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Ali Rahman
Phil 1720
10/4/16
Why does Kant believe that proofs in geometry yield synthetic a priori cognition? Do you
think he is right?
in particular why he claimed that geometry is included in this concept. To this end I will recount
Kants argument that spatial reasoning arises from our intuition and that our sense for geometry
arises from our intuitive sense of space. I will conclude by providing my own view on his
arguments.
I begin by providing a background about what synthetic a priori cognition is. Kant
supposes cognition occupies two dimensions: synthetic vs analytic and a priori vs a posteriori.
The latter item is easier to explain. A priori knowledge (or cognition, or judgment) is knowledge
that can be obtained without experience, i.e. by merely sitting and thinking in an armchair
(unless the experience of sitting and thinking in an armchair is related to acquiring that
knowledge). In more Kantian language it is knowledge that is necessarily true and universal as
in purely logical, objective, independent of your own world, etc. For example all bachelors are
proposition you could know without having ever met a bachelor (assuming you know the
definitions of the words in the statement) because you could merely reason this to be true.
On the other hand, a posteriori knowledge is knowledge that must be obtained through
proposition that must be experienced (seen, heard, smelled, etc.). It cannot be deduced sitting at
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an armchair completely removed from the experience of the rain (assuming you had not known it
distinction is more abstract. Analytic knowledge is knowledge that is deductive, i.e., knowledge
that is contained in (that is implied by or deducible from) the knowledge of a more information-
dense knowledge. For example all bachelors are unmarried is also analytic knowledge because
contained in the concept bachelor is a man who is unmarried. Continuing the example, all
bachelors are male is also analytic knowledge because male is contained in the concept
bachelor.
On the other hand, synthetic knowledge is knowledge that is inductive, i.e., knowledge
that is outside the known concept but is related to it and in a sense adds to it. For example, all
swans are white is synthetic knowledge because whiteness has nothing to do with the concept
swan. A swan could for instance be black and still be a swan (in other words this is a
contingent truth rather than necessary). However our knowledge of swans seems to include that
they are often white. This is a proposition we have added around the concept of swan and in no
way could have deduced it from the given concept of swan in this case a priori.
It is clear to see then how a priori knowledge relates to analytic knowledge and how a
posteriori knowledge relates to synthetic knowledge. But Kants profound claim is that there is
knowledge that is synthetic a priori. In fact much of what we traditionally expect to be analytic a
= 12. First of all this proposition is clearly a priori because it is necessarily true independent of
our own experience. Second on the surface it seems that this is an analytic proposition. 7+5 is
contained in the concept of 12 because when combined with the concept sum they make up 12
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you might reason. But if you examine more closely what these constituent concepts are, you see
the sum 7+5 when you think of the concept of twelveness? By the same token, can you deduce,
knowing only what sevenness and fiveness are, what combing the two gives?
Let me exaggerate the example to underscore the point. Without using any algorithm or
mental aid can you tell me what number is 956534151+1328465843? In other words, if in a
world we only knew what 956534151 and 1328465843 were could you tell what they made
together?
No. Because the concept that numbers are made up of smaller numbers is not a concept
contained in the concept number. That is something we seem to understand not through
reasoning but according to Kant through something entirely different intuition (in this case the
if our minds were preprogramed to shape (or organize) our inner experience of outer stimulation
in a particular way. Intuition is the crux of Kants distinction between synthetic a priori and
analytic a priori cognition. It is what allows us to know a priori facts without having to prove or
reason them but just feel that they are right. I will make this statement clearer now that I consider
geometry.
Consider the a priori fact that a line is the shortest distance between two points (in
Euclidean geometry). Kant claims this is a synthetic proposition because the concept of straight
line is a purely qualitative concept while shortest distance is a quantitative concept and thus
outside the concept of line. We cannot deduce this fact from pure analysis. Instead here help
must be gotten from intuition. That intuition Kant believes is our sense of space or in more
is awareness innate to us (in the same way that senses such as sight, smell, etc. are innate to us).
It cannot be learned from experience a posteriori but is in fact what allows us to have experience
in the first place. To see this latter claim observe that for me to separate two sensations not
merely as different but as in different places I must already be aware that they coexist in a
greater concept, i.e., that space separates the two. In other words space is the fundamental
intuition that our outer experiences are built on. We can observe spatial phenomena because we
have the concept of distance that arises from it. Although distance is not contained in the concept
line our spatial reasoning allows us to synthesize that a line can also be distance. Therefore it is
synthetic a priori knowledge that a line is the shortest distance between two points.
In summary, synthetic a priori knowledge arises from a priori facts that cannot be arrived
at purely through reason. An additional set of information must come into play in order for us to
know these facts that information is intuition, which is innate in us and pre-informs our
experience. What I have shown is Kants argument that space is a pure intuition because it is
what allows us to have experience rather than what is learned through experience. Thus I have
shown that because geometry which is the science of space arises from our intuitions of
counter point that Kant fails to distinguish pure geometry of mathematics which is a priori and
analytic and applied geometry which is a posteriori and synthetic and applies to the real world.
Therefore geometry is not synthetic a priori knowledge (which Frege claims more strongly that
there is no such thing) because it divides into two different categories of knowledge.
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Despite this I agree that geometry is synthetic a priori (and that the category of synthetic
a priori cognition exists). Firstly I expect that geometry as it applies to the world and as a
logical abstraction is a priori. It is plausible to me to conceive of the notions of lines and points
and planes having never experienced space before (i.e., being blind and deaf and without the
sense of touch) just as I can conceive of topologies and shapes I have never and will never
experience. I can do this because of the minds intuition of spatial reasoning. And this latter
to make in order to deduce deeper truths (that is uncover analytic knowledge) about geometry.
They cannot be proved and yet they seem entirely true and in fact self-evident. Kant would say
that they arrive automatically true to us because they appeal to our intuition about space. Indeed