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Seminar on War Economy in Mogadishu

Opening Speech by Abdurahman M. Abdullahi

Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Mogadishu University
abdurahmanba@yahoo.com
03/05/2007, Oslo, Norway

Jeg onsker dere alle velkommen til dette seminaret!!!

Bismi Allah Al-rahman Al-rahiim!!!
Assalaamu aleykum wa raxmatu Allah!!!

On behalf of Mogadishu University, let me first express our gratitude to

the government of Norway in supporting this research project. Special
thank goes to Mogadishu University research team coordinator
Professor Yahya Haji Ibrahim, the dean of the faculty of economics and
management and his colleague Dr. Stig Hansen from Norway. This
research was conducted in a very dangerous environment where
security concerns were the priority of the research team. Let me also
thank all of you for your keen interest in Somalia. The research team
will present their findings in the war economy in Mogadishu. My role
will be limited to give short background on the current situation of
Somalia.

As you are aware, Somalia is a classical example of a collapsed state.

Since 1991 it has been without an efficient government and remains
one of the hot spots in the world news of conflicts, civil wars and
human suffering. Somali ethnic being part of four horn of African
states, namely Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya, it is natural and
inevitable that any major conflict and crisis occurring in Somalia
proliferates to the other three countries and vice versa. On other
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hand, Somalia belongs to both African Union and Arab League and both
regional blocks mostly pull Somali issue into different directions.
Moreover, Europeans represented by the former colony of Italy and UK
are not always in agreement with the US hegemonic and unilateral
policies in Somalia. Therefore, Somali conflict is so complex that
involves not only divided Somalis but also many divided regional and
international actors. Not aware of that complexity, many people,
particularly, the Somalis are upset why homogeneous Somalis so much
united in their common language, religion and aspirations fail to
reconcile and reconstitute their collapsed state.

Because of that complexity, successive regional attempts in

reconstituting Somali state in the last two decades in holding
numerous reconciliation conferences failed to solve the conflict.
Approaches used in these process were swinging from the warlord
driven (1991-1999) to the civil society driven (2000) in Djibouti and to
the warlord dominated (2003) in Kenya. Almost, three years have
passed since current transitional government was formed;
nevertheless, the TFG remains dysfunctional and Somali people
continue to be divided not only politically and socially, but also in the
interpretation of the Islam and its role in the state.

Historically, two major internal conflicts and rebellions against the

Somali state had been observed: rebellion based on clan sentiment
and rebellion in the name of Islam. Evidently, since the collapse of the
state in 1991, most people resorted to take refuge and solace in Islam
and protection from their clans. Consequently, Islam and clan
developed into undisputed position in the society that should be
reckoned and respected in any power configuration in Somalia. In
understanding Somali debacle, it is important to look into state-society
relations. Let me briefly comment into those relations.
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1. Clans vs. the State: Conflict and accommodation

Clans began their armed rebellion during socialist regime when some
clans had dissented power sharing modality among different clans. In
the course of the Somali history, the state was consistently striving to
suppress clan sentiments through variety of legislations and harsh
policies. Yet, policies and approaches used during military regime had
nurtured clan polarization and radicalization. As a result, clan based
factions were formed one after another as follows: Somali Salvation
Democratic Front (SSDF) in 1978, Somali National Movement (SNM) in
1981, United Somali Congress (USC) in 1986, and United Somali
Patriotic (USP) in 1989. These armed factions has gradually weakened
the Somali state and finally succeeded to topple the regime and the
state in 1991. In the absence of the national state, armed factions
disagreed on the modality for transitional political arrangement. In the
southern regions, Somalia remained in turmoil and as fiefdoms in the
hands of different warlords. On other hand, Somaliland and Puntland,
succeeded to abolish armed factions and established peaceful and
thriving administrations on the basis of clan based power sharing. This
change of paradigm and official recognition of the role of clan leaders
in the state formation has saved these communities.

After 10 years of more that 11 failed reconciliation conferences

participated by the leaders of the armed clan militia in the south, new
approach was set into motion in the Djibouti Peace initiative in 2000.
This conference had adopted clan based power sharing formula based
on 4.5. This quota offers equal shares to the four big clans, namely,
Darood, Hawiye, Dir and Digil & Mirifle. It also gives association of all
other minority clans half of the quota. In this conference, clan factor
was recognized, accepted and affirmed in the Transitional National
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Charter. This was a sealing victory of tradition against modernity so

much advocated by the Somali nationalist movement.

2. Islam vs. the State: conflict and marginalization

Although Islam is the religion of the Somalis, however, its role in the
modern Somali state was peripheral. As a result, Islamic movements
were formed to express such grievances. With the collapse of the
state, two major politically motivated organizations appeared to the
scene, namely, Al-Islah and Al-Ittihad. These organizations were
established and operating underground since 1970s and played a
major role in preaching and advocating the application of Islamic
principles in all aspects of life in Somalia. Evidently, these
organizations took different approaches in dealing with the Somali
society. Al-Islah holds the ideology and approaches similar to the
Egyptian Muslim brotherhood that aims to reform Muslim societies in
promoting Islamic values and principles in evolutionary way. It is non-
violent organization focussing on long term projects and
developmental programs like education, training, health and
reconciliation in order to propagate Islamic values and principles. On
the other hand, Al-Ittihad is a neo-Salafiya movement ideologically
affiliated to the global Salafiya. Their methodology and approaches
puts them in conflict with the traditional Sufis widespread in Somalia.
Moreover, their peaceful programs of 1980s developed into militant in
1990s and as a result, they entered into armed confrontations with
different clan militias in 1990s.

During Somali Reconciliation Conference in Djibouti in 2000, Islam was

given due consideration and Islamic organizations actively participated
in the conference. However, during IGAD sponsored Somali
Reconciliation Conference in Kenya in 2003, Islamic organizations were
fully marginalized and the warlord–dominated conference was
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concluded. Moreover, with the US support, the warlords in Mogadishu

organized an alliance to eliminate Islamist elements considered by US
to be part of global networks of terrorists. This action had provoked
unprecedented upsurge of Islamic sentiment led by the Union of the
Islamic Courts (UIC). Consequently, political environment of Somalia
had totally changed with the victory of UIC over the warlords and their
uncontested power in Mogadishu and most regions in the southern
Somalia. After two meetings in Khartoum between the TFG and UIC, it
was clear that both sides were not ready to conclude a deal and the
conflict escalated into a total war.

The initial confrontation between the warlords and UIC in Mogadishu

could be considered as a popular uprising and legitimate defence
under Islamic banner against old clan based armed groups fulfilling US
agenda. Nonetheless, UIC’s rapid advances to other regions, their plan
to destroy the TNG in Baidoa, their uncompromising position in the
reconciliation conferences gave them an image as new political faction
based on Islam. It could be said that if clan based armed factions
destroyed Somali state in 1991, Islam based faction was following the
same line to destroy the TFG in Baidoa. Evidently, Islam and clan
sentiments as the basics of Somaliness, if they are aroused, are
capable of destroying the Somali state. It was so in 1991 and the
same scenario repeats itself in 2006. The major difference between
1991 and 2006 with respect for Somali state is the change that
occurred in the world after 9/11. And because of that change, Ethiopia
and US intervened militarily and defeated forces of the UIC and
propped up the weak TFG. As you all know, this fight has reached its
peak in the recent bloody war in Mogadishu that was so much
devastating in terms of human lives lost and properties destroyed.
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External actors like the US, IGAD countries particularly Ethiopia and
Eritrea, Arab League in particular Egypt and Yemen and other
international community are involved in this conflict. They are divided
on how to deal with the complex Somali situation. US and Ethiopia
advocate that the fighting is part of the global war on terrorism and
both countries cooperate to deal with it militarily. They also mobilize
other African states to participate in the pacification of Somalia. On
other hand, Eritrea and other actors support insurgents, remnants of
UIC and other oppositions. Unfortunately, Somali people who had
suffered greatly from the cold war and civil war are becoming a gain a
victim of the proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea and US global war
on terrorism.

3. Conclusion
Military defeat of UIC does not mean that the core ideology that
motivated them and their supporters will easily dissipate and fade
away. Also, it does not means that protracted Somali debacle will be
solved once for all. The biggest challenges in solving Somali conflict
are: (1) the low capacity of the current transitional institutions, (2)
proliferation of weapons, (3) anarchists who are opposing any system
of governance and (4) interventions of the regional and international
actors. Eventually, this conflict will persist until all political groups are
disarmed and accept to participate in the political process through
peaceful and democratic means. Classification of Somali citizens into
“good and bad Muslims” advocated by some Islamic circles and
relinquishing Islam into the periphery espoused by secular elites and
supported by the external actors will not contribute to restoring peace
in Somalia and the Horn of Africa. Therefore, there is a need for a
comprehensive and inclusive approach that offers all Somalis an
opportunity to reinvent their system of governance and to
accommodate all groups within that system. For that reason, it
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becomes important to have a genuine peace conference participated

by all stakeholders where, among other issues, the roles of clans and
Islam in the state is debated and agreed. Moreover, any success of the
future Somali state depends on the skilful reconciliation of nationalism
and Islam on one hand and accommodating clan attachments on the
other.

This research project, financed by Norwegian government and

conducted by Mogadishu University and Bath University in UK, provides
better understanding of Mogadishu business community and their role
in peace and war. This study is very important because business
group’s economic power has been contributing much in opposing or
supporting different political projects in Mogadishu in the last two
decades. It also provides insights of the resilience of Somali community
in dealing with the harsh environment of civil war. Let us give the
stage to prof. Yahya and Dr. Hansen to share with us their findings.