Locke's Political Philosophy

FirstpublishedWedNov9,2005;substantiverevisionMonJan11,2016
JohnLocke(16321704)isamongthemostinfluentialpoliticalphilosophersofthemodern
period.IntheTwoTreatisesofGovernment,hedefendedtheclaimthatmenarebynature
freeandequalagainstclaimsthatGodhadmadeallpeoplenaturallysubjecttoamonarch.He
arguedthatpeoplehaverights,suchastherighttolife,liberty,andproperty,thathavea
foundationindependentofthelawsofanyparticularsociety.Lockeusedtheclaimthatmen
arenaturallyfreeandequalaspartofthejustificationforunderstandinglegitimatepolitical
governmentastheresultofasocialcontractwherepeopleinthestateofnatureconditionally
transfersomeoftheirrightstothegovernmentinordertobetterensurethestable,
comfortableenjoymentoftheirlives,liberty,andproperty.Sincegovernmentsexistbythe
consentofthepeopleinordertoprotecttherightsofthepeopleandpromotethepublicgood,
governmentsthatfailtodosocanberesistedandreplacedwithnewgovernments.Lockeis
thusalsoimportantforhisdefenseoftherightofrevolution.Lockealsodefendstheprinciple
ofmajorityruleandtheseparationoflegislativeandexecutivepowers.IntheLetter
ConcerningToleration,Lockedeniedthatcoercionshouldbeusedtobringpeopleto(what
therulerbelievesis)thetruereligionandalsodeniedthatchurchesshouldhaveanycoercive
powerovertheirmembers.Lockeelaboratedonthesethemesinhislaterpoliticalwritings,
suchastheSecondLetteronTolerationandThirdLetteronToleration.
ForamoregeneralintroductiontoLocke'shistoryandbackground,theargumentoftheTwo
Treatises,andtheLetterConcerningToleration,seeSection1,Section3,andSection4,
respectively,ofthemainentryonJohnLockeinthisencyclopedia.Thepresententryfocuses
onsevencentralconceptsinLocke'spoliticalphilosophy.

1.NaturalLawandNaturalRight

2.StateofNature

3.Property

4.Consent,PoliticalObligation,andtheEndsofGovernment

5.LockeandPunishment

6.SeparationofPowersandtheDissolutionofGovernment

7.Toleration

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1. Natural Law and Natural Rights

PerhapsthemostcentralconceptinLocke'spoliticalphilosophyishistheoryofnaturallaw
andnaturalrights.ThenaturallawconceptexistedlongbeforeLockeasawayofexpressing
theideathattherewerecertainmoraltruthsthatappliedtoallpeople,regardlessofthe
particularplacewheretheylivedortheagreementstheyhadmade.Themostimportantearly
contrastwasbetweenlawsthatwerebynature,andthusgenerallyapplicable,andthosethat
wereconventionalandoperatedonlyinthoseplaceswheretheparticularconventionhadbeen
established.Thisdistinctionissometimesformulatedasthedifferencebetweennaturallaw
andpositivelaw.
Naturallawisalsodistinctfromdivinelawinthatthelatter,intheChristiantradition,
normallyreferredtothoselawsthatGodhaddirectlyrevealedthroughprophetsandother
inspiredwriters.Naturallawcanbediscoveredbyreasonaloneandappliestoallpeople,
whiledivinelawcanbediscoveredonlythroughGod'sspecialrevelationandappliesonlyto
thosetowhomitisrevealedandwhoGodspecificallyindicatesaretobebound.Thussome
seventeenthcenturycommentators,Lockeincluded,heldthatnotallofthe10
commandments,muchlesstherestoftheOldTestamentlaw,werebindingonallpeople.The
10commandmentsbeginHearOIsraelandthusareonlybindingonthepeopletowhom
theywereaddressed(Works6:37).Aswewillseebelow,eventhoughLockethoughtnatural
lawcouldbeknownapartfromspecialrevelation,hesawnocontradictioninGodplayinga
partintheargument,solongastherelevantaspectsofGod'scharactercouldbediscoveredby
reasonalone.InLocke'stheory,divinelawandnaturallawareconsistentandcanoverlapin
content,buttheyarenotcoextensive.ThusthereisnoproblemforLockeiftheBible
commandsamoralcodethatisstricterthantheonethatcanbederivedfromnaturallaw,but
thereisarealproblemiftheBibleteacheswhatiscontrarytonaturallaw.Inpractice,Locke
avoidedthisproblembecauseconsistencywithnaturallawwasoneofthecriteriaheused
whendecidingtheproperinterpretationofBiblicalpassages.
InthecenturybeforeLocke,thelanguageofnaturalrightsalsogainedprominencethrough
thewritingsofsuchthinkersasGrotius,Hobbes,andPufendorf.Whereasnaturallaw
emphasizedduties,naturalrightsnormallyemphasizedprivilegesorclaimstowhichan
individualwasentitled.Thereisconsiderabledisagreementastohowthesefactorsaretobe
understoodinrelationtoeachotherinLocke'stheory.LeoStrauss,andmanyofhisfollowers,
takerightstobeparamount,goingsofarastoportrayLocke'spositionasessentiallysimilar
tothatofHobbes.TheypointoutthatLockedefendedahedonisttheoryofhumanmotivation
(Essay2.20)andclaimthathemustagreewithHobbesabouttheessentiallyselfinterested
natureofhumanbeings.Locke,theyclaim,recognizesnaturallawobligationsonlyinthose
situationswhereourownpreservationisnotinconflict,furtheremphasizingthatourrightto
preserveourselvestrumpsanydutieswemayhave.
Ontheotherendofthespectrum,morescholarshaveadoptedtheviewofDunn,Tully,and
Ashcraftthatitisnaturallaw,notnaturalrights,thatisprimary.TheyholdthatwhenLocke
emphasizedtherighttolife,liberty,andpropertyhewasprimarilymakingapointaboutthe
dutieswehavetowardotherpeople:dutiesnottokill,enslave,orsteal.Mostscholarsalso
arguethatLockerecognizedageneraldutytoassistwiththepreservationofmankind,
includingadutyofcharitytothosewhohavenootherwaytoprocuretheirsubsistence(Two
Treatises1.42).ThesescholarsregarddutiesasprimaryinLockebecauserightsexistto
ensurethatweareabletofulfillourduties.Simmonstakesapositionsimilartothelatter
group,butclaimsthatrightsarenotjusttheflipsideofdutiesinLocke,normerelyameans
toperformingourduties.Instead,rightsanddutiesareequallyfundamentalbecauseLocke
believesinarobustzoneofindifferenceinwhichrightsprotectourabilitytomakechoices.
Whilethesechoicescannotviolatenaturallaw,theyarenotameremeanstofulfillingnatural
laweither.BrianTienreyquestionswhetheroneneedstoprioritizenaturallawornaturalright
sincebothtypicallyfunctionascorollaries.Hearguesthatmodernnaturalrightstheoriesarea
developmentfrommedievalconceptionsofnaturallawthatincludedpermissionstoactornot
actincertainways.
Therehavebeensomeattemptstofindacompromisebetweenthesepositions.Michael
ZuckertsversionoftheStraussianpositionacknowledgesmoredifferencesbetweenHobbes
andLocke.ZuckertstillquestionsthesincerityofLockestheism,butthinksthatLockedoes
developapositionthatgroundspropertyrightsinthefactthathumanbeingsownthemselves,
somethingHobbesdenied.AdamSeagravehasgoneastepfurther.Hearguesthatthe
contradictionbetweenLockesclaimthathumanbeingsareownedbyGodandthathuman
beingsownthemselvesisonlyapparent.BasedonpassagesfromLockesotherwritings
(especiallytheEssayConcnerningHumanUnderstanding)Inthepassagesaboutdivine
ownership,Lockeisspeakingabouthumanityasawhole,whileinthepassagesaboutself
ownershipheistakingaboutindividualhumanbeingswiththecapacityforproperty
ownership.Godcreatedhumanbeingswhoarecapableofhavingpropertyrightswithrespect
tooneanotheronthebasisofowningtheirlabor.Bothofthememphasizedifferences
betweenLocke'suseofnaturalrightsandtheearliertraditionofnaturallaw.
AnotherpointofcontestationhastodowiththeextenttowhichLockethoughtnaturallaw
could,infact,beknownbyreason.BothStraussandPeterLaslett,thoughverydifferentin
theirinterpretationsofLockegenerally,seeLocke'stheoryofnaturallawasfilledwith
contradictions.IntheEssayConcerningHumanUnderstanding,Lockedefendsatheoryof
moralknowledgethatnegatesthepossibilityofinnateideas(EssayBook1)andclaimsthat
moralityiscapableofdemonstrationinthesamewaythatMathematicsis(Essay3.11.16,
4.3.1820).YetnowhereinanyofhisworksdoesLockemakeafulldeductionofnaturallaw
fromfirstpremises.Morethanthat,Lockeattimesseemstoappealtoinnateideasin
theSecondTreatise(2.11),andinTheReasonablenessofChristianity(Works7:139)he
admitsthatnoonehaseverworkedoutallofnaturallawfromreasonalone.Straussinfers
fromthisthatthecontradictionsexisttoshowtheattentivereaderthatLockedoesnotreally
believeinnaturallawatall.Laslett,moreconservatively,simplysaysthatLockethe
philosopherandLockethepoliticalwritershouldbekeptveryseparate.
Manyscholarsrejectthisposition.Yolton,Colman,Ashcraft,Grant,Simmons,Tucknessand
othersallarguethatthereisnothingstrictlyinconsistentinLocke'sadmissioninThe
ReasonablenessofChristianity.Thatnoonehasdeducedallofnaturallawfromfirst
principlesdoesnotmeanthatnoneofithasbeendeduced.Thesupposedlycontradictory
passagesintheTwoTreatisesarefarfromdecisive.WhileitistruethatLockedoesnot
provideadeductionintheEssay,itisnotclearthathewastryingto.Section4.10.119ofthat
workseemsmoreconcernedtoshowhowreasoningwithmoraltermsispossible,notto
actuallyprovideafullaccountofnaturallaw.Nonetheless,itmustbeadmittedthatLockedid
nottreatthetopicofnaturallawassystematicallyasonemightlike.Attemptstoworkouthis
theoryinmoredetailwithrespecttoitsgroundanditscontentmusttrytoreconstructitfrom
scatteredpassagesinmanydifferenttexts.
TounderstandLocke'spositiononthegroundofnaturallawitmustbesituatedwithina
largerdebateinnaturallawtheorythatpredatesLocke,thesocalledvoluntarism
intellectualism,orvoluntaristrationalistdebate.Atitssimplest,thevoluntaristdeclares
thatrightandwrongaredeterminedbyGod'swillandthatweareobligedtoobeythewillof
GodsimplybecauseitisthewillofGod.Unlessthesepositionsaremaintained,the
voluntaristargues,Godbecomessuperfluoustomoralitysinceboththecontentandthe
bindingforceofmoralitycanbeexplainedwithoutreferencetoGod.Theintellectualist
repliesthatthisunderstandingmakesmoralityarbitraryandfailstoexplainwhywehavean
obligationtoobeyGod.
Withrespecttothegroundsandcontentofnaturallaw,Lockeisnotcompletelyclear.Onthe
onehand,therearemanyinstanceswherehemakesstatementsthatsoundvoluntaristtothe
effectthatlawrequiresalawgiverwithauthority(Essay1.3.6,4.10.7).Lockealsorepeatedly
insistsintheEssaysontheLawofNaturethatcreatedbeingshaveanobligationtoobeytheir
creator(ELN6).Ontheotherhandtherearestatementsthatseemtoimplyanexternalmoral
standardtowhichGodmustconform(TwoTreatises2.195;Works7:6).Lockeclearlywants
toavoidtheimplicationthatthecontentofnaturallawisarbitrary.Severalsolutionshave
beenproposed.OnesolutionsuggestedbyHerzogmakesLockeanintellectualistby
groundingourobligationtoobeyGodonapriordutyofgratitudethatexistsindependentof
God.Asecondoption,suggestedbySimmons,issimplytotakeLockeasavoluntaristsince
thatiswherethepreponderanceofhisstatementspoint.Athirdoption,suggestedby
Tuckness(andimpliedbyGrant),istotreatthequestionofvoluntarismashavingtwo
differentparts,groundsandcontent.Onthisview,Lockewasindeedavoluntaristwith
respecttothequestionwhyshouldweobeythelawofnature?Lockethoughtthatreason,
apartfromthewillofasuperior,couldonlybeadvisory.Withrespecttocontent,divine
reasonandhumanreasonmustbesufficientlyanalogousthathumanbeingscanreasonabout
whatGodlikelywills.LocketakesitforgrantedthatsinceGodcreateduswithreasonin
ordertofollowGod'swill,humanreasonanddivinereasonaresufficientlysimilarthat
naturallawwillnotseemarbitrarytous.
ThoseinterestedinthecontemporaryrelevanceofLocke'spoliticaltheorymustconfrontits
theologicalaspects.StraussiansmakeLocke'stheoryrelevantbyclaimingthatthetheological
dimensionsofhisthoughtareprimarilyrhetorical;theyarecovertokeephimfrombeing
persecutedbythereligiousauthoritiesofhisday.Others,suchasDunn,takeLocketobeof
onlylimitedrelevancetocontemporarypoliticspreciselybecausesomanyofhisarguments
dependonreligiousassumptionsthatarenolongerwidelyshared.Morerecentlyanumberof
authors,suchasSimmonsandVernon,havetriedtoseparatethefoundationsofLocke's
argumentfromotheraspectsofit.Simmons,forexample,arguesthatLocke'sthoughtisover
determined,containingbothreligiousandseculararguments.HeclaimsthatforLockethe
fundamentallawofnatureisthatasmuchaspossiblemankindistobepreserved(Two
Treatises135).Attimes,heclaims,Lockepresentsthisprincipleinruleconsequentialist
terms:itistheprincipleweusetodeterminethemorespecificrightsanddutiesthatallhave.
Atothertimes,LockehintsatamoreKantianjustificationthatemphasizestheimproprietyof
treatingourequalsasiftheyweremeremeanstoourends.Waldron,inhismostrecentwork
onLocke,explorestheoppositeclaim:thatLocke'stheologyactuallyprovidesamoresolid
basisforhispremiseofpoliticalequalitythandocontemporarysecularapproachesthattend
tosimplyassertequality.
Withrespecttothespecificcontentofnaturallaw,Lockeneverprovidesacomprehensive
statementofwhatitrequires.IntheTwoTreatises,Lockefrequentlystatesthatthe
fundamentallawofnatureisthatasmuchaspossiblemankindistobepreserved.Simmons
arguesthatinTwoTreatises2.6Lockepresents1)adutytopreserveone'sself,2)adutyto
preserveotherswhenselfpreservationdoesnotconflict,3)adutynottotakeawaythelifeof
another,and4)adutynottoactinawaythattendstodestroyothers.Libertarian
interpretersofLocketendtodownplaydutiesoftype1and2.Lockepresentsamore
extensivelistinhisearlier,andunpublishedinhislifetime,EssaysontheLawofNature.
Interestingly,Lockehereincludespraiseandhonorofthedeityasrequiredbynaturallawas
wellaswhatwemightcallgoodcharacterqualities.
2. State of Nature
Locke'sconceptofthestateofnaturehasbeeninterpretedbycommentatorsinavarietyof
ways.Atfirstglanceitseemsquitesimple.Lockewriteswant[lack]ofacommonjudge,
withauthority,putsallpersonsinastateofnatureandagain,Menlivingaccordingto
reason,withoutacommonsuperioronearth,tojudgebetweenthem,isproperlythestateof
nature.(TwoTreatises2.19)ManycommentatorshavetakenthisasLocke'sdefinition,
concludingthatthestateofnatureexistswhereverthereisnolegitimatepoliticalauthority
abletojudgedisputesandwherepeopleliveaccordingtothelawofreason.Onthisaccount
thestateofnatureisdistinctfrompoliticalsociety,wherealegitimategovernmentexists,and
fromastateofwarwheremenfailtoabidebythelawofreason.
Simmonspresentsanimportantchallengetothisview.Simmonspointsoutthattheabove
statementiswordedasasufficientratherthannecessarycondition.Twoindividualsmightbe
able,inthestateofnature,toauthorizeathirdtosettledisputesbetweenthemwithoutleaving
thestateofnature,sincethethirdpartywouldnothave,forexample,thepowertolegislate
forthepublicgood.Simmonsalsoclaimsthatotherinterpretationsoftenfailtoaccountfor
thefactthattherearesomepeoplewholiveinstateswithlegitimategovernmentswhoare
nonethelessinthestateofnature:visitingaliens(2.9),childrenbelowtheageofmajority
(2.15,118),andthosewithadefectofreason(2.60).Heclaimsthatthestateofnatureisa
relationalconceptdescribingaparticularsetofmoralrelationsthatexistbetweenparticular
people,ratherthanadescriptionofaparticulargeographicalterritory.Thestateofnatureis
justthewayofdescribingthemoralrightsandresponsibilitiesthatexistbetweenpeoplewho
havenotconsentedtotheadjudicationoftheirdisputesbythesamelegitimategovernment.
Thegroupsjustmentionedeitherhavenotorcannotgiveconsent,sotheyremaininthestate
ofnature.ThusAmaybeinthestateofnaturewithrespecttoB,butnotwithC.
Simmons'accountstandsinsharpcontrasttothatofStrauss.AccordingtoStrauss,Locke
presentsthestateofnatureasafactualdescriptionofwhattheearliestsocietyislike,an
accountthatwhenreadcloselyrevealsLocke'sdeparturefromChristianteachings.Stateof
naturetheories,heandhisfollowersargue,arecontrarytotheBiblicalaccountinGenesisand
evidencethatLocke'steachingissimilartothatofHobbes.Asnotedabove,ontheStraussian
accountLocke'sapparentlyChristianstatementsareonlyafaadedesignedtoconcealhis
essentiallyantiChristianviews.AccordingtoSimmons,sincethestateofnatureisamoral
account,itiscompatiblewithawidevarietyofsocialaccountswithoutcontradiction.Ifwe
knowonlythatagroupofpeopleareinastateofnature,weknowonlytherightsand
responsibilitiestheyhavetowardoneanother;weknownothingaboutwhethertheyarerich
orpoor,peacefulorwarlike.
AcomplementaryinterpretationismadebyJohnDunnwithrespecttotherelationship
betweenLocke'sstateofnatureandhisChristianbeliefs.DunnclaimedthatLocke'sstateof
natureislessanexerciseinhistoricalanthropologythanatheologicalreflectiononthe
conditionofman.OnDunn'sinterpretation,Locke'sstateofnaturethinkingisanexpression
ofhistheologicalposition,thatmanexistsinaworldcreatedbyGodforGod'spurposesbut
thatgovernmentsarecreatedbymeninordertofurtherthosepurposes.
Locke'stheoryofthestateofnaturewillthusbetiedcloselytohistheoryofnaturallaw,since
thelatterdefinestherightsofpersonsandtheirstatusasfreeandequalpersons.Thestronger
thegroundsforacceptingLocke'scharacterizationofpeopleasfree,equal,andindependent,
themorehelpfulthestateofnaturebecomesasadeviceforrepresentingpeople.Still,itis
importanttorememberthatnoneoftheseinterpretationsclaimsthatLocke'sstateofnature
isonlyathoughtexperiment,inthewayKantandRawlsarenormallythoughttousethe
concept.Lockedidnotrespondtotheargumentwherehavethereeverbeenpeopleinsucha
statebysayingitdidnotmattersinceitwasonlyathoughtexperiment.Instead,heargued
thatthereareandhavebeenpeopleinthestateofnature.(TwoTreatises2.14)Itseems
importanttohimthatatleastsomegovernmentshaveactuallybeenformedinthewayhe
suggests.Howmuchitmatterswhethertheyhavebeenornotwillbediscussedbelowunder
thetopicofconsent,sincethecentralquestioniswhetheragoodgovernmentcanbe
legitimateevenifitdoesnothavetheactualconsentofthepeoplewholiveunderit;
hypotheticalcontractandactualcontracttheorieswilltendtoanswerthisquestiondifferently.

3. Property
Locke'streatmentofpropertyisgenerallythoughttobeamonghismostimportant
contributionsinpoliticalthought,butitisalsooneoftheaspectsofhisthoughtthathasbeen
mostheavilycriticized.ThereareimportantdebatesoverwhatexactlyLockewastryingto
accomplishwithhistheory.Oneinterpretation,advancedbyC.B.Macpherson,seesLockeas
adefenderofunrestrictedcapitalistaccumulation.OnMacpherson'sinterpretation,Lockeis
thoughttohavesetthreerestrictionsontheaccumulationofpropertyinthestateofnature:1)
onemayonlyappropriateasmuchasonecanusebeforeitspoils(TwoTreatises2.31),2)one
mustleaveenoughandasgoodforothers(thesufficiencyrestriction)(2.27),and3)one
may(supposedly)onlyappropriatepropertythroughone'sownlabor(2.27).Macpherson
claimsthatastheargumentprogresses,eachoftheserestrictionsistranscended.Thespoilage
restrictionceasestobeameaningfulrestrictionwiththeinventionofmoneybecausevalue
canbestoredinamediumthatdoesnotdecay(2.4647).Thesufficiencyrestrictionis
transcendedbecausethecreationofprivatepropertysoincreasesproductivitythateventhose
whonolongerhavetheopportunitytoacquirelandwillhavemoreopportunitytoacquire
whatisnecessaryforlife(2.37).AccordingtoMacpherson'sview,theenoughandasgood
requirementisitselfmerelyaderivativeofapriorprincipleguaranteeingtheopportunityto
acquire,throughlabor,thenecessitiesoflife.Thethirdrestriction,Macphersonargues,was
notoneLockeactuallyheldatall.ThoughLockeappearstosuggestthatonecanonlyhave
propertyinwhatonehaspersonallylaboredonwhenhemakeslaborthesourceofproperty
rights,Lockeclearlyrecognizedthateveninthestateofnature,theTurfsmyServanthas
cut(2.28)canbecomemyproperty.Locke,accordingtoMacpherson,thusclearly
recognizedthatlaborcanbealienated.Asonewouldguess,Macphersoniscriticalofthe
possessiveindividualismthatLocke'stheoryofpropertyrepresents.Hearguesthatits
coherencedependsupontheassumptionofdifferentialrationalitybetweencapitalistsand
wagelaborersandonthedivisionofsocietyintodistinctclasses.BecauseLockewasbound
bytheseconstraints,wearetounderstandhimasincludingonlypropertyownersasvoting
membersofsociety.
Macpherson'sunderstandingofLockehasbeencriticizedfromseveraldifferentdirections.
AlanRyanarguedthatsincepropertyforLockeincludeslifeandlibertyaswellasestate
(TwoTreatises2.87),eventhosewithoutlandcouldstillbemembersofpoliticalsociety.The
disputebetweenthetwowouldthenturnonwhetherLockewasusingpropertyinthemore
expansivesenseinsomeofthecrucialpassages.JamesTullyattackedMacpherson's
interpretationbypointingoutthattheFirstTreatisespecificallyincludesadutyofcharity
towardthosewhohavenoothermeansofsubsistence(1.42).Whilethisdutyisconsistent
withrequiringthepoortoworkforlowwages,itdoesunderminetheclaimthatthosewho
havewealthhavenosocialdutiestoothers.
TullyalsoarguedforafundamentalreinterpretationofLocke'stheory.Previousaccountshad
focusedontheclaimthatsincepersonsowntheirownlabor,whentheymixtheirlaborwith
thatwhichisunowneditbecomestheirproperty.RobertNozickcriticizedthisargumentwith
hisfamousexampleofmixingtomatojuiceonerightfullyownswiththesea.Whenwemix
whatweownwithwhatwedonot,whyshouldwethinkwegainpropertyinsteadoflosingit?
OnTully'saccount,focusonthemixingmetaphormissesLocke'semphasisonwhathecalls
theworkmanshipmodel.Lockebelievedthatmakershavepropertyrightswithrespectto
whattheymakejustasGodhaspropertyrightswithrespecttohumanbeingsbecauseheis
theirmaker.HumanbeingsarecreatedintheimageofGodandsharewithGod,thoughtoa
muchlesserextent,theabilitytoshapeandmoldthephysicalenvironmentinaccordancewith
arationalpatternorplan.Waldronhascriticizedthisinterpretationonthegroundsthatit
wouldmaketherightsofhumanmakersabsoluteinthesamewaythatGod'srightoverhis
creationisabsolute.SreenivasanhasdefendedTully'sargumentagainstWaldron'sresponse
byclaimingadistinctionbetweencreatingandmaking.Onlycreatinggeneratesanabsolute
propertyright,andonlyGodcancreate,butmakingisanalogoustocreatingandcreatesan
analogous,thoughweaker,right.
AnothercontroversialaspectofTully'sinterpretationofLockeishisinterpretationofthe
sufficiencyconditionanditsimplications.Onhisanalysis,thesufficiencyargumentiscrucial
forLocke'sargumenttobeplausible.SinceLockebeginswiththeassumptionthattheworld
isownedbyall,individualpropertyisonlyjustifiedifitcanbeshownthatnooneismade
worseoffbytheappropriation.Inconditionswherethegoodtakenisnotscarce,wherethere
ismuchwaterorlandavailable,anindividual'stakingsomeportionofitdoesnoharmto
others.Wherethisconditionisnotmet,thosewhoaredeniedaccesstothegooddohavea
legitimateobjectiontoappropriation.AccordingtoTully,Lockerealizedthatassoonasland
becamescarce,previousrightsacquiredbylabornolongerheldsinceenoughandasgood
wasnolongeravailableforothers.Oncelandbecamescarce,propertycouldonlybe
legitimatedbythecreationofpoliticalsociety.
Waldronclaimsthat,contrarytoMacpherson,Tully,andothers,Lockedidnotrecognizea
sufficiencyconditionatall.Henotesthat,strictlyspeaking,Lockemakessufficiencya
sufficientratherthannecessaryconditionwhenhesaysthatlaborgeneratesatitletoproperty
atleastwherethereisenough,andasgoodleftincommonforothers(TwoTreatises2.27).
WaldrontakesLocketobemakingadescriptivestatement,notanormativeone,aboutthe
conditionthathappenstohaveinitiallyexisted.Waldronalsoarguesthatinthetextenough
andasgoodisnotpresentedasarestrictionandisnotgroupedwithotherrestrictions.
WaldronthinksthattheconditionwouldleadLocketotheabsurdconclusionthatin
circumstancesofscarcityeveryonemuststarvetodeathsincenoonewouldbeabletoobtain
universalconsentandanyappropriationwouldmakeothersworseoff.
OneofthestrongestdefensesofTully'spositionispresentedbySreenivasan.Hearguesthat
Locke'srepetitioususeofenoughandasgoodindicatesthatthephraseisdoingsomereal
workintheargument.Inparticular,itistheonlywayLockecanbethoughttohaveprovided
somesolutiontothefactthattheconsentofallisneededtojustifyappropriationinthestate
ofnature.Ifothersarenotharmed,theyhavenogroundstoobjectandcanbethoughtto
consent,whereasiftheyareharmed,itisimplausibletothinkofthemasconsenting.
SreenivasandoesdepartfromTullyinsomeimportantrespects.Hetakesenoughandas
goodtomeanenoughandasgoodopportunityforsecuringone'spreservation,not
enoughandasgoodofthesamecommodity(suchasland).Thishastheadvantageof
makingLocke'saccountofpropertylessradicalsinceitdoesnotclaimthatLockethoughtthe
pointofhistheorywastoshowthatalloriginalpropertyrightswereinvalidatthepointwhere
politicalcommunitieswerecreated.Thedisadvantageofthisinterpretation,asSreenivasan
admits,isthatitsaddlesLockewithaflawedargument.Thosewhomerelyhavethe
opportunitytolaborforothersatsubsistencewagesnolongerhavethelibertythatindividuals
hadbeforescarcitytobenefitfromthefullsurplusofvaluetheycreate.Moreoverpoor
laborersnolongerenjoyequalityofaccesstothematerialsfromwhichproductscanbemade.
SreenivasanthinksthatLocke'stheoryisthusunabletosolvetheproblemofhowindividuals
canobtainindividualpropertyrightsinwhatisinitiallyownedbyallpeoplewithoutconsent.
Simmonspresentsastilldifferentsynthesis.HesideswithWaldronandagainstTullyand
Sreenivasaninrejectingtheworkmanshipmodel.Heclaimsthatthereferencestomaking
inchapterfiveoftheTwoTreatisesarenotmakingintherightsenseofthewordforthe
workmanshipmodeltobecorrect.Lockethinkswehavepropertyinourownpersonseven
thoughwedonotmakeorcreateourselves.SimmonsclaimsthatwhileLockedidbelievethat
Godhadrightsascreator,humanbeingshaveadifferentlimitedrightastrustees,notas
makers.SimmonsbasesthisinpartonhisreadingoftwodistinctargumentshetakesLocketo
make:thefirstjustifiespropertybasedonGod'swillandbasichumanneeds,thesecondbased
onmixinglabor.Accordingtotheformerargument,atleastsomepropertyrightscanbe
justifiedbyshowingthataschemeallowingappropriationofpropertywithoutconsenthas
beneficialconsequencesforthepreservationofmankind.Thisargumentisoverdetermined,
accordingtoSimmons,inthatitcanbeinterpretedeithertheologicallyorasasimplerule
consequentialistargument.Withrespecttothelatterargument,Simmonstakeslabornottobe
asubstancethatisliterallymixedbutratherasapurposiveactivityaimedatsatisfying
needsandconveniencesoflife.LikeSreenivasan,Simmonsseesthisasflowingfromaprior
rightofpeopletosecuretheirsubsistence,butSimmonsalsoaddsapriorrighttoself
government.Laborcangenerateclaimstoprivatepropertybecauseprivatepropertymakes
individualsmoreindependentandabletodirecttheirownactions.SimmonsthinksLocke's
argumentisultimatelyflawedbecauseheunderestimatedtheextenttowhichwagelabor
wouldmakethepoordependentontherich,underminingselfgovernment.Healsojoinsthe
chorusofthosewhofindLocke'sappealtoconsenttotheintroductionofmoneyinadequate
tojustifytheveryunequalpropertyholdingsthatnowexist.
SomeauthorshavesuggestedthatLockemayhavehadanadditionalconcerninmindin
writingthechapteronproperty.Tully(1993)andBarbaraArneilpointoutthatLockewas
interestedinandinvolvedintheaffairsoftheAmericancoloniesandthatLocke'stheoryof
laborledtotheconvenientconclusionthatthelaborofNativeAmericansgeneratedproperty
rightsonlyovertheanimalstheycaught,notthelandonwhichtheyhuntedwhichLocke
regardedasvacantandavailableforthetaking.Armitageevenarguesthatthereisevidence
thatLockewasactivelyinvolvedinrevisingtheFundamentalConstitutionsofCarolinaatthe
sametimehewasdraftingthechapteronpropertyfortheSecondTreatise.MarkGoldie,
however,cautionsthatweshouldnotmissthefactthatpoliticaleventsinEnglandwerestill
Locke'sprimaryfocusinwritingthetheSecondTreatise.
Afinalquestionconcernsthestatusofthosepropertyrightsacquiredinthestateofnature
aftercivilsocietyhascomeintobeing.ItseemsclearthatattheveryleastLockeallows
taxationtotakeplacebytheconsentofthemajorityratherthanrequiringunanimousconsent
(2.140).NozicktakesLocketobealibertarian,withthegovernmenthavingnorighttotake
propertytouseforthecommongoodwithouttheconsentofthepropertyowner.Onhis
interpretation,themajoritymayonlytaxattherateneededtoallowthegovernmentto
successfullyprotectpropertyrights.Attheotherextreme,Tullythinksthat,bythetime
governmentisformed,landisalreadyscarceandsotheinitialholdingsofthestateofnature
arenolongervalidandthusarenoconstraintongovernmentalaction.Waldron'sviewisin
betweenthese,acknowledgingthatpropertyrightsareamongtherightsfromthestateof
naturethatcontinuetoconstrainthegovernment,butseeingthelegislatureashavingthe
powertointerpretwhatnaturallawrequiresinthismatterinafairlysubstantialway.

4. Consent, Political Obligation, and the

Ends of Government
ThemostdirectreadingofLocke'spoliticalphilosophyfindstheconceptofconsentplayinga
centralrole.Hisanalysisbeginswithindividualsinastateofnaturewheretheyarenot
subjecttoacommonlegitimateauthoritywiththepowertolegislateoradjudicatedisputes.
Fromthisnaturalstateoffreedomandindependence,Lockestressesindividualconsentasthe
mechanismbywhichpoliticalsocietiesarecreatedandindividualsjointhosesocieties.While
thereareofcoursesomegeneralobligationsandrightsthatallpeoplehavefromthelawof
nature,specialobligationscomeaboutonlywhenwevoluntarilyundertakethem.Locke
clearlystatesthatonecanonlybecomeafullmemberofsocietybyanactofexpressconsent
(TwoTreatises2.122).TheliteratureonLocke'stheoryofconsenttendstofocusonhow
Lockedoesordoesnotsuccessfullyanswerthefollowingobjection:fewpeoplehaveactually
consentedtotheirgovernmentssono,oralmostno,governmentsareactuallylegitimate.This
conclusionisproblematicsinceitisclearlycontrarytoLocke'sintention.
Locke'smostobvioussolutiontothisproblemishisdoctrineoftacitconsent.Simplyby
walkingalongthehighwaysofacountryapersongivestacitconsenttothegovernmentand
agreestoobeyitwhilelivinginitsterritory.This,Lockethinks,explainswhyresidentaliens
haveanobligationtoobeythelawsofthestatewheretheyreside,thoughonlywhiletheylive
there.Inheritingpropertycreatesanevenstrongerbond,sincetheoriginalownerofthe
propertypermanentlyputthepropertyunderthejurisdictionofthecommonwealth.Children,
whentheyacceptthepropertyoftheirparents,consenttothejurisdictionofthe
commonwealthoverthatproperty(TwoTreatises2.120).Thereisdebateoverwhetherthe
inheritanceofpropertyshouldberegardedastacitorexpressconsent.Ononeinterpretation,
byacceptingtheproperty,Lockethinksapersonbecomesafullmemberofsociety,which
impliesthathemustregardthisasanactofexpressconsent.GrantsuggeststhatLocke'sideal
wouldhavebeenanexplicitmechanismofsocietywhereuponadultswouldgiveexpress
consentandthiswouldbeapreconditionofinheritingproperty.Ontheotherinterpretation,
Lockerecognizedthatpeopleinheritingpropertydidnotintheprocessofdoingsomakeany
explicitdeclarationabouttheirpoliticalobligation.
Howeverthisdebateisresolved,therewillbeinanycurrentorpreviouslyexistingsociety
manypeoplewhohavenevergivenexpressconsent,andthussomeversionoftacitconsent
seemsneededtoexplainhowgovernmentscouldstillbelegitimate.Simmonsfindsitdifficult
toseehowmerelywalkingonastreetorinheritinglandcanbethoughtofasanexampleofa
deliberate,voluntaryalienatingofrights(69).Itisonething,heargues,forapersonto
consentbyactionsratherthanwords;itisquiteanothertoclaimapersonhasconsented
withoutbeingawarethattheyhavedoneso.Torequireapersontoleavebehindalloftheir
propertyandemigrateinordertoavoidgivingtacitconsentistocreateasituationwhere
continuedresidenceisnotafreeandvoluntarychoice.Simmons'approachistoagreewith
Lockethatrealconsentisnecessaryforpoliticalobligationbutdisagreeaboutwhethermost
peopleinfacthavegiventhatkindofconsent.SimmonsclaimsthatLocke'sargumentspush
towardphilosophicalanarchism,thepositionthatmostpeopledonothaveamoral
obligationtoobeythegovernment,eventhoughLockehimselfwouldnothavemadethis
claim.
HannahPitkintakesaverydifferentapproach.SheclaimsthatthelogicofLocke'sargument
makesconsentfarlessimportantinpracticethanitmightappear.Tacitconsentisindeeda
wateringdownoftheconceptofconsent,butLockecandothisbecausethebasiccontentof
whatgovernmentsaretobelikeissetbynaturallawandnotbyconsent.Ifconsentweretruly
foundationalinLocke'sscheme,wewoulddiscoverthelegitimatepowersofanygiven
governmentbyfindingoutwhatcontracttheoriginalfounderssigned.Pitkin,however,thinks
thatforLocketheformandpowersofgovernmentaredeterminedbynaturallaw.Whatreally
matters,therefore,isnotpreviousactsofconsentbutthequalityofthepresentgovernment,
whetheritcorrespondstowhatnaturallawrequires.Lockedoesnotthink,forexample,that
walkingthestreetsorinheritingpropertyinatyrannicalregimemeanswehaveconsentedto
thatregime.Itisthusthequalityofthegovernment,notactsofactualconsent,thatdetermine
whetheragovernmentislegitimate.Simmonsobjectstothisinterpretation,sayingthatitfails
toaccountforthemanyplaceswhereLockedoesindeedsayapersonacquirespolitical
obligationsonlybyhisownconsent.
JohnDunntakesastilldifferentapproach.Heclaimsthatitisanachronistictoreadinto
Lockeamodernconceptionofwhatcountsasconsent.Whilemoderntheoriesdoinsistthat
consentistrulyconsentonlyifitisdeliberateandvoluntary,Locke'sconceptofconsentwas
farmorebroad.ForLocke,itwasenoughthatpeoplebenotunwilling.Voluntary
acquiescence,onDunn'sinterpretation,isallthatisneeded.AsevidenceDunncanpointto
thefactthatmanyoftheinstancesofconsentLockeuses,suchasconsentingtotheuseof
money,makemoresenseonthisbroadinterpretation.Simmonsobjectsthatthisignoresthe
instanceswhereLockedoestalkaboutconsentasadeliberatechoiceandthat,inanycase,it
wouldonlymakeLockeconsistentatthepriceofmakinghimunconvincing.
Recentscholarshiphascontinuedtoprobetheseissues.DaviscloselyexaminesLocke's
terminologyandarguesthatwemustdistinguishbetweenpoliticalsocietyandlegitimate
government.Onlythosewhohaveexpresslyconsentedaremembersofpoliticalsociety,
whilethegovernmentexerciseslegitimateauthorityovervarioustypesofpeoplewhohave
notsoconsented.Thegovernmentissupremeinsomerespects,butthereisnosovereign.Van
derVossenmakesarelatedargument,claimingthattheinitialconsentofpropertyownersis
notthemechanismbywhichgovernmentscometoruleoveraparticularterritory.Rather,
Lockethinksthatpeople(probablyfathersinitially)simplybeginexercisingpolitical
authorityandpeopletacitlyconsent.Thisissufficienttojustifyastateinrulingoverthose
peopleandtreatiesbetweengovernmentsfixtheterritorialborders.Hoffgoesstillfurther,
arguingthatweneednoteventhinkofspecificactsoftacitconsent(suchasdecidingnotto
emigrate).Instead,consentisimpliedifthegovernmentitselffunctionsinwaysthatshowitis
answerabletothepeople.
Arelatedquestionhastodowiththeextentofourobligationonceconsenthasbeengiven.
TheinterpretiveschoolinfluencedbyStraussemphasizestheprimacyofpreservation.Since
thedutiesofnaturallawapplyonlywhenourpreservationisnotthreatened(2.6),thenour
obligationsceaseincaseswhereourpreservationisdirectlythreatened.Thishasimportant
implicationsifweconsiderasoldierwhoisbeingsentonamissionwheredeathisextremely
likely.GrantpointsoutthatLockebelievesasoldierwhodesertsfromsuchamission(Two
Treatises2.139)isjustlysentencedtodeath.GranttakesLocketobeclaimingnotonlythat
desertionlawsarelegitimateinthesensethattheycanbeblamelesslyenforced(something
Hobbeswouldgrant)butthattheyalsoimplyamoralobligationonthepartofthesoldierto
giveuphislifeforthecommongood(somethingHobbeswoulddeny).AccordingtoGrant,
Lockethinksthatouractsofconsentcaninfactextendtocaseswherelivinguptoour
commitmentswillriskourlives.Thedecisiontoenterpoliticalsocietyisapermanentonefor
preciselythisreason:thesocietywillhavetobedefendedandifpeoplecanrevoketheir
consenttohelpprotectitwhenattacked,theactofconsentmadewhenenteringpolitical
societywouldbepointlesssincethepoliticalcommunitywouldfailattheverypointwhereit
ismostneeded.Peoplemakeacalculateddecisionwhentheyentersociety,andtheriskof
dyingincombatispartofthatcalculation.GrantalsothinksLockerecognizesadutybased
onreciprocitysinceothersrisktheirlivesaswell.
MostoftheseapproachesfocusonLocke'sdoctrineofconsentasasolutiontotheproblemof
politicalobligation.Adifferentapproachaskswhatroleconsentplaysindetermining,here
andnow,thelegitimateendsthatgovernmentscanpursue.Onepartofthisdebateiscaptured
bythedebatebetweenSeligerandKendall,theformerviewingLockeasaconstitutionalist
andthelatterviewinghimasgivingalmostuntrammeledpowertomajorities.Ontheformer
interpretation,aconstitutioniscreatedbytheconsentofthepeopleaspartofthecreationof
thecommonwealth.Onthelatterinterpretation,thepeoplecreatealegislaturewhichrulesby
majorityvote.Athirdview,advancedbyTuckness,holdsthatLockewasflexibleatthispoint
andgavepeopleconsiderableflexibilityinconstitutionaldrafting.
Asecondpartofthedebatefocusesonendsratherthaninstitutions.LockestatesintheTwo
TreatisesthatthepoweroftheGovernmentislimitedtothepublicgood.Itisapowerthat
hathnootherendbutpreservationandthereforecannotjustifykilling,enslaving,or
plunderingthecitizens.(2.135).LibertarianslikeNozickreadthisasstatingthatgovernments
existonlytoprotectpeoplefrominfringementsontheirrights.Analternateinterpretation,
advancedindifferentwaysbyTuckness,drawsattentiontothefactthatinthefollowing
sentencestheformulationofnaturallawthatLockefocusesonisapositiveone,thatas
muchaspossiblemankindistobepreserved.Onthissecondreading,governmentislimited
tofulfillingthepurposesofnaturallaw,buttheseincludepositivegoalsaswellasnegative
rights.Onthisview,thepowertopromotethecommongoodextendstoactionsdesignedto
increasepopulation,improvethemilitary,strengthentheeconomyandinfrastructure,andso
on,providedthesestepsareindirectlyusefultothegoalofpreservingthesociety.Thiswould
explainwhyLocke,intheLetter,describesgovernmentpromotionofarms,riches,and
multitudeofcitizensastheproperremedyforthedangerofforeignattack(Works6:42)

5. Locke and Punishment

JohnLockedefinedpoliticalpowerasaRightofmakingLawswithPenaltiesofDeath,and
consequentlyalllessPenalties(TwoTreatises2.3).Lockestheoryofpunishmentisthus
centraltohisviewofpoliticsandpartofwhatheconsideredinnovativeabouthispolitical
philosophy.Buthealsoreferredtohisaccountofpunishmentasaverystrangedoctrine
(2.9),presumablybecauseitranagainsttheassumptionthatonlypoliticalsovereignscould
punish.Lockebelievedthatpunishmentrequiresthattherebealaw,andsincethestateof
naturehasthelawofnaturetogovernit,itispermissibletodescribeoneindividualas
punishinganotherinthatstate.Lockesrationaleisthatsincethefundamentallawofnature
isthatmankindbepreservedandsincethatlawwouldbeinvainwithnohumanpowerto
enforceit,itmustthereforebelegitimateforindividualstopunisheachotherevenbefore
governmentexists.Inarguingthis,LockewasdisagreeingwithSamuelPufendorf.Samuel
Pufendorfhadarguedstronglythattheconceptofpunishmentmadenosenseapartfroman
establishedpositivelegalstructure.
Lockerealizedthatthecrucialobjectiontoallowingpeopletoactasjudgeswithpowerto
punishinthestateofnaturewasthatsuchpeoplewouldendupbeingjudgesintheirown
cases.Lockereadilyadmittedthatthiswasaseriousinconvenienceandaprimaryreasonfor
leavingthestateofnature(TwoTreatises2.13).Lockeinsistedonthispointbecauseithelped
explainthetransitionintocivilsociety.Lockethoughtthatinthestateofnaturemenhada
libertytoengageininnocentdelights(actionsthatarenotaviolationofanyapplicable
laws),toseektheirownpreservationwithinthelimitsofnaturallaw,andtopunishviolations
ofnaturallaw.Thepowertoseekonespreservationislimitedincivilsocietybythelawand
thepowertopunishistransferredtothegovernment.(128130).Thepowertopunishinthe
stateofnatureisthusthefoundationfortherightofgovernmentstousecoerciveforce.
Thesituationbecomesmorecomplex,however,ifwelookattheprincipleswhichareto
guidepunishment.Rationalesforpunishmentareoftendividedintothosethatareforward
lookingandbackwardlooking.Forwardlookingrationalesincludedeterringcrime,
protectingsocietyfromdangerouspersons,andrehabilitationofcriminals.Backwardlooking
rationalesnormallyfocusonretribution,inflictingonthecriminalharmcomparabletothe
crime.Lockemayseemtoconflatethesetworationalesinpassageslikethefollowing:
AndthusintheStateofNature,oneMancomesbyaPoweroveranother;butyetno
AbsoluteorArbitraryPower,touseaCriminalwhenhehasgothiminhishands,according
tothepassionateheats,orboundlessextravagancyofhisownWill,butonlytoretributeto
him,sofarascalmreasonandconsciencedictates,whatisproportionatetohisTransgression,
whichissomuchasmayserveforReparationandRestraint.Forthesetwoaretheonly
reasons,whyoneManmaylawfullydoharmtoanother,whichisthat[which]wecall
punishment.(TwoTreatises2.8)
Locketalksbothofretributionandofpunishingonlyforreparationandrestraint.Simmons
arguesthatthisisevidencethatLockeiscombiningbothrationalesforpunishmentinhis
theory.Asurveyofotherseventeenthcenturynaturalrightsjustificationsforpunishment,
however,indicatesthatitwascommontousewordslikeretributeintheoriesthatreject
whatwewouldtodaycallretributivepunishment.Inthepassagequotedabove,Lockeis
sayingthattheproperamountofpunishmentistheamountthatwillproviderestitutionto
injuredparties,protectthepublic,anddeterfuturecrime.Lockesattitudetowardpunishment
inhisotherwritingsontoleration,education,andreligionconsistentlyfollowsthispath
towardjustifyingpunishmentongroundsotherthanretribution.TucknessclaimsthatLocke's
emphasisonrestitutionisinterestingbecauserestitutionisbackwardlookinginasense(it
seekstorestoreanearlierstateofaffairs)butalsoforwardlookinginthatitprovidestangible
benefitstothosewhoreceivetherestitution.ThereisalinkherebetweenLockes
understandingofnaturalpunishmentandhisunderstandingoflegitimatestatepunishment.
Eveninthestateofnature,aprimaryjustificationforpunishmentisthatithelpsfurtherthe
positivegoalofpreservinghumanlifeandhumanproperty.Theemphasisondeterrence,
publicsafety,andrestitutioninpunishmentsadministeredbythegovernmentmirrorsthis
emphasis.
Asecondpuzzleregardingpunishmentisthepermissibilityofpunishinginternationally.
Lockedescribesinternationalrelationsasastateofnature,andsoinprinciple,statesshould
havethesamepowertopunishbreachesofthenaturallawintheinternationalcommunitythat
individualshaveinthestateofnature.Thiswouldlegitimize,forexample,punishmentof
individualsforwarcrimesorcrimesagainsthumanityevenincaseswhereneitherthelawsof
theparticularstatenorinternationallawauthorizepunishment.ThusinWorldWarII,evenif
crimesofaggressionwasnotatthetimerecognizedasacrimeforwhichindividual
punishmentwasjustified,iftheactionsviolatedthatnaturallawprinciplethatoneshouldnot
depriveanotheroflife,liberty,orproperty,theguiltypartiescouldstillbeliabletocriminal
punishment.Themostcommoninterpretationhasthusbeenthatthepowertopunish
internationallyissymmetricalwiththepowertopunishinthestateofnature.
Tuckness,however,hasarguedthatthereisanasymmetrybetweenthetwocasesbecause
Lockealsotalksaboutstatesbeinglimitedinthegoalsthattheycanpursue.Lockeoftensays
thatthepowerofthegovernmentistobeusedfortheprotectionoftherightsofitsown
citizens,notfortherightsofallpeopleeverywhere(TwoTreatises1.92,2.88,2.95,2.131,
2.147).Lockearguesthatinthestateofnatureapersonistousethepowertopunishto
preservehissociety,mankindasawhole.Afterstatesareformed,however,thepowerto
punishistobeusedforthebenefitofhisownparticularsociety.Inthestateofnature,a
personisnotrequiredtoriskhislifeforanother(TwoTreatises2.6)andthispresumably
wouldalsomeanapersonisnotrequiredtopunishinthestateofnaturewhenattemptingto
punishwouldriskthelifeofthepunisher.Lockemaythereforebeobjectingtotheideathat
soldierscanbecompelledtorisktheirlivesforaltruisticreasons.Inthestateofnature,a
personcouldrefusetoattempttopunishothersifdoingsowouldriskhislifeandsoLocke
reasonsthatindividualsmaynothaveconsentedtoallowthestatetorisktheirlivesfor
altruisticpunishmentofinternationalcrimes.

6. Separation of Powers and the

Dissolution of Government
Lockeclaimsthatlegitimategovernmentisbasedontheideaofseparationofpowers.First
andforemostoftheseisthelegislativepower.Lockedescribesthelegislativepoweras
supreme(TwoTreatises2.149)inhavingultimateauthorityoverhowtheforceforthe
commonwealthshallbeemployed(2.143).Thelegislatureisstillboundbythelawofnature
andmuchofwhatitdoesissetdownlawsthatfurtherthegoalsofnaturallawandspecify
appropriatepunishmentsforthem(2.135).Theexecutivepoweristhenchargedwith
enforcingthelawasitisappliedinspecificcases.Interestingly,Lockesthirdpoweriscalled
thefederativepoweranditconsistsoftherighttoactinternationallyaccordingtothelawof
nature.Sincecountriesarestillinthestateofnaturewithrespecttoeachother,theymust
followthedictatesofnaturallawandcanpunishoneanotherforviolationsofthatlawin
ordertoprotecttherightsoftheircitizens.
ThefactthatLockedoesnotmentionthejudicialpowerasaseparatepowerbecomesclearer
ifwedistinguishpowersfrominstitutions.Powersrelatetofunctions.Tohaveapowermeans
thatthereisafunction(suchasmakingthelawsorenforcingthelaws)thatonemay
legitimatelyperform.WhenLockesaysthatthelegislativeissupremeovertheexecutive,he
isnotsayingthatparliamentissupremeovertheking.Lockeissimplyaffirmingthatwhat
cangivelawstoanother,mustneedsbesuperiortohim(TwoTreatises2.150).Moreover,
Lockethinksthatitispossibleformultipleinstitutionstosharethesamepower;forexample,
thelegislativepowerinhisdaywassharedbytheHouseofCommons,theHouseofLords,
andtheKing.Sinceallthreeneededtoagreeforsomethingtobecomelaw,allthreearepart
ofthelegislativepower(1.151).Healsothinksthatthefederativepowerandtheexecutive
powerarenormallyplacedinthehandsoftheexecutive,soitispossibleforthesameperson
toexercisemorethanonepower(orfunction).Thereis,therefore,noonetoone
correspondencebetweenpowersandinstitutions.
Lockeisnotopposedtohavingdistinctinstitutionscalledcourts,buthedoesnotsee
interpretationasadistinctfunctionorpower.ForLocke,legislationisprimarilyabout
announcingageneralrulestipulatingwhattypesofactionsshouldreceivewhattypesof
punishments.Theexecutivepoweristhepowertomakethejudgmentsnecessarytoapply
thoserulestospecificcasesandadministerforceasdirectedbytherule(TwoTreatises2.88
89).Bothoftheseactionsinvolveinterpretation.Lockestatesthatpositivelawsareonlyso
farright,astheyarefoundedontheLawofNature,bywhichtheyaretoberegulatedand
interpreted(2.12).Inotherwords,theexecutivemustinterpretthelawsinlightofits
understandingofnaturallaw.Similarly,legislationinvolvesmakingthelawsofnaturemore
specificanddetermininghowtoapplythemtoparticularcircumstances(2.135)whichalso
callsforinterpretingnaturallaw.Lockedidnotthinkofinterpretinglawasadistinctfunction
becausehethoughtitwasapartofboththelegislativeandexecutivefunctions(Tuckness
2002a).
IfwecompareLockesformulationofseparationofpowerstothelaterideasofMontesquieu,
weseethattheyarenotsodifferentastheymayinitiallyappear.AlthoughMontesquieugives
themorewellknowndivisionoflegislative,executive,andjudicial,asheexplainswhathe
meansbythesetermshereaffirmsthesuperiorityofthelegislativepoweranddescribesthe
executivepowerashavingtodowithinternationalaffairs(Lockesfederativepower)andthe
judicialpowerasconcernedwiththedomesticexecutionofthelaws(Lockesexecutive
power).Itismoretheterminologythantheconceptsthathavechanged.Lockeconsidered
arrestingaperson,tryingaperson,andpunishingapersonasallpartofthefunctionof
executingthelawratherthanasadistinctfunction.
Lockebelievedthatitwasimportantthatthelegislativepowercontainanassemblyofelected
representatives,butaswehaveseenthelegislativepowercouldcontainmonarchicaland
aristocraticelementsaswell.Lockebelievedthepeoplehadthefreedomtocreatedmixed
constitutionsthatutilizeallofthese.Forthatreason,Lockestheoryofseparationofpowers
doesnotdictateoneparticulartypeofconstitutionanddoesnotprecludeunelectedofficials
fromhavingpartofthelegislativepower.Lockewasmoreconcernedthatthepeoplehave
representativeswithsufficientpowertoblockattacksontheirlibertyandattemptstotaxthem
withoutjustification.ThisisimportantbecauseLockealsoaffirmsthatthecommunity
remainstherealsupremepowerthroughout.Thepeopleretaintherighttoremoveoralter
thelegislativepower(TwoTreatises2.149).Thiscanhappenforavarietyofreasons.The
entiresocietycanbedissolvedbyasuccessfulforeigninvasion(2.211),butLockeismore
interestedindescribingtheoccasionswhenthepeopletakepowerbackfromthegovernment
towhichtheyhaveentrustedit.Iftheruleoflawisignored,iftherepresentativesofthe
peoplearepreventedfromassembling,ifthemechanismsofelectionarealteredwithout
popularconsent,orifthepeoplearehandedovertoaforeignpower,thentheycantakeback
theiroriginalauthorityandoverthrowthegovernment(2.21217).Theycanalsorebelifthe
governmentattemptstotakeawaytheirrights(2.222).Lockethinksthisisjustifiablesince
oppressedpeoplewilllikelyrebelanywayandthosewhoarenotoppressedwillbeunlikelyto
rebel.Moreover,thethreatofpossiblerebellionmakestyrannylesslikelytostartwith
(2.2246).Forallthesereasons,whilethereareavarietyoflegitimateconstitutionalforms,
thedelegationofpowerunderanyconstitutionisunderstoodtobeconditional.
Lockesunderstandingofseparationofpowersiscomplicatedbythedoctrineofprerogative.
Prerogativeistherightoftheexecutivetoactwithoutexplicitauthorizationforalaw,oreven
contrarytothelaw,inordertobetterfulfillthelawsthatseekthepreservationofhumanlife.
Akingmight,forexample,orderthatahousebetorndowninordertostopafirefrom
spreadingthroughoutacity(TwoTreatises1.159).Lockedefinesitmorebroadlyasthe
powerofdoingpublicgoodwithoutarule(1.167).ThisposesachallengetoLockes
doctrineoflegislativesupremacy.Lockehandlesthisbyexplainingthattherationaleforthis
poweristhatgeneralrulescannotcoverallpossiblecasesandthatinflexibleadherencetothe
ruleswouldbedetrimentaltothepublicgoodandthatthelegislatureisnotalwaysinsession
torenderajudgment(2.160).Therelationshipbetweentheexecutiveandthelegislature
dependsonthespecificconstitution.Ifthechiefexecutivehasnopartinthesupreme
legislativepower,thenthelegislaturecouldoverruletheexecutivesdecisionsbasedon
prerogativewhenitreconvenes.If,however,thechiefexecutivehasaveto,theresultwould
beastalematebetweenthem.Lockedescribesasimilarstalemateinthecasewherethechief
executivehasthepowertocallparliamentandcanthuspreventitfrommeetingbyrefusingto
callitintosession.Insuchacase,Lockesays,thereisnojudgeonearthbetweenthemasto
whethertheexecutivehasmisusedprerogativeandbothsideshavetherighttoappealto
heaveninthesamewaythatthepeoplecanappealtoheavenagainstatyrannical
government(2.168).
TheconceptofanappealtoheavenisanimportantconceptinLockesthought.Locke
assumesthatpeople,whentheyleavethestateofnature,createagovernmentwithsomesort
ofconstitutionthatspecifieswhichentitiesareentitledtoexercisewhichpowers.Lockealso
assumesthatthesepowerswillbeusedtoprotecttherightsofthepeopleandtopromotethe
publicgood.Incaseswherethereisadisputebetweenthepeopleandthegovernmentabout
whetherthegovernmentisfulfillingitsobligations,thereisnohigherhumanauthorityto
whichonecanappeal.Theonlyappealleft,forLocke,istheappealtoGod.Theappealto
heaven,therefore,involvestakinguparmsagainstyouropponentandlettingGodjudgewho
isintheright.

7. Toleration
InLocke'sLetterConcerningToleration,hedevelopsseverallinesofargumentsthatare
intendedtoestablishtheproperspheresforreligionandpolitics.Hiscentralclaimsarethat
governmentshouldnotuseforcetotrytobringpeopletothetruereligionandthatreligious
societiesarevoluntaryorganizationsthathavenorighttousecoercivepowerovertheirown
membersorthoseoutsidetheirgroup.OnerecurringlineofargumentthatLockeusesis
explicitlyreligious.LockearguesthatneithertheexampleofJesusnortheteachingofthe
NewTestamentgivesanyindicationthatforceisaproperwaytobringpeopletosalvation.
Healsofrequentlypointsoutwhathetakestobeclearevidenceofhypocrisy,namelythat
thosewhoaresoquicktopersecuteothersforsmalldifferencesinworshipordoctrineare
relativelyunconcernedwithmuchmoreobviousmoralsinsthatposeanevengreaterthreatto
theireternalstate.
Inadditiontotheseandsimilarreligiousarguments,Lockegivesthreereasonsthataremore
philosophicalinnatureforbarringgovernmentsfromusingforcetoencouragepeopleto
adoptreligiousbeliefs(Works6:1012).First,hearguesthatthecareofmen'ssoulshasnot
beencommittedtothemagistratebyeitherGodortheconsentofmen.Thisargument
resonateswiththestructureofargumentusedsooftenintheTwoTreatisestoestablishthe
naturalfreedomandequalityofmankind.ThereisnocommandintheBibletelling
magistratestobringpeopletothetruefaithandpeoplecouldnotconsenttosuchagoalfor
governmentbecauseitisnotpossibleforpeople,atwill,tobelievewhatthemagistratetells
themtobelieve.Theirbeliefsareafunctionofwhattheythinkistrue,notwhattheywill.
Locke'ssecondargumentisthatsincethepowerofthegovernmentisonlyforce,whiletrue
religionconsistsofgenuineinwardpersuasionofthemind,forceisincapableofbringing
peopletothetruereligion.Locke'sthirdargumentisthatevenifthemagistratecouldchange
people'sminds,asituationwhereeveryoneacceptedthemagistrate'sreligionwouldnotbring
morepeopletothetruereligion.Manyofthemagistratesoftheworldbelievereligionsthat
arefalse.
Locke'scontemporary,JonasProast,respondedbysayingthatLocke'sthreeargumentsreally
amounttojusttwo,thattruefaithcannotbeforcedandthatwehavenomorereasontothink
thatwearerightthananyoneelsehas.Proastarguedthatforcecanbehelpfulinbringing
peopletothetruthindirectly,andatadistance.Hisideawasthatalthoughforcecannot
directlybringaboutachangeofmindorheart,itcancausepeopletoconsiderargumentsthat
theywouldotherwiseignoreorpreventthemfromhearingorreadingthingsthatwouldlead
themastray.Ifforceisindirectlyusefulinbringingpeopletothetruefaith,thenLockehas
notprovidedapersuasiveargument.AsforLocke'sargumentabouttheharmofamagistrate
whosereligionisfalseusingforcetopromoteit,Proastclaimedthatthiswasirrelevantsince
thereisamorallyrelevantdifferencebetweenaffirmingthatthemagistratemaypromotethe
religionhethinkstrueandaffirmingthathemaypromotethereligionthatactuallyistrue.
Proastthoughtthatunlessonewasacompleteskeptic,onemustbelievethatthereasonsfor
one'sownpositionareobjectivelybetterthanthoseforotherpositions.
JeremyWaldron,inaninfluentialarticle,restatedthesubstanceofProast'sobjectionfora
contemporaryaudience.Hearguedthat,leavingasideLocke'sChristianarguments,hismain
positionwasthatitwasinstrumentallyirrational,fromtheperspectiveofthepersecutor,to
useforceinmattersofreligionbecauseforceactsonlyonthewillandbeliefisnotsomething
thatwechangeatwill.Waldronpointedoutthatthisargumentblocksonlyoneparticular
reasonforpersecution,notallreasons.Thusitwouldnotstopsomeonewhousedreligious
persecutionforsomeendotherthanreligiousconversion,suchaspreservingthepeace.Even
incaseswherepersecutiondoeshaveareligiousgoal,WaldronagreeswithProastthatforce
maybeindirectlyeffectiveinchangingpeople'sbeliefs.Muchofthecurrentdiscussionabout
Locke'scontributiontocontemporarypoliticalphilosophyintheareaoftolerationcenterson
whetherLockehasagoodreplytotheseobjectionsfromProastandWaldron.
SomecontemporarycommentatorstrytorescueLocke'sargumentbyredefiningthereligious
goalthatthemagistrateispresumedtoseek.SusanMendus,forexample,notesthat
successfulbrainwashingmightcauseapersontosincerelyutterasetofbeliefs,butthatthose
 beliefsmightstillnotcountasgenuine.Beliefsinducedbycoercionmightbesimilarly
problematic.PaulBouHabibarguesthatwhatLockeisreallyafterissincereinquiryandthat
Lockethinksinquiryundertakenonlybecauseofduressisnecessarilyinsincere.These
approachesthustrytosaveLocke'sargumentbyshowingthatforcereallyisincapableof
bringingaboutthedesiredreligiousgoal.
OthercommentatorsfocusonLocke'sfirstargumentaboutproperauthority,andparticularly
ontheideathatauthorizationmustbebyconsent.DavidWoottonarguesthatevenifforce
occasionallyworksatchangingaperson'sbelief,itdoesnotworkoftenenoughtomakeit
rationalforpersonstoconsenttothegovernmentexercisingthatpower.Apersonwhohas
goodreasontothinkhewillnotchangehisbeliefsevenwhenpersecutedhasgoodreasonto
preventthepersecutionscenariofromeverhappening.RichardVernonarguesthatwewant
notonlytoholdrightbeliefs,butalsotoholdthemfortherightreasons.Sincethebalanceof
reasonsratherthanthebalanceofforceshoulddetermineourbeliefs,wewouldnotconsentto
asysteminwhichirrelevantreasonsforbeliefmightinfluenceus.
Othercommentatorsfocusonthethirdargument,thatthemagistratemightbewrong.Here
thequestioniswhetherLocke'sargumentisquestionbeggingornot.Thetwomostpromising
linesofargumentarethefollowing.Woottonarguesthatthereareverygoodreasons,from
thestandpointofagivenindividual,forthinkingthatgovernmentswillbewrongaboutwhich
religionistrue.Governmentsaremotivatedbythequestforpower,nottruth,andareunlikely
tobegoodguidesinreligiousmatters.Sincetherearesomanydifferentreligionsheldby
rulers,ifonlyoneistruethenlikelymyownruler'sviewsarenottrue.Woottonthustakes
Locketobeshowingthatitisirrational,fromtheperspectiveoftheindividual,toconsentto
governmentpromotionofreligion.Adifferentinterpretationofthethirdargumentis
presentedbyTuckness.Hearguesthatthelikelihoodthatthemagistratemaybewrong
generatesaprincipleoftolerationbasedonwhatisrationalfromtheperspectiveofa
legislator,nottheperspectiveofanindividualcitizen.DrawingonLocke'slaterwritingson
toleration,hearguesthatLocke'stheoryofnaturallawassumesthatGod,asauthorofnatural
law,takesintoaccountthefallibilityofthosemagistrateswhowillcarryoutthecommandsof
naturallaw.Ifuseforcetopromotethetruereligionwereacommandofnaturallaw
addressedtoallmagistrates,itwouldnotpromotethetruereligioninpracticebecauseso
manymagistrateswronglybelievethattheirreligionisthetrueone.Tucknessclaimsthatin
Locke'slaterwritingsontolerationhemovedawayfromargumentsbasedonwhatitis
instrumentallyrationalforanindividualtoconsentto.Instead,heemphasizedtesting
proposedprinciplesbasedonwhethertheywouldstillfulfilltheirgoalifuniversallyapplied
byfalliblehumanbeings.

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Other Internet Resources

TheWorksofJohnLocke,1824edition;severalvolumes,includingtheEssay
ConcerningHumanUnderstanding,TwoTreatisesofGovernment,allfourLetterson
Toleration,andhiswritingsonmoney.

TheEpistemeLinksLockepage,keepsanuptodatelistingoflinkstoLockesiteson
theweb.

JohnLocke'sPoliticalPhilosophy,entrybyAlexanderMoseley,intheInternet
EncyclopediaofPhilosophy

ImagesofLocke,attheNationalPortraitGallery,GreatBritain.

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