FLORENTINO ATILLO III v.
COURT OF APPEALS, Whether there was res judicata- YES
G.R. No. 119053 January 23, 1997
Judicial Admissions
FACTS
Respondent Amancor, Inc. (AMANCOR) a corporation then owned and
controlled by petitioner Florentino L. Atillo III, contracted a loan in the
amount of P1,000,000 with Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company,
secured by real estate properties. Before the said loan could be paid,
petitioner entered into a MOA with respondent Michell Lhuillier
(LHUILLIER) whereby the latter bought shares of stock in AMANCOR. As
a consequence of the foregoing transaction, petitioner and LHUILLIER
each became owner of 47% of the outstanding shares of stock of
AMANCOR while the officers of the corporation owned the remaining 6%.
Due to the need for more capital to support the business operations of
AMANCOR, petitioner and LHUILLIER executed another MOA by virtue of
which LHUILLIER undertook to invest additional capital in AMANCOR. As
a result, a Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement was entered into by
the petitioner and LHUILLIER which states:
F.L. Atillo III may dispose off (sic) his properties at P. del Rosario
St., Cebu City which may involve pre-payment of AMANCOR'S
mortgage loan to the bank estimated at 300,000.00 and while
AMANCOR may not yet be in the position to re-pay said amount to
him, it shall pay the interests to him equivalent to prevailing bank
rate.
Thereafter, petitioner incurred a 300,000 loan balance with Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Company. After offsetting the amount of P300,00 with
some of the accounts that petitioner had with AMANCOR, the amount
which remained due to the petitioner was P199,888.89. Since AMANCOR
failed to pay, petitioner filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money.
Court thereafter ordered AMANCOR to pay petitioner P199,888.89 plus
interest. The court absolved LHUILLIER. The petitioner appealed claiming
that LHUILLIER should have been declared jointly and severally liable
with AMANCOR.
ISSUE
HELD
The claim that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the appellees as
they did not file any opposition or responsive pleading is untenable. This
is because the postponement of hearing on January 14, 1957 to May 16,
1957 was due to respondents. Likewise, the hearing set on May 16, 1957
was postponed to July 12, 1957 upon motion of the respondents.
Appellant next points out that the lower court should not have
dismissed his first petition for annulment because no "parole"
evidence need be taken to support it, the matters therein alleged
being parts of the records of L.R.C. No. 144, G.L.R.O. No. 1025, and
L.R.C. 173, G.L.R.O. No. 1474, which were well within the judicial
notice and cognizance of the said court.
As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice in
the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of
other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending
in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may
have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge
Additionally, if appellant had really wanted the court to take judicial notice
of such records, he should have presented the proper request or
manifestation to that effect instead of sending, by counsel, a telegraphic
motion for postponement of hearing, which the court correctly denied.
Finally, the point raised by counsel is now academic, as no appeal was
taken from the order dismissing his first petition, and said order had long
become final when the complaint in the present action was filed.
Lastly, there was res judicata since the first petition (amending the
records) is similar to the present petition (asking for reconveyance of
land) as in both instances the effect would be the reversion of 157
hectares at issue. The claim for damages and other reliefs are not
materially different from such other remedies, just and equitable in the
premises" prayed for in the first case.