Francisco Chavez v. Raul M.

Gonzales
GR No. 168338, 15 February 2008
Ponente: Puno

FACTS:
A year following the 2004 national and local elections, Press Secretary
Ignacio Bunye disclosed to the public how the opposition planned to
destabilize the administration by releasing an audiotape of a mobile phone
conversation allegedly between President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and
Commissioner Garcillano of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The
conversation was alleged to have been audio-taped through wire-tapping. On
June 8, 2005, respondent Secretary Raul Gonzales of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) warned reporters who are in possession of copies of the said
conversation, as well as those broadcasting companies and/or publishers
that they may be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. Consequently,
the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued a press release
strengthening the prohibition on the dissemination of the same that the
broadcasting/airing of such information shall be just cause for the
suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations
issued by the Commission. Petitioner Francisco Chavez filed a petition
against respondent Chavez and NTC, praying for the issuance of writs of
certiorari and prohibition for the nullification of the acts, issuances and
orders of respondents as they were outright violations of the freedom of
expression and of the press, and the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern.

ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of the respondents abridge freedom of

speech and of the press.

HELD:

Yes. Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are

evaluated by either or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous
tendency doctrine, which limits speech once a rational connection has
been established between the speech restrained and the danger
contemplated; (b) the balancing of interests tests, a standard when
courts balance conflicting social values and individual
interests, and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on the
premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger
that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to
prevent.

It appears that the great evil which government wants to prevent is the
airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law.
However, respondents evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and
present danger test. Firstly, the various statements of the Press Secretary
obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape recording. Secondly, the
integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary
showed to the public two versions, one supposed to be a complete version
and the other, an altered version. Thirdly, the evidence of the
respondents on the whos and the hows of the wiretapping act is
ambivalent, especially considering the tapes different versions. The identity
of the wire-tappers, the manner of its commission and other related and
relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given all
these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing
would violate the anti-wiretapping law.

We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the
exercise of freedom of speech and of the press.

The need to prevent their violation cannot per se trump the exercise
of free speech and free press, a preferred right whose breach can
lead to greater evils. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer
proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option
but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing
that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers
the national security of the State.