1

Introduction and Admission to Practice

1. Director of Religious Affairs vs Bayot

Facts: The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an
advertisement in the Sunday Tribune, reading Marriage license promptly secured thru our assistance &
the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties.
Respondent admitted the charge and promised not to repeat the misconduct. n further mitigation he
alleged that the said advertisement was published only once in the Tribune and that he never had any case
at law by reason thereof.

Issue: WON respondent has committed misconduct.

Held: Yes. It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of
the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule
127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a
trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of
mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public.

2. Ledesma vs Climaco

Facts: petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz,
Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to discharge its duties. As he was counsel
de parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to
withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him counsel de
oficio for the two defendants. Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be
allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require
full time service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from
handling adequately the defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied
said motion. A motion for reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding.

Issue: WON Petitioner can be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio after having accepted a public
office.

Held: No. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly mindful of his obligation
as counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes in the profession, being appointed
counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. For those holding such belief, it may come as a surprise that counsel
of repute and of eminence welcome such an opportunity. "It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel.
But we do say that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as one employed and
paid by defendant himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and
professional ability in behalf of the person assigned to his care. He is to render effective assistance. The
accused-defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory representation.

3. Cui vs Cui

Facts: Hospico de San Jose Barili is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and
Doa Benigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and
incapacitated and helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence by legislation and endowed with
extensive properties by the said spouses through a series of donations. On 2 July 1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui,
only son of Mauricio Cui, became the administrator. Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui
are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui. he then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in
favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between them and embodied in a notarial
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document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had
no prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the position. As between Jesus and
Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications to the position of administrator. Jesus is
the older of the two and therefore under equal circumstances would be preferred pursuant to section 2 of
the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the
one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephews therein named, that if not a lawyer, the
administrator should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these,
should be the one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. The specific point in
dispute is the mealing of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws
from the University of Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the
examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and
although disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 (administrative case No. 141), was reinstated by
resolution promulgated on 10 February 1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of
administrator of the Hospicio de Barili. The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said
that the phrase "titulo de abogado," should not be given a strict interpretation but a liberal one," and
therefore means a law degree or diploma of Bachelor of Laws.

Issue: WON a holder of a bachelors of law degree suffices as titulo de abogado

Held: No. whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado" means not mere possession of
the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto,
qualifying one for the practice of law. A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a law school upon
completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession.
The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general
signification, and has reference to that class of persons who are by license officers of the courts,
empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and
liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the
practice of law is under the authority of the Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires
passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court,
this certificate being his license to practice the profession.

4. Villegas vs Legaspi

Facts: In September 1979, Raul Villegas filed a complaint for annulment of bank checks and damages
against spouses Vera Cruz et al before the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu. The Vera Cruz spouses filed
their answer to the complaint and they were represented by Valentino Legaspi, then a member of the
Batasang Pambansa. Villegas then challenged the representation made by Legaspi as counsel for the
spouses on the ground that it is unconstitutional; as pointed out by Villegas no member of the Batasang
Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without appellate jurisdiction. The presiding judge
however overruled Villegas challenged and proceeded with the trial. The judge said that CFIs have
appellate jurisdiction.

Edgardo P. Reyes filed before the CFI against N. V. Verenigde Buinzenfabrieken Excelsior-De Maas for
annulment of sale. Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for Excelsior.
This appearance was questioned.

Issue: whether or not members of the Batasang Pambansa can appear as counsel before Courts of First
Instance.

Held: Clearly, what is prohibited to a Batasang Pambansa member is "appearance as counsel" "before any
Court without appellate jurisdiction. "appearance as counsel" is a voluntary submission to a court's
jurisdiction by a legal advocate or advising lawyer professionally engaged to represent and plead the
cause of another. "appearance as counsel" is a voluntary submission to a court's jurisdiction by a legal
advocate or advising lawyer professionally engaged to represent and plead the cause of another. By law,
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Courts of First Instance are Courts of general original jurisdiction. Since the respective Courts of First
Instance, before which Assemblymen Legaspi and Fernandez appeared as counsel, were acting in the
exercise of original and not appellate jurisdiction, they must be held barred from appearing as counsel
before said Courts in the two cases involved herein. The need for it was felt by the 1934 Constitutional
Convention, a sentiment shared by the last Constitutional Convention, because of the widespread belief
that legislators found it difficult to resist, as perhaps most men, the promptings of self-interest. Clearly, the
purpose was and is to stress the fiduciary aspect of the position. There is thus fidelity to the maxim that a
public office is a public trust.

5. Enriquez vs Gimenez

Facts: On 18 June 1955 Republic Act No. 1383 creating the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority as
a public corporation and vesting in it the ownership, jurisdiction, supervision and control over all territory
embraced by the Metropolitan Water District as well as all areas served by existing government-owned
waterworks and sewerage and drainage systems within the boundaries of cities, municipalities, and
municipal districts in the Philippines. On 19 September 1955 the President of the Philippines promulgated
Executive Order No. 127 providing, among others, for the transfer to the National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority of all the records, properties, machinery, equipment, appropriations, assets, choses in
actions, liabilities, obligations, notes, bonds and all indebtedness of all government-owned waterworks and
sewerage systems in the provinces, cities, municipalities and municipal districts. the municipal council of
Bauan, Batangas, adopted and passed Resolution No. 152 stating "that it is the desire of this municipality
in this present administration not to submit our local Waterworks to the provisions of the said Republic Act
No. 1383." The municipal mayor requested the opinion of the provincial fiscal on the matter and informed
him that he would handle and prosecute the case in court should the council should test the legality of the
act. The fiscal endered an opinion holding that Republic Act No. 1383 is valid and constitutional and
declined to represent the municipality of Bauan in an action to be brought against the National Waterworks
and Sewerage Authority. The municipality hired a special counsel who agreed on specific terms of
payment. The Auditor General disallowed in audit the petitioner's claim for initial attorney's fees based
upon an opinion rendered on 10 May 1957 by the Secretary of Justice who held that the Provincial Fiscal
was not disqualified to handle and prosecute in court the case of the municipality of Bauan and that its
municipal council had no authority to engage the services of a special counsel. The Revised Administrative
Code provides that The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal
district thereof in any courtWhen the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other
political subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be employed by its council.

Issue: WON the inhibition of the provincial fiscal is justified.

Held: No. Under the foregoing provisions of law, the Provincial Fiscal is the legal adviser of the mayor and
counsel of the various municipalities of a province and it is his duty to represent the municipality in any
court except when he is disqualified by law. When he is disqualified to represent the municipality, the
municipal council may engage the services of a special attorney. Under the foregoing provisions of law, the
Provincial Fiscal is the legal adviser of the mayor and counsel of the various municipalities of a province
and it is his duty to represent the municipality in any court except when he is disqualified by law. When he
is disqualified to represent the municipality, the municipal council may engage the services of a special
attorney.

6. Salcedo vs Diaz

Facts: Attorney Vicente Francisco, representing the petitioner-appellant, inserted alleged contemptuous
paragraph in his motion for reconsideration read as follows:

We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this court, denying our
motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the
petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of
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Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within out power in order that this error may be
corrected by the very court which has committed it, because we should not want that some citizen,
particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as
he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and because it
is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of each and every member
thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions
like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase
the proselytes of sakdalism and make the public lose confidence in the administration of justice.

The court required him to show cause, if any, why he should not be found guilty of contempt, giving him a
period of ten days for that purpose. In his answer Atty. Francisco, far from regretting having employed the
phrases contained in said paragraph in his motion, reiterated them several times contending that they did
not constitute contempt because, according to him it is not contempt to tell the truth.

Issue: WON respondent is guilty of contempt.

Held: Yes. As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any
attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not only because it
has conferred upon him the high privilege, not right It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending
the cause and rights of his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it
is not, and never will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without
the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts require. The reason for this is that respect of the
courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such guarranty, said institution would be resting
on a very shaky foundation.of being what he now is.

7. Alawi vs Alauya

Facts: Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa &
Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent
executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were classmates, and used
to be friends. Through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya
of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm. Alauya addressed a letter to the
President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company, stating that his
consent to the contract was obtained by Alawi through gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonest
and abuse of confidence. Alawi filed with the SC a complaint, accusing Alauya Causing undue injury to, and
blemishing her honor and established reputation; and usurpation of the title attorney, which only regular
members of the Philippine bar may use. Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and
established reputation.

Issue: WON Alauya has committed misconduct and WON his using of the title of attorney is justified.

Held: Yes. As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights of
others at all times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint,
courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot
be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged. As a judicial employee, it
is expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every
act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from
these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction
that he had been grievously wronged.

Persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only
practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has
been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give
counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is
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reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken
the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members
thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

8. Pangan vs Ramos

Facts: This has reference to the motion of complainant, Santa Pangan, to cite respondent Dionisio Ramos
for contempt. It appears from the record that on September 7, 1978 and March 13, 1979, the hearings in
this administrative case were postponed on the basis of respondent's motions for postponement. . Upon
verification, the attorney of record of the accused in said case is one "Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos, 306 Dona
Salud Bldg., Dasmarinas Manila." Respondent admits that he used the name of "Pedro D.D. Ramos" before
said court in connection with Criminal Case No. 35906, but avers that he had a right to do so because in
his Birth Certificate (Annex "A"), his name is "Pedro Dionisio Ramos", and -his parents are Pedro Ramos and
Carmen Dayaw, and that the D.D. in "Pedro D.D. Ramos" is but an abbreviation of "Dionisio Dayaw his
other given name and maternal surname.

Issue: WON respondent is allowed to use a name other than that appearing in the Roll of Attorneys in his
practice of law.

Held: No. The name appearing in the "Roll of Attorneys" is "Dionisio D. Ramos". The attorney's roll or
register is the official record containing the names and signatures of those who are authorized to practice
law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys in his
practice of law. The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he will do no falsehood".In
using the name of' Pedro D.D. Ramos" before the courts instead of the name by which he was authorized
to practice law - Dionisio D. Ramos - respondent in effect resorted to deception. The demonstrated lack of
candor in dealing with the courts. The circumstance that this is his first aberration in this regard precludes
Us from imposing a more severe penalty.

9. Philippine Lawyers Association vs Agrava

FACTS: This is a petition filed by the Philippine Lawyers Association for prohibition and injunction against
Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity s Director of the Philippines Patent Office. On May 23, 1957, respondent
Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the
purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the said office. Petitioner
contends that one who has passed the bar examinations, and is in good standing, is duly qualified to
practice before the Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent Director's holding an examination for
the purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law. The respondent, in reply, maintains
that the prosecution of patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but include the
application of scientific and technical knowledge and training as a matter of actual purpose so as to
include engineers and other individuals who passed the examination can practice before the Patent Office.
Furthermore, respondent contends that he has previously conducted such examinations and that this is the
first time that he is questioned formally.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not members of the bar should first take and pass an examination conducted by the
Patent Office before he would be allowed to practice law in said office;

2. Whether or not appearance before the Patent Office and the preparation of applications or patents, etc.
constitutes practice of law or is included in the practice of law; and,

3. Whether or not the Director of the Patent Office is authorized to conduct examinations for patent
attorneys.

HELD: The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines and any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law
anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines.
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Moreover, "The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation m court; it embraces
the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected
with the law incorporation sendees, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy
and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect
of facts and conditions. As such, , the practice of law includes such appear ance before the Patent Office,
the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications
for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Thus, under the
present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good
standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business
in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law
and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of
the functions of the Patent Director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders
and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court. In sum, the practice of law covers any
activity in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, principles or practice and
calls for legal knowledge, training and experience. And, only the Supreme Court has the exclusive and
constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of law

10. Ui vs Iris Bonifacio

Facts: Complainant Leslie Ui is married to Carlos L. Ui. Sometime in December 1987, however, complainant
found out that her husband, Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris
Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime in 1986, and that they had been living together at No.
527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate of the
College of Law of the University of the Philippines was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982. Carlos Ui
admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. After several attempts of Leslie to request
Bonifacio to discontinue her affairs with Carlos, the affair continued. A complaint for disbarment was filed
by Leslie before the Commission on Bar Discipline on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for
carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainants husband. In her Answer, respondent averred that
she met Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge,
however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been
estranged. She stated that during one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her
and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 1985. In her Answer,[2] respondent averred that she met
Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge, however,
that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged.
She stated that during one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her and they in
fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 1985. In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
complainant filed a Motion to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the Commission [10] wherein she charged
respondent with making false allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting document which
was altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of respondent filed before the Integrated Bar,
respondent averred, among others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and attached a
Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment. However, the Certificate of Marriage [11] duly
certified by the State Registrar as a true copyrevealed that the date of marriage between Carlos Ui and
respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent
in her Answer. the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dismissed the complaint for
gross immorality and reprimanded Atty. Bonifacio for falsifying the Marriage Certificate.

Issue: WON respondent committed gross immorality.

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Held: No. But she is reprimanded for falsifying the marriage certificate.The practice of law is a privilege. A
bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by passing the
bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a
lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar
is that an applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral
character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice,
otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. Atty. Bonifacio should have at
least aroused respondents suspicion that something was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and
moved her to ask probing questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had
children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort to find
out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Respondents act of immediately distancing herself
from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves
that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession.
Complainants bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon
the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by
clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.

On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer, we find
improbable to believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy of the Marriage
Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the
information contained in an attachment to her pleading, especially so when she has personal knowledge of
the facts and circumstances contained therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated
date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot stand.

11. Deles vs Aragona

Facts: This is a disbarment proceeding against Vicente E. Aragona, Jr. 1 upon a verified letter-complaint of
Aurora Soriano Deles filed with this Court on November 6, 19637 charging the former with having made,
under oath, false and unfounded allegations against her in a motion filed in Court of Agrarian Relations
cases 1254 and 1255 Iloilo, which allegedly caused her great mental, torture and moral suffering. On
November 13, 1963 this Court required the respondent to answer the complaint. On December 10, 1963
the respondent filed his answer, affirming the truth of the allegations in the questioned motion, but
claiming in his defense that in preparing it, he relied not only upon information received but also upon
other matters of public record. He also averred that the complainant had made a similar charge against
him in a counter-motion to declare him in contempt of court filed in the same C.A.R. case which was
however dismissed together with the complainant's counterclaims when the main cases were dismissed;
that the complainant failed to move for the reconsideration of the said dismissal or to appeal therefrom;
and that during the few years that he has been a member of the bar, he has always comforted himself
correctly, and has adhered steadfastly to his conviction that the practice of law is a sacred trust in the
interest of truth.

Issue: WON statements made by a lawyer in a motion, when they were found to be false, could be a
ground for disbarment.

Held: No. [S]tatement made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged that is,
privileged regardless of defamatory tenor and of the presence of malice if the same are relevant,
pertinent or material to the cause in hand or subject of the inquiry. And that, in view of this, the person
who makes them such as a judge, lawyer, or witness does not thereby incur the risk of being found
liable thereon in a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages. To be sure, the charges
levelled by the respondent against the complainant in the questioned pleading lack sufficient factual basis.
But even this circumstance will not strengthen the complainant's position. "The privilege is not affected by
factual or legal inaccuracies in the utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings." 4 In fact, "Even
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when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the
charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual.

12. Pasion vs Arcangel

Facts: Complainants Olegaria Blanza and Maria Pasion ask this Court to take disciplinary action against
respondent Atty. Agustin Arcangel for professional non-feasance. They complain that way back in April,
1955, respondent volunteered to help them in their respective pension claims in connection with the
deaths of their husbands, both P.C. soldiers, and for this purpose, they handed over to him the pertinent
documents and also affixed their signatures on blank papers. But subsequently, they noticed that since
then, respondent had lost interest in the progress of their claims and when they finally asked for the return
of their papers six years later, respondent refused to surrender them. Respondent admitted having
received the documents from complainants but explainer that it was for photostating purposes only. His
failure to immediately return them, he said, was due to complainants' refusal to hand him the money to
pay for the photostating costs which prevented him from withdrawing said documents from the photostat
service. Respondent admitted having received the documents from complainants but explainer that it was
for photostating purposes only. His failure to immediately return them, he said, was due to complainants'
refusal to hand him the money to pay for the photostating costs which prevented him from withdrawing
said documents from the photostat service.

Issue: WON respondent should be given disciplinary action for not returning the documents and for not
taking action on petitioners pension claims.

Held: No. Respondent's explanation for the delay in filing the claims and in returning the documents has
not been controverted by complainants. On the contrary, they admitted4 that respondent asked them to
shoulder the photostating expenses but they did not give him any money therefor. Moreover, the
documents and their photostats were actually returned by respondent during the fiscal's investigation with
him paying for the photostating costs himself. However, Respondent's explanation for the delay in filing the
claims and in returning the documents has not been controverted by complainants. On the contrary, they
admitted4 that respondent asked them to shoulder the photostating expenses but they did not give him
any money therefor. Moreover, the documents and their photostats were actually returned by respondent
during the fiscal's investigation with him paying for the photostating costs himself.

13. Zoreta vs Simpliciano

Facts: Complainant Melanio L. Zoreta alleged that on 02 August 2001, he filed before Branch 4 of the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, a complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against Security
Pacific Assurance Corporation (SPAC) dated 22 June 2001 due to the latters failure to honor SPACs
Commercial Vehicle Policy No. 94286, where respondent Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano was the
latters counsel. In said cases, respondent who was not a duly commissioned Notary Public in 2002 per
Certifications issued by the Clerk of Court of Quezon City Mercedes S. Gatmaytan, performed acts of
notarization. Respondent failed to appear and present a defense on the allegations against him before the
IBP. The Board of Governors suspended him for 3 -6 months.

Issue: WON a lawyer committed misconduct for notarizing documents after the expiration his commission.

Held: Yes. At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege
bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only during good behavior and can only be
deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be
heard has been afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, an attorneys right to
practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to
hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood that the
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purpose of suspending or disbarring him as an attorney is to remove from the profession a person whose
misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office
of attorney, and thus to protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than
to punish an attorney. It has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not
qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the
administrative offices in general. It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts
a private document into a public document making that document admissible in evidence without further
proof of authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this
reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their
duties. For such reprehensible conduct, the Court has sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the
practice of law, revocation of the notarial commission and disqualification from acting as such, and even
disbarment.

14. A-1 Financial Services Inc. vs. Valerio

Facts: On November 13, 2001, A-1 Financial Services, Inc., a financing corporation, granted the loan
application of Atty. Valerio amounting to P50,000.00. To secure the payment of the loan obligation, Atty.
Valerio issued a postdated check, However, upon presentation at the bank for payment on its maturity
date, the check was dishonored due to insufficient funds. As of the filing of the instant case, despite
repeated demands to pay her obligation, Atty. Valerio failed to pay the whole amount of her obligation. A
complaint for BP 22 was filed against respondent. A warrant of arrest was issued by the court. She was
scheduled for arraignment but did not appear. Despite several court orders and notices, respondent
refused to abide. The complainant filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Valerio before the IBP.
Respondent failed to appear and present her defense. Instead, her mother sent a letter and explained that
respondent is diagnosed with schizophrenia, thus she could not properly respond to the complaint.
However, respondent failed to affirm the truthfulness of the claim.

Issue: WON respondents deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks
constitute gross misconduct.

Held: Yes. Deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross
misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are
instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They must at all times
faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt
payment of financial obligations. Respondents repeated disobedience to court orders runs counter to the
precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility and violates the lawyers oath which imposes upon
every member of the Bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. Atty. Valerio has failed to live up
to the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
justification that respondent suffers schizophrenia is unmeritorious, considering that she failed to prove the
contents of the medical certificate or present the physician who issued it.

15. 2003 Bar Examination Bar Matter

Facts: On 22 September 2003, the day following the bar examination in Mercantile Law, Justice Jose C.
Vitug, Chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee, was apprised of a rumored leakage in the
examination on the subject. After making his own inquiries, Justice Vitug reported the matter to Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and to the other members of the Court, recommending that the bar
examination on the subject be nullified and that an investigation be conducted forthwith. On 23 September
2003, the Court adopted the recommendation of Justice Vitug, and resolved to nullify the examination in
Mercantile Law and to hold another examination. Consequently, the Court, finding merit in the petitions
not to have a re-examination, resolved to cancel the scheduled examination in Mercantile Law on 04
October 2003 and to allocate the fifteen percentage points among the seven bar examination subjects. In
 10

the same resolution, the Court further resolved to create a Committee composed of three retired members
of the Court that would conduct a thorough investigation of the incident subject of the 23 September 2003
resolution.

The investigating committee found out that the leaked test questions in Mercantile Law were the questions
which the examiner, Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos, had prepared and submitted to Justice Jose C. Vitug, as
chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee. Atty. Balgos claimed that the leaked test questions
were prepared by him on his computer. Without any doubt, the source of the leaked test questions was
Atty. Balgos computer. The culprit who stole or downloaded them from Atty. Balgos computer without the
latters knowledge and consent, and who faxed them to other persons, was Atty. Balgos legal assistant,
Attorney Danilo De Guzman, who voluntarily confessed the deed to the Investigating Committee. De
Guzman revealed that he faxed the test questions to his fraternity brods. Atty. De Guzman claims that he
was unaware that the questionnaire were bar exam question, and he thought the same were just quizzers
and faxed them to his bros informing them that they were just guide questions. Atty. Balgos contends that
he is not literate in using a computer and he was unaware that there were other people that can gain
access to it.

Issue: WON Atty. Guzman committed grave misconduct in leaking the bar exam questions and WON Atty.
Balgos was negligent

Held: Yes. He transgressed the very first canon of the lawyers Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that [a] lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for
law and legal processes.

By transmitting and distributing the stolen test questions to some members of the Beta Sigma Lambda
Fraternity, possibly for pecuniary profit and to given them undue advantage over the other examiners in
the mercantile law examination, De Guzman abetted cheating or dishonesty by his fraternity brothers in
the examination, which is violative of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, as well as Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for members of the Bar, which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conductAttorney Danilo De Guzman be DISBARRED for he had shown that he is morally unfit to continue as
a member of the legal profession, for grave dishonesty, lack of integrity, and criminal behavior. In addition,
he should make a written PUBLIC APOLOGY and pay DAMAGES to the Supreme Court for involving it in
another bar scandal, causing the cancellation of the mercantile law examination, and wreaking havoc upon
the image of this institution. ttorney Marcial O. T. Balgos should be REPRIMANDED by the Court and
likewise be required to make a written APOLOGY to the Court for the public scandal he brought upon it as a
result of his negligence and lack of due care in preparing and safeguarding his proposed test questions in
mercantile law. As the Court had to cancel the Mercantile Law examination on account of the leakage of
Attorney Balgos test questions, which comprised 82% of the bar questions in that examination, Atty. Balgos
is not entitled to receive any honorarium as examiner for that subject.

16. In re: Petition to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, Medado

Facts: Michael Medado passed the bar exam in 1979. On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorneys Oath. e was
scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date,
allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys5 given by the Bar Office when
he went home to his province for a vacation. Several years later, while rummaging through his old college
files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not
signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an
attendance record. By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was
mainly doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice.
Thus, he operated "under the mistaken belief that since he had already taken the oath, the signing of the
Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer";8 and "the matter of signing in
 11

the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten." Medado filed the
instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.

Issue: WON Medada should be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys

Held: Yes. Not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him the
ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the most serious ethical
transgressions of members of the Bar. For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral
character when he finally filed the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. It was Medado himself
who acknowledged his own lapse. Petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the
practice of law. Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held
various positions at the Laurel Law Office, Petron and PNOC. All these demonstrate Medados worth to
become a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar.1wphi1 While the practice of law is not a right but a
privilege,20 this Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals who have shown
mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession. However, his behavior of not
signing in the Roll for more than 30 years is unjustified. he moment he realized that what he had signed
was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid
justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the
Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing therein that
would have made him so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without
taking the necessary steps to complete all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law. Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise
transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

His petition to sign in the roll is granted, but was fined for his unauthorized practice of law.

17. In re: David

Facts: Respondent was suspended for bad practices in the exercise of his profession as a lawyer for a
period of five years from the November 9, 1949. The defendant admits this suspension in `his written
report filed on March 17, 1951, yet he continued to exercise the profession within the period of suspension,
November 9, 1949 to November 8, 1954.

On Feb 28 1950 the respondent file a claim in the case of Tan Tek vs Sy not as a lawyer but as an agent.
(For and in behalf of Tan Tek Sy) CFI decided in favor of Tan Tek, subsequently Atty Felix David filed a
motion for execution. In another civil case of the CFI called Malayan Saw Mill, Inc vs Tolentino, defendant
filed a brief for an order to demolish homes.

In order - says the appeal - to show That I did not Have the intention to disregard the suspension of the
Supreme Court, I did not With The Knowledge of Tan Tek Identified Sy Even myself as the attorney for the
Appelles But In Good Faith, I signed for and in Behalf of the appellee Without Designating That I am
Practicing as attorney-at-law.

ISSUE: Whether the acts of Atty Felix David is tantamount to practice of law.

HELD: Yes. Neither can he allow his name to appear in such pleading by itself or as part of firm name under
the signature of another qualified lawyer because the signature of an agent amounts to signing of a non-
qualified senator or congressman, the office of an attorney being originally an agency, and because he will,
by such act, be appearing in court or quasi-judicial or administrative body in violation of the constitutional
restriction. He cannot do indirectly what the Constitution prohibits directly.

18. PLA vs Agrava(Same as number 9)

 12

19. Cayetano vs Monsod

Facts: Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position
of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
possess required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The
1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of
a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years. After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty.
Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970) and
then proceeded to render services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant. He also
appeared for NAMFREL, worked for the underprivileged sectors and also served in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission.

Issue: Whether the respondent possesses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.

Held: Yes. Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of
service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." The contention
that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsods past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of
both rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of
COMELEC chairman.

20. De Leon vs CA

Facts: Petitioner Rodolfo de Leon filed with the RTC for sum of money against private respondents.
Respondent Estelita admitted the loan obligation. Based on Estelita's admission, petitioner filed a motion
for partial judgment against Estelita, which the trial court granted in an order. Counsel for private
respondent spouses received a copy of the partial judgment on May 21, 1996, but no appeal was taken
therefrom. Thus, petitioner filed a motion for execution of said judgment on June 6, 1996. Counsel for
private respondents was furnished a copy of the motion on the same date. As private respondents
interposed no objection, a writ of execution was correspondingly issued. After trial, final judgment was
rendered ordering private respondent Avelino Batungbacal to pay the amount of the loan. Counsel for
private respondent spouses received a copy of the decision on June 6, 1997. Avelino through counsel, filed
a notice of appeal. In a notice of appearance bearing the conformity solely of Estelita, a new counsel
appeared in collaboration with the counsel of record for the private respondents. On the same date,
Estelita through said new counsel, served a notice that she is appealing both decisions promulgated on to
the Court of Appeals. However, the trial court, in an order denied the notice of appeal filed by Estelita on
the ground that said notice was filed beyond the reglementary period to appeal. CA reversed the dismissal
and admitted the appellants brief.

Issue: WON the court erred in taking cognizance of the appeal.

Held: No. The period of appeal commenced when counsel for private respondents received a copy of the
decision dated June 2, 1997. When a party is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and
Notice of the judgment upon such counsel, therefore, was notice to the clients for all legal intents and
purposes. rivate respondents' appeal had been taken within the reglementary period since Avelino
Batungbacal had filed a notice of appeal on June 19, 1997 or 13 days from their counsel's receipt of the
 13

decision on June 6, 1997. Respondent spouses having been jointly sued under a common cause of action,
an appeal made by the husband inures to the benefit of the wife.

21. Soriano vs Dizon

Facts: Roberto Soriano alleged that respondent Atty. Dizon had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction of the latter for frustrated homicide, which involved
moral turpitude, should result in his disbarment for shooting petitioner while under the influence of liquor,
paralyzing him leaving petitioner disabled for his job as a taxi driver. In her Report and Recommendation,
Commissioner Herbosa of the IBP recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law for
having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

Issue: WON respondent should be disbarred.

Held: Yes. Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or
good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes
his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. Under
Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground
for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the
administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral character. 13 In the instant case,
respondent has been found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated homicide.
Whether the crime of homicide constitutes moral turpitude is a question of fact, but in this case, he
circumstances clearly evince the moral turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law. He
was the aggressor and shot the petitioner with treachery.

22. Metrobank vs CA

Facts: A certain Celedonio Javier bought seven (7) parcels of land owned by Eustaquio Alejandro, et al.,
with a total area of about ten (10) hectares. Properties were thereafter mortgaged by Javier with the
petitioner to secure a loan obligation. The obligors having defaulted, petitioner foreclosed the mortgages
Subsequently, Alejandro, , brought suits against Javier, et al., and included petitioner as defendant therein.
It was during the pendency of these suits that these parcels of land were sold by petitioner to its sister
corporation, Service Leasing Corporation. Private respondent, on its part, filed on August 16, 1983 a
verified motion to enter in the records of the aforesaid civil cases its charging lien, pursuant to Section 37,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the actual and current market
values of the litigated properties as its attorney's fees. Despite due notice, petitioner failed to appear and
oppose said motion, as a result of which the lower court granted the same and ordered the Register of
Deeds of Rizal to annotate the attorney's liens on the certificates of title of the parcels of land. Meanwhile,
the plaintiffs Alejandro filed a motion to dismiss their complaints therein, which motion the lower court
granted. Private respondent filed a motion to fix its attorney's fees, based on quantum meruit, which
motion precipitated an exchange of arguments between the parties. Petitioner avers that private
respondent has no enforceable attorney's charging lien in the civil cases before the court below because
the dismissal of the complaints therein were not, in the words of Section 37, Rule 138, judgments for the
payment of money or executions issued in pursuance of such judgments.

Issues: (1) whether or not private respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for
payment of its attorney's fees;

(2) whether or not a separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of such lien, and

Held: (1) No. a charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorney's fees, requires as a
condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the
main action by the attorney in favor of his client. A lawyer may enforce his right to fees by filing the
necessary petition as an incident in the main action in which his services were rendered when something is
 14

due his client in the action from which the fee is to be paid. In the case at bar, the civil cases below were
dismissed upon the initiative of the plaintiffs "in view of the full satisfaction of their claims." The dismissal
order neither provided for any money judgment nor made any monetary award to any litigant, much less
in favor of petitioner who was a defendant therein. This being so, private respondent's supposed charging
lien is, under our rules, without any legal basis. It is flawed by the fact that there is nothing to generate it
and to which it can attach in the same manner as an ordinary lien arises and attaches to real or personal
property.

(2) A petition for recovery of attorney's fees, either as a separate civil suit or as an incident in the main
action, has to be prosecuted and the allegations therein established as any other money claim. Besides, in
fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit,
the elements to be considered are generally (1) the importance of the subject matter in controversy, (2)
the extent of the services rendered, and (3) the professional standing of the lawyer. A determination of all
these factors would indispensably require nothing less than a full-blown trial where private respondent can
adduce evidence to establish its right to lawful attorney's fees and for petitioner to oppose or refute the
same.

Law advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple
rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a
greater deal of freedom from government interference, is impressed with public interest, for which it is
subject to State regulation.

23. Reyes vs Gaa

Facts: Complainant reported to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that he had been the victim of
extortion by respondent, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, who was investigating a complaint for estafa
filed by complainant's business rival. An entrapment was set up by the NBI and respondent was identified
to have been in possession of the marked money given by complainant for a supposed pay-off. Respondent
declined to give a sworn statement to explain his side of the case, invoking his right against self-
incrimination. Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) recommended that respondent be disbarred.

Issue: WON respondent should disbarred.

Held: Yes. Respondent was caught in flagrante delicto in the act of receiving the marked money from
complainant during the entrapment conducted by the NBI agents, which resulted in his arrest and the
subsequent filing of administrative and criminal cases against him. In his defense, respondent merely
denied the charge of extortion and retorted that the marked money was planted by complainant. When the
integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he
must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains
that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him. The extortion committed by
respondent constitutes misconduct as a public official, which also constitutes a violation of his oath as a
lawyer. The lawyer's oath imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The
lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or
other disciplinary action.

24. Ting- Dumali vs. Torres

Facts: In a Complaint-Affidavit 1 filed on 22 October 1999 with this Court, complainant Isidra Ting-Dumali
charges respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres with presentation of false testimony; participation in, consent
to, and failure to advise against, the forgery of complainant's signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement; and gross misrepresentation in court for the purpose of profiting from such forgery, thereby
violating his oath as a lawyer and the canons of legal and judicial ethics. Respondent contends that he
cannot be faulted by the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involving
 15

Lot 1603 because he had no part in the execution of the document. All the while he believed in good faith
that the Ting sisters had already agreed on how to dispose of the said lot. If ever complainant's signature
was affixed on that document, it was done in good faith.

Issue: WON respondent should be disbarred.

Held: Yes. The respondent has sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally and legally unfit to remain in
the exclusive and honorable fraternity of the legal profession. In his long years as a lawyer, he must have
forgotten his oath as a lawyer. Respondent concealed the fact that there were other compulsory heirs to
the estate of the deceased, which he knows as he is the brother-in-law of the complainant. Respondent
was also consulted regarding the falsification of complainant's signature in the Extrajudicial Settlement.
Such act of counterfeiting the complainant's signature to make it appear that the complainant had
participated in the execution of that document is tantamount to falsification of a public document.

Respondent did not advise his wife and his sisters-in-law from doing acts which are contrary to law. The
Code of Professional Responsibility underscores the primacy of such duty by providing as its canon that a
lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal
processes. In addition, respondent allowed Marcelina to commit a crime by giving false testimony 24 in
court, and he never corrected the same despite full knowledge of the true facts and circumstances of the
case. a lawyer owes candor, fairness, and good faith to the court. He shall "not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice."
This Rule was clearly and openly violated by the respondent when he permitted Marcelina to falsely testify
that she had no siblings aside from Felicisima and when he offered such testimony in the petition for
reconstitution of the title. Respondent's acts or omissions reveal his moral flaws and doubtless bring
intolerable dishonor to the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct for which is a ground for
disbarment.

25. People vs Tuanda

Facts: respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry for sale on a
commission basis, with the condition that the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and return
the unsold items to Ms. Marquez. Respondent, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry issued 3
checks. All three (3) checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of
funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, respondent made no arrangements with the bank
concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms.
Marquez. On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the
trial court but, in addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law. Respondent claimed
that, she had not violated her oath as a member of the Philippine Bar upon the ground that when she
issued the checks which bounced, she did not intend to cause damage to complainant Ms. Marquez.

Issue: WON respondents suspension from the bar was proper.

Held: YES. Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest
and public order. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty
involved moral turpitude. We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import
deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which
she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not
(as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a
lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such
offense.

26. In re: Elmo S. Abad

 16

Facts: Charged by Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., president of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., of
practicing law without having been previously admitted to the Philippine Bar, Mr. Elmo S. Abad could not
deny and had to admit the practice. He gave the explanation that he was the Chief Justice wanted to talk
to him the day he was about to take the lawyers oath which is why he failed to do so and that he failed
the required dues to the IBP.

Issue: WON Elmo Abad can practice without taking the lawyers oath.

Held: No. Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances which he has narrated do not constitute
his admission to the Philippine Bar and the right to practice law thereafter. He should know that two
essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be
administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.

27. Aguirre vs Rana

Facts: Respondent Edwin L. Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. one day
before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar,
complainant Donna Marie Aguirre ("complainant") filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of
Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave
misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation. The Court allowed respondent to take his oath
as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International
Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending
the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyer's oath on the scheduled date
but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a
lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate, George Bunan, in the May 2001 elections before the
Municipal Board of Election Canvassers of Mandaon, Masbate. In his Comment, respondent admits that
Bunan sought his "specific assistance" to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that "he
decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law." Respondent
admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing.
He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an "attorney"
in the pleading. Complainant also alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao filed a petition for
proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this
petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance
on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the
government. OBC recommends respondents denial of admission to the bar.

Issue: WON can practice law without taking his oath as a lawyer.

Held: No. Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings
before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge
of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself "counsel" knowing fully well that he was not a
member of the Bar. Having held himself out as "counsel" knowing that he had no authority to practice law,
respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law. 8 Respondent should know that two essential requisites for
becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court
and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.
 17

28. In re: Atty. Marcial Edillion

Facts: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. On
November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors recommended to the Court
the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. The authority of
the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's
name from the Roll of Attorneys and obligation to pay IBP dues are found in the IBP By-laws and Rule of
Court 139-A. The core of the respondent's arguments is that said provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as
a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-
Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

Issue: WON the obligatory membership and payment of dues to the IBP is tantamount to deprivation of
rights, liberty and property guaranteed by the Constitution and the freedom not to associate.

Held: No. Respondent is hereby disbarred. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to
vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual
dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared
by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers. It is also quite apparent that
the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure. It is a valid exercise of police power.

The Court has the constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar. The practice of law is not a property right but a
mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance
with the lawyer s public responsibilities. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the
matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and
supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities,
and the authorities holding such are legion.