CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS COMPILATION (1)

ARTS. 36, 89-99 RPC

1. 1. PEOPLE V BAYOTAS

2. 2. PANAGUITON V DOJ

3. 3. RECEBIDO V
PEOPLE
4. 4. PANGAN V
GATBALITE
5. 5. DEL CASTILLO V
TORRECAMPO
PROBATION LAW CASES

6. 6. DIMAKUTA V
PEOPLE
7. 7. ALMERO V PEOPLE

8. 8. COLINARES V
PEOPLE
9. 9. LAGROSA V PEOPLE

10. 10. VICOY V

PEOPLE
11. 11. FRANCISCO
V CA

1. PEOPLE V BAYOTAS
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Facts: Rogelio Bayotas was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof.
Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at the National
Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic
encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently,
the Supreme Court in its dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it
required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil
liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-
appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the
offense charged.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the
Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction
is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties.

Issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his
civil liability.

Ruling: Yes.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only when
the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task
of ascertaining the legal import of the term "final judgment." Is it final judgment as
contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment which is final
and executory?
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel down to
one positive conclusion: The term final judgment employed in the Revised Penal
Code means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a judgment has not become
executory, it cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the felony
charged against him.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final
determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of
the civil action, such that when the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of
accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The
claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true,
would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the
criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This
is to be distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil
Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its
life from a criminal proceeding.
Summarize ruling of the SC:
1.Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
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terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and
based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."
2.Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. 19Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation
from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a)Law b)Contracts c)Quasi-contracts d). . . e)Quasi-delicts
3.Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action
and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4.Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the
civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,
conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21of the Civil Code, that should thereby
avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant
Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the
act complained of, i.e., rape.
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2. PANAGUITON JR V DOJ

G.R. No. 167571

November 25, 2008

Facts: This is a petition for Review of CA resolutions dismissing Luis Panaguiton, Jr.
petition for certiorari and motion for reconsideration

In 1992, Cawili borrowed money from petitioner and later issued checks as payment
both signed by Cawili and his business associate Tongson. But checks were
dishonored either for insufficiency of funds or closure of account.

Panaguiton then made a formal demand to Cawili and Tongson to pay but to no
avail.

So Panaguiton filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating BP Blg. 22
before QC Prosecutor's Office.

During PI, Tongson filed his counter-affidavit claiming that he had been unjustly
included as party-respondent since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in Cawili's
personal capacity. He averred that he was not Cawili's business associate and
claimed that he himself has criminal cases against Cawili. Tongson also denied that
he had issued bounced checks and that his signatures on the checks had been
falsified.

As counter, Panaguiton presented documents showing Tongson's signature which

was the same as the signatures on the checks. Panaguiton presented also an
affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson claimed to be Cawili's business
associate.

December 1995, Prosecutor found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed
the charges against Tongson.

Panaguiton filed a partial appeal before DOJ even the case against Cawili was filed
before the proper court.

Later on July 1997, after finding that Tongson was possible to co-sign the bounced
checks and had altered his signature in pleadings submitte during PI, Chief State
Prosecutor directed the City Prosecutor of QC to conduct reinvestigation of the case
against Tongson and refer the signatures to NBI.

On March 1999, Asst. City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint against Tongson
without referring to the NBI, holding that the case had already prescribed pursuant
to Act. No. 3326, stating that in this case the 4 year period started on the date the
checks were dishonored and that the filing of complaint in QC prosecutor's office did
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not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period as the law contemplates judicial
and not administrative proceedings. Four years had elapsed and no information was
filed against Tongson. And the order to refer the matter to NBI could no longer be
sanctioned under Section 3, Rule 112 of rules of criminal procedure because the
initiative should come from the petitioner himself and not from the investigating
prosecutor.

Petitioner appealed to DOJ through undersecretary Teehankee but was dismissed.

Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration of DOJ and through undersecretary
Gutierrez ruled in his favor and declared that the prescription period was
interrupted by the filing of the complaint in the Prosecutor's office.

However, in August 2004, DOJ acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by
Tongson ruled the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered the
withdrawal of 3 informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against Tongson. DOJ
explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do not provide
for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder.

Panguiton thus filed a petition for Certiorari before CA assailing the august
resolution of the DOJ, but was dismissed by CA in view of failure to attach a proper
verification and certification of non-forum shopping.

Panaguiton then filed for instant petition claiming that CA committed grave error on
dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it
was without merit and questions are too unsubstantial.

The DOJ stated that CA did not err in dismissing the petition for non-compliance with
the rules of court.

Then Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment arguing that CA did not err in
dismissing the petition for certiorari, and they also claim that the offense of
violation of BP Blg. 22 has prescribed and the long delay, attributable to petitioner
and the State violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases. The
petition is meritorious.

Issue: Whether or not the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has already prescribed
per Act No. 3326

Ruling: We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed.
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense
under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30)
days but not more than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the commission of the offense or, if
the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we
cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a case in court can toll the running
of the prescriptive period.
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It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926,
preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the
peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment, "and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a
complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the
prescription of the offense is halted.
While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No.
3326 appears before "investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the
subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes
of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term
"proceedings" should now be understood either executive or judicial in character:
executive when it involves the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the
trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative
proceeding instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his
prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.
A clear example would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit
on 24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He likewise
timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the dismissal of the
charges against Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the
prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit
with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ
issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed.
Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated
the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer
setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act
No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and
actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further
simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accuseds delaying
tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
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3. RECEBIDO V. PEOPLE (346 SCRA 88)

Facts: On September 1990, Caridad Dorol went to the house of Aniceto Recebido
to redeem her property which Dorol mortgaged to petitioner sometime in April
1985. Recebido and Dorol did not execute a document on the mortgage but Dorol
gave petitioner a copy of the Deed of Sale dated June 16, 1973 executed in her
favour by her father, Juan Dorol.
Caridad Dorol verified from the Office of Assessor that there exists on its file a Deed
of Sale dated Aug. 133, 1979 allegedly executed by Dorol in favour of Recebido and
that the property was registered in the latters name. After comparison, NBI Doc
Examiner found that the signature was falsified.
Petitioner was charged and convicted by the trial court of falsifying the signature of
Caridad Dorol, causing it to appear that said Caridad Dorol has signed her name on
a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property in his favor, when in truth and in fact he
well knew, that Caridad Dorol did not execute said document, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court except for
the award for damage.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime charged had already prescribed at the time the
information was filed.
Decision: The crime charged has not prescribed.
The petitioner is correct in stating that whether or not the offense charged has
already prescribed when the information was filed would depend on the penalty
imposable therefor, which in this case is prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000.00 pesos. [9]Under the Revised
Penal Code,[10]said penalty is a correctional penalty in the same way that the fine
imposed is categorized as correctional. Both the penalty and fine being correctional,
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the offense shall prescribe in ten years. [11]The issue that the petitioner has missed,
however, is the reckoning point of the prescriptive period. The petitioner is of the
impression that the ten-year prescriptive period necessarily started at the time the
crime was committed. This is inaccurate.Under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code,
the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, x x x. In People v.
Reyes,[12] this Court has declared that registration in public registry is a notice to the
whole world. The record is constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests,
legal and equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with knowledge of
what it contains.

4. PANGAN V. GATBALITE

Facts: On September 16, 1987, the petitioner was convicted of the offense charged
and was sentenced to serve a penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, on October 24, 1988, affirmed in toto the
decision of the MTC. Petitioner never got to serve his sentence and hid for about
nine years.

Then, on January 20, 2000, the petitioner was apprehended and detained at the
Mabalacat Detention Cell. Four days thereafter, he filed a Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus at the RTC of Angeles City, impleading respondent (Acting Chief of
Police of Mabalacat, Pampanga). Petitioner contended that his arrest was illegal and
unjustified on the grounds that, a) the straight penalty of two months and one day
of arresto mayor prescribes in five years under No. 3,Article 93 [of the] Revised
Penal Code, and (b) having been able to continuously evade service of sentence
for almost nine years, his criminalliability has long been totally extinguished under
No. 6, Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied since there was no evasion of
the service of the sentence. Evasion presupposes escape during the service of the
sentence consisting in deprivation of liberty.

Issue: Whether or not the penalty already prescribed

Held: No.
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The period of prescription of penalties the succeeding Article 93 provides "shall

commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his
sentence". Article 157 of the RPC discussed how evasion of service of sentence was
perfected. It is provided therein that,

"The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be
imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping
during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment. To consider
properly the meaning of evasion service of sentence, its elements must be
present these are: (1) the offender is a convict by final judgment; (2) he "is serving
his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades service of
sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. For, by the express terms of
the statute, a convict evades "service of his sentence" by "escaping during the term
of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment."

That escape should take place while serving sentence, is emphasized by the second
sentence of Article 157. It provides for a higher penalty if such "evasion or escape
shall have taken place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows,
gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit,
violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or employees of
the penal institution, . . ." Indeed, evasion of sentence is but another expression of
the term "jail breaking."

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlance and for purposes
of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means the unlawful departure of prisoner from the
limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be
said to have escaped therefrom.

In this case, the petitioner was never brought to prison. As the record would show,
even before the execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in
hiding. He now begs for the compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live
a life of peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the execution of
his sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to become a fugitive. The Court
accords compassion only to those who are deserving. Petitioner's guilt was proven
beyond reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he committed. He
is therefore not to be rewarded therefor.
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5. DEL CASTILLO V TORRECAMPO

394 SCRA 221

Facts: On May 17, 1982 (Brgy. Election Day), the accused conducted himself in a
disorderly manner, by striking the electric bulb and two kerosene petromax lamps
lighting the room where voting center plunging the room in complete darkness,
thereby interrupting & disrupting the proceeding of the Board of Election Tellers. On
Jan. 14, 1985, the trial court rendered judgement and declared petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. During the execution of judgement, petitioner failed to
appear which prompted the presiding judge to issue an order of arrest of petitioner
and the confiscation of his bond. However, pet. was never apprehended. He
remained at large. Ten years later, on Oct. 24, 1997, petitioner filed before the trial
court a motion to quash warrant issued for his arrest on the ground of prescription
of the penalty imposed upon him. The motion was denied by the trial court. Del
Castillo, on a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals, questioned the denial by
the trial court. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Upon
denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Del Castillo raised the matter to this Court.

Issue: Whether or not the penalty imposed has prescribed

Ruling: No. Penalty imposed has not yet prescribed.

Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription of penalties
shall commence to run. Under said provision, it shall commence to run from the
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date the felon evades the service of his sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the
same Code, evasion of service of sentence can be committed only by those who
have been convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of his sentence.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlance and for
purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner
from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison
cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.
In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, even before the
execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. Now
petitioner begs for the compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live a life
of peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the execution of his
sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to become a fugitive. The Court accords
compassion only to those who are deserving. Petitioner's guilt was proven beyond
reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he committed. He is
therefore not to be rewarded therefor.

Because petitioner was never placed in confinement, prescription never started to

run in his favour.

6.DIMAKUTA V PEOPLE

Facts: Petitioner Mustapha Dimakuta y Maruhom alias Boyet was indicted for
Violation of Section 5 Paragraph (b), Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 or the
Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discriminatory Act.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). When asked to comment
on the appeal, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), relying heavily on People v.
Abello,5 opined that petitioner should have been convicted only of Acts of
Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). On June 28,
2012, the CA rendered a Decision adopting the recommendation of the OSG
Modified the RTC Decision.

Petitioner received a copy of CA Decision on July 6, 2012. Instead of further

appealing the case, he filed on July 23, 2012 before the CA a manifestation with
motion to allow him to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC. 8
Petitioner invoked the case of Colinares v. People9 which allowed petitioner therein
to apply for probation after his sentence was later reduced on appeal by the
Supreme Court. The CA denied petitioner's manifestation with motion.
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Issue: Whether or not the petitioner may still be allowed to apply for probation
despite having perfected an appeal

Ruling: No.

In view of the latest amendment to Section 4 of the Probation Law that "no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction," prevailing jurisprudence35
treats appeal and probation as mutually exclusive remedies because the law is
unmistakable about it.36 Indeed, the law is very clear and a contrary interpretation
would counter its envisioned mandate. Courts have no authority to invoke "liberal
interpretation" or "the spirit of the law" where the words of the statute themselves,
and as illuminated by the history of that statute, leave no room for doubt or
interpretation.37 To be sure, the remedy of convicted felons who want to avail of the
benefits of probation even after the remedy of an appeal is to go to the Congress
and ask for the amendment of the law. To surmise a converse construal of the
provision would be dangerously encroaching on the power of the legislature to enact
laws and is tantamount to judicial legislation.

To be sure, if petitioner intended in the first instance to be entitled to apply for

probation he should have admitted his guilt and buttressed his appeal on a claim
that the penalty imposed by the RTC was erroneous or that he is only guilty of a
lesser offense necessarily included in the crime for which he was originally
convicted. Unfortunately for him, he already perfected his appeal and it is late in the
day to avail the benefits of probation despite the imposition of the CA of a
probationable penalty.

7.ALMERO V PEOPLE

Facts:

THE MTC RULING

Petitioner is the accused for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and multiple
physical injuries. On 8 January 2007, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Labo,
Camarines Norte found petitioner guilty and sentenced him to suffer prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Petitioner filed an Application for
Probation on 7 September 2007, reasoning that he was informed of his conviction
only upon being served the warrant for his arrest. On 22 February 2007, the MTC
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denied his application, prompting petitioner to file a special civil action with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC).
THE RTC RULING IN SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION NO. 07-0012
RTC did not address the issue of probation.
THE CA RULING
The CA ruled that the RTC should have confined itself to determining whether or not
the MTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners application for
probation. Since no appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law is available against the denial of probation, a Rule 65 petition
is clearly the appropriate remedy. However, the trial court erred in taking
cognizance of supplemental grounds assailing the judgment of conviction, because
an application for probation is a waiver of the right to appeal from the judgment of
conviction and effectively renders the same final. The CA ruled that even assuming
petitioner failed to be present at the promulgation of judgment, he had no one but
himself to blame for failing to inform the MTC of his change of address. 6
The CA also found that petitioner filed his application for probation only on 7
September 2007, or more than one month after he received notice of the judgment
of conviction. Inasmuch as the grant of probation rests solely on the discretion of
the court, the denial thereof cannot be considered grave abuse, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the trial courts appealed January 28, 2008
Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is entered ordering
the DISMISSAL of appellees petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the CA is correct in ruling that Pet. is not entitled to probation
Ruling: (W)e find that public respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion in
denying appellees application for probation.
Probation is not a right but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency conferred
by the State, and may be granted by the court to a deserving defendant.
Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court. It is
to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally
for the benefit of the accused.
In the present case, petitioner cannot make up his mind whether to question the
judgment, or apply for probation, which is necessarily deemed a waiver of his right
to appeal.20 While he did not file an appeal before applying for probation, he
assailed the validity of the conviction in the guise of a petition supposedly assailing
the denial of probation. In so doing, he attempted to circumvent P.D. No. 968, as
amended by P.D. 1990, which seeks to make appeal and probation mutually
exclusive remedies.
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8. COLINARES V PEOPLE

Eligibility for Probation Even After Appealing From an Erroneous Judgment

: The Colinares vs. People (G.R. No. 182748, December 13, 2011) Doctrine

DECISION

ABAD, J.:
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I. THE FACTS

Accused-appellant Arnel Colinares (Arnel) was charged with frustrated

homicide for hitting the head of the private complainant with a piece of stone. He
alleged self-defense but the trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and
sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from 2 years and 4 months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as
maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only
up to 6 years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.

Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and,

alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide with the
consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him. His conviction was affirmed
by the CA. Hence, this appeal to the Supreme Court.

II. THE ISSUES

Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower [lesser] offense
[of attempted homicide] and a reduced probationable penalty, may he may still
apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court?

III. THE RULING

[The Supreme Court voted to PARTIALLY GRANT the appeal, MODIFIED the CA
decision and found Arnel GUILTY of ATTEMPTED (not frustrated) HOMICIDE and
SENTENCED him to and indeterminate but PROBATIONABLE penalty of 4 months of
arresto mayor as minimum and 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional as
maximum. The Court also voted 8-7 to allow Arnel to APPLY FOR PROBATION
within 15 days from notice that the record of the case has been remanded for
execution to trial court.]

YES, Arnel may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the
trial court.

Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having

appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide. But,
the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and
holds that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be lowered to
imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four
months of prision correccional, as maximum. With this new penalty, it would be but
fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the
RTC.

[W]hile it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel
has the right to such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is the right
to apply for that privilege. The Court finds that his maximum jail term should only
be 2 years and 4 months. If the Court allows him to apply for probation because of
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the lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide whether or not to grant
him the privilege of probation, taking into account the full circumstances of his case.

If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinions hard position, it will

apply the probation law on Arnel based on the trial courts annulled judgment
against him. He will not be entitled to probation because of the severe penalty that
such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Courts judgment of conviction
for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to the trial
courts judgmenteven if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now
also be made to pay for the trial courts erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of
his right to apply for probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa
kalabaw (the horse errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there?

Here, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to
apply for probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. He
was not in a position to say, By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for
probation. The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied him that
choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this
Courts greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It
remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have
the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.

In a real sense, the Courts finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated
homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first
time imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the
start, it would have found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the
right penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would have afforded
Arnel the right to apply for probation.

9.LAGROSA V PEOPLE
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Facts: On October 29, 1996, the RTC rendered a decision finding petitioners
Domingo Lagrosa and Osias Baguin guilty of violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as
amended (The Revised Forestry Code), for having in their possession forest products
without the requisite permits. . The trial court sentenced them to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as
maximum. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the decision was denied by the
trial court on November 21, 1996. Petitioners appealed their conviction to the Court
of Appeals. On March 14, 2000, the appellate court affirmed the conviction of the
petitioners, with the modification as to the penalty imposed, , which was reduced to
an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty one (21)
days of prision correccional, as maximum.

On August 29, 2001, petitioners filed an Application for Probation with the trial
court, which, as mentioned at the outset, was denied. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied by the trial court. Hence, petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which rendered the assailed
decision affirming the questioned resolutions of the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners should be allowed to apply for probation even if
they had already appealed the decision of the trial court.

Ruling: No.

SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court
may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application
by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution
of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon
such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal
from the judgment of conviction. (underscoring ours)
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General reiterates the express
provision of P.D. 968 prohibiting the grant of probation to those who have appealed
their convictions.[15] It argues that, even if the petitioners have appealed for the
purpose of reducing an incorrect penalty, this fact does not serve to remove them
from the prohibition in Section 4 of P.D. 968 for the law makes no such distinction.

There is no question that petitioners appealed from the decision of the trial court.
This fact alone merits the denial of petitioners Application for Probation. Having
appealed from the judgment of the trial court and having applied for probation only
after the Court of Appeals had affirmed their conviction, petitioners were clearly
precluded from the benefits of probation.
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS COMPILATION (1)

10. VICOY V PEOPLE

Facts: The present controversy stemmed from a judgment of conviction

promulgated on August 24, 1995 by the Municipal Trial Court. [GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of City Ordinance No. 365-B for peddling fish outside
the Agora Public Market crime of Resistance and Serious Disobedience To Agents
Of A Person In Authority].

On the same date, petitioner filed an application for probation. On September 18,
1995, however, petitioner filed a motion to withdraw her application for probation
and simultaneously filed a notice of appeal. MTCC of Tagbilaran granted petitioners
withdrawal of her application for probation but denied her notice of appeal for
having been filed out of time. Hence, petitioner filed a special civil action for
certiorari with the RTC of Bohol contending that the MTCC of Tagbilaran gravely
abused its discretion in denying her the right to appeal.

The RTC rendered the assailed Order dismissing petitioners special civil action for
certiorari for failure to comply with the Order of furnishing City Prosecutors Office
with a copy of her memorandum and of the assailed judgment.

Issue: Whether or not the petition for certiorari was validly dismissed by the
Regional Trial Court on the ground of petitioners failure to comply with its Order
dated August 2, 1996.

Ruling: Yes. Dismissed validly

Even assuming that RTC did not order the said dismissal, petitioners special
civil action, questioning the denial of her notice of appeal, would still fail. Note that
petitioner filed an application for probation. Section 7, Rule 120, of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure is explicit that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final when
the accused has applied for probation. This is totally in accord with Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law of 1976, as amended), which in part
provides that the filing of an application for probation is deemed a waiver of the
right to appeal. Thus, there was no more opportunity for petitioner to exercise her
right to appeal, the judgment having become final by the filing of an application for
probation.
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS COMPILATION (1)

11.FRANCISO V CA

PABLO C. FRANCISCO v. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HONORABLE MAXIMO

C. CONTRERAS G.R. No. 108747. April 6, 1995

Facts:

Pablo Francisco was accused of multiple grave oral defamation by his employees.
The Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati sentenced him of prision correccional in its
minimum period in each crime committed on each date of each case. Francisco then
elevated the case to the RTC in which they sentenced him only of eight straight
months for appreciating mitigating circumstances.

Francisco failed to make an appeal on the RTCs decision making it final. The MTC
issued a warrant of arrest, but before Francisco was to be arrested, he filed an
application for probation which the MTC denied. He went to the Court of Appeals on
certiorari which was also denied.

Issue: Whether Pablo Francisco is still qualified to avail of probation.

Ruling: No.

Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation. First, Francisco violated Sec.4 of the
Probation Law in which no application for probation shall be entertained after the
judgement is final.

Second, Francisco misunderstood when he thought that his prison sentence held by
the MTC was not qualified for probation. Multiple prison terms should not be added
up. Consequently, Francisco lost his right to probation when he appealed the MTC
decision to the RTC. The law considers appeal and probation mutually exclusive
remedies.

Third, Franciscos appeal to the RTC was not for reducing his penalties but for his
assertion of his innocence. The Probation Law prevent opportunism when petitioners
apply for probation when their appeal was dismissed.

Lastly, the application for probation was filed way beyond the period allowed by law.