route where the search was
conducted; (3) Narcom agents were informed or "tipped off" by an undercover
"deep penetration" agent that prohibited drugs would be brought into the
country on a particular airline flight on a given date; (4) Narcom agents had
received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province,
had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents confronted
the accused Caucasian, because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he
failed to present his passport and other identification papers when requested to
do so; and (5) Narcom agents had received confidential information that a Spouses Veroy v. Layague, G.R. No. L-95630, 210 SCRA 97, June 18,
woman having the same physical appearance as that of the accused would be 1992
transporting marijuana. Herein, there is nothing in the record that any
circumstance which constituted or could have reasonably constituted probable Doctrine: "Qualified consent" - The permission to enter a house and search for
cause for the peace officers to search the carton box allegedly owned by Barros. persons and effects may be qualified, and the searching officer may not act in
The testimony of the law enforcement officers who had apprehended the excess of the authority granted to him. Although the offense of illegal possession
accused (M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan), and who had searched of firearms is a malum prohibitum, it does not follow that the subjects may be
the box in his possession, (C2C Fernando Bongyao), simply did not suggest or seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary in
indicate the presence of any such probable cause. Further, The accused is not to the context of this case.
be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted on the occasion of
Facts:
his warrantless arrest "simply because he failed to object." To constitute a
waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person
The Veroys moved to QC and left their house in Davao City to a caretaker who
involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right;
had keys to the kitchen only. The Veroys had the keys to the interior of the
and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. The
house. Capt. Obrero raided the house based on an information that rebel
fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not
soldiers are allegedly hiding there.With the help of caretakers, they were able to
amount to a permission to make a search therein. As the constitutional quaranty
enter only up to the yard since the owner was not around and they did not have
is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place
a search warrant. They contacted Mrs. Veroy, and explained that the house was
the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or
reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center of rebel soldiers. Mrs.
waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful
Veroy then gave permission to search the house with the condition that Major
submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is
Macasaet, a long-time family friend, must be there during the search. Despite
merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. Courts indulge
the qualified consent, the officers entered various rooms, including the childrens
every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional
room, and confiscated a .45 caliber gun and other effects, which were the basis
rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental
of the charge of illegal possession of firearms against them. Despite the fact that
rights. Accordingly, the search and seizure of the carton box was equally
the warrants for their arrest have not yet been served on them, petitioners
nonpermissible and invalid. The "fruits" of the invalid search and seizure i.e.,
voluntarily surrendered themselves to Brig. Gen. Pantaleon Dumlao, PC-CIS
the 4) kilos of marijuana should therefore not have been admitted in evidence
Chief, since it was the CIS that initiated the complaint. However, the latter
against Barros.
refused to receive them on the ground that his office has not yet received copies
of their warrants of arrest. The Spouses Veroy assailed the admissibility of the
evidence for being obtained in violation of their constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure.

Issue: Whether the evidence is admissible? NO.

Ratio:
Petitioners alleged that while Capt. Obrero had permission to enter their house,
it was merely for the purpose of ascertaining the presence of the alleged "rebel"
soldiers. The permission did not include the authority to conduct a room to room
search inside the house. The items taken were, therefore, products of an illegal
search, violative of their constitutional rights. As such, they are inadmissible in
evidence against them. The Court ruled that the case at bar does not fall on the
exceptions for a warrantless search. The reason for searching the house is that it
was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldiers.
While Capt. Obrero was able to enter the yard, he did not enter the house
because he did not have a search warrant and the owners were not present. This
shows that he himself recognized the need for a search warrant, hence, he did
not persist in entering the house but rather contacted the Veroys to seek
permission to enter the same. Permission was granted by Mrs. Veroy to enter the
house but only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers. Under the
circumstances the police officers had time to procure a search warrant but they
did not. The Court also ruled that although the offense of illegal possession of
firearms is a malum prohibitum, it does not follow that the subjects may be
seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary.
The rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the articles
People v. Damaso, G.R. No. 93516, 212 SCRA 547, August 12, 1992
seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the exclusionary
principle. They cannot be used as evidence against the petitioners in the
criminal action against them for illegal possession of firearms.
Doctrine: The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal
right. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures,
being personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except 1) the person whose
rights are invaded or 2) one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her
behalf.

Facts:
The group of Lt. Quijardo were sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members
in Dagupan City. They put under surveillance the rented apartment of
Rosemarie, sister of someone whom they earlier arrested. They interviewed
Luzviminda Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie, who stated that she worked with
Bernie Mendoza alias Basilio Damaso, the appellant. Together with Morados,
they reached the house of Damaso where they saw Luz Tanciangco, a helper.
Tanciangco then allowed the group to enter inside the house. The group of Lt.
Quijardo entered the dwelling of Damaso without a valid warrant when the latter
was absent. They requested the persons in the house to allow them to look
around. In one of the rooms, they saw subversive materials which they
confiscated. They likewise brought the persons found in the house to the
headquarters for investigation and the persons revealed that Damaso was the
lessee of the house and owned the items confiscated. Based on this, Damaso
was charged with illegal possession of firearms.

Issue: Whether the evidence is admissible? NO.

Ratio:
The Court ruled that the law enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of
a valid search and seizure. None of these exceptions for a warrantless search is
present in this case. Moreover, the constitutional immunity from unreasonable
searches and seizures, being personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except
1) the person whose rights are invaded or 2) one who is expressly authorized to
do so in his or her behalf. In this case, the records show that Damaso was not in
his house at that time Luz, his alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter.
There was no evidence that would establish the fact that Luz was indeed
Damasos helper or if it was true that she was his helper, that Damaso had given
her authority to open his house in his absence. Being a helper, she does not
qualify as a person authorized to waive such right in representation of her
employer.Thus, the search being invalid for lack of warrant, the evidence
obtained thereafter is inadmissible.
ARREST AND SEIZURE
Art. 3, Section 8, 1987 Philippine Constitution
Section 2.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
Doctrine:
Without the proper search warrant, no public official has the right to enter the
premises of another without his consent for the purpose of search and seizure. It
does not admit of doubt therefore that a search or seizure cannot be stigmatized
as unreasonable and thus offensive to the Constitution if consent be shown. For
this immunity from unwarranted intrusion is a personal right which may be
waived either expressly or impliedly.
Lopez vs. Commissioner of Customs
GR L-27968,
3 December 1975
Ponente: FERNANDO, J.:
Nature of Case:
Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
BRIEF
The search and seizure by the respondents of the hotel room of the petitioners
who imported smuggled goods and the luggages, boxes, documents and paper
therein was held to be lawful by the Supreme Court. Before said search was
conducted, Teofila Ibaez, the actual occupant of the room at the time,
voluntarily consented to the search of the room and signed receipts of the
seized items and received copies thereof. As such, the search and seizure was
conducted with consent in the presence of the occupant.
FACTS:
Petitioners claim that the 1,408 sacks of copra and 86 sacks of coffee in
question were purchased in Kiamba, Lumatin, and Lumasal, all in the province of
Cotabato, from a certain Osmea Juanday. Petitioners contend that, inasmuch as
the said goods were not imported and of foreign origin, they are not legally
subject to seizure and forfeiture. They likewise contend that the forfeiture made
by the Collector of Customs of Davao was invalid because the said forfeiture was
based on documents and papers which were illegally seized by agents of the
Government through violence and intimidation. Petition alleged that at about
3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of September 19, 1966, when the vessel was
searched, a combined team of Constabulary and Regional Anti-Smuggling Center
operatives headed by NBI agent Earl Reynolds raided the hotel room then being
rented by petitioner Tomas Velasco without any search warrant and in the
absence at the time of such petitioner Tomas Velasco or the presence of any
other person, except one Teofila Ibaez, a mere manicurist of Davao City by
occupation and "forcibly opened luggages and boxes from which only several
documents and papers were found, then seized, confiscated and took away the
same."
Respondents replied that after Captain Pantinople informed the team that
petitioner Tomas Velasco, the charterer of the vessel, had other documents
showing that vessel came from Indonesia carrying smuggled copra and coffee,
some members of the team proceeded to the room of petitioner Velasco at the
Skyroom Hotel in Davao City, to ask for said documents; (b) Although petitioner
Velasco was not inside the hotel room, respondent Reynolds, after identifying
himself as a police officer and after explaining his purpose, was allowed to enter
the room by Mrs. Tomas Velasco who subsequently volunteered to open the
suitcases and baggages of petitioner Velasco and delivered the documents and
things contained therein to respondent Reynolds; ... (c) The said police team did
not search the room; neither did the members thereof forcibly open the
luggages and boxes nor seized and confiscated the documents and things
contained therein, since that was not necessary because ... Mrs. Tomas Velasco
voluntarily opened the baggages and suitcases and gave their contents of
documents and things to respondent Reynolds.
Here the wife of petitioner Tomas Velasco, upon being informed of the purpose of
the search by the officers, invited them to enter and search the hotel room and
even voluntarily gave the documents and things requested by said officers. This
fact could be gleaned from the following records of the two seizure cases
involving the vessel M/V Jolo Lema and its cargo of Indonesian copra and coffee:
(a) On September 19, 1966, Teofila Ibaez, wife of petitioner Tomas Velasco,
issued a written statement which states that "... I have voluntarily and freely
allowed my husband's and my personal belongings to be searched and freely
gave the following items." ... (b) On the same date, she issued another
certification which reads in part, viz.: "... That I have voluntarily turned over for
safekeeping and verification the following."... (c) Also on the same date, she
issued still another certification which reads partially, thus:"... that I have freely
and voluntarily allowed the search of my and my husband's personal belongings
and turn-over to the NBI of the following items."... (d) On October 13, 1966 the
Davao City Police Department issued a certification to the effect that the
petitioner Tomas Velasco never filed any "report for robbery or other offenses ...
against any member of the NBI or the PC during the period from September 19,
1966 to the present,"
ISSUE:
Whether in this instance there was consent on the part of the person who was
the occupant of the hotel room then rented by petitioner Velasco.
ACTIONS of the COURT
CTA: Search and seizure was declared lawful.
SC: Petition dismissed. Affirmed the validity of the seizure proceeding.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE RULING
It was set forth at the outset that the state policy of minimizing, if not doing
away entirely with the festering sore of smuggling must be carried out with due
respect for constitutional rights. It is a truism in law that a desirable end cannot
be attained by illegal means. Whenever there is a showing therefore that the
safeguards of the fundamental law are disregarded, more specifically the
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure, then judicial redress is
appropriate. Such is not the case here.
There was an attempt on the part of petitioners to counteract the force of the
above recital by an affidavit of one Corazon Y. Velasco, who stated that she is the
legal wife of petitioner Tomas Velasco, and another by such petitioner himself
reiterating such a fact and that the person who was present at his hotel room
was one Teofila Ibaez, "a manicurist by occupation ." Their effort appurtenant
thereto is doomed to failure. If such indeed were the case, then it is much more
easily understandable why that person, Teofila Ibaez, who could be aptly
described as the wrong person at the wrong place and at the wrong time, would
have signified her consent readily and immediately. Under the circumstances,
that was the most prudent course of action. It would save her and even
petitioner Velasco himself from any gossip or innuendo. Nor could the officers of
the law be blamed if they would act on the appearances. There was a person
inside who from all indications was ready to accede to their request. Even
common courtesy alone would have precluded them from inquiring too closely
as to why she was there. Under all the circumstances, therefore, it can readily be
concluded that there was consent sufficient in law to dispense with the need for
a search warrant. The petition cannot, therefore, prevail
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is dismissed.
Costs against petitioners.
ARREST AND SEIZURE
Art. 3, Section 8, 1987 Philippine Constitution
Section 2.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
Doctrine:
Warrantless search of moving vehicle - when a vehicle is stopped and subjected
to an extensive search, such a warrantless search would be constitutionally
permissible only if the officers conducting the search have reasonable or
probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-
offender or they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in
the vehicle to be searched.
Caballes vs. Court of Appeals
GR 136292,
15 January 2002
Ponente: PUNO, J
Nature of Case:
Petition for certiorari
BRIEF
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of respondent Court of Appeals
dated September 15, 1998 which affirmed the judgment rendered by the
Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna, finding herein petitioner, Rudy
Caballes y Taio, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft, and the
resolution2 dated November 9, 1998 which denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of CA and acquitted
the accused and declared the warrantless arrest of moving vehicle as unlawful.
FACTS:
At about 9:15 p.m. of June 28, 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de
Castro, while on a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna,
spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves. Suspecting
that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged
down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by appellant. When asked what was
loaded on the jeep, he did not answer; he appeared pale and nervous.
With appellant's consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they
discovered bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires
exclusively owned by National Power Corporation (NPC). The conductor wires
weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55, 244.45. Noceja asked appellant where the
wires came from and appellant answered that they came from Cavinti, a town
approximately 8 kilometers away from Sampalucan. Thereafter, appellant and
the vehicle with the high-voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police
Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of the appellant and the jeep loaded with
the wires which were turned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan,
Laguna. Appellant was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail.
In defense, appellant interposed denial and alibi. He testified that he is a driver
and resident of Pagsanjan, Laguna; a NARCOM civilian agent since January, 1988
although his identification card (ID) has already expired. In the afternoon of June
28, 1989, while he was driving a passenger jeepney, he was stopped by one
Resty Fernandez who requested him to transport in his jeepney conductor wires
which were in Cavinti, Laguna. He told Resty to wait until he had finished his last
trip for the day from Santa Cruz, Laguna. On his way to Santa Cruz, Laguna, he
dropped by the NARCOM headquarters and informed his superior, Sgt. Callos,
that something unlawful was going to happen. Sgt. Callos advised him to
proceed with the loading of the wires and that the former would act as back-up
and intercept the vehicle at the Sambat Patrol Base in Pagsanjan.
After receiving those instructions, he went back to see Resty. Although Resty had
his own vehicle, its tires were old so the cable wires were loaded in appellant's
jeep and covered with kakawati leaves. The loading was done by about five (5)
masked men. He was promised P1,000.00 for the job. Upon crossing a bridge,
the two vehicles separated but in his case, he was intercepted by Sgt. Noceja
and Pat. De Castro. When they discovered the cables, he told the police officers
that the cables were loaded in his jeep by the owner, Resty Fernandez. But
despite his explanation, he was ordered to proceed to police headquarters where
he was interrogated. The police officers did not believe him and instead locked
him up in jail for a week.
ISSUE:
Whether the constitutional right of petitioner was violated when the police
officers searched his vehicle and seized the wires found therein without a search
warrant and when samples of the wires and references to them were admitted in
evidence as basis for his conviction.
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC: Valid warrantless search and seizure. Accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Theft of property.
CTA: AFFIRMED with the modification that appellant RUDY CABALLES is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in theft
SC: REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused Rudy Caballes is ACQUITTED of the
crime charged.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE RULING
Search of moving vehicle they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure.
This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial
warrant an extensive search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had It cannot likewise be said that the cable wires found in petitioner's vehicle were
emanated from a package the distinctive smell of marijuana; (2) agents of the in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid. It is clear from the records of
Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the Philippine National Police ("PNP") had this case that the cable wires were not exposed to sight because they were
received a confidential report from informers that a sizeable volume of placed in sacks and covered with leaves.
marijuana would be transported along the route where the search was
conducted; (3) Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian Consented search
coming from Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs
and when the Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and
conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other seizures is a personal right which may be waived. The consent must be
identification papers when requested to do so; (4) Narcom agents had received voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the
confidential information that a woman having the same physical appearance as consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any
that of the accused would be transporting marijuana;(5) the accused who were duress or coercion.
riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier
received confidential reports that said accused would transport a large quantity
Petitioner contends that the statement of Sgt. Victorino Noceja that he checked
of marijuana; and (6) where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the vehicle "with the consent of the accused" is too vague to prove that
the basis of intelligence information and clandestine reports by a deep petitioner consented to the search. He claims that there is no specific statement
penetration agent or spy - one who participated in the drug smuggling activities as to how the consent was asked and how it was given, nor the specific words
of the syndicate to which the accused belonged - that said accused were spoken by petitioner indicating his alleged "consent." At most, there was only an
bringing prohibited drugs into the country. implied acquiescence, a mere passive conformity, which is no "consent" at all
within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.
In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the
SUPREME COURT RULING:
police officers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw
that the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which, according
to them, was unusual and uncommon. We hold that the fact that the vehicle WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused
looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be covered with Rudy Caballes is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. Cost de oficio.
kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as would justify the
conduct of a search without a warrant. In addition, the police authorities do not
claim to have received any confidential report or tipped information that
petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise
have sustained their suspicion. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases where
tipped information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a
warrantless search and seizure. Unfortunately, none exists in this case.

Plain view doctrine

If the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its
appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in
plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that

ARREST AND SEIZURE
Art. 3, Section 8, 1987 Philippine Constitution
Section 2.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
Doctrine:
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, being a
personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are
invaded or who is expressly authorized to do so on his or her behalf.
People vs. Asis
GR 142531,
15 October 2002
Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.
Nature of Case:
Petition for certiorari
BRIEF
Danilo Asis and Gilbert Formento are ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt, and
ordered immediately RELEASED from custody because the decision of the RTC
was based on inadmissible evidence obtained through a warrantless arrest
without consent of the accused and on insufficient circumstantial evidence. The
bloodstained pair of shorts, a piece of evidence seized on the occasion of an
unlawful search and seizure. Thus, it is tainted and should thus be excluded for
being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. In the language of the
fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding.
FACTS:
Diana Yu, the sister of the victim, testified that on February 9, 1998, before 8:30
oclock in the evening, she was in the office of her brother where she was
working at 1042 Benavidez St., Binondo, Manila. She saw the two appellants,
namely: Danilo Asis and Gilbert Formento, and her brother (the victim), who are
all deaf-mutes, talking in sign language. She testified that Danilo Asis frequented
the office of the victim, while Gilbert Formento came only on the night of
February 9, 1998. At around 8:30 oclock in the evening, she left the office,
leaving both appellants and the victim behind. The following morning, at around
7:30 oclock in the morning, her son, George Huang, informed her of her
brothers (victims) death. Upon learning of said incident, she went to the office
where she saw her brothers body. She discovered that the sales proceeds of the
preceding day were missing and the necklace of her brother (victim) which he
always wore was also missing.
"On re-direct examination, Diana testified that she suspected both appellants,
especially Gilbert Formento, to have perpetrated the crime because of the fact
that she saw the pair of shorts of the victim in the bag of appellant Gilbert
Formento.
ISSUE:
Whether there was a valid waiver of the warrantless search and seizure and
whether the bloodstained pair of shorts allegedly recovered from the bag of
Appellant Formento can be admitted as evidence to the prosecution considering
that it was obtained without the voluntary consent of the accused.
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC: Found Danilo Asis y Fonperada and Gilbert Formento y Saricon guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide aggravated by abuse of
confidence, superior strength and treachery.
SC: Set aside decision of RTC and acquitted the accused. Accused did not
waived his right to warrantless search and seizure. The evidence is inadmissible.
The prosecutions evidence does not prove the guilt of appellants beyond
reasonable doubt; hence, their constitutional right to be presumed innocent
remains and must be upheld.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE RULING
 officers authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they
hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an
Evidence Is Inadmissible invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of
the law.
In any event, appellants argument of illegal search and seizure cannot simply
be brushed aside, considering the guarantee so sacredly enshrined in our This point becomes even more pronounced in the present case, in which
Constitution. appellant is a deaf-mute, and there was no interpreter to explain to him what
was happening. His seeming acquiescence to the search without a warrant may
be attributed to plain and simple confusion and ignorance.
There is no question that appellants were collared without any arrest warrant.
Neither was there any valid search warrant obtained against them. However,
they never questioned the legality of their arrest through a motion to quash the SUPREME COURT RULING:
Information. Instead, they entered a plea of not guilty and participated in the
trial. Settled is the rule that any objection involving the arrest or the trial courts WHEREFORE, the automatically appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
procedure of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made Manila (Branch 54) in Criminal Case No. 98-163090 is SET ASIDE. Danilo Asis and
before the arraignment; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.
Gilbert Formento are ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt, and ordered immediately
RELEASED from custody, unless they are being held for some other lawful cause.
Indeed, appellants do not now question the legality of their arrest. What they
object to is the introduction of the bloodstained pair of shorts allegedly
recovered from the bag of Appellant Formento. They argue that the search was
illegally done, making the obtainment of the pair of shorts illegal and taints
them as inadmissible. The prosecution, on the other hand, contends that it was
the wife of appellant who voluntarily surrendered the bag that contained the
bloodstained trousers of the victim. Her act, it claims, constituted a valid consent
to the search without a warrant.

We clarify. Primarily, the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and

seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person
whose rights are invaded or who is expressly authorized to do so on his or her
behalf. In the present case, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses show
that at the time the bloodstained pair of shorts was recovered, Appellant
Formento, together with his wife and mother, was present. Being the very
subject of the search, necessarily, he himself should have given consent. Since
he was physically present, the waiver could not have come from any other
person.
To constitute a valid waiver, it must be shown that first, the right exists; second,
the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of
such a right; and third, the person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right. How could Appellant Formento have consented to a warrantless search
when, in the first place, he did not understand what was happening at that
moment? The prosecution witnesses themselves testified that there was no
interpreter to assist him -- a deaf-mute -- during the arrest, search and seizure.
Naturally, it would seem that he indeed consented to the warrantless search, as
the prosecution would want this Court to believe.
As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the
citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an
ARREST AND SEIZURE
Art. 3, Section 8, 1987 Philippine Constitution
Section 2.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
Doctrine:
The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree of
consistency, is that reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition,
that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
People vs. Tudtud
GR 144037,
26 September 2003
Ponente: TINGA, J
Nature of Case:
Appeal
BRIEF
Tudtud was arrested for illegal possession of prohibited drugs and convicted for
such crime by the RTC but was later acquitted by the Supreme Court due to an
invalid warrantless arrest conducted by the police officers rendering the
evidence seized as inadmissible.
FACTS:
Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the Toril Police
Station, Davao City received a report from a civilian asset named Bobong Solier
about a certain Noel Tudtud. Solier related that his neighbors have been
complaining about Tudtud, who was allegedly responsible for the proliferation of
marijuana in their area.
Reacting to the report, PO1 Ronald Desierto, PO1 Ramil Floreta and their
superior, SPO1 Villalonghan, all members of the Intelligence Section of the Toril
Police Station, conducted surveillance in Soliers neighborhood in Sapa, Toril,
Davao City. For five days, they gathered information and learned that Tudtud
was involved in illegal drugs. According to his neighbors, Tudtud was engaged in
selling marijuana.
On August 1, 1999, Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to
Cotabato and would be back later that day with new stocks of marijuana. Solier
described Tudtud as big-bodied and short, and usually wore a hat. At around
4:00 in the afternoon that same day, a team composed of PO1 Desierto, PO1
Floreta and SPO1 Villalonghan posted themselves at the corner of Saipon and
McArthur Highway to await Tudtuds arrival. All wore civilian clothes.
About 8:00 later that evening, two men disembarked from a bus and helped
each other carry a carton marked King Flakes. Standing some five feet away
from the men, PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta observed that one of the men fit
Tudtuds description. The same man also toted a plastic bag.
PO1 Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached the suspects and identified
themselves as police officers. PO1 Desierto informed them that the police had
received information that stocks of illegal drugs would be arriving that night. The
man who resembled Tudtuds description denied that he was carrying any drugs.
PO1 Desierto asked him if he could see the contents of the box. Tudtud obliged,
saying, it was alright. Tudtud opened the box himself as his companion looked
on.
The box yielded pieces of dried fish, beneath which were two bundles, one
wrapped in a striped plastic bag and another in newspapers. PO1 Desierto asked
Tudtud to unwrap the packages. They contained what seemed to the police
officers as marijuana leaves.
The police thus arrested Tudtud and his companion, informed them of their
rights and brought them to the police station. The two did not resist.
The confiscated items were turned over to the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination. Forensic tests conducted by Police
Chief Inspector Noemi Austero, forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory,
Region XI, on specimens taken from the confiscated items confirmed the police
officers suspicion.The plastic bag contained 3,200 grams of marijuana leaves
while the newspapers contained another 890 grams. Police Chief Inspector
Austero reduced her findings in her report, Physical Sciences Report No. D-220-
99 dated 2 August 1999.
Noel Tudtud and his companion, Dindo Bulong, were subsequently charged
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City with illegal possession of
prohibited drugs. Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty. The
defense, however, reserved their right to question the validity of their arrest and
the seizure of the evidence against them.
The accused, denying the charges against them, cried frame-up.
ISSUE:
Whether the Tudtuds implied acquiescence (Tudtuds statement of its all right
when the police officers requested that the box be opened) be considered a
waiver and whether the admission in evidence of the marijuana leaves, which
they claim were seized in violation of their right against unreasonable searches
and seizures, is unlawful.
ACTIONS of the COURT

RTC: RTC rendered judgment convicting both accused.
SC: No valid waiver and inadmissible evidence. Reversed RTC decision. Items
seized were held inadmissible, having been obtained in violation of the
accuseds constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE RULING
Appellants in this case were neither performing any overt act or acting in a
suspicious manner that would hint that a crime has been, was being, or was
about to be, committed. If the arresting officers testimonies are to be believed,
appellants were merely helping each other carry a carton box. Although
appellant Tudtud did appear afraid and perspiring, pale and trembling, this was
only after, not before, he was asked to open the said box.
It may be conceded that the mere subjective conclusions of a police officer
concerning the existence of probable cause is not binding on the courts which
must independently scrutinize the objective facts to determine the existence of
probable cause and that a court may also find probable cause in spite of an
officers judgment that none exists. However, the fact that the arresting officers
felt that they did not have sufficient basis to obtain a warrant, despite their own
information-gathering efforts, raises serious questions whether such surveillance
actually yielded any pertinent information and even whether they actually
conducted any information-gathering at all, thereby eroding any claim to
personal knowledge.
In no sense can the knowledge of the herein arresting officers that
appellant Tudtud was in possession of marijuana be described as personal,
having learned the same only from their informant Solier. Solier, for his part,
testified that he obtained his information only from his neighbors and the friends
of appellant Tudtud.
Confronted with a dubious informant, the police perhaps felt it necessary to
conduct their own surveillance. This surveillance, it turns out, did not actually
consist of staking out appellant Tudtud to catch him in the act of plying his illegal
trade, but of a mere gathering of information from the assets there. The police
officers who conducted such surveillance did not identify who these assets were
or the basis of the latters information. Clearly, such information is also hearsay,
not of personal knowledge
Finally, there is an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches
and seizures if the following requisites are present:
1. It must appear that the rights exist;
2. The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
existence of such right;
3. Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third requisites.
Records disclose that when the police officers introduced themselves as such
and requested appellant that they see the contents of the carton box supposedly
containing the marijuana, appellant Tudtud said it was alright. He did not resist
and opened the box himself.
Appellants implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than
mere passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and
is, thus, considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee. Consequently, appellants lack of objection to the search and seizure
is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary
submission to the warrantless search and seizure.
As the search of appellants box does not come under the recognized
exceptions to a valid warrantless search, the marijuana leaves obtained thereby
are inadmissible in evidence. And as there is no evidence other than the hearsay
testimony of the arresting officers and their informant, the conviction of
appellants cannot be sustained.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is
REVERSED. Appellants Noel Tudtud yPaypa and Dindo Bolong y Naret are hereby
ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is
ordered to cause the immediate release of appellants from confinement, unless
they are being held for some other lawful cause, and to report to this Court
compliance herewith within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

Chimel vs. California [395 US 752, 23 June 1969] Stewart (J)
Facts: Late in the afternoon of 13 September 1965, three police officers arrived
at the Santa Ana, California, home of the Chimel with a warrant authorizing his
arrest for the burglary of a coin shop. The officers knocked on the door,
identified themselves to Chimel's wife, and asked if they might come inside. She
ushered them into the house, where they waited 10 or 15 minutes until Chimel
returned home from work. When Chimel entered the house, one of the officers
handed him the arrest warrant and asked for permission to "look around."
Chimel objected, but was advised that "on the basis of the lawful arrest," the
officers would nonetheless conduct a search. No search warrant had been
issued. Accompanied by Chimel's wife, the officers then looked through the
entire three-bedroom house, including the attic, the garage, and a small
workshop. In some rooms the search was relatively cursory. In the master
bedroom and sewing room, however, the officers directed Chimel's wife to open
drawers and "to physically move contents of the drawers from side to side so
that they might view any items that would have come from the burglary." After
completing the search, they seized numerous items - primarily coins, but also
several medals, tokens, and a few other objects. The entire search took between
45 minutes and an hour. At Chimel's subsequent state trial on two charges of
burglary, the items taken from his house were admitted into evidence against
him, over his objection that they had been unconstitutionally seized. He was
convicted, and the judgments of conviction were affirmed by both the California
Court of Appeal, and the California Supreme Court. Both courts accepted
Chimel's contention that the arrest warrant was invalid because the supporting
affidavit was set out in conclusory terms, but held that since the arresting
officers had procured the warrant "in good faith," and since in any event they
had sufficient information to constitute probable cause for Chimel's arrest, that
arrest had been lawful. From this conclusion the appellate courts went on to hold
that the search of Chimel's home had been justified, despite the absence of a
search warrant, on the ground that it had been incident to a valid arrest.
Issue: Whether the search incident to arrest extends to the whole of the
house where the accused was arrested.
Held: Approval of a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest seems first to
have been articulated by the Court in 1914 as dictum in Weeks v. United States,
232 US 383. The statement therein however made no reference to any right to
search the place where an arrest occurs, but was limited to a right to search the
"person." 11 years later, the case of Carroll v. United States (267 U.S. 132)
brought the following embellishment of the Weeks statement: "When a man is
legally arrested for an offense, whatever is found upon his person or in his
control which it is unlawful for him to have and which may be used to prove the
offense may be seized and held as evidence in the prosecution." A similar
analysis underlies the "search incident to arrest" principle, and marks its proper
extent. When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might
seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's
safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is
entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence
on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And
the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or
evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. There is ample
justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's person and the area "within
his immediate control" - construing that phrase to mean the area from within
which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. There is
no comparable justification, however, for routinely searching any room other
than that in which an arrest occurs - or, for that matter, for searching through all
the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself. Such
searches, in the absence of well-recognized exceptions, may be made only
under the authority of a search warrant. The "adherence to judicial processes"
mandated by the Fourth Amendment requires no less. Herein, the search went
far beyond Chimel's person and the area from within which he might have
obtained either a weapon or something that could have been used as evidence
against him. There was no constitutional justification, in the absence of a search
warrant, for extending the search beyond that area. The scope of the search
was, therefore, "unreasonable" under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments,
and Chimel's conviction cannot stand.

ARREST AND SEIZURE
Art. 3, Section 8, 1987 Philippine Constitution
Section 2.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Doctrine:
A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing or is attempting to commit an offense. It is a matter of
judicial experience that in the arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs
Act in a buy-bust operation, the malefactors were invariably caught red-
handed. There being no violation of the constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure, the confiscated articles are admissible
in evidence.
People vs. Dela Cruz
GR 83260,
18 April 1990
Ponente: REGALADO, J
Nature of Case:
Appeal
BRIEF
Accused-appellant Juan de la Cruz y Gonzales and his co-accused
Reynaldo Beltran y Aniban were arrested without warrant in a buy-bust
operation. The Supreme Court held that such arrest was valid and
evidence admissible because a search warrant is not necessary when
the search is incident to a lawful arrest.
FACTS:
On or about May 4, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
each other, not being authorized by law to sell, deliver, give away to
another or distribute any prohibited drug, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and knowingly sell, deliver or give away to and other the
following:1. One (1) cigarette foil wrapper containing marijuana; Two (2)
cigarette foil wrapper containing marijuana which are prohibited drugs.
On its part, the prosecution alleged that after receiving a confidential
report from Arnel, their informant, a "buy-bust" operation was conducted
by the 13th Narcotics Regional Unit through a team composed of T/Sgt.
Jaime Raposas as Team Leader, S/Sgt. Rodelito Oblice, Sgt. Dante Yang,
Sgt. Vicente Jimenez, P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy as poseur-buyer and Pat.
Deogracias Gorgonia at Maliclic St., Tondo, Manila at around 2:30 o'clock
in the afternoon of May 4, 1987 to catch the pusher/s. P/Pfc. Adolfo
Arcoy acted as the poseur-buyer with Arnel as his companion to buy
marijuana worth P10.00 from the two accused, Juan de la Cruz and
Reynaldo Beltran. At the scene, it was Juan de la Cruz whom Arcoy first
negotiated (with) on the purchase and when Arcoy told De la Cruz that
he was buying P10.00 worth of marijuana, De la Cruz instructed
Reynaldo Beltran to give one aluminum foil of marijuana which Beltran
got from his pants' pocket and delivered it to Arcoy. After ascertaining
that the foil of suspected marijuana was really marijuana, Arcoy gave
the prearranged signal to his teammates by scratching his head and his
teammates who were strategically positioned in the vicinity, converged
at the place, identified themselves as NARCOM agents and effected the
arrest of De la Cruz and Beltran. The P10.00 marked bill (Exhibit C-1)
used by Arcoy was found in the possession of Juan de la Cruz together
with two aluminum foils and containing marijuana (Exhibits "B-2" and "B-
3").
Traversing this version is that of the defense which, in brief, consists of a
denial to (sic) the prosecution's theory and the claim that accused Juan
de la Cruz, who was then suffering from loose bowel movement, was all
the time in bed at their place at 3034 Maliclic St., Tondo, Manila; that he
never left their place throughout that day of May 4, 1987; that he never
had a visitor on that day and that he was never engaged in the sale of
marijuana. The NARCOM agents raided his place without search warrant
or without first securing his previous permission. One searched
thoroughly his place, the second acted as a guard posted at the door of
De la Cruz' place and the third agent was a mere observer. His place was
ransacked and he was even bodily searched. As regards accused
Reynaldo Beltran, he was arrested by the same group (prior to the arrest
of Juan de la Cruz) while he was playing "pool" at Aling Ely's place along
Maliclic St. that afternoon and that without much ado, he was taken
because he was fingered by one Arnel to be engaged in selling
marijuana. Both accused were brought to a parked vehicle of the raiding
team, From there, they were taken to NARCOM headquarters for
investigation where for the first time they came to know that they were
being charged of selling marijuana.
ISSUE:
Whether the NARCOM violated the accuseds constitutional right against
unlawful search and seizure by raiding his place without search warrant
or without first securing his previous permission.
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC: Found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the Violation
of Section 4, Article II, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, both of
Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972.
SC: Valid search and seizure. Admissible evidence. Affirmed the
judgment of conviction. (Dela Cruz died before the SC decision, thus, his
case was dismissed. Aniban was convicted with final judgment.)
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE RULING
Appellant assails, unconstitutional, the manner in which the so-called
buy-bust operation is conducted in order to enforce the Dangerous
Drugs Act. He stigmatizes it as no different from seizure of evidence
from one's person or abode without a search warrant. He argues that
this procedure is pregnant with opportunities, and gives rise to
situations, for corrupting our law enforcers.
We are not unmindful of the fact that the common modus operandi of
narcotic agents in utilizing poseur-buyers does not always commend
itself as the most reliable way to go after violators of the Dangerous
Drugs Act as it is susceptible of mistakes as well as harassment,
extortion and abuse. By the very nature of this anti-narcotics operation,
the possibility of abuse is great.
We are not, however, inclined to shackle the hands of narcotics agents
whose task, as it is, is already formidable and attended with great risk,
lest their dedicated efforts for the apprehension and successful
prosecution of prohibited drug violators be unduly hampered. The
proliferation of drug addiction and trafficking has already reached an
alarming level and has spawned a network of incorrigible, cunning and
dangerous operations. Our experience has proven entrapment to be an
effective means of apprehending drug peddlers as exemplified by this
case.
The Solicitor General explains that a buy-bust operation is the method
employed by peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante
delicto. It is essentially a form of entrapment since the peace officer
neither instigates nor induces the accused to commit a
crime. 11 Entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for the
purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker from whose mind the
criminal intent originated. Oftentimes, it is the only effective way of
apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of the offense.
While it is conceded that in a buy-bust operation, there is seizure of
evidence from one's person without a search warrant, needless to state
a search warrant is not necessary, the search being incident to a lawful
arrest. A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in
his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing or is attempting to commit an offense. It is a matter of
judicial experience that in the arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs
Act in a buy-bust operation, the malefactors were invariably caught red-
handed. There being no violation of the constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure, the confiscated articles are admissible
in evidence.
At any rate, the testimony of other witnesses in this case would only be
cumulative or corroborative as they would only be repeating the facts
already amply testified to by the government witnesses. Credence
should be accorded to the prosecution's evidence more so as it
consisted mainly of testimonies of policemen. Law enforcers are
presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of proof
to the contrary.
We agree with the Solicitor General, since this is borne out by the
records, that Exhibit E is actually based on, as it is merely a clearer copy
of, the receipt prepared at the scene of the crime by P/Pfc. Arcoy. Since
the draft receipt had to be prepared hurriedly at the scene in order that
the accused could be brought to the Narcotics Command, such draft
receipt was not clearly written, so Sgt. Vicente Jimenez mechanically
transferred the written entries of P/Pfc. Arcoy into a more legible
copy. Nonetheless, there is no dispute that Sgt. Jimenez, a member of
the team, had personal knowledge of the facts set forth in both receipts,
being an eyewitness to the events that had transpired.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in
Criminal Case No. 87-54417, insofar as accused-appellant Reynaldo
Beltran y Aniban is concerned, is hereby AFFIRMED.
ARREST AND SEIZURE
Art. 3, Section 8, 1987 Philippine Constitution
Section 2.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
Doctrine:
The accused-appellant was arrested in flagrante delicto as a result of the
entrapment and so came under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
authorizing a warrantless arrest of any person actually committing a crime. The
search was made as an incident of a lawful arrest and so was also lawful under
Section 12 of Rule 116. In addition to the aforecited Rules, there is abundant
jurisprudence justifying warrantless searches and seizures under the conditions
established in this case.
People v. Kalubiran
GR 84079,
6 May 1991
Ponente: CRUZ, J.
Nature of Case:
Appeal
BRIEF
The accused-appellant is questioning his conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete City of selling marijuana in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. He
contends that the trial court erred in giving credence to the evidence of the
prosecution, in violating his constitutional rights against unreasonable searches
and seizures, and in not according him the presumption of innocence.
FACTS:
Nestor Kalubiran was arrested on July 12, 1985, at about nine o'clock in the
evening, at Real Street in Dumaguete City, by elements of the Narcotics
Command stationed in that city. His arrest was the result of a "buy-bust"
operation in which Pat. Leon Quindo acted as the buyer while the other team
members lay in wait to arrest Kalubiran at the pre-arranged signal. Quindo
approached the accused-appellant, who was with a group of friends in front of
the Gamo Memorial Clinic, and asked if he could "score," the jargon for buying
marijuana. Kalubiran immediately produced two sticks of marijuana, for which
Quindo paid him a previously marked P 5.00 bill. Quindo then gave the signal
and Cpl. Levi Dorado approached and arrested Kalubiran. Dorado frisked the
accused-appellant. He recovered the marked money and found 17 more sticks of
marijuana on Kalubiran's person. The other team members, namely M/Sgt.
Ranulfo Villamor and Sgt. Ruben Laddaran, came later in a jeep, where they
boarded Kalubiran to take him to the police station.
The 19 sticks of marijuana were marked and then taken to the PC Crime
Laboratory, where they were analyzed, with positive results, as reported and
later testified on by Forensic Chemist Myrna Arreola. The above-named Narcotics
agents all testified and corroborated each other in narrating the "buy-bust"
operation.
As might be expected, the defense had a different version of the accused-
appellant's arrest. Kalubiran said he and his friends were in front of the Gamo
Memorial Clinic that evening of July 12, 1985, when a jeep stopped in front of
them and several persons alighted. One of themwhom he subsequently
identified as Quindoapproached and frisked him. Finding nothing on him,
Quindo went back to the jeep, and he for his part left for his house. However, he
was called back by another person he later came to know as Villamor. He was
told at gunpoint to board the jeep and taken to PC headquarters, then to the
police station. He was released the following day with the help of a lawyer his
girl friend, Norma Diez, had contacted. He denied having sold marijuana and
insisted that the 19 sticks of marijuana and the marked bill never came from
him.
Norma Diez corroborated Kalubiran. So did the other defense witness, Bob Reloj,
except that he testified he was also frisked and likewise taken to PC
headquarters and later to the police station, where he and Kalubiran were
detained for three days.
ISSUE:
Whether the evidence gathered was admissible to the court proceeding and
whether Kalubiran should be made to answer for the 19 sticks of marijuana
found in his possession during his arrest.
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC: Declared Kalubiran guilty as charged, and sentenced him to life
imprisonment.
SC: Affirmed decision of RTC. Admissibe evidence. But Kalubiran is convicted for
the 2 sticks sold.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE RULING
This Court places much reliance upon the factual findings of the trial judge who
has the advantages of directly observing the witnesses on the stand and to
gauge by their demeanor whether they are being true to their oath or lying in
their teeth. Such an opportunity is not available to the appellate judge, who
must depend on the inanimate record that cannot reveal the tell-tale signs by
which the truth may be discerned and the falsehood exposed. Lacking any
showing of arbitrarinessand there is none in the case at barsuch findings of
the trial court cannot be faulted by this Court.
There are indeed some inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses but we do not find them substantial enough to impair the essential
veracity of their narration of Kalubiran's arrest as it actually happened. We have
said often enough that such imperfections may in fact bolster rather than
emasculate a person's credibility as one cannot be expected to remember a
particular incident with unerring accuracy in every minute detail.
It is the defense evidence that in fact suffers from the defects it would impute to
the prosecution. While it has not been shown that the Narcotics agents were
acting with ulterior motives rather than merely pursuing their duties, Norma
Diez's testimony is reasonably suspect as she is the girl friend of Kalubiran and
can be expected to be loyal to him, to the point of even lying for him. As for
Reloj, his inconsistency with Kalubiran's testimony is not merely insignificant but
loudly proclaims its own falsity. It is noted that Reloj said he was also arrested
with the accused-appellant and the two of them were detained at the police
station for three days. The accused- appellant said he was the only one arrested
and that he was released the following morning.
At any rate, we have already observed in People vs. Paco, that:
Drug-pushing when done on a small level as in this case belongs to that
class of crimes that may be committed at anytime and at any place.
After the offer to buy is accepted and the exchange is made, the illegal
transaction is completed in a few minutes. The fact that the parties are
in a public place and in the presence of other people may not always
discourage them from pursuing their illegal trade as these factors may
even serve to camouflage the same. Hence, the Court has sustained the
conviction of drug pushers caught selling illegal drugs in a billiard hall
(People vs. Rubio, G.R. No. 66875, June 19, 1986,142 SCRA 329; People
vs. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 72141, January 12, 1987, 147 SCRA 252), in front
 of a store (People vs. Khan, supra) along a street at 1:45 p.m. (People vs.
Toledo, G.R. No. 67609, November 22, 1985, 140 SCRA 259), and in front
of a house (People vs. Policarpio, G.R. No. 69844, February 23, 1988).
However, Kalubiran was accused only of selling the two sticks of marijuana
under Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act when he should also have been
charged with possession of the 17 other sticks found on his person at the time of
his arrest. It is unfortunate that he cannot be held to answer for the second
offense because he has not been impleaded in a separate information for
violation of Section 8 of the said law.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
People vs Michael Malmstedt: lawful arrest w/o warrant and
probable cause
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991
Ponente: Padilla
PRINCIPLE:
A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or
a private person under the following circumstances.
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
xxx
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances
which could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
BRIEF
Personal effects of Malmstedt, charged for violation of Sec 4, Art II of RA
6425 (Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Prohibited Drugs), was searched without a search warrant.
FACTS
Swedish national Mikael Malmstedt entered the Philippines as a tourist.
After his visit to Sagada, he boarded a bus from Sagada to Baguio.
NARCOM officers set up a temporary checkpoint to check all vehicles
coming from Cordillera Region, prompted by persistent reports that
vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other
prohibited drugs. NARCOM also received an information, on the same
day the check point was set up, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada
has in his possession prohibited drugs.
NARCOM officers Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan conducted an inspection in
the bus boarded by Malmstedt. During the inspection, CIC Galutan
noticed a bulge on Malmstedt's waist. Suspecting it to be a gun, Galutan
asked for Malmstedt's passport and other identification papers. When
Malmstedt failed to comply, Galutan required him to bring out what was
bulging on his waist, which turned out to be a pouch bag with wrapped
objects containing hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Malmstedt got 2 travelling bags from the luggage carrier before he
alighted from the bus when invited by NARCOM for questioning. Officers
took and opened the bags, each containing a teddy bear which also had
bulges inside. Malmstedt was brought to headquarters of NARCOM for
further investigation. Teddy bears were opened and were found to also
contain hashish confirmed by a chemistry report.
ISSUE of the CASE
Whether search of Malmstedts personal effects was illegal because it
was made without a search warrant, and therefore, the prohibited drugs
which were discovered during the illegal search are not admissible as
evidence against him.
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC: accused guilty
SC: accused guilty
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of conviction
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the accused-
No. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in appellant.
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures. However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful
arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest
without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person
under the following circumstances.
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
Espano vs CA: Warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police
station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with RODOLFO ESPANO, accused-petitioner,
Rule 112, Section 7. (6a 17a). vs.
Malmstedt was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused G.R. No. 120431 April 1, 1998
and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his Ponente: Romero
personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing
provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful PRINCIPLE: Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for
arrest. dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from commission of an offense may extend beyond the person of the one
Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate
failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a control.
whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused
NATURE
was trying to hide something illegal from the authorities. From these
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which
circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the warrantless affirmed in toto the judgment of RTC Manila convicting Rodolfo Espano
search that was made on the personal effects of the accused. for violation of Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
SUPREME COURT RULING: amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
BRIEF
Two bags of marijuana were seized from Espano during arrest in buy
bust operation in the streets of Manila and additional 10 bags of
marijuana were seized in his house.
FACTS
Pat. Romeo Pagilagan and other police officers, namely , Pat. Wilfredo
Aquino, Simplicio Rivera, and Erlindo Lumboy of the Western Police
District (WPD), Narcotics Division went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets,
Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in the area. They saw
petitioner selling something to another person. After the alleged buyer
left, they approached petitioner, identified themselves as policemen,
and frisked him. The search yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of
marijuana. When asked if he had more marijuana, he replied that there
was more in his house. The policemen went to his residence where they
found ten more cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner was
brought to the police headquarters where he was charged with
possession of prohibited drugs.
ISSUE of the CASE
Whether pieces of evidence seized were inadmissible as evidence in
court.
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC: accused guilty of the crime of violation of Section 8, Article II, in
relation to Section 2 (e-L) (I) of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 179
CA: affirmed RTC decision in toto
SC: Petition denied
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
Two bags of marijuana seized during arrest were admissible while 10
bags of marijuana seized in his house were inadmissible.
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
a. when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b. Espanos arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He was
caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation. His arrest
was, lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized
during the buy bust operation were admissible in evidence, being
the fruits of the crime. As for the ten cellophane bags of
marijuana found at Espanos residence, are inadmissible in
evidence.
An exception to freedom against unreasonable searches and seizures is
a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons
or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense. It may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include
the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. The ten
cellophane bags of marijuana seized at petitioners house after his arrest
at Pandacan and Zamora Streets do not fall under the said exceptions,
as they are beyond the reach and control of Espano
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 13976 dated January 16, 1995 is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Rodolfo Espano is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) months and
ONE (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum to TWO (2) years, FOUR (4)
months and ONE (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum.
People vs Tangliben: Search incident to lawful arrest
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MEDEL TANGLIBEN Y BERNARDINO, defendant-appellant
G.R. No. L-63630 April 6, 1990
Ponente: GUTIERREZ, JR.
PRINCIPLE:
Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides:
Section 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant.
NATURE
This is an appeal from the decision of RTC finding Medel Tangliben y
Bernardino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article
II of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and
sentencing him to life imprisonment, to pay a fine of P20,000 and to pay
the costs.
FACTS
Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Romeo Punzalan, and Barangay Tanod
Macario Sacdalan, were conducting a surveillance mission at the Victory
Liner Terminal compound aimed against persons engaging in traffic of
dangerous drugs.
Tangliben, carrying a traveling bag and acting suspiciously, was
confronted by the patrolmen. Tangliben initially refused to open the bag
upon Quevedo and Punzalans request but acceded later on when the
patrolmen identified themselves. Found inside the bag were more or less
1 kg marijuana leaves wrapped in plastic wrapper.
ISSUE of the CASE
Whether package of marijuana was inadmissible as evidence as it was a
product of an unlawful search without a warrant.
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC: accused guilty
SC: affirmed but modified trial court decision
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
No. One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant
is a search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 12 of Rule 126 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant.
Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides:
. . . A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the
time of his arrest. This case therefore falls squarely within the exception.
The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is
consequently valid. The case presented urgency. An informer pointed to
Tangliben as carrying marijuana. Faced with on-the-spot information,
police officers had to act quickly. There was no enough time to secure a
search warrant.
The offense committed by the appellant is possession of marijuana
under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
as amended).
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED but MODIFIED. The appellant is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years and fine of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos.
People vs Che Chun Ting: Valid warrantless search
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CHE CHUN TING alias "DICK," accused-appellant.
G.R. Nos. 130568-69. March 21, 2000
Ponente: Bellosillo
PRINCIPLE: As to subject, the warrantless search is sanctioned only
with respect to the person of the suspect, and things that may be seized
from him are limited to "dangerous weapons" or "anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of the offense." The search must have
been conducted at about the time of the arrest or immediately
thereafter and only at the place where the suspect was arrested, or the
premises or surroundings under his immediate control.
NATURE
Automatic Review
BRIEF
CHE CHUN TING alias "DICK," a Hong Kong national, was found guilty by
the trial court of delivering, distributing and dispatching in transit 999.43
grams of shabu; and, having in his custody, possession and control
5,578.68 grams of the same regulated drug. He was meted two (2)
death sentences, one for violation of Sec. 15 and the other for violation
of Sec. 16, both of Art. III, of RA 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
as amended). He was likewise ordered to pay a fine of P1,000,000.00 in
the first case, and P12,000,000.00 in the second.

FACTS
NARCOM apprehended Mabel Cheung Mei Po, after she delivered a
transparent plastic bag containing a white crystalline substance to an
informant, in full view of NARCOM agents. When questioned, Mabel
Cheung Mei Po cooperated with the government agents and revealed
the name of accused Che Chun Ting as the source of the drugs.
NARCOM deployed a team of agents for entrapment and arrest of Che
Chun Ting. Mabel ordered 1 kilo of shabu from Ting and agreed to meet
at Roxas Seafront Garden. 2 NARCOM agents, who waited inside the car
parked 2 meters away, saw Ting went out of the unit to hand Mabel a
transparent plastic bag containing white crystalline substance. Agents
immediately alighted and arrested Ting, radioed their superiors, and
coordinated with security guard to make a search of Unit 122. During
the search, SPO3 Campanilla seized a black bag with several plastic
bags containing a white crystalline substance in an open cabinet at the
second floor. The bag was examined in the presence of Major Garbo, the
accused himself, and his girlfriend Nimfa Ortiz. The accused together
with the evidence was then brought to Camp Crame where Forensic
Chemist found the white crystalline substance to be positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
ISSUE of the CASE
Whether shabu seized inside Unit 122 was inadmissible as evidence
since it was seized without a search warrant and not within his
immediate control.
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC: guilty of delivering, distributing and dispatching and possession of
shabu
SC: guilty only of delivering, distributing and dispatching shabu
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
Yes. The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the
warrantless search under the exception, the same must be limited to
and circumscribed by the subject, time and place of the arrest. As to
subject, the warrantless search is sanctioned only with respect to the
person of the suspect, and things that may be seized from him are
limited to "dangerous weapons" or "anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of the offense." The search must have been
conducted at about the time of the arrest or immediately thereafter and
only at the place where the suspect was arrested, or the premises or
surroundings under his immediate control.
The accused was admittedly outside unit 22 and in the act of delivering
to Mabel Cheung Mei Po a bag of shabu when he was arrested by the
NARCOM operatives. Unit 122 was not even his residence but that of his
girlfriend Nimfa Ortiz, and that he was merely a sojourner therein. It can
hardly be said that the inner portion of the house constituted a
permissible area within his reach or immediate control, to justify a
warrantless search therein.
The purposes of the exception are only to protect the arresting officer
against physical harm from the person being arrested who might be
armed with a concealed weapon, and also to prevent the person
arrested from destroying the evidence within his reach.
The search in Unit 122 and the seizure therein of some 5,578.68 grams
of shabu do not fall within the exception, hence, were illegal for being
violative of ones basic constitutional right and guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
As a consequence of the illegal search, the things seized on the occasion
thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule. They
are regarded as having been obtained from a polluted source, the "fruit
of a poisonous tree." However, objects and properties the possession of
which is prohibited by law cannot be returned to their owners
notwithstanding the illegality of their seizure. Thus, the shabu seized by
the NARCOM operatives which cannot legally be possessed by the
accused under the law, can and must be retained by the government to
be disposed of in accordance with law.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court in Crim. Case No. 96-8932
convicting accused CHE CHUN TING alias "DICK" for violation of Sec. 15,
Art. III, of RA 6425 is AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that the
penalty imposed by the trial court is reduced to reclusion perpetua. The
accused is ordered to pay a fine in the increased amount of
P2,000,000.00, and the costs.
In Crim. Case No. 96-8933, accused CHE CHUN TING alias "DICK" is
ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt the evidence against him being inadmissible.
The 999.43 grams and 5,578.68 grams of shabu, subject of Crim. Case
Nos. 96-8932 and 96-8933 are FORFEITED in favor of the government to
be turned over immediately to the Dangerous Drugs Board and the
National Bureau of Investigation for proper disposition.
People vs Estella: Searches and seizures incident to lawful
arrests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO C. ESTELLA, appellant.
[G.R. Nos. 138539-40. January 21, 2003
Ponente: Panganiban
PRINCIPLE: The Constitution bars the admission of evidence gathered
in violation of the right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Searches and seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section
12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have
been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a
search warrant. However, the scope of the search should be limited to
the area within which the person to be arrested can reach for a weapon
or for evidence that he or she can destroy. The prevailing rule is that the
arresting officer may take from the arrested individual any money or
property found upon the latters person -- that which was used in the
commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime, or which may
provide the prisoner with the means of committing violence or escaping,
or which may be used in evidence in the trial of the case.
NATURE
Appeal to the Decision of the RTC of Iba, Zambales. The trial court found
him guilty of violating Section 8, Article II of RA 6425, as amended by RA
7659, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
BRIEF
The illegal drug was searched for and found in a hut that has not been
proven to be owned, controlled, or used by appellant for residential or
any other purpose. Hence, he cannot be held guilty of illegal possession
of the illegal drug found therein.
FACTS
Executive Judge Estrada of RTC issued warrant for conduct of search and
seizure in the residence of Antonio Estella at Purok Yakal, Barangay
Baloganon, Masinloc, Zambales.
On their way to Purok Yakal, SPO1 Buloronm, SPO1 Arca and several
other members of Provincial Special Operation Group, approached
Antonio Estella whom they saw sitting on a rocking chair located 2
meters away from a hut owned by Narding Estella, brother of Antonio,
and being rented by Antonios live-in partner, Eva. They showed him the
search warrant and asked if Antonio had in his possession prohibited
drugs and if so, to surrender the same so he would deserve a lesser
penalty.
According to prosecution, while inside the hut, Antonio surrendered 2
cans containing marijuana fruiting tops. The team found a plastic
container under kitchen table containing 4 big bricks of dried marijuana
leaves and .38 caliber revolver with 4 live ammunitions. The team
seized the prohibited drug, revolver, and ammunitions.
According to the defense, the house searched was occupied by Spouses
Vicente and Fely Bakdangan. Accused also denied having surrendered
tin cans containing marijuana to the police and having any firearm.
ISSUE of the CASE
Whether police search undertaken in the hut where the subject
marijuana was seized was legal.
ACTIONS of the COURT However, the scope of the search should be limited to the area within
RTC: convicted appellant of illegal possession of dangerous drugs which the person to be arrested can reach for a weapon or for evidence
(marijuana), but acquitted him of illegal possession of firearms. that he or she can destroy. The prevailing rule is that the arresting
SC: accused acquitted
officer may take from the arrested individual any money or property
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS found upon the latters person -- that which was used in the commission
Antonios ownership of the house seized and the voluntary surrender of of the crime or was the fruit of the crime, or which may provide the
marijuana to the police officers were not proven by the prosecution. The prisoner with the means of committing violence or escaping, or which
Barangay Captains testimony contradicted the story of SPO1 Buloron. may be used in evidence in the trial of the case.
Search incident to lawful arrest presupposes a lawful or valid arrest and
can only be invoked through Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Searched was the entire hut, which cannot be said to have been within
Criminal Procedure, which we quote: Antonios immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of
that which may be considered to be incident to a lawful arrest. The
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful - A peace officer or a private search was illegal. Without the badge of legality, any evidence obtained
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: therein becomes ipso facto inadmissible.
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is SUPREME COURT RULING:
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is SET ASIDE. Antonio C. Estella is
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable ACQUITTED and ordered immediately RELEASED from custody, unless he
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances is being held for some other lawful cause.
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
Never was it proven that Antonio, who was the person to be arrested,
was in possession of the subject prohibited drug during the search. It
follows, that there was no way of knowing if he had committed or was
actually committing an offense in the presence of the arresting officers.
Without that knowledge, there could have been no search incident to a
lawful arrest.
Assuming arguendo that appellant was indeed committing an offense in
the presence of the arresting officers, and that the arrest without a
warrant was lawful, it still cannot be said that the search conducted was
within the confines of the law. Searches and seizures incident to lawful
arrests are governed by Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which reads:
Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have
been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a
search warrant.

People vs Libnao: Search of moving vehicles
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN and ROSITA NUNGA y VALENCIA, accused.
G.R. No. 136860. January 20, 2003
Ponente: Puno
PRINCIPLE: search of moving vehicles, exception to requirement of a
judicial warrant prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure
NATURE
Appeal from the Decision of the RTC Tarlac City, finding Agpanga Libnao
and her co-accused Rosita Nunga guilty of violating Article II, Section 4
of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
For their conviction, each was sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of two million pesos.
FACTS
Intelligence operatives of PNP stationed in Tarlac, began conducting
surveillance operation on suspected drug dealers in the area. PNP
learned from their asset that a certain woman from Tajiri, tarlac and a
companion from Baguio City were transporting illegal drugs once a
month in big bulks.
Police Alert Team installed a checkpoint in Barangay Salapungan after
Chief Insp. Arceo received a tip that 2 drug pushers, riding in a tricycle,
would be making a delivery. SPO1 Gamotea and PO3 Ferrer flagged
down a tricycle. Libnao and Nunga were seated inside. In front of them
was a black bag. Suspicious of the black bag and the twos uneasy
behavior when asked about its ownership and content, the officers
invited them to Kabayan Center No. 2 located at the same barangay.
They brought with them the black bag which when opened was found to
contain 8 bricks of leaves, suspected to be marijuana, sealed in plastic
bags.
ISSUE of the CASE
Whether right of accused against illegal and unwarranted arrest and
search was violated by the police officers who arrested both accused.
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC: Libnao ang Nunga guilty of violation of Art II Sec.4 of RA 6425.
SC: appeal dismissed
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
Be that as it may, the requirement that a judicial warrant must be
obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure is not absolute.
There are certain familiar exceptions to the rule, one of which relates to
search of moving vehicles.
Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in
recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said
circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such
cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of
the vehicle is limited to visual inspection. When a vehicle is stopped and
subjected to an extensive search, such would be constitutionally
permissible only if the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a
belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing
officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains as item, article or
object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction.
The warrantless search in the case at bench is not bereft of a probable
cause. The Tarlac Police Intelligence Division had been conducting
surveillance operation for three months in the area. The surveillance
yielded the information that once a month, appellant and her co-
accused Rosita Nunga transport drugs in big bulks. At 10:00 pm of
October 19, 1996, the police received a tip that the two will be
transporting drugs that night riding a tricycle. Surely, the two were
intercepted three hours later, riding a tricycle and carrying a suspicious-
looking black bag, which possibly contained the drugs in bulk. When
they were asked who owned it and what its content was, both became
uneasy. Under these circumstances, the warrantless search and seizure
of appellants bag was not illegal.
It is also clear that at the time she was apprehended, she was
committing a criminal offense. She was making a delivery or
transporting prohibited drugs in violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A.
No. 6425. Under the Rules of Court, one of the instances a police officer
is permitted to carry out a warrantless arrest is when the person to be
arrested is caught committing a crime in flagrante delicto, thus:
Section 5. Arrest without Warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a
private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
xxx
SUPREME COURT RULING:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DENIED. The decision of the
trial court finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425 in relation to
R.A. No. 7659, and sentencing her to an imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of two million pesos is hereby AFFIRMED.
PEOPLE VS. MUSA [217 SCRA 597; G.,R. NO. 96177; 27 JAN 1993]
Doctrine: See bold text in the held portion
Facts: A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was engaged in
selling marijuana in Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani wasordered by NARCOM
leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to conduct a surveillance and test buy on Musa. The
civilian informer guided Ani to Musas house and gave the description of Musa.
Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00.
The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right hand if he
successfully buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded to the house, the
NARCOM team positioned themselves about 90 to 100 meters away. From his
position, Belarga could see what was going on. Musa came out of the house and
asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted more marijuanaand gave Musa
the P20.00 marked money. Musa went into the house and came back, giving Ani
two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened
and inspected it. He raised his right hand as a signal to the other NARCOM
agents, and the latter moved in and arrested Musa inside the house. Belarga
frisked Musa in the living room but did not find the marked money (gave it to his
wife who slipped away). T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and
found a cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the
kitchen. They asked Musa about its contents but failed to get a response. So
they opened it and found driedmarijuana leaves inside. Musa was then placed
under arrest.
Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana inside it
is unreasonable, hence, inadmissible as evidence.
Held: Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not be
admitted as evidence. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a
suspects lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to
include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in
the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence. The plain view doctrine is usually applied where a police
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It will
not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of
the object is not apparent from the plain view of the object. In the case
at bar, the plastic bag was not in the plain view of the police. They arrested the
accused in the living room and moved into the kitchen in search for other
evidences where they found the plastic bag. Furthermore, the marijuana inside
the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the plain view of said
object.
Therefore, the plain view does not apply. The plastic bag was seized confinement at the New Bilibid Prison. Appellant filed a motion for
illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III Section 3 (2) reconsideration but was denied
of the Constitution.
Issue:
1 Whether the appellant is entitled to bail.

Rationale:

PADILLA VS. CA Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, provides:

DOCTRINE:
Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
Bail is either a matter of right, or of discretion. It is a matter of right imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an
when the ofense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of
perpetua or life imprisonment. guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.

ROBIN CARIO PADILLA, accused-appellant, In this case, appellant was convicted of a crime punishable by reclusion
vs. perpetua. Applying the aforequoted rule, the court finds appellant not entitled to
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees. bail as his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt is strong. And
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- contrary to appellant's asseveration, a summary hearing for his bail application
G.R. No. 121917 for the sole purpose of determining whether or not evidence is strong is
July 31, 1996 unnecessary. Indeed, the extensive trial before the lower court and the appeal
Ponente: FRANCISCO, J..: before respondent court are more than sufficient in accomplishing the purpose
for which a summary hearing for bail application is designed.
Nature of Case:
Petition for review on certiorari with an application for bail Supreme Court Ruling:

Brief: ACCORDINGLY, the cancellation of appellant's bailbond by public respondent

Dissatisfied with the denial for motion of reconsideration by the CA, appellant court is AFFIRMED and the instant application for bail is DENIED for lack of merit.
filed a petition for review on certiorari with an application for bail to the Supreme
Court praying, among others, to be allowed to post bail for his temporary liberty.

Facts:
In an information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, appellant
was charged with violation of P.D. No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms
punishable by reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua.

Pending trial, appellant was released on bail. Thereafter, appellant was

convicted as charged and meted an indeterminate penalty of 17 years 4 months
and 1 day of reclusion temporal to 21 years of reclusion perpetua. He appealed
to public respondent Court of Appeals, but judgment was rendered affirming his
conviction. Respondent court cancelled his bailbond and ordered his arrest for
 In an Information dated September 26, 1996, the appellant was charged for
wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously planting, cultivating and culturing seven
(7) fully grown marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp weighing 2.194 kilos,
from which dangerous drugs maybe (sic) manufactured or derived, to the
damage and prejudice of the government of the Republic of the Philippines.

A reaction team was formed upon receiving a tip from unnamed informer. The
team was composed of SPO3 Marcelo M. Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2
Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Upon arrival to the
site, the police found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to
look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot
PEOPLE VS. VALDEZ high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters from
appellant's hut. PO2 Balut, a member of the team asked appellant who owned
DOCTRINE: the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were
his. The police uprooted the seven marijuana plants, which weighed 2.194
Search and seizure must be carried on the strength of a judicial kilograms. The police took photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis
warrant. Otherwise, the search and seizure is deemed "unreasonable." plants. Appellant was then arrested. One of the plants, weighing 1.090
Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and kilograms, was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in
seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for analysis. Inspector Prevy Fabros Luwis, the Crime
tree and should be excluded. Laboratory forensic analyst, testified that upon microscopic examination of said
plant, she found cystolitic hairs containing calcium carbonate, a positive
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, indication for marijuana.
vs.
ABE VALDEZ y DELA CRUZ, accused-appellant. Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show that
--------------------------------------------------------------- the law enforcers had more than ample time to secure a search warrant. Second,
G.R. No. 129296 that the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does not remove
September 25, 2000 appellant from the mantle of protection against unreasonable searches and
Ponente: QUISUMBING, J..: seizures.

Nature of Case:
Petition for automatic review
Brief:
For automatic review is the decision1 promulgated on February 18, 1997, by the
Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case
No. 3105. It found appellant Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425),
as amended by R.A. No. 7659. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death
by lethal injection.
Facts:
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the records
clearly show that there was no search made by the police team, in the first
place. The seized marijuana plants were, thus, in plain view of the police
officers. The instant case must, therefore, be treated as a warrantless lawful
search under the "plain view" doctrine.
Issues:
1 Was the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case
lawful?
2 Were the seized plants admissible in evidence against the accused?

Rationale:
 Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and imposing upon him the death
The Court finds no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's contention that we penalty, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for insufficiency of evidence.
apply the "plain view" doctrine. For the doctrine to apply, the following elements Appellant is ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED immediately from confinement
must be present: unless held for another lawful cause.

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right
to be where they are; and

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and

(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police officer is
not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across
an incriminating object. Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not
inadvertent. The Court also note the testimony of SPO2 Tipay that upon arriving
at the area, they first had to "look around the area" before they could spot the
illegal plants. Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately
apparent" and a "further search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in
question were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand." The "plain view"
doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply. Arizona v. Hicks

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity of one's
person, which includes his residence, his papers, and other possessions. The
guarantee refers to "the right of personal security" of the individual. As appellant
correctly points out, what is sought to be protected against the State's unlawful
intrusion are persons, not places.
As to the second issue, which involves the admissibility of the marijuana plants
as evidence for the prosecution, the court finds that said plants cannot, as
products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence against
appellant. They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a
reversible error on the part of the court a quo to have admitted and relied upon
the seized marijuana plants as evidence to convict appellant.
Supreme Court Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated on February 18, 1997, by the Regional
Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 3105,
finding Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Brief Fact Summary. When investigating a shooting in an apartment, a police
officer moved certain stereo equipment, which was very fancy and looked out of
place, and learned that it had been taken during an armed robbery.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Only when a police officer had probable cause, not
reasonable suspicion, could they invoke the plain view doctrine.
Facts. A bullet was fired through the floor of the Respondents apartment,
hitting an individual in the apartment below. In response to the shooting, the
police entered the Respondents apartment and found three weapons and a
stoking-cap mask. One of the officers who entered the Respondents apartment
noticed expensive stereo equipment that looked out of place and he moved the
components to check their serial numbers. After phoning the police station, the
officer learned that the equipment was taken during a recent armed robbery. The
officer seized some of the equipment immediately and obtained a warrant to
seize the rest of it, which was determined to have been taken during the same
armed robbery.
The Respondent was indicted for robbery. The state trial court granted the
Respondents motion to suppress, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, the
Arizona Supreme Court refused to review, and the state filed a petition to the
Supreme Court.

Issue. Did the officers conduct constitute a seizure?

Did the officers conduct constitute a search?
Can the plain view doctrine be invoked when the police have less than
probable cause to believe that the item in question is evidence of a crime or is
contraband? Was the search reasonable under the Fourth Amendment?

Held. No. The majority first observed the mere recording of the serial numbers
did not constitute a seizure.
Yes. The court observed that the officers moving of the equipment did
constitute a search separate and apart from the search for the shooter,
victims, and weapons that was the lawful objective of his entry into the
apartment. The officers actions were unrelated to the objectives of the
authorized intrusion, [and] exposed to view concealed portions of the apartment
or its contents, did produce a new invasion of respondents privacy unjustified
by the exigent circumstance that validated the entry.
No. The majority first observed that the general rule dictates that pursuant to
[Coolidge] under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain
view without a warrant. These occasions occur [w]here the initial intrusion that
brings the police within plain view of such [evidence] is supported . . . by one of
the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. The majority then held
that only when a police officer had probable cause, not reasonable suspicion,
could they invoke the plain view doctrine.
In support of this conclusion, the court reasoned that [d]ispensing with the
PEOPLE VS. COMPACION
need for a warrant is worlds apart from permitting a lesser standard of cause for
the seizure than a warrant would require, i. e., the standard of probable cause.
DOCTRINE:
No reason is apparent why an object should routinely be seizable on lesser
grounds, during an unrelated search and seizure, than would have been needed
Search and seizure must be carried on the strength of a judicial
to obtain a warrant for that same object if it had been known to be on the
warrant. Otherwise, the search and seizure is deemed "unreasonable."
premises.
Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and
seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous
tree and should be excluded.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ARMANDO COMPACION y SURPOSA, accused-appellant..
---------------------------------------------------------------
G.R. No. 124442
July 20, 2001
Ponente: KAPUNAN, J..:
Nature of Case:
Petition for certiorari
Brief:
The accused now appeals from the judgment of conviction for violating Section 9
of R.A. No. 6425 (known as Dangerous Drugs Act) and asks the Court to reverse
the same.
Facts:
Armando S. Compacion was charged with violating Section 9 of R.A. No. 6425
(known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended by R.A. No. 7659, for
wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously planting, cultivating and culturing two
(2) full grown Indian Hemp Plants, otherwise known as "Marijuana plants", more
or less eleven (11) feet tall.
The result of the surveillance made after a confidential tip supplied by a police
informant brought the creation a team formed to undertake a search operation.
The team proceeded to barangay Bagonbon, Saa Carlos City, Negros Occidental
and arrived at the residence of accused-appellant in the early morning of July 13,
1995 without securing a warrant though the team attempted to secure one from
the house of exec. Judge Robert S. Javellana but was denied because it was
made at nighttime.
The prosecution contends that the accused-appellant opened the gate and
permitted them to come in. He was immediately asked by SPO4 Villamor, a
member of the team, about the suspected marijuana plants and he admitted
that he planted and cultivated the same for the use of his wife who was suffering
from migraine. SPO4 Villamor then told him that he would be charged for
violation of Section 9 of R.A. No. 6425 and informed him of his constitutional
rights. The operatives then uprooted the suspected marijuana plants. SPO1
Linda conducted an initial field test of the plants by using the Narcotics Drug
Identification Kit. The test yielded a positive result.
On his part, accused-appellant maintains that around one-thirty in the early
morning of July 13, 1995 while he and his family were sleeping, he heard
somebody knocking outside his house. After he opened the gate, four (4)
persons who he thought were members of the military, entered the premises
then went inside the house. After about twenty (20) minutes of searching, the
men called him outside and brought him to the backyard. After he was informed
that the plants in his backyard were marijuana, the men took pictures of him and
themselves. At around ten o'clock that same morning, they brought him with
them to the city hall. A criminal complaint for violation of Section 9 of R.A. No.
6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 was filed against accused-appellant.
Issues:
1. Was the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case
lawful?
2. Were the seized plants admissible in evidence against the accused?
Rationale:
In the instant case, the search and seizure conducted by the composite team in
the house of accused-appellant was not authorized by a search warrant. It does
not appear either that the situation falls under any circumstances where
warrantless arrest is allowed. Consequently, accused-appellant's right against
unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated.
It is extant from the records that accused-appellant did not consent to the
warrantless search and seizure conducted. The act of the accused-appellant in
allowing the members of the military to enter his premises and his consequent
silence during the unreasonable search and seizure could not be construed as
voluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to warrantless search and
seizure especially so when members of the raiding team were intimidatingly
numerous and heavily armed. Consequently, herein accused-appellant's lack of
objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his
constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and
seizure.
Neither could the members of the composite team have justified their search of
accused-appellant's premises by invoking the necessity and urgency of the
situation. Surely, the raiding team had all the opportunity to have first secured a
search warrant before forcing their way into accused-appellant's premises. The
team's apprehension of a tip-off was unfounded.
Since the evidence was secured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and
seizure, the same is tainted and illegal and should therefore be excluded for
being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.
Supreme Court Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Branch
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Armando S. Compacion
is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged on ground of reasonable doubt. He is
ordered released from confinement unless he is being held for some other legal
grounds. The subject marijuana is ordered disposed of in accordance with law.
ROLDAN VS. ARCA
DOCTRINE:
Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and air crafts for violations
of the customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional
requirement of a search warrant.
ARMANDO COMPACION y SURPOSA, accused-appellant.. HONORABLE ARSENIO
N. ROLDAN, JR., in his capacity as Acting Commissioner, Philippine Fisheries
Commission, and THE PHILIPPINE NAVY, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANCISCO ARCA, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Manila (Branch 1) and MORABE, DE GUZMAN & COMPANY, respondents.
---------------------------------------------------------------
G.R. No. L-25434
July 25, 1975
Ponente: MAKASIAR, J..:
Nature of Case:
Petition for certiorari
Brief:
Petitioners initiated this case through this petition for certiorari and prohibition
against respondent Judge of the Manila Court of First Instance for acting without
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when he issued on October 18,
1965 the order directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction and when he refused to reconsider the same.
Facts:
Respondent company filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a civil case
docketed as No. 56701 against petitioner Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio N.
Roldan, Jr., for the recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI (one of two fishing boats
in question) which had been seized and impounded by petitioner Fisheries
Commissioner through the Philippine Navy On April 3, 1964.
On April 28, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila set aside its order of April
10, 1964 and granted respondent company's motion for reconsideration praying
for preliminary mandatory injunction.
On December 10, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed Civil Case
No. 56701 for failure of therein petitioner (respondent company herein) to
prosecute as well as for failure of therein defendants (petitioners herein)to
appear on the scheduled date of hearing. The vessel, Tony Lex VI or Srta. Winnie
however, remained in the possession of respondent company.
On July 20, 1965, petitioner Fisheries Commissioner requested the Philippine
Navy to apprehend vessels Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III for alleged violations of
some provisions of the Fisheries Act and the rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder. On August 5 or 6, 1965, the two fishing boats were actually seized
for illegal fishing with dynamite.
On October 2 and 4, likewise, the Court of First Instance of Palawan ordered the
Philippine Navy to take the boats in custody. On October 2, 1965, respondent
company filed a complaint with application for preliminary mandatory injunction,
docketed as Civil Case No. 62799 with the Court of First Instance of Manila
against herein petitioners.
On October 18, 1965, herein petitioners, as defendants in said Civil Case No.
62799, filed their answer to the complaint with affirmative defenses. On said
day, October 18, 1965, the respondent Judge issued the challenged order
granting the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and issued
the preliminary writ upon the filing by private respondent of a bond of P5,000.00
for the release of the two vessels(pp. 95-102, rec.).
The Commission and the Navy filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction to restrain Judge Arca from enforcing hi order on October
18, 1965. On October 19, 1965, herein petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied on November 23, 2016
Under Section 13 of Executive Order No. 389 of December 23, 1950,
reorganizing the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine Navy has the
function, among others, "to assist the proper governmental agencies in the
enforcement of laws and regulations pertaining to ... fishing ..." (46 OG 5905,
5911).
Section 2210 of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended by PD No. 34 of
October 27, 1972, authorized any official or person exercising police authority
under the provisions of the Code, to search and seize any vessel or air craft as
well as any trunk, package, bag or envelope on board and to search any person
on board for any breach or violation of the customs and tariff laws.
When the Philippine Navy, upon request of the Fisheries Commissioner,
apprehended on August 5 or 6, 1965 the fishing boats Tony Lex III and Tony Lex
VI, otherwise known respectively as Srta. Agnes and Srta. Winnie, these vessels
were found to be without the necessary license in violation of Section 903 of the
Tariff and Customs Code and therefore subject to seizure under Section 2210 of
the same Code, and illegally fishing with explosives and without fishing license
required by Sections 17 and 18 of the Fisheries Law (pp. 46-47, rec.).
Supreme Court Ruling:

Issues: WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED AND THE ORDER OF

1. Whether seizure of vessels of the company for illegal fishing be validly
directed/effected by the Fisheries Commission
Rationale:
RESPONDENT JUDGE DATED OCTOBER 18, 1965, THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
MANDATORY INJUNCTION ISSUED THEREUNDER AND THE ORDER DATED
NOVEMBER 23, 1965, ARE HEREBY SET ASIDE AS NULL AND VOID, WITH COSTS
AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT.

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3512 approved on March 20, 1963 empowers the
Fisheries Commissioner to carry out the provisions of the Fisheries Act, as
amended, and all rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, to make
searches and seizures personally or through his duly authorized representatives
in accordance with the Rules of Court, of "explosives such as ... dynamites and
the like ...; including fishery products, fishing equipment, tackle and other things
that are subject to seizure under existing fishery laws"; and "to effectively
implement the enforcement of existing fishery laws on illegal fishing."

Paragraph 5 of Section 4 of the same Republic Act 3512 likewise transferred to

and vested in the Philippine Fisheries Commission "all the powers, functions and
duties heretofore exercised by the Bureau of Customs, Philippine Navy and
Philippine Constabulary over fishing vessels and fishery matters ..."
HIZON VS. CA
DOCTRINE:
Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and air crafts for violations
of the customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional
requirement of a search warrant.
RICHARD HIZON, SILVERIO GARGAR, ERNESTO ANDAYA, NEMESIO GABO,
RODRIGO ABRERA, CHEUNG TAI FOOK, SHEK CHOR LUK et. al, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
---------------------------------------------------------------
G.R. No. 119619
December 13, 1996
Ponente: PUNO, J..:
Nature of Case:
Petition for Review for certiorari
Brief:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 15417 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 52, Palawan in Criminal Case No. 10429 convicting petitioners of the
offense of illegal fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance
penalized under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 704, the Fisheries Decree of 1975.
Facts:
In response to these reports of illegal fishing operations in the coastal waters,
the city mayor of Puerto Princesa Palawan organized Task Force Bantay Dagat to
assist the police in the detection and apprehension of violators of the laws on
fishing.
The police, headed by SPO3 Romulo Enriquez, and members of the Task Force
Bantay Dagat, headed by Benito Marcelo, Jr., immediately proceeded to the area
and found several men fishing in motorized sampans and a big fishing boat
identified as F/B Robinson within the seven-kilometer shoreline of the city. They
boarded the F/B Robinson and inspected the boat with the acquiescence of the
boat captain, Silverio Gargar. In the course of their inspection, the police saw
two foreigners in the captain's deck. SP03 Enriquez examined their passports
and found them to be mere photocopies. The police also discovered a large
aquarium full of live lapu-lapu and assorted fish weighing approximately one ton
at the bottom of the boat. 2 They checked the license of the boat and its
fishermen and found them to be in order. Nonetheless, SP03 Enriquez brought
the boat captain, the crew and the fishermen to Puerto Princesa for further
investigation.
The boat captain and the two foreigners were again interrogated at the PNP
Maritime Command office. Thereafter, an Inspection/Apprehension Report was
prepared and the boat, its crew and fishermen were charged with the following
violations: (1) Conducting fishing operations within Puerto Princesa coastal
waters without mayor's permit; (2) Employing excess fishermen on board
(Authorized 26; On board 36); (3)Two (2) Hongkong nationals on board
without original passports.
On October 7, 1992, NBI Forensic Chemist Emilia Rosaldes conducted two tests
on the fish samples and found that they contained sodium cyanide.
In light of these findings, the PNP Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa City
filed the complaint at bar against the owner and operator of the F/B Robinson,
the First Fishermen Fishing Industries, Inc., represented by herein petitioner
Richard Hizon, the boat captain, Silverio Gargar, the boat engineer, Ernesto
Andaya, two other crew members, the two Hongkong nationals and 28 fishermen
of the said boat for the offense of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous
substances penalized under PD 704.
On November 23, 1992, Salud Rosales, another forensic chemist of the NBI in
Manila conducted three (3) tests on the specimens and found the fish negative
for the presence of sodium cyanide.
On July 9 ,1993 the trial court found Hizon et. al guilty and sentenced them to
imprisonment for a minimum of 8 years and 1 day to maximum of 9 years and 4
months.
Issues:
1. Whether there is a valid search and seizure of the vessel
Rationale:
The rule on search warrant is subject to certain exceptions. Some of these are:
(1) a search incident to a lawful of arrest; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(3) search of a moving motor vehicle; and (4) search in violation of customs
laws.

Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations
of customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional
requirement of a search warrant. It is rooted on the recognition that a vessel and
an aircraft, like motor vehicles, can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought and secured.

The Court holds as valid the warrantless search on the F/B Robinson, a fishing
boat suspected of having engaged in illegal fishing. The fish and other evidence
seized in the course of the search were properly admitted by the trial court.
Moreover, petitioners failed to raise the issue during trial and hence, waived
their right to question any irregularity that may have attended the said search
and seizure.
Hizon et. al were not guilty of the offence. The prosecution failed to explain the
contradictory findings on the fish samples and this omission raises a reasonable
doubt that the one ton of fishes in the cage were caught with the use of sodium
cyanide. The absence in the second set support Hizons claim that they did not
use the poison in the fishing.
Supreme Court Ruling:
PEOPLE VS. GATWARD
DOCTRINE:
The rule on search warrant is subject to certain exceptions. Some of these are:
(1) a search incident to a lawful of arrest; (2) seizure of evidence in plain
view; (3) search of a moving motor vehicle; and (4) search in violation of
customs laws.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NIGEL RICHARD GATWARD, and U AUNG WIN, accused.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and the decision of the Court of NIGEL RICHARD GATWARD, accused-appellant.
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15417 is reversed and set aside. Petitioners are ---------------------------------------------------------------
acquitted of the crime of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances G.R. No. 119772-73
defined under Section 33 of Republic Act No. 704, the Fisheries Decree of 1975. February 7, 1997
No costs. Ponente: REGALADO, J..:

Nature of Case:
Petition for Review for certiorari

Brief:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the judgement of court a quo,
specifically with regard to the penalties imposed on the accused-appellant.

Facts:

U Aung Win was charged and convicted with violating RA 6425 (Dangerous
Drugs Act) for importing and bringing into the Philippines 5,579.80 grams of
heroin. Nigel Gatward was also charged the same for transporting 5,237.70
grams of heroin.
 U Aung Win was caught in NAIA after arriving from Bangkok, Thailand.
He
He had a luggage inspected the proceeded to the conveyor in the to retrieve
another baggage but never came back. The Customs Examiner became alarmed
by this and subjected the luggage under X-ray and found the powdery substance
of Heroin. Thereafter, the Customs Police were alerted and U Aung Win was
caught the next day at the check-in counter trying to depart.
Getward was caught with the help of U Aung Wins information during his
investigation. He was found bound for Amsterdam and already on the plane but
was off-loaded in time. The baggage was returned on the returning flight,
subjected to X-ray where two envelopes of heroin were found.
U Aung Win pleaded guilty. Getward filed an appeal. During its pendency and
while awaiting for the filing of appellants brief, the Court received a
mimeographed Urgent Moion to Withdraw Appeal. It was signed by appellant but
not by counsel. The Court denied the motion for lack of merit.
Issues:
3 Whether the accused-appellants luggages may be searched without warrant.
Rationale:
The trial court was also correct in rejecting the challenge to the admissibility in
evidence of the heroin retrieved from the bag of appellant. While no search
warrant had been obtained for that purpose, when appellant checked in his bag
as his personal luggage as a passenger of KLM Flight No. 806 he thereby agreed
to the inspection thereof in accordance with customs rules and regulations, an
international practice of strict observance, and waived any objection to a
warrantless search. His subsequent arrest, although likewise without a warrant,
was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of the heroin
in his bag, or in flagrante delicto.
The conviction of accused U Aung Win is likewise unassailable. His culpability
was not based only upon his plea of guilty but also upon the evidence of the
prosecution, the presentation of which was required by the lower court despite
said plea. The evidence thus presented convincingly proved his having imported
into this country the heroin found in his luggage which he presented for customs
examination upon his arrival at the international airport. There was, of course,
no showing that he was authorized by law to import such dangerous drug, nor
did he claim or present any authority to do so.
Supreme Court Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the.court a quo, specifically with regard to the
penalty imposed on accused-appellant Nigel Richard Gatward in Criminal Case
No. 94-6268 and that of accused U Aung Win in Criminal Case No. 94-6269, is
hereby MODIFIED in the sense that both accused are sentenced to serve the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in its entire duration and full extent. In all other
respects, said judgment is hereby AFFIRMED, but with costs to be assessed
against both accused in all instances of these cases.
People v. Johnson
138881 : December 18, 2000
Doctrine: A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person: (a) when in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense; (b) when an offense has in fact just been
committed and person to be arrested has committed it;
Brief:
This is an appeal from the decision, dated May 14, 1999, of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 110, Pasay City, finding accused-appellant Leila
Johnson y Reyes guilty of violation of 16 of R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous
Drugs Act), as amended by R.A. No. 7659, and sentencing her to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and
the costs of the suit.
Facts:
Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58 years
old, a widow, and a resident of Ocean Side, California, U.S.A. She
is a former Filipino citizen who was naturalized as an American on
16 June 1968 and had since been working as a registered nurse,
taking care of geriatric patients and those with Alzheimer's disease,
in convalescent homes in the United States. On 16 June 1998, she
arrived in the Philippines to visit her son's family in Calamba,
Laguna. She was due to fly back to the United States on July 26.
On July 25, she checked in at the Philippine Village Hotel to avoid
the traffic on the way to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA) and checked out at 5:30 p.m. the next day, 26 June 1998.
At around 7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a
lady frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure area. Her duty was
to frisk departing passengers, employees, and crew and check for
weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband goods, and
explosives. When she frisked Johnson, a departing passenger
bound for the United States via Continental Airlines CS-912, she
felt something hard on the latter's abdominal area. Upon inquiry,
Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as
she had just undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic
pregnancy. Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the
matter to her superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile, saying "Sir, hindi po
ako naniniwalang panty lang po iyon." She was directed to take
Johnson to the nearest women's room for inspection. Ramirez took
Johnson to the rest room, accompanied by SPO1 Rizalina Bernal.
Embile stayed outside. Inside the women's room, Johnson was
asked again by Ramirez what the hard object on her stomach was
and Johnson gave the same answer she had previously given.
Ramirez then asked her "to bring out the thing under her girdle."
Johnson brought out three plastic packs, which Ramirez then turned
over to Embile, outside the women's room. The confiscated packs
contained a total of 580.2 grams of a substance which was fount
by NBI Chemist George de Lara to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu." Embile took Johnson and the plastic
packs to the 1st Regional Aviation and Security Office (1st RASO)
at the arrival area of the NAIA, where Johnson's passport and
ticket were taken and her luggage opened. Pictures were taken
and her personal belongings were itemized. Johnson was charged
for the possession of 3 plastic bages of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug, weighing a total of 580.2 grams; a
violation of 16 of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended
by RA 7659. On 14 May 1999, the Regional Trial Court, Branch
110, Pasay City, found Johnson guilty and sentenced her to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00 and the costs of the suit. Johnson appealed.
Action of the Courts:
RTC : Conviction in violation of the Dangerous drugs Act
SC: Affirmed RTC decision
Issue:
Whether airport searches violate the rights against unreasonable search
and seizures.
Rationale :
The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she
was never placed under custodial investigation but was validly
arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5,
Rule 113 of tie 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides
that "A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person: (a) when in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense; (b) when an offense has in fact just been
committed and person to be arrested has committed it; and xxx."
The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused falls in
either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above cited, hence the
allegation that she has been subjected to custodial investigation is
far from being accurate. The methamphetamine hydrochloride
seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport was
acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause
by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a
manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy,
which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With
increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come
increased security at the nation's airports. Passengers attempting to
board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their
carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely
subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the
presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to
determine what the objects are. There is little question that such
searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the
gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy
expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are
often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and
notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and,
if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be
subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on
notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless
searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.
The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been
obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in
evidence against Johnson. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest,
although likewise without warrant, was justified since it was
effected upon the discovery and recovery of "shabu" in her person society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is
in flagrante delicto. implicit in airport security procedures

Brief:

For automatic review is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
45, Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 94-16100 convicting Hedishi
Suzuki, appellant, of illegal possession of marijuana, defined and
penalized under Section 8, Article II of R.A. No. 6525, as amended, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay a fine of
P10,000,000.00

Facts:

Sometime in November 1993, the PNP Narcotics Command issued

a directive to all Chiefs of Narcotics Regional Field Units to cover
all domestic airport terminals within their respective areas of
responsibility, following reports that drug trafficking is prevalent in
domestic airports; and to coordinate with local airport authorities
and the PASCOM. In the morning of 12 April 1994, Hedishi Suzuki
and Takeshi Koketsu, both Japanese nationals, entered the pre-
departure area of the Bacolod Airport Terminal. Suzuki was bound
for Manila via flight 132 of the Philippine Airlines and was
carrying a small traveling bag and a box marked Bongbongs
piaya. At the pre-departure area, upon the advice of Corazon
Sinosa, a civilian personnel of the PASCOM, Suzuki proceeded to
the walk-through metal detector, a machine which produces a red
light and an alarm once it detects the presence of metallic
substance or object. Thereupon, the red light switched on and the
alarm sounded, signifying the presence of metallic substance either
in his person or in the box he was carrying. This prompted PO3
People vs Suzuki Rhodelin Poyugao of the Police Aviation Security Command
(PASCOM) to frisk him bodily. Finding no metallic object in his
120670 October 23, 2000 body, PO3 Poyugao picked up the box of piaya and passed it
through the machine. Again, the machine was activated. PO3
J. Sanfoval-Gutierrez Poyugao then ordered Suzuki to go to the hand-carried luggage
inspection counter where several PASCOM and NARCOM personnel
En Banc were present. SPO1 Arturo Casugod, Sr. requested Suzuki to open
the box. He appeared tense and reluctant and started to leave,
Doctrine: but SPO1 Casugod called him. Eventually he consented, saying in
faltering English, open, open. SPO1 Casugod opened the box and
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by found therein 18 small packs, 17 of which were wrapped in
exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner aluminum foil. SPO1 Casugod opened one pack. Inside were
reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation dried fruiting tops which looked like marijuana. Upon seeing this,
Suzuki ran outside the pre-departure area but he was chased by
PO3 Poyugao, SPO1 Gilbert Linda of the Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) and Donato Barnezo of the PASCOM. They apprehended
Suzuki near the entrance of the terminal and brought him to the
PASCOM office. They also brought Takeshi and his wife, Lourdes
Linsangan, to the office, being suspects as conspirators with Suzuki
in drug trafficking. Lourdes asked permission to call Atty. Silvestre
Tayson. When he arrived, the police apprised Suzuki of his
constitutional rights. Meanwhile, SPO1 Casugod weighed the
contents of the box and inventoried the same. The total weight
of the suspected marijuana fruiting tops was 1.9 kilograms or
1,900 grams. He then drafted a confiscation receipt which
Suzuki, upon the advice of Atty. Tayson, refused to acknowledge.
SPO1 Casugod turned over Suzuki to SPO1 Linda for investigation.
Subsequently, Suzuki and his companions were brought to the
prosecutors office for inquest and placed under the custody of
C/Inspector Ernesto Alcantara at the NARCOM office. The box with
its contents was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory. P/Inspector
Rea Abastillas Villavicencio, the forensic chemist of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, conducted three tests on
the specimen samples which proved positive for marijuana. Suzuki
was charged with unlawful possession of marijuana, a prohibited
drug, in violation of the Dangerous Drug Act. Suzuki entered a
plea of not guilty, and trial followed thereafter. The Regional Trial
Court, Branch 45, Bacolod City in Criminal Case 94-16100
convicted Hedishi Suzuki of illegal possession of marijuana, defined
and penalized under Section 8, Article II of RA 6525, as amended,
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay a
fine of P10,000,000.00. Hence, the automatic review.
Action of the courts:
RTC: Conviction of the violation of Dangerous drugs act RA 6525
SC: Affirmed RTC decision
Issue:
Whether the PASCOM has the authority to inspect luggages or
hand-carried bags.
Ratio:
The Police Aviation Security Command (PASCOM) is the
implementing arm of the National Action Committee on Anti-
Hijacking (NACAH), which is a creation of Presidential Letter of
Instruction (LOI) 399, dated 28 April 1976. On 18 February 1978, a
Memorandum of Understanding among the Secretary of National
Defense, the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and
Communication, the Secretary of Justice, the Director General,
National Intelligence and Security Authority and the Secretary of
Finance was signed. Under the said Memorandum of Understanding
the then AVSECOM (now PASCOM) shall have the following
functions and responsibilities: (1) Secure all airports against
offensive and terroristic acts that threaten civil aviation; (2)
Undertake aircraft anti-hijacking operations; (3) Exercise operational
control and supervision over all agencies involved in airport
security operations; (4) Take all necessary preventive measures to
maintain peace and order, and provide other pertinent public
safety services within the airports; xxx. Based upon the
Memorandum of Understanding, pursuant to President LOI 399, in
relation to RA 6235, the PASCOM had the legal authority to be at
the Bacolod Airport, Bacolod City and to inspect luggages or hand-
carried bags. This is not the first time that the Court recognize a
search conducted pursuant to routine airport security procedure as
an exception to the proscription against warrantless searches. In
People vs. Canton, and People vs. Johnson, the Court validated the
search conducted on the departing passengers and the consequent
seizure of the shabu found in their persons. Clearly, the PASCOM
agents have the right under the law to conduct search of
prohibited materials or substances. To simply refuse passengers
carrying suspected illegal items to enter the pre-departure area is
to deprive the authorities of their duty to conduct search, thus
sanctioning impotence and ineffectivity of the law enforcers, to the
detriment of society. It should be stressed, however, that whenever
the right against unreasonable search and seizure is challenged,
an individual may choose between invoking the constitutional
protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search or
seizure. Here, Suzuki voluntarily gave his consent to the search
conducted by the PASCOM agents.

Bureau of Customs vs. Ogario
[GR 138081, 30 March 2000] Second Division, Mendoza (J):
concur
Doctrine: Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to
pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture
proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs and to enjoin or
otherwise interfere with these proceedings. The Collector of
Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings has exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching on the
seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods.
Brief:
The question for decision in this case is whether the Regional Trial Court
has jurisdiction to enjoin forfeiture proceedings in the Bureau of
Customs.
Facts:
On 9 December 1998, Felipe A. Bartolome, District Collector of
Customs of Cebu, issued a Warrant of Seizure and Detention of
25,000 bags of rice, bearing the name of "SNOWMAN, Milled in
Palawan" shipped on board the M/V "Alberto," which was then
docked at Pier 6 in Cebu City. The warrant was issued on the
basis of the report of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB), Region VII that the rice had been illegally imported.
The report stated that the rice was landed in Palawan by a
foreign vessel and then placed in sacks marked "SNOWMAN, Milled
in Palawan." It was then shipped to Cebu City on board the vessel
M/V "Alberto." Forfeiture proceedings were started in the customs
office in Cebu (Cebu Seizure Identification Case 17-98). On 10
December 1998, Mark Montelibano, the consignee of the sacks of
rice, and his buyer, Nelson Ogario, filed a complaint for injunction
(Civil Case CEB-23077) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu
City. In separate motions, the Bureau of Customs (BOC), Port of
Cebu and the EIIB, as well as the Philippine Navy and Coast
Guard, sought the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
the RTC had no jurisdiction, but their motions were denied in a
resolution dated 11 January 1999. BOC and EIIB moved for a
reconsideration, but their motion was denied by the RTC in its
order dated 25 January 1999. In the same order, the RTC also
increased the amount of Ogario and Montelibanos bond to
P22,500,000.00. On certiorari to the Court of Appeals, the
resolution and order of the RTC were sustained on 15 April 1999.
Accordingly, on 26 April 1999, upon motion of Ogario, et. al., the
4 RTC ordered the sheriff to place in their possession the 25,000
bags of rice. Meanwhile, in the forfeiture proceedings before the
Collector of Customs of Cebu, a decision was rendered forfeiting
the vessel M/V "Alberto"; the 25,000 bags of rice brand
"Snowman"; and the two (2) trucks bearing Plates GCC 844 and
GHZ 388 in favor of the government to be disposed of in the
manner prescribed by law while releasing the 7 trucks bearing
Plates GFX 557; GFX 247; TPV 726; GBY 874; GVE 989; and GDF
548 in favor of their respective owners upon proper identification
and compliance with pertinent laws, rules and regulations.
Montelibano did not take part in the proceedings before the
District Collector of Customs despite due notice sent to his
counsel because he refused to recognize the validity of the
forfeiture proceedings On 30 April 1999, Ogario and Montelibano
filed the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
Action of the Courts:
RTC:
The 25,000 bags of rice brand "Snowman"; and the two (2) trucks
bearing Plate Nos. GCC 844 and GHZ 388 are all FORFEITED in favor of
the government to be disposed of in the manner prescribed by law while
the seven (7) trucks bearing Plate Nos. GFX 557; GFX 247; TPV 726; GBY
874; GVE 989; and GDF 548 are RELEASED in favor of their respective
owners upon proper identification and compliance with pertinent laws,
rules and regulations
SC:
The temporary restraining order issued on May 17, 1999 is hereby made
permanent. The decision, dated April 15, 1999, of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and Civil Case No. CEB-23077 in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 5, Cebu City is DISMISSED.
Issue:
Whether the Regional Trial Courts are competent to pass upon the
validity or regularity of the seizure and forfeiture proceedings
conducted by the Bureau of Customs.

Ratio:

Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon

the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings
conducted by the Bureau of Customs and to enjoin or otherwise
interfere with these proceedings. The Collector of Customs sitting in
seizure and forfeiture proceedings has exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and determine all questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture
of dutiable goods. The Regional Trial Courts are precluded from
assuming cognizance over such matters even through petitions of
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. Under the law, the question of
whether probable cause exists for the seizure of the subject sacks
of rice is not for the Regional Trial Court to determine. The
customs authorities do not have to prove to the satisfaction of the Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, June 10, 1968
court that the articles on board a vessel were imported from
abroad (Stop and Frisk- this case is a sikat one hahahaha. It is adopted by
the Philippine Supreme Court in many many cases - VEM)
or are intended to be shipped abroad before they may exercise
the power to effect customs searches, seizures, or arrests provided FACTS
by law and continue with the administrative hearings.

Cleveland, Ohio detective McFadden was on a downtown beat that he had been
patrolling for many years when he observed two strangers (Terry and another
man, Chilton) at a street corner. He saw them proceed alternately back and forth
along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same store window, which they
did for a total of about 24 times. Each completion of the route was followed by a
conference between the two on a corner, at one of which they were joined by a
third man (Katz) who thereafter left swiftly. Suspecting the two men of casing a
job, a stick-up, the officer followed them and saw them rejoin the third man a
couple of blocks away in front of a store. The officer approached the three,
identified himself as a policeman, and asked their names. The men mumbled
something, whereupon McFadden spun Terry around, patted down his outside
clothing, and felt in his overcoat pocket but was unable to remove a pistol.
He removed Terrys overcoat, took out a revolver, and ordered the three to face
the wall with their hands raised. He patted down the outer clothing of Chilton
and Katz and seized a revolver from Chiltons outside overcoat pocket. He did
not put his hands under the outer garments of Katz (since he discovered nothing

in his pat-down which might have been a weapon), or under Terrys or Chiltons
outer garments until he felt the guns. Terry and Chilton were charged with
carrying concealed weapons. The defense moved to suppress the weapons,
which was denied by the trial court. Terry eventually went to the U.S. Supreme
Court to question the admissibility of the gun and his resulting conviction.
ISSUE
Was the gun seized from Terry admissible in evidence against him and thus his
conviction of carrying concealed weapon was proper?
RULING
[The U.S. Supreme Court voted 8-1 to AFFIRM Terrys conviction of carrying a
concealed weapon.]
YES, the gun seized from Terry was admissible in evidence against him; thus, his
conviction of carrying concealed weapon was proper.
First, in assessing the reasonableness of stop-and-frisk as a valid form of
warrantless search, the U.S. Supreme Court held:
The crux of this case, however, is not the propriety of Officer McFaddens taking
steps to investigate [Terrys] suspicious behavior, but rather, whether there was
justification for McFaddens invasion of Terry's personal security by searching
him for weapons in the course of that investigation. We are now concerned with
more than the governmental interest in investigating crime; in addition, there is
the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that
could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him. Certainly it would be
unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the
performance of their duties. xxx
xxx [W]e cannot blind ourselves to the need for law enforcement officers to
protect themselves and other prospective victims of violence in situations where
they may lack probable cause for an arrest. When an officer is justified in
believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at
close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it
would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take
necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a
weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.
xxx. A search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest, however,
must, like any other search, be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which
justify its initiation. Thus it must be limited to that which is necessary for the
discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby,
and may realistically be characterized as something less than a full search, even
though it remains a serious intrusion.
Next, on the distinction between protective search for weapons under stop-and-
frisk on one hand, and arrest (and the search incidental thereof) on the other
hand, it was declared:
An arrest is a wholly different kind of intrusion upon individual freedom from a
limited search for weapons, and the interests each is designed to serve are
likewise quite different. An arrest is the initial stage of a criminal prosecution. It
is intended to vindicate society's interest in having its laws obeyed, and it is
inevitably accompanied by future interference with the individuals freedom of
movement, whether or not trial or conviction ultimately follows. The protective
search for weapons, on the other hand, constitutes a brief, though far from
inconsiderable, intrusion upon the sanctity of the person. It does not follow that
because an officer may lawfully arrest a person only when he is apprised of facts
sufficient to warrant a belief that the person has committed or is committing a
crime, the officer is equally unjustified, absent that kind of evidence, in making
any intrusions short of an arrest. Moreover, a perfectly reasonable apprehension
of danger may arise long before the officer is possessed of adequate information
to justify taking a person into custody for the purpose of prosecuting him for a
crime. Petitioners reliance on cases which have worked out standards of
reasonableness with regard to seizures constituting arrests and searches
incident thereto is thus misplaced. It assumes that the interests sought to be
vindicated and the invasions of personal security may be equated in the two
cases, and thereby ignores a vital aspect of the analysis of the reasonableness
of particular types of conduct under the [right against unreasonable search and
seizure].
Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck in this type of case
leads us to conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a
reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he
has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual,
regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.
The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue
is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted
in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.
xxx [The protective search for weapons under stop-and-frisk], unlike a search
without a warrant incident to a lawful arrest, is not justified by any need to
prevent the disappearance or destruction of evidence of crime. The sole
justification of the search in the present situation is the protection of the police
officer and others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an
intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden
instruments for the assault of the police officer. (Emphasis supplied)
Revolver seized from Terry admissible in evidence.
The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the revolver seized from Terry was
properly admitted in evidence against him, thus:
xxx. At the time he seized [Terry] and searched him for weapons, Officer
McFadden had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner was armed and
dangerous, and it was necessary for the protection of himself and others to take
swift measures to discover the true facts and neutralize the threat of harm if it
materialized. The policeman carefully restricted his search to what was
appropriate to the discovery of the particular items which he sought. Each case
of this sort will, of course, have to be decided on its own facts. We merely hold
today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies
himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in
the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his
own or others safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in
the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
Such a search is a reasonable search under the [contest of the constitutional
right against unreasonable search and seizure], and any weapons seized may
properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were
taken. (Emphasis supplied)
People vs Solayao
119220 September 20, 1996
J Romero : Second Division
Doctrine:
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
Brief:
Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao was charged before the Regional Trial
Court of Naval, Biliran, Branch 16, with the crime of illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition[1] defined and penalized under Presidential
Decree No. 1866.
Facts:
On 9 June 1992, CAFGU members, headed by SPO3 Nino, were
conducting an intelligence patrol to verify reports on the presence
of armed persons roaming around the barangays of Caibiran. In
Baragay Onion, they met the 5-man group of accused Nilo
Solayao, who was also wearing a camouflage uniform. His
companions, upon seeing the government agents, fled. SPO3 Nio
told Salayao not to run away and introduced himself as "PC," after
which he seized the dried coconut leaves which the latter was
carrying and found wrapped in it a 49-inch long homemade firearm
locally known as "latong." When he asked Salayao who issued him
a license to carry said firearm or whether he was connected with
the military or any intelligence group, the latter answered that he
had no permission to possess the same. Thereupon, SPO3 Nio
confiscated the firearm and turned him over to the custody of the
policemen of Caibiran who subsequently investigated him and
charged him with illegal possession of firearm. Salayao did not
contest the confiscation of the shotgun but averred that this was
only given to him by one of his companions, Hermogenes
Cenining, when it was still wrapped in coconut leaves, which they
were using the coconut leaves as a torch. Salayaos claim was
corroborated by one Pedro Balano. On 15 August 1994, the RTC of
Naval Biliran (Branch 16) found Salayao guilty of illegal possession
of firearm under Section 1 of PD 1866 and imposed upon him the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from reclusion temporal maximum
to reclusion perpetua. The trial court, having found no mitigating
but one aggravating circumstance of nighttime, sentenced accused-
appellant to suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalties provided by law. Solayao appealed to the
Supreme Court.
Action of the courts:
RTC:
Accused was convicted of illegal possesion of firearms.
SC:
Reversed and set aside RTC decision
Issue:
Whether the search made upon Solayao is valid
Ratio:
Nilo Solayao and his companions' drunken actuations aroused the
suspicion of SPO3 Nio's group, as well as the fact that he himself
was attired in a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit and that
upon espying the peace officers, his companions fled. It should be
noted that the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence
mission to verify reports that armed persons were roaming around
the barangays of Caibiran. The circumstances are similar to those
obtaining in Posadas v. Court of Appeals where this Court held
that "at the time the peace officers identified themselves and
apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee, they did not
know that he had committed, or was actually committing the
offense of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions. They just
suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did
not know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not
justify an arrest without a warrant." As with Posadas, the case
herein constitutes an instance where a search and seizure may be
effected without first making an arrest. There was justifiable cause
to "stop and frisk" Solayao when his companions fled upon seeing
the government agents. Under the circumstances, the government
agents could not possibly have procured a search warrant first.
Thus, there was no violation of the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Nor was there error on
the part of the trial court when it admitted the homemade firearm
as evidence.
Manalili vs CA
Doctrine: When Warrantless Arrest Valid (Stop and Frisked Rule)
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking the reversal of CAs decision in
affirming TCs decision on convicting Manalili of illegal possession of
prohibited drug violating RA 6425.Police operatives Espiritu, Lumabas
and driver Enriquez conducted surveillance along the front of Kalookan
Cemetery based on the information that drug addicts were roaming
around in the area, saw a man who appeared to be high on drugs and
introduced themselves as policemen. Said man avoided them and tried
to resist, when they asked what the man was holding in his hand, the
man held out his wallet and allowed Espiritu to examine it, who found
what he suspected to be crushed Marijuana leaves. The man was
brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit and turned out to be Manalili. The
substance found on Manalilis wallet was sent to NBI Foresic Chemistry
Section and was confirmed as marijuana. Manalilis version of the story
was that early afternoon he was riding in a tricycle when 3 policemen
stopped the tricycle and informed them of the suspected possession of
mj, the policemen bodily searched both Manalili and the driver and upon
finding nothing illegal on their persons, let the driver go but brought
Manalili along to the police station. Manalili while on the way to the
station saw a neighbor whom he signaled to follow them and when he
was again searched in the station, he was asked to strip his pants where
they found nothing illegal. Said neighbor then asked the policemen to let
Manalili go seeing as they had not found anything illegal but Manalili
was put on a cell who was brought to a fiscal later that day and was told
not to say anything despite his saying that the policemen had not found
mj on his person. Said tricycle driver and neighbor testified on court as
to how the 2 searches yielded nothing illegal on Manalilis person.
Issues:
1. W/N evidence seized during a stop-and-frisk is admissible.
2. W/N Manalilis actions constituted a waiver of his rights.
3. W/N the evidence is sufficient to prove Manalilis guilt.
Ruling:
I. In Terry vs Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as the
vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a
citizen on the street, interrogate him and pat him for
weapons: W)here a police officer observes an unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
 persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior
he identified himself as a policeman and makes reasonable
inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or
others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and
others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search
is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any
weapon seized may properly be introduced in evidence
against the person from whom they were taken. It did not,
however abandon the rule that the police must, whenever
practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and
seizures through the warrant procedure, excused only by
exigent circumstances. As People vs Lacerna enumerated 5
recognized exceptions to the rule against warrantless
searches and seizures: 1) search incidental to lawfu larrest; 2)
search of moving vehicles; 3) seizure in plain view; 4)
customs search; 5) waiver of the accused of his rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures. From Espiritus
experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of
Caloocan City Police, Manalilis suspicious behavior was
characteristic of drug addicts who were high.
II. SGs contention that Manalili effectively waived the
inadmissibility of the evidence illegally obtained when he
failed to raise this issue or object during trial. A valid waiver
of right against unreasonable searches and seizures require
the concurrence of these requisites: 1) the right to be waived
existed; 2) the person waiving it had knowledge; and 3)
he/she had actual intention to relinquish the right. In this case
however, it is deemed that Manalili has waived such right for
failure to raise its violation before the trial court, at the
earliest opportunity possible. Issues not raised below cannot
be pleaded for the first time on appeal.
III. Manalilis contention that the charge was trumped up to
extort money and testimonies of the arresting officers were
inconsistent, it held that the trial courts assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses particularly when affirmed by CA is
accorded great weight and respect as it had opportunity to
observe their demeanor and deportment as they testified
before it. The elements of illegal possession of marijuana are:
a) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is
identified to be a prohibited drug; b) such possession is not
authorized by law; and c) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug. The substance found on Manalilis
wallet was identified as marijuana which was prohibited and
knowingly without authority. Considering that he was high
and tried to avoid and resist, such behavior clearly shows that
he knew he was holding marijuana and it was prohibited by
law.
MALACAT vs. CA
Facts:
Petitioner was arrested for having in his possession a hand grenade after he was
searched by a group of policemen when he was said to be acting suspiciously
when he was hanging around Plaza Miranda with his eyes moving fast together
with other Muslim-looking men. When the policemen approached the group of
men, they scattered in all directions which prompted the police to give chase
and petitioner was then apprehended and a search was made on his person. He
was then convicted under PD 1866 in the lower court. Hence, the present
petition wherein petitioner contended that the lower court erred in holding that
the search made on him and the seizure of the hand grenade from him was an
appropriate incident to his arrest and that it erred in admitting the hand grenade
as evidence since it was admissible because it was a product of an unreasonable
and illegal search.
Issue: WON the search and seizure conducted by the police was valid.
Held:
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is
needed in order to validly effect the same. 31
The Constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected
without a validly issued warrant, 32
subject to certain exceptions. As regards
valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, which reads, in part:
Sec. 5. Arrest, without warrant; when lawful A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped . . .
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a)
has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section
5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1)
customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain
view; (4) consent searches; 33
(5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; 34
and (6)
a "stop and frisk.
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-
frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of
warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before
they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the
arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an
arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. 36
In this
instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a
search can be made the process cannot be reversed. 37 At bottom,
assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of
the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a
weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property
found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of
the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might
furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing
violence.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk"
as a "limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down
in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct
which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal
activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this
behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries,
and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used
to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment . .
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to
conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch
will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of
the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant
the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about
him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the
general interest of efective crime prevention and detection, which
underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for
purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without
probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-
preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police
officer.
Florida vs. J.L. [000 US 98-1993, 28 March 2000]
Facts:
On 13 October 1995, an anonymous caller reported to the Miami-Dade
Police that a young black male standing at a particular bus stop and
wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun. There is no audio recording of
the tip, and nothing is known about the informant. Sometime after the
police received the tip, two officers were instructed to respond. They
arrived at the bus stop about 6 minutes later and saw 3 black males
"just hanging out [there]." One of the three, J. L., was wearing a plaid
shirt. Apart from the tip, the officers had no reason to suspect any of the
three of illegal conduct. The officers did not see a firearm, and J. L. made
no threatening or otherwise unusual movements. One of the officers
approached J. L., told him to put his hands up on the bus stop, frisked
him, and seized a gun from J. L.'s pocket. The second officer frisked the
other two individuals, against whom no allegations had been made, and
found nothing. J. L., who was at the time of the frisk "10 days shy of his
16th birth[day]," was charged under state law with carrying a concealed
firearm without a license and possessing a firearm while under the age
of 18. He moved to suppress the gun as the fruit of an unlawful search,
and the trial court granted his motion. The intermediate appellate court
reversed, but the Supreme Court of Florida quashed that decision and
held the search invalid under the Fourth Amendment
Issue:
Whether the anonymous tip is sufficient basis to conduct stop adn
frisk upon the person of J.L.
The tip herein lacked the moderate indicia of reliability. The anonymous
call concerning J. L. provided no predictive information and therefore left
the police without means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility.
That the allegation about the gun turned out to be correct does not
suggest that the officers, prior to the frisks, had a reasonable basis for
suspecting J. L. of engaging in unlawful conduct: The reasonableness of
official suspicion must be measured by what the officers knew before
they conducted their search. All the police had to go on in this case was
the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither
explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for
believing he had inside information about J. L. The requirement that an
anonymous tip bear standard indicia of reliability in order to justify a
stop in no way diminishes a police officer's prerogative, in accord with
Terry, to conduct a protective search of a person who has already been
legitimately stopped. On the other hand, an anonymous tip lacking
indicia of reliability of the kind contemplated in Adams (Adams v.
Williams, 407 US 143 [1972]) and White (Alabama v. White, 496 US 325)
does not justify a stop and frisk whenever and however it alleges the
illegal possession of a firearm.

Held:

In Terry v. Ohio (392 US 1 [1968]), it was held that "where a police officer
observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in
light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he
identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and
where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him." Herein, the
officers' suspicion that J. L. was carrying a weapon arose not from any
observations of their own but solely from a call made from an unknown
location by an unknown caller. Unlike a tip from a known informant
whose reputation can be assessed and who can be held responsible if
her allegations turn out to be fabricated, "an anonymous tip alone
seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity."

G.R. No. 105834 February 13, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JEAN BALINGAN Y BOBBONAN alias "SUSAN", "JANE" and
"JUANA", accused-appellant.
Facts:
On 31 August 1988, the Narcotics Intelligence Division of the Baguio City
Police Station received a telephone call from an unnamed male
informant. He passed the information that Jean Balingan y Bobbonan
was going to Manila with a bag filled with marijuana. Acting on the
information, then P/Lt. Manuel Obrera formed a surveillance team to
monitor Balingan's movements. The team as deployed at different
places in Baguio City, including Balingan's house on Brookside and bus
stations. Cpl. Garcia soon reported seeing Balingan move out from her
residence at Brookside and board a taxicab which proceeded to the
direction of Bonifacio Street. Balingan was wearing a pink dress and
carrying a gray luggage with orange or yellow belts. She also reported
the make and plate number of the taxicab which Balingan boarded.
Upon receiving the report, Lt. Obrera ordered Cpl. Garcia to proceed to
the Philippine Rabbit Terminal in case Balingan would go there. Pat.
Kimay, who must have intercepted Cpl. Garcia's message, also reported
that the taxicab described by the latter passed along Bonifacio Rotunda.
Lt. Obrera instructed him to move out and proceed to the Police
Checkpoint at Kennon Road going to the Philippine Military Academy.
From his post at the Dangwa Bus Station, Pat. Bueno informed Lt. Obrera
that Balingan boarded a Dangwa Bus with plate number NTU-153 bound
for Manila. Lt. Obrera promptly proceeded to the bus station to verify the
report. There, he went up the bus described by Pat. Bueno, and he saw
Balingan on the third or fourth seat behind the driver's seat. In the
luggage carrier above her head was the gray luggage earlier described
by Cpl. Garcia. He then left and positioned himself with Ong at the
Lakandula burned area to wait for the bus to depart. At about 11:00
a.m., the bus moved out (on its way) to Manila via Kennon Road. Lt.
Obrera instructed Pat. Kimay, who was at the Kennon Road Checkpoint,
to stop the bus when it reaches the place. Meanwhile, Lt. Obrera and Lt.
Ong tailed the bus at about 15 to 20 meters behind. As instructed, Pat.
Kimay stopped the bus at the Kennon Road Checkpoint. That was
already at 11:30 a.m. Lt. Obrera and Pat. Ong arrived at the Checkpoint
less than a minute after the bus did and immediately boarded it. Lt.
Obrera announced a routinary check-up. Pat. Ong identified himself as a
policeman to Balingan and asked her permission to check her luggage,
she did not respond and just looked outside the window. He opened the
luggage in the luggage carrier overhead and above Balingan and found
suspected marijuana in it. He pulled out the luggage and turned it over
to Lt. Obrera. Thereupon, Lt. Obrera tried to arrest Balingan but the
latter resisted and tried to bite his hand and furthermore held tightly
onto the window pane. Lt. Obrera asked Pat. Ong to fetch Cpl. Garcia
from the Philippine Rabbit Terminal in the City proper, so that she would
be the one to bring out Balingan from the bus. In the meantime, he
remained inside the bus holding the confiscated luggage while the other
passengers alighted from the bus. After some 30 minutes, Garcia arrived
and pulled Balingan out of the bus and brought her to the Baguio City
Police Station and there locked her up in jail. On 24 October 1988,
Balingan was charged with Violation of Sec. 4, Art. II of Republic Act
6425, otherwise known as "The Dangerous Drugs Act. On 4 April 1989,
Balingan was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. After trial, Balingan was
convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 4, and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment; to pay a fine of
P20,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and
to pay the costs. Balingan appealed.
Issue:
Whether the search conducted in the Dangwa bus, subsequent to police
surveillance pursuant to an informants tip, is valid.
Held:
The search and seizure herein happened in a moving, public vehicle. The
rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily
liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the
basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be
obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be
described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which
borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use
of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to
another with impunity. A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is
justified on the ground that "it is not practicable to secure a warrant
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought." Unquestionably, the
warrantless search herein is not bereft of a probable cause. The Baguio
INP Narcotics Intelligence Division received an information that Balingan
was going to transport marijuana in a bag to Manila. Their surveillance
operations revealed that Balingan, whose movements had been
previously monitored by the Narcotics Division, boarded a Dangwa bus
bound for Manila carrying a suspicious-looking gray luggage bag. When
the moving, public bus was stopped, her bag, upon inspection, yielded G.R. No. 125959 February 1, 1999
marijuana. Under those circumstances, the warrantless search of
Balingan's bag was not illegal.
JOSE MARIA M. ASUNCION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts:

On 6 December 1993, in compliance with the order of the Malabon

Municipal Mayor to intensify campaign against illegal drugs particularly
at Barangay Taong, the Chief of the Malabon Police AntiNarcotics Unit
ordered his men to conduct patrol on the area with specific instruction to
look for a certain vehicle with a certain plate number and watch out for
a certain drug pusher named Vic Vargas. Pursuant thereto, SPO1
Advincula, PO3 Parcon, PO3 Pilapil and a police aide were dispatched at
around 11:45 p.m.. The team proceeded to Barangay Taong where they
were joined by their confidential informant and the latter informed them
that a gray Nissan car is always parked therein for the purpose of selling
shabu. While patrolling along Leoo Street, the confidential informant
pointed the gray Nissan car to the policemen and told them that the
occupant thereof has shabu in his possession. The policemen
immediately flagged down the said car along First Street and
approached the driver, who turned out to be Jose Maria Asuncion y
Marfori, a movie actor using the screen name Vic Vargas and who is also
known as Binggoy. Advincula then asked Asuncion if they can inspect
the vehicle. As Asuncion acceded thereto, Advincula conducted a search
on the vehicle and he found a plastic packet containing white substance
suspected to be methamphetamine hydrochloride beneath the driver's
seat. Asuncion told the policemen that he just borrowed the said car and
he is not the owner thereof. Asuncion was thereafter taken at the police
headquarters for the purpose of taking his identification. However, when
he was frisked by Advincula at the headquarters, the latter groped
something protruding from his underwear, which when voluntarily taken
out by the accused turned out to be a plastic packet containing white
substance suspected to be methamphetamine hydrochloride. A press
conference was conducted the following day presided by Northern Police
District Director Pureza during which Asuncion admitted that the
methamphetamine hydrochloride were for his personal use in his
shooting. On the other hand, Asuncion denied the charges against him.
He claimed that on that day, "between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m., he was
abducted at gun point in front of the house where his son lives by men
who turned out to be members of the Malabon Police Anti-Narcotics Unit;
that he was told to board at the back seat by the policemen who took
over the wheels; that he acceded to be brought at the Pagamutang
Bayan ng Malabon for drug test but only his blood pressure was checked
in the said hospital; that he was thereafter brought at the Office of the
Malabon Police Anti-Narcotics Unit; and that he is not aware of what
happened at 11:45 p.m. as he was then sleeping at the said office." On
14 June 1994, a decision was rendered by the trial court finding
Asuncion guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, adn
sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 1 year 8 months
and 20 days as minimum, to 3 years 6 months and 20 days, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of P3,000.00. On 29 June 1994, a Notice of
Appeal was filed and the records of the case were transmitted by the
trial court to the Court of Appeals. On 30 April 1996 a decision was
rendered by the appellate court, modifying the penalty imposed
(reducing the sentence to 6 months of arresto mayor in its maximum
period as minimum to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional in its
medium period as maximum and deleting the fine of P3,000.00 imposed
on Asuncion). On 6 August 1996, the Court of Appeals denied the motion
for reconsideration filed by Asuncion. Asuncion filed a petition for review
on certiorari Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the search upon Asuncions vehicle is valid.
Held:
Well-entrenched in this country is the rule that no arrest, search and
seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by competent
judicial authority. So sacred is this right that no less than the
fundamental law of the land ordains it. However, the rule that search
and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not absolute. The
search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions
to the Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be made
except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally
determining the existence of probable cause. The prevalent
circumstances of the case undoubtedly bear out the fact that the search
in question was made as regards a moving vehicle Asuncion's vehicle
was "flagged down" by the apprehending officers upon identification.
Therefore, the police authorities were justified in searching Asuncion's
automobile without a warrant since the situation demanded immediate
action. The apprehending officers even sought the permission of
petitioner to search the car, to which the latter agreed. As such, since
the shabu was discovered by virtue of a valid warrantless search and
Asuncion himself freely gave his consent to said search, the prohibited
drugs found as a result were admissible in evidence.
G.R. No. L-27360 February 28, 1968
HON. RICARDO G. PAPA, as Chief of Police of Manila; HON. JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, as Commissioner of Customs; PEDRO PACIS, as
Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila; and MARTIN ALAGAO,
as Patrolman of the Manila Police Department, petitioners,
vs.
REMEDIOS MAGO and HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge
of Branch 23, Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents.
Facts:
Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police
Department, acting upon a reliable information received on 3 November
1966 to the effect that a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly
misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from
the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and
upon orders of Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly
deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at
gate 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks left gate 1 at about 4:30
p.m. of 4 November 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit went
after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita,
Manila. The load of the two trucks, consisting of nine bales of goods, and
the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon
investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed to
the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on
Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the
name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit. Claiming to have been prejudiced
by the seizure and detention of the two trucks and their cargo, Remedios
Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Manila a petition "for mandamus with restraining order or preliminary
injunction (Civil Case 67496), praying for the issuance of a restraining
order, ex parte, enjoining the police and customs authorities, or their
agents, from opening the bales and examining the goods, and a writ of
mandamus for the return of the goods and the trucks, as well as a
judgment for actual, moral and exemplary damages in their favor. On 10
November 1966, Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte
restraining Ricardo Papa (as Chief of Police of Manila) and Juan Ponce
Enrile (as Commissioner of Customs) in Civil Case 67496. However,
when the restraining order was received by Papa. et. al., some bales had
already been opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the
presence of officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city
fiscal and a representative of Remedios Mago. Under date of 15
November 1966, Mago filed an amended petition, including as party
defendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila and Lt.
Martin Alagao of the Manila Police Department. At the hearing on 9
December 1966, the lower court, with the conformity of the parties,
ordered that an inventory of the goods be made by its clerk of court in
the presence of the representatives of the claimant of the goods, the
Bureau of Customs, and the Anti- Smuggling Center of the Manila Police
Department. On 23 December 1966, Mago filed an ex parte motion to
release the goods, alleging that since the inventory of the goods seized
did not show any article of prohibited importation, the same should be
released as per agreement of the parties upon her posting of the
appropriate bond that may be determined by the court. On 7 March
1967, the Judge issued an order releasing the goods to Mago upon her
filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00. On 13 March 1967, Papa,
on his own behalf, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the
court releasing the goods under bond, upon the ground that the Manila
Police Department had been directed by the Collector of Customs of the
Port of Manila to hold the goods pending termination of the seizure
proceedings. Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for
reconsideration, and alleging that they had no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, Papa, et. al. filed the
action for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction before
the Supreme Court.
Held:
The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been
deputized in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for the
purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect
searches, seizures, and arrests, and it was his duty to make seizure,
among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable property when the
same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under
customs and tariff laws. He could lawfully open and examine any box,
trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he had
reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop,
search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected
of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. It cannot be doubted,
therefore, that Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect the
search and seizure of the goods in question. The Tariff and Customs
Code authorizes him to demand assistance of any police officer to effect
said search and seizure, and the latter has the legal duty to render said
assistance. This was what happened precisely in the case of Lt. Martin
Alagao who, with his unit, made the search and seizure of the two trucks
loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle. He
was given authority by the Chief of Police to make the interception of
the cargo. Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to
effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent
court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant herein.
The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203
of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any
land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house;
and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any
trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board, or stop and
search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding
or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the
Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search
warrant in said cases. But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code
provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only
upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace." Except in the
case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police
authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without
a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws. Herein, Martin
Alagao and his companion policemen did not have to make any search
before they seized the two trucks and their cargo. But even if there was
a search, there is still authority to the effect that no search warrant
would be needed under the circumstances obtaining herein. The
guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is
construed as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a
dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search warrant
may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or
automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a
warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Having declared that
the seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department of the
goods in question was in accordance with law and by that seizure the
Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the
purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, to the
exclusion of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
G.R. No. L-41686 November 17, 1980
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH IX, QUEZON CITY,
presided by HON. ULPIANO SARMIENTO, JESSIE HOPE and
MONINA MEDINA, respondents.
Facts:
One week before 9 February 1974, the Regional Anti-Smuggling Action
Center (RASAC) was informed by an undisclosed Informer that a
shipment of highly dutiable goods would be transported to Manila from
Angeles City on a blue Dodge car. Spurred by such lead, RASAC Agents
Arthur Manuel and Macario Sabado, on said date and upon order of the
Chief of Intelligence and Operations Branch, RASAC-MBA, Col. Antonio
Abad, Jr., stationed themselves in the vicinity of the toll gate of the North
Diversion Road at Balintawak, Quezon City. At about 6:45 a.m. of the
same day, a light blue Dodge car with Plate 21-87-73, driven by Sgt.
Jessie Hope who was accompanied by Monina Medina approached the
exit gate and after giving the toll receipt sped away towards Manila. The
RASAC agents gave a chase and overtook Sgt. Hope's car. Agent Sabado
blew his whistle and signaled Sgt. Hope to stop but the latter instead of
heeding, made a Uturn back to the North Diversion Road, but he could
not go through because of the buses in front of his car. At this point, the
agents succeeded in blocking Sgt. Hope's car and the latter stopped.
Manuel and Sabado who were in civilian clothes showed their
identification cards to Hope and Medina and introduced themselves as
RASAC agents. The Agents saw 4 boxes on the back seat of the Dodge
and upon inquiry as to what those boxes were, Sgt. Hope answered "I do
not know." Further, Hope and Medina were asked where they were
bringing the boxes, to which Medina replied that they were bringing
them (boxes) to the Tropical Hut at Epifanio de los Santos. Agent Sabado
boarded the Dodge car with Hope and Medina while Agent Manuel took
their own car and both cars drove towards Tropical Hut making a brief
stop at the Bonanza where Agent Manuel called up Col. Abad by
telephone. Arriving at the Tropical Hut, the party, together with Col.
Abad who had joined them waited for the man who according to Monina
Medina was supposed to receive the boxes. As the man did not appear,
Col. Abad "called off the mission" and brought respondents and their car
to Camp Aguinaldo arriving there at about 9:00 a.m. An inspection of
Sgt. Hope's car at Camp Aguinaldo yielded 11 sealed boxes, 4 on the
rear seat and 7 more in the baggage compartment which was opened on
orders of Col. Abad. On the same order of the intelligence officer, the
boxes were opened before the presence of Hope and Medina,
representatives of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Bureau of Customs,
P.C., COSAC and photographers of the Department of National Defense.
The contents of the bozes revealed some "4,441 more or less wrist
watches of assorted brands; 1,075 more or less watch bracelets of
assorted brands," supposedly untaxed. As consequence, thereof, ASAC
Chairman General Pelagio Cruz requested the Bureau of Customs to
issue a Warrant of Seizure and Detention against the articles including
the Dodge car. The Collector of Customs did issue the same on 12
February 1974. It was admitted, however, that when the apprehending
agents arrested respondents and brought them together with the seized
articles to the ASAC Office in Camp Aguinaldo, the former were not
armed with a warrant of arrest and seizure. In conjunction with the
Warrant of Seizure and Detention issued by the Collector of Customs,
seizure proceedings were instituted and docketed as Seizure
Identification 14281 against the wrist watches and watch bracelets
pursuant to Section 2530 (m) 1 of the Tariff and Customs Code, and
Seizure Identification No. 14281-A against the Dodge car pursuant to
Section 2530(k) of the same Code. On the other hand, Hope and Medina
disclaimed ownership of the seized articles. Ownership was instead
claimed by one Antonio del Rosario who intervened in the proceedings.
Hope claimed that at the time of apprehension, he had no knowledge of
the contents of the boxes, and granting that he had such knowledge, he
never knew that these are untaxed commodities; that he consented to
transport said boxes from Angeles City to Manila in his car upon request
of his girl friend Monina as a personal favor; that he was not present
when the boxes were loaded in his car nor was he ever told of their
contents on the way. On the part of Monina Medina, she testified that
what she did was only in compliance with the agreement with Mr. Del
Rosario to transport the boxes and deliver them to a certain Mr. Peter at
the Tropical Hut who will in turn give her the contracted price; that Mr.
Del Rosario did not reveal the contents of the boxes which she came to
know of only when the boxes were opened at Camp Aguinaldo. As there
was not enough evidence to controvert the testimonies of respondents
and the narration of claimant Antonio del Rosario, the Collector of
Customs issued his decision in the seizure cases on 1 April 1975
declaring that the seized articles including the car are not subject of
forfeiture. Meanwhile, on 14 March 1974, after the requisite preliminary
investigation, the City Fiscal of Quezon City, finding the existence of a
prima facie case against Hope and Medina, filed Criminal Case Q-3781 in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City). Upon arraignment on
23 April 1974, respondents pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced on 28
January 1975 and while the prosecution through its first witness, Agent
Macario Sabado, was adducing as evidence the pictures of the 11 boxes
containing the assorted watches and watch bracelets, the defense
counsel objected to the presentation of the pictures and the subject
articles on the ground that they were seized without the benefit of
warrant, and therefore inadmissible in evidence under Section 4(2),
Article IV of the New Constitution. After the parties have argued their
grounds in their respective memoranda, the trial court issued the order
of 20 August 1975 declaring that the alleged smuggled articles and the
pictures taken of said items as inadmissible in evidence. The
prosecution's motion for reconsideration was denied on 30 September
1975. The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari which was treated as
a special civil action in the Supreme Court's Resolution of 5 May 1976.
Issue:
Whether the search and seizure made on the boxes in the blue Dodge
car was valid, even after the Collector of Customs declared the seized
articles not subject to forfeiture.
Held:
It is not accurate to say that the Collector of Customs made no findings
that the articles were smuggled. In fact, what the Collector stated was
that the prosecution failed to present the quantum of evidence sufficient
to warrant the forfeiture of the subject articles. In a general sense, this
does not necessarily exclude the possibility of smuggling. The decision
of the Collector of Customs, as in other seizure proceedings, concerns
the res rather than the persona. The proceeding is a probe on
contraband or illegally imported goods. The importer or possessor is
treated differently. The fact that the administrative penalty befalls on
him is an inconsequential incidence to criminal liability. By the same
token, the probable guilt cannot be negated simply because he was not
held administratively liable. The Collector's final declaration that the
articles are not subject to forfeiture does not detract his findings that
untaxed goods were transported in Hope and Medina's car and seized
from their possession by agents of the law. Whether criminal liability
lurks on the strength of the provision of the Tariff and Customs Code
adduced in the information can only be determined in a separate
criminal action. Hope and Medina's exoneration in the administrative
cases cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute. But under our
penal laws, criminal responsibility, if any, must be proven not by
preponderance of evidence but by proof beyond reasonable doubt. As
enunciated in the leading case of Papa vs. Mago, in the exercise of the
specific functions, the Code does not mention the need of a search
warrant unlike Section 2209 which explicitly provides that a "dwelling
house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a
judge (or justice of the peace), upon sworn application showing probable
cause and particularly describing the place to be searched and person or
thing to be seized." Aware of this delineation, the Court in that case
expressed the considered view that "except in the case of the search of
a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs
law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the Whren v. United States [ 517 US 806 (No. 95-5841), 10 June
enforcement of customs laws." The rationale of the Mago ruling was 1996] Scalia (J)
nurtured by the traditional doctrine in Carroll v. United States 6 wherein
an imprimatur against, constitutional infirmity was stamped in favor of a Facts:
warrantless search and seizure of such nature as herein. On this stable
foundation, the warrantless seizure did not violate Article IV, Section 3 of On the evening of 10 June 1993, plainclothes vice-squad officers of the
the 1973 Constitution, which finds origin in the Fourth Amendment of District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department were patrolling a
the American Constitution. "high drug area" of the city in an unmarked car. Their suspicions were
aroused when they passed a dark Pathfinder truck with temporary
license plates and youthful occupants waiting at a stop sign, the driver
looking down into the lap of the passenger at his right. The truck
remained stopped at the intersection for what seemed an unusually long
time--more than 20 seconds. When the police car executed a U-turn in
order to head back toward the truck, the Pathfinder turned suddenly to
its right, without signalling, and sped off at an "unreasonable" speed.
The policemen followed, and in a short while overtook the Pathfinder
when it stopped behind other traffic at a red light. They pulled up
alongside, and Officer Ephraim Soto stepped out and approached the
driver's door, identifying himself as a police officer and directing the
driver, James L. Brown, to put the vehicle in park. When Soto drew up to
the driver's window, he immediately observed two large plastic bags of
what appeared to be crack cocaine in Michael A. Whren's hands. Whren
and Brown were arrested, and quantities of several types of illegal drugs
were retrieved from the vehicle. They were charged in a four-count
indictment with violating various federal drug laws, including 21 U. S. C.
Section(s) 844(a) and 860(a). At a pretrial suppression hearing, they
challenged the legality of the stop and the resulting seizure of the drugs.
They argued that the stop had not been justified by probable cause to
believe, or even reasonable suspicion, that they were engaged in illegal
drug-dealing activity; and that Officer Soto's asserted ground for
approaching the vehicle--to give the driver a warning concerning traffic
violations--was pretextual. The District Court denied the suppression
motion, concluding that "the facts of the stop were not controverted,"
and "[t]here was nothing to really demonstrate that the actions of the
officers were contrary to a normal traffic stop." Whren and Brown were
convicted of the counts at issue here. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
convictions, holding with respect to the suppression issue that,
"regardless of whether a police officer subjectively believes that the
occupants of an automobile may be engaging in some other illegal
behavior, a traffic stop is permissible as long as a reasonable officer in
the same circumstances could have stopped the car for the suspected
traffic violation."
Issue:
Whether the seizure involving possession of drugs valid, when the
vehicle was stopped due to a violation of the traffic code.
Held:
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." Temporary detention of individuals
during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief
period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a "seizure" of "persons"
within the meaning of this provision. An automobile stop is thus subject
to the constitutional imperative that it not be "unreasonable" under the
circumstances. As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile
is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a
traffic violation has occurred. It is of course true that in principle every
Fourth Amendment case, since it turns upon a "reasonableness"
determination, involves a balancing of all relevant factors. With rare
exceptions not applicable here, however, the result of that balancing is
not in doubt where the search or seizure is based upon probable cause.
analysis involved searches or seizures conducted in an extraordinary
manner, unusually harmful to an individual's privacy or even physical
interests--such as, for example, seizure by means of deadly force,
unannounced entry into a home, entry into a home without a warrant, or
physical penetration of the body. The making of a traffic stop out-of-
uniform does not remotely qualify as such an extreme practice, and so is
governed by the usual rule that probable cause to believe the law has
been broken "outbalances" private interest in avoiding police contact.
Herein, the officers had probable cause to believe that Whren and Brown
had violated the traffic code. That rendered the stop reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment, the evidence thereby discovered admissible.
Arkansas vs. Sullivan [000 US 00-262, 29 May 2001]
Facts:
In November 1998, Officer Joe Taylor of the Conway, Arkansas, Police
Department stopped Kenneth Andrew Sullivan for speeding and for
having an improperly tinted windshield. Taylor approached Sullivans
vehicle, explained the reason for the stop, and requested Sullivans
license, registration, and insurance documentation. Upon seeing
Sullivans license, Taylor realized that he was aware of intelligence on
Sullivan regarding narcotics. When Sullivan opened his car door in an
unsuccessful attempt to locate his registration and insurance papers,
Taylor noticed a rusted roofing hatchet on the cars floorboard. Taylor
then arrested Sullivan for speeding, driving without his registration and
insurance documentation, carrying a weapon (the roofing hatchet), and
improper window tinting. After another officer arrived and placed
Sullivan in his squad car, Officer Taylor conducted an inventory search of
Sullivans vehicle pursuant to the Conway Police Departments Vehicle
Inventory Policy. Under the vehicles armrest, Taylor discovered a bag
containing a substance that appeared to him to be methamphetamine
as well as numerous items of suspected drug paraphernalia. As a result
of the detention and search, Sullivan was charged with various state-law
drug offenses, unlawful possession of a weapon, and speeding. Sullivan
moved to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle on the basis
that his arrest was merely a pretext and sham to search him and,
therefore, violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution. The trial court granted the suppression motion and,
on the States interlocutory appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court
affirmed. The State petitioned for rehearing, contending that the court
had erred by taking into account Officer Taylors subjective motivation,
in disregard of the US Supreme Courts opinion in Whren v. United States
(517 US 806 [1996]). Over the dissent of three justices, the court
rejected the States argument that Whren makes the ulterior motives of
police officers irrelevant so long as there is probable cause for the traffic
stop and denied the States rehearing petition. The Arkansas Supreme
Court declined to follow Whren on the ground that much of it is dicta.
The court reiterated the trial judges conclusion that the arrest was
pretextual and made for the purpose of searching Sullivans vehicle for
evidence of a crime, and observed that we do not believe that Whren
disallows suppression on such a basis. Finally, the court asserted that,
even if it were to conclude that Whren precludes inquiry into an
arresting officers subjective motivation, there is nothing that prevents
this court from interpreting the U. S. Constitution more broadly than the
United States Supreme Court, which has the effect of providing more
rights. Hence, the States petition for a writ of certiorari and reverse.
Issue:
Whether subjective intentions play a role in ordinary, probable-cause
Fourth Amendment analysis.
Held:
The Arkansas Supreme Court never questioned Officer Taylor's authority
to arrest Sullivan for a fineonly traffic violation (speeding). Rather, the
court affirmed the trial judge's suppression of the drug-related evidence
on the theory that Officer Taylor's arrest of Sullivan, although supported
by probable cause, nonetheless violated the Fourth Amendment
because Taylor had an improper subjective motivation for making the
stop. The Arkansas Supreme Court's holding to that effect cannot be
squared with the US Supreme Court decision in Whren, in which the
Court noted its "unwillingness to entertain Fourth Amendment
challenges based on the actual motivations of individual officers," and
held unanimously that "subjective intentions play no role in ordinary,
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis." That Whren involved a
traffic stop, rather than a custodial arrest, is of no particular moment;
indeed, Whren itself relied on United States v. Robinson (414 US 218
[1973]), for the proposition that "a traffic-violation arrest will not be
rendered invalid by the fact that it was 'a mere pretext for a narcotics
search.'" The Arkansas Supreme Court's alternative holding, that it may
interpret the United States Constitution to provide greater protection
than this Court's own federal constitutional precedents provide, is
foreclosed by Oregon v. Hass (420 US 714 [1975]). While "a State is free
as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police
activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon federal
constitutional standards," it "may not impose such greater restrictions
as a matter of federal constitutional law when this Court specifically
refrains from imposing them." Thus, the judgment of the Arkansas
Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with the US Supreme Court's opinion.

PEOPLE vs DE GRACIA
G. R. Nos. 102009-10, July 6, 1994
Second Division
Regalado, J
Nature of the Case: Appeal
Brief: At the height of the coup d' etat staged in December, 1989 by ultra-
rightist elements headed by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of
the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) against the Government, a raid was conducted in
Eurocar Sales Office located at EDSA without a valid search warrant where
different firearms and ammunitions were seized and confiscated.
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was a former military personnel and a
highly trusted right-hand man of Col. Matillano, (whose active armed opposition
against the Government, particularly at the Camelot Hotel, was well known), was
charged in two separate informations for illegal possession of ammunition and
explosives in furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted homicide to a certain
Sgt. Crispin Sagario, who was shot and hit on the right thigh.
In the early morning of December 1, 1989, Maj. Efren Soria of the Intelligence
Division, together with his team, were conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar
Sales Office located at EDSA pursuant to an intelligence report division that said
establishment was being occupied by elements of the RAM-SFP as a
communication command post. During the surveillance, a group of five men,
walked towards the car of the surveillance team, drew their guns and fired at the
team, which attack resulted in the wounding of Sgt. Sagario.
As a consequence, at around 6:30 A.M. of December 5, 1989, a searching team
composed of F/Lt. Virgilio Babao as team leader, among others, raided the
Eurocar Sales Office and were able to find and confiscate six cartons of M-16
ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers,
and "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col.
Matillano. De Gracia who was holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a
door was the only person then present inside the room.
No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because, according to them,
at that time there was so much disorder considering that the nearby Camp
Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous
firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts
were consequently closed.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure? Yes
ACTIONS OF THE COURT:
Regional Trial Court- QC: Acquitted the appellant Rolando de Gracia of
attempted homicide, but found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion and
sentenced him to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The court
recommends that Rolando de Gracia be extended executive clemency after
serving a jail term of five (5) years of good behavior.
Supreme Court: The judgement of lower court is affirmed but its
recommendation therein for executive clemency and the supposed basis thereof
are hereby DELETED
RATIONALE:
The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was
being used as headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid, there was a
surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired
at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building. When the military
operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to open the door
despite requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the former to break into
the office. The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is
definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for
explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of
automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and
explosives could not be justifiably or even colorably explained. In addition, there
was general chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous and
intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo
which was under attack by rebel forces. The courts in the surrounding areas
were obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were
deserted.
The military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had
reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was
consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action.
Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no
opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial
judge himself manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was
conducted, his court was closed. Under such urgency and exigency of the
moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.
VALMONTE vs DE VILLA
G.R. No. 83988, May 24, 1990
En Banc
Padilla, J
NOTE: This is just a decision for reconsideration filed by the petitioners. Facts
are discussed in G.R. No. 83988, September 29, 1989
Nature of the Case: Motion and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration for
prohibition seeking the declaration of the checkpoints as unconstitutional and
their dismantling and/or banning.
Brief: Ricardo C. Valmonte for and in his own behalf and Union of Lawyers and
Advocates for Peopless Rights (ULAP) filed a petition seeking the declaration of
the checkpoints as unconstitutional and their dismantling and/or banning.
FACTS:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command
(NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine
General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations
within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of
establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and
providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain
peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila.
Recent and on-going events have pointed to the continuing validity and need for
checkpoints manned by either military or police forces. The sixth (6th)
attempted coup d' etat (stronger than all previous ones) was staged only last 1
December 1989. Another attempt at a coup d' etat is taken almost for granted.
The NPA, through its sparrow units, has not relented but instead accelerated its
liquidation of armed forces and police personnel. Murders, sex crimes, hold-ups
and drug abuse have become daily occurrences. Unlicensed firearms and
ammunition have become favorite objects of trade. Smuggling is at an all time
high. Whether or not effective as expected, checkpoints have been regarded by
the authorities as a security measure designed to entrap criminals and
insurgents and to constitute a dragnet for all types of articles in illegal trade.
Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates For Peoples Rights (ULAP)
sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere
as unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that respondents Renato De
Villa and the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed to
formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of
the people. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents
blanket authority to make searches and seizures without search warrant or court
order in violation of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people
against unreasonable search and seizures? NO
RATIONALE:
The routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on motorist's right
to "free passage without interruption", but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it
involves only a brief detention of travellers during which the vehicle's occupants
are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is
neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the
inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot
be regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search.
The Court had to assume that the men in uniform live and act by the code of
honor and they are assigned to the checkpoints to protect, and not to abuse, the
citizenry. The checkpoint is a military "concoction." It behooves the military to
improve the QUALITY of their men assigned to these checkpoints. For no system
or institution will succeed unless the men behind it are honest, noble and
dedicated.

ANIAG VS. COMELEC [237 SCRA 194; G.R. NO. 104961; 7 OCT 1994]
Facts: In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections, the
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2323, Gun Ban, promulgating rules and
regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of firearm or other deadly
weapons on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of
security agencies or police organizations, and organization or maintenance of
reaction forces during the election period. COMELEC also issued Resolution No.
2327 providing for the summary disqualification ofcandidates engaged in
gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces,
and establishing spot checkpoints. Pursuant to the Gun Ban, Mr. Serrapio
Taccad, Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives, wrote petitioner for
the return of the two firearms issued to him by the House of Representatives.
Petitioner then instructed his driver, Arellano, to pick up the firearms from
petitioners house and return them to Congress. The PNP set up a checkpoint.
When the car driven by Arellano approached the checkpoint, the PNP searched
the car and found the firearms. Arellano was apprehended and detained. He
then explained the order of petitioner. Petitioner also explained that Arellano
was only complying with the firearms ban, and that he was not a security officer
or a bodyguard. Later, COMELEC issued Resolution No.92-0829 directing the
filing of information against petitioner and Arellano for violation of the Omnibus
Election Code, and for petitioner to show cause why he should not
be disqualified from running for an elective position. Petitioner then questions
the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He argues that gunrunning, using
or transporting firearms or similar weapons and other acts mentioned in the
resolution are not within the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus,
according to petitioner, Resolution No. 2327 is unconstitutional. The issue on
the disqualification of petitioner from running in the elections was rendered
moot when he lost his bid for a seat in Congress in the elections.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioner can be validly prosecuted for instructing his
driver to return the firearms issued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered
from the warrant less search of his car
Held: A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by
an appropriate authority. However, a warrantless search is not violative
of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its
occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle
is merely limited to a visual search. In the case at bar, the guns were
not tucked in Arellanos waist nor placed within his reach, as they were
neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the
car. Given these circumstances, the PNP could not have thoroughly searched the
car lawfully as well as the package without violating the constitutional
injunction. Absent any justifying circumstance specifically pointing to the
culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search could not have been valid.
Consequently, the firearms obtained from the warrantless search cannot be
admitted for any purpose in any proceeding. It was also shown in the facts that
the PNP had not informed the public of the purpose of setting up the checkpoint.
Petitioner was also not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the
Omnibus Election Code. He was not informed by the City Prosecutor that he was
a respondent in the preliminary investigation. Such constituted a violation of his
right to due process. Hence, it cannot be contended that petitioner was fully
given the opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not
informed that he was himself a respondent in the case. Thus, the warrantless
search conducted by the PNP is declared illegal and the firearms seized during
the search cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner.
Resolution No. 92-0829 is unconstitutional, and therefore, set aside.
People vs. Escano, Usana and Lopez [GR 129756-58, 28 January 2000]
First Division, Davide Jr. (CJ): 4 concur
Facts: On 5 April 1995 and during a COMELEC gun ban, some law enforcers of
the Makati Police, namely, PO3 Eduardo P. Suba, PO3 Bernabe Nonato, SPO4
Juan de los Santos, and Inspector Ernesto Guico, were manning a checkpoint at
the corner of Senator Gil Puyat Ave. and the South Luzon Expressway (SLEX).
They were checking the cars going to Pasay City, stopping those they found
suspicious, and imposing merely a running stop on the others. At about past
midnight, they stopped a Kia Pride car with Plate TBH 493. P03 Suba saw a long
firearm on the lap of the person seated at the passenger seat, who was later
identified as Virgilio Usana. They asked the driver, identified as Julian D. Escao,
to open the door. P03 Suba seized the long firearm, an M-1 US Carbine, from
Usana. When Escao, upon order of the police, parked along Sen. Gil Puyat Ave.,
the other passengers were searched for more weapons. Their search yielded a .
45 caliber firearm which they seized from Escao. The three passengers were
thereafter brought to the police station Block 5 in the Kia Pride driven by PO3
Nonato. Upon reaching the precinct, Nonato turned over the key to the desk
officer. Since SPO4 de los Santos was suspicious of the vehicle, he requested
Escao to open the trunk. Escao readily agreed and opened the trunk himself
using his key. They noticed a blue bag inside it, which they asked Escao to
open. The bag contained a parcel wrapped in tape, which, upon examination by
National Bureau of Investigation Forensic Chemist Emilia A. Rosaldos, was found
positive for hashish weighing 3.3143 kilograms. Virgilio T. Usana and Jerry C.
Lopez, together with Julian D. Escao, were charged before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 64, in Criminal Case 95-936 with violation of Section
4, Article II of Republic Act 6425, as amended. Escao and Usana were also
charged in Criminal Cases 95-937 and 95-938 with illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition in violation of Presidential Decree 1866. The cases were
consolidated and jointly tried. In its Decision of 30 May 1997, which was
promulgated on 17 June 1997, the trial court convicted Escao, Lopez and Usana
in Criminal Case 95-936, Escao in Criminal Case 95-937, and Usana in Criminal
Case 95-938. Escao filed on 19 June 1997 a Notice of Appeal, but on 16 July
1997, he filed a Manifestation and Withdrawal of Appeal, which was granted by
the trial court in its Order of 17 July 1997. Usana and Lopez filed a Notice of
Appeal on 30 June 1997, manifesting therein that they were appealing to the
Supreme Court and to the Court of Appeals. Considering the penalties imposed,
the decision in Criminal Case 95-936 was appealed to the Supreme Court, while
the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the appeal from Criminal Case 95-938.
In its Order of 30 June 1997, the trial court gave due course to the appeal and
ordered the transmittal of the record in Criminal Case 95-936 to the Supreme
Court and the record of Criminal Case 95-938 to the Court of Appeals.
Accordingly, it is only the appeal from the judgment in Criminal Case 95-936 that
is before the Supreme Court.
conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by the COMELEC. The
COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputized agents were
limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose for
which such ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during said
period would know that they only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate their
malicious designs. The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a violation
of the constitutional rights of the accused against illegal search and seizure. PO3
Suba admitted that they were merely stopping cars they deemed suspicious,
such as those whose windows are heavily tinted just to see if the passengers
thereof were carrying guns. At best they would merely direct their flashlights
inside the cars they would stop, without opening the car's doors or subjecting its
passengers to a body search. There is nothing discriminatory in this as this is
what the situation demands. Despite the validity of the search, the Court cannot
affirm the conviction of Usana and Lopez for violation of RA 6425, as amended.
The following facts militate against a finding of conviction: (1) the car belonged
to Escao; (2) the trunk of the car was not opened soon after it was stopped and
after the accused were searched for firearms; (3) the car was driven by a
policeman from the place where it was stopped until the police station; (4) the
car's trunk was opened, with the permission of Escao, without the presence of
Usana and Lopez; and (5) after arrival at the police station and until the opening
of the car's trunk, the car was in the possession and control of the police
authorities. No fact was adduced to link Usana and Lopez to the hashish found in
the trunk of the car. Their having been with Escao in the latter's car before the
"finding" of the hashish sometime after the lapse of an appreciable time and
without their presence left much to be desired to implicate them to the offense
of selling, distributing, or transporting the prohibited drug. In fact, there was no
showing that Usana and Lopez knew of the presence of hashish in the trunk of
the car or that they saw the same before it was seized.

Issue: Whether the search conducted on Escanos car is illegal, and whether the
evidence acquired therein would be sufficient to convict Lopez and Usana for
possession of illegal drugs.

Held: The Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are
warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least
intrusive to motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do
intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists' right to "free passage without
interruption," but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief
detention of travelers during which the vehicle's occupants are required to
answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor
its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is
limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of
an individual's right against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks,
when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. The checkpoint herein
Camara vs. Municipal Court of the City and Country of San Francisco
[387 US 523, 5 June 1967]
Facts: On 6 November 1963, an inspector of the Division of Housing Inspection
of the San Francisco Department of Public Health entered an apartment building
to make a routine annual inspection for possible violations of the city's Housing
Code. The building's manager informed the inspector that Camara, lessee of the
ground floor, was using the rear of his leasehold as a personal residence.
Claiming that the building's occupancy permit did not allow residential use of the
ground floor, the inspector confronted Camara and demanded that he permit an
inspection of the premises. Camara refused to allow the inspection because the
inspector lacked a search warrant. The inspector returned on November 8, again
without a warrant, and Camara again refused to allow an inspection. A citation
was then mailed ordering Camara to appear at the district attorney's office.
When Camara failed to appear, two inspectors returned to his apartment on
November 22. They informed Camara that he was required by law to permit an
inspection under 503 of the Housing Code. Camara nevertheless refused the
inspectors access to his apartment without a search warrant. Thereafter, a
complaint was filed charging him with refusing to permit a lawful inspection in
violation of 507 of the Code. Camara was arrested on December 2nd released on
bail. When his demurrer to the criminal complaint was denied, Camara filed the
petition for a writ of prohibition in a California Superior Court alleging that he
was awaiting trial on a criminal charge of violating the San Francisco Housing
Code by refusing to permit a warrantless inspection of his residence, and that a
writ of prohibition should issue to the criminal court because the ordinance
authorizing such inspections is unconstitutional on its face. The Superior Court
denied the writ, the District Court of Appeal affirmed, and the Supreme Court of
California denied a petition for hearing.
Issue: Whether Camara can validly refuse the inspection of his dwelling by the
Division of Housing Inspection.
Held: The Fourth Amendment bars prosecution of a person who has refused to
permit a warrantless codeenforcement inspection of his personal residence. The
basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment, which is enforceable against the States
through the Fourteenth, through its prohibition of "unreasonable" searches and
seizures is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary
invasions by governmental officials. With certain carefully defined exceptions, an
unconsented warrantless search of private property is "unreasonable."
Administrative searches of the kind at issue here are significant intrusions upon
the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, that such searches when
authorized and conducted without a warrant procedure lack the traditional
safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual, and that
the reasons put forth in Frank v. Maryland and in other cases for upholding these
warrantless searches are insufficient to justify so substantial a weakening of the
Fourth Amendment's protections. Contrary to the assumption of Frank v.
Maryland, Fourth Amendment interests are not merely "peripheral" where
municipal fire, health, and housing inspection programs are involved whose
purpose is to determine the existence of physical conditions not complying with
local ordinances. Those programs, moreover, are enforceable by criminal
process, as is refusal to allow an inspection. Warrantless administrative searches
cannot be justified on the grounds that they make minimal demands on
occupants; that warrants in such cases are unfeasible; or that area inspection
programs could not function under reasonable search-warrant requirements.
Probable cause upon the basis of which warrants are to be issued for area code-
enforcement inspections is not dependent on the inspector's belief that a
particular dwelling violates the code but on the reasonableness of the
enforcement agency's appraisal of conditions in the area as a whole. The
standards to guide the magistrate in the issuance of such search warrants will
necessarily vary with the municipal program being enforced. Nothing here is
intended to foreclose prompt inspections, even without a warrant, that the law
has traditionally upheld in emergency situations. On the other hand, in the case
of most routine area inspections, there is no compelling urgency to inspect at a
particular time or on a particular day. Moreover, most citizens allow inspections
of their property without a warrant. Thus, as a practical matter and in light of the
Fourth Amendment's requirement that a warrant specify the property to be
searched, it seems likely that warrants should normally be sought only after
entry is refused unless there has been a citizen complaint or there is other
satisfactory reason for securing immediate entry. Similarly, the requirement of a
warrant procedure does not suggest any change in what seems to be the
prevailing local policy, in most situations, of authorizing entry, but not entry by
force, to inspect. Herein, Camara has been charged with a crime for his refusal
to permit housing inspectors to enter his leasehold without a warrant. There was
no emergency demanding immediate access; in fact, the inspectors made three
trips to the building in an attempt to obtain Camara's consent to search. Yet no
warrant was obtained and thus appellant was unable to verify either the need for
or the appropriate limits of the inspection. No doubt, the inspectors entered the
public portion of the building with the consent of the landlord, through the
building's manager, but the City/County does not contend that such consent was
sufficient to authorize inspection of Camara's premises. Assuming the facts to be
as the parties have alleged, camara had a constitutional right to insist that the
inspectors obtain a warrant to search and that appellant may not constitutionally
be convicted for refusing to consent to the inspection. It appears from the
opinion of the District Court of Appeal that under these circumstances a writ of
prohibition will issue to the criminal court under California law.
 Issue: Whether Dural can be validly arrested without any warrant of arrest for
the crime of rebellion.

Held: Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of
shooting the 2 CAPCOM soldiers nor was he arrested just after the commission of
the said offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident.
Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified. However, Dural was arrested
for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive
organization. Subversion being a continuing ofense, the arrest of
Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was
committing an ofense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses
In RE: Umil, Umil vs. Ramos [GR 81567, 9 July 1990]; also Roque vs. de committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct
Villa [GR 84581-82], In RE: Anonuevo. Anonuevo vs. Ramos [GR 84583- assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. The arrest
84], In RE: Ocaya. Ocaya vs. Aguirre [GR 83162], In RE: Espiritu. of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or
Espiritu vs. Lim [GR 85727], and In RE: Nazareno. Nazareno vs. Station for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an
Commander of Muntinlupa Police Station [GR 86332] act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion,
than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory
Facts: [GR 81567] On 1 February 1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the
Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential information prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the
about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being treated for a existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest
gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a
verification, it was found that the wounded person, who was listed in the judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons
hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or any other
NPA liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers the day milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or
before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very
City. In view of this verification, Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical survival of society and its government and duly constituted authorities.
Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4
February 1988, Dural was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman
who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the 2
CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC
Renato Manligot. As a consequence of this positive identification, Dural was
referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an information charging
Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of "Double Murder with
Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority." (Criminal Case C-30112; no bail
recommended). On 15 February 1988, the information was amended to include,
as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the original information,
was still unidentified. Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas
corpus was filed with the Supreme Court on behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando
Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus on 9
February 1988 and Fidel V. Ramos, Maj. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon
Montano, and Brig. Gen. Alexander Aguirre filed a Return of the Writ on 12
February 1988. Thereafter, the parties were heard on 15 February 1988. On 26
February 1988, however, Umil and Villanueva posted bail before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City where charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act
had been filed against them, and they were accordingly released.

PEOPLE VS. SUCRO
G.R. No. 93239 March 18, 1991
FACTS:
Roy Fulgencio was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station Commander of
the INP) to monitor the activities of appellant Edison Sucro, because of
information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana. Pat. Fulgencio
saw appellant enter the chapel, taking something which turned out later to be
marijuana from the compartment of a cart found inside the chapel, and then
return to the street where he handed the same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After
a while appellant went back to the chapel and again came out with marijuana
which he gave to a group of persons. Pat. Fulgencio called up Seraspi to report
that a third buyer later Identified as Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with
appellant. At that point, the team of P/Lt. Seraspi proceeded to the area and
while the police officers were at the Youth Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio
told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante and appellant. Upon seeing the police,
Macabante threw something to the ground which turned out to be a tea bag of
marijuana. When confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he bought the
same from Sucro. The police team was able to overtake and arrest appellant and
recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside the chapel
and another teabag from Macabante
ISSUES:
Whether or not the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful and
consequently.
Whether or not the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.
HELD:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides for the instances where arrest without warrant
is considered lawful. The rule states:
A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within
the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer
sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created
thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. Fulgencio, within a distance
of two meters saw Sucro conduct his nefarious activity and the fact that
Macabante, when intercepted by the police, was caught throwing the marijuana
stick and when confronted, readily admitted that he bought the same from
accused-appellant clearly indicates that Sucro had just sold the marijuana stick
to Macabante, and therefore, had just committed an illegal act of which the
police officers had personal knowledge, being members of the team which
monitored Sucro's nefarious activity. Police officers have personal knowledge of
the actual commission of the crime when it had earlier conducted surveillance
activities of the accused.
That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an
absolute rule. Among the exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a
lawful arrest under Sec. 13, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which
provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense, without a search warrant. There is nothing unlawful about the arrest
considering its compliance with the requirements of a warrantless arrest. Ergo,
the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest are admissible in evidence.
 Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs] in relation to Section 21
[Attempt and Conspiracy]. RTC convicted them.

ISSUE AND HOLDING

WON RTC correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view, making its
warrantless seizure valid. NO

RATIO
Re: warrantless arrest
Gaddao s warrantless arrest was illegal because she was arrested solely on the
basis of the alleged identification made by Doria. Doria did not point to her as
his associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the
marked bills. This identification does not necessarily mean that Gaddao
conspired with Doria in pushing drugs. If there is no showing that the person
who effected the warrantless arrest had knowledge of facts implicating the
person arrested to the perpetration of the criminal offense, the arrest is legally
objectionable.
Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, the search of her
person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana
cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest.
Plain view issue
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be
introduced in evidence.
People v. Florencio Doria [ Jun ] and Violeta Gaddao [ Neneth ]
Requisites
22 Jan 1999 / Puno / Appeal from a Pasig RTC decision
1. The law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
Search and seizure > Nature, scope and definition > Types > Warrantless
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
search and seizure > Plain view doctrine
particular area
2. The discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent
FACTS
3. It is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may
Members of the PNP Narcotics Command received information that
be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure
one Jun [Doria] was engaged in illegal drug activities, so they decided to
An object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The
entrap and arrest him in a buy-bust operation. He was arrested. They frisked him
difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object
but did not find the marked bills on him, and upon inquiry, he revealed that he
seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and
left it at the house of his associate Neneth [Gaddao], so he led the police
therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. If the package is such that an
team to her house.
experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the
The team found the door open and a woman inside the
prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be
house. Jun identified her as Neneth, and she was asked by SPO1 Badua
immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be
about the marked money as PO3 Manlangit looked over her house [he was still
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
outside the house]. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box
In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents
under the dining table. One of the box s flaps was open, and inside it was
of the box were marijuana because he himself checked and marked the said
something wrapped in plastic, and it appeared similar to the marijuana earlier
contents. On cross-examination, however, he admitted that he merely presumed
sold to him by Jun. His suspicion aroused, so he entered the house and took
the contents to be marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as the
hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and saw 10 bricks of what appeared to
buy-bust marijuana. Each of the ten bricks of marijuana in the box was
be dried marijuana leaves. SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills
individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed inside plastic bags white,
from Neneth and they arrested her. The bricks were examined and they were
pink or blue in color. PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on cross-examination that
found to be dried marijuana leaves.
the contents of the box could be items other than marijuana. He did not know
Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao were charged with violation of RA
exactly what the box contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its
6425 [Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972], Section 4 [Sale, Administration, Delivery,
contents. It was not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of
 the box was marijuana; hence, it was not in plain view and its seizure without
the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution. It
was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded and never
considered by the trial court.
The fact that the box containing about 6 kilos of marijuana was found in
Gaddao s house Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of
the crime charged.
In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the
submission of proof that the sale took place between the poseur-buyer and the
seller and the presentation of the drug as evidence in court.
Prosecution established the fact that in consideration of the P1,600.00
he received, Doria sold and delivered 970 grams of marijuana to PO3
Manlangit, the poseur-buyer
Prosecution failed to prove that Gaddao conspired with accused-
appellant Doria in the sale of said drug
DORIA SENTENCED TO SUFFER RECLUSION PERPETUA + 500K FINE
GADDAO ACQUITTED
People vs. Go [GR 116001, 14 March 2001]; also Go vs. Court of Appeals
[GR 123943]
Facts: On 22 October 1992, at around 10:00 p.m., SPO1 Mauro Piamonte and
SPO3 Candido Liquido, members of the Intelligence and Follow-up Unit of the
Calamba Police, went to the police outpost at Crossing, Calamba, Laguna, to
follow up an intelligence report that methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu,
a regulated drug, was being supplied there. Police civilian agent Ronnie
Panuringan arrived and reported to them that he saw Luisito Go, also known as
"King Louie", enter the Flamingo Disco House with two women. Panuringan said
that he spotted a gun tucked in Go's waist. Together, the three policemen
proceeded to the Flamingo, which was located about a hundred meters away
from the outpost. When they arrived at the Flamingo, the police officers
informed the owner that they were conducting an "Operation Bakal," whereby
they search for illegally possessed firearms. The owner allowed them in and told
a waiter to accompany them. They went up to the second floor of the disco. The
waiter turned on the lights, and the police officers saw Go and his lady
companions seated at a table. They identified themselves and asked Go to stand
up. When the later did so, the policemen saw the gun tucked in his waist. SPO1
Piamonte asked for the license of the gun, but Go was unable to produce any.
Instead, Go brought out the driver's license of a certain Tan Antonio Lerios. SPO1
Piamonte confiscated the gun, which was later identified as a 9mm Walther P88
Serial Number 006784, with a magazine containing 10 rounds of live
ammunition. Go was invited to the police precinct for questioning. On the way
out of the disco, Go asked permission to bring his car, which was parked outside.
The police officers accompanied Go to his car, a Honda Civic with license plate
number TCM-789. Through the windshield, SPO3 Liquido noticed a Philippine
National Police identification card hanging from the rearview mirror. He asked Go
if he was a member of the PNP, and he said no. The police officers asked Go for
his driver's license and the registration papers of the vehicle, but he was unable
to produce them. When Go opened the door, SPO3 Liquido took the ID card and
found that the same belonged to SPO4 Zenaida Bagadiong. The police officers
saw pieces of glass tooters and tin foils on the backseat and floor of the car.
They asked Go why he had these items, but he did not say anything. Instead, Go
suggested that they talk the matter over, and intimated that he had money.
SPO3 Liquido replied that they should talk at the police headquarters. Go took
out an attach case from the car and opened it. There were two black clutch
bags inside. Go opened the first bag, which contained shiny white substance
wrapped in cellophane. The second bag contained P120,000.00 in cash. The
police officers brought Go to the police station. When they arrived at the
precinct, they turned over the attach case together with the two black clutch
bags to the investigator. The investigator found eight cellophane bags
containing granules suspected to be shabu in one of the clutch bags. When the
attach case was opened, the police officers found that it also contained three
glass tooters, tin foils, an improvised burner, magazines and newspapers.
Consequently, two Informations were filed against Go before the Regional Trial
Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 34 (Criminal Case 3308-92-C, for violation of
Article III of RA 6452 or the Dangerous Drugs Act; and Criminal Case 3309-92-C,
for violation of PD 1866) After a joint trial, the lower court rendered judgment
convicting Go in the two criminal cases, and sentencing him in Criminal Case
3308-92-C to a penalty of imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day to 12 years and a
fine of P12,000.00; and in Criminal Case 3309-92-C to suffer an imprisonment of
reclusion perpetua. Go appealed his conviction in Criminal Case 3309-92-C
directly to the Supreme Court (GR 116001). On the other hand, Go brought his
appeal of the judgment in Criminal Case 3308-92-C before the Court of Appeals.
In an Amended Decision dated 21 February 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed
Go's conviction but modified the penalty imposed by the trial court by
sentencing him, in addition to imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day to 12 years, to
pay a fine of P6,000.00, citing Section 8 of RA 6425, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Go filed the petition for review (GR 123943).
The two cases were subsequently consolidated.
Issue: Whether Go was legally arrested without warrant for illegal possession of
firearms and illegal drugs.
Held: The constitutional proscription, that no person shall be arrested without
any warrant of arrest having been issued prior thereto, is not a hard-and-fast
rule. The Rules of Court and jurisprudence recognize exceptional cases where an
arrest may be effected without a warrant. Among these are when, in the
presence of a peace officer, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense has in
fact just been committed, and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. Herein, the
police saw the gun tucked in Go's waist when he stood up. The gun was plainly
visible. No search was conducted as none was necessary. Go could not show any
license for the firearm, whether at the time of his arrest or thereafter. Thus, he
was in effect committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. No
warrant of arrest was necessary in such a situation, it being one of the
recognized exceptions under the Rules. As a consequence of Go's valid
warrantless arrest, he may be lawfully searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a
search warrant, as provided in Rule 126, Section 12. This is a valid search
incidental to the lawful arrest. The subsequent discovery in his car of drug
paraphernalia and the crystalline substance, which was later identified as shabu,
though in a distant place from where the illegal possession of firearm was
committed, cannot be said to have been made during an illegal search. As such,
the seized items do not fall within the exclusionary clause, which states that any
evidence obtained in violation of the right against warrantless arrest cannot be
used for any purposes in any proceeding. Hence, not being fruits of the
poisonous tree, so to speak, the objects found at the scene of the crime, such as
the firearm, the shabu and the drug paraphernalia, can be used as evidence
against appellant. Besides, it has been held that drugs discovered as a result of
a consented search is admissible in evidence.
People vs. de Guzman [GR 117952-53, 14 February 2001] First Division,
Ynares-Santiago (J): 4 concur
Facts: Prior to the arrest of Danilo de Guzman, the Police Chief Inspector of the
Cavite Philippine National Police Command issued an Order of Battle listing the
names of the suspected drug pushers in Cavite City. Included therein was the
name of de Guzman. In response to the said directive, the Noveleta Police
Station assigned SPO1 Arnel Cuevas to conduct surveillance at the Villamar
Beach Resort. On 18 October 1992, SPO1 Arnel Cuevas spotted Danilo de
Guzman at the Villamar Beach Resort, but the latter stayed for only 30 minutes.
Subsequently, he learned that De Guzman was engaged in a drug sale that day
and reported the same to headquarters. Pursuant to his report, the Chief of
Intelligence of their station, SPO2 Rowell Tendero, instructed him to continue his
surveillance of said beach resort with the hope of catching de Guzman. On 26
October 1992, at around 9:00 p.m., de Guzman returned to Villamar Beach
Resort with companion Edsel Martin. They rented one of the resort cottages. 15
minutes later, SPO1 Cuevas climbed the ladder which he perched on the
concrete wall of the cottage. He, then, peeped through the window of the
cottage and saw Danilo and Edsel seated face to face while using shabu. He also
saw on top of the table 3 plastic bags of shabu, a weighing scale and other drug
related paraphernalia. SPO1 Cuevas hurriedly descended the ladder and hailed a
tricycle and instructed the driver to inform SPO2 Tendero to proceed to Villamar
Beach Resort immediately. Shortly, SPO2 Tendero, along with other police
officers, arrived at the beach resort. However, instead of rushing to the cottage
of De Guzman and Martin, the police officers decided to wait for them to come
out of the cottage. SPO1 Cuevas explained that they did this so as not to
forewarn the two of their presence. Otherwise, the two might simply flush the
shabu down the toilet bowl and destroy the evidence. The police officers waited
the whole night for De Guzman and Martin to come out of the cottage. Finally,
De Guzman came out at around 7:40 a.m. the next day. SPO2 Tendero nabbed
him upon seeing that his waist was bulging with a gun. While Police Officer Vedar
held De Guzman, SPO2 Tendero went up the cottage to check on Martin. SPO2
Alfaro and SPO3 Benavise, accompanied by a chambermaid and a boy from the
resort, also went up with him. Inside the cottage, the same paraphernalia which
the witness saw the night before were found, namely, 3 plastic bags of shabu, a
plastic scoop, a burner, a lighter, several empty rolled aluminum foils, 3 pieces
of tooter, rubber band, several pieces of paper, a black clutch bag containing a
disposable lighter, 2 forceps, a pair of scissors, a knife and a key holder with a
knife, filter, sandpaper, electric plug, pocket electronic weighing scale. De
Guzman was brought to the police station for questioning and detention. The
police officers were without warrants of arrest or search warrants at the time of
the arrests and seizure of evidence. As the operation was conducted largely
during nighttime, the police officers were unable to secure the necessary
warrants for fear of leaving the place of surveillance. Subsequent forensic
examination by Felicisima Francisco of the National Bureau of Investigation
showed that the substance seized was indeed methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu weighing 299.5 grams. In Criminal Case 39-94, De Guzman and Martin,
the latter is still at large, were charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of
Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). In Criminal Case 40-94, de
Guzman was charged with violation of Section 1, PD 1866 (Unlawful Possession
of Firearms and Ammunition). De Guzman was arraigned on 22 February 1993
with the assistance of his counsel de officio. He pleaded "not guilty" to both
charges. On 22 August 1994, the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch 17,
found de Guzman guilty of violation of Section 16, Article III, Republic Act 6425
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P50,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Furthermore,
the trial court found him guilty of violation of Section 1, Presidential Decree 1866
and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to
pay the costs in both instances. De Guzman appealed.
Issue: Whether de Guzmans arrest and the subsequent seizure of drug
paraphernalia inside de Guzmans cottage were legal even without issued
warrants for those purposes.
Held: The police officers' manner of conducting de Guzman's arrest was not
tainted with any constitutional infirmity. Despite word from their fellow officer,
SPO1 Cuevas, that he saw De Guzman sniff "shabu", they resisted the first
impulse to storm the rented cottage which could have caused them to seriously
disregard constitutional safeguards. Instead, the police officers waited for the
needed opening to validly arrest de Guzman. To their minds, it would be the
arrival of drug buyers. As the situation would have it, the arrest was
necessitated by the presence of de Guzman with a gun obviously tucked in his
pants. Rule 113, Section 5 (a) of the Rules of Court provides that "A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense." In this jurisdiction, the mere possession of a
firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be
used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition is a criminal offense
under PD 1866. De Guzman was caught by the police officers in flagrante delicto
while carrying a firearm without the necessary permit or license. Clearly, it was
in violation of PD 1866, Section 1, at the time of the arrest. Necessarily, the
search conducted immediately after De Guzman's arrest was valid. Rule 126,
Section 12 of the Rules of Court provides that "a person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant. The legal parameters of this
rule limit its application to instances when the search is made contemporaneous
to the arrest and within a permissible area of search." In this case, it was
impossible for the police officers to obtain a search warrant as they were merely
on surveillance, and to do so might abort any possible illegal activity that was
taking place. Any attempt at leaving the place may cause them to lose sight of
the accused-appellant altogether. Second, their presence in the area was not
planned as they acted purely on a tip given by a fellow officer. Further, there was
not enough opportunity to obtain a warrant of arrest or a search warrant as the
surveillance was conducted from 10:00 p.m. up to 7:00 a.m. The search
conducted immediately after de Guzman was apprehended was made more
necessary by the presence of his companion inside the cottage which was just a
few steps away from where he stood. The presence of de Guzman's companion
posed a danger to the police officers' life and limb, hence, it became necessary
for them to locate him. Upon entry at the rented cottage, the police officers saw
the shabu and drug- related paraphernalia scattered on top of the table.
Jurisprudence allows the seizure of personality despite absence of warrant under
the "plain view doctrine," so long as the area of search is within the immediate
control of the arrested person and that the object of the search was open to the
eye, as in the present case.
People vs. Gerente [GR 95847-48, 10 March 1993] First Division, Grino-
Aquino (J): 3 concur
Facts: At about 7:00 a.m. of 30 April 1990, Gabriel Gerente, together with Fredo
Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren, allegedly started drinking liquor and smoking
marijuana in Gerente's house which is about 6 meters away from the house of
Edna Edwina Reyes who was in her house on that day. She overheard the three
men talking about their intention to kill Clarito Blace. She testified that she
heard Fredo Echigoren saying, "Gabriel, papatayin natin si Clarito Blace." Fredo
and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace at
about 2:00 p.m. of the same day. Reyes allegedly witnessed the killing. Fredo
Echigoren struck the first blow against Clarito Blace, followed by Totoy Echigoren
and Gabriel Gerente who hit him twice with a piece of wood in the head and
when he fell, Totoy Echigoren dropped a hollow block on the victim's head.
Thereafter, the three men dragged Blace to a place behind the house of
Gerente. At about 4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the
Valenzuela Police Station received a report from the Palo Police Detachment
about a mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the
victim was brought. He was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died
on arrival. The cause of death was massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard
and heavy object. Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, together with Police Corporal
Romeo Lima and Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the
mauling incident took place. There they found a piece of wood with blood stains,
a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana. They were informed by Reyes that
she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the three men
who killed Clarito. The policemen proceeded to the house of Gerente, who was
then sleeping. They told him to come out of the house and they introduced
themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked Gerente and found a coin
purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. The
dried leaves were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination.
The Forensic Chemist found them to be marijuana. Only Gerente was
apprehended by the police. The other suspects, Fredo and Totoy Echigoren, are
still at large. On 2 May 1990, two separate informations were filed by Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Benjamin Caraig against him for Violation of Section 8, Art.
II, of RA 6425, and for Murder. When arraigned on 16 May 1990, Gerente pleaded
not guilty to both charges. A joint trial of the two cases was held. On 24
September 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch
172, found Gerente guilty of Violation of Section 8 of Republic Act 6425 and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a term of 12 years and
1 day, as minimum, to 20 years, as maximum; and also found him guilty of
Murder for which crime he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. . Gerente appealed.

Issue: Whether the police officers have the personal knowledge of the killing of
Blace to allow them to arrest, and the subsequent searchly Gerentes person,
without the necessary warrant.

Held: The search of Gerente's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in
his possession were valid because they were incident to a lawful warrantless
arrest. Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court
provide that "A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense
has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;" The policemen
arrested Gerente only some 3 hours after Gerente and his companions had killed
Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene
of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a
concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The
eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and
pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those
circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death
of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they
could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest
until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two
companions did. The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful
because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with
Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that "A person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant." The frisk and search of Gerente's person upon his arrest was a
permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect themselves,
for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them
unless he is first disarmed.
People vs. Sinoc [GR 113511-12, 1 July 1997] Third Division, Narvasa
(CJ): 4 concur
Facts: On 20 September 1991, at about 6:00 a.m., Isidoro Viacrusis, manager of
Taganito Mining Corporation, was motoring from the company compound (at
Taganito, Claver, Surigao del Norte) to Surigao City. He was riding on a company
vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero (DFX-397), driven by Tarcisio Guijapon. As Viacrusis
and Guijapon were approaching the public cemetery of Claver, they were
stopped by several armed men. The latter, identifying themselves as members
of the New People's Army (NPA), boarded the Pajero and ordered Guijapon to
proceed. When they reached Barobo, Surigao del Norte, the armed men ordered
Viacrusis and Guijapon to alight, led them, their hands bound behind their back
to a coconut grove some 6 meters from the road, and after making them lie face
down on the ground, shot them several times. Viacrusis miraculously survived.
The driver, Guijapon, was not as lucky; he died on the spot. At about 7 a.m. the
following day, a secret informant (known as a "civilian asset") named Boyet
reported to the police Station at Monkayo, Davao del Norte that the stolen
("carnapped") "Pajero" was parked behind the apartment of a certain Paulino
Overa at the Bliss Housing Project at Poblacion, Monkayo. On instructions of the
Station Commander, a police team went to the place. They saw the "Pajero" and,
their initial inquiries having yielded the information that the man who had
brought it there would return that morning, posted themselves in such a manner
as to keep it in view. Some 3 hours later, at about 10:30 a.m., they saw a man kidnapping and killing accompanying its asportation) was thus palpable. The
approach the "Pajero" who, on seeing them, tried to run away. They stopped foregoing circumstances left the police officers no alternative save to arrest
him. They found out that the man, identified as Danilo Sinoc of Surigao del Sinoc and take possession of the "Pajero." His arrest without warrant was
Norte, had the key of the "Pajero," and was acting under instructions of certain justified; indeed, it was in the premises the officers' clear duty to apprehend
companions who were waiting for him at the Star Lodge at Tagum, Davao del him; their omission to do so would have been inexcusable.
Norte. Riding on the recovered "Pajero," the police officers brought Sinoc to the
Star Lodge only to discover that his companions were no longer there. They later
turned over Sinoc to the 459th Mobile Force, together with the "Pajero." Sinoc,
Vicente Salon @ "Dodong," Benjamin Espinosa @ "Benji," Jaime Jornales @
"James," Victorino Delegencia @ Jun-Gren," and one Roger Doe @ "Ram" (at
large) were charged on 23 January 1992. Only Sinoc and Vicente Salon were
arraigned, on 14 July 1992, the other accused being then at large. Assisted by
their respective counsel, both Sinoc and Salon entered pleas of not guilty and
were thereafter jointly tried. On 7 October 1993, the Regional Trial Court of
Surigao City, Branch 30, found Sinoc guilty beyond reasonable doubt in two
cases jointly tried: one, of the special complex crime of kidnapping with murder
(under Article 267 in relation to Articles 248 2 and 48 3 of the Revised Penal
Code) in Criminal Case 3564; and the other, of the complex crime of
kidnapping with frustrated murder (under Articles 267, 248, 6 4 and 48 of the
same Code) in Criminal Case 3565. In each case, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua was imposed on him. Salon, on the other hand was acquitted inasmuch
as conspiracy was not proven. Sinoc appealed.

Issue: Whether the police officer had personal knowledge of the crime Sinoc
committed to allow them to arrest the latter without a warrant of arrest.

Held: The law provides that an arrest without warrant may be licitly effected by
a peace officer, inter alia. "When an offense has in fact just been committed,
and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it." There is no question that the police officers in this case were
aware that an offense had just been committed; i.e., that some 12 hours earlier,
a "Pajero" belonging to a private company had been stolen ("carnapped") and its
driver and passenger shot, the former having died and the latter being on the
verge of death. Nor is there any doubt that an informer ("asset") had reported
that the stolen "Pajero" was at the Bliss Housing Project at Monkayo. It was
precisely to recover the "Pajero" that a team composed of SPO1 Michael Aringo
and "joint elements of 459 PNP MFC and Moncayo Police Station led by Insptr
Eden T. Ugale," went to that place and, on taking custody of the "Pajero,"
forthwith dispatched a radio message to "Higher Headquarters" advising of that
fact. There is no question either that when SPO1 Aringo and his companions People vs. Baula [GR 132671, 15 November 2000] Third Division, Vitug
reached the place where the "Pajero" was parked, they were told by Paulino (J): 3 concur
Overa, owner of the apartment behind which the vehicle was parked, that the
man who had brought the "Pajero" would be back by 12:00 noon; that the Facts: On 13 December 1995, at around 8:00 p.m., Jupiter Caburao, allegedly
person thus described did in fact show up at about 10:00 A.M., and was decided to follow his mother, Patrocinia Caburao, who had earlier left their house
immediately identified by Overa as "the one who rode on that car 'Pajero;'" just at Barangay Siwasiw West, Sual, Pangasinan, to settle her due obligations at a
as there is no question that when the police officers accosted him, Sinoc had the store, about 1 1/2 kilometers away, owned by a certain Brigida Tumamang.
key to the stolen "Pajero" and was in the act of moving toward it admittedly to While traversing the road towards the store, Jupiter allegedly noticed a
take possession of it (after having arrived by bus from Tagum together with commotion near the creek about 10 meters away from him. He allegedly
another suspect, "Ram"). Sinoc's link to the stolen vehicle (and hence to the focused his flashlight towards the direction where he heard the commotion and
saw Crisanto Baula and Danilo Dacucos in the act of hacking a person who was
lying on the ground, while Robert Baula and Ruben Baula stood as lookouts. The
assault allegedly lasted for about 4minutes. The Baulas and Dacucos allegedly
fled but not before they had threatened Jupiter with death if he were to divulge
the incident to anyone. Jupiter went near the lifeless body of the victim who
turned out to be his own mother. Her head and face sustained four hacking
wounds, two of which damaged her brain tissues. Jupiter rushed home and
brought his niece and nephew to the house of a neighbor for their safety. For
fear of reprisal from the Baulas, et. al. and believing that the police would be
able to solve the gory killing on their own, Jupiter did not reveal the damage to
either his relatives or the police. About 2:00 a.m. of 14 December 1995, the
police authorities, led by SPO4 Fermin Mirande, went to the locus criminis, and
took pictures of the body of the victim. The investigation revealed that before
the victim was killed, she had been to Brigida Tumamang's store; that the
Baulas, et. al. were also at the store having a drinking spree; that the victim left
the store between 7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m., and that, 15 minutes later, the
Baulas, et. al. also left. SPO4 Mirande, with several policemen, repaired to the
respective houses of accused-appellants. The policemen asked Ruben Baula and
Crisanto Baula for the clothing they wore on the night of the murder. Ruben
Baula gave his bloodstained pair of short pants, and Crisanto Baula turned over
his bloodstained polo shirt. The policemen next went to the hut of Danilo
Dacucos. Inside the hut, the group found hanging on the wall a bloodstained
bolo. The bloodstained pair of short pants, polo shirt and bolo, together with the
victim's dried blood samples, were sent on the same day to the National Bureau
of Investigation, Dagupan City Branch Office, for forensic examination. The
results of the examination disclosed that the bloodstains found in the bolo, the
bloodstains on the polo shirt and the bloodstains on the pair of short pants had
the same type "O" blood as that of the victim. On 7 August 1996, Crisanto Baula,
Ruben Baula, Robert Baula and Danilo Dacucos were charged with murder
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, of Lingayen, Pangasinan. When
arraigned, the accused all entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged.
Trial shortly thereafter ensued. The Baulas, et. al. denied their involvement in
Patrocinias killing. The trial court rendered its judgment on 17 November 1997,
convicting Baula, et. al. of the crime charged, and sentenced them to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of
Patrocinia Caburao (a) 50,000.00 for the death of Patrocinia Caburao; (b)
P15,000.00 for funeral expenses; (c) moral damages of P75,000.00; and (d) to
pay proportionally the costs. Baula, et. al. appealed.
moving vehicle; or consented search; or customs search. The situation here in
question, however, can hardly come within the purview of any of the established
exceptions. In a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, the arrest itself
must have to be effected under the circumstances enumerated by law. One such
case is when an offense has in fact just been committed, and the peace officer
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it. Danilo Dacucos, Crisanto Baula and Ruben Baula were not being
arrested at the time that the bloodstained bolo, polo shirt and short pants were
allegedly taken from them but were just being questioned by the police officers
conducting the investigation about the death of Patrocinia Caburao. The
investigating officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
accused had committed the crime. Being in no position to effect a warrantless
arrest, the police officers were thus likewise barred from effecting a warrantless
search and seizure. The police officers acted on a mere suspicion that Baula, et.
al. could be responsible for the commission of the crime and only because of
their being at the store where the victim was last seen. Mere suspicion cannot
satisfy the requirement of probable cause which signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he can be charged. An illegal search cannot be undertaken
and then an arrest effected on the strength of the evidence yielded by that
search. The Court finds it less than credible the stance of the prosecution that
the polo shirt and short pants have been voluntarily given. An alleged consent to
a warrantless search and seizure cannot be based merely on the presumption of
regularity in the performance of duty. This presumption by itself, cannot prevail
against the constitutionally protected rights of an individual, and zeal in the
pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the
Constitution itself abhors.

Issue: Whether the Baulas can be arrested without warrant for the killing of
Petrocinia Caburao, and whether seizures can be effected pursuant to such
arrests.

Held: The proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures is not

absolute, and the Court has had occasions to rule that a warrantless search and
seizure of property is valid under certain circumstances. There can, for instance,
be a lawful warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under
Section 12, Rules 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; or
seizure of evidence in "plain view," its elements being extant; or search of a

People vs. Cubcubin [GR 136267, 10 July 2001] En Banc, Mendoza (J):
12 concur, 1 on official business, 1 on leave
Facts: At about 3:30 a.m. of 26 August 1997, Sgt. Rogel, desk officer of the
Cavite City police station, received a telephone call that a person had been shot
near the cemetery along Julian Felipe Boulevard in San Antonio, Cavite City. For
this reason, a police team, composed of SPO1 Malinao, Jr., PO3 Rosal, PO3 Estoy,
Jr., PO3 Manicio, and SPO3 Manalo, responded to the call and found Henry P.
Piamonte slumped dead on his tricycle which was then parked on the road.
Police photographer Fred Agana took pictures of the crime scene showing the
victim slumped on the handle of the tricycle. PO3 Rosal testified that a tricycle
driver, who refused to divulge his name, told him that Fidel Abrenica Cubcubin Jr.
and the victim were last seen together coming out of the Sting Cafe, located in
San Antonio near the gate of Sangley Point, Cavite City, about a kilometer and a
half away from the crime scene. Forthwith, PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. went
to the cafe and talked to Danet Garcellano, a food server/waitress in Sting Cafe.
Garcellano described Cubcubin as a lean, dark-complexioned, and mustachioed
man who had on a white t-shirt and brown short pants. Armando Plata, another
tricycle driver, told PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. that Garcellano's description
fitted a person known as alias "Jun Dulce." Armando Plata, who knew where
Cubcubin lived, led PO3 Rosal, SPO1 Malinao, Jr., and Prosecutor Lu to
Cubucubin's house in Garcia Extension, Cavite City. The policemen knocked on
the door for about 3 minutes before it was opened by a man who answered the
description given by Danet Garcellano and who turned out to be Cubcubin. The
police operatives identified themselves and informed him that he was being
sought in connection with the shooting near the cemetery. Cubcubin denied
involvement in the incident. PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. then asked
permission to enter and look around the house. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said that upon
entering the house, he noticed a white t-shirt, bearing the brand name "Hanes"
and the name "Dhenvher" written in the inner portion of the shirt's hemline,
placed over a divider near the kitchen. Upon close examination, he said that he
found it to be "bloodied." When he picked up the t-shirt, two spent .38 caliber
shells fell from it. PO3 Rosal stayed with Cubcubin while he conducted a search.
They then took the t-shirt and the two bullet shells. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. then asked
Cubcubin to go with them to Sting Cafe for purposes of identification. There,
Cubcubin was positively identified by Danet Garcellano as the victim's
companion. The police investigators asked Cubcubin where the fatal gun was.
SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said Cubcubin refused to tell him where he hid the gun so he
sought the latter's permission to go back to his house to conduct a further
search. Thereupon, SPO1 Malinao, Jr., accompanied by Prosecutor Lu, PO3 Estoy,
Jr., PO3 Manicio, SPO3 Manalo, and PO3 Rosal, proceeded thereto. Inside the
house, they saw Cubcubin's 11-year old son Jhumar. PO3 Estoy, Jr. found on top
of a plastic water container (drum) outside the bathroom a homemade Smith
and Wesson caliber .38 revolver (six shooter), without a serial number. He found
the gun loaded with five live bullets. PO3 Estoy, Jr. said that he inscribed his
initials "RDE" (for Raymundo D. Estoy) on the cylinder of the gun with the use of
a sharp object. While PO3 Estoy, Jr. was conducting the search, SPO1 Malinao, Jr.
and PO3 Rosal stayed with Cubcubin in the sala. The .38 caliber gun, the white
"Hanes" t-shirt, and the two spent .38 caliber shells were all photographed.
Cubcubin was then taken to the police station, where he was photographed
along with the things seized from him. Cubcubin was charged for the crime of
murder. On 5 October 1998, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City,
found Cubcubin guilty of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
death.
Issue: Whether there was "probable cause" for PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr.,
the arresting officers, to believe that Cubcubin committed the crime, to allow
them to conduct the latter's warrantless arrest.
Held: Rule 113, 5 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended,
provides that "A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense
has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; (c) When the person
to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another." Under 5(b), two conditions must concur for a warrantless arrest to be
valid: first, the offender has just committed an offense and, second, the
arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. It has been held that
"personal knowledge of facts' in arrests without a warrant must be based upon
probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion." Herein, the arrest of Cubcubin was effected shortly after the victim
was killed. There was no "probable cause, however, for PO3 Rosal and SPO1
Malinao, Jr., the arresting officers, to believe that Cubcubin committed the crime.
The two did not have "personal knowledge of facts" indicating that Cubcubin had
committed the crime. Their knowledge of the circumstances from which they
allegedly inferred that Cubcubin was probably guilty was based entirely on what
they had been told by others, to wit: by someone who called the PNP station in
San Antonio, Cavite City at about 3:30 a.m. of 26 August 1997 and reported that
a man had been killed along Julian Felipe Boulevard of the said city; by an
alleged witness who saw Cubcubin and the victim coming out of the Sting Cafe;
by Danet Garcellano, waitress at the Sting Cafe, who said that the man last seen
with the victim was lean, mustachioed, dark-complexioned and was wearing a
white t-shirt and a pair of brown short pants; by a tricycle driver named
Armando Plata who told them that the physical description given by Garcellano
fitted Cubcubin, alias "Jun Dulce" and who said he knew where Cubcubin lived
and accompanied them to Cubcubin's house. Thus, PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao,
Jr. merely relied on information given to them by others. Be that as it may,
Cubcubin cannot now question the validity of his arrest without a warrant. The
records show that he pleaded not guilty to the charge when arraigned on 11
November 1997. Cubcubin did not object to the arraignment, and thus has
waived the right to object to the legality of his arrest. On the other hand, the
search of Cubcubin's house was illegal and, consequently, the things obtained as
a result of the illegal search, i.e., the white "Hanes" t-shirt, two spent shells, and
the .38 caliber gun, are inadmissible in evidence against him. It cannot be said
that the .38 caliber gun was discovered through inadvertence. After bringing
Cubcubin to the Sting Cafe where he was positively identified by a waitress
named Danet Garcellano as the victim's companion, the arresting officers
allegedly asked Cubcubin where he hid the gun used in killing the victim.
According to SPO1 Malinao, Jr., when Cubcubin refused to answer, he sought
Cubcubin's permission to go back to his house and there found the .38 caliber
revolver on top of a plastic water container outside the bathroom. Thus, the gun
was purposely sought by the police officers and they did not merely stumble
upon it. Nor were the police officers justified in seizing the white "Hanes" t-shirt
placed on top of the divider "in plain view" as such is not contraband nor is it
incriminating in nature which would lead SPO1 Malinao, Jr. to conclude that it
would constitute evidence of a crime. Contrary to what SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said,
the t-shirt was not "bloodied" which could have directed his attention to take a
closer look at it. From the photograph of the t-shirt, it is not visible that there
were bloodstains. The actual t-shirt merely had some small specks of blood at its
lower portion. Furthermore, there is no evidence to link Cubcubin directly to the
crime.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DON RODRIGUEZA
G.R. No. 95902 February 4, 1992
Facts:
CIC Taduran et al was in their headquarters at the office of the Narcotics
Regional Unit at Camp Bagong Ibalon, Legaspi City when a confidential informer
arrived and told them that there was an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited
drugs. They form a team to conduct a buy bust operation. The money with ultra
violet powder was given to Tadura who acted as the poseur buyer. He was told to
look for a certain Don, The alleged seller of prohibited drug. Tudara went to
Tagas alone, and while along the road he met Samuel Segovia. He asked Segovia
where he could find Don and where he could buy marijuana. Segovia left for a
while when he return he was accompanied by Don. Don gave Tudaran a certain
object wrapped in a plastic which was later identified as marijuana and received
payment thereof. Thereafter Taduran return to the headquarter and made a
report. In the evening they arrested appellant however they ae not armed with
warrant of arrest.Then they conducted a raid in the house of Jovencio
Rodriqueza, father of appellant. During the raid they were able to confiscate
dried marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe. The search however was not
authorized by any search warrant.
Issue: Whether the arrest of Rodrigueza valid
Ruling:
A search warrant to be valid, must generally be authorized by search warrant
duly issued by proper government authority. The court has allowed government
authorities to conduct searches and seizure even without search warrant. Thus,
when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest, when it is made on vessels,
aircraft for violation of custom laws, when it made to automobile for the purpose
of preventing violation of smuggling or immigration laws, when it involves
prohibited article in plain view or in case of inspection of building and other
premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulation.
In the case at bar the raid conducted was not authorized by search warrant and
it does not appear that the situation falls any of the aforementioned cases.
Buy bust must be in flagrante delicto = requires that the suspected dealer
must be caught red handed in the act of selling marijuana or any prohibited
drugs.
GO VS. COURT OF APPEALS [206 SCRA 138; G.R. NO. 101837; 11 FEB
1992]
Facts: Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street,
almost had a collision with another vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got out of his
car, shot the driver of the other vehicle, and drove off. An eyewitness of the
incident was able to take down petitioners plate number and reported the same
to the police, who subsequently ordered a manhunt for petitioner. 6 days after
the shooting, petitioner presented himself in the police station, accompanied by
2 lawyers, the police detained him. Subsequently a criminal charge was brought
against him. Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower
court, setting and commencing trial without preliminary investigation.
Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary
investigation as bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has
been arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and
Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for
the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests.
Petitioner in his petition for certiorari assails such procedure and actions
undertaken and files for a preliminary investigation.
Issues:
(1) WON warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful.
(2) WON petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation.
Held: Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v. Ramos, wherein the
Court upheld the warrantless arrest as valid effected 1 to 14 days from actual
commission of the offenses, which however constituted continuing crimes, i.e.
subversion, membership in an outlawed organization, etc. There was no lawful
warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113. This is because the arresting
officers were not actually there during the incident, thus they had no personal
knowledge and their information regarding petitioner were derived from other
sources. Further, Section 7, Rule 112, does not apply.
Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he walked in the police station, he
neither expressed surrender nor any statement that he was or was not guilty of
any crime. When a complaint was filed to the prosecutor, preliminary
investigation should have been scheduled to determine probable cause.
Prosecutor made a substantive error, petitioner is entitled to preliminary
investigation, necessarily in a criminal charge, where the same is required
appear thereat. Petition granted, prosecutor is ordered to conduct preliminary
investigation, trial for the criminal case is suspended pending result from
preliminary investigation, petitioner is ordered released upon posting a bail
bond.
People vs. Calimlim [GR 123980, 30 August 2001] En Banc, Quisumbing
(J): 14 concur
Facts: Lanie S. Limin was 14 years old and had been living with the family of
Kagawad Manny Ferrer and Cresencia Ferrer for the past 3 years. On the night of
2 April 1995, she was left alone in one of the two houses of the Ferrers since her
usual companions, the sons of Manny and Cresencia, were out for the night
(disco). The Ferrers were in the other house about 15 meters away. At around
11:30 P.M., she was awakened when she heard somebody, later identified as
Manuel Calimlim y Muyano, enter her room. Calimlim immediately poked a knife
at the left side of her neck and said "Accompany me because I killed my wife."
She was then dragged to the pig pen, about 8-9 meters away from the place
where she slept. Afterwards, she was again forcibly taken back to her room, then
to her cousin's room and to the kitchen. In each of these places, Calimlim
forcibly had sexual intercourse with her while he poked a knife against her neck.
According to Limin, she first recognized Calimlim while they were in the kitchen
when she was able to remove the cloth covering his face. She stated that she
knew Calimlim because she had seen him always following her whenever she
went to school. Limin claimed that she did not struggle nor shout nor resist
because she was afraid that appellant might kill her. After the fourth intercourse,
Calimlim threatened that he would kill her if she reported the incidents. Despite
the threat, she told her cousin, Manicris Ferrer, who then reported the matter to
Dr. Nancy Quinto who lived nearby. The rapes were reported to the station of
SPO1 Mario Suratos by Kagawad Ferrer. Dr. Ricardo Ferrer conducted the
physical examination on Lanie, and found that there was minimal vaginal
bleeding and there were lacerations in the hymen, the positions of which were at
9:00 o'clock, 6:00 o'clock and 3:00 o'clock, all fresh, indicating that there were
insertions within the past 24 hours. There was also a whitish vaginal discharge
which was found positive for spermatozoa. Manuel Calimlim denied the
accusations. Calimlim was charged in 4 informations for rape in Criminal Cases
U-8525, 8638 to 8640. On 17 November 1995, the Regional Trial Court, First
Judicial Region, Branch 46, Urdaneta, Pangasinan found Calimlim guilty of 4
counts of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death, to pay the
offended party the amount of P50,000.00 as damages, and to pay the costs, in
each of the cases. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether Calimlim may raise the illegality of the warrantless arrest
conducted against him, especially as the arrest was made a day after the crime
was committed.
Held: Calimlim avers that his arrest violated Section 5 of Rule 113, 40 since his
arrest was made one day after the crime was committed, but without any
judicial warrant, although the police had ample time to get one. This he claims is
also in violation of Article III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution. But here it will be noted
that Calimlim entered a plea of not guilty to each of the informations charging
him of rape. Thus, he had effectively waived his right to question any irregularity
which might have accompanied his arrest and the unlawful restraint of his
liberty. This is clear from a reading of Section 9 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which provides that "the failure of the accused to assert
any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege
the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except
those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and (i) of
section 3 of this Rule." Given the circumstances of his case, the exceptions do
not apply here and the Court is constrained to rule that Calimlim is estopped
from raising the issue of the legality of his arrest. Moreover, the illegal arrest of
an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered
upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. The defense's claim of
warrantless arrest which is illegal cannot render void all other proceedings
including those leading to the conviction of Calimlim, nor can the state be
deprived of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to his
culpability.
People vs. Enrile [GR 74189, 26 May 1993] First Division, Cruz (J): 3
concur
Facts: At about 6:30 p.m. of 25 October 1985, a buy-bust team composed of
Pat. Jaime Flores and Pat. Wilson Rances of the Quezon City Police Anti-Narcotics
Unit was dispatched to entrap Rogelio Abugatal at Roosevelt Avenue in San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. The plan was made on the strength of a tip
given by Renato Polines, a police informer, who was himself to pose as the
buyer. On that occasion the policemen saw Polines hand over to Abugatal the
marked money representing payment for the mock transaction. Abugatal left
with the money and returned 10 minutes later with a wrapped object which he
gave Polines. The two policemen then approached Abugatal and placed him
under arrest, at the same time confiscating the wrapped object. Subsequent
laboratory examination revealed this to be marijuana with flowering tops
weighing 22 grams. Upon prodding, Abugatal led the policemen to a house at 20
De Vera Street, also in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, where he called
out for Antonio Enrile. Enrile came out and met them at the gate. Abugatal
pointed to Enrile as the source of the marijuana, whereupon the policemen
immediately arrested and frisked him. They found in the right front pocket of his
trousers the marked money earlier delivered to Abugatal. At the police
headquarters, Abugatal signed a sworn confession. Enrile refused to make any
statement pending consultation with a lawyer. Antonio Enrile y Villaroman and
Rogelio Abugatal y Marquez were charged for violation of the Dangerous Drug
Act by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The RTC, after trial and on 14
February 1986, found Enrile and Abugatal guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
sentenced them to life imprisonment and a fine of P30,000.00. Both appealed.
Abugatal, however, was killed in an attempted jailbreak and thus the appeal is
dismissed as to him.
Issue: Whether the mark money found in Enriles possession, pursuant to a
warrantless arrest, search and seizure, provide for his criminal culpability.
Held: It was Abugatal who was allegedly caught red-handed by the policemen
as he sold the marijuana to Polines. Enrile was not even at the scene of the
entrapment at that time. Abugatal said he did lead the policemen to Enrile's
house where he pointed to Enrile as the source of the marijuana. Even assuming
this to be true, that circumstance alone did not justify Enrile's warrantless arrest
and search. Under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, a peace officer or a
private person may make a warrantless arrest only under any of the following
circumstances: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b)
When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another. Paragraphs (a) and (b) are clearly inapplicable.
Paragraph (b) is also not in point because the policemen who later arrested
Enrile at his house had no personal knowledge that he was the source of the
marijuana. According to the policemen themselves, what happened was that
they asked Abugatal who gave him the marijuana and were told it was Enrile. It
was for this reason that they proceeded to Enrile's house and immediately
arrested him. What the policemen should have done was secure a search
warrant on the basis of the information supplied by Abugatal and then, with such
authority, proceeded to search and, if the search was fruitful, arrest Enrile. They
had no right to simply force themselves into his house on the bare (and
subsequently disallowed) allegations of Abugatal and bundle Enrile off to the
police station as if he had been caught in flagrante delicto. The discovery of the
marked money on him did not mean he was caught in the act of selling
marijuana. The marked money was not prohibited per se. Even if it were, that
fact alone would not retroactively validate the warrantless search and seizure .
Arrest and Seizure
RA 6425 or The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
Doctrines:
1 Search warrant is required before a law enforcer may validly search
or seize the person, house, papers or efects of any individual; and
2 Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into
custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a
crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask
questions on the suspects participation.
PEOPLE vs. PASUDAG
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALBERTO PASUDAG y BOKANG @ BERTING, accused-appellant
G.R. No. 128822
May 4, 2001
Ponente: PARDO
Nature of Case:
Appeal
BRIEF:
This is an appeal assailing the decision of the Regional Trial Court finding the
accused guilty and sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
FACTS:
SP02 Pepito Calip urinated at a bushy bamboo fence behind the public school.
About five (5) meters away, he saw a graden of about 70 sq.m. There were
marijuana plants in between corn plants and camote tops. He inquired from a
storekeeper nearby as to who owned the house with the garden. The storeowner
told him that Pasudag owned it. A team was dispatched and the team arrived
and went straight to the house of Pasudag. The police looked for accused
Pasudag and asked him to bring the team to his backyard garden which was
about five (5) meters away. Upon seeing the marijuana plants, the policemen
called for a photographer, who took pictures of accused Pasudag standing
beside one of the marijuana plants. The team brought Pasudag and the seven
uprooted marijuana plants to the police station. At the police station, accused
Pasudag admitted, in the presence of the Chief of Police of Astrero, that he
owned the marijuana plants. SP03 Fajarito prepared a confiscation report which
accused Pasudag signed.
ISSUE:
Whether the arrest is valid or not.
ACTIONS OF THE COURT
RTC: Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal cultivation of marijuana.
SC: RTC decision REVERSED. Plaintif-appellee ACQUITTED.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS:
As a general rule, the procurement of a search warrant is required before a law
enforcer may validly search, or seize the person, house, papers or effects of any
individual. In the case at bar, the police authorities had ample opportunity to
secure from the courst a search warrant, SP02 Pepito Calip inquiredas to who
owned the house. He was acquainted with marijuana plants and immediately
recognized that some plants in the backyard of the house were marijuana plants.
Time was not of the essence to uproot and confiscate the plants. They were
three month old and there was no sufficient reason to believe that they would be
uprooted on that same day. With the illegal seizure of the marijuana plants
subject of this case, the seized plants are inadmissible in evidence against
accused-appellant.
The arrest of accused-appellant was tainted with constitutional infirmity. The
testimony of SP03 Jovencio Fajarito reveals that appellant was not duly informed
of his constitutional rights. It has been held repeatedly that custodial
investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out
as a suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation and the police
officers begin to ask questions on the suspects participation therein and which
tend to elicit an admission. Obviously, accused-appellant was a suspect from the
moment the police team went to his house and ordered the uprooting of the
marijuana plants in his backyard garden.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accused-appellant ALBERTO PASUDAG y BOKANG is ACQUITED of
the crime charged for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Director of
Corrections is hereby directed to forthwith release accused-appellant unless he
is held for another case, and to inform the Court of the action taken hereon
within ten (10) days from notice.
Arrest and Seizure
RA 6425 or The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
Doctrine: The evidence of probable cause, for the purpose of issuance
for warrant of arrest or search/seizure warrant, should be determined
by a judge and not by law enforcement agents.
PEOPLE vs. AMINNUDIN
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant
G.R. No. L-74869
July 6, 1988
Ponente: CRUZ
Nature of Case:
Appeal
BRIEF:
This is an appeal assailing the decision of the Regional Trial Court finding the
accused guilty and sentenced to suffer the penalty of Life Imprisonment.
FACTS:
The Philippine Constabulary officer received a tip from one of their informers
that accused was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo city and was carrying
marijuana. He was identified by name. Acting on this tip, they waited for him in
the evening and approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the
informer pointed at him. They detained him and inspected the bag he was
carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as
marijuana leaves by the NBI forensic examiner. On the basis of the finding, the
corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
ISSUE:
Whether the accuseds constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure was violated.
ACTIONS OF THE COURT
RTC: Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal transportation of
marijuana.
SC: RTC decision REVERSED. Plaintif-appellee ACQUITTED.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS:
Warrantless arrest is allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court if the accused
was caught in flagrante or a crime was about to be committed or had just been
committed. Vessels and aircrafts are subject to warrantless searches and
seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.

In the present case, it is clear that the PC had at least two days within which
they could have obtained a warrant of arrest and search Aminnudin who was
coming to Iloilo City aboard the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known and the
vehicle was identified as well as his date of arrival. And from the information
they have received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was a
probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. Arrest and Seizure
The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC Lieutenant who was the
head of the arresting team had determine on his own authority that a search Doctrine: Defects in the arrest of accused are cured by their
warrant was not necessary. submission of pleading during arraignment.

The evidence of probable cause should be determined by a judge and not law PEOPLE vs. PLANA
enforcement agents. Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized
from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution must fall. That evidence cannot be PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial court for the vs.
simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. The search was not an
incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the ANTONIO PLANA alias "CATONG" EDGARDO PERAYRA, RENE SALDEVEA and
warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of RICHARD BANDAY, defendant-appellant
Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained
thereby was inadmissible. G.R. No. 128285
November 27, 2001
SUPREME COURT RULING: Ponente: PER CURIAM
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-
appellant is ACQUITTED. It is so ordered. Nature of Case:
Automatic review of RTC decision

BRIEF:

This is an automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15
of Roxas City in Criminal Case No. 4659 finding accused-appellants Antonio
Plana, Edgardo Perayra, Rene Saldevea and Richard Banday guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and imposing upon them
the supreme penalty of Death.

FACTS:
On 23 September 1994, at around 10:30am, Felix LAgud was walking at the
feeder road in Barangay Cobe, Dumarao, Capiz. He just came from his farm in
Alipasyawan, Dumarao and was on his way home to Poblacion Ilawod. A
movement at about 50 meters to his left side caught his attention. He saw 3
persons seemed to be wrestling. He came nearer so he would be able to see
them more clearly. From about a distance of 20 meters, he saw 3 men holding a
girl while another man was on top of her. The girl was being raped and she was
later stabbed. Frightened that the assailants would see him, Lagud ran away. He
intended to go straight home but when he passed by the house of Porferio
Haguisan, the latter invited him for a milagrosa. Lagud obliged and stayed at the
house of his kumpare until 2am. On 26 September 1994, the victim, Helen
Perote, was found dead by her brother and the police. The body was found in
prone position and was already in an advance state of decomposition. Lagud
identified the accused-appellants as the men who were holding the girl while the
fourth man, who was not recognized by Lagud during the incident, was raping
her. However, when he saw Plana, et al at the municipal hall where they were
brought when they were arrested on 26 September 1994, he identified the
fourth man to be Richard Banday. On the other hand, per the post mortem
examination conducted by the Rural Health Officer of Cuartero, Capiz, the victim
sustained a number of stab wounds, hymen laceration and other injuries and
that the most probable cause of death was massive hemorrhage or blood loss
secondary to multiple stab wounds. According to the RHO, the victim died more
than 72 hours already before the police authorities found her body. An
information was filed against the accused for the crime of rape with homicide
before the RTC of Roxas City. At their arraignment, the accused pleaded not
guilty. On 23 November 1996, after due trial, a judgment was rendered by the
RTC finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with
homicide and imposed upon them the penalty of death.
Arrest and Seizure
ISSUE:
Doctrine: An accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his
Whether the trial court erred in not censuring the actuation of the police
arrest if he failed to move for the quashing of the Information against
authorities in detaining the accused without the benefit of Court filed
him before his arraignment.
information nor judicial order of detention as well as violation of their
constitutional rights during their so-called custodial invitation and interrogation.
PEOPLE vs. CONDE
ACTIONS OF THE COURT
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
RTC: Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide.
vs.
SC: RTC Decision AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to amount of
damages awarded.
OSCAR CONDE y LUTOC, ALLAN ATIS y ABET and ALEJANDRO PEREZ, JR.
y CARSILLAR, accused, OSCAR CONDE y LUTOC and ALLAN ATIS y ABET,
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS:
defendant-appellant
The accused already waived their right to question the irregularity, if any, in
their arrest. They respectively entered a plea of not guilty at their arraignment.
G.R. No. 113269
By so pleading, they submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby
April 10, 2001
curing any defect in their arrest, for the legality of an arrest affects only the
Ponente: QUISUMBING
jurisdiction of the court over their persons.
Nature of Case:
SUPREME COURT RULING:
Appeal
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Roxas City
finding accused-appellants Antonio Plana, Edgardo Perayra, Rene Saldevea and
BRIEF:
Richard Banday, guilty of Rape with Homicide under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic act No. 7659, and imposing upon them the
On appeal is the decision 1 dated December 15, 1993, of the Regional Trial
supreme penalty of Death is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that said
Court, Branch 129, Kalookan City finding accused Oscar Conde, Allan Atis and
accused-appellants are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the heirs of
Alejandro Perez, Jr., guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide
Helen Perote the amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
moral damages and P25,000.00 as actual damages.
accessory penalties under the law, and to jointly and severally indemnify the
heirs of each of the victims, Sukhdev Singh and Biant Singh, in the amount of
P50,000.00.
FACTS:
On 25 May 1992 at about 8am, Apollo Romero was home sitting by the window
and drinking coffee when he saw 4 men in Santolan Street block the path of 2
Indian nationals on a motorcycle. Oscar Conde Y Lutoc poked a gun at the two
Indians while his three companions approached and stabbed the Indians. Atis
took the goods which were being sold by the two Indians on installment. After
the stabbing, the four men fled from the crime scene towards Mabolo St. P03
Rodencio Sevillano of the Intelligence and Ivestigation Division (IID) of the PNP-
Kalookan investigated the incident. On 30 May 1992, the police arrested Conde,
Perez and Atis. Police recovered the weapons used in the robbery, when
Felicidad Macabare, Condes wife, went to the police station to toal to Conde.
These weapons were discovered inside her bag after a routine inspection.
Sevillano admitted, however, that they did not have a warrant of arrest when
they searched the house of a certain Jimmy where they found the stolen items.
Conde, Perez, and Atis were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide.
The accused entered pleas of not guilty. On 15 December 1993, the RTC of
Kalookan City found Conde, Atis and Perez guilty of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide and sentenced each of them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties under the law, and to jointly and
severally indemnify the heirs of each of the victims, in the amount of
P50,000.00. The accused appealed but the counsel de parte for Perez failed to
file brief for Perez prompting the Court to dismiss his appeal. The decision of the
trial court became final and executor with respect to Perez. Hence, the present
appeal concerns only Atis and Conde, who filed their separate briefs.
ISSUE:
Whether the illegal warrantless arrest, which was waived, is sufficient cause for
setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial
free of error.
ACTIONS OF THE COURT
RTC: Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide.
SC: RTC Decision is MODIFIED.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS:
The arrests of the accused came after 5 days from the time they were seen
committing the crime. At the time they were arrested, the police were not armed
with any warrants for their arrests. Section 5 of Rule 113, of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure enumerates the instances when an arrest can be made
without warrant, namely: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) when the person to be arrested
is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. None of the
above circumstances is present herein. The accused were merely walking along
Tandang Sora Avenue and were not committing any crime. Neither can it be said
that the crime had just been committed as 5 days had already passed from the
time of the robbery with homicide. It cannot also be said that the arresting
officers had probable cause based on personal knowledge, as P03 Sevillano
admitted that they learned about the suspects from Apollo Romero and certain
unnamed informants. Further, the lapse of 5 days gave the police more than
enough time to conduct surveillance of the appellants and apply for a warrant of
arrest. Clearly, the rights of the accused provided in Sec. 2, Article III of the
Constitution were violated. Unfortunately, they did not assert their constitutional
rights prior to their arraignment. This is fatal to their case. An accused is
estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to move for the
quashing of the Information against him before his arraignment. When they
entered their pleas on arraignment without invoking their rights to question any
irregularity, which might have accompanied their arrests, they voluntarily
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and the judicial process.
Any objection, defect, or irregularity attending their arrests should have been
made before they entered their pleas. It is much too late for them to raise the
question of their warrantless arrests. Their please to the information upon
arraignment constitute clear waivers of their rights setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error. The
warrantless arres, even if illegal, cannot render void all other proceedings
including those leading to the conviction of the appellants and his co-accused,
nor can the state be deprived of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts
on record point to their culpability.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City,
Branch 129, finding the appellants Oscar Conde and Allan Atis guilty of robbery
with homicide is hereby MODIFIED. They are declared guilty only of two counts
of homicide and each is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence
of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal for each count of homicide. They
are likewise ordered to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of each of the
victims, Sukhdev Singh and Biant Singh, in the amount of P50,000.00, and to
pay the costs.