Dauan v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, et al.
approved after it had been found by the Director and the Secretary that no such
January 31, 1967 | Regala, J. | Appeal | The Law-Fact Distinction
SUMMARY: Dauan filed a homestead application over a public land in Nueva
Vizcaya. He subsequently sold his rights to various portions of the land to the
appellants without the prior approval of the SANR. He thereafter requested that the
application of the appellants be cancelled, since the supposed sales were void for
having been sold without the prior approval of the SANR. The Director of Lands and
the SANR both ruled that Dauans homestead application had not been approved,
therefore, the prior approval of the SANR over the subsequent sales is unnecessary.
CFI reversed, stating that Dauans homestead application was approved, hence, the
subsequent sales were void for lack of SANRs prior approval. SC affirmed.
DOCTRINE: The conclusion drawn from the facts is a conclusion of law which the
courts may review.
FACTS:
1. Serapio Dauan (Apellee) filed for an application for the homestead of 14.25 ha of
public land in Bambang, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Vizcaya, which he acquired from
the successors of Jose Aquino. Dauan subsequently sold his rights to of the
land to Simon Ilarde, 4 ha to Lord Calangan and 3 ha to Basilia Tomas. Calangan
and Tomas, in turn, sold their rights to some part of the land to Santos and Baysa.
All of these sales were made without the previous approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources.
2. Appellants filed applications for free patent covering the portions of the
homestead sold to them. Thereafter, the appellee filed before the Bureau of Lands
a petition for cancellation of said applications, claiming that the agreement was
that of a loan and that the supposed sales were void for having been made without
prior approval of the SANR. Appellants maintained that their agreement was that
of a sale, and that the Secretarys approval is not necessary since the Director of
Lands had not approved appellees homestead application. (The requirement of
the SANRs prior approval is only necessary when the transfer of rights is
executed after the approval of a homestead application. If the application was not
approved, then SANRs approval over the subsequent transfer is not needed).
3. The Director of Lands held the transactions to be sales and sustained their
validity based on the finding that appellees homestead application had not been
approved. This was affirmed by the SANR, who stated that the records do not
reveal that appellees homestead application has ever been approved. The SANR
did not give credence to appellees allegation that the approved records were lost
during the war since there were neither reconstituted records of said approval nor
any evidence to show an attempt to reconstitute the same.
4. Instead of appealing to the OP, appellee filed a petition for certiorari before the
CFI of Nueva Vizcaya, charging both the Director of Lands and the SANR of
GAD. The court granted the petition, holding that the papers presented by Dauan
were sufficient to conclude that he is a holder of a perfected homestead;
consequently, the applications of herein appellants were declared null and void.
5. Appellants: Decision of the Director of lands, which was affirmed by the SANR
became final and executor for failure of the appellee to appeal to the President.
Moreover, the trial court erred in ruling that appellees application had been
approval had been given.
ISSUE/S: WoN appellees homestead application had been approved, making the
subsequent sales void for lack of the SANRs prior approval YES.
HELD/RULING: Decision appealed from AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. While the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies would indeed require an
appeal to be taken to the President before resort to the courts can be made, it is
equally true that the rule is not without exception. For instance, the rule does not
apply where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, and nothing of an
administrative nature is to be or can be done.
2. In this case, the question was whether, from the evidence submitted by the
parties it could fairly be concluded that appellees homestead application had
been granted. The court stated that if the matter was a simple process of
ascertaining from the records whether the application had been granted, then it
would be a question of facts. However, since the records of the Bureau of Lands
had been destroyed during the war, circumstantial evidence had to be introduced.
And the settled rule is that the conclusion drawn from the facts is a conclusion of
law which the courts may review. (From a series of facts, we can draw
conclusions of law and these conclusions are subject to judicial review).
3. Evidence proving that appellees application was approved:
a. In a previous decision by the Director of Lands wherein a certain Teodora
Escobedo contested appellees application and claimed the land in question
and its improvements, the Director made a statement from which it may be
inferred that appellee had been allowed to enter the land and that his
application had been granted, since under Sec. 13 of the Public Land Act,
entry is allowed only after the approval of the application.
b. The documents entitled Transfer of Homestead Rights, whereby appellee
transferred his rights to appellants, stated that by virtue of Homestead
Application No. 206623 approved on Jan. 28, 1941 the Director of Lands
allowed Dauan to enter upon, occupy, cultivate and reside on the tract of land
described as follows xxx. Incidentally, the documents were in the form
prescribed by the Bureau of Lands, and the date of approval given is the date
of the decision in the abovementioned case.
c. If appellees application had not been approved, then he obviously had no right
to transfer to the appellants.
d. Appellee had all the qualifications prescribed by the statute and the
presumption is that in the performance of his duty, the Director granted the
application. The fact that he was in possession of the land, coupled with the
lack of anything to show that he did not possess the requisite qualifications
indicates that his application had been approved.
4. Hence, the subsequent conveyances to appellants are void. The court also noted
that said transfer of rights without the prior approval of the SANR shall result in
the cancellation of the entry and the refusal of the patent of the appellee.
However, the cancellation is not automatic and as long as the Govt does not act,
then appellees rights stand.