Documente Academic
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FACTS:
In March 1993, when Corazon passed away, her sole heir, her daughter
respondent Cristina Trinidad Zarate Romero, asserted ownership over the
subject property to the extent of one-half. However, respondent discovered
that the property was already registered as early as June 13, 1989 in the
name of DBP under TCT No. 54142, with TCT No 10070 in the names of her
mother and uncle already cancelled.
The RTC, , issued TRO restraining DBP from proceeding with its
scheduled auction of the disputed property.
DBP moved to lift the TRO arguing that it violates Section 2 of PD No.
385 which prohibits the issuance of a restraining order, temporary or
permanent, against government financing institutions like DBP to enjoin any
action taken pursuant to the mandatory foreclosure clause of the decree.
RTC denied DBPs motion to lift the TRO and granted respondents plea
for an injunctive writ.
DBP moved to reconsider the December 14, 1998 Order and at the
same time sought the dismissal of respondents complaint on the sole
ground that the same states no cause of action
RTC denied DBPs motion for reconsideration of the denial of its motion
for the lifting of the TRO. The RTC likewise denied in the same order DBPs
motion to dismiss the complaint, and ordered DBP to file an answer.
DBP moved to reconsider the denial of its motion to dismiss. But even
before the RTC could resolve said motion, DBP filed its Answer on April 5,
1999. A manifestation was later filed by DBP indicating that the answer it filed
was a mere cautionary measure or what is known as an answer ad
cautelam and thus without prejudice to any right of action it may take and
without any waiver of any of the grounds for the dismissal of the complaint
and any favorable resolution or order that a superior court may issue
hereinafter.
On April 20, 1999, the RTC issued an order denying DBPs motion for
reconsideration of its March 8, 1999 Order. The RTC in the same order
emphasized that DBP already filed an answer thereby rendering the motion to
dismiss moot and academic.
CAs RULING
On June 23, 1999, DBP filed a petition for certiorari before the CA but
was dismissed on procedural grounds (filed beyond the sixty (60)-day
reglementary period). e CA noted that as regards the third order, DBP was
notified of the denial of its motion for reconsideration of the December 14,
1998 Order on March 18, 1999 and thus only had until May 17, 1999 to
question the same. The CA further stated that DBPs subsequent filing of its
Answer to the complaint rendered its motion to dismiss moot and academic.
ISSUES:
HELD:
1. NO. As to DBPs motion to dismiss the complaint, we agree with the RTC and
CA that the same should be denied, but not for the reason cited by said
courts that it has been rendered moot and academic by DBPs filing of its
answer but because the same lacks merit. Contrary to DBPs submission, a
perusal of the allegations of the complaint clearly reveals
respondents cause of action against DBP. The complaint states.
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a
right of another. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three
essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
whatever law it arises; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant to
respect such right; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant violates the
right of the plaintiff. If any of these elements is absent, the complaint
becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action.
Evidently, all the above elements of a cause of action are alleged in the
complaint: (1) the legal right of the respondent over the subject property
foreclosed premised on the fact that she is the sole heir of one of the owners
who is entitled to the right of redemption; (2) the correlative obligation of
defendant DBP, as the foreclosing entity, to respect such right of redemption;
and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right, i.e.,
the act of DBP and its co-defendant Zarate to cause the ostensible foreclosure
of the subject property and the subsequent execution of a deed of conditional
sale between the defendants even prior to the lapse of redemption period to
deprive respondents mother of her right over the property.
2. YES. The petition for certiorari assailing the orders pertaining to the grant
of the TRO and the writ of injunction were filed out of time. Notice of the
issuance of the TRO was received by DBP on the same day it was
granted, November 24, 1998; thus, the petition for certiorari should have
been filed not later than January 23, 1999. The denial of the motion for
reconsideration of the order granting the writ of injunction, on the other
hand, was received by DBP on March 18, 1999 and thus, it had only until
May 17, 1999 to file the petition for certiorari. DBP, however, filed its
petition only on June 23, 1999.
FACTS:
These were 2 separate cases originally filed by Godofredo Pineda at the RTC
of Tagum for recovery of possession (acciones publiciana) against 3
defendants, namely: Antonia Noel, Ponciano Panes, and Maximo Tacay.
Pineda was the owner of 790 sqm land evidenced by TCT No. T-46560. The
previous owner of such land has allowed the 3 defendants to use or occupy
the same by mere tolerance. Pineda, having himself the need to use the
property, has demanded the defendants to vacate the property and pay
reasonable rentals therefore, but such were refused.
The Motions to Dismiss were denied by Judge Matas but the claims for
damages in the complaint were expunged for failure to specify the amounts.
The motions to dismiss submitted in Civil Cases Numbered 2211 and 2209
were also denied in separate orders promulgated by Judge Marcial
Fernandez. Thus, ascribing grave abuse of discretion to both Judges Matas
and Fernandez in the rendition of the Orders, the defendants filed a Joint
Petition for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and temporary restraining
order against the RTC.
Petitioners Contention:
They re-asserted the proposition that because the complaints had failed to
state the amounts being claimed as actual, moral and nominal damages, the
Trial Courts a quo had not acquired jurisdiction over the three (3) actions in
question-indeed, the respondent Clerk of Court should not have accepted the
complaints which initiated said suits, and (b) it was not proper merely to
expunge the claims for damages and allow "the so-called cause of action for
"reivindicatoria" remain for trial" by itself.
ISSUE:
WoN the Court has not acquired jurisdiction of the case for failure to state the
amounts being claimed as actual, moral, and nominal damages
RULING:
NO.
It is true that the complaints do not state the amounts being claimed as
actual, moral and nominal damages. It is also true, however, that the actions
are not basically for the recovery of sums of money. They are principally
for recovery of possession of real property, in the nature of an accion
publiciana. Determinative of the court's jurisdiction in this type of
actions is the nature thereof, not the amount of the damages
allegedly arising from or connected with the issue of title or
possession, and regardless of the value of the property. Quite
obviously, an action for recovery of possession of real property (such as an
accion plenaria de possesion) or the title thereof, or for partition or
condemnation of, or the foreclosure of a mortgage on, said real property - in
other words, a real action-may be commenced and prosecuted without
an accompanying claim for actual, moral, nominal or exemplary
damages; and such an action would fall within the exclusive, original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
LECTURE
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides that Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction inter alia over "all civil actions which
involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts." 14 The rule
applies regardless of the value of the real property involved, whether it be
worth more than P20,000.00 or not, infra. The rule also applies even where
the complaint involving realty also prays for an award of damages; the
amount of those damages would be immaterial to the question of the Court's
jurisdiction. The rule is unlike that in other cases e.g., actions simply for
recovery of money or of personal property, 15 or actions in admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction 16 in which the amount claimed, 17 or the value of the
personal property, is determinative of jurisdiction; i.e., the value of the
personal property or the amount claimed should exceed twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) in order to be cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.
Circular No. 7 dated March 24, 1988, cannot thus be invoked as authority
for the dismissal of the actions at bar. That circular, avowedly inspired by the
doctrine laid down in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of
appeals, has but limited application to said actions.. Moreover, the rules
therein laid down have since been clarified and amplified by the Court's
subsequent decision in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, et
al.
Circular No. 7 was aimed at the practice of certain parties who omit
from the prayer of their complaints "any specification of the amount
of damages," the omission being "clearly intended for no other
purposes than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not
to mislead the docket clerk, in the assessment of the filing fee."
1. All complaints, petitions, answers, and similar pleadings should specify the
amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but
also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of
the filing fees in any case.
2. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be
accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
3. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will
not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the
docket fee based on the amount sought in the amended pleading.
The clarificatory and additional rules laid down in Sun Insurance Office,
Ltd. v. Asuncion, supra, read as follows:
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if
specified, the same has been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be
the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to
enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
TACAY DOCTRINE:
Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or damages, the
docket fees are assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount claimed,
exclusive only of interests and costs. In this case, the complaint or similar
pleading should, according to Circular No. 7 of this Court, "specify
the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be
considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case."
One is where the complaint or similar pleading sets out a claim purely
for money or damages and there is no precise statement of the
amounts being claimed. In this event the rule is that the pleading will
"not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from
the record." In other words, the complaint or pleading may be dismissed, or
the claims as to which the amounts are unspecified may be expunged,
although as aforestated the Court may, on motion, permit amendment of the
complaint and payment of the fees provided the claim has not in the
meantime become time-barred.
The other is where the pleading does specify the amount of every
claim, but the fees paid are insufficient; and here again, the rule now is
that the court may allow a reasonable time for the payment of the
prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and upon such payment, the
defect is cured and the court may properly take cognizance of the
action, unless in the meantime prescription has set in and
consequently barred the right of action.
Where the action involves real property and a related claim for
damages as well, the legal fees shall be assessed on the basis of both (a) the
value of the property and (b) the total amount of related damages sought.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the initiatory
pleading is accompanied by the payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees
are not paid at the time of the filing of the pleading, as of the time of full
payment of the fees within such reasonable time as the court may grant,
unless, of course, prescription has set in the meantime.
But where-as in the case at bar-the fees prescribed for an action involving
real property have been paid, but the amounts of certain of the related
damages (actual, moral and nominal) being demanded are unspecified, the
action may not be dismissed. The Court undeniably has jurisdiction over the
action involving the real property, acquiring it upon the filing of the complaint
or similar pleading and payment of the prescribed fee. And it is not divested
of that authority by the circumstance that it may not have acquired
jurisdiction over the accompanying claims for damages because of lack of
specification thereof. What should be done is simply to expunge those claims
for damages as to which no amounts are stated, which is what the
respondent Courts did, or allow, on motion, a reasonable time for the
amendment of the complaints so as to allege the precise amount of each item
of damages and accept payment of the requisite fees therefor within the
relevant prescriptive period.
CERVANTES V. CA
Facts:
He filed a complaint for damages, and for breach of contract of carriage with
the RTC but was dismissed for lack of merit. CA upheld the dismissal of the
case. Petitioner came to the SC via Petition for Review.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the act of the PAL agents in confirming subject ticket
extended the period of validity of petitioner's ticket
(2) Whether or not the denial of the award for damages was proper
Held:
(1) From the facts, it can be gleaned that the petitioner was fully aware that
there was a need to send a letter to the legal counsel of PAL for the extension
of the period of validity of his ticket. Under Article 1898 11 of the New Civil
Code, the acts of an agent beyond the scope of his authority do not bind the
principal, unless the latter ratifies the same expressly or impliedly.
Furthermore, when the third person (herein petitioner) knows that the agent
was acting beyond his power or authority, the principal cannot be held liable
for the acts of the agent. If the said third person is aware of such limits of
authority, he is to blame, and is not entitled to recover damages from the
agent, unless the latter undertook to secure the principal's ratification.
Neither can the claim for exemplary damages be upheld. Such kind of
damages is imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, and
the existence of bad faith is established. The wrongful act must be
accompanied by bad faith, and an award of damages would be allowed only if
the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless or malevolent manner.
Here, there is no showing that PAL acted in such a manner. An award for
attorney's fees is also improper.
May 4, 2010
ALLAN C. GO, doing business under the name and style "ACG Express Liner,"
Petitioner,
vs.
MORTIMER F. CORDERO, Respondent.
Notes: Without So Ping Bun v. CA and Lagon v. CA, this would have been a
case for tortious interference. The SC had to rely in Article 19, to uphold its
ruling that there was tortious interference. All of this when Article 1314 does
not in itself require malice.
CAST: (lol)
Mortimer F. Cordero Vice-President of Pamana Marketing Corporation
(Pamana)
Tony Robinson an Australian national based in Brisbane, Australia, who is
the Managing Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA).
Allan C. Go owner/operator of ACG Express Liner of Cebu City, a single
proprietorship
Felipe Landicho and Vincent Tecson lawyers of Go
FACTS:
1996, Cordero ventured into the business of marketing inter-island
passenger vessels
o After contacting various overseas fast ferry manufacturers from
all over the world, he came to meet Robinson.
June and August 1997, Robinson signed documents appointing
Cordero as the exclusive distributor of AFFA catamaran and
other fast ferry vessels in the Phils
o As exclusive distributor, Cordero offered for sale to prospective
buyers the 25-meter Aluminum Passenger catamaran known as
the SEACAT 25
After negotiations with Gos lawyers, Cordero was able to close a deal
for the purchase of 2 SEACAT 25 as evidenced by the MOA (1997)
o They executed Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 for one 1 high-
speed catamaran (SEACAT 25) for the price of US$1,465,512.00
o Per agreement between, Cordero shall receive commissions
totaling US$328,742.00, or 22.43% of the purchase price, from
the sale of each vessel
Cordero made 2 trips to the AFFA Shipyard in Australia, and on 1
occasion even accompanied Go and his family and Landicho, to monitor
the progress of the building of the vessel
o He shouldered all the expenses for airfare, food, hotel
accommodations, transportation and entertainment during these
trips
o also spent for long distance telephone calls to Robinson, Go,
Tecson and Landicho
However, Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing directly
with Robinson when he was informed by Dennis Padua of Wartsila
Philippines that Go was canvassing for a second catamaran engine from
their company which provided the ship engine for the first SEACAT 25
o Padua told Cordero that Go instructed him to fax the requested
quotation of the second engine to the Park Royal Hotel in
Brisbane where Go was then staying
o Cordero tried to contact Go and Landicho to confirm the matter
but they were nowhere to be found, while Robinson refused to
answer his calls
o Cordero immediately flew to Brisbane to clarify matters
with Robinson, only to find out that Go and Landicho were
already there in Brisbane negotiating for the second sale
Despite repeated follow-up calls, no explanation was given
by Robinson, Go, Landicho and Tecson who even made
Cordero believe there would be no further sale between
AFFA and ACG Express Liner.
In a handwritten letter, Cordero informed Go that such act of dealing
directly with Robinson violated his exclusive distributorship and
demanded that they respect the same.
o Corderos lawyer, Atty. Tabujara, also wrote ACG Express Liner
assailing the fraudulent actuations and misrepresentations
committed by Go in connivance with his lawyers in breach of
Corderos exclusive distributorship appointment
o Having been apprised of Corderos demand letter, the lawyers of
AFFA and Robinson, faxed a letter to Corderos lawyers asserting
that the appointment of Cordero as AFFAs distributor was
for the purpose of 1 transaction only and that the offer of
exclusive distributorship was already being revoked for
failure of Cordero to return the draft agreement within a
reasonable time.
Cordero later testified that, on the same day, Landicho talked to him
over the telephone and offered to amicably settle the dispute
o Tecson and Landicho offered to convince Go to honor his exclusive
distributorship with AFFA and to purchase all vessels for ACG
Express Liner through him for the next three (3) years.
Landicho set up a meeting with Cordero at Mactan Island Resort Hotel
lobby.
o However, only Landicho and Tecson came
o lawyers proposed that they will convince Go to pay him
US$1,500,000.00 on the condition that they will get a cut of 20%
o so it was agreed that the lawyers will give Cordero a weekly
status report and that the matter will be settled amicably within
3-4 wks
Cordero would give Landicho and Tecson their respective commission,
or cuts from his own commission
o Said amounts were apart from the earlier expenses shouldered by
Cordero for Landichos airline tickets, transportation, food and
hotel accommodations for the trip to Australia.
o However, no such weekly status report was made as it
turned out that they had no intention to do so and were
just buying time as the catamaran vessel was due to arrive
from Australia.
Cordero then filed a complaint with the Bureau of Customs (BOC)
to prohibit the entry of SEACAT 25 from Australia based on
misdeclaration and undervaluation
o an Alert Order was issued by BOC for the vessel which in fact
arrived on July 17, 1998
o Cordero claimed that Go and Robinson had conspired to
undervalue the vessel by around US$500,000.00
Cordero instituted a Civil Case seeking to hold Robinson, Go,
Tecson and Landicho liable jointly and solidarily for conniving
and conspiring together in violating his exclusive
distributorship in bad faith and wanton disregard of his rights,
thus depriving him of his due commissions (balance of unpaid
commission from the sale of the first vessel in the amount of
US$31,522.01 and unpaid commission for the sale of the second vessel
in the amount of US$328,742.00) and causing him actual, moral and
exemplary damages, including P800,000.00 representing expenses for
airplane travel to Australia, telecommunications bills and
entertainment, on account of AFFAs untimely cancellation of the
exclusive distributorship agreement
o Cordero also prayed for the award of moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
Cordero presented documentary evidence including photographs of the
meeting with Landicho, Tecson and Atty. Tabujara at Shangri-la,
photographs taken in Brisbane showing Cordero, Go with his family,
Robinson and Landicho, and also various documents, communications,
vouchers and bank transmittals.
Petitioner:
It was Cordero who stopped communicating.
o He was not doing his part in making progress status reports that
Go had to engage the services of Landicho to fly to Australia to
handle matters.
As to the inquiry for a Wartsila ship engine, Cordero misinterpreted this
as indication that Go was buying a second vessel.
The lawyers had no transaction with Cordero.
o As to the supposed meeting, this was due to the malicious
demand of Cordero to be given US$3,000,000 as otherwise he will
expose in the media the alleged undervaluation of the vessel with
the BOC.
In any case, Cordero no longer had cause of action for his commission
for the sale of the second vessel under the 1997 MOA considering the
termination of his authority by AFFAs lawyers on 1998.
ISSUES:
1 WoN Cordero has a cause of action against Go et al (YES)
2 WoN Go can be held liable even if they are not parties to the contract
(YES)
3 WoN Go et als interference was unjustified (YES)
4 WoN Go et als liability with Robinson and AFFA is solidary (YES)
5 WoN awards justified (YES)
RATIO:
1 Cordero has cause of action
Cordero is the exclusive distributor and not Pamana (adopted CAs
ratio) AND Cordero has proprietary rights under the agreement that he
may protect.
Yu v. CA: the right to perform an exclusive distributorship agreement and to
reap the profits resulting from such performance are proprietary rights which
a party may protect.
rights granted not be rendered illusory by interposing a person to
obtain goods for which the exclusive distributorship was
conceptualized.
o Cordero was no longer informed and had clearly been cut off from
the transaction until the arrival of the first SEACAT 25
o was not paid the balance of his commission
o Go et al directly dealt with Robinson behind Corderos back
o Worse, AFFA even terminated his exclusive dealership insisting
that his services were engaged for only 1 transaction.
GO et al: this case not similar to Yu v.CA
no conclusive proof that they actually purchased a second SEACAT 25
directly from AFFA
hence there was no violation of the exclusive distributorship agreement
SC: YES, there is NO sufficient evidence of second purchase. BUT this will not
absolve Go et al from liability.
They clearly acted in bad faith in bypassing Cordero.
Cordero incurred losses as he was not paid the balance of his
commission and his exclusive distributorship was revoked.
3. interference unjustified
as enunciated and reiterated in So Ping Bun v. CA:
A duty which the law of torts is concerned with is respect for the
property of others, and a cause of action ex delicto may be predicated
upon an unlawful interference by one person of the enjoyment by the
other of his private property. This may pertain to a situation where a
third person induces a party to renege on or violate his undertaking
under a contract.
General rule: justified interference with the business relations of
another exists where the actors motive is to benefit himself
o It is sufficient if the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper
business interest rather than in wrongful motives
o He acts in self-protection in this case
NOT necessary that the interferers interest outweigh that
of the party whose rights are invaded
NOT necessary that an individual acts under an economic
interest that is substantial, not merely de minimis
Unjustified interference: sole motive is to cause harm to the other
o induce refers to situations where a person causes another to
choose one course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation
o Malice connotes ill will or spite, and speaks not in response to
duty
implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm
Malice is bad faith or bad motive
Go et al: There was another contract superseding the 1997 MOA and that
Cordero merely misinterpreted the inquiry on engine price.
SC: allegations unconvincing and a mere afterthought
It appears that the purported second contract stating a lower price of
US$1,150,000.00 (not US$1,465,512.00) was only presented before the
BOC to show that the vessel imported was not undervalued by almost
US$500,000.00
4. solidarily liable
Conformably with NCC 2194, the responsibility of two or more persons
who are liable for the quasi-delict is solidary
Obligations arising from tort are, by their nature, always solidary.
FACTS:
In pursuance of his appointment by the then Secretary of Justice Ricardo
Nepomuceno , as special counsel to assist the City Fiscal of Manila in the
cases of city government officials or employees he had investigated, Atty.
Abelardo Subido (chief of the division of investigation in the office of the
mayor of the City of Manila), subscribed, swore to and presented an
information against Pedro P. Villa for falsification of a payroll of the division of
veterinary service, Manila health department.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The case at bar does not come within the rationale of the above
decisions. Attorney Subido is a regular officer or employee in the
Department of Interior, more particularly in the City Mayor's office. For this
reason he belongs to the class of persons disqualified for appointment to the
post of special counsel.
That to be eligible as special counsel to aid a fiscal the appointee must be
either an employee or officer in the Department of Justice is so
manifest from a bare reading of section 1686 of the Revised Administrative
Code as to preclude construction. And the limitation of the range of choice in
the appointment or designation is not without reason.
2 YES
The defendant had pleaded to the information before he filed a motion to
quash, and it is contended that by his plea he waived all objections to the
information. The contention is correct as far as formal objections to the
pleading are concerned. But by clear implication it not by express provision of
section 10 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, and by a long line of uniform
decisions, questions of want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage
of the proceeding. Now, the objection to the respondent's actuations goes
to the very foundations of jurisdiction. It is a valid information signed by a
competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the
court over the person of the accused and the subject matter of the
accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity of the nature noted in
the information cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express
consent.
The petition will therefore be granted and the respondent judge ordered to
desist from proceeding with criminal case No. 11963 upon the information
filed by Attorney Abelardo Subido, without costs.
LLAMAS v. CA
FACTS.
On August 16, 1984, petitioners were charged before the RTC of Makati with
the crime of "other forms of swindling" penalized by Article 316, paragraph
2, of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
o Francisco R. Llamas and Carmelita C. Llamas sold their property in
Paranaque to Conrado P. Avila, representing it tobe free from all liens
and encumbrances while it was leased to the Rural Bank of Imus.
30 June 1994: RTC found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt
19 February 1999: CA affirmed decision of the trial court, and on 22
December 1999 denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
11 February 2000: Petitioners filed a petition for review, rejected by the SC for
failure to state material dates
28 June 2000: SC denied subsequent motion for reconsideration; judgment of
conviction final and executory
On April 27, 2001, Petitioner Carmelita C. Llamas was arrested by the police
but they failed to arrest petitioner Francisco R. Llamas because he was
nowhere to be found
On July 16, 2001, Francisco moved for the lifting or recall of the warrant of
arrest, raising for the first time the issue that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the offense charged.
There being no action taken by the trial court on the motion, petitioners
instituted, on September 13, 2001, the instant proceedings for the
annulment of the trial and the appellate courts decisions
The Court initially dismissed on technical grounds the petition in the
September 24, 2001 Resolution, but reinstated the same, on motion for
reconsideration, in the October 22, 2001 Resolution.
2. WON the RTC had jurisdiction over the criminal case. YES.
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established
rule is that the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the
court. In this case, at the time of the filing of the information,
the applicable law was Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, approved
on August 14, 1981
the established rule is that the statute in force (in this case the statute
was BP 1293) at the time of the commencement of the action
determines the jurisdiction of the court
The penalty for the crime charged in this case is arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods, which has a duration of 1 month and 1
day to 4 months, and a fine of not less than the value of the damage
caused and not more than three times such value. Here, the imposable
fine is P12,895.00
1 Section 1. Coverage. This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of
Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no
fault of the petitioner.
2 Sec. 18. Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal ProcedureApplication of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases. The provisions of Rules 42,
44 to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court in original and appealed civil cases shall be applied to criminal
cases insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.
3 Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases
not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.x x x x
Section 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in criminal cases. Except
in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a
fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount
thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
The MeTC could not have acquired jurisdiction over the criminal action
because at the time of the filing of the information, its jurisdiction was
limited to offenses punishable with a fine of not more than P4,000.00.
DECISION.
Petition DENIED.
SARMIENTO V. ZARATAN
Facts: Petitioner Gliceria Sarmiento filed an ejectment case against
respondent Emerita Zaratan, in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon
City. On 31 March 2003, the MeTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.
( MeTC ordered the defendant to pay plaintiff monthly rentals and to vacate
the premises.)
Respondent filed her notice of appeal. Thereafter, the case was raffled to the
RTC of Quezon City.
In the Notice of Appealed Case, the RTC directed respondent to submit her
memorandum in accordance with the provisions of Section 7(b) of Rule 40 of
the Rules of Court and petitioner to file a reply memorandum within 15 days
from receipt.
On 9 June 2003, respondent filed her Memorandum. On 19 June 2003, the RTC
dismissed the appeal for failure to submit the required memorandum within
the prescribed period.4
Issue: Whether the lack of notice of hearing in the Motion for Extension of
Time to file Memorandum on Appeal is fatal, such that the filing of the motion
is a worthless piece of paper.
Held:
NO. Petitioner avers that, because of the failure of respondent to include a
Notice of Hearing in her Motion for Extension of Time to file Memorandum on
Appeal in the RTC, the latters motion is a worthless piece of paper with no
legal effect.
It is not disputed that respondent perfected her appeal on 4 April 2003 with
the filing of her Notice of Appeal and payment of the required docket fees.
However, before the expiration of time to file the Memorandum, she
filed a Motion for Extension of Time seeking an additional period of five
days within which to file her Memorandum, which motion lacked the Notice of
Hearing required by Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Court which
provides:
SEC. 4. Hearing of Motion. - Except for motions which the court may act upon
without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall
be set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing
thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other
party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for
good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.
As may be gleaned above and as held time and again, the notice
requirement in a motion is mandatory. As a rule, a motion without a
Notice of Hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the
reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite
pleading.
There are, indeed, reasons which would warrant the suspension of the
Rules: (a) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, b) the merits
of the case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of
the party favored by the suspension of rules, (d) a lack of any showing that
the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party will
not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. Elements or circumstances (c), (d) and (e)
exist in the present case.
Further, it has been held that a "motion for extension of time x x x is not a
litigated motion where notice to the adverse party is necessary to afford the
latter an opportunity to resist the application, but an ex parte motion made to
the court in behalf of one or the other of the parties to the action, in the
absence and usually without the knowledge of the other party or parties." As
a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist
the relief sought by the motion and principles of natural justice demand that
his rights be not affected without an opportunity to be heard. It has been said
that "ex parte motions are frequently permissible in procedural matters, and
also in situations and under circumstances of emergency; and an exception to
a rule requiring notice is sometimes made where notice or the resulting delay
might tend to defeat the objective of the motion.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. No
costs. SO ORDERED.
Facts:
The Spouses Benjamin and Anna Marie Bautista filed a complaint, in behalf of
their son Karl Bautista and Gloria Pomera, against the Asian Spirit Airlines in
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City for breach of contract and damages.
After trial, the court rendered a decision on March 24, 2003 in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendant. Defendants counterclaim is DISMISSED
ISSUE:
HELD:
1. YES
1. The filing of the Appellants Brief is due on January 31, 2004. The notice
from the Honorable Court was received on December 17, 2003 and because
of the holiday season at that time, the undersigned counsel gave instruction
to his Secretary to file the usual Motion for Time asking for forty-five (45) days
from January 31, 2004 or until March 16, 2004.
2. NO
We agree with the petitioners contention that the rules of procedure may be
relaxed for the most persuasive reasons. But as this Court held in Galang v.
Court of Appeals.
Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-
observance may have resulted in prejudice to a partys substantive rights. Like
all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive
of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with
the procedure prescribed.[16]
PETITION DENIED
OTHER DOCTRINES:
The CA was evidently not satisfied with the explanation by the petitioner.
Its action in this regard is not subject to review, for the Supreme Court cannot
interfere with the discretion of the Court of Appeals.
This Honorable Court will be setting a bad example if it accepts the excuse
of the Petitioners counsel that he instructed his secretary to file the motion
for extension who, in turn, forgot to file it. Logic dictates that the Secretary
cannot release the request without the lawyers signature but still the basic
and simple prudence to follow it up by counsel leaves much to be
desired. Every lawyer may soon adopt this reasoning to justify non-filing
of the brief on time.[11]
Spouses Robles entered into a mortgage contract with the DBP to create the
State Theatre Building in Talisay, Cebu. Upon completion, Rudy Robles
executed a contract of lease in favour of Cebu Bionic Builders Supply.
However, the spouses defaulted on their obligation to pay and DBP
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. DBP sent a letter to Cebu Bionic that
if they were interested in leasing the facilities, they would have to pay DBP.
However, nothing came from these correspondences.
DBP then invited parties to bid on the property. Initially, Cebu Bionic
submitted their interest in bidding, but the price that they gave was
insufficient. DBP then awarded the auction to Respondents To Chip, Yap and
Balila. In response to several demand letters by the Respondents, Cebu Bionic
filed a petition for preliminary injunction, cancellation of deed of sale
and specific performance against DBP with the RTC. Petitioners then
related that, without their knowledge, DBP sold the subject properties to
respondents To Chip, Yap and Balila. The sale was claimed to be simulated
and fictitious, as DBP still received rentals from petitioners until March
1991.By acquiring the subject properties, petitioners contended that DBP was
deemed to have assumed the contract of lease executed between them and
Rudy Robles. They alleged that the original leases clause of the Right of First
Option to Buy should be upheld.
The trial court granted their complaint. The Court of Appeals similarly
upheld the decision of the trial court. Cebu Bionic filed a motion for entry
of judgment, but Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration on the
ground that they relied on the friend of their lawyer to personally file the MR,
but apparently did not. The court granted their MR, and reversed their
judgment before. Thus, the petitioners file the case (petition for review on
certiorari) before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
Respondents To Chip, Yap and Balila next argue that the instant petition
raises questions of fact, which are not allowed in a petition for review
on certiorari. They, therefore, submit that the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals are binding on this Court.
2.WHETHER OR NOT THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADMITTING
RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DESPITE ITS BEING FILED
OUT OF TIME
Petitioners fault the CA for admitting the Motion for Reconsideration of
its Decision dated February 14, 2001, which was filed by respondents To Chip,
Yap and Balila more than six months after receipt of the said decision. The
motion was eventually granted and the Court of Appeals issued its assailed
Amended Decision, ruling in favor of respondents
HELD:
1. NO.
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically states that the petition
filed thereunder shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set
forth. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises
as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law,
the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue
must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence
presented, the question posed is one of fact.
The above rule, however, admits of certain exceptions, one of which is when
the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court. As
will be discussed further, this exception is attendant in the case at bar.
2. NO.
Indeed, the appellate courts Decision dated February 14, 2001 would
have ordinarily attained finality for failure of respondents to seasonably file
their Motion for Reconsideration thereon. However, we agree with the Court of
Appeals that the higher interest of substantial justice will be better
served if respondents procedural lapse will be excused.
In this case, what are involved are the property rights of the parties
given that, ultimately, the fundamental issue to be determined is who among
the petitioners and respondents To Chip, Yap and Balila has the better right to
purchase the subject properties. More importantly, the merits of the case
sufficiently called for the suspension of the rules in order to settle
conclusively the rights and obligations of the parties herein.
In essence, the questions that must be resolved are: 1) whether or not there
was a contract of lease between petitioners and DBP; 2) if in the affirmative,
whether or not this contract contained a right of first refusal in favor of
petitioners; and 3) whether or not respondents To Chip, Yap and Balila are
likewise bound by such right of first refusal.