Constitutional Law 2 Set II

Search and Seizures

1. Salazar vs Achacoso (183 SCRA 145)

Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged
petitioner with illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent
petitioner a telegram directing him to appear to the POEA regarding the complaint
against him. On the same day, after knowing that petitioner had no license to
operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas Achacoso
issued a Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It stated that there will a
seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as
the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that petitioner has
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to
recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing
acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of
the same code. A team was then tasked to implement the said Order. The group,
accompanied by mediamen and Mandaluyong policemen, went to petitioners
residence. They served the order to a certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let them in.
The team confiscated assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a letter
requesting for the return of the seized properties, because she was not given prior
notice and hearing. The said Order violated due process. She also alleged that it
violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the properties were confiscated against her
will and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation.

Issue:

Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the

Secretary of Labor) can validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest)
under Article 38 of the Labor Code

Held:

Under the new Constitution, . . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. Mayors and prosecuting officers cannot issue warrants of
seizure or arrest. The Closure and Seizure Order was based on Article 38 of the
Labor Code. The Supreme Court held, We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not
being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities
must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38,
paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect The
power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously,
exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) cannot be made to extend to other
cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the
courts. Furthermore, the search and seizure order was in the nature of a general
warrant. The court held that the warrant is null and void, because it must identify
specifically the things to be seized.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to
return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure
Order No. 1205.

2. Presidential Anti Dollar vs CA (171 SCRA 348) = sribd

3. Papa vs Mago (22 SCRA 857) = scribd

4. People vs Lo Ho Wing (193 SCRA 122)

5. Nolasco vs Cruz Pao (147 SCRA 509 & 139 SCRA 152)

Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia Nolasco by the

Constabulary Security Group (CSG). Milagros had been wanted as a high ranking
officer of the CPP. The arrest took place at 11:30 a.m. of August 6, 1984. At noon of
the same day, her premises were searched and 428 documents, a portable
typewriter and 2 boxes were seized.

Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Pao issued a search warrant to be served at Aguilar-
Roques leased residence allegedly an underground house of the CPP/NPA. On the
basis of the documents seized, charges of subversion and rebellion by the CSG were
filed by but the fiscals office merely charged her and Nolasco with illegal
possession of subversive materials. Aguilar-Roque asked for suppression of the
evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained and that the search warrant is
void because it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with
particularity the things subject of the search and seizure, and that probable cause
has not been properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the
applicants witness.

WON the search warrant was valid?

NO. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. It also specifically provides
that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by
the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.

It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of
personal properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all- embracing
description which includes everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party
of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify what the
subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available to
the public contain to make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the
crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to
what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion
regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable
typewriter and 2 wooden boxes.

It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional

mandate requiring particular description of the things to be seized. In the recent
rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar description were considered null and
void for being too general

6. Pita vs CA (178 SCRA 362)

On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the

Mayor of the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-
Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the
Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers,
distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines,
publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and
indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the University belt along
C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers
and members of various student organizations.

Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines
published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita.

Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of
Western Police District of the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and
their agents from confiscating plaintiffs magazines or from preventing the sale or
circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational
magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected by the
Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Plaintiff also filed
an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against
indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy"
Magazines, pending hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction. The Court
granted the temporary restraining order. The case was set for trial upon the lapse of
the TRO. RTC ruled that the seizure was valid. This was affirmed by the CA.

Issue: Whether or Not the seizure violative of the freedom of expression of the
petitioner.

Held: Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to
protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as
indeed we have laws punishing the author, publishers and sellers of obscene
publications. However, It is easier said than done to say, that if the pictures here in
question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes,
the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection. Using the Kottinger
rule: the test of obscenity is "whether the tendency of the matter charged as
obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral
influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being
obscene may fall." Another is whether it shocks the ordinary and common sense of
men as an indecency. Ultimately "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must
depend upon the circumstances of the case and that the question is to be decided
by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it." The
government authorities in the instant case have not shown the required proof to
justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature First of all, they were not
possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography,
and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search
warrant. The court provides that the authorities must apply for the issuance of a
search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion an obscenity seizure is in order and
that;

1. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized
are obscene and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to
warrant State interference and action;
2. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The
question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judges sound
discretion;

7. People vs Asis (177 SCRA 250): Scribd

8. Posadas vs CA (188 SCRA 288)

While Pat. Ungab and Umpar were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes
Street,Davao City, they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed
him to beacting suspiciously.They approached the petitioner and identified
themselves asmembers of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to
get away wasthwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance.They then checked
the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38revolver, two (2)
rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun

a smoke (tear gas)grenade,

and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun.

the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess the
firearms and ammunitions but failed to do so.

Issue: Whether or not the warantless arrest and search was valid.

Ruling:An arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or private

person, among others, when in his presence the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when
an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the
facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it. Contrary to the argument
of the Solicitor General that when the two policemen approached the petitioner, he
was actually committing or had just committed the offense of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions in the presence of the police officers and consequently
the search and seizure of the contraband was incidental to the lawful arrest in
accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure; At
the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the
petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not know that he had committed, or was
actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions.
They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did not
know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest
without a warrant

9. Stonehill vs Diokno (28 SCRA 283)

1. Respondent (porsecution) made possible the issuance of 42 search warrants

against the petitioner and the corporation to search persons and premises of
several personal properties due to an alleged violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Custom Laws, Internal Revenue Code and the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines. As a results, search and seizures were conducted in the both the
residence of the petitioner and in the corporation's premises.

2.The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their
issuance violated the Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants.
Thus,he filed a petition with the Supreme Court for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus and injunction to prevent the seized effects from being introduced as
evidence in the deportation cases against the petitioner. The court issued the writ
only for those effects found in the petitioner's residence.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can validly assail the legality of the search and
seizure in both premises

RULING: No, he can only assail the search conducted in the residences but not those
done in the corporation's premises. The petitioner has no cause of action in the
second situation since a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from
the personality of its officers or herein petitioner regardless of the amount of shares
of stock or interest of each in the said corporation, and whatever office they hold
therein. Only the party whose rights has been impaired can validly object the
legality of a seizure--a purely personal right which cannot be exercised by a third
party. The right to object belongs to the corporation ( for the 1st group of
documents, papers, and things seized from the offices and the premises).

10. People vs Marti (193 SCRA 57)

August 14, 1957, the appellant and his common-law wife, Sherly Reyes, went to the
booth of the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders carrying Four (4) wrapped
packages. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to
a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes asked if she could examine and inspect
the packages. She refused and assures her that the packages simply contained
books, cigars, and gloves.

Before the delivery of appellants box to the Bureau of Customs and Bureau of
Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (Proprietor), following the standard operating procedure,
opened the boxes for final inspection. A peculiar odor emitted from the box and that
the gloves contain dried leaves. He prepared a letter and reported to the NBI and
requesting a laboratory examinations. The dried marijuana leaves were found to
have contained inside the cellophane wrappers.

The accused appellant assigns the following errors: The lower court erred in
admitting in evidence the illegality of search and seized objects contained in the
four (4) parcels.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the seizing of illegal objects is legal?

HELD:

Yes, appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

RATIONALE:

Article III, Sections 2 and 3, 1987 Constitution

11. Aberca vs Ver (160 SCRA 590)

Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the respondents postulate

the view that as public officers they are covered by the mantle of state immunity
from suit for acts done in the performance of official duties or function

ISSUE:whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a
civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and
other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. If such
action for damages may be maintained, who can be held liable for such violations:
only the military personnel directly involved and/or their superiors as well.

RATIO DICIDENDI:
SC: We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit
totally misplaced. The cases invoked by respondents actually involved acts done by
officers in the performance of official duties written the ambit of their powers.

It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
were merely responding to their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in accordance with Proclamation
No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981,
and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre- emptive strikes against alleged
communist terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket
license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to
disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen
enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the
supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe
obedience and allegiance at all times.

Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any
private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and
liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from
responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided
their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal
statute.

We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause
of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their
constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal
arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek
release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of
obtaining his liberty.

Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for damages 5 Section 1, Article 19. to
'acts of alleged physical violence" which constituted delict or wrong. Article 32
clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or in any manner impeding or
impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties enumerated therein, among
others

The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and
details, how plaintiffs' constitutional rights and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of
the Civil Code were violated and impaired by defendants. The complaint speaks of,
among others, searches made without search warrants or based on irregularly
issued or substantially defective warrants; seizures and confiscation, without proper
receipts, of cash and personal effects belonging to plaintiffs and other items of
property which were not subversive and illegal nor covered by the search warrants;
arrest and detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under irregular, improper and
illegal circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places of
'safehouses" where they were kept incommunicado and subjected to physical and
psychological torture and other inhuman, degrading and brutal treatment for the
purpose of extracting incriminatory statements. The complaint contains a detailed
recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs violative of their constitutional
rights.

Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated
"directly" should be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the
ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its
violation.

The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth in
the complaint. It is well established in our law and jurisprudence that a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action must be based
on what appears on the face of the complaint. 6 To determine the sufficiency of the
cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no others, should be
considered. 7 For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the
truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.

Arrest Warrant

1. People vs Burgos (144 SCRA 1)

Defendant is charged with illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion

(tasks such as recruiting members to the NPA and collection of contributions from
its members) and found guilty by the RTC of Digos, Davao del Sur. From the
information filed by the police authorities upon the information given by Masamlok,
allegedly a man defendant tried to recruit into the NPA, the police authorities arrest
defendant and had his house searched. Subsequently, certain NPA-related
documents and a firearm, allegedly issued and used by one Alias Cmdr. Pol of the
NPA, are confiscated. Defendant denies being involved in any subversive activities
and claims that he has been tortured in order to accept ownership of subject firearm
and that his alleged extrajudicial statements have been made only under fear,
threat and intimidation on his person and his family. He avers that his arrest is
unlawful as it is done without valid warrant, that the trial court erred in holding the
search warrant in his house for the firearm lawful, and that the trial court erred in
holding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of PD 9 in relation to GOs
6and 7.
Issue: If defendants arrest, the search of his home, and the subsequent confiscation
of a firearm and several NPA-related documents are lawful.

Held: Records disclose that when the police went to defendants house to arrest him
upon the information given by Masamlok, they had neither search nor arrest
warrant with themin wanton violation of ArtIV, Sec 3 (now Art III, sec 2). As the
Court held in Villanueva vs Querubin, the state, however powerful, doesnt have
access to a mans home, his haven of refuge where his individuality can assert itself
in his choice of welcome and in the kind of objects he wants around him. In the
traditional formulation, a mans house, however humble, is his castle, and thus is
outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by the government.

The trial court justified the warrantless arrest under Rule 113 Sec 6 ofthe RoC:

a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is

about to commit an offense in his presence;

b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable

ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;

c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another and the confiscation of the firearm under Rule 126, Sec 12:

A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or

anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.

However, the trial court has erred in its conclusion that said warrantless arrest is
under the ambit of aforementioned RoC. At the time of defendants arrest, he wasnt
in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document, and was not
committing any subversive acthe was plowing his field. It is not enough that
there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed
a crime in a warrantless arrest. An essential precondition is that a crime must have
beenin fact or actually have been committed first; it isnt enough to suspect a crime
may have been committed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the
identity of the perpetrator. The Court also finds no compelling reason for the haste
with which the arresting officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why
they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed
they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a
crime. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was
on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts
of the accused were unknown.

In proving the ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged subversive

documents, assuming they were really illegal, the defendant was never informed of
his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest; thus the admissions obtained are in
violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec 20 Art IV
(now Sec 12, Art III) and thus inadmissible as evidence.

Furthermore, the defendant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted
by counsel during the custodial interrogation. His extra-judicial confession, the
firearm, and the alleged subversive documents are all inadmissible as evidence. In
light of the aforementioned, defendant is acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt
of the crime with which he has been charged. Subject firearm and alleged
subversive documents have been disposed of in accordance with law.

The Court also maintains that violations of human rights do not help in overcoming
a rebellion. Reiterating Morales vs Enrile, while the government should continue to
repel the communists, the subversives, the rebels, and the lawless with the means
at its command, it should always be remembered that whatever action is taken
must always be within the framework of our Constitution and our laws.

2. Go vs CA (206 SCRA 138)

An information was filed charging herein petitioner

Rolito Go

for murder before the Regional Trial Court of MetroManila. Petitioner voluntarily
presented himself together with his two lawyers to the police upon
obtainingknowledge of being hunted by the latter. However, he was immediately
detained and denied his right of a

preliminary investigation

unless he executes and sings a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
RevisedPenal Code. Upon omnibus motion for immediate release on recognizance or
on bail and proper preliminaryinvestigation on the ground that his warrantless arrest
was unlawful and no preliminary investigation wasconducted before the information
was filed, which is violative of his rights, the same was granted but later onreversed
by the lower court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The appellate court in
sustaining the decision of the lower court held that petitioner's warrantless arrest
was valid in view of the fact that the offense wascommitted, the petitioner was
clearly identified and there exists valid information for murder filed against
petitioner

Hence, the petitioner filed this present petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S

: The issues assailed in the case at bar are the following:1.whether or not the
warrantless arrest of herein petitioner was lawful, and

whether or not petitioner waived his right to

preliminary investigation

RULING

The general rule on arrest provides that the same is legitimate if effected with a
valid warrant. However, there areinstances specifically enumerated under the law
when a warrantless arrest may be considered lawful. Despite that,the warrantless
arrest of herein petitioner Rolito Go

does not fall within the terms of said rule. The police were notpresent at the time of
the commission of the offense, neither do they have personal knowledge on the
crime to becommitted or has been committed not to mention the fact that
petitioner was not a prisoner who has escaped fromthe penal institution. In view of
the above, the allegation of the prosecution that petitioner needs to sign a waiver of
the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code before a preliminary
investigation may be conducted isbaseless. In this connection, petitioner has all the
right to ask for a

preliminary investigation

to determinewhether is probable cause that a crime has been committed and that
petitioner is probably guilty thereof as well asto prevent him from the hassles,
anxiety and aggravation brought by a criminal proceeding. This reason of
theaccused is substantial, which he should not be deprived of.On the other hand,
petitioner did not waive his right to have a preliminary investigation contrary to the
prosecutor'sclaim. The right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the
accused fails to invoke it before or at thetime of entering a pleas at arraignment.
The facts of the case show that petitioner insisted on his right topreliminary
investigation before his arraignment and he, through his counsel denied answering
questions beforethe court unless they were afforded the

proper preliminary investigation

For the above reasons, the petitionwas granted and the ruling of the appellate court
was set aside and nullified. The Supreme Court however, contraryto petitioner's
allegation, declared that failure to accord the right to preliminary investigation did
not impair thevalidity of the information charging the latter of the crime of murder

3. Umil vs Ramos (187 SCRA 311 & 202 SCRA 251)

FACTS: This consolidated case of 8 petitions for habeas corpus assails the validity of
the arrests and searches made by the military on the petitioners. The arrests relied
on the confidential information that the authorities received. Except for one case
where inciting to sedition was charged, the rest are charged with subversion for
being a member of the New Peoples Army.

RULING: The arrests were legal. Regarding the subversion cases, the arrests were
legal since subversion is a form of a continuing crime together with rebellion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit rebellion/subversion, and crimes committed in
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith. On the inciting to sedition case, the
arrest was legal since an information was filed prior to his arrest. Lastly, the arrests
were not fishing expeditions but a result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safe
houses pinpointed by none other than members of the NPA.

The right to preliminary investigation should be exercised by the offender as soon

as possible. Otherwise, it would be considered as impliedly waived and the filing of
information can proceed. This sort of irregularity is not sufficient to set aside a valid
judgment upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial free from error.

DISSENT: (Sarmiento, J.) The confidential information was nothing but hearsay. The
searches and arrests made were bereft of probable cause and that the petitioners
were not caught in flagrante delicto or in any overt act. Utmost, the authorities was
lucky in their fishing expeditions.
2. The Bill of Rights can only be invoked only against the state. People vs. Marti --
Marti and his wife went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders"
carrying with them four (4) gift-wrapped packages. Marti informed the owner that
the packages simply contained books, cigars and gloves as gifts to his friends in
Zurich and refused to allow the owner to examine and inspect the packages.
However, before the delivery of the box to the Bureau of Customs, the owner's
husband inspected the package and found marijuana which was later turned over to
the NBI. A case was filed against Marti. Marti invoked his right against illegal
searches and seizure. Held: The constitutional proscription against unlawful
searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could
only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed

4. People vs Linsangan (195 SCRA 784)

Held:

This case was tried and decided in the court below before the Constitution of the
Philippines took effect. But while this appeal was pending, the said Constitution
became effective, and, section 1, clause 12, of Article III thereof provides that "no
person shall be imprisoned for debt or nonpayment of a poll tax." This introduces a
new element into the case, for while our previous organic law provided that no
person should be imprisoned for debt, it contained no express provision against
imprisonment for non-payment of a poll or cedula tax.

Turning again to the particular question raised in this case, section 2 of Article XV of
the Constitution, provides:

All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain operative,
unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered, modified, or
repealed by the National Assembly, and all references in such laws to the
Government or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as
applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this
Constitution.
It seems too clear to require demonstration that section 2718 of the Revised
Administrative Code is inconsistent with section 1, clause 12, of Article III of the
Constitution, in that, while the former authorizes imprisonment for nonpayment of
the poll or cedula tax, the latter forbids it. It follows that upon the inauguration of
the Government of the Commonwealth, said section 2718 of the Revised
Administrative Code became inoperative, and no judgment of conviction can be
based thereon.