Consult India CP

1nc
Text: The United States federal government should enter into
binding consultation with the Republic of India and propose
that it should [the plan]. The United States federal government
should abide by the results of consultation.
Consultation on economic and diplomatic engagement bolsters
US-India cooperation
Curtis 8 [Lisa Curtis, senior research fellow on South Asia in The Heritage
Foundations Asian Studies Center, 11/25/08, U.S.-India Relations: The China
Factor, The Heritage Foundation,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/11/us-india-relations-the-china-
factor, schauer]
The U.S. should: Continue to build strong, strategic ties to India by encouraging
India to play a more active political and economic role in the region. To help India fulfill that role,
Washington should continue to seek a robust military-to-military relationship with New Delhi and enhance defense trade ties.
Washington should also develop an Asian dialogue with India to discuss developments in

the broader Asia region more formally and regularly . Encourage India's permanent involvement in
values-based strategic initiatives like the U.S.-Japan-Australia trilateral dialogue. Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had proposed that Japan,
India, Australia, and the U.S. formalize a four-way strategic dialogue. The new government in Canberra led by Kevin Rudd, however, has since backed
away from the initiative. Washington should convince Canberra of the benefits of reviving and elevating a quadrilateral forum focused on promoting
democracy, counterterrorism, and economic freedom and development in Asia. In the meantime, Washington should continue to build the bilateral com-
ponents of such a grouping--U.S.-Japan, U.S.- India, and U.S.-Australia relations--and work on a meaningful trilateral agenda among the U.S., Japan, and
Australia that can accommodate additional partners down the road. The U.S. can also pursue U.S.-Japan-India trilateral initiatives, especially in the areas
of energy and maritime cooperation, and through the institution of regular dialogue on Asian security issues. Indian- Japanese relations have been
strengthening in recent years, as demonstrated by Prime Minister Singh's late October visit to Japan, where he signed a joint declaration on security
cooperation and accepted a $4 billion Japanese loan commitment for infrastructure projects in India. The security agreement was the third such pact Japan

has ever signed, including one with the U.S. and one with Australia. Collaborate more closely with India on initia-
tives that strengthen economic development and democratic trends in the
region and work with India to counter any Chinese moves that could potentially undermine such trends in order to ensure the peaceful, democratic
development of South Asia and Southeast Asia. This will require close coordination on developments in both South and Southeast Asia and

increasing mutual confidence between India and the U.S. on each other's
strategic intentions in the region. The U.S. should, for example, encourage India's role in helping Afghanistan develop
into a stable democracy by encouraging Indian assistance for strengthening democratic institutions in Afghanistan, deepening U.S.- Indian exchanges on
developments in Afghanistan, and ensuring that India has a role in any regional efforts to stabilize the country. Help India strengthen its cooperative activi-
ties with the International Energy Agency to coordinate response mechanisms in the event of an oil emergency. The U.S. has a major stake in how India
copes with its increasing energy demand and how it pursues competition with China for energy resources. The U.S. should work closely with India as it
develops its strategic oil reserves to ensure that the major energy-consuming countries are prepared to cooperate to resolve any potential global energy
crises. Avoid any potential India-China military conflict over unresolved border issues given the U.S. interest in ensuring stability in the region. Washington
should watch their ongoing border talks closely without trying to mediate. The two sides are unlikely to reach any breakthroughs in their discussions in the
near future, but Washington should remain watchful for any signs that tensions are ratcheting upward.

India would say yes they want increased economic and

diplomatic engagement
Office of the Press Secretary 15 [U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for the
Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, 1/25/15, White House.gov,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/25/us-india-joint-strategic-
vision-asia-pacific-and-indian-ocean-region, schauer]
We will also work together to promote the shared values that have made our countries great,
recognizing that our interests in peace, prosperity and stability are well served by our common commitment to the Universal
 We commit to strengthening the East Asia Summit on its tenth
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).

anniversary to promote regional dialogue on key political and security issues, and to

work together to strengthen it. In order to achieve this regional vision, we will develop a roadmap that
leverages our respective efforts to increase ties among Asian powers,
enabling both our nations to better respond to diplomatic, economic and
security challenges in the region .

But, lack of active dialogue freezes out India and strains

relations
Madan 15 (Tanvi Madan; fellow in the Project on International Order and
Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution;
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/01/20-us-india-relationship-and-
china-madan; 1-20-15; 6-22-16)
The Peoples Republic of China has shaped the U.S.-India relationship since it came
into existence in 1949. Fifty five years ago, for example, a senator from Massachusetts argued that there was a
struggle between India and China for the economic and political leadership of the
East, for the respect of all Asia, for the opportunity to demonstrate whose way of life is the better. He asserted that it was crucial that
the U.S. help India win that contest with China . A few months later, that senator would be elected president. The
man he defeated, Richard Nixon, had earlier also highlighted the importance of the U.S. helping India to

succeed in the competition between the two great peoples in Asia. This objective was made
explicit in Eisenhower and Kennedy administration documents, which stated that it was in American national interest to strengthen Indiaeven if that
country wasnt always on the same page as the U.S. Today, both India and the U.S. have relationships with China that have elements of cooperation,
competition and, potentially, conflictthough in different degrees. Each country has a blended approach of engaging China, while preparing for a turn for

the worse in Chinese behavior.Each sees a role for the other in its China strategy . Each
thinks a good relationship with the other sends a signal to China , but neither wants
to provoke Beijing or be forced to choose between the other and China. Each also
recognizes that Chinaespecially uncertainty about its behavioris partly what is driving the India-U.S. partnership. Arguably , there have

been three imperatives in the U.S. for a more robust relationship with India and for
supporting its rise: strategic interest, especially in the context of the rise of China; economic interest; and
shared democratic values. Indian policymakers recognize that American concerns about the nature of Chinas rise are responsible for
some of the interest in India. New Delhis own China strategy involves strengthening India both security-wise and economically (internal balancing) and
for the U.S. in both. Some Indian policymakers highlight another
building a range of partnerships (external balancing)and it envisions a key role

India and the U.S. also have

benefit of the U.S. relationship: Beijing takes Delhi more seriously because Washington does. But

concerns about the other when it comes to China . Both sides remain uncertain
about the others willingness and capacity to play a role in the Asia-Pacific. Additionally,
Indian policymakers worry both about a China-U.S. condominium (or G-2) and a China-U.S. crisis or conflict. There is concern about

the reliability of the U.S., with the sense that the U.S. will end up choosing China
because of the more interdependent Sino-American economic relationship and/or
leave India in the lurch. Some in the U.S. also have reliability concerns about India. They question whether the quest for strategic
autonomy will allow India to develop a truly strategic partnership with the U.S. There are also worries about the gap between Indian potential and
performance. Part of the rationale for supporting Indias rise is to help demonstrate that democracy and development arent mutually exclusive. Without
delivery, however, this rationaleand Indias importancefades away. As things stand, neither India nor the U.S. is interested in the others relationship

with China being too hot or too coldthe Goldilocks view . For New Delhi, a too-cosy Sino-U.S. relationship is
seen as freezing India out and impinging on its interests . It would also
eliminate one of Washingtons rationales for a stronger relationship with India . A China-
U.S. crisis or conflict, on the other hand, is seen as potentially destabilizing the region and forcing India to choose between the two countries. From the
U.S. perspective, any deterioration in Sino-Indian relations might create instability in the region and perhaps force it to choose sides. Too much Sino-Indian
bonhomie, on the other hand, would potentially create complications for the U.S. in the bilateral, regional and multilateral spheres. However, both India
and the U.S. do share an interest in managing Chinas rise. Neither would like to see what some have outlined as President Xi Jinpings vision of Asia, with
a dominant China and the U.S. playing a minimal role. India and the U.S. recognize that China will play a crucial role in Asiait is the nature of that role
that concerns both countries. Their anxiety has been more evident since 2009, leading the two sides to discuss Chinaand the Asia-Pacific broadlymore
willingly. They have an East Asia dialogue in place. There is also a trilateral dialogue with Japan and talk of upgrading it to ministerial level and including
Japan on a more regular basis in India-U.S maritime exercises. The Obama administration has also repeatedly stated that it sees India as part of its
rebalance strategy. In November 2014, President Obama, speaking in Australia, stressed that the U.S. support[ed] a greater role in the Asia Pacific for
India. The Modi government, in turn, has made the region a foreign policy priority. Prime Minister Modi has implicitly criticized Chinese behavior in the
region (and potentially in the Indian Ocean), with his admonition about countries with expansionist mindsets that encroach on others lands and seas. In
a departure from its predecessor, his government has shown a willingness to express its support for freedom of navigation in the South China Sea in joint
statements with Vietnam and the U.S. In an op-ed, the prime minister also stated that the India-U.S. partnership will be of great value in advancing
peace, security and stability in the Asia and Pacific regions and, in September, President Obama and he reaffirm[ed] their shared interest in preserving
regional peace and stability, which are critical to the Asia Pacific region's continued prosperity. Recommendations India and the U.S. should continue to
strengthen their broader relationship (and each other); this will, in and of itself, shape Chinas perception and options. But they should also continue to
The two countries should
engage with Beijingthis can benefit all three countries and demonstrate the advantages of cooperation.

continue their consultations on China . The need to balance the imperatives

of signaling Beijing, while not provoking it might mean that publicly India and the
U.S. continue to couch these official discussions in terms of the Asia-Pacific (or sometimes
the Indo-Pacific), but privately the dialogue needs to be more explicit. Both countries regional strategies arent all about China, but it features significantly

This dialogue should be consistent and not contingent

a fact that needs to be acknowledged.

on Chinese behavior during a given quarter . It should perhaps include contingency planning. It might also
be worth expanding or upgrading this dialogue beyond the foreign policy
bureaucracies. In addition, there should be consideration of bringing in other like-minded countries, like Australia and Japan. Furthermore, the
two countries can also consult on the sidelines ofor prior toregional summits. The U.S. should continue to support the development of Indias
relationships with its allies and countries in Southeast Asia. But while nudging and, to some extent participating in, the development of these ties,
Washington should let them take shape organically. Relationships driven byand seen as driven byDelhi and Tokyo or Delhi and Canberra will be far
more sustainable over the long term rather than partnerships perceived as driven by the U.S. New Delhi, in turn, has to show that it can walk the talk
and follow through on its Act East policydeepening both strategic and economic cooperation with the region. It will also need to move beyond its
traditional aversion to all external powers activity in South Asia and consider working with the U.S. on shaping the strategic and economic options
available to Indias neighbors (whose relations with China have expanded). There can be learning about China, including its domestic dynamics and
actors, as well as perceptions and policies about it in the other countryand not just on the part of the governments. To the extent that competitive
instincts will allow, the American and Indian private sectors, for example, can discuss doing business in China, perhaps learning from each others
experiences. Or they can do this in the context of a Track-II India-U.S. dialogue about China that involves other stakeholders. There should also be
consideration of an official China-India-U.S. trilateral dialogue, which could serve at least two purposes: provide a platform to discuss issues of common
concern and show Beijing that India and the U.S. arent interested in excluding it if it is willing to be part of the solution. It can also help allay Indian
concerns about being left out of a new kind of major power relationship between the other two countries.

Relations key to check nuke terror

Joshi et al 13 [Sunjoy Joshi, C. Raja Mohan, Vikram Sood, Rajeswari Pillai
Rajagopalan, Ph.D., James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Walter Lohman, Lisa Curtis and
Derek Scissors, Ph.D., 4/26/13, Beyond the Plateau in U.S. India Relations, The
Heritage Foundation, Special Report #132 on Alliances, Arms Control and
Nonproliferation, Economic Freedom, National Security and Defense, Terrorism,
Trade, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/beyond-the-plateau-in-us-
india-relations, schauer]
Nuclear Terrorism. One promising area for expanded U.S.India cooperation is the

prevention of nuclear terrorism . Given the level of terrorist activity in the region
and India's vulnerability to Pakistan-based and state-supported terrorism, as well as the
question of the safety of Pakistan's nuclear assets , there is strong concern in New Delhi
about the possibility of nuclear terrorism. Furthermore, New Delhi is concerned about partial state support to terrorist
groups that might be interested in gaining access to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. The vulnerability of Pakistan's nuclear

arsenal is a growing concern, especially given the number of Pakistani Taliban

attacks on Pakistan's military facilities. A few years ago, the U.S. had put in place contingency plans for the recovery of
Pakistan's nuclear weapons in the event of a crisis of governance or, worse, an extremist takeover of the country. India and the U.S.

must institute measures that would ensure that nuclear weapons are in
responsible hands. Helping to strengthen Pakistan's command-and-control
structure is an important task. In the unlikely event of a Taliban takeover, India and the U.S. would have
to work with both the civilian and military institutions to gain complete control of
the weapons, failing which, India and the U.S. would have to physically take control
of the weapons and neutralize them . With the U.S. set to draw down forces in
Afghanistan, India's concerns about the potential for nuclear terrorism in
the region will only grow . The U.S., and India to a lesser extent, are also concerned about
the possibility that Iran might transfer its emerging nuclear capabilities to terrorist
groups, such as Hezbollah. There is strong potential for India and the U.S. to increase their
cooperation to deal with this common threat, including establishing certain contingency measures in the event of a
catastrophic development, as well as preparing means to secure vulnerable nuclear facilities.

Causes extinction
Dvorkin 12 [Vladimir Z. Dvorkin 12 Major General (retired), doctor of technical
sciences, professor, and senior fellow at the Center for International Security of the
Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of
Sciences. The Center participates in the working group of the U.S.-Russia Initiative
to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, 9/21/12, "What Can Destroy Strategic Stability:
Nuclear Terrorism is a Real Threat,"
belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22333/what_can_destroy_strategic_stability
.html]
Hundreds of scientific papers and reports have been published on nuclear terrorism. International conferences have
been held on this threat with participation of Russian organizations, including IMEMO and the Institute of U.S. and
Canadian Studies. Recommendations on how to combat the threat have been issued by the International
Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs,
Russian-American Elbe Group, and other organizations. The UN General Assembly adopted the International
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2005 and cooperation among intelligence services of
leading states in this sphere is developing. At the same time, these efforts fall short for a number of
reasons, partly because various acts of nuclear terrorism are possible. Dispersal of
radioactive material by detonation of conventional explosives (dirty bombs) is a
method that is most accessible for terrorists. With the wide spread of radioactive
sources, raw materials for such attacks have become much more accessible than
weapons-useable nuclear material or nuclear weapons. The use of dirty bombs will
not cause many immediate casualties, but it will result into long-term radioactive contamination,
contributing to the spread of panic and socio-economic destabilization . Severe
consequences can be caused by sabotaging nuclear power plants,
research reactors, and radioactive materials storage facilities. Large cities
are especially vulnerable to such attacks. A large city may host dozens of
research reactors with a nuclear power plant or a couple of spent nuclear
fuel storage facilities and dozens of large radioactive materials storage
facilities located nearby. The past few years have seen significant efforts made to enhance
organizational and physical aspects of security at facilities, especially at nuclear power plants. Efforts have
also been made to improve security culture. But these efforts do not preclude the
possibility that well-trained terrorists may be able to penetrate nuclear
facilities . Some estimates show that sabotage of a research reactor in a
metropolis may expose hundreds of thousands to high doses of radiation. A
formidable part of the city would become uninhabitable for a long time . Of all the
scenarios, it is building an improvised nuclear device by terrorists that poses the
maximum risk. There are no engineering problems that cannot be solved if
terrorists decide to build a simple gun-type nuclear device. Information on
the design of such devices, as well as implosion-type devices, is available in the
public domain. It is the acquisition of weapons-grade uranium that presents the sole serious obstacle. Despite
numerous preventive measures taken, we cannot rule out the possibility that such materials can be
bought on the black market. Theft of weapons-grade uranium is also
possible . Research reactor fuel is considered to be particularly vulnerable to theft,
as it is scattered at sites in dozens of countries. There are about 100 research
reactors in the world that run on weapons-grade uranium fuel, according to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). A terrorist gun-type uranium bomb
can have a yield of least 10-15 kt, which is comparable to the yield of the
bomb dropped on Hiroshima . The explosion of such a bomb in a modern
metropolis can kill and wound hundreds of thousands and cause serious economic
damage. There will also be long-term sociopsychological and political consequences.
The vast majority of states have introduced unprecedented security and surveillance
measures at transportation and other large-scale public facilities after the terrorist
attacks in the United States, Great Britain, Italy, and other countries. These measures have proved
burdensome for the countries populations, but the public has accepted them as necessary . A nuclear terrorist attack
will make the public accept further measures meant to enhance control even if these measures significantly restrict the democratic
liberties they are accustomed to. Authoritarian states could be expected to adopt even more restrictive measures. If a nuclear
terrorist act occurs, nations will delegate tens of thousands of their secret services best personnel to investigate and attribute the
attack. Radical Islamist groups are among those capable of such an act. We can imagine what would happen if they do so, given the
anti-Muslim sentiments and resentment that conventional terrorist attacks by Islamists have generated in developed democratic
such an attack in what
countries. Mass deportation of the non-indigenous population and severe sanctions would follow
will cause violent protests in the Muslim world. Series of armed clashing
terrorist attacks may follow. The prediction that Samuel Huntington has made in
his book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order may come
true. Huntingtons book clearly demonstrates that it is not Islamic extremists that are the cause of the Western
worlds problems. Rather there is a deep, intractable conflict that is rooted in the fault lines that run between Islam
This is especially dangerous for Russia because these fault lines run
and Christianity.
across its territory. To sum it up, the political leadership of Russia has every reason to revise its list of factors
that could undermine strategic stability. BMD does not deserve to be even last on that list because its effectiveness
in repelling massive missile strikes will be extremely low. BMD systems can prove useful only if deployed to defend
against launches of individual ballistic missiles or groups of such missiles. Prioritization of other destabilizing factors
that could affect global and regional stabilitymerits a separate study or studies. But even without them I can
conclude that nuclear terrorism should be placed on top of the list. The threat of nuclear
terrorism is real, and a successful nuclear terrorist attack would lead to a
radical transformation of the global order . All of the threats on the revised list must
become a subject of thorough studies by experts. States need to work hard to forge a common understanding of
these threats and develop a strategy to combat them.
2nc counterplan
 solvency
Lack of consultation over China empirically chills relations
Joshi et al 13 [Sunjoy Joshi, C. Raja Mohan, Vikram Sood, Rajeswari Pillai
Rajagopalan, Ph.D., James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Walter Lohman, Lisa Curtis and
Derek Scissors, Ph.D., 4/26/13, Beyond the Plateau in U.S. India Relations, The
Heritage Foundation, Special Report #132 on Alliances, Arms Control and
Nonproliferation, Economic Freedom, National Security and Defense, Terrorism,
Trade, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/beyond-the-plateau-in-us-
india-relations, schauer]
Third, there have been genuine policy missteps in both New Delhi and Washington with unintended

negative consequences for the bilateral relationship. The first year of the Obama
Administration saw the United States try to construct stronger relations with Pakistan and
China without reference to India's sensitivities and interests . The assumption in
Washington that the road to peace in Afghanistan demanded Indian political concessions to Pakistan raised genuine concerns in New Delhi that President
Obama's attempt to
Obama was abandoning President Bush's neutrality on the question of Kashmir. Similarly, President

accommodate China's rise through strategic reassurance and collaboration on regional and global
issues generated deep apprehensions in New Delhi about the potential consequences of a SinoU.S. duopoly in Asia.
To be sure, President Obama corrected the direction and reaffirmed the importance of India in the American worldview. But there was no denying the
damage in New Delhi and the perceived need to hedge against significant reversals in the U.S. policy toward India. In New Delhi, the Congress Party, which
returned triumphant in the 2009 elections, believed that economic populism was the key to its political success. This, in turn, resulted in a de-emphasis of
economic reforms, and public discussion of some of the old foreign policy approaches, such as non-alignment. There is some recognition in New Delhi of
the costs of these strategic errors, and the Indian government is working on reviving economic reforms and rejuvenating its foreign policy. Yet, there is no
denying that the past three years generated many anxieties among India's friends in the United States and beyond about New Delhi's political
commitment to the partnership. India's parliamentary management of the nuclear-liability legislation also created difficulties for the U.S. nuclear industry,
which was hoping to make big investments after the historic civil initiative. Finally, there has undoubtedly been some exaggeration of the possibilities in
the bilateral relationship. In both of these large democracies, making the case for a fundamental change in the structure and direction of bilateral relations
in the face of considerable skepticism arguably raised expectations that could not be met. Realists on both sides, however, know that India was never
Instead of an approximation of a traditional alliance
going to be an Australia or Japan to the United States.

relationship founded on presumed common geostrategy , New Delhi and Washington

should focus on pragmatic cooperation on the basis of the intersection of their
narrower respective interests.

Consultation is key to stabilizing relations

Blackwill et al 11 (Robert D. Blackwill and Naresh Chandra, Chairs Christopher
Clary, Rapporteur; Council on Foreign Relations; The United States and India A
Shared Strategic Future; September 2011; 6-23-16)
The previous analysis compels both the United States and India to strengthen cooperation for
their mutual benefit. The international system has recently changed considerably and will continue to do so. The
past pursuit of different priorities led to mutual doubts and animosities between
Washington and New Delhi, but those past disputes, old habits, and inertial policies are irrelevant to current needs.
Policymakers and opinion leaders need to adapt to these strategic trends and
shared national interests. Indians used to see U.S. policy as an effort to achieve
world dominance and in the process create the worst sort of capitalist imperialism,
and Americans tended to dismiss Indias role as at best an insignificant nuisance
and at worst detrimental to the United States good intentions and national
interests. These lingering legacies of past prejudices still sometimes come in the
way of the great services each side should now be rendering the other. These distorted
visions need to be actively dispelled. Both states are transitioning to new roles in the international system. For India, great power
status means that it will have greater responsibilities in managing global problems. On controversial subjects, avoiding taking
positions is inappropriate for such a potentially major contributor to the international system. For the United States, which became
accustomed to often leading alone, it means encouraging a more prominent role for a state like India, even though Indias more
prominent voice may periodically disagree on matters of policy. A relationship will be healthy only if there is an acceptance of
differences. As stressed earlier, this report is rooted in the great commonality of national interests and policy objectives that the two
sides now have. Common objectives, however, do not preclude differences, often sharp and profound, over ways and means of
reaching them. The major concerns of each side include the balance of power in East Asia, the security Turning the Page 12 The
United States and India: A Shared Strategic Future of the Persian Gulf, the stability of Central Asia, and maintaining the security and
Washington and New Delhi are bound
stability of the Indian Ocean. On each of these topics, and many others,

to have their own approaches. They should make special efforts to encourage the
realization that both states are pursuing a partnership, and even the closest
partners will have disagreements. What is laid out in the following section is a
practical agenda to begin ever closer cooperation to promote shared U.S. and
Indian national interests, even while acknowledging that both sides will sometimes
diverge in their pursuit of those shared ends.

Close collaboration and dialogue key to maintaining strong

relations
Singh and Verma 15 [Arun K. Singh, Indian Ambassador to the United States,
Richard Verma, United States Ambassador to India, 7/20/15, India And The U.S.
Partnering To Shape The 21st Century, Huffington Post, World Post,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/arun-k-singh-/india-and-the-us-
partnering_b_7814248.html, schauer]
Since President Obamas January visit to India, we are now working on new initiatives from the outer reaches of space to the depths of the
oceans. We have reenergized some 30 different dialogues and working groups to ensure close collaboration on issues like cyber and
homeland security, womens empowerment, counter-terrorism cooperation and global health security . In a world filled with complex

security and economic challenges, this relationship matters more now than ever before. Thats
why our leaders have aggressively set out to increase our defense cooperation, create greater economic opportunities for our people and work more

closely on climate change. Our national interests are converging on the vital issues of the day. Our two
countries, for example, have become indispensable partners in the Asia-Pacific and the Indian
Ocean regions, whether our navies are conducting anti-piracy patrols off the Horn of Africa, responding to the latest humanitarian crises or participating in
an ever-growing array of military exercises. Last month we signed a new 10-year agreement on defense cooperation and launched two new defense
projects for co-development and co-production. Our commercial ties similarly continue to deepen and enrich the lives of millions in both our countries.
Two-way trade between our economies increased fivefold over the past decade to reach more than $100 billion today. Our leaders are committed to
accelerating bilateral trade another fivefold. U.S. infrastructure and technology firms are ready to bring their expertise to Prime Minister Modis ambitious
plan to build 100 smart cities by 2020. And Indian firms and investors are increasingly present in the United States to help power Americas growth and to
create jobs. Ultimately, through our shared values of free enterprise and the rule of law, sustained and inclusive economic growth in both our countries
can help continue to lift and empower those who need it the most. Beyond the strategic and economic ties, our people continue to bring us closer
together. More than a million Americans traveled to India in 2013, and more than 4,000 Indians applied for student visas at U.S. diplomatic facilities in
India on a single day in May. These statistics attest to the strength of our people-to-people ties. Indian students account for the second-largest group of
foreign students in the United States, with more than 100,000 students studying in the United States during the past academic year. The Indian diaspora
has also made enormous contributions to every facet of American society, contributing its talents and ingenuity at the tech start-ups of Silicon Valley, the
lecture halls and labs of premier educational institutions, the board rooms of Fortune 500 companies, and the corridors of power in Washington and in
state capitols across the nation. And now, they are increasingly giving back to their ancestral home, as well. In India, Americans and Indians are working
closely together to spur advances in medicine, science and technology, helping to power Indias growth and improving the lives of ordinary Indian citizens.
India and the United States are also increasingly cooperating to meet development challenges in India and around the world, working together in vital
areas such as agricultural research, combating HIV/AIDS, and sharing Indian innovations and expertise with other countries from

the true test of our defining partnership

Afghanistan to Africa to East Asia. As U.S.-India ties continue to blossom,

for the 21st century will be how it benefits not just our common citizens but also the global commons.
Our leaders vision of a rules-based international order where disputes between states are settled peacefully, trade flows more freely and clean energy
reduces the threat of climate change offers the best promise of a more peaceful, prosperous and sustainable century than the past one. The fact is,

we are stronger when we work together , and our close collaboration in the
years ahead can have a big impact upon global peace and prosperity. Given our shared democratic values, multicultural

we are natural partners , and indeed on

traditions, robust people-to-people ties and convergent economic and security interests,

we are resolute in our

a course to be best partners. Serving as our governments highest representatives in our respective capitals,

determination to ensure we remain on this course, and we are optimistic about our future partnership
together.
 at: india says no
Counterplan serves as a joint venture even if India says no,
its still beneficial for the relationship
Ayres 16 [Alyssa Ayres, Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia, Council
on Foreign Relations, 5/24/16, Before the Committee on Foreign Relations United
States Senate 2nd Session, 114th Congress,Hearing on U.S.-India Relations:
Balancing Progress and Managing Expectations full text pdf accessed via
http://www.cfr.org/india/us-relations-india/p37905, schauer]
The Model for U.S.-India Ties: Think Joint Venture, Not Alliance One of the overarching recommendations our Task Force made concerned how we think
Many Americans see India, the worlds largest democracy, a fastgrowing
about what our relationship with India should look like.

and see a future in which our shared values will bring both
economy, and a nation of great diversity,

countries ever-closer together. That has been taking place, but the shared values of
democracy do not always mean that Washington and New Delhi will see eye-to-eye
on every matter. Although the present Indian government does not emphasize nonalignment or its successor term, strategic autonomy in
the same way its predecessors did, New Delhis model for its own foreign relations focuses on the idea that the world is a family. India does not seek
alliance relationships, seeing them as potential constraints on its freedom of choice. As we in the United States look to advance ties with India, our Task

Force recommended, given Indias size , its independence , and what we termed its class-
of-its-own sense of self, an alternate framework for how we think about our
relations with India: the model of a joint venture , in the business sense of the word, rather than a not-quite
alliance.2 This model provides more conceptual space to increase cooperation in areas
of convergence without assuming agreement or support on matters across
the board , as one would typically expect from an alliance. In the words of the Task Force, Reframing ties with this
flexible model will also create conceptual space for the inevitable disagreements
without calling into question the basis of the partnership the expectation will be that divergences
inherently exist and, therefore, must be managed.
 at: relations resilient
Consistency in dialogue is absolutely key to maintaining the
relationship now is key
Acharya 6/23 [Nishith Acharya , 6/23/16, India-U.S.: not yet a priority partner,
Gateway House, Indian Council on Global Relations,
http://www.gatewayhouse.in/india-is-a-second-term-country/, schauer]
The other first term opportunity for India is for to maintain its position as a bright spot in U.S.
foreign policy. Continued foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Indian economy by U.S. investors and companies is the most public measure of
this, as is continued movement by the Indian government to become more investor and business friendly. This, by definition, creates

opportunities for collaboration between the two governments, including

discussions around bilateral investment treaties, Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP
participation, and R&D collaboration. There are many other ways to deepen the
relationship , but, in the short term , the Indian government must ensure
consistency in its discussions with the Obama administration and Clinton
campaign, and focus intensely on the key issues that must be transitioned to the new president.

Relations are warming up but recent examples prove fragility

Raghuvanshi 6/11 [Vivek Raghuvanshi, India bureau chief, News, 6/11/16,
Skepticism Persists in Strengthened US-India Ties, Defense News,
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense-news/2016/06/11/skepticism-persists-
strengthened-us-india-ties/85644480/, schauer]
NEW DELHI India is seen to be warming up to tighter relations with the United States , as

Prime Minister Narendra Modi addressed the US Congress June 8 during his fourth visit after coming to power in May 2014. But while two US

lawmakers introduced legislation June 8 in the House of Representatives to designate India as a

Special Global Partner of America, analysts here are unsure about the new stance toward
Washington, which marks a paradigm shift in India's foreign and defense policy. In general , a tighter
embrace is in store, or so it seems from Modi's address to lawmakers, though it is unclear what practical
steps might follow. One recent exchange between the two sides illustrates the
differing expectations at play. Shortly after U.S. Pacific Command chief Adm. Harry Harris publicly
envisioned the Indian and US navies "sailing together," Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar said there
would be no joint patrolling, notes Bharat Karnad, research professor at New Delhi based Centre for Policy Research.
 at: china not key
Consulting over China good for facilitation of overlapping
interests
Joshi et al 13 [Sunjoy Joshi, C. Raja Mohan, Vikram Sood, Rajeswari Pillai
Rajagopalan, Ph.D., James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Walter Lohman, Lisa Curtis and
Derek Scissors, Ph.D., 4/26/13, Beyond the Plateau in U.S. India Relations, The
Heritage Foundation, Special Report #132 on Alliances, Arms Control and
Nonproliferation, Economic Freedom, National Security and Defense, Terrorism,
Trade, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/beyond-the-plateau-in-us-
india-relations, schauer]
Cooperation in East and Southeast Asia. Both the U.S. and India share concerns about China 's rapid rise,

particularly its intense military modernization campaign and its willingness to assert its interests on the high seas in increasingly aggressive ways. Yet

both countries have complex relationships with China that include a desire to
build on economic and trade ties and to avoid provoking China into a defensive position. There are actions that
New Delhi and Washington could take in the region that would not directly target Chinese interests, yet would
strengthen their cooperation in ways that would put any crisis involving China in a new perspective: Enhance U.S. and
Indian participation in regional trade forums. The U.S. and India should facilitate one another's
involvement in regional trade discussions . For example, the U.S. should help India achieve observer status in
the Trans-Pacific Partnership, while India should help the U.S. gain observer status in the 16-nation Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership that

was launched in November 2012. The U.S. and India should also make membership for India in APEC a priority. Use current
dialogues and create new ones to explore overlapping interests . There has been
positive momentum in the U.S.IndiaJapan trilateral dialogue. There should also be a U.S.IndiaAustralia trilateral dialogue, ultimately leading to the
resurrection of the Japan-proposed Quad Dialogue. In 2007, senior foreign ministry officials from these three countries, plus Japan, met on the sidelines of
India and the U.S. should
a regional forum. However, further formalization of the dialogue was scrapped due to Chinese objections.

also find ways to more closely coordinate policies with ASEAN and Southeast Asian

nations.
 at: pakistan relations da
U.S. Pakistan relations already tanked drone strikes
Express Tribune 16 [Express Tribune, 6/11/16, Pak-US relations dropping
off the edge?, http://tribune.com.pk/story/1120836/pak-us-relations-dropping-off-
edge/, schauer]

Whilst it would be an exaggeration to say that relations between the USA and Pakistan are in free-fall, the downwards
trajectory is steepening rather than flattening out. Although shaky prior to the drone strike that
killed Taliban leader Mullah Mansoor, it was that action which has precipitated a sudden slide . A
red line was crossed for the Pakistan government, and an apparently unwritten
agreement violated namely that drone strikes would be limited to the tribal areas whereas Mullah Mansoor was killed
60 miles inside Balochistan. The Americans have now received a message loud and clear any similar strike is, not may, going to
jeopardise cooperative bilateral relations. It must be assumed that this will include intelligence sharing. Two senior American
officials, US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Olson and Senior Adviser and Director for South Asian
Affairs at the National Security Council Dr Peter Lavoy, received the message from the Prime Ministers Adviser on Foreign Affairs,
Sartaj Aziz, and the Army Chief, General Raheel Sharif. Messengers do not come much weightier than that. The Chinese have
weighed in with support for our position on drones as well as our future membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG); which is
yet another foreign policy matter that suffers from the absence of a foreign minister to have an overall responsibility for a range of
current and overlapping issues. Discussions were said to be candid and tense, which is Diplo-speak for something close to a
blazing row, with the Pakistan team requesting the Americans target the Taliban safe havens in Afghanistan something they have
hitherto largely avoided. Pakistan-US relations have always been transactional and always tempered by whatever the US has on its
to-do list no matter we like it or not. America continues to operate a doctrine of unilateral exceptionalism and expects the rest of the
world to be at least complicit with that. Pakistan now finds itself between the proverbial rock and a hard place damned if we do

and damned if we dont. Arresting the slide in relations is not going to be easy , and another
incident such as that which killed Mullah Mansoor could be mortal to more than the intended target. The Mansoor
incident, apart from prompting a slide in relations, appears to also be prompting a reassessment of
bilateral relations with the US more generally. The warming of relations was
only ever skin deep , and with Washington strengthening its ties with India on the defence and civil nuclear power
fronts, and seen beside the successful visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in the last week, there is a danger of Pakistan
being pushed yet again to the sidelines in terms of regional geopolitics. Sartaj Aziz is not far from the mark when he says that the
US abandons us when it doesnt need our help symptomatic of the transactional relationship referenced above and a symptom
of a malaise that has persisted for 60 years.

No central Asia war- empirically proven the impact will be

contained
Collins and Wohlforth 4 (Kathleen, Professor of Political Science Notre Dame and William,
Professor of Government Dartmouth, Defying Great Game Expectations, Strategic Asia 2003-4: Fragility
and Crisis, p. 312-313)

Conclusion The popular great game lens for analyzing Central Asia fails to capture the declared
interests of the great powers as well as the best reading of their objective interests in
security and economic growth. Perhaps more importantly, it fails to explain their actual
behavior on the ground, as well the specific reactions of the Central Asian states themselves.
Naturally, there are competitive elements in great power relations. Each countrys policymaking
community has slightly different preferences for tackling the challenges presented in the region, and the more
influence they have the more able they are to shape events in concordance with those preferences. But
these clashing preferences concern the means to serve ends that all the great powers share.
To be sure, policy-makers in each capital would prefer that their own national firms or their own governments
budget be the beneficiaries of any economic rents that emerge from the exploitation and transshipment of the
regions natural resources. But the scale of these rents is marginal even for Russias oil-fueled budget. And for
taxable profits to be created, the projects must make sense economicallysomething that is determined more
by markets and firms than governments. Does it matter? The great game is an arresting metaphor that serves
the great-game lens can distort
to draw peoples attention to an oft-neglected region. The problem is
realities on the ground, and therefore bias analysis and policy. For when great powers are locked in
a competitive fight, the issues at hand matter less than their implication for the relative power of contending
states. Power itself becomes the issueone that tends to be nonnegotiable. Viewing an essential
positive-sum relationship through zero sum conceptual lenses will result in missed
opportunities for cooperation that leaves all playersnot least the people who live in the regionpoorer
and more insecure. While cautious realism must remain the watchword concerning an impoverished and
potentially unstable region comprised of fragile and authoritarian states, our analysis yields at least
relative optimism. Given the confluence of their chief strategic interests, the
conditional and
major powers are in a better position to serve as a stabilizing force than analogies to the
Great Game or the Cold War would suggest. It is important to stress that the regions response to
the profoundly destabilizing shock of coordinated terror attacks was increased cooperation
between local governments and China and Russia, andmultipolar rhetoric notwithstandingbetween both of
them and the United States. If this trend is nurtured and if the initial signals about potential SCO-CSTO-NATO
cooperation are pursued, another destabilizing shock might generate more rather than less
cooperation among the major powers. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan
[The Stans] are clearly on a trajectory that portends longer-term cooperation with each of the
great powers. As military and economic security interests become more entwined, there are sound
reasons to conclude that great game politics will not shape Central Asias future in the same
competitive and destabilizing way as they have controlled its past. To the contrary, mutual interests in
Central Asia may reinforce the broader positive developments in the great powers relations that
have taken place since September 11, as well as reinforce regional and domestic stability in
Central Asia.

No great power draw in

Weitz 6 [Richard Weitz, senior fellow and associate director of the Center for
Future Security Strategies at the Hudson Institute, Summer, 2006 [Washington
Quarterly, Averting a New Great Game in Central Asia]
Fortunately, the fact that Central Asia does not represent the most important geographic
region for any external great power also works against the revival of a traditional, geopolitical great-
game conflict. Russia, China, and the United States have strong reasons to cooperate in the
region. Although each country has extensive goals in Central Asia, the resources they have
available to pursue them are limited, given other priorities. As long as their general relations
remain non-confrontational, Moscow, Beijing, and Washington are unlikely to pursue policies
in a lower priority region such as Central Asia that could disrupt their overall ties. Most often,
they will find it more efficient and effective to collaborate to diminish redundancies, exploit
synergies, and pool funding and other scarce assets in the pursuit of common objectives.
Unfounded fears or overtly competitive policies could undermine these opportunities for cooperation and
should be avoided.
2nc net benefit
 at: relations not key
Cointinued expansion of US-India cooperation is vital to check
nuclear terrorism
Joshi et al 13 [Sunjoy Joshi, C. Raja Mohan, Vikram Sood, Rajeswari Pillai
Rajagopalan, Ph.D., James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Walter Lohman, Lisa Curtis and
Derek Scissors, Ph.D., 4/26/13, Beyond the Plateau in U.S. India Relations, The
Heritage Foundation, Special Report #132 on Alliances, Arms Control and
Nonproliferation, Economic Freedom, National Security and Defense, Terrorism,
Trade, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/beyond-the-plateau-in-us-
india-relations, schauer]

The international counterterrorism effort, particularly since 9/11, has had remarkable success in containing and degrading
several terrorist groups across the world, especially al-Qaeda. This has been possible following the U.S.
initiative, at considerable human and financial cost, against terrorism culminating in the elimination of Osama bin Laden on
May 2, 2011. Although al-Qaeda has suffered substantial degradation and leadership loss in the past decade, the terror threat still
exists. The other key factor that contributed to this degradation was the network of alliances and partnerships that the U.S. was able
to create in countering terrorism across continents. Although the U.S. counterterrorism strategy was at times contentious within the
international community, there have been some significant universally accepted lessons. First, the gravity of the terrorist threat and
the nature of the terrorist threat has become more
its transnational nature is now well understood. Second,
complex and diffuse to the point that terrorists find shelter in more secure niches in urban surroundings as well as in the cyber
world. Third, there is need to innovate and use cutting-edge technology to outsmart terrorist groups. Finally, the

need to forge partnerships between international stakeholders is now clear. Frequent U.S.

India interactions and training courses between the investigating agencies of both countries have deepened
their cooperation and understanding in countering terrorism . There is now a broader
consensus in New Delhi and Washington postNovember 2008 stressing continued robust and
political

comprehensive bilateral cooperation to counter new and complex threats. The Evolving Threat. Post-9/11, terrorists and
terror groups have evolved, despite setbacks, in terms of their reach, range, organization, and methods, including their use of

modern technology. Operational capabilities have improved and local groups have become global threats , while
smaller groups have networked with other groups to magnify their capabilities and threats. Some of the attacks on
Pakistani military establishments have created the fear that these may be trial runs
to attack the country's nuclear sites. Different extremist and terrorist groups today dominate or influence a
larger geographical area than in the past. This phenomenon is apparent in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al-Qaeda has moved toward
the Arab world and Africa, closer to U.S. strategic interests in the region, but other problems remain in Pakistan and Afghanistan. For
instance, Pakistan's attitude toward the Taliban and the Haqqani network, along with other groups targeting India, has remained
suspect. The picture is further complicated by the power struggles and uncertainties in the Arab world, which are exacerbated by
the rivalry between Iran-led Shia groups and groups allied with Sunni Saudi Arabia. The violence and turbulence in the region has
allowed terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda, to move quickly into Syria and other countries. India's Four Key Concerns. It is now well
established that most of the terrorism in India has had its origins and bases in Pakistan with the patronage of some elements of the
state, which additionally keeps the terror infrastructure intact. The terrorist group that concerns India the most is Lashkar-e-Tayyiba
(LeT). The LeT has been involved in some of the most serious terrorist attacks in India in the recent past, backed by enormous
resources and patronage of the Pakistani security services. Even after the November 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai, the LeT
remained untouched by Pakistan and has been successful in reorganizing its structure to prevent any crackdown. The LeT's growth
is noticeable in three areas: (1) expanding and strengthening its alliances with pan-Asian groups in countries such as Sri Lanka,
Nepal, the Maldives, and Bangladesh; (2) the recruitment and training of foreigners, mainly from the U.S. and Europe, using well-
established religious contacts; and (3) fundraising programs focusing on West Asia, the United Kingdom, other parts of Europe, and
the U.S.[7] The LeT's footprints are found today in over 30 countries, including the U.S., and the group has become more
sophisticated in its operations and use of technology. The second Indian concern has been the close proximity of terrorist groups to
the Pakistan Army and its intelligence wing, the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The Pakistan Army's and ISI's
involvement in fomenting insurgency and terrorism in India's northeast, as well as in Kashmir and beyond in India's heartland, is well
documented. Pakistan's unwillingness to act against its own radical extremist groups intensifies this concern. India's third concern is
the growing radicalization in Pakistan, often directly encouraged by the state authorities, or indirectly encouraged by its inability to
counter the expanding radicalism. Religious places and groups promoting extremist ideology and politics have increased in number
and moved from fringe areas to center stage in Pakistan. The state's multi-layered association with such groups has remained
unchanged, despite the growing evidence of threats from these groups to Pakistan itself. Instead, the state is more involved in co-
opting these groups as instruments of influence in domestic politics. The inability or the unwillingness of the moderates and liberals
or the political parties to condemn radicalism is worrying. The steady radicalization of the armed forces, including its
 will create far more complex threats to both India and the U.S. in the
intelligence agencies,
future. The October 2009 attack on Pakistan's General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi; the May 2011 attack on the Mehran
naval base in Karachi; and the August 2012 attack on the Kamra Aeronautical Complex near Islamabad show the extent of
infiltration of the armed forces by terrorist elements. Disentangling state sponsorship of terrorism in and by Pakistan will be one of
the biggest global challenges in coming years. Finally, homegrown terrorism in India and the emergence of the Indian Mujahideen
(IM), along with various modules of LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), are an indication of the growing influence of terrorist
ideologies and groups among Indian Muslim communities that have established cross-border links throughout the region. Areas of
IndiaU.S. cooperation in counterterrorism increased significantly after 9/11. The U.S.India
Cooperation.

experienced setbacks that have dampened some of

Cyber Security Forum was set up in 2002, but

the enthusiasm for cooperating in this particular arena. The 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai and the extent of
help sought and given by the U.S. in the investigations, as well as diplomatic efforts by India, culminated in the Bilateral
Counterterrorism Cooperation Agreement in 2010. Other joint initiatives include interactions between security and intelligence
officials, exchange visits of senior leadership of security and intelligence units, joint training exercises, and U.S. assistance to India in
enhancing critical investigation skills. A key component of this cooperation has been the State Department's Anti-Terrorism Country
Assistance Plan for India for training more than 2,000 officials from various intelligence, police, paramilitary, and security agencies.
These Indian officials have undergone training in forensic analysis, evidence gathering, bomb blast investigations, human rights,
extradition, and prosecution. In 2012, training capsules widened to include air and seaport security. There is now a strong working
relationship between the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team and India's Computer Emergency Response Team. Issues of

Contention. Despite the successes in U.S.Indian counterterrorism cooperation,

the true potential of this relationship remains unfulfilled . There are several reasons for
this gap between expectations and achievementsome of them are historical, a few because of divergent perceptions, and the rest
caused by structural mismatch. Indian policymakers, strategists, and analysts are unable to reconcile their perception of U.S. policy
on terrorism and its attitude toward Pakistan. Washington's over-eagerness to accommodate Pakistani demands and perceptions
accompanied by an inability or unwillingness to penalize Pakistan, despite the harsh reality of Pakistan's continued support for
terrorism, remains inexplicable to most Indians. This continued support by the U.S. has emboldened Pakistan to resist demands to
dismantle its terrorist infrastructure. The U.S. handling of the case of Pakistani-American David Headley, who conspired with LeT in
the 2008 Mumbai attacks, also disappointed Indian counterterrorism professionals. The U.S. reluctance to allow India free access to
Headley only strengthened Indian doubts about U.S. credibility in prosecuting terrorism cases linked to Pakistan. The alacrity with
which Headley was allowed a plea bargain and the refusal to facilitate Indian investigation of his links to LeT and his role in the
Mumbai attacks remain sore points in New Delhi. Finally, there is a mismatch in structure and capacity of Indian and U.S. nodal
agencies of cooperation. Capacity deficiencies, archaic methods of training, and poor instructors within the police force have made it
difficult for India to raise a strong and capable security bulwark against terrorism. Indian institutions remain ill-equipped to make full
Despite flaws,
use of cooperation from the U.S., which has led to less than optimal results from bilateral cooperation.
challenges, it is acknowledged by both New Delhi and Washington that
contradictions, and
robust and comprehensive counterterrorism cooperation will help to contain terrorist
threats and also strengthen the overall bilateral relationship. A full-scope, sustained,
and multilayered counterterrorism dialogue is one of the best ways to safeguard
both nations.
 at: no nuke terror
Their authors are wrong motive and means exist
Allison 9 (Graham Allison, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government and Director of
the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's
Kennedy School of Government, A Response to Nuclear Terrorism Skeptics Brown
Journal of World Affairs, Hein Online)
What drives Mueller and other skeptics to arrive at such different conclusions ? They
make four major claims that merit serious examination and reflection. CLAIM 1: No ONE IS SERIOUSLY
MOTIVATED TO CONDUCT A NUCLEAR TERRORIST ATTACK. More than a decade
ago, no one could have imagined that a Japanese doomsday cult would be
sufficiently motivated to disseminate sarin gas on the Tokyo subway . Indeed, at the time of
that attack, the consensus among terrorism experts was that terrorists wanted an

audience and sympathy-not casualties. The leading American student of terrorism, Brian Jenkins, summarized the consensus judgment in
1975: "terrorists seem 34 to be more interested in having a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead."" As intelligence officials later testified, an inability to

recognize the shifting modus operandi of some terrorist groups was part of the
reason why members of Aum Shinrikyo "were simply not on anybody's radar
screen."" This, despite the fact that the group owned a 12-acre chemical weapons factory in Tokyo, had $1 billion in its bank account, and had a history of serious nuclear
ambitions.'9 Similarly, before the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon that extinguished 3,000 lives, few imagined that

terrorists could mount an attack upon the American homeland that would kill more
Americans than the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor. As Secretary Rice testified to the 9/11 Commission, "No one could have imagined
them taking a plane, slamming it into the Pentagon and into the World Trade Center, using planes as a missile." 20 For most Americans, the idea of international terrorists mounting an
attack on our homeland and killing thousands of citizens was not just unlikely, but inconceivable. But assertions about what is "imaginable" or "conceivable" are propositions about
individuals' mental capacities, not about what is objectively possible. In fact, Al Qaeda's actions in the decade prior to the 9/11 attacks provided clear evidence both of intent and
capability. While its 1993 attack on the World Trade Center succeeded in killing only six people, Ramzi Yousef, the key operative in this case, had planned to collapse one tower onto the
second, killing 40,000. In the summer of 1996, Osama bin Laden issued a fatwa declaring war upon the United States. Two years later, Al Qaeda attacked the U.S. embassies in Nairobi,
Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing more than 200 people. In October 2000, Al Qaeda attacked the warship USS Cole. Throughout this period, Al Qaeda's leadership was running
thousands of people through training camps, preparing them for mega-terrorist attacks. Notwithstanding Aum Shinrikyo's brazen attack, Al Qaedas audacious 9/11 attack, and the recent

attacks in Mumbai that killed 179 people, Mueller maintains that "terrorists groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire... they have discovered that the tremendous effort
asserts that the evidence about Al Qaedas nuclear intentions
required is scarcely likely to be successful." He

ranges from the "ludicrous to the merely dubious," and that those who take Al Qaeda's nuclear aspiration seriously border on "full-on fantasyland."1 Even

scholars who would have been inclined to agree with this point of view have revised their
judgment as new facts have accumulated. In 2006, for example, Jenkins reversed the basic proposition that he had set forth three
decades earlier. In his summary: "In the 1970s the bloodiest incidents caused fatalities in the tens. In the 1980s, fatalities from the worst incidents were in the hundreds; by the 1990s,
attacks on this scale had become more frequent. On 9/11 there were thousands of fatalities, and there could have been far more. We now contemplate plausible scenarios in which tens

of 35 thousands might die." Underlining the contrast with his own 1975 assessment, Jenkins now says: " Jihadists seem ready to murder
millions , if necessary. Many of today's terrorists want a lot of people watching and
a lot of people dead."22 (Emphasis added.) Al Qaeda has been deadly clear about its ambitions. In 1998, Osama bin Laden declared that he considered obtaining
weapons of mass destruction "a religious duty."" In December 2001, he urged his supporters to trump the 9/11 attacks: "America is in retreat by the grace of God Almighty..but it needs
further blows."2 A few months later, Al Qaeda announced its goal to "kill four million Americans."5 It eVen managed to gain religious sanction from a radical Saudi cleric in 2003 to kill

"ten million Americans" with a nuclear or biological weapon.26 We also now know that Al Qaeda has been seriously
seeking a nuclear bomb. According to the Report of the 9/11 Commission, "Al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years...
and continues to pursue its strategic goal of obtaining a nuclear capability." It further reveals " bin Laden had reportedly been heard to

speak of wanting a 'Hiroshima." The Commission provides evidence of Al Qaedas

effort to recruit nuclear expertise-including evidence about the meeting between two Pakistani nuclear weapon scientists, bin Laden, and his
deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri in Afghanistan to discuss nuclear weapons.2 These scientists were founding members of Ummah Tamer-e-Nau (UTN), a so-called charitable agency to support
projects in Afghanistan. The foundation's board included a fellow nuclear scientist knowledgeable about weapons construction, two Pakistani Air Force generals, one Army general, and
an industrialist who owned Pakistan's largest foundry.28 In his memoir, former CIA Director George Tenet offers his own conclusion that "the most senior leaders of Al Qaeda are still
singularly focused on acquiring WMD" and that "the main threat is the nuclear one." In Tenet's view, Al Qaedas strategic goal is to obtain a nuclear capability. He concludes as follows: "I

CLAIM 2: IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR

am convinced that this is where Osama bin Laden and his operatives desperately want to go."2 9

TERRORISTS TO ACQUIRE FISSILE MATERIAL. Assuming that terrorists have the intent-could they acquire the necessary materials for
a Hiroshima-model bomb? Tenet reports that after 9/11, President Bush showed President Putin his briefing on UTN. In Tenet's account of the meeting, Bush "asked Putin point blank if
Russia could account for all of its material." Putin responded that he could guarantee it was secure during his watch, underlying his inability to provide assurance about events under his
predecessor, Boris Yeltsin.3o When testifying to the Senate Intelligence Committee in February 2005, Commit- 36 tee Vice-Chairman John Rockefeller (D-WV) asked CIA Director Porter

There is
Goss whether the amount of nuclear material known to be missing from Russian nuclear facilities was sufficient to construct a nuclear weapon. Goss replied, "

sufficient material unaccounted for that it would be possible for those with know-
how to construct a weapon.. .I can't account for some of the material so I can't make the assurance about its whereabouts." Mueller
sidesteps these inconvenient facts to assert a contrary claim . According to his telling, over the last 10 years,
there have been only 10 known thefts of highly enriched uranium (HEU), totaling less than 16 pounds, far less than required for an atomic explosion. He acknowledges, however, that

"There may have been additional thefts that went undiscovered."32 Yet, as Matthew Bunn testified to the Senate in April 2008, "Theft of
HEU and plutonium is not a hypothetical worry, it is an ongoing reality ." He notes that
"nearly all of the stolen HEU and plutonium that has been seized over the years had never been missed before it was seized." The IAEA Illicit Nuclear

Trafficking Database notes 1,266 incidents reported by 99 countries over the last 12 years, including 18
incidents involving HEU or plutonium trafficking. 130 research reactors around the world in 40 developing and transitional countries still hold the essential ingredient for nuclear

The world stockpiles of HEU and separated plutonium are enough to

weapons. As Bunn explains, "

make roughly 200,000 nuclear weapons; a tiny fraction of one percent of these
stockpiles going missing could cause a global catastrophe ." Consider the story of Russian citizen Oleg Khinsagov.
Arrested in February 2006 in Georgia, he was carrying 100 grams of 89-percent enriched HEU as a sample and attempting to find a buyer for what he claimed were many additional
kilograms. Mueller asserts that "although there is a legitimate concern that some material, particularly in Russia, may be somewhat inadequately secured, it is under lock and key, and

CLAIM 3: IT IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO

even sleepy, drunken guards, will react with hostility (and noise) to a raiding party.""

CONSTRUCT A NUCLEAR DEVICE THAT WORKS. Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, former director of the Department of Energy's Office of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence, testified that, "The 21s' century will be defined first by the desire and then by the ability of non-state actors to procure or develop crude nuclear
weapons."6 In contrast, Mueller contends that, "Making a bomb is an extraordinarily difficult task... the odds, indeed, are stacked against the terrorists, perhaps massively so." 37

Mueller argues that his conclusion follows from an analysis of 20 steps an atomic
terrorist would have to accomplish in what he judges to be the most likely nuclear terrorism scenario. On the basis of this list, he
claims that there is "worse than one in a 37 million" chance of success . 38 His
approach, however, misunderstands probabilistic risk assessment . For example, some of the steps on
the list would have to be completed before an attempt to acquire material could begin (therefore, the success rate for any of those steps during the path would, by definition, be 100
percent). Other steps are unnecessary, such as having a technically sophisticated team pre-deployed in the target country. Although he assumes that stolen materials will be missed, in

At U.S. weapons labs and among the

none of the 18 documented cases mentioned earlier had the seized material been reported missing."

U.S. intelligence community, experts who have examined this issue largely agree. John
Foster, a leading American bomb maker and former director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, wrote a quarter century ago, "If the essential nuclear materials are at

Taylor, the nuclear physicist

hand, it is possible to make an atomic bomb using information that is available in the open literature." 4 Similarly, Theodore

who designed America's smallest and largest atomic bombs, has repeatedly stated
that, given fissile material, building a bomb is "very easy. Double underline. Very Easy." 4 Inquiring into such claims,
then-Senator Joe Biden (D-DE) asked the major nuclear weapons laboratories whether they could make such a device if they had nuclear materials. All three laboratories answered
affirmatively. The laboratories built a gun-type device using only components that were commercially available and without breaking a single U.S. law. The Commission on the
Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, known as the Silberman-Robb Commission, reported in 2005 that the intelligence community
believed Al Qaeda "probably had access to nuclear expertise and facilities and that there was a real possibility of the group developing a crude nuclear device." It went on to say that

Skeptics argue that terrorists

"fabrication of at least a 'crude' nuclear device was within Al Qaedas capabilities, if it could obtain fissile material."43

cannot replicate the effort of a multi-billion dollar nuclear program of a state. This
claim does not distinguish between the difficulty of producing nuclear materials for
a bomb (the most difficult threshold) and the difficulty of making a bomb once the material has
been acquired. The latter is much easier. In the Iraq case, for example, the CIA noted that if Saddam Hussein had stolen or purchased nuclear materials from abroad,
this would have cut the time Iraq needed to make a bomb from years to months.1 Moreover, terrorists do not require a state-of-the art weapon and delivery system, since for blowing up

The grim reality of globalization's dark underbelly is that non-

a single city a crude nuclear device would suffice.

state actors are increasingly capable of enacting the kind of lethal destruction
heretofore the sole reserve of states. CLAIM 4: IT IS TOO DIFFICULT TO DELIVER A
NUCLEAR DEVICE TO THE UNITED STATES. In the spring of 1946, J. Robert Oppenheimer was asked whether units of the atom bomb
could be smuggled into New York and then detonated. He answered, "Of course it could be done, and people could destroy New York." As for how such a weapon smuggled in a crate or a
suitcase might be detected, Oppenheimer opined, "with a screwdriver." He went on to explain that because the HEU in a nuclear weapon emits so few radioactive signals, a bomb
disguised with readily available shielding would not be detected when inspectors opened the crates and examined the cargo.41 The nuclear weapon that terrorists would use in the first
attack on the United States is far more likely to arrive in a cargo container than on the tip of a missile. In his appearance before a Senate subcommittee in March 2001, six months before
9/11, National Intelligence Officer Robert Walpole testified that "non-missile delivery means are less costly, easier to acquire, and more reliable and accurate."' 6 Citing the 1999-2003

Mueller
U.S. Congressional Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (the Gilmore Commission),

states that transporting an improvised nuclear device would require overcoming

"Herculean challenges."" He does not explain, however, why bringing a crude nuclear
weapon into an American city would be materially different than the challenge faced
by drug smugglers or human traffickers. According to the Government Accountability Organization, an average of 275 metric tons of
cocaine have arrived in Mexico each year for transshipment to the United States since 2000. Reported seizures averaged about 36 tons a year, a 13 percent success rate for the
intelligence and law enforcement community. Three million illegal immigrants enter the country each year, and only one in three gets caught."

nuclear terror threat high terrorists can use cyber

capabilities to steal materials
NTI 1/14 [ Nuclear Terror Initiative, Founders Ted Turner and former U.S. Senator
Sam Nunn serve as co-chairs of the board of directors, which includes prestigious
international membership, 1/14/16 As Final Head-of-State Nuclear Security Summit
Approaches, Nunn and NTI Warn of Slowing Progress on Preventing Nuclear
Terrorism http://www.nti.org/newsroom/news/final-head-state-nuclear-security-
summit-approaches-nunn-and-nti-warn-slowing-progress-preventing-nuclear-
terrorism/]
WASHINGTON, DCAt a time of escalating threats and as world leaders prepare to gather for the final Nuclear Security Summit, the third edition of the

Nuclear Threat Initiative ( NTI ) Nuclear Security Index finds that progress on reducing the threat of
catastrophic nuclear terrorism has slowed and major gaps remain in the
global nuclear security system. The 2016 NTI Index, which has become a critical resource and tool for assessing the
security of the worlds deadliest materials, also finds troubling shortfalls in areas assessed for the first time: how well countries are

protecting nuclear facilities against sabotage, as well as the emerging threat of cyber attacks . "The purpose of the NTI Index
is not to award gold medals or scold those who do not score well. Our purpose is to show how all countries can improve the security of dangerous nuclear
materials," said NTI Co-Chairman and former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn. "Significant progress deserving of two cheers and applause has been made, but

the world has miles to go before we sleep." The NTI Index, developed biennially with the Economist

Intelligence Unit (EIU), finds that, since 2014, no improvements have been made in several key areas
related to securing highly enriched uranium and plutonium that are measured by the NTI Index: on-site physical protection ,
control and accounting , insider threat prevention , physical security
during transport , and response capabilities . The number of countries taking
the most important step to prevent theft eliminating their materialsalso has
dropped. In the two-year period preceding the release of the 2014 NTI Index, seven countries eliminated their weapons-usable nuclear materials;
the 2016 edition finds one countryUzbekistanmoving from the list of countries with weapons-usable nuclear materials to the list of those without those

materials. Responding to the changing threat environment , for the first time the 2016 NTI
Index assesses the potential risks to nuclear facilities posed by cyber attack and sabotage.

The results are striking: Nearly half the countries assessed do not have a
single requirement in place to protect their nuclear facilities from cyber attacks , and only
nine of the 24 countries with weapons-usable nuclear materials received the maximum score on cybersecurity. A new "sabotage ranking" of 45 countries
many countries considering nuclear power are struggling to put in
with certain types of nuclear facilities shows that

place the basic measures necessary to prevent an act of sabotage that could
result in a radiological release similar in scale to the 2011 Fukushima disaster in Japan.
World leaders are scheduled to meet in Washington for the fourth and final Nuclear Security Summit March 31-April 1. The upcoming meeting caps off a
series of summits in Washington (2010), Seoul (2012), and The Hague (2014) that have drawn attention to the threat and committed countries to stronger
measures to prevent nuclear terrorism. President Obama launched the summit process, and he and his team, as well as a host of committed world
leaders, deserve credit for their achievements so far, Nunn said. The work is not complete, however, and a plan to sustain high-level political attention
on nuclear security must be a top priority at the Summit. The current global nuclear security system has dangerous gaps that prevent it from being truly

comprehensive and effective, said NTI President Joan Rohlfing. Until those gaps are closed, terrorists
will seek to exploit them. Leaders must commit to a path forward when they meet this spring. The consequences of inaction
in the face of new and evolving threats are simply too great.
permutations
 at: perm general
Only the counterplan alone recognizes the nuanced nature of
the India-US-China relationship the logic of the permuatation
is focused soley on security
Maini 16 [Tridivesh Maini, 3/13/16, What the US Gets Wrong About India's
Relationship With China, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/what-the-
us-gets-wrong-about-indias-relationship-with-china/ schauer]
The India-China relationship is a far more complex and multi-layered one than many U.S. analysts
Both countries are trying to find common ground in a number of areas. It was surprising to
realize.

discover that the views of many U.S. analysts mirror skeptics in the strategic community in India. Both tend to view

the India-China relationship solely from the prism of security issues and territorial disputes while
ignoring key state-level economic ties . I met off-the-record with about 40 strategic analysts and policymakers in
Washington, D.C., during a SAV visiting fellowship at the Stimson Center. Some Americans, I found, had a good grasp of South Asian
politics, while others were way off the mark. Perhaps the greatest misconception I came across in D.C. concerns the India-China
relationship. Most conversations focused on the contentious aspects of the relationship, and ignored an unnoticed transformation
If Americans fail to recognize the nuances in the
taking place between Beijing and Delhi.
relationship between China and India, their Asia policy is bound to be heavy-handed
and Washington could lose an opportunity to shape regional politics in a positive way.
 at: perm do the cp
Consultation over other issues doesnt mean its the norm we
need to develop new frameworks for consultation over China that
are tailored to the unique relationship between the US-India-
China
Blackwill et al 11 (Robert D. Blackwill and Naresh Chandra, Chairs Christopher
Clary, Rapporteur; Council on Foreign Relations; The United States and India A
Shared Strategic Future; September 2011; 6-23-16)
Any planning for a stable international order must acknowledge, and indeed seek to enlist, the role of China . The major
consequences of Chinas rise will be as influential as they are uncertain: is China going to
use its great and increasing power as a leader in the organization of a world order with constructive multilateral cooperation and the
maintenance of international equilibrium as goals, or is it going to assert itself in pursuit of perceived national interests in ways
associated with hegemonic intentions, as ascendant powers have done in the past? Other states, especially those directly affected
by Chinese actions and policies, would be prudent to prepare for either possibility, and Chinese policymakers should not be
surprised that others do not always see the record to date, and its implications, as reassuring. Chinese leaders should also
appreciate that what other states do will be shaped by what China does. Both India and the United States have major national
interests that are best served by good relations with China; they would therefore like to seek the closest cooperation with Beijing.
The United States and
But both also find some Chinese actions incompatible with the reciprocal creation of goodwill.

India therefore need to develop the closest cooperation with each other, and
with other states that share in the objective of a peaceful, cooperative Asia , free of
the excessive pressures of any single power. Neither India nor the United States
desire confrontation with China, or to forge a coalition for Chinas containment . This
report details the great range of issues and reasons that now call for a U.S.-India partnership, with managing Chinas rise as only
one component of a multifaceted relationship. But what China does has become such an important factor in world affairs that it is

India and America should consult and consider possible reactions to what
natural that

are as yet uncertain developments. Both states have a strong interest in pursuing
strategies that maximize the likelihood of congenial relations with China . But this
desire has to be reconciled with the overriding objective of preventing any nation
from exercising hegemony over Asia.
 at: lie perm

Leaks are inevitable

Shafer 04 [Editor at Large, Slate Magazine (Jack, J. William Leonard frets about
the breakdown of the classification system Slate 6-23-2004
http://www.slate.com/id/2102855/]
Don't mistake Leonard for an ACLU firebrand: As Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists (whose excellent listserv alerted me to the
speech) puts it, Leonard "is not an 'openness' advocate or a free-lance critic of government secrecy." He's a career security professional who deplores the

Leonard attributes what he calls an "epidemic" of leaks to the press to

leaks of classified material to the press.

the dysfunctional classification system, which has recently taken to using the war as an "excuse to disregard the basics of
the security classification system." Leaks are coming out of the "highest levels of our

government" (the Valerie Plame affair); a former Cabinet secretary is alleged to have handed off classified material to a book author for
publication, and the classification machine is operating so poorly down at Guantanamo Bay that a chaplain was publicly charged with pilfering secrets on
The problem [Leonard] has identified is that the currency of
his computer and then released. "

classification is being devalued by questionable, sometimes suspiciously self-

serving secrecy actions ," writes Aftergood in e-mail. "This produces an erosion of security
discipline , which in turn fosters an environment in which leaks are more likely
to come about. The net result is bad security policy and bad public policy."
Affirmative Answers
2ac counterplan
 solvency
Consultations fail theyre irrelevant
Thomson 13 (Stuart Thomson; Bircham Dyson Bell is a leading UK law firm; The
Reasons Why Government Fails At Consultation; 1-5-14)
As Easton rightly notes 'consultations are not referendums but this is often unclear to those responding and
when the stress is on approaching consultations with an open mind with ministers being in listening mode the clear implication is
that at least changes may be made. Consultations work best when there are clear options on the table and an adequate
explanation is provided as to why and how those options have been arrived at. A simple take it or leave it approach does not suit
most consultations and makes them, in effect, appear to be referendums based on a single issue. Engagement will increase when
input can have an effect. Consultation has for many in government become a proxy for
support for the policy, inferring that it has been developed / changed on the basis of
a consultation. This is misleading at best especially when often the number of
responses is low. It could be that the government is completely right to progress the policies concerned. However, the
formal government responses to consultations are often badly lacking. They
contain simple statements that do not respond to the points raised in submissions.
Instead, they highlight the matters raised and go on to restate the preferred policy
option. No evidence is used as to why the submissions are being, in effect, rejected and often none used to justify the policy
position in the first instance (which can actually make responses difficult to formulate). Restating a policy is not a
response. This is not a party political point - the number of consultations undertaken increased hugely under Labour and their
record was far from perfect. However, the Coalition continues to champion evidence-based policy-making but is not always living by
its own rules, especially when it comes to consultations. All this means that public confidence in consultations is being undermined.
Along with flaws in the way that some are conducted which have led to successful legal challenges, the public do not believe that
they are really being consulted. The implications go far beyond the public sector. The private sector, particularly for these involved
Participation rates may fall further and all confidence
in local development, are then tainted as well.
in them is lost. Ministers have also complained about the use of judicial reviews and have been looking at ways to reduce
the numbers. But it is a problem partly of their own making. For those involved in public affairs all this shows is the value in being
involved much earlier in the policy formation process, ideally before any consultations are put on paper. The chances of
having an impact at this stage are limited .
 india says no
They will say no fear of China expanding
Beech 15 (Hannah Beech; TIME; http://time.com/3856833/china-india-relations-
narendra-modi-xi-jinping/; 5-13-15; 6-24-16)
Yet for all the feting of Xuanzang, India and Chinas relations remain tenuous. The worlds two
most populous nations comprise more than one-third of humanity . Yet bilateral trade
hovers around $70 billion, less than half the dollar figure of commercial ties between China and Australia.
Memories of border battles the most recent in 1962 fester, and the 4,000-km frontier, which cuts
through disputed territory, remains tense. The bilateral relationship cannot be very
good unless the border dispute is solved , says Zhao Gancheng, a South Asia expert from the
Shanghai Institute for International Studies. Imagine: there is not a single direct flight between two of Asias
financial capitals, Shanghai and Mumbai. Between Beijing and New Delhi, nonstop flights only run three times a
week. In 2013, 175,000 Chinese went on holiday in India, according to the Indian Ministry of Tourism. Thailand,
meanwhile, attracted 4.6 million Chinese visitors last year. Ahead of his China trip, Modi joined Weibo, the Chinese
social-media service that has flourished partly because Twitter is blocked by Chinese censors. Modi may be a Twitter
rock star, with 12.2 million followers, but he has attracted fewer than 50,000 fans on Weibo. By comparison, Apple
CEO Tim Cook garnered 300,000 Weibo acolytes within 3 hours of joining the Chinese microblogging network this
week.Modis Weibo feed was seized upon by Chinese nationalists who demanded that
India return South Tibet, as they refer to the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh.
South Tibet belongs to China, went one comment. Give it back to us. Otherwise
we will take it back by force sooner or later. Such incendiary rhetoric notwithstanding, Modi spoke
on the eve of his China trip of resetting the Sino-Indian relationship, focusing on economic pragmatism over
troublesome politics. I look forward to working out a road map for qualitatively upgrading our economic relations
and seek greater Chinese participation in Indias economic growth, he told Chinese media in New Delhi, especially
stumbling blocks are hard to
in transforming Indias manufacturing sector and infrastructure. Still, the
budge. Chinas historic friendship with Pakistan hasnt helped, nor has Indias
decades-long hosting of the Dalai Lama, the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader whose political
counterpart Modi invited to his inauguration last year. Asked to comment on Sino-Indian ties, several India experts
from leading Chinese universities refused to talk to TIME, citing the sensitivity of the bilateral relationship. The
Modi
Global Times, a daily affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party, published an editorial on Monday accusing
of playing little tricks over border disputes and security issues, hoping to boost his
domestic prestige while increasing his leverage in negotiations with China . The
editorial, written by an academic at the Institute of International Relations at the Shanghai Academy of Social
Sciences, went on to criticize the Indian elites blind arrogance and confidence in their democracy, as well as the
inferiority of [Indias] ordinary people.

Say no disputes with China

Challaney 14 (Brahma Chellaney; Ph.D., is professor of strategic studies at the
Center for Policy Research in New Delhi and an affiliate with the International Centre
for the Study of Radicalization at Kings College London;
http://www.jpri.org/publications/occasionalpapers/op48.html; January 2014; 6-24-16)
Nothing better illustrates Asias challenges than the troubled relationship between its two demographic giants, China and
India. The disputes and tensions between the two countries hold significant
implications for international security and Asian power dynamics . As China and India gain
economic heft, they are drawing more international attention. Their underlying strategic dissonance and rivalry, however, usually
The issues that divide India and China extend from land to water
attracts less notice.
issues, with their larger geopolitical rivalry shaping their attitudes and policy
approaches. China and India are more than just nation-states; they are large ancient civilizations that together comprise
nearly two-fifths of humanity. Though they represent markedly dissimilar cultures and competing models of development, they also
followed similar historical trajectories in modern times, freeing themselves from colonial powers and emerging as independent
both seek to play a global role by reclaiming the power they
nations around the same time. Today,
enjoyed for many centuries before they went into decline after the advent of the
industrial revolution. In 1820, China and India alone made up nearly half of the world income, while Asia collectively
accounted for 60 percent of the global GDP. Today each views the other as a geopolitical rival. [1]
 china not key
Other issues swamp Chinese relations
Sekhon and Purushothaman 10 (Oct 31, 2010 * Senior Fellow ** Junior
Fellow ORF Issue Breif The Obama Visit: Issues and Challnges Dr. Harinder Sekhon
and Ms. Uma Purushothaman
http://www.observerindia.com/cms/export/orfonline/modules/issuebrief/attachments
/orf-ib_1288782673490.pdf)
India would like the US to make a more concrete statement on Indias aspirations for
a permanent seat on the UN Security Council if the US claim of India being an indispensable
partnership is to be taken seriously here in India. A statement on this would generate an
enormous amount of goodwill in India and create tremendous momentum in Indo-
US ties. The US could also start negotiations to make India a part of non
proliferation regimes in the nuclear field like the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the MTCR
and the Wassenaar Arrangement. It should further stop exhorting India to join the
NPT as a non-nuclear state. It should also support Indias inclusion in the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation and the International Energy Agency . Higher education is another area
with great potential for cooperation though this will obviously not be at the government-to-government level. India
aims to triple enrollment in higher education by 2020 and needs foreign investment in this sector to build more
colleges and universities. India and the US could work together to create centres of excellence building on the
Obama-Singh knowledge initiative. Steps have already been taken for expanded cooperation in this area through
Another area which is important from the
the establishment of the Indo-US Education Council.
perspective of Indias growth imperative is health . Indias health sector needs to be expanded so
that all citizens, particularly those in rural areas, get access to medical facilities and medicines. This requires huge
The US can help India by investing in the
expenditure which India cannot afford at the moment.
health sector in India, providing cutting-edge technologies and medicines and in
collaborating in joint research to find cheaper and better medicines and
technologies. The two countries could also collaborate in developing space-based solar power as an alternative
energy source. The challenge of climate change requires that India and the US, though
they were on opposing sides during the Copenhagen Summit, work together to use
energy more efficiently and also to invent and distribute green technology to reduce
emissions.
2ac net benefit
 engagement now
US engagement with China now should have triggered the
impact
Adam 15 (Sunil Adam Editor, News India Times;
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sunil-adam/a-conversation-with-
ambas_b_7867708.html; 7-24-15; 6-24-16)
So is Singh. Our national interests are converging on the vital issues of the day , the two
ambassadors attested in an op-ed article they co-authored in the Huffington Post last week. Talk of being on the same page.
Speaking at Carnegie, Ambassador Singh, who is a veteran of 36 years in the diplomatic corps, was effusive about defense
cooperation that includes joint development and joint production, and unprecedented maritime security cooperation that
harmonizes Americas Rebalance in the Asia-Pacific region and Indias Act East policy. Beyond the commercial components, he
said, there is now also robust engagement between our nuclear energy
establishments. They are collaborating in high-energy physics and accelerator
research. Our collaboration under the aegis of the Global Center for Nuclear Energy
Partnership has also been progressing well . And expectedly, Singh did not see Indias
close relationship with countries like Russia and Iran , not to mention its forays onto multilateral
platforms like the BRICS, the grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, as having a bearing on
its relations with the United States. Washington, he says, understands Indias diverse interests in the
international arena and embraces Indias rise as a global player. That said, even if no one on either side would
admit that moving U.S.-India bilateral strategic partnership into a new Strategic
Plus phase is an attempt to tilt the balance of power against China, it can be safely
assumed that Washington is pleased with the remarkable dexterity with which India
has been navigating its relations with all the great powers of in the Indian Ocean
and Asia-Pacific region China, Japan and the United States. Without necessarily characterizing
it as carping in the media, Singh brushed aside the assumption of sluggish progress on other issues like patents, intellectual
property rights and climate change. Despite some criticism, he asserted, somewhat hyperbolically, that Indias policies with regard
to intellectual property are at international level, even if there are some differences (with the U.S,) on the implementation
aspects. But the important thing, he felt, is that where there are differences, both sides are in discussions, on all the subjects,
including environment, where India sees the U.S. as a major partner in reaching its clean energy goals. India, he reasoned as a
way of qualifier, needs to grow at 8 to 10 percent annually to extricate people out of poverty. But the Modi government is
committed to achieving that goal through focusing on renewable energy, he assured.
 relations resilient
Relations are untouchably strong sea change
Saine 6/7 [Cindy Saine, 6/7/16, Sea Change Seen in US-India Relationship as
Obama Welcomes Modi, Voices of America, http://www.voanews.com/content/sea-
change-seen-united-states-india-obama-welcomes-modi/3366387.html, schauer]
WHITE HOUSE President Barack Obama and Indias Prime Minister Narendra Modi highlighted the strong

bonds between their two countries, the worlds two largest democracies, during a visit to the White House on

Tuesday by the prime minister. In an interview with VOA, Michael Kugelman of the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars said the rapport
between the two leaders and the transformation in bilateral ties has been
remarkable . There has been a sea change in U.S.-India relations over the course of
When President Obama first came to power, he really wanted to focus
the Obama administration," he said. "

on the war in Afghanistan. He wanted to take ownership over that war. And that meant a very narrowly defined strategic focus on South Asia
that really emphasized Afghanistan and, by extension, Pakistan. It didnt really leave that much room for the relationship with

India. But Kugelman said all that changed dramatically during Obamas second term, and especially during the
past two years, when the president got serious about his pivot to Asia and ended combat operations in
Afghanistan. Kugelman said the Obama administration views India as the power most qualified to counterbalance China and its maritime aggressions in
the South China Sea.Kugelman said there is definitely good personal chemistry between Obama and Modi, which is surprising, considering that until three
years ago, Modi was barred from entering the United States after religious riots broke out in a state he governed. Modi has come a long way, with official
Washington celebrating him this time. He received a festive welcome and working lunch with the president and vice president at the White House, and an
invitation to address a joint meeting of Congress on Wednesday.

Climate change agreements created stability in relations no

risk of collapse
Ayres 6/9 (Alyssa Ayres is a senior fellow and expert of India, Pakistan, and South
Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations.; http://fortune.com/2016/06/09/narendra-
modi-visit-to-us/; 7-9-16; 6-24-16)
Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India visited the White House this week. Earlier this week, Prime Minister Narendra
Modi of India visited President Obama , marking his second visit to the White House in two years. Like his two
immediate predecessors, Obama has made special efforts to expand ties with India. Against
the backdrop of a tough external environment Iraqs chaos, a truculent Russia, Chinas increased
assertiveness, unending conflict in Afghanistanthe U.S.-India relationship stands out as a rare bright
spot, one that has spanned Democratic and Republican administrations alike . Former
president Bill Clinton opened the door to India in 2000 after decades of estrangement. And after him, George W. Bush recognized
Indias strategic importance, and pushed through a civil-nuclear deal that permitted nuclear energy cooperation with India and
brought the country inside the global nonproliferation tent. With the conclusion of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modis three-day
Obamas support for nurturing ties to India will be
visit to Washington yesterday, one thing is clear:
marked by his work with one of the worlds largest industrializing economies to curb
climate change and support clean energy. This is not to suggest that the Obama
administration has not advanced ties in other areasincluding defense,
counterterrorism, and homeland securitybut to point out new ground covered
during his presidency. From the beginning to the end of his two terms in office, Obama has made a bet on clean energy,
and in Modis India he has found an enthusiastic partner. President Obama has expanded clean energy cooperation with India more
than any previous U.S. administration. This will be his defining legacy for the burgeoning U.S. relationship with India. Ahead of the
prime ministers arrival this week, many speculated that defense ties would be the big story, particularly with the finalization of text,
after a decade of dialogue, for a logistics exchange agreement that will allow the two countries militaries to use each others bases.
both
Defense is important, including the decision to treat India as a major defense partner for technology transfer. Nonetheless,
countries agreed to make climate and clean energy cooperation a priority and
outlined steps to advance these causes in a joint statement following the summit.
These measures will have a global impact, given Indias 1.3 billion people, its
rapidly-industrializing $2.3 trillion economy, and its hundreds of millions of poor
citizens who will use more energy as their incomes and standard of living rise . On a per
capita basis, Indias carbon emissions are just one-ninth those of the United States, and
India remains a much smaller emitter of emissions, in absolute terms, relative to
China and the United States. But due to its size, India nonetheless is the third-largest
source of carbon emissions. India therefore seeks low-carbon growth to power its
economy without poisoning its atmosphere, while the U.S. sees the same goal as a
vital global good. The summit brought long-awaited news that Westinghouse Electric would at last begin site work on six
nuclear energy reactors in India, albeit with contract negotiations still under way. This marks the transition from the diplomatic slog
Modi and
begun under the George W. Bush administration in 2005 to the actual commercialization of civil-nuclear ties.
Obama noted the intention of India and the U.S. Export-Import Bank to cooperate
toward a financing package to help nudge this enormous clean energy
infrastructure undertaking along. Nuclear energy will not be able to supply all of Indias fast-growing
energy needs, but it will position India with a stable supply from a renewable source to add
to Indias overall energy mix, which is currently largely dependent on oil from the
Middle East. Among other initiatives, officials this week announced efforts to finance clean energy projects, including plans
for both India and the U.S. to raise up to $400 million to deliver renewable energy to up to 1 million households by 2020. A new
U.S.-India Clean Energy Hub will serve as a single-window to organize renewable energy investment to India. The U.S. and India
also agreed to establish the U.S.-India Catalytic Solar Finance Program, which is expected to attract private investments of up to
$1 billion for projects on a smaller scale. Reference to technical support for a rooftop solar initiative in India, and a Greening the
Grid initiative all appear in the joint statement. A $30 million public-private smart grid initiative will support research. Taken
together, these efforts flow directly from the bilateral clean energy cooperation launched in 2009, at the start of President Obamas
first term. The Partnership to Advance Clean Energy (PACE), as the initiative is known, has to date secured more than $2.5 billion in
public and private investment. The new announcements add another $1.4 billion to that total. PACE has developed a joint clean
energy research consortium drawing on the scientific talents of both countries, and it has also supported targeted efforts (green
buildings, smart grids) to deploy clean energy where it can make a difference. India has consistently sought greater space to give its
economy time to grow and raise living standards before making commitments to cap its carbon emissions. For this reason, the
multilateral diplomacy with India has not been easy. But through its ambitious targets of installing 175 gigawatts of clean energy
(100GW of that via solar), the Modi government has put forward another side of India to the world, an India that seeks to lead on the
transition to renewables.
The Modi-Obama joint statement includes a slightly ambiguous
reference to implementing the Paris agreementas soon as possible this year for
the United States, and work toward this shared objective for India but no ambiguity exists
on the extent and range of joint undertakings on the clean energy front. A year and a half ago, after the Modi-Obama Republic Day
summit of January 2015, I wrote that clean energy was the next big idea in U.S.-India relations. This kind of cooperation takes place
out of the diplomatic spotlight, and rests on the talents of scientists, energy experts, utilities, and leading-edge companiesnot

grand governmental gestures. For that reason, however, the successes achieved during this
weeks meeting stand a better chance of having lasting and
transformative effects.
 no nuke terror
Zero risk of nuclear terrorism no desire or means to acquire
or build a weapon
Mueller, 10 [professor of political science at Ohio State University and author of
Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda, more qualed than your tool-authors
[John, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Winter, http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html]
A daunting task Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be the most immediate and extreme threat to global security. It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert
Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression of
a pattern of dramatic risk inflation that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would blow up about 1% of the citys areaa tragedy, of course, but not the
same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be immediate, explaining at length how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb. At the time he thought it

In contrast to
was already too late to prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then, or in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late. Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their easy task. these

predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even
less progress in going atomic after brief exploration of the possible routes, . This may be because,

they have discovered the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely

, unlike generations of alarmists, that

to be successful. to manufacture an atomic device

The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be themselves from purloined fissile

remains daunting requiring a considerable series of

material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, a one, that

difficult hurdles be conquered in sequence Outright theft is exceedingly and . armed of fissile material

unlikely because of guards

not only chase would be immediate to
the resistance of , but because . A more promising approach would be

corrupt insiders requires the terrorists pay off a host of greedy

to smuggle out the required substances. However, this to

confederates any one of whom could turn on them or furnish

, including brokers and money-transmitters, , either out of guile or incompetence,

them with stuff that is useless Insiders might consider terrorists . also the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the

have every incentive to eliminat their confederates

would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, cover their trail, beginning with ing . If

terrorists would then have to transport it a long distance

were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they probably

over unfamiliar terrain while being pursued and probably by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established

smuggling routes are often under watch border

, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and the of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If

personnel might find it in their interest to disrupt passage,

became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them perhaps to

collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty,

terrorists would need a large and well-equipped machine shop to set up to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very

The group would have to be assembled and retained for

select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators.

the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police

the bomb-building team would have to be utterly

about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of also

devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some

the
observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerlands Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that

task could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group. precise They point out that

blueprints are required even with a good blueprint the terrorist group , not just sketches and general ideas, and that

would be forced to redesign

most certainly the work is difficult, dangerous, and . They also stress that

extremely exacting, the technical requirements verge on the unfeasible

and that in several fields . Stephen

uranium is exceptionally difficult to

Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that

machine whereas plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered,
a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.
to think that a terrorist group
Stressing the daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues, Younger concludes, , working in isolation with an unreliable supply of

could fabricate a bomb is farfetched at best.

electricity and little access to tools and supplies making a Under the best circumstances, the process of

bomb could take a year or more in utter secrecy.

months or even , which would, of course, have to be carried out In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may

the finished product would

observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, , weighing a ton or more, then

have to be transported and smuggled into the relevant target country where it to

would have to be received by collaborators who are totally dedicated and at once

technically proficient The financial costs could

at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. of this extensive and extended operation

be monumental
easily come the vast
. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but

conspiracy requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and

also

opportunists , each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and
psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is not impossible. But although it may not

be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood becomes vanishingly small
that a group could surmount a series of them quickly . Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that

must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will
undoubtedly conclude their prospects are daunting and terminally
that accordingly uninspiring or even

dispiriting assuming terrorists have

. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists favorfor example, the

a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles the chances that a concerted effort would be successful

comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes more realistically , somewhat , that their

chances are one in three, the cumulative odds

at each barrier will be one in over that they able to pull off the deed drop to well

three billion terrorists are unlikely to be given or sold a

. Other routes would-be might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They

bomb because the risk would be high that the bomb

by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad , even for a country led by extremists, (and its

would be discovered
source) Another concern even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself.

would be the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence.

that The terrorist group might
also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a loose nuke somewhere. However, it seems probable that none exist. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has

finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear
developed,

explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with And there are other .

security techniques Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts
:

stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two
people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an

nuclear
unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon. There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions,

weapons would remain under heavy guard probably by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of
Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled.
2ac relations bad
 improved relations bad
Better relations lead to high expectations creates challenges
Khanna and Mohan 6 (February/March 2006. Parag Khanna fellow at the
New America Foundation and Raja Mohan strategic affairs editor of the Indian
Express in New Dehli. Getting India Right.
http://www.gees.org/documentos/Documen-710.pdf)
Better relations, however, create rising expectations. As American and Indian interests
naturally come into closer alignment, both countries must recognize that their noisy
democracies will examine every minute detail in the agreements that the two
governments negotiate. Preventing these noises from overwhelming the long-awaited strategic signals of
greater engagement will be the most difficult challenge that Washington and Delhi have to
overcome.
 2ac pakistan relations da

US India relations create friction with Pakistan relations key

to central Asian stability
The National 13 (The National Editorial;
http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/editorial/why-pakistan-is-still-
important-to-the-us; 12-9-13; 6-24-16)
However, there is no question that Pakistans significance to the US goes beyond terrorism . Pakistan
is one of the biggest recipients of economic aid from China often seemingly targeted to annoy or provoke India and Iran.
Islamabads relations with Beijing reached a milestone earlier this year when it
handed over management of the Gwadar port to China. The port has geostrategic
and political significance for US policy and interests in the region: it will link China to
the Arabian Sea and to the Strait of Hormuz, the gateway for one-third of the
worlds traded oil. If used as a Chinese naval base, the port will have new implications, not only for the US but also for
India. China is also reportedly investing in Pakistans nuclear energy projects, which raises the risk of proliferation. So, the US should
have serious concerns over such cooperation. If these were the only pieces of the geopolitical puzzle in the region, it would be fair to
expect a competitive two-bloc formation to take shape in South Asia: China and Pakistan on one side, and India and the US on the

other. But the puzzle is more complicated than that. Thanks to its location, Pakistan will inevitably play a
central role in the future of Afghanistan, and ultimately the stability and
economic interdependence of much of Central Asia . That is why
Afghanistans stability is unthinkable without Pakistans cooperation. That is also
why the US should demonstrate a more nuanced approach to its relations with
Pakistan. It must understand that i t cannot launch drone strikes at will or sign deals that appear to disadvantage
Pakistan or favour India without there being some consequence to tripartite
dynamics.

Central Asia instability escalatesdraws in great powers and

goes nuclear
Peimani 2 -- Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for International Cooperation
and Security, Senior International Relations consultant with the United Nations in
Geneva, PhD in International Relations, Hooman, Failed Transition, Bleak Future?, p.
2-5
If the existing negative trend continues, the entire Caucasus and Central Asia will likely head toward long-term tension and
instability. The first and foremost victims of this undesirable future will obviously be the three Caucasian and five CA countries.
Yet, this bleak future will also have major implications for a number of regional ( Iran , China ,

Turkey , and Russia ) and nonregional (United States) powers with long-term
interests in the two regions most of which share borders with them . The
deteriorating situation will create a suitable ground for the emergence and growth of
political extremism among the peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia, who are mostly dissatisfied with the status quo.
These frustrated and disenchanted peoples will likely find the extremist political
ideologies and programs more appealing and more convincing than those of their discredited rulers. The
latters legitimacy is being questioned by a growing number of their nationals for a wide range of reasons, including incompetence,
In response to the rising internal threat,
rampant corruption, and an antidemocratic style of government.
the ruling elites will likely resort to nationalism. In particular, they might promote extreme forms of
nationalism, including chauvinism, as experienced in many other countries in different continents confronting the same situation.
Creating an appealing alternative to that of the opposition extremist groups aimed at the dissatisfied people will be one of its major
objectives. Extreme nationalism will be very attractive for the youth the social stratum most vulnerable to extremist ideologies
and the main targets of extremist groups. The ruling elites might also find their resort to extreme nationalism necessary for the sake
of consolidating their challenged power apparatus. In this case, they could seek to manipulate the nationalist sentiment of their
using the
peoples as a means to increase their legitimacy and strengthen their social basis of support. However,
nationalist card will have a negative backlash, with weakening and destabilizing
effects on its users. Extreme nationalism could, and will likely, provoke ethnic
conflicts within the multiethnic Caucasian and CA countries. It could therefore lead to civil wars . Moreover, it
could spread fear in the neighboring countries. They might feel threatened by the surge of nationalism in their vicinity, which could
easily take the form of expansionism in the Caucasian and CA countries characterized with territorial and border disputes. In
addition to various external influences, many internal social, economic, and political factors will determine in what form and to what
extent instability will surface in each Caucasian and CA country. Needless to say, based on the specific situation in each country
the logical
there will be differences in its shape and in the extent of its initial emergence. Regardless of these differences,
and predictable outcome of the current trend will likely be instability in the form of
civil, interstate, and regional wars in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The existence of unsettled, although
currently inactive, violent con-flicts (i.e., independence movements and civil wars) in these two regions have left no doubt about the
feasibility of this scenario. To this list, one should also add the existence of many ethnic grievances and territorial and border
disagreements, which will likely create a suitable ground for the instigation of new ethnic conflicts and territorial disputes in violent
forms. For a number of reasons,there is a great possibility that many of them could escalate to
civil wars and interstate wars, respectively. Among other factors, the ethnic makeup of the Caucasus
and Central Asia and the existence of many sources of conflict between their regional states will pave the way for
their further escalation to the level of regional wars, despite the intention of their
initiators. The presence of certain regional (Iran, China, Turkey, and Russia) and
nonregional (United States) powers with long-term interests in the two regions will have a certain
impact on the development of the scenarios mentioned above and will likely contribute to the extent,
intensity, and duration of wars of various forms. In particular, the presence of these
powers will increase the possibility of their intentional or unintentional involvement
in those wars in support of one side or another , while preserving their interests. Depending on the
situation, whether this involvement takes a direct or indirect form will be determined by many factors, including the importance of
the affected Caucasian or CA countries for each of the five states and the latters political, economic, and military capabilities. These
factors also include the geographical realities, which, depending on the case, facilitate or impede their access to the affected
countries, and the overall political environment in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The latter determines whether a foreign
intervention in whatever form can take place at all. The possibility of some or all of the five states being dragged into any future
military conflict will therefore strengthen the potential for the escalation and expansion of military conflicts in either of the two
War and instability in these energy-producing regions bordering regional and
regions.

global powers with strong conventional military and/or nuclear capabilities will
have long-term political, economic, and security implications . They will not be
confined only to the countries directly involved in any future regional military
conflict. In one way or another, they could affect the stability of the Caucasus and Central Asia as
well as that of the Asian and/or European regions in their proximity. As a result, wars in
whatever form in those two regions could escalate and affect the stability of
the international system and global peace.
 1ar pakistan relations da

US India relations will create friction with Pakistan

Lakshman 11 (Narayan Lakshman; writer for The Hindu; U.S.-India ties zero sum
game for Pakistan: Hillary.
http://m.thehindu.com/news/international/article2131879.ece/; 6-25-11; 6-24-16)
Pakistan has viewed successive partnerships between India and the United States
as a zero-sum game and always asked, So are you our friend or are you their friend? according to U.S. Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton, who made rare, candid comments on Pakistans India-centric perspectives on possible outcomes in
Afghanistan. Addressing probing questions from Senators during a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Ms. Clinton said
the U.S. had to recognise that the overriding strategic framework in which Pakistan
thinks of itself was its relationship with India. Every time we make a move toward
improving our relationship with India, which we started in [with] a great commitment to back in the 90s and
it has been bipartisan with both President Clinton and President Obama and President Bush the Pakistanis find that
creates a lot of cognitive dissonance, she said. Her comments came even as there was less than a month to
go before the second round of the India-U.S. Strategic Dialogue in New Delhi. The Secretary was especially pressed by the
Committee Chairman John Kerry, Democrat of Massachusetts, and Ben Cardin, Democrat of Maryland, to explain why, despite $2.8
billion being channelled into Pakistan last year, there is clear evidence that their intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence, is
assisting and funding a terrorist group, Lashkar-e-Taiba; and that is inconsistent with our laws. Ms. Clinton responded by painting a
picture of the complex web of inter-relationships between India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. On the Pakistan-Afghanistan equation she
argued that Pakistan desired strategic depth in Afghanistan, by which it meant a regime in Kabul and a border that were not going
to challenge its interests.
permutations
 perm do the cp
Perm do the CP consult is the norm no reason why we
wouldnt do it this time
MEA 2016 (Ministry of External Affairs; Government of India;
http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/USA_15_01_2016.pdf)
India-U.S. bilateral relations have developed into a "global strategic partnership ",
based on shared democratic values and increasing convergence of interests on bilateral, regional and global issues. The
emphasis placed by the Government in India on development and good governance
has created opportunity to reinvigorate bilateral ties and enhance cooperation under
the motto --- Chalein Saath Saath: Forward Together We Go, and "Sanjha Prayas, Sab ka Vikas" (Shared Effort, Progress for All)
Regular exchange of
adopted during the summits of our leaders in September 2014 and January 2015 respectively.
high level political visits has provided sustained momentum to bilateral cooperation,
while the wide-ranging and ever-expanding dialogue architecture has established a
long-term framework for India-U.S. engagement. Today, the India-U.S. bilateral
cooperation is broad-based and multi-sectoral , covering trade and investment, defence and security,
education, science and technology, cyber security, high-technology, civil nuclear energy, space technology and applications, clean
energy, environment, agriculture and health. Vibrant people-to-people interaction and support across the political spectrum in both
The frequency of high-level visits and
countries nurture our bilateral relationship. Political Relations:
exchanges between India and the U.S. has gone up significantly of late. Prime Minister Modi
visited the U.S. on 26-30 September 2014; he held meetings with President Obama, members of the U.S. Congress and political
leaders, including from various States and cities in the U.S., and interacted with members of President Obama's Cabinet. He also
reached out to the captains of the U.S. commerce and industry, the American civil society and think-tanks, and the IndianAmerican
community. A Vision Statement and a Joint Statement were issued during the visit. The visit was followed by President Obama's visit
to India on 25-27 January 2015 as the Chief Guest at India's Republic Day. During the visit, the two sides issued a Delhi Declaration
of Friendship and adopted a Joint Strategic Vision for Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region. Both sides elevated the Strategic
Dialogue between their Foreign Ministers to Strategic and Commercial Dialogue of Foreign and Commerce Ministers. Prime Minister
Modi again visited the U.S. on 23-28 September 2015, during which he held a bilateral meeting with President Obama, interacted
with leaders of business, media, academia, the provincial leaders and the Indian community, including during his travel to the
There is frequent interaction between the leadership of the two countries,
Silicon Valley.
including telephone calls and meetings on the sidelines of international summits . A
hotline has been established between the Prime Minister's Office and the U.S. White House. There are more than 50
bilateral dialogue mechanisms between the two governments . The first meeting of the Strategic
and Commercial Dialogue at the level of EAM and MoS(Commerce & Industry) was held in Washington DC on 22 September 2015; it
has added a commercial component to the five traditional pillars of bilateral relations on which the erstwhile Strategic Dialogue has
focussed, namely: Strategic Cooperation; Energy and Climate Change, Education and Development; Economy, Trade and Agriculture;
Science and Technology; and Health and Innovation. In addition, there are Ministerial-level dialogues involving home (Homeland
Security Dialogue), finance (Financial and Economic Partnership), commerce (Trade Policy Forum), HRD (Higher Education Dialogue),
Science & Technology (Joint Commission Meeting on S&T) and energy (Energy Dialogue).