Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court - versus -

Manila

FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC.,

THIRD DIVISION
FIL ESTATE ECOCENTRUM
CORPORATION, LA
PAZHOUSING AND
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, WARBIRD
SECURITY AGENCY,
JUANA COMPLEX I G.R. No. 152272
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, ENRIQUE RIVILLA,
INC., ANDRES C. BAUTISTA,
BRIGIDO DIMACULANGAN, MICHAEL E. JETHMAL
DOLORES P. PRADO, IMELDA
DE LA CRUZ, EDITHA C. DY, and MICHAEL ALUNAN,
FLORENCIA M. MERCADO,
LEOVINO C. DATARIO, AIDA Respondents.

A. ABAYON, NAPOLEON M. x-------------------------------------------x

DIMAANO, ROSITA G. ESTIGOY
and NELSON A. LOYOLA, FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC.,

Petitioners, FIL ESTATE ECOCENTRUM

CORPORATION, LA
PAZHOUSING AND Respondents.
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, WARBIRD
SECURITY AGENCY, ENRIQUE
RIVILLA, MICHAEL E.
JETHMAL and MICHAEL
ALUNAN, G. R. No. 152397

Petitioners,
Present:

- versus -

JUANA COMPLEX I VELASCO, JR.,

HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
INC., ANDRES C. BAUTISTA, PERALTA,
BRIGIDO DIMACULANGAN, Promulgated:
DOLORES P. PRADO, IMELDA ABAD,
DE LA CRUZ, EDITHA C. DY,
MENDOZA, and
FLORENCIA M. March 5, 2012
MERCADO, LEOVINO C. PERLAS-BERNABE,
X
DATARIO, AIDA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A. ABAYON, NAPOLEON M. --------------------- X
DIMAANO, ROSITA G. ESTIGOY
and NELSON A. LOYOLA,
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.: Corporation (La Paz), and Warbird Security Agency
and their respective officers (collectively referred as
Fil-Estate, et al.).
Before the Court are two (2) consolidated
petitions assailing the July 31, 2001 Decision[1] and
The complaint alleged that JCHA, et al. were
February 21, 2002 Resolution[2] of the Court of
regular commuters and motorists who constantly
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 60543, which
travelled towards the direction of Manila and
annulled and set aside the March 3, 1999 Order [3] of
Calamba; that they used the entry and exit toll gates of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Bian,
South Luzon Expressway (SLEX) by passing through
Laguna (RTC), granting the application for the
right-of-way public road known as La Paz Road; that
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and
they had been using La Paz Road for more than ten
upheld the June 16, 2000 Omnibus Order[4] denying
(10) years; that in August 1998, Fil-estate excavated,
the motion to dismiss.
broke and deliberately ruined La Paz Road that led to
SLEX so JCHA, et al. would not be able to pass
The Facts:
through the said road; that La Paz Road was restored
by the residents to make it passable but Fil-estate
On January 20, 1999, Juana Complex I
excavated the road again; that JCHA reported the
Homeowners Association, Inc. (JCHA), together with
matter to the Municipal Government and the Office of
individual residents of Juana Complex I and other
the Municipal Engineer but the latter failed to repair
neighboring subdivisions (collectively referred as
the road to make it passable and safe to motorists and
JCHA, et. al.), instituted a complaint[5] for damages, in
pedestrians; that the act of Fil-estate in excavating La
its own behalf and as a class suit representing the
Paz Road caused damage, prejudice, inconvenience,
regular commuters and motorists of Juana Complex I
annoyance, and loss of precious hours to them, to the
and neighboring subdivisions who were deprived of
commuters and motorists because traffic was re-
the use of La Paz Road, against Fil-Estate Land,
routed to narrow streets that caused terrible traffic
Inc. (Fil-Estate), Fil-estate Ecocentrum
congestion and hazard; and that its permanent closure
Corporation (FEEC), La Paz Housing & Development
would not only prejudice their right to free and
unhampered use of the property but would also cause
great damage and irreparable injury.
Accordingly, JCHA, et al. also prayed for the
immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) or a writ of preliminary
injunction (WPI) to enjoin Fil-Estate, et al. from
stopping and intimidating them in their use of La Paz
Road.
On February 10, 1999, a TRO was issued
ordering Fil-Estate, et al, for a period of twenty (20)
days, to stop preventing, coercing, intimidating or
harassing the commuters and motorists from using
the La Paz Road. [6]
Subsequently, the RTC conducted several
hearings to determine the propriety of the issuance of
a WPI.
On February 26, 1999, Fil-Estate, et al. filed a
motion to dismiss[7] arguing that the complaint failed
to state a cause of action and that it was improperly
filed as a class suit. On March 5, 1999, JCHA, et al.
filed their comment[8] on the motion to dismiss to
which respondents filed a reply.[9]
On March 3, 1999, the RTC issued an
[10]
Order granting the WPI and required JCHA, et al.
to post a bond.
On March 19, 1999, Fil-Estate, et al. filed a
motion for reconsideration[11] arguing, among others,
that JCHA, et al. failed to satisfy the requirements for
the issuance of a WPI. On March 23, 1999, JCHA, et
al. filed their opposition to the motion.[12]
The RTC then issued its June 16,
2000 Omnibus Order, denying both the motion to
dismiss and the motion for reconsideration filed by
Fil-Estate, et al.
Not satisfied, Fil-Estate, et al. filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition before the CA to annul
(1) the Order dated March 3, 1999 and (2) the
Omnibus Order dated June 16, 2000. They contended
that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and
that it was improperly filed as a class suit. With regard
to the issuance of the WPI, the defendants averred that
JCHA, et al. failed to show that they had a clear and
unmistakable right to the use of La Paz Road; and
further claimed that La Paz Road was a torrens
registered private road and there was neither a
voluntary nor legal easement constituted over it.[13]
On July 31, 2001, the CA rendered the decision
partially granting the petition, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
partially GRANTED. The Order
dated March 3, 1999 granting the writ of
preliminary injunction is hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE but the
portion of the Omnibus Order dated June
16, 2000 denying the motion to dismiss is
upheld.
SO ORDERED.[14]
The CA ruled that the complaint sufficiently
stated a cause of action when JCHA, et al. alleged in
their complaint that they had been using La Paz Road
for more than ten (10) years and that their right was
violated when Fil-Estate closed and excavated the
road. It sustained the RTC ruling that the complaint
was properly filed as a class suit as it was shown that
the case was of common interest and that the
individuals sought to be represented were so
numerous that it was impractical to include all of
them as parties. The CA, however, annulled the WPI
for failure of JCHA, et al. to prove their clear and
present right over La Paz Road. The CA ordered the
remand of the case to the RTC for a full-blown trial on
the merits.
Hence, these petitions for review.
In G.R. No. 152272, JCHA, et al. come to this
Court, raising the following issues:
(A)
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, IN HOLDING THAT A FULL-
BLOWN TRIAL ON THE MERITS IS
REQUIRED TO DETERMINE THE
NATURE OF THE LA PAZ ROAD, HAD
DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND
USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS AS TO CALL FOR AN
EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF
SUPERVISION.
(B)
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, IN HOLDING THAT THE
PETITIONERS FAILED TO SATISFY THE
 REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE
OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION, HAD DECIDED NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURT.[15]
In G.R. No. 152397, on the other hand, Fil-
Estate, et al. anchor their petition on the following
issues:
I.
The Court of Appeals declaration that
respondents Complaint states a cause
of action is contrary to existing law
and jurisprudence.
II.
The Court of Appeals pronouncement
that respondents complaint was
properly filed as a class suit is contrary
to existing law and jurisprudence.
III.
The Court of Appeals conclusion that
full blown trial on the merits is
required to determine the nature of
the La Paz Road is contrary to existing
laws and jurisprudence.[16]
JCHA, et al. concur with the CA that the
complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action. They,
however, disagree with the CAs pronouncement that a
full-blown trial on the merits was necessary. They
claim that during the hearing on the application of the
writ of injunction, they had sufficiently proven that La
Paz Road was a public road and that commuters and
motorists of their neighboring villages had used this
road as their means of access to the San Agustin
Church, Colegio De San Agustin and to SLEX in
going to Metro Manila and to Southern Tagalog
particularly during the rush hours when traffic at
Carmona Entry/Exit and Susana Heights Entry/Exit
was at its worst.
JCHA, et al. argue that La Paz Road has
attained the status and character of a public road or
burdened by an apparent easement of public right of
way. They point out that La Paz Road is the widest
road in the neighborhood used by motorists in going
to Halang Road and in entering the SLEX-Halang toll
gate and that there is no other road as wide as La Paz
Road existing in the vicinity. For residents of San
Pedro, Laguna, the shortest, convenient and safe route
towards SLEX Halang is along Rosario
Avenue joining La Paz Road.
Finally, JCHA, et al. argue that the CA erred
when it voided the WPI because the public nature of
La Paz Road had been sufficiently proven and, as
residents of San Pedro and Bian, Laguna, their right to
use La Paz Road is undeniable.
In their Memorandum,[17] Fil-Estate, et al.
explain that La Paz Road is included in the parcels of
land covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCT) Nos. T-120008, T-90321 and T-90607, all
registered in the name of La Paz. The purpose of
constructing La Paz Road was to provide a
passageway for La Paz to its intended projects to the
south, one of which was the Juana Complex I. When
Juana Complex I was completed, La Paz donated the
open spaces, drainage, canal, and lighting facilities
inside the Juana Complex I to the Municipality of
Bian. The streets within the subdivisions were then
converted to public roads and were opened for use of
the general public. The La Paz Road, not being part of
the Juana Complex I, was excluded from the donation.
Subsequently, La Paz became a shareholder of FEEC,
a consortium formed to develop several real properties
in Bian, Laguna, known as Ecocentrum Project. In
exchange for shares of stock, La Paz contributed some
of its real properties to the Municipality of Bian,
including the properties constituting La Paz Road, to
form part of the Ecocentrum Project.
Fil-Estate, et al. agree with the CA that the
annulment of the WPI was proper since JCHA, et al.
failed to prove that they have a clear right over La Paz
Road. Fil-Estate, et al. assert that JCHA, et al. failed
to prove the existence of a right of way or a right to
pass over La Paz Road and that the closure of the said
road constituted an injury to such right. According to
them, La Paz Road is a torrens registered private road
and there is neither a voluntary nor legal easement
constituted over it. They claim that La Paz Road is a
private property registered under the name of La
Paz and the beneficial ownership thereof was
transferred to FEEC when La Paz joined the
consortium for the Ecocentrum Project.
Fil-Estate, et al., however, insist that the
complaint did not sufficiently contain the ultimate
facts to show a cause of action. They aver the bare
allegation that one is entitled to something is an
allegation of a conclusion which adds nothing to the
pleading.
They likewise argue that the complaint was
improperly filed as a class suit for it failed to show
that JCHA, et al. and the commuters and motorists they
are representing have a well-defined community of
interest over La Paz Road. They claim that the excavation
of La Paz Road would not necessarily give rise to a
common right or cause of action for JCHA, et al. against
them since each of them has a separate and distinct
purpose and each may be affected differently than the
others.
The Courts Ruling
The issues for the Courts resolution are: (1) whether
or not the complaint states a cause of action; (2)
whether the complaint has been properly filed as a
class suit; and (2) whether or not a WPI is warranted.
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines
a cause of action as an act or omission by which a
party violates the right of another. A complaint states a
cause of action when it contains three (3) essential
elements of a cause of action, namely:
(1) the legal right of the plaintiff,
(2) the correlative obligation of the defendant,
and
(3) the act or omission of the defendant in
violation of said legal right.[18]
The question of whether the complaint states a
cause of action is determined by its averments
regarding the acts committed by the defendant.
[19]
Thus, it must contain a concise statement of the
ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiffs
cause of action.[20] To be taken into account are only
the material allegations in the complaint; extraneous
facts and circumstances or other matters aliunde are
not considered.[21]
The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the
complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether
or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could
render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of
said complaint.[22] Stated differently, if the allegations
in the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the
complaint can be maintained, the same should not be
dismissed regardless of the defense that may be
asserted by the defendant.[23]
 In the present case, the Court finds the
allegations in the complaint sufficient to establish a
cause of action. First, JCHA, et al.s averments in the
complaint show a demandable right over La Paz
Road. These are: (1) their right to use the road on the
basis of their allegation that they had been using the
road for more than 10 years; and (2) an easement of a
right of way has been constituted over the said roads.
There is no other road as wide as La Paz
Road existing in the vicinity and it is the shortest,
convenient and safe route towards SLEX Halang that
the commuters and motorists may use. Second, there
is an alleged violation of such right committed by Fil-
Estate, et al. when they excavated the road and
prevented the commuters and motorists from using
the same. Third, JCHA, et al. consequently suffered
injury and that a valid judgment could have been
rendered in accordance with the relief sought therein.
With respect to the issue that the case was
improperly instituted as a class suit, the Court finds
the opposition without merit.
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines
a class suit, as follows:
Sec. 12. Class suit. When the subject
matter of the controversy is one of common
or general interest to many persons so
numerous that it is impracticable to join all
as parties, a number of them which the
court finds to be sufficiently numerous and
representative as to fully protect the
interests of all concerned may sue or
defend for the benefit of all. Any party in
interest shall have the right to intervene to
protect his individual interest.
The necessary elements for the maintenance of
a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of controversy is
one of common or general interest to many persons;
2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the
parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently
numerous or representative of the class and can fully
protect the interests of all concerned.[24]
In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits
all commuters and motorists who use La Paz Road. As
succinctly stated by the CA:
The subject matter of the instant
case, i.e., the closure and excavation of
the La Paz Road, is initially shown to be of
common or general interest to many
persons. The records reveal that numerous
individuals have filed manifestations with
the lower court, conveying their intention to
join private respondents in the suit and
 claiming that they are similarly situated
with private respondents for they were also
prejudiced by the acts of petitioners in
closing and excavating the La Paz Road.
Moreover, the individuals sought to be
represented by private respondents in the
suit are so numerous that it is impracticable
to join them all as parties and be named
individually as plaintiffs in the complaint.
These individuals claim to be residents of
various barangays in Bian, Laguna and
other barangays in San Pedro, Laguna.
Anent the issue on the propriety of the WPI,
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court lays down
the rules for the issuance thereof. Thus:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to
the relief demanded, and the whole or part
of such relief consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the acts
complained of, or in the performance of an
act or acts, either for a limited period or
perpetually;
(b) That the commission,
continuance or non-performance of the act
or acts complained of during the litigation
would probably work injustice to the
applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, or agency or a
person is doing, threatening, or attempting to
do, or is procuring or suffering to be done,
some act or acts probably in violation of the
rights of the applicant respecting the subject
of the action or proceeding, and tending to
render the judgment ineffectual.
A writ of preliminary injunction is available to
prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to
parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and
adjudicated.[25] The requisites for its issuance are: (1) the
existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be
protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for
the writ to prevent serious damage.[26]For the writ to issue,
the right sought to be protected must be a present right, a
legal right which must be shown to be clear and positive.
[27]
This means that the persons applying for the writ
must show that they have an ostensible right to the
final relief prayed for in their complaint.[28]
In the case at bench, JCHA, et al. failed to establish
a prima facie proof of violation of their right to justify the
issuance of a WPI. Their right to the use of La Paz
Road is disputable since they have no clear legal right
therein. As correctly ruled by the CA:
Here, contrary to the ruling of
respondent Judge, private respondents failed
to prove as yet that they have a clear and
unmistakable right over the La Paz Road which
was sought to be protected by the injunctive
writ. They merely anchor their purported right
over the La Paz Road on the bare allegation
that they have been using the same as public
road right-of-way for more than ten years. A
mere allegation does not meet the standard of
proof that would warrant the issuance of the
injunctive writ. Failure to establish the
existence of a clear right which should be
judicially protected through the writ of
injunction is a sufficient ground for denying the
injunction.
Consequently, the case should be further heard by
the RTC so that the parties can fully prove their respective
positions on the issues.
Due process considerations dictate that the
assailed injunctive writ is not a judgment on the
merits but merely an order for the grant of a
provisional and ancillary remedy to preserve the
status quo until the merits of the case can be heard.
The hearing on the application for issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction is separate and distinct from
the trial on the merits of the main case. [29] The
evidence submitted during the hearing of the incident
is not conclusive or complete for only a "sampling" is
needed to give the trial court an idea of the
justification for the preliminary injunction pending the
decision of the case on the merits.[30] There are vital
facts that have yet to be presented during the trial
which may not be obtained or presented during the
hearing on the application for the injunctive writ.
[31]
Moreover, the quantum of evidence required for
one is different from that for the other.[32]
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED.
Accordingly, the July 31, 2001 Decision and February
21, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 60543 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
 Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Chairperson
SECOND DIVISION The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 65 (sic)[2] having, by Decision[3] of July 10,
ERNESTO C. DEL ROSARIO andDAVAO G.R. No. 150134
TIMBER CORPORATION, 2001, dismissed petitioners complaint in Civil Case
Petitioners, Present: No. 00-540 on the ground of res judicata and splitting
of a cause of action, and by Order of September 24,
QUISUMBING,
2001[4] denied their motion for reconsideration
Chairperson,
thereof, petitioners filed the present petition for
- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO review on certiorari.
MORALES,
TINGA, and
From the rather lengthy history of the present
VELASCO, JR.,
FAR EAST BANK & TRUST controversy, a recital of the following material facts
[1]
COMPANY and culled from the records is in order.
PRIVATE DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION PROMULGATED:
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. October 31, On 2007May 21, 1974, petitioner Davao Timber
Corporation (DATICOR) and respondent Private
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Development Corporation of the Philippines (PDCP)
--------------x entered into a loan agreement under which PDCP
extended to DATICOR a foreign currency loan of US
DECISION
$265,000 and a peso loan of P2.5 million or a total
CARPIO MORALES, J.: amount of approximately P4.4 million, computed at
the then prevailing rate of exchange of the dollar with
the peso.
The loan agreement provided, among other things,
that DATICOR shall pay: (1) a service fee of one
percent (1%) per annum (later increased to six percent
[6%] per annum) on the outstanding balance of the
peso loan; (2) 12 percent (12%) per annum interest on
the peso loan; and (3) penalty charges of two percent
(2%) per month in case of default.
The loans were secured by real estate
mortgages over six parcels of land one situated
in Manila (the Otis property) which was registered in
the name of petitioner Ernesto C. Del Rosario, and
five in Mati, Davao Oriental and chattel mortgages
over pieces of machinery and equipment.
Petitioners paid a total of P3 million to PDCP,
which the latter applied to interest, service fees and
penalty charges. This left petitioners,
by PDCPs computation, with an outstanding balance
on the principal of more than P10 million as of May
15, 1983.
By March 31, 1982, petitioners had filed a
complaint against PDCP before the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Manila for violation of the Usury
Law, annulment of contract and damages. The case,
docketed as Civil Case No. 82-8088, was dismissed
by the CFI.
On appeal, the then Intermediate Appellate
Court (IAC) set aside the CFIs dismissal of the
complaint and declared void and of no effect the
stipulation of interest in the loan agreement between
DATICOR and PDCP.
PDCP appealed the IACs decision to this Court
where it was docketed as G.R. No. 73198.
In the interim, PDCP assigned a portion of its
receivables from petitioners (the receivables) to its co-
respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company
(FEBTC) under a Deed of Assignment dated April 10,
1987[5] for a consideration of P5,435,000. The Deed of
Assignment was later amended by two Supplements.[6]

FEBTC, as assignee of the receivables, and petitioners
later executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
dated December 8, 1988 whereby petitioners agreed
to, as they did pay FEBTC[7] the amount of P6.4
million as full settlement of the receivables.
On September 2, 1992, this Court promulgated its
Decision in G.R. No. 73198[8] affirming in toto the
decision of the IAC. It determined that after deducting
the P3 million earlier paid by petitioners to PDCP,
their remaining balance on the principal loan was
only P1.4 million.
Petitioners thus filed on April 25, 1994 a
Complaint[9] for sum of money against PDCP and
FEBTC before the RTC of Makati, mainly to recover
the excess payment which they computed to be P5.3
million[10] P4.335 million from PDCP, and P965,000
from FEBTC. The case, Civil Case No. 94-1610, was
raffled to Branch 132 of the Makati RTC.
On May 31, 1995, Branch 132 of
the Makati RTC rendered a decision[11] in Civil Case
No. 94-1610 ordering PDCP to pay petitioners the
sum of P4.035 million,[12] to bear interest at 12% per
annum from April 25, 1994 until fully paid; to execute
a release or cancellation of the mortgages on the five
parcels of land in Mati, Davao Oriental and on the
pieces of machinery and equipment and to return the
corresponding titles to petitioners; and to pay the costs
of the suit.
As for the complaint of petitioners against respondent
FEBTC, the trial court dismissed it for lack of cause
of action, ratiocinating that the MOA between
petitioners and FEBTC was not subject to this Courts
Decision in G.R. No. 73198, FEBTC not being a party
thereto.
From the trial courts decision, petitioners and
respondent PDCP appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA). The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
50591.
On May 22, 1998, the CA rendered a
decision[13] in CA-G.R. CV No. 50591, holding that
petitioners outstanding obligation, which this Court
had determined in G.R. No. 73198 to be P1.4 million,
could not be increased or decreased by any act of the
creditor PDCP.
The CA held that when PDCP assigned its
receivables, the amount payable to it by DATICOR
was the same amount payable to assignee FEBTC,
irrespective of any stipulation that PDCP and
FEBTC might have
provided in the Deed of Assignment, DATICOR not
having been a party thereto, hence, not bound by its
terms.
Citing Articles 2154[14] and 2163[15] of the Civil
Code which embody the principle of solutio indebiti,
the CA held that the party bound to refund the excess
payment of P5 million[16] was FEBTC as it received
the overpayment; and that FEBTC could recover from
PDCP the amount of P4.035 million representing its
overpayment for the assigned receivables based on the
terms of the Deed of Assignment or on the general
principle of equity.
Noting, however, that DATICOR claimed in its
complaint only the amount of P965,000 from FEBTC,
the CA held that it could not grant a relief different
from or in excess of that prayed for.
Finally, the CA held that the claim of PDCP
against DATICOR for the payment of P1.4 million
had no basis, DATICORs obligation having already
been paid in full, overpaid in fact, when it paid
assignee FEBTC the amount of P6.4 million.
Accordingly, the CA ordered PDCP to execute a
release or cancellation of the mortgages it was holding
over the Mati real properties and the machinery and
equipment, and to return the corresponding
certificates of title to petitioners. And it ordered
FEBTC to pay petitioners the amount of P965,000
with legal interest from the date of the promulgation
of its judgment.
FEBTCs motion for reconsideration of the CA
Decision was denied, and so was its subsequent
appeal to this Court.

On April 25, 2000, petitioners filed before the
RTC of Makati a Complaint[17] against FEBTC to
recover the balance of the excess payment of P4.335
million.[18] The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
00-540, the precursor of the present case and raffled
to Branch 143 of the RTC.
In its Answer,[19] FEBTC denied responsibility,
it submitting that nowhere in the dispositive portion of
the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 50591 was it
held liable to return the whole amount of P5.435
million representing the consideration for the
assignment to it of the receivables, and since
petitioners failed to claim the said whole amount in
their original complaint in Civil Case No. 94-1610 as
they were merely claiming the amount of P965,000
from it, they were barred from claiming it.
FEBTC later filed a Third Party
[20]
Complaint against PDCP praying that the latter be
made to pay the P965,000 and the interests adjudged
by the CA in favor of petitioners, as well as
the P4.335 million and interests that petitioners were
claiming from it. It posited that PDCP should be held
liable because it received a consideration of P5.435
million when it assigned the receivables.
Answering[21] the Third Party Complaint, PDCP
contended that since petitioners were not seeking the
recovery of the amount of P965,000, the same cannot
be recovered via the third party complaint.
PDCP went on to contend that since the final
and executory decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 50591
had held that DATICOR has no cause of action
against it for the refund of any part of the excess
payment, FEBTC can no longer re-litigate the same
issue.
Moreover, PDCP contended that it was not
privy to the MOA which explicitly excluded the
receivables from the effect of the Supreme Court
decision, and that the amount of P6.4 million paid by
petitioners to FEBTC was clearly intended as
consideration for the release and cancellation of the
lien on the Otis property.

[22]
Replying, FEBTC pointed out that PDCP cannot
deny that it benefited from the assignment of its rights
over the receivables from petitioners. It added that the
third party claim being founded on a valid and
justified cause, PDCPs counterclaims lacked factual
and legal basis.
Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment[23] to which FEBTC filed its
opposition.[24]
By Order of March 5, 2001, the trial court
denied the motion for summary judgment for lack of
merit.[25]
On July 10, 2001, the trial court issued the
assailed Decision dismissing petitioners complaint on
the ground of res judicata and splitting of cause of
action. It recalled that petitioners had filed Civil Case
No. 94-1610 to recover the alleged overpayment both
from PDCP and FEBTC and to secure the cancellation
and release of their mortgages on real properties,
machinery and equipment; that when said case was
appealed, the CA, in its Decision, ordered PDCP to
release and cancel the mortgages and FEBTC to
pay P965,000 with interest, which Decision became
final and executory on November 23, 1999; and that a
Notice of Satisfaction of Judgment between
petitioners and FEBTC was in fact submitted on
August 8, 2000, hence, the issue between them was
finally settled under the doctrine of res judicata.
The trial court moreover noted that the MOA
between petitioners and FEBTC clearly stated that the
pending litigation before the Supreme Court of the
Philippines with respect to the Loan exclusive of the
Receivables assigned to FEBTC shall prevail up to the
extent not covered by this Agreement. That statement
in the MOA, the trial court ruled, categorically made
only the loan subject to this Courts Decision in G.R.
No. 73198, hence, it was with the parties full
knowledge and consent that petitioners agreed to
pay P6.4 million to FEBTC as consideration for the
settlement. The parties cannot thus be allowed to
welsh on their contractual obligations, the trial court
concluded.
 Respecting the third party claim of FEBTC, the
trial court held that FEBTCs payment of the amount
of P1,224,906.67 (P965,000 plus interest) to
petitioners was in compliance with the final judgment
of the CA, hence, it could not entertain such claim
because the Complaint filed by petitioners merely
sought to recover from FEBTC the alleged
overpayment of P4.335 million and attorneys fees
of P200,000.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration[26] of
the July 10, 2001 decision of the trial court was
denied by Order of September 24, 2001.
Hence, the present petition.
In their Memorandum,[27] petitioners proffer
that, aside from the issue of whether their complaint is
dismissible on the ground of res judicata and splitting
of cause of action, the issues of 1) whether FEBTC
can be held liable for the balance of the
overpayment of P4.335 million plus interest
which petitioners previously claimed against PDCP in
Civil Case No. 94-1610, and 2) whether PDCP can
interpose as defense the provision in the Deed of
Assignment and the MOA that the assignment of the
receivables shall not be affected by this Courts
Decision in G.R. No. 73198, be considered.
Stripped of the verbiage, the only issue for this
Courts consideration is the propriety of the dismissal
of Civil Case No. 00-540 upon the grounds stated by
the trial court.This should be so because a Rule 45
petition, like the one at bar, can raise only questions of
law (and that justifies petitioners elevation of the case
from the trial court directly to this Court) which must
be distinctly set forth.[28]
The petition is bereft of merit.
Section 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, on
the doctrine of res judicata, reads:
Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final
orders. The effect of a judgment or final
order rendered by a court of
the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or final order,
may be as follows:

xxxx
(b) In other cases, the judgment or
final order is, with respect to the matter
directly adjudged or as to any other matter
that could have been raised in relation
thereto, conclusive between the parties and
their successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the
action or special proceeding, litigating for
the same thing and under the same title and
in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between
the same parties or their successors in
interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgment or final
order which appears upon its face to have
been so adjudged, or which was actually
and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto. (Underscoring supplied)
The above-quoted provision lays down two
main rules. Section 49(b) enunciates the first rule
of res judicata known as bar by prior judgment or
estoppel by judgment, which states that the judgment
or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the
merits concludes the parties and their privies to the
litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit
involving the same cause of action either before the
same or any other tribunal.[29]
Stated otherwise, bar by former judgment
makes the judgment rendered in the first case an
absolute bar to the subsequent action since that
judgment is conclusive not only as to the matters
offered and received to sustain it but also as to any
other matter which might have been offered for that
purpose and which could have been adjudged therein.
[30]
It is in this concept that the term res judicata is
more commonly and generally used as a ground for a
motion to dismiss in civil cases.[31]
The second rule of res judicata embodied in
Section 47(c), Rule 39 is conclusiveness of
judgment. This rule provides that any right, fact, or
matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily
involved in the determination of an action before a
competent court in which a judgment or decree is
rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein and cannot again be litigated
between the parties and their privies whether or not
the claim or demand, purpose, or subject matter of the
two suits is the same.[32] It refers to a situation where
the judgment in the prior
action operates as an estoppel only as to the matters
actually determined or which were necessarily
included therein.[33]
The case at bar satisfies the four essential
requisites of bar by prior judgment, viz:
(a) finality of the former judgment;
(b) the court which rendered it had
jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties;
(c) it must be a judgment on the
merits; and
(d) there must be, between the first
and second actions, identity
of parties, subject matter and
causes of action.[34]
There is no doubt that the judgment on appeal
relative to Civil Case No. 94-1610 (that rendered in
CA-G.R. CV No. 50591) was a final judgment. Not
only did it dispose of the case on the merits; it also
became executory as a consequence of the denial of
FEBTCs motion for reconsideration and appeal.[35]
Neither is there room to doubt that the
judgment in Civil Case No. 94-1610 was on the merits
for it determined the rights and liabilities of the
parties.[36] To recall, it was ruled that: (1) DATICOR
overpaid by P5.3 million; (2) FEBTC was bound to
refund the excess payment but because DATICORs
claim against FEBTC was only P965,000, the court
could only grant so much as the relief prayed for; and
(3) PDCP has no further claim against DATICOR
because its obligation had already been paid in
full.
Right or wrong, that judgment bars another case based
upon the same cause of action.[37]

As to the requisite of identity of parties, subject
matter and causes of action, it cannot be gainsaid that
the first case, Civil Case No. 94-1610, was brought by
petitioners to recover an alleged overpayment of P5.3
million P965,000 from FEBTC and P4.335 million
from PDCP.
On the other hand, Civil Case No. 00-540, filed
by the same petitioners, was for the recovery
of P4.335 million which is admittedly part of the P5.3
million earlier sought to be recovered in Civil Case
No. 94-1610. This time, the action was brought solely
against FEBTC which in turn impleaded PDCP as a
third party defendant.
In determining whether causes of action are
identical to warrant the application of the rule of res
judicata, the test is to ascertain whether the same
evidence which is necessary to sustain the second
action would suffice to authorize a recovery in the
first even in cases in which the forms or nature of the
two actions are different.[38] Simply stated, if the same
facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions
are considered the same within the rule that the
judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent
action.
It bears remembering that a cause of action is
the delict or the wrongful act or omission committed
by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of
the plaintiff.[39]
In the two cases, petitioners imputed to FEBTC
the same alleged wrongful act of mistakenly receiving
and refusing to return an amount in excess of what
was due it in violation of their right to a refund. The
same facts and evidence presented in the first case,
Civil Case No. 94-1610, were the very same facts and
evidence that petitioners presented in Civil Case No.
00-540.
Thus, the same Deed of Assignment between
PDCP and FEBTC, the first and second supplements
to the Deed, the MOA between petitioners and
FEBTC, and this Courts Decision in G.R. No. 73198
were submitted in Civil Case No. 00-540.
 Notably, the same facts were also pleaded by
the parties in support of their allegations for, and
defenses against, the recovery of the P4.335
million. Petitioners, of course, plead the CA Decision
as basis for their subsequent claim for the remainder
of their overpayment. It is well established, however,
that a party cannot, by varying the form of action or
adopting a different method of presenting his case, or
by pleading justifiable circumstances as herein
petitioners are doing, escape the operation of the
principle that one and the same cause of action shall
not be twice litigated.[40]
In fact, authorities tend to widen rather than
restrict the doctrine of res judicata on the ground that
public as well as private interest demands the ending
of suits by requiring the parties to sue once and for all
in the same case all the special proceedings and
remedies to which they are entitled.[41]
This Court finds well-taken then the
pronouncement of the court a quo that to allow the re-
litigation of an issue that was finally settled as
between petitioners and FEBTC in the prior case is to
allow the splitting of a cause of action, a ground for
dismissal under Section 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of
Court reading:
SEC. 4. Splitting of a single cause
of action; effect of. If two or more suits are
instituted on the basis of the same cause of
action, the filing of one or a judgment
upon the merits in any one is available
as a ground for the dismissal of the
others. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
This rule proscribes a party from dividing a single or
indivisible cause of action into several parts or claims
and instituting two or more actions based on it.
[42]
Because the plaintiff cannot divide the grounds for
recovery, he is mandated to set forth in his first action
every ground for relief which he claims to exist and
upon which he relies; he cannot be permitted to rely
upon them by piecemeal in successive actions to
recover for the same wrong or injury.[43]
 Clearly then, the judgment in Civil Case No.
94-1610 operated as a bar to Civil Case No. 00-540, WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The
following the above-quoted Section 4, Rule 2 of the assailed Decision of the RTC, Branch
Rules of Court. 143, Makati dismissing petitioners complaint in Civil
Case No. 00-540 is AFFIRMED.
A final word. Petitioners are sternly reminded that
both the rules on res judicata and splitting of causes
of action are based on the salutary public policy Costs against petitioners.
against unnecessary multiplicity of suits interest SO ORDERED.
reipublicae ut sit finis litium.[44] Re-litigation of
matters already settled by a courts final judgment
CONCHITACARPIO
merely burdens the courts and the taxpayers, creates MORALES
uneasiness and confusion, and wastes valuable time Associate Justice
and energy that could be devoted to worthier cases.[45]

DECISION
SECOND DIVISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

[G.R. No. 123555. January 22, 1999] May the lessee which instituted before the Metropolitan
Trial Court an action for forcible entry with damages against its
PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT lessor file a separate suit with the Regional Trial Court against
CORPORATION, INC., petitioner, vs. the same lessor for moral and exemplary damages plus actual
COURT OF APPEALS and WESTIN and compensatory damages based on the same forcible entry?
SEAFOOD MARKET, INC., respondents.
On grounds of litis pendencia and forum-shopping,
petitioner invokes established jurisprudence that a party cannot
by varying the form of action or adopting a different method
of presenting his case evade the principle that the same cause
of action shall not be litigated twice between the same
parties or their privies.[1] Petitioner therefore prays for reversal
of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 May 1995, as
well as its Resolution dated 17 January 1996 denying
reconsideration, which upheld the denial by the Regional Trial
Court of petitioner's motion to dismiss private respondent's
damage suit.
The antecedents: On 27 May 1991 petitioner leased to
private respondent Westin Seafood Market, Inc., a parcel of
land with a commercial building thereon located at Araneta
Center, Cubao, Quezon City, for a period of nine (9) years and
three (3) months, i.e., from 2 January 1989 to 30 April 1998,
with a monthly rental of approximately P600,000.00. The
contract contained, among others, the following pertinent terms
and conditions:
EFFECT OF VIOLATIONS
25. LESSEE hereby agrees that all the provisions
contained in this Contract shall be deemed as
conditions, as well as covenants, and that this Contract
shall be automatically terminated and cancelled without
resorting to court action should LESSEE violate any or
all said conditions, including the payment of Rent,
CUSA and other charges indicated in the FLP when due
within the time herein stipulated and in any such cases,
LESSEE hereby irrevocably appoints LESSOR, its
authorized agents, employees and/or representatives as
his duly authorized attorney-in-fact, even after the
termination, expiration or
cancellationof this Contract, with full power and
authority to open, enter, repossess, secure, enclose,
fence and otherwise take full and complete physical
possession and control of the leased premises and its
contents without resorting to court action and/or to
summarily disconnect electrical and/or water services
thereof, and that LESSEE hereby irrevocably empowers
LESSOR, his authorized agents, employees and/or
representatives to take inventory and possession of
whatever equipment, furniture, articles, merchandise,
appliances, etc., found therein belonging to LESSEE,
consignors and/or to any other persons and to place the
same in LESSORs warehouse or any other place at
LESSORs discretion for safekeeping; charging LESSEE
the corresponding storage fees therefor; that in case
LESSEE fails to claim said equipment, furniture,
articles, merchandise, appliances, etc. from storage and
simultaneously liquidate any liability with LESSOR
within seven (7) days from date of said transfer to
LESSORs warehouse, LESSOR is likewise hereby
expressly authorized and empowered by LESSEE to
dispose of said property/properties in a public sale
through a Notary Public of LESSORs choice and to
apply the proceeds thereof to whatever liability
and/or indebtedness LESSEE may have to LESSOR
plus reasonable expenses for the same, including storage
fees, and the balance, if any, shall be turned over to
LESSEE; that LESSEE hereby expressly agrees that any
or all acts performed by LESSOR, his authorized
agents, employees and/or representatives under the
provisions of this Section may not be the subject of any
petition for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction or
Mandatory Injunction in court, and that LESSOR and/or
his authorized agents, employees, and/or representatives
shall be free from any civil and/or criminal liability or
responsibility whatsoever therefor.
TERMINATION OF LEASE
26. Upon the automatic termination of this lease
contract, as the case may be, LESSEE shall immediately
vacate and redeliver physical possession of the leased
premises, including the keys appertaining thereto, to
LESSOR in good, clean and sanitary condition,
reasonable wear and tear excepted, devoid of all
occupants, equipment, furniture, articles, merchandise,
etc., belonging to LESSEE or to any other person except
those belonging to LESSOR; that should LESSEE fail
to comply with this provision, LESSOR is hereby given
the same rights and power to proceed against LESSEE
as expressly granted in the immediately preceding
section.
Private respondent failed to pay rentals despite several
demands by petitioner. As of 19 October 1992 the arrearages
amounted to P8,608,284.66. Admittedly, non-payment of
rentals constituted breach of their contract; thus, pursuant to the
express authority granted petitioner under the above-quoted
Secs. 25 and 26 of the lease agreement, petitioner on 31
October 1992 repossessed the leased premises, inventoried the
movable properties found within and owned by private
respondent and scheduled public auction for the sale of the
movables on 19 August 1993 with notice to private respondent.
On 26 November 1992 private respondent filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint against
petitioner for forcible entry with damages and a prayer for a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. The case was raffled to Branch 40
[2]
presided over by Judge Guillermo L. Loja Jr. who issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining petitioner from selling
private respondents properties at a public auction.
On 9 December 1992 Judge Loja inhibited himself from
trying the case and directed its transfer to Branch 34 presided
over by Judge Joselito SD Generoso. Soon after, petitioner
filed an urgent motion for the inhibition of Judge Generoso and
the immediate reraffle of the case arguing that the summary
transfer of the case to Judge Generoso was irregular as it was
not done by raffle.
The motion was granted and the case went to Branch 36
presided over by Judge Francisco D. Villanueva. Thereafter, on
22 December 1992, at the continuation of the hearing on the
issuance of a writ preliminary mandatory injunction, the parties
agreed, among others, on the following: (a) private respondent
would deposit with the Philippine Commercial and Industrial
Bank in the name of theMetropolitan Trial Court, Branch 36,
the amount of P8,000,000.00 to guarantee the payment of its
back rentals; (b) petitioner would defer the sale of the personal
properties of the Westin Seafood Market, Inc., until a final
settlement of the case had been arrived at; (c) petitioner shall
allow private respondent to retrieve all the perishable goods
from inside the leased premises like frozen meat, vegetables
and fish, all properly receipted for; (d) petitioner shall allow
three (3) maintenance personnel of private respondent to enter
the premises at reasonable working hours to maintain the
restaurant equipment; and (e) the parties shall negotiate for the
restoration of the premises to private respondent, and if no
settlement be arrived at on or before January 8, 1993, the
hearing on the merits of the case shall proceed and the
disposition of the amount deposited representing the rental
arrearages shall be left to the discretion of the court.
This agreement was incorporated in the order of the court
dated 22 December 1992[3] which in effect terminated for all
intents and purposes the incident on the issuance of a
preliminary writ of injunction.
Private respondent did not comply with its undertaking to
deposit with the designated bank the amount representing its
back rentals. Instead, with the forcible entry case still pending
with the MeTC, private respondent instituted on 9 June 1993
another action for damages against petitioner with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was raffled to Branch 101
presided over by Judge Pedro T. Santiago.[4]
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the damage suit on the
ground of litis pendencia and forum shopping. On 2 July 1993,
instead of ruling on the motion, Judge Santiago issued an
order archiving the case pending the outcome of the forcible
entry case being heard at the MeTC for the reason that "the
damages is (sic) principally anchored on whether or not the
defendants (petitioner herein) have committed forcible
entry."[5] On 2 August 1993 petitioner moved for
reconsideration of the order and reiterated its motion to dismiss
the suit for damages.
Before petitioner's motion to dismiss could be resolved,
private respondent filed with the RTC on 18 August 1993 an
amended complaint for damages. On 14 September 1993 it also
filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for the Grant of a
Preliminary Prohibitory and Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction. On the very same day, Judge Santiago issued an
order (a) denying petitioner's motion to dismiss, (b) admitting
private respondent's amended complaint, and (c) granting
private respondent's application for a temporary restraining
order against petitioner.
Thus, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special
civil action for certiorari and prohibition on the ground that
Judge Santiago acted in excess of his jurisdiction and/or
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in admitting the amended complaint of private
respondent and issuing a restraining order against petitioner; in
allowing private respondent to engage in forum shopping; and,
taking cognizance of the action for damages despite lack of
jurisdiction.[6]
But the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition due to the
failure of petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration of
Judge Santiago's order of 14 September 1993 which, it
explained, was a prerequisite to the institution of a petition
for certiorari and prohibition. It also found that the elements
of litis pendencia were lacking to justify the dismissal of the
action for damages with the RTC because despite the pendency
of the forcible entry case with the MeTC the only damages
recoverable thereat were those caused by the loss of the use
and occupation of the property and not the kind of damages
being claimed before the RTC which had no direct relation to
loss of material possession. It clarified that since the damages
prayed for in the amended complaint with the RTC were those
caused by the alleged high-handed manner with which
petitioner reacquired possession of the leased premises and the
sale of private respondents movables found therein, the RTC
and not the MeTC had jurisdiction over the action of damages.
[7]
Petitioner, aggrieved by the decision of the appellate court,
filed the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court alleging that it erred in (a) finding that
petitioner failed to avail of its plain, speedy and adequate
remedy of a prior motion for reconsideration with the
RTC; (b) ruling that the trial judge did not act with grave abuse
of discretion in taking cognizance of the action for damages
and injunction despite the pendency of the forcible entry case
with the MeTC; and, (c) ruling that private respondent did not
commit forum shopping since the causes of action before the
RTC and MeTC were not identical with each other.
There is merit in the petition. While generally a motion for
reconsideration must first be filed before resorting
to certiorari in order to give the lower court an opportunity to
correct the errors imputed to it[8] this rule admits of exceptions
and is not intended to be applied without considering the
circumstances of the case.[9] The filing of the motion for
reconsideration before availing of the remedy of certiorari is
not sine qua non when the issue raised is one purely of law,
or where the error is patent or the disputed order is void ,[11] or
[10]
the questions raised on certiorari are the same as those already
squarely presented to and passed upon by the lower court.
 In its motion for dismissal of the action for damages with
the RTC petitioner raised the ground that another action for
forcible entry was pending at the MeTC between the same
parties involving the same matter and cause of
action. Outrightly rejected by the RTC, the same issue was
elevated by petitioner on certiorari before the Court of
Appeals. Clearly, under the prevailing circumstance, any
motion for reconsideration of the trial court would have been a
pointless exercise.[12]
We now turn to the issue of whether an action for damages
filed with the Regional Trial Court by the lessee against the
lessor should be dismissed on the ground of pendency of
another action for forcible entry and damages earlier filed by
the same lessee against the same lessor before the Metropolitan
Trial Court.
Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that
any person deprived of the possession of any land or building
by force, indimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, or against
whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld, may bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial
Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or
depriving of possession, together with damages and costs. The
mandate under this rule is categorical: that all cases for forcible
entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed before the Municipal
Trial Court which shall include not only the plea for restoration
of possession but also all claims for damages and costs arising
therefrom. Otherwise expressed, no claim for damages arising
out of forcible entry or unlawful detainer may be filed
separately and independently of the claim for restoration of
possession.
This is consistent with the principle laid down in Sec. 1,
par. (e), of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court which states that the
pendency of another action between the same parties for the
same cause is a ground for dismissal of an action. Res
adjudicata requires that there must be between the action
sought to be dismissed and the other action the following
elements: (a) identity of parties or at least such as representing
the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and, (c) the identity in the two (2) preceding particulars
should be such that any judgment which may be rendered on
the other action will, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration.[13]
It is likewise basic under Sec. 3 of Rule 2 of the Revised
Rules of Court, as amended, that a party may not institute more
than one suit for a single cause of action. Under Sec. 4 of the
same Rule, if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the
same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the
merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of
the other or others. "Cause of action" is defined by Sec. 2 of
Rule 2 as the act of omission by which a party violates a right
of another.[14] These premises obtaining, there is no question at
all that private respondent's cause of action in the forcible entry
case and in the suit for damages is the alleged illegal retaking
of possession of the leased premises by the lessor, petitioner
herein, from which all legal reliefs arise. Simply stated, the
restoration of possession and demand for actual damages in the
case before the MeTC and the demand for damages with the
RTC both arise from the same cause of action, i.e., the forcible
entry by petitioner into the leased premises.
A comparative study of the two (2) complaints filed by
private respondent against petitioner before the two (2) trial
courts shows that not only are the elements of res
adjudicata present, at least insofar as the claim for actual and
compensatory damages is concerned, but also that the claim for
damages - moral and exemplary in addition to actual and
compensatory - constitutes splitting a single cause of
action.Since this runs counter to the rule against multiplicity of
suits, the dismissal of the second action becomes imperative.
The complaint for forcible entry contains the following
pertinent allegations -
2.01 On 02 January 1989, plaintiff entered into a
contract of lease with defendant PDC over a property
designated as Ground Floor, Seafood Market
(hereinafter Subject Premises) situated at the corner of
EDSA corner MacArthur Street, Araneta Center, Cubao,
Quezon City, for a period of ten (10) years from 02
January 1989 to 30 April 1998.
2.02 Immediately after having acquired actual physical
possession of the Subject Premises, plaintiff established
and now operates thereon the now famous Seafood
Market Restaurant. Since then, plaintiff had been in
actual, continuous, and peaceful physical possession of
the Subject Premises until 31 October 1992.
xxxx
3.02 Plaintiff, being the lessee of the Subject Premises,
is entitled to the peaceful occupation and enjoyment of
the Subject Premises to the exclusion of all others,
including defendants herein.
3.03 Defendants resort to strong arms tactics to forcibly
wrest possession of the Subject Premises from plaintiff
and maintain possession thereof through the use of
force, threat, strategy and intimidation by the use of
superior number of men and arms amounts to the taking
of the law into their own hands.
3.04 Thus, defendants act of unlawfully evicting out
plaintiff from the Subject Premises it is leasing from
defendant PDC and depriving
it of possession thereof through the use of force, threat,
strategy and intimidation should be condemned and
declared illegal for being contrary to public order and
policy.
3.05 Consequently, defendants should be enjoined from
continuing with their illegal acts and be ordered to
vacate the Subject Premises and restore possession
thereof, together with its contents, to plaintiff.
xxxx
4.07 Considering that defendants act of forcibly
grabbing possession of the Subject Premises from
plaintiff is illegal and null and void, defendant should be
adjudged liable to plaintiff for all the aforedescribed
damages which plaintiff incurred as a result thereof.
The amended complaint for damages filed by private
respondent alleges basically the same factual circumstances
and issues as bases for the relief prayed for, to wit:
4. On May 28, 1991, plaintiff and defendant PDC
entered into a Contract of Lease for a period of ten years
or from January 2, 1989 up to April 30, 1998 over a
property designated as Ground Floor, Seafood Market
(hereinafter referred to as Subject Premises) situated at
the corner of EDSA corner McArthur Street, Araneta
Center, Cubao, Quezon City. A copy of the lease
contract is attached hereto as Annex A.
5. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff took over actual
physical possession of Subject Premises, and
established thereon the now famous Seafood Market
Restaurant.
xxxx
7. On October 31, 1992 at around 8:30 p.m., defendant
PDC, without the benefit of any writ of possession or
any lawful court order and with the aid of
approximately forty (40) armed security guards and
policemen under the supervision of defendant Tejam,
forcibly entered the subject premises through force,
intimidation, threats and stealth and relying on brute
force and in a thunderboltish manner and against
plaintiffs will, unceremoniously drew away all of
plaintiffs men out of the
subject premises, thereby depriving herein plaintiff of
its actual, physical and natural possession of the subject
premises. The illegal, high-handed manner and gestapo
like take-over by defendants of subject premises is more
particularly described as follows: x x x
8. To date, defendants continue to illegally possess and
hold the Subject Premises, including all the multi-
million improvements, fixtures and equipment therein
owned by plaintiff, all to the damage and prejudice of
plaintiff. The actuations of defendants constitute an
unlawful appropriation, seizure and taking of property
against the will and consent of plaintiff. Worse,
defendants are threatening to sell at public auction and
without the consent of plaintiff and without
lawful authority, the multi-million fixtures and
equipment of plaintiff and at prices way below the
market value thereof. Plaintiff hereby attaches as Annex
B the letter from defendants dated August 6, 1993
addressed to plaintiff, informing the latter that the
former intends to sell at an auction on August 19, 1993
at 2:00 p.m. properties of the plaintiff presently in
defendants possession.
xxxx
12. Defendants unlawful takeover of the premises
constitutes a violation of its obligation under Art. 1654
of the New Civil Code requiring the lessor to maintain
the lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the
lease for the entire duration of the contract. Hence,
plaintiff has filed the present suit for the recovery of
damages under Art. 1659 of the New Civil Code x x x x
Restated in its bare essentials, the forcible entry case has
one cause of action, namely, the alleged unlawful entry by
petitioner into the leased premises out of which three (3) reliefs
(denominated by private respondent as its causes of action)
arose: (a) the restoration by the lessor (petitioner herein) of the
possession of the leased premises to the lessee; (b) the claim
for actual damages due to the losses suffered by private
respondent such as the deterioration of perishable foodstuffs
stored inside the premises and the deprivation of the use of the
premises causing loss of expected profits; and, (c) the claim for
attorney's fees and costs of suit.
On the other hand, the complaint for damages prays for a
monetary award consisting of (a) moral damages
of P500,000.00 and exemplary damages of
another P500,000.00; (b) actual damages of P20,000,000.00
and compensatory damages of P1,000,000.00 representing
unrealized profits; and, (c) P200,000.00 for attorney's fees and
costs, all based on the alleged forcible takeover of the leased
premises by petitioner. Since actual and compensatory damages
were already prayed for in the forcible entry case before the
MeTC, it is obvious that this cannot be relitigated in
the damage suit before the RTC by reason of res adjudicata.
The other claims for moral and exemplary damages cannot
also succeed considering that these sprung from the main
incident being heard before the MeTC. Jurisprudence is
unequivocal that when a single delict or wrong is committed -
like the unlawful taking or detention of the property of another
- there is but one single cause of action regardless of the
number of rights that may have been violated, and all such
rights should be alleged in a single complaint as constituting
one single cause of action.[15] In a forcible entry case, the real
issue is the physical possession of the real property. The
question of damages is merely secondary or incidental, so
much so that the amount thereof does not affect
the jurisdiction of the court. In other words, the unlawful act of
a deforciant in taking possession of a piece of land by means of
force and intimidation against the rights of the party actually in
possession thereof is a delict or wrong, or a cause of action that
gives rise to two (2) remedies, namely, the recovery of
possession and recovery of damages arising from the loss of
possession, but only to one action. For obvious reasons, both
remedies cannot be the subject of two (2) separate and
independent actions, one for recovery of possession only, and
the other, for the recovery of damages. That would inevitably
lead to what is termed in law as splitting up a cause of action.
[16]
In David v. de la Cruz[17] we observed -
Herein tenants have but one cause of action against their
landlord, their illegal ejectment or removal from their
landholdings, which cause of action however entitles
them to two (2) claims or remedies - for reinstatement
and damages. As both claims arise from the same cause
of action, they should be alleged in a single complaint.
A claim cannot be divided in such a way that a part of the
amount of damages may be recovered in one case and the rest,
in another.[18] In Bachrach v. Icarangal[19] we explained that the
rule was aimed at preventing repeated litigations between the
same parties in regard to the same subject of the controversy
and to protect the defendant from unnecessary vexation. Nemo
debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa.
What then is the effect of the dismissal of the other
action? Since the rule is that all such rights should be alleged in
a single complaint, it goes without saying that those not therein
included cannot be the subject of subsequent complaints for
they are barred forever.[20] If a suit is brought for a part of a
claim, a judgment obtained in that action precludes the plaintiff
from bringing a second action for the residue of the claim,
notwithstanding that the second form of action is not identical
with the first or different grounds for relief are set for the
second suit. This principle not only embraces what was
actually determined, but also extends to every matter which the
parties might have litigated in the case. [21] This is why the legal
basis upon which private respondent anchored its second claim
for damages, i.e., Art. 1659 in relation to Art. 1654 of the Civil
Code,[22] not otherwise raised and cited by private respondent in
the forcible entry case, cannot be used as justification for the
second suit for damages. We note, not without some degree of
displeasure, that by filing a second suit for damages, private
respondent was not only able to press a claim for moral and
exemplary damages which by its failure to allege the same in
its suit before the MeTC foreclosed its right to sue on it, but it
was also able to obtain from the RTC, by way
of another temporary restraining order, a second reprieve from
an impending public auction sale of its movables which it
could not anymore secure from the MeTC before which the
matter of the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction was
already closed.
The foregoing discussions provide sufficient basis to
petitioner's charge that private respondent and its counsel in the
trial courts committed forum shopping. In Crisostomo v.
Securities and Exchange Commission[23] we ruled -
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an
adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable
opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in
another. The principle applies x x x with respect to suits
filed in the courts x x x in connection with litigations
commenced in the court x x x in anticipation of an
unfavorable x x x ruling and a favorable case where the
court in which the second suit was brought, has no
jurisdiction.
This Court likewise elucidated in New Pangasinan Review, Inc.
v. National Labor Relations Commission [24] that there is forum
shopping when the actions involve the same transactions, the
same essential facts and circumstances. The reason behind the
proscription of forum shopping is obvious. This unnecessarily
burdens our courts with heavy caseloads, unduly taxes the
manpower and financial resources of the judiciary and trifles
with and mocks our judicial processes, thereby adversely
affecting the efficient administration of justice. This
condemnable conduct has prompted the Court to issue
circulars[25]ordering among others that a violation thereof shall
be cause for the dismissal of the case or cases without
prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel
or party concerned.
The records ineluctably show that the complaint lodged by
private respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City contained no certification of non-forum shopping. When
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case raising among
others the ground of forum shopping it pointed out the absence
of the required certification. The amended complaint, as well
as the second and third amended complaints, attempted to
rectify the error by invariably stating that there was no other
action pending between the parties involving the same causes
of action although there was actually a forcible entry case
pending before the MTC of Quezon City. By its admission of a
pending forcible entry case, it is obvious that private
respondent was indulging in forum shopping. While private
respondent conveniently failed to inform the RTC that it had
likewise sought damages in the MTC on the basis of the same
forcible entry, the fact remains that it precisely did so, which
stratagem was being duplicated in the second case.This is a
compelling reason to dismiss the second case.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-41423 February 23, 1989
LUIS JOSEPH, petitioner
vs.
HON. CRISPIN V. BAUTISTA, PATROCINIO PEREZ,
ANTONIO SIOSON, JACINTO PAGARIGAN, ALBERTO
CARDENO and LAZARO VILLANUEVA, respondents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The
questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27
September 1995 and the Order of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City dated 24 September 1993
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City is directed to dismiss Civil Case No. Q-93-16409,
"Westin Seafood Market, Inc. v. Progressive Development
Corporation, et al.," and the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City to proceed with the proper disposition of Civil
Case No. 6589, "Westin Seafood Market, Inc. v. Progressive
Development Corporation, et al.," with dispatch considering
the summary nature of the case. Treble costs against private
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.
Jose M. Castillo for petitioner.
Arturo Z. Sioson for private respondent, Patrocinio Perez.
Cipriano B. Farrales for private respondents except P. Perez.
REGALAD0, J.:
Petitioner prays in this appeal by certiorari for the annulment
and setting aside of the order, dated July 8, 1975, dismissing
petitioner's complaint, as well as the order, dated August 22,
1975, denying his motion for reconsideration of said dismissal,
both issued by respondent Judge Crispin V. Bautista of the
former Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III.
Petitioner herein is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 50-V-73
entitled "Luis Joseph vs. Patrocinio Perez, Domingo Villa y de
Jesus, Rosario Vargas, Antonio Sioson, Lazaro Villanueva and
Jacinto Pagarigan", filed before the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, Branch III, and presided over by respondent Judge
Crispin V. Bautista; while private respondents Patrocinio
Perez, Antonio Sioson, Jacinto Pagarigan and Lazaro
Villanueva are four of the defendants in said case. Defendant
Domingo Villa y de Jesus did not answer either the original or
the amended complaint, while defendant Rosario Vargas could
not be served with summons; and respondent Alberto Cardeno
is included herein as he was impleaded by defendant
Patrocinio Perez, one of respondents herein, in her cross-
claim.
The generative facts of this case, as culled from the written
submission of the parties, are as follows:
Respondent Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a cargo truck
with Plate No. 25-2 YT Phil. '73 for conveying cargoes and
passengers for a consideration from Dagupan City to Manila.
On January 12, 1973, said cargo truck driven by defendant
Domingo Villa was on its way to Valenzuela, Bulacan from
Pangasinan. Petitioner, with a cargo of livestock, boarded the
cargo truck at Dagupan City after paying the sum of P 9.00 as
one way fare to Valenzuela, Bulacan. While said cargo truck
was negotiating the National Highway proceeding towards
Manila, defendant Domingo Villa tried to overtake a tricycle
likewise proceeding in the same direction. At about the same
time, a pick-up truck with Plate No. 45-95 B, supposedly
owned by respondents Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan,
then driven by respondent Lazaro Villanueva, tried to overtake
the cargo truck which was then in the process of overtaking
the tricycle, thereby forcing the cargo truck to veer towards the
shoulder of the road and to ram a mango tree. As a result,
petitioner sustained a bone fracture in one of his legs. 1
The following proceedings thereafter took place: 2
Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent
Patrocinio Perez, as owner of the cargo truck, based on a
breach of contract of carriage and against respondents
Antonio Sioson and Lazaro Villanueva, as owner and driver,
respectively, of the pick-up truck, based on quasi-delict.
Respondent Sioson filed his answer alleging that he is not and
never was an owner of the pick-up truck and neither would he
acquire ownership thereof in the future.
On September 24, 1973, petitioner, with prior leave of court,
filed his amended complaint impleading respondents Jacinto
Pagarigan and a certain Rosario Vargas as additional
alternative defendants. Petitioner apparently could not
ascertain who the real owner of said cargo truck was, whether
respondents Patrocinio Perez or Rosario Vargas, and who was
the real owner of said pick-up truck, whether respondents
Antonio Sioson or Jacinto Pagarigan.
Respondent Perez filed her amended answer with crossclaim
against her co-defendants for indemnity and subrogation in the
event she is ordered to pay petitioner's claim, and therein
impleaded cross-defendant Alberto Cardeno as additional
alternative defendant.
On September 27, 1974, respondents Lazaro Villanueva,
Alberto Cardeno, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan, thru
their insurer, Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, paid
petitioner's claim for injuries sustained in the amount of P
1,300.00. By reason thereof, petitioner executed a release of
claim releasing from liability the following parties, viz:
Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, Alberto Cardeno,
Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan.
On December 2, 1974, respondents Lazaro Villanueva, Alberto
Cardeno and their insurer, the Insurance Corporation of the
Philippines, paid respondent Patrocinio Perez' claim for
damages to her cargo truck in the amount of P 7,420.61.
Consequently, respondents Sioson, Pagarigan, Cardeno and
Villanueva filed a "Motion to Exonerate and Exclude Defs/
Cross defs. Alberto Cardeno, Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio
Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan on the Instant Case", alleging
that respondents Cardeno and Villanueva already paid P
7,420.61 by way of damages to respondent Perez, and
alleging further that respondents Cardeno, Villanueva, Sioson
and Pagarigan paid P 1,300.00 to petitioner by way of
amicable settlement.
Thereafter, respondent Perez filed her "Opposition to Cross-
defs.' motion dated Dec. 2, 1974 and Counter Motion" to
dismiss. The so-called counter motion to dismiss was
premised on the fact that the release of claim executed by
petitioner in favor of the other respondents inured to the
benefit of respondent Perez, considering that all the
respondents are solidarity liable to herein petitioner.
On July 8, 1975, respondent judge issued the questioned
order dismissing the case, and a motion for the
reconsideration thereof was denied. Hence, this appeal,
petitioner contending that respondent judge erred in declaring
that the release of claim executed by petitioner in favor of
respondents Sioson, Villanueva and Pagarigan inured to the
benefit of respondent Perez; ergo, it likewise erred in
dismissing the case.
We find the present recourse devoid of merit.
The argument that there are two causes of action embodied in
petitioner's complaint, hence the judgment on the compromise
agreement under the cause of action based on quasi-delict is
not a bar to the cause of action for breach of contract of
carriage, is untenable.
A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act
or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the
primary rights of the plaintiff. 3 It is true that a single act or
omission can be violative of various rights at the same time, as when
the act constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and
distinct legal obligations. However where there is only one delict or
wrong, there is but a single cause of action regardless of the number
of rights that may have been violated belonging to one person. 4
The singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of
the- delict or wrong violating the rights of one person.
Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted from several wrongful
acts, only one cause of action arises. 5 In the case at bar, there is
no question that the petitioner sustained a single injury on his
person. That vested in him a single cause of action, albeit with the
correlative rights of action against the different respondents through
the appropriate remedies allowed by law.
The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that there was
only one cause of action involved although the bases of
recovery invoked by petitioner against the defendants therein
were not necessarily Identical since the respondents were not
identically circumstanced. However, a recovery by the
petitioner under one remedy necessarily bars recovery under
the other. This, in essence, is the rationale for the proscription
in our law against double recovery for the same act or
omission which, obviously, stems from the fundamental rule
against unjust enrichment.
There is no question that the respondents herein are solidarily
liable to petitioner. On the evidence presented in the court
below, the trial court found them to be so liable. It is
undisputed that petitioner, in his amended complaint, prayed
that the trial court hold respondents jointly and severally liable.
Furthermore, the allegations in the amended complaint clearly
impleaded respondents as solidary debtors. We cannot accept
the vacuous contention of petitioner that said allegations are
intended to apply only in the event that execution be issued in
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
his favor. There is nothing in law or jurisprudence which would
countenance such a procedure.
The respondents having been found to be solidarity liable to
petitioner, the full payment made by some of the solidary
debtors and their subsequent release from any and all liability
to petitioner inevitably resulted in the extinguishment and
release from liability of the other solidary debtors, including
herein respondent Patrocinio Perez.
The claim that there was an agreement entered into between
the parties during the pre-trial conference that, after such
payment made by the other respondents, the case shall
proceed as against respondent Perez is both incredible and
unsubstantiated. There is nothing in the records to show,
either by way of a pre-trial order, minutes or a transcript of the
notes of the alleged pre-trial hearing, that there was indeed
such as agreement.
WHEREFORE, the challenged orders of the respondent judge
are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla, and
Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-66620 September 24, 1986
REMEDIO V. FLORES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE HEILIA S. MALLARE-PHILLIPPS, IGNACIO
BINONGCAL & FERNANDO CALION, respondents.
Lucio A. Dixon for respondent F. Calion.
FERIA, J.:
The Court rules that the application of the totality rule under
Section 33(l) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and Section 11 of
the Interim Rules is subject to the requirements for the
permissive joinder of parties under Section 6 of Rule 3 which
provides as follows:
Permissive joinder of parties.-All persons in
whom or against whom any right to relief in
respect to or arising out of the same transaction
or series of transactions is alleged to exist,
whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative,
may, except as otherwise provided in these
rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as
defendants in one complaint, where any
question of law or fact common to all such
plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in
the action; but the court may make such orders
as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or
defendant from being embarrassed or put to
expense in connection with any proceedings in
which he may have no interest.
Petitioner has appealed by certiorari from the order of Judge
Heilia S. Mallare-Phillipps of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City and Benguet Province which dismissed his complaint for
lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner did not attach to his petition a
copy of his complaint in the erroneous belief that the entire
original record of the case shall be transmitted to this Court
pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 39 of BP129.
This provision applies only to ordinary appeals from the
regional trial court to the Court of Appeals (Section 20 of the
Interim Rules). Appeals to this Court by petition for review on
certiorari are governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
(Section 25 of the Interim Rules).
However, the order appealed from states that the first cause of
action alleged in the complaint was against respondent Ignacio
Binongcal for refusing to pay the amount of P11,643.00
representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit
from petitioner on various occasions from August to October,
1981; and the second cause of action was against respondent
Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay the amount of
P10,212.00 representing cost of truck tires which he
purchased on credit from petitioner on several occasions from
March, 1981 to January, 1982.
On December 15, 1983, counsel for respondent Binongcal
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
since the amount of the demand against said respondent was
only P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8) of BP129 the
regional trial court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
if the amount of the demand is more than twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00). It was further averred in said motion that
although another person, Fernando Calion, was allegedly
indebted to petitioner in the amount of P10,212.00, his
obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other
respondent. At the hearing of said Motion to Dismiss, counsel
for respondent Calion joined in moving for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Counsel for
petitioner opposed the Motion to Dismiss. As above stated, the
trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner maintains that the lower court has jurisdiction over
the case following the "novel" totality rule introduced in Section
33(l) of BP129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules.
The pertinent portion of Section 33(l) of BP129 reads as
follows:
... Provided,That where there are several claims
or causes of action between the same or
different parties, embodied in the same
complaint, the amount of the demand shall be
the totality of the claims in all the causes of
action, irrespective of whether the causes of
action arose out of the same or different
transactions. ...
Section 11 of the Interim Rules provides thus:
Application of the totality rule.-In actions where
the jurisdiction of the court is dependent on the
amount involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be
the aggregate sum of all the money demands,
exclusive only of interest and costs, irrespective
of whether or not the separate claims are
owned by or due to different parties. If any
demand is for damages in a civil action, the
amount thereof must be specifically alleged.
Petitioner compares the above-quoted provisions with the
pertinent portion of the former rule under Section 88 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended which reads as follows:
... Where there are several claims or causes of
action between the same parties embodied in
the same complaint, the amount of the demand
shall be the totality of the demand in all the
causes of action, irrespective of whether the
causes of action arose out of the same or
different transactions; but where the claims or
causes of action joined in a single complaint are
separately owned by or due to different parties,
each separate claim shall furnish the
jurisdictional test. ...
and argues that with the deletion of the proviso in the former
rule, the totality rule was reduced to clarity and brevity and the
jurisdictional test is the totality of the claims in all, not in each,
of the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of
action arose out of the same or different transactions.
This argument is partly correct. There is no difference between
the former and present rules in cases where a plaintiff sues a
defendant on two or more separate causes of action. In such
cases, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the
claims in all the causes of action irrespective of whether the
causes of action arose out of the same or different
transactions. If the total demand exceeds twenty thousand
pesos, then the regional trial court has jurisdiction. Needless to
state, if the causes of action are separate and independent,
their joinder in one complaint is permissive and not mandatory,
and any cause of action where the amount of the demand is
twenty thousand pesos or less may be the subject of a
separate complaint filed with a metropolitan or municipal trial
court.
On the other hand, there is a difference between the former
and present rules in cases where two or more plaintiffs having
separate causes of action against a defendant join in a single
complaint. Under the former rule, "where the claims or causes
of action joined in a single complaint are separately owned by
or due to different parties, each separate claim shall furnish
the jurisdictional test" (Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948
as amended, supra). This was based on the ruling in the case
of Vda. de Rosario vs. Justice of the Peace, 99 Phil. 693. As
worded, the former rule applied only to cases of permissive
joinder of parties plaintiff. However, it was also applicable to
cases of permissive joinder of parties defendant, as may be
deduced from the ruling in the case of Brillo vs. Buklatan, thus:
Furthermore, the first cause of action is
composed of separate claims against several
defendants of different amounts each of which
is not more than P2,000 and falls under the
jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court
under section 88 of Republic Act No, 296. The
several claims do not seem to arise from the
same transaction or series of transactions and
there seem to be no questions of law or of fact
common to all the defendants as may warrant
their joinder under Rule 3, section 6. Therefore,
if new complaints are to be filed in the name of
the real party in interest they should be filed in
the justice of the peace court. (87 Phil. 519,
520, reiterated in Gacula vs. Martinez, 88 Phil.
142, 146)
Under the present law, the totality rule is applied also to cases
where two or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action
against a defendant join in a single complaint, as well as to
cases where a plaintiff has separate causes of action against
two or more defendants joined in a single complaint. However,
the causes of action in favor of the two or more plaintiffs or
against the two or more defendants should arise out of the
same transaction or series of transactions and there should be
a common question of law or fact, as provided in Section 6 of
Rule 3.
The difference between the former and present rules in cases
of permissive joinder of parties may be illustrated by the two
cases which were cited in the case of Vda. de Rosario vs.
Justice of the Peace (supra) as exceptions to the totality rule.
In the case of Soriano y Cia vs. Jose (86 Phil. 523), where
twenty-nine dismissed employees joined in a complaint
against the defendant to collect their respective claims, each
of which was within the jurisdiction of the municipal court
although the total exceeded the jurisdictional amount, this
Court held that under the law then the municipal court had
jurisdiction. In said case, although the plaintiffs' demands were
separate, distinct and independent of one another, their joint
suit was authorized under Section 6 of Rule 3 and each
separate claim furnished the jurisdictional test. In the case of
International Colleges, Inc. vs. Argonza (90 Phil. 470), where
twenty-five dismissed teachers jointly sued the defendant for
unpaid salaries, this Court also held that the municipal court
had jurisdiction because the amount of each claim was within,
although the total exceeded, its jurisdiction and it was a case
of permissive joinder of parties plaintiff under Section 6 of Rule
3.
Under the present law, the two cases above cited (assuming
they do not fall under the Labor Code) would be under the
jurisdiction of the regional trial court. Similarly, in the
abovecited cases of Brillo vs. Buklatan and Gacula vs.
Martinez (supra), if the separate claims against the several
defendants arose out of the same transaction or series of
transactions and there is a common question of law or fact,
they would now be under the jurisdiction of the regional trial
court.
In other words, in cases of permissive joinder of parties,
whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 of Rule
3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional
test. Needless to state also, if instead of joining or being joined
in one complaint separate actions are filed by or against the
parties, the amount demanded in each complaint shall furnish
the jurisdictional test.
In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the
jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties
pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of the
complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for
the reason that the claims against respondents Binongcal and
Calion are separate and distinct and neither of which falls
within its jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., and Paras, JJ., concur.