Husserl, Kant, and the Transcendental

Phenomenology

Transcendental phenomenology is not simply a theory about the structure

of (inter)subjectivity, nor is it merely a discourse about how we understand
and perceive the natural world and our sense-constitutive activities and
passivities. It is not even a theory about how the world appears to us, if such a
theory is supposed to be complemented by a further investigation (left to
metaphysics) of what the world itself is like. Transcendental phenomenology
aims to answer the following question: in what way is the being of the
world, the world, which is for me and could be for me, grounded in my
intending, in my streaming experiencing and otherwise conscious life, and in my
enduring features?1
Despite of a long tradition of invocation and discussion of Husserls
transcendental thinking, the deep meaning of the idea of a transcendental
constitution of consciousness remains even today troublingly obscure. We
would like to take Husserls references seriously and reflect on the following
topics:

The Kantian and the Husserlian notion of the transcendental ego;

The relation of transcendental phenomenology to post-Kantian
philosophies;
The idea of transcendental logic;
 Husserls mature transcendental phenomenology;
Husserls notion of a world-annihilation;
The transcendental foundation of the natural sciences;
The distinction between the transcendental and the natural, the
transcendental and the psychological, the transcendental and the
anthropological;
Eugen Fink and the critique of transcendental reason;

Title and abstract: 500 words, due February 28, 2017.

Final Paper Deadline: 7,000 -10,000 words, due January 15, 2018.
Date of publication will be Fall 2018.

Submit abstracts and papers to Claudia Serban [claudia_serban@hotmail.fr]

and Iulian Apostolescu [iulian.apostolescu@gmail.com].

1 Edmund Husserl, Zur phnomenologischen Reduktion. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1926-
1935). Sebastian Luft (ed.). Husserliana XXXIV (Dordrecht: Kluwer), 244.