FIRST DIVISION

HEIRS OF DR. JOSE G.R. No. 169913

DELESTE, namely:
JOSEFA DELESTE,
JOSE RAY DELESTE,
RAUL HECTOR
DELESTE, and Present:
RUBEN ALEX
DELESTE,
Petitioners, CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO,
LAND BANK OF THE DEL CASTILLO,
PHILIPPINES (LBP), and
as represented by its PEREZ, JJ.
Manager,
Respondents. Promulgated:
June 8, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to reverse and set aside the
October 28, 2004 Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its September 13, 2005
Resolution[2] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

The spouses Gregorio Nanaman (Gregorio) and Hilaria Tabuclin (Hilaria) were the owners of a parcel
of agricultural land located in Tambo, Iligan City, consisting of 34.7 hectares (subject property). Said
spouses were childless, but Gregorio had a son named Virgilio Nanaman (Virgilio) by another woman.
Virgilio had been raised by the couple since he was two years old. Gregorio also had two daughters,
Esperanza and Caridad, by still another woman. [3]

When Gregorio died in 1945, Hilaria and Virgilio administered the subject property. [4] On February
16, 1954, Hilaria and Virgilio sold the subject property to Dr. Jose Deleste (Deleste) for PhP 16,000. [5] The
deed of sale was notarized on February 17, 1954 and registered on March 2, 1954. Also, the tax
declaration in the name of Virgilio was canceled and a new tax declaration was issued in the name of
Deleste. The arrears in the payment of taxes from 1952 had been updated by Deleste and from then on, he
paid the taxes on the property.[6]

On May 15, 1954, Hilaria died.[7] Gregorios brother, Juan Nanaman, was appointed as special
administrator of the estate of the deceased spouses. Subsequently, Edilberto Noel (Noel) was appointed as
the regular administrator of the joint estate.[8]

On April 30, 1963, Noel, as the administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased spouses, filed
before the Court of First Instance, Branch II, Lanao del Norte an action against Deleste for the reversion of
title over the subject property, docketed as Civil Case No. 698. [9] Said case went up to this Court in Noel v.
CA, where We rendered a Decision [10] on January 11, 1995, affirming the ruling of the CA that the subject
property was the conjugal property of the late spouses Gregorio and Hilaria and that the latter could only
sell her one-half (1/2) share of the subject property to Deleste. As a result, Deleste, who died in 1992, and
the intestate estate of Gregorio were held to be the co-owners of the subject property, each with a one-half
(1/2) interest in it.[11]

Notably, while Civil Case No. 698 was still pending before the CFI, particularly on October 21, 1972,
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 was issued. This law mandates that tenanted rice and corn lands be
brought under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries. Thus, the
subject property was placed under the said program. [12] However, only the heirs of Gregorio were identified
by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) as the landowners. Concomitantly, the notices and processes
relative to the coverage were sent to these heirs.[13]

In 1975, the City of Iligan passed City Ordinance No. 1313, known as the Zoning Regulation of Iligan
City, reclassifying the subject property as commercial/residential. [14]
 Eventually, on February 12, 1984, DAR issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) in favor of private
respondents who were tenants and actual cultivators of the subject property. [15] The CLTs were registered
on July 15, 1986.[16]

In 1991, the subject property was surveyed. [17] The survey of a portion of the land consisting of
20.2611 hectares, designated as Lot No. 1407, was approved on January 8, 1999. [18] The claim folder for
Lot No. 1407 was submitted to the LBP which issued a Memorandum of Valuation and a Certificate of Cash
Deposit on May 21, 2001 and September 12, 2001, respectively. Thereafter, Emancipation Patents (EPs)
and Original Certificates of Title (OCTs) were issued on August 1, 2001 and October 1, 2001, respectively,
in favor of private respondents over their respective portions of Lot No. 1407. [19]

Meanwhile, on November 22, 1999, the City of Iligan filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 4 in Iligan City for the expropriation of a 5.4686-hectare portion of Lot No. 1407, docketed as
Special Civil Action No. 4979. On December 11, 2000, the RTC issued a Decision granting the expropriation.
Considering that the real owner of the expropriated portion could not be determined, as the subject
property had not yet been partitioned and distributed to any of the heirs of Gregorio and Deleste, the just
compensation for the expropriated portion of the subject property in the amount of PhP 27,343,000 was
deposited with the Development Bank of the Philippines in Iligan City, in trust for the RTC in Iligan City. [20]

On February 28, 2002, the heirs of Deleste, petitioners herein, filed with the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a petition seeking to nullify private respondents EPs. [21] This was
docketed as Reg. Case No. X-471-LN-2002.

On July 21, 2003, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) rendered a
Decision[22] declaring that the EPs were null and void in view of the pending issues of ownership, the
subsequent reclassification of the subject property into a residential/commercial land, and the violation of
petitioners constitutional right to due process of law.

Dissatisfied, private respondents immediately filed their Notice of Appeal on July 22, 2003.
Notwithstanding it, on July 24, 2003, petitioners filed a Motion for a Writ of Execution pursuant to Section 2,
Rule XII of the Revised Rules of Procedure, which was granted in an Order dated August 4, 2003 despite
strong opposition from private respondents. [23] On January 28, 2004, the DARAB nullified the Order dated
August 4, 2003 granting the writ of execution.[24]

Subsequently, the DARAB, in DARAB Case No. 12486, reversed the ruling of the PARAD in its
Decision[25] dated March 15, 2004. It held, among others, that the EPs were valid as it was the heirs of
Deleste who should have informed the DAR of the pendency of Civil Case No. 698 at the time the subject
property was placed under the coverage of the OLT Program considering that DAR was not a party to the
said case. Further, it stated that the record is bereft of any evidence that the city ordinance has been
approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), as mandated by DAR Administrative
Order No. 01, Series of 1990, and held that whether the subject property is indeed exempt from the OLT
Program is an administrative determination, the jurisdiction of which lies exclusively with the DAR
Secretary or the latters authorized representative. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied by the DARAB in its Resolution[26] dated July 8, 2004.

Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85471,
challenging the Decision and Resolution in DARAB Case No. 12486. This was denied by the CA in a
Resolution dated October 28, 2004 for petitioners failure to attach the writ of execution, the order
nullifying the writ of execution, and such material portions of the record referred to in the petition and
other supporting papers, as required under Sec. 6 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was also denied by the appellate court in a Resolution dated September 13, 2005 for
being pro forma.

On November 18, 2005, petitioners filed a petition for review with this Court. In Our
Resolution[27] dated February 4, 2008, We resolved to deny the said petition for failure to show sufficiently
any reversible error in the assailed judgment to warrant the exercise by the Court of its discretionary
appellate jurisdiction in this case.

On March 19, 2008, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration. [28] On April 11, 2008, they also
filed a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration.[29]

In Our Resolution[30] dated August 20, 2008, this Court resolved to grant petitioners motion for
reconsideration and give due course to the petition, requiring the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.

The Issues

I. [WHETHER THE CA WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING] OUTRIGHT THE PETITION

FOR REVIEW OF PETITIONERS X X X.

II. [WHETHER] THE OUTRIGHT DENIAL OF PETITIONERS MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION BASED ON A MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS IS JUSTIFIED; AND
[WHETHER THE] OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION IS JUST CONSIDERING THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES RAISED THEREIN.
 XXXX

III. [WHETHER PETITIONERS LAND IS] COVERED BY AGRARIAN REFORM GIVEN THAT
THE CITY OF ILIGAN PASSED [CITY] ORDINANCE NO. 1313 RECLASSIFYING THE AREA
INTO A STRICTLY RESIDENTIAL AREA IN 1975.

IV. [WHETHER THE LAND] THAT HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY AND PARTIALLY
EXPROPRIATED BY A CITY GOVERNMENT [MAY] STILL BE SUBJECT[ED] TO AGRARIAN
REFORM.

V. [WHETHER DAR VIOLATED] THE RIGHTS OF PETITIONERS TO PROCEDURAL DUE

PROCESS.

VI. [WHETHER] THE COMPENSATION DETERMINED BY DAR AND LBP IS CORRECT

GIVEN THAT THE FORMULA USED HAD BEEN REPEALED.

VII. [WHETHER] THE ISSUANCE OF EMANCIPATION PATENTS [IS] LEGAL GIVEN THAT
THEY WERE FRUITS OF AN ILLEGAL PROCEEDING.

VIII. [WHETHER] THE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE [ARE] VALID GIVEN THAT THEY WERE
DIRECTLY ISSUED TO THE FARMER-BENEFICIARIES IN GROSS VIOLATION OF SECTION
16(E) OF R.A. 6657 X X X.[31]

Our Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Effect of non-compliance with the requirements

under Sec. 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court

In filing a petition for review as an appeal from awards, judgments, final orders, or resolutions of
any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions, it is required under Sec. 6(c), Rule
43 of the Rules of Court that it be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true
copy of the award, judgment, final order, or resolution appealed from, with certified true copies of such
material portions of the record referred to in the petition and other supporting papers. As stated:

Sec. 6. Contents of the petition. The petition for review shall (a) state the full names
of the parties to the case, without impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or
respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the
grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original
or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from,
together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein
and other supporting papers; and (d) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as
provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42. The petition shall state the specific
material dates showing that it was filed within the period fixed herein. (Emphasis supplied.)

Non-compliance with any of the above-mentioned requirements concerning the contents of the
petition, as well as the documents that should accompany the petition, shall be sufficient ground for its
dismissal as stated in Sec. 7, Rule 43 of the Rules:

Sec. 7. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. The failure of the petitioner to
comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and
other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of
and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the instant case, the CA dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 85471 for petitioners failure to
attach the writ of execution, the order nullifying the writ of execution, and such material portions of the
record referred to in the petition and other supporting papers. [32]

A perusal of the issues raised before the CA would, however, show that the foregoing documents
required by the appellate court are not necessary for the proper disposition of the case. Specifically:

Is [Lot No. 1407] within the ambit of the [Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program]?

Can the OLT by DAR over the subject land validly proceed without notice to the landowner?

Can the OLT be validly completed without a certification of deposit by Land Bank?
 [I]s the landowner barred from exercising his right of retention x x x [considering that EPs
were already issued on the basis of CLTs]?

Are the EPs over the subject land x x x valid x x x? [33]

Petitioners complied with the requirement under Sec. 6(c), Rule 43 of the Rules of Court when they
appended to the petition filed before the CA certified true copies of the following documents: (1) the
challenged resolution dated July 8, 2004 issued by the DARAB denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration; (2) the duplicate original copy of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated April 6,
2005; (3) the assailed decision dated March 15, 2004 issued by the DARAB reversing on appeal the
decision of the PARAD and nullifying with finality the order of execution pending appeal; (4) the Order
dated December 8, 2003 issued by the PARAD reinstating the writ of execution earlier issued; and (5) the
Decision dated July 21, 2003 issued by the PARAD in the original proceedings for the cancellation of the
EPs.[34] The CA, therefore, erred when it dismissed the petition based on such technical ground.

Even assuming that the omitted documents were material to the appeal, the appellate court,
instead of dismissing outright the petition, could have just required petitioners to submit the necessary
documents. In Spouses Espejo v. Ito,[35] the Court held that under Section 3 (d), Rule 3 of the Revised
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, [36] the Court of Appeals is with authority to require the parties to
submit additional documents as may be necessary to promote the interests of substantial justice.

Moreover, petitioners subsequent submission of the documents required by the CA with the motion
for reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance with Section 6(c), Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
[37]
In Jaro v. CA, this Court held that subsequent and substantial compliance may call for the relaxation of
the rules of procedure. Particularly:

The amended petition no longer contained the fatal defects that the original petition
had but the Court of Appeals still saw it fit to dismiss the amended petition. The Court of
Appeals reasoned that non-compliance in the original petition is admittedly attributable to
the petitioner and that no highly justifiable and compelling reason has been advanced to the
court for it to depart from the mandatory requirements of Administrative Circular No. 3-96.
The hard stance taken by the Court of Appeals in this case is unjustified under the
circumstances.

There is ample jurisprudence holding that the subsequent and substantial compliance
of an appellant may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure. In Cusi-Hernandez vs.
Diaz and Piglas-Kamao vs. National Labor Relations Commission, we ruled that the
subsequent submission of the missing documents with the motion for reconsideration
amounts to substantial compliance. The reasons behind the failure of the petitioners in these
two cases to comply with the required attachments were no longer scrutinized. What we
found noteworthy in each case was the fact that the petitioners therein substantially
complied with the formal requirements. We ordered the remand of the petitions in these
cases to the Court of Appeals, stressing the ruling that by precipitately dismissing the
petitions the appellate court clearly put a premium on technicalities at the expense of a just
resolution of the case.[38] (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)

Time and again, this Court has held that a strict and rigid application of technicalities must be
avoided if it tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. [39] As held in Sta. Ana v. Spouses
Carpo:[40]

Rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. If
the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it is
always within our power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from their
operation. Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance with
the procedural rules, even the most mandatory in character, mindful of the duty to
reconcile the need to put an end to litigation speedily and the parties right to an opportunity
to be heard.

Our recent ruling in Tanenglian v. Lorenzo is instructive:

We have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that

merit liberal application of the Rules, allowing us, depending on the circumstances, to
set aside technical infirmities and give due course to the appeal. In cases where we
dispense with the technicalities, we do not mean to undermine the force and
effectivity of the periods set by law. In those rare cases where we did not stringently
apply the procedural rules, there always existed a clear need to prevent the
commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried
to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and
the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper
disposition of his cause. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
 Clearly, the dismissal of the petition by the CA on mere technicality is unwarranted in the instant
case.

On the coverage of the subject property

by the agrarian reform program

Petitioners contend that the subject property, particularly Lot No. 1407, is outside the coverage of
the agrarian reform program in view of the enactment of City Ordinance No. 1313 by the City
of Iligan reclassifying the area into a residential/commercial land. [41]

Unconvinced, the DARAB, in its Decision, noted that the record is bereft of any evidence that the
city ordinance has been approved by the HLURB, thereby allegedly casting doubt on the validity of the
reclassification over the subject property. [42] It further noted that whether the subject property is exempt
from the OLT Program is an administrative determination, the jurisdiction of which lies exclusively with the
DAR Secretary, not with the DARAB.

Indeed, it is the Office of the DAR Secretary which is vested with the primary and exclusive
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program. [43] However, this
will not prevent the Court from assuming jurisdiction over the petition considering that the issues raised in
it may already be resolved on the basis of the records before Us. Besides, to allow the matter to remain
with the Office of the DAR Secretary would only cause unnecessary delay and undue hardship on the
parties. Applicable, by analogy, is Our ruling in the recent Bagong Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa ng Triumph
International v. Department of Labor and Employment Secretary,[44] where We held:

But as the CA did, we similarly recognize that undue hardship, to the point of
injustice, would result if a remand would be ordered under a situation where we are in the
position to resolve the case based on the records before us. As we said in Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals:

[w]e have laid down the rule that the remand of the case to the lower court
for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the Court is in a position to
resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in
the public interest and for the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved
actions on the merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for further
proceedings, such as where the ends of justice, would not be subserved by the
remand of the case.
Thus, we shall directly rule on the dismissal issue. And while we rule that the CA
could not validly rule on the merits of this issue, we shall not hesitate to refer back to its
dismissal ruling, where appropriate. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)

Pertinently, after an assiduous study of the records of the case, We agree with petitioners that the
subject property, particularly Lot No. 1407, is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program in view
of the enactment by the City of Iligan of its local zoning ordinance, City Ordinance No. 1313.

It is undeniable that the local government has the power to reclassify agricultural into non-
agricultural lands. In Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. CA,[45] this Court held that pursuant to
Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. (RA) 2264, amending the Local Government Code, municipal and/or city councils
are empowered to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations in consultation with the National
Planning Commission. It was also emphasized therein that [t]he power of the local government to convert
or reclassify lands [from agricultural to non-agricultural lands prior to the passage of RA 6657] is not
subject to the approval of the [DAR].[46]

Likewise, it is not controverted that City Ordinance No. 1313, which was enacted by the City
of Iligan in 1975, reclassified the subject property into a commercial/residential area. DARAB, however,
believes that the approval of HLURB is necessary in order for the reclassification to be valid.

We differ. As previously mentioned, City Ordinance No. 1313 was enacted by the City of Iligan in
1975. Significantly, there was still no HLURB to speak of during that time. It was the Task Force on Human
Settlements, the earliest predecessor of HLURB, which was already in existence at that time, having been
created on September 19, 1973 pursuant to Executive Order No. 419. It should be noted, however, that the
Task Force was not empowered to review and approve zoning ordinances and regulations. As a matter of
fact, it was only on August 9, 1978, with the issuance of Letter of Instructions No. 729, that local
governments were required to submit their existing land use plans, zoning ordinances, enforcement
systems and procedures to the Ministry of Human Settlements for review and ratification. The Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) was the regulatory arm of the Ministry of Human Settlements.
[47]

Significantly, accompanying the Certification[48] dated October 8, 1999 issued by Gil R. Balondo,
Deputy Zoning Administrator of the City Planning and Development Office, Iligan City, and the
letter[49] dated October 8, 1999 issued by Ayunan B. Rajah, Regional Officer of the HLURB, is the Certificate
of Approval issued by Imelda Romualdez Marcos, then Minister of Human Settlements and Chairperson of
the HSRC, showing that the local zoning ordinance was, indeed, approved on September 21, 1978. This
leads to no other conclusion than that City Ordinance No. 1313 enacted by the City of Iligan was approved
by the HSRC, the predecessor of HLURB. The validity of said local zoning ordinance is, therefore, beyond
question.

Since the subject property had been reclassified as residential/commercial land with the enactment
of City Ordinance No. 1313 in 1975, it can no longer be considered as an agricultural land within the ambit
of RA 6657. As this Court held in Buklod nang Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. v. E.M. Ramos and Sons,
Inc.,[50] To be exempt from CARP, all that is needed is one valid reclassification of the land from agricultural
to non-agricultural by a duly authorized government agency before June 15, 1988, when the CARL took
effect.

Despite the foregoing ruling, respondents allege that the subsequent reclassification by the local
zoning ordinance cannot free the land from the legal effects of PD 27 which deems the land to be already
taken as of October 21, 1972, when said law took effect. Concomitantly, they assert that the rights which
accrued from said date must be respected. They also maintain that the reclassification of the subject
property did not alter its agricultural nature, much less its actual use. [51]

Verily, vested rights which have already accrued cannot just be taken away by the expedience of
issuing a local zoning ordinance reclassifying an agricultural land into a residential/commercial area. As
this Court extensively discussed in Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. CA:[52]

In the main, REMMAN hinges its application for exemption on the ground that the
subject lands had ceased to be agricultural lands by virtue of the zoning classification by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Dasmarias, Cavite, and approved by the HSRC, specifying them as
residential.

In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture, this Court resolved the issue of
whether lands already classified for residential, commercial or industrial use, as approved by
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its precursor agencies, i.e.,
National Housing Authority and Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, prior to 15 June
1988, are covered by Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. We answered in the negative, thus:

We now determine whether such lands are covered by the CARL. Section 4 of R.A.
6657 provides that the CARL shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands. As to what constitutes
agricultural land, it is referred to as land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in
this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial
land. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation.
Agricultural lands are only those lands which are arable and suitable agricultural
lands and do not include commercial, industrial and residential land.

xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of
CARL. These include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the
effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than respondent DAR. In its
Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands to
Non-Agricultural Uses, DAR itself defined agricultural land thus

. . . Agricultural lands refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in

R.A. 6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies, and not classified in
town plans and zoning ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15 June
1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use.

Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988, respondent DAR is
bound by such conversion. . . . .

However, Natalia should be cautiously applied in light of Administrative Order 04,

Series of 2003, which outlines the rules on the Exemption on Lands from CARP Coverage
under Section (3) of Republic Act No. 6657, and Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44,
Series of 1990. It reads:

I. Prefatory Statement

Republic Act (RA) 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL),
Section 3, Paragraph (c) defines agricultural land as referring to land devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land.

Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, (or DOJ Opinion 44-1990 for
brevity) and the case of Natalia Realty versus Department of Agrarian Reform (12
 August 2993, 225 SCRA 278) opines that with respect to the conversion of
agricultural land covered by RA 6657 to non-agricultural uses, the authority of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to approve such conversion may be exercised
from the date of its effectivity, on 15 June 1988. Thus, all lands that are already
classified as commercial, industrial or residential before 15 June 1988 no longer need
any conversion clearance.

However, the reclassification of lands to non-agricultural uses shall not operate to

divest tenant[-]farmers of their rights over lands covered by Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 27, which have been vested prior to 15 June 1988.

As emphasized, the reclassification of lands to non-agricultural cannot be applied to

defeat vested rights of tenant-farmers under Presidential Decree No. 27.

Indeed, in the recent case of Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante,
where the Court was confronted with the issue of whether the contentious property therein
is agricultural in nature on the ground that the same had been classified as park since 1979
under the Zoning Ordinance of Cabuyao, as approved by the HLURB, the Court said:
The Court recognizes the power of a local government to reclassify and convert
lands through local ordinance, especially if said ordinance is approved by the HLURB.
Municipal Ordinance No. 110-54 dated November 3, 1979, enacted by
the Municipality of Cabuyao, divided the municipality into residential, commercial,
industrial, agricultural and institutional districts, and districts and parks for open
spaces. It did not convert, however, existing agricultural lands into residential,
commercial, industrial, or institutional. While it classified Barangay Casile into a
municipal park, as shown in its permitted uses of land map, the ordinance did not
provide for the retroactivity of its classification. In Co vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, it was held that an ordinance converting agricultural lands into residential or
light industrial should be given prospective application only, and should not change
the nature of existing agricultural lands in the area or the legal relationships existing
over such land. . . . .
A reading of Metro Manila Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01, series of 1981, does not
disclose any provision converting existing agricultural lands in the covered area into
residential or light industrial. While it declared that after the passage of the measure,
the subject area shall be used only for residential or light industrial purposes, it is not
provided therein that it shall have retroactive effect so as to discontinue all rights
previously acquired over lands located within the zone which are neither residential
nor light industrial in nature. This simply means that, if we apply the general rule, as
we must, the ordinance should be given prospective operation only. The further
implication is that it should not change the nature of existing agricultural lands in the
area or the legal relationships existing over such lands. (Citations omitted; emphasis
supplied.)

This, however, raises the issue of whether vested rights have actually accrued in the instant case.
In this respect, We reckon that under PD 27, tenant-farmers of rice and corn lands were deemed owners of
the land they till as of October 21, 1972. This policy, intended to emancipate the tenant-farmers from the
bondage of the soil, is given effect by the following provision of the law:

The tenant farmer, whether in land classified as landed estate or not, shall
be deemed owner of a portion constituting a family size farm of five (5) hectares if not
irrigated and three (3) hectares if irrigated. (Emphasis supplied.)

It should be clarified that even if under PD 27, tenant-farmers are deemed owners as of October 21,
1972, this is not to be construed as automatically vesting upon these tenant-farmers absolute ownership
over the land they were tilling. Certain requirements must also be complied with, such as payment of just
compensation, before full ownership is vested upon the tenant-farmers. This was elucidated by the Court
in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform:[53]

It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as

October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall be deemed the owner of a portion of land
consisting of a family-sized farm except that no title to the land owned by him was to be
actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly
recognized farmers cooperative. It was understood, however, that full payment of the just
compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.

When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:

All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21,
1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27.

it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree,
after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers cooperatives and full payment of just
 compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its Section
2 that the lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21,
1972 (pending transfer of ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be
considered as advance payment for the land.

The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the
land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the
deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until
then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is
contemplated either. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)

Prior to compliance with the prescribed requirements, tenant-farmers have, at most, an inchoate
right over the land they were tilling. In recognition of this, a CLT is issued to a tenant-farmer to serve as a
provisional title of ownership over the landholding while the lot owner is awaiting full payment of [just
compensation] or for as long as the [tenant-farmer] is an amortizing owner. [54] This certificate proves
inchoate ownership of an agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn production. It is issued in
order for the tenant-farmer to acquire the land[55] he was tilling.

Concomitantly, with respect to the LBP and the government, tenant-farmers cannot be considered
as full owners of the land they are tilling unless they have fully paid the amortizations due them. This is
because it is only upon such full payment of the amortizations that EPs may be issued in their favor.

In Del Castillo v. Orciga, We explained that land transfer under PD 27 is effected in two (2) stages.
The first stage is the issuance of a CLT to a farmer-beneficiary as soon as the DAR transfers the landholding
to the farmer-beneficiary in recognition that said person is its deemed owner. And the second stage is the
issuance of an EP as proof of full ownership of the landholding upon full payment of the annual
amortizations or lease rentals by the farmer-beneficiary.[56]

In the case at bar, the CLTs were issued in 1984. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, it was only
in 1984 that private respondents, as farmer-beneficiaries, were recognized to have an inchoate right over
the subject property prior to compliance with the prescribed requirements. Considering that the local
zoning ordinance was enacted in 1975, and subsequently approved by the HSRC in 1978, private
respondents still had no vested rights to speak of during this period, as it was only in 1984 that private
respondents were issued the CLTs and were deemed owners.

The same holds true even if EPs and OCTs were issued in 2001, since reclassification had taken
place twenty-six (26) years prior to their issuance. Undeniably, no vested rights accrued prior to
reclassification and its approval. Consequently, the subject property, particularly Lot No. 1407, is outside
the coverage of the agrarian reform program.

On the violation of petitioners right to due process of law

Petitioners contend that DAR failed to notify them that it is subjecting the subject property under
the coverage of the agrarian reform program; hence, their right to due process of law was violated.
[57]
Citing De Chavez v. Zobel,[58] both the DAR and the private respondents claim that the enactment of PD
27 is a statutory notice to all owners of agricultural lands devoted to rice and/or corn production,
[59]
implying that there was no need for an actual notice.

We agree with petitioners. The importance of an actual notice in subjecting a property under the
agrarian reform program cannot be underrated, as non-compliance with it trods roughshod with the
essential requirements of administrative due process of law. [60] Our ruling in Heirs of Jugalbot v. CA[61] is
particularly instructive:

Firstly, the taking of subject property was done in violation of constitutional due
process. The Court of Appeals was correct in pointing out that Virginia A. Roa was denied due
process because the DAR failed to send notice of the impending land reform coverage to the
proper party. The records show that notices were erroneously addressed and sent in the
name of Pedro N. Roa who was not the owner, hence, not the proper party in the instant
case. The ownership of the property, as can be gleaned from the records, pertains to Virginia
A. Roa. Notice should have been therefore served on her, and not Pedro N. Roa.

xxxx

In addition, the defective notice sent to Pedro N. Roa was followed by a DAR
certification signed by team leader Eduardo Maandig on January 8, 1988 stating that the
subject property was tenanted as of October 21, 1972 and primarily devoted to rice and corn
despite the fact that there was no ocular inspection or any on-site fact-finding investigation
and report to verify the truth of the allegations of Nicolas Jugalbot that he was a tenant of
the property. The absence of such ocular inspection or on-site fact-finding investigation and
report likewise deprives Virginia A. Roa of her right to property through the denial of due
process.
 By analogy, Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals applies to the case at bar since
there was likewise a violation of due process in the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law when the petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection and
investigation to be conducted by the DAR before acquisition of the property was to be
undertaken. Neither was there proof that petitioner was given the opportunity to at least
choose and identify its retention area in those portions to be acquired. Both in the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and Presidential Decree No. 27, the right of retention
and how this right is exercised, is guaranteed by law.

Since land acquisition under either Presidential Decree No. 27 and the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law govern the extraordinary method of expropriating
private property, the law must be strictly construed. Faithful compliance with legal
provisions, especially those which relate to the procedure for acquisition of expropriated
lands should therefore be observed. In the instant case, no proper notice was given to
Virginia A. Roa by the DAR. Neither did the DAR conduct an ocular inspection and
investigation. Hence, any act committed by the DAR or any of its agencies that results from
its failure to comply with the proper procedure for expropriation of land is a violation of
constitutional due process and should be deemed arbitrary, capricious, whimsical and
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)

Markedly, a reading of De Chavez invoked by both the DAR and private respondents does not show
that this Court ever made mention that actual notice may be dispensed with under PD 27, its enactment
being a purported statutory notice to all owners of agricultural lands devoted to rice and/or corn
production that their lands are subjected to the OLT program.

Quite contrarily, in Sta. Monica Industrial & Devt. Corp. v. DAR,[62] this Court underscored the
significance of notice in implementing the agrarian reform program when it stated that notice is part of the
constitutional right to due process of law. It informs the landowner of the States intention to acquire a
private land upon payment of just compensation and gives him the opportunity to present evidence that
his landholding is not covered or is otherwise excused from the agrarian law.
The Court, therefore, finds interest in the holding of the DARAB that petitioners were not denied the
right to due process despite the fact that only the Nanamans were identified as the owners. Particularly:

Fourthly, the PARAD also ruled that the petitioners were denied the right to be given
the notice since only the Nanamans were identified as the owners. The fault lies with
petitioners who did not present the tax declaration in the name of Dr. Deleste as of October
21, 1972. It was only in 1995 that Civil Case No. 698 was finally decided by the Supreme
Court dividing the 34.7 hectares between the Delestes and the Nanamans. Note that Dr.
Deleste died in 1992 after PD 27 was promulgated, hence, the subject land or his share was
considered in his name only (see Art. 777, New Civil Code). Even then, it must be borne in
mind that on September 26, 1972, PD No. 2 was issued by President Marcos proclaiming the
whole country as a land reform area, this was followed by PD 27. This should have alarmed
them more so when private respondents are in actual possession and cultivation of the
subject property.

But it was incumbent upon the DAR to notify Deleste, being the landowner of the subject property. It
should be noted that the deed of sale executed by Hilaria in favor of Deleste was registered on March 2,
1954, and such registration serves as a constructive notice to the whole world that the subject property
was already owned by Deleste by virtue of the said deed of sale. In Naval v. CA, this Court held:

Applying the law, we held in Bautista v. Fule that the registration of an instrument
involving unregistered land in the Registry of Deeds creates constructive notice and binds
third person who may subsequently deal with the same property. [63] x x x (Emphasis
supplied.)

It bears stressing that the principal purpose of registration is to notify other persons not parties to a
contract that a transaction involving the property has been entered into. [64] There was, therefore, no reason
for DAR to feign ignorance of the transfer of ownership over the subject property.

Moreover, that DAR should have sent the notice to Deleste, and not to the Nanamans, is bolstered
by the fact that the tax declaration in the name of Virgilio was already canceled and a new one issued in
the name of Deleste.[65] Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, they are nonetheless good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no
one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or, at least, constructive
possession.[66]

Petitioners right to due process of law was, indeed, violated when the DAR failed to notify them that
it is subjecting the subject property under the coverage of the agrarian reform program.

On this note, We take exception to our ruling in Roxas & Co., Inc. v. CA,[67] where, despite a finding
that there was a violation of due process in the implementation of the comprehensive agrarian reform
program when the petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection and investigation to be conducted
by the DAR before acquiring the property, thereby effectively depriving petitioner the opportunity to at
least choose and identify its retention area in those portions to be acquired, [68] this Court nonetheless ruled
that such violation does not give the Court the power to nullify the certificates of land ownership award
(CLOAs) already issued to the farmer-beneficiaries, since the DAR must be given the chance to correct its
procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings.

Manifesting her disagreement that this Court cannot nullify illegally issued CLOAs and should first
ask the DAR to reverse and correct itself, Justice Ynares-Santiago, in her Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion,[69] stated that [i]f the acts of DAR are patently illegal and the rights of Roxas & Co. violated, the
wrong decisions of DAR should be reversed and set aside. It follows that the fruits of the wrongful acts, in
this case the illegally issued CLOAs, must be declared null and void. She also noted that [i]f CLOAs can
under the DARs own order be cancelled administratively, with more reason can the courts, especially the
Supreme Court, do so when the matter is clearly in issue.

In the same vein, if the illegality in the issuance of the CLTs is patent, the Court must immediately
take action and declare the issuance as null and void. There being no question that the CLTs in the instant
case were improperly issued, for which reason, their cancellation is warranted. [70] The same holds true with
respect to the EPs and certificates of title issued by virtue of the void CLTs, as there can be no valid
transfer of title should the CLTs on which they were grounded are void. [71] Cancellation of the EPs and OCTs
are clearly warranted in the instant case since, aside from the violation of petitioners right to due process
of law, the subject property is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program.

Issue of Validity of EPs Not Barred by Res Judicata

The LBP maintains that the issue of the EPs validity has already been settled by this Court in Heirs
of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[72] where We held that the EPs and OCTs issued in
2001 had already become indefeasible and incontrovertible by the time the petitioners therein instituted
the case in 2005; hence, their issuance may no longer be reviewed. [73]

In effect, the LBP raises the defense of res judicata in order to preclude a relitigation of the issue
concerning the validity of the EPs issued to private respondents.

Notably, the doctrine of res judicata has two aspects, namely: (1) bar by prior judgment,[74] wherein
the judgment in a prior case bars the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or
cause of action;[75] and (2) conclusiveness of judgment, [76] which precludes relitigation of a particular fact or
issue in another action between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action. [77]

Citing Agustin v. Delos Santos,[78] this Court, in Spouses Antonio v. Sayman,[79] expounded on the
difference between the two aspects of res judicata:

The principle of res judicata is applicable by way of (1) bar by prior judgment and (2)
conclusiveness of judgment. This Court had occasion to explain the difference between
these two aspects of res judicata as follows:

There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where the
judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the
judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise
put, the judgment or decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits
concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a
bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action before the same or
other tribunal.

But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity
of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually
and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved
therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as conclusiveness of
judgment. Stated differently, any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in
which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment
therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether
or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.
(Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)

To be sure, conclusiveness of judgment merits application when a fact or question has been
squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent
jurisdiction.[80] Elucidating further on this second aspect of res judicata, the Court, in Spouses Antonio,
stated:

x x x The fact or question settled by final judgment or order binds the parties to that
action (and persons in privity with them or their successors-in-interest), and continues to
bind them while the judgment or order remains standing and unreversed by proper authority
on a timely motion or petition; the conclusively-settled fact or question cannot again be
litigated in any future or other action between the same parties or their privies and
successors-in-interest, in the same or in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for
the same or for a different cause of action. Thus, only the identities of parties and issues are
 required for the operation of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment. [81] (Citations
omitted; emphasis supplied.)

Applying the above statement of the Court to the case at bar, We find that LBPs contention that this
Courts ruling in Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy that the EPs and OCTs issued in 2001 had already become
indefeasible and incontrovertible precludes a relitigation of the issue concerning the validity of the EPs
issued to private respondents does not hold water.

In the first place, there is no identity of parties in Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy and the instant
case. Arguably, the respondents in these two cases are similar. However, the petitioners are totally
different. In Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy, the petitioners are the more than 120 individuals who claim to
be descendants of Fulgencio Nanaman, Gregorios brother, and who collectively assert their right to a share
in Gregorios estate, arguing that they were deprived of their inheritance by virtue of the improper issuance
of the EPs to private respondents without notice to them. On the other hand, in the instant case,
petitioners are the heirs of Deleste who seek nullification of the EPs issued to private respondents on
grounds of violation of due process of law, disregard of landowners right of retention, improvident issuance
of EPs and OCTs, and non-coverage of the agrarian reform program, among others. Evidently, there is even
no privity among the petitioners in these two cases.

And in the second place, the issues are also dissimilar. In Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy, the issue
was whether the filing of a petition for prohibition was the proper remedy for the petitioners therein,
considering that the EPs and OCTs had already been issued in 2001, four (4) years prior to the filing of said
petition in 2005. In the instant case, however, the issue is whether the EPs and OCTs issued in favor of
private respondents are void, thus warranting their cancellation.

In addition, the factual circumstances in these two cases are different such that the necessity of
applying the rule on indefeasibility of title in one is wanting in the other. In Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy,
the petition for prohibition was filed by the petitioners therein in 2005, notwithstanding the fact that the
EPs and OCTs had already been issued in 2001. For that reason, apart from making a ruling that
[p]rohibition, as a rule, does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli, it becomes incumbent
upon this Court to hold that:

x x x Considering that such EPs and OCTs were issued in 2001, they had become
indefeasible and incontrovertible by the time petitioners instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 00365 in
2005, and may no longer be judicially reviewed.[82] (Emphasis supplied.)

On the contrary, in the instant case, the petition for nullification of private respondents EPs and
OCTs was filed on February 28, 2002. Taking into account that the EPs and OCTs were issued on August 1,
2001 and October 1, 2001, respectively, the filing of the petition was well within the prescribed one year
period, thus, barring the defense of indefeasibility and incontrovertibility. Even if the petition was filed
before the DARAB, and not the Regional Trial Court as mandated by Sec. 32 of the Property Registration
Decree,[83] this should necessarily have the same effect, considering that DARABs jurisdiction extends to
cases involving the cancellation of CLOAs, EPs, and even of certificates of title issued by virtue of a void EP.
As this Court held in Gabriel v. Jamias:[84]

It is well-settled that the DAR, through its adjudication arm, i.e., the DARAB and its
regional and provincial adjudication boards, exercises quasi-judicial functions and jurisdiction
on all matters pertaining to an agrarian dispute or controversy and the implementation of
agrarian reform laws. Pertinently, it is provided in the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure that
the DARAB has primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine
and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and related agrarian reform laws. Such jurisdiction shall
extend to cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents which are registered with the Land
Registration Authority.

This Court has had the occasion to rule that the mere issuance of an emancipation
patent does not put the ownership of the agrarian reform beneficiary beyond attack and
scrutiny. Emancipation patents may be cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and
regulations. Section 12 (g) of P.D. No. 946 (issued on June 17, 1976) vested the then Court of
Agrarian Relations with jurisdiction over cases involving the cancellation of emancipation
patents issued under P.D. No. 266. Exclusive jurisdiction over such cases was later lodged
with the DARAB under Section 1 of Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure.

For sure, the jurisdiction of the DARAB cannot be deemed to disappear the moment a
certificate of title is issued, for, such certificates are not modes of transfer of property but
merely evidence of such transfer, and there can be no valid transfer of title should the CLOA,
on which it was grounded, be void. The same holds true in the case of a certificate of title
issued by virtue of a void emancipation patent.

From the foregoing, it is therefore undeniable that it is the DARAB and not the regular
courts which has jurisdiction herein, this notwithstanding the issuance of Torrens titles in the
names of the petitioners. For, it is a fact that the petitioners Torrens titles emanated from
the emancipation patents previously issued to them by virtue of being the farmer-
 beneficiaries identified by the DAR under the OLT of the government. The DAR ruling that
the said emancipation patents were erroneously issued for failing to consider the valid
retention rights of respondents had already attained finality. Considering that the action filed
by respondents with the DARAB was precisely to annul the emancipation patents issued to
the petitioners, the case squarely, therefore, falls within the jurisdiction of the DARAB. x x x
(Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)

Inevitably, this leads to no other conclusion than that Our ruling in Heirs of Sofia
Nanaman Lonoy concerning the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of the EPs and OCTs
issued in 2001 does not bar Us from making a finding in the instant case that the EPs and
OCTs issued to private respondents are, indeed, void.

With the foregoing disquisition, it becomes unnecessary to dwell on the other issues raised by the
parties.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the CAs October 28,
2004 and September 13, 2005 Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 85471. The Emancipation Patents and Original
Certificates of Title covering the subject property, particularly Lot No. 1407, issued in favor of private
respondents are herebydeclared NULL and VOID.

The DAR is ordered to CANCEL the aforementioned Emancipation Patents and Original Certificates
of Title erroneously issued in favor of private respondents.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
THIRD DIVISION

DATU KIRAM SAMPACO, G.R. No. 163551

substituted by HADJI SORAYA Present:
S. MACABANDO,
Petitioner, CARPIO,* J.,
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
- versus - MENDOZA, JJ.

HADJI SERAD MINGCA

LANTUD, Promulgated:
Respondent.
July 18, 2011

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals Decision dated August 15, 2003 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 63801 and its Resolution dated May 13, 2004, denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

The facts, as stated by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

 On September 14, 1984, respondent Hadji Serad Mingca Lantud, the plaintiff in the lower court,
filed an action to quiet title with damages[1] with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur, Branch 8,
Marawi City (trial court), against petitioner Datu Kiram Sampaco (deceased), the defendant in the lower
court, who has been substituted by his heirs, represented by Hadji Soraya Sampaco-Macabando. [2]

Respondent alleged in his Complaint[3] that he is the owner in fee simple of a parcel of residential lot
located at Marinaut, Marawi City, with an area of 897 square meters covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. P-658. On August 25, 1984, petitioner Datu Kiram Sampaco, through his daughter Soraya
Sampaco-Macabando with several armed men, forcibly and unlawfully entered his property and destroyed
the nursery buildings, cabbage seedlings and other improvements therein worth P10,000.00. On August
30, 1984, Barangay Captain Hadji Hassan Abato and his councilmen prepared and issued a decision [4] in
writing stating that petitioner Datu Kiram Sampaco is the owner of the subject parcel of land. Respondent
stated that the acts of petitioner and the said decision of the Barangay Captain may cast a cloud over or
otherwise prejudice his title.Respondent stated that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
public and exclusive possession of the subject property. He prayed that the acts of petitioner and the
decision of Barangay Captain Hadji Hassan Abato and his councilmen be declared invalid, and that
petitioner be ordered to pay respondent damages in the amount of P10,000.00 and attorneys fees.

In his Answer,[5] defendant Datu Kiram Sampaco, petitioner herein, denied the material allegations
of the Complaint. Petitioner asserted that he and his predecessors-in-interest are the ones who had been in
open, public, continuous, and exclusive possession of the property in dispute. Petitioner alleged that OCT
No. P-658 was secured in violation of laws and through fraud, deception and misrepresentation,
considering that the subject parcel of land is a residential lot and the title issued is a free patent. Moreover,
respondent and his predecessors-in-interest had never taken actual possession or occupied the land under
litigation. On the contrary, petitioner has all the evidence of actual possession and ownership of
permanent improvements and other plants on the land in dispute.

Petitioner filed a counterclaim for actual and moral damages, and attorney's fees for the unfounded
complaint and prayed for its dismissal. He also sought the cancellation of respondents OCT No. P-658 and
the reconveyance of the subject parcel of land.

During the trial, respondent Hadji Lantud testified that he acquired the subject lot from his
grandmother, Intumo Pagsidan, a portion thereof from his grandmothers helper, Totop Malacop, pursuant
to a court decision after litigating with him. [6] Respondent had been residing on the lot for more than 30
years, applied for a title thereto and was issued OCT No. P-658. [7] He paid the corresponding real estate
taxes for the land.[8] He planted assorted trees and plants on the lot like bananas, jackfruits, coconuts and
others.[9] He testified that he was not aware of the alleged litigation over the lot before Barangay Captain
Hadji Hassan Abato, although he was furnished a copy of the decision. [10]

On the other hand, petitioner Datu Kiram Sampaco testified that the land under litigation is only a
portion of the 1,800 square meters of land that he inherited in 1952 from his father, Datu Sampaco Gubat.
[11]
Since then, he had been in adverse possession and ownership of the subject lot, cultivating and
planting trees and plants through his caretaker Hadji Mustapha Macawadib. [12] In 1962, he mortgaged the
land (1,800 square meters) with the Development Bank of the Philippines, Ozamis branch.[13] He declared
the land (1,800 square meters) for taxation purposes [14] and paid real estate taxes, and adduced in
evidence the latest Tax Receipt No. 1756386 dated September 15, 19[9]3. [15] Petitioner presented four
corroborating witnesses as regards his possession of the subject property.

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision on March 31, 1999 in favor of petitioner,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered the court is of the opinion and so holds that the
preponderance of evidence is in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff. Judgment is
hereby rendered as follows:

1. Dismissing plaintiffs complaint for lack of merit;

2. Declaring Original Certificate of Title No. P-658 (Exh. A) null and void and of
no legal effect;

3. Declaring the defendant the absolute or true owner and possessor of the
land in dispute; and

4. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of P10,000.00 for
attorneys fees plus P500.00 per appearance.[16]

The trial court held that the issuance of respondents title, OCT No. P-658, was tainted with fraud
and irregularities and the title is, therefore, spurious; hence, it is null and void, and without any probative
value. The finding of fraud was based on: (1) the Certification issued by Datu Samra Andam, A/Adm.
Assistant II, Natural Resources District No. XII-3, Marawi City, stating that the data contained in
respondents title were verified and had no record in the said office; (2) the said Certification was not
refuted or rebutted by respondent; (3) while free patents are normally issued for agricultural lands,
respondents title is a free patent title issued over a residential land as the lot is described in the Complaint
as a residential lot; and (4) Yusoph Lumampa, an employee of the local Bureau of Lands, to whom
respondent allegedly entrusted the paperwork of the land titling, was not presented as a witness.

Moreover, the trial court stated that respondent failed to establish with competent and credible
evidence that he was in prior possession of the subject property. No corroborative witness was presented
to further prove his prior possession.

On the other hand, the trial court stated that petitioner offered documentary evidence, consisting of
a contract of real estate mortgage of the subject property, tax declarations, an official tax receipt, and
testimonial evidence to prove that he had been in open, public, continuous, and lawful possession of the
subject property in the concept of owner.

Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals.

On August 15, 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision reversing the decision of the trial
court, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE:

1. The appeal is granted and the appealed judgment is hereby totally REVERSED.

2. To quiet his title, plaintiff-appelant Hadji Serad Mingca Lantud is confirmed the owner
of the parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-658;

3. The defendant-appellee is ordered to pay P50,000.00 as attorneys fees to the plaintiff-

appellant; and

4. Costs against the defendant-appellee.[17]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution[18] dated May 13, 2004.
 The Court of Appeals held that there is no controversy that respondent is a holder of a Torrens title;
hence, he is the owner of the subject property. The appellate court stressed that Section 47 [19] of the Land
Registration Act (Act No. 496) provides that the certificate of title covering registered land shall be
received as evidence in all courts of the Philippines and shall be conclusive as to all matters stated therein.

The Court of Appeals stated that the Torrens title has three attributes: (1) a Torrens title is the best
evidence of ownership over registered land and, unless annulled in an appropriate proceeding, the title is
conclusive on the issue of ownership; (2) a Torrens title is incontrovertible and indefeasible upon the
expiration of one year from the date of the entry of the decree of registration; [20] and (3) a Torrens title is
not subject to collateral attack.[21]

The Court of Appeals held that petitioners counterclaim filed on October 15, 1984 for cancellation of
respondents original certificate of title issued on May 22, 1981 was filed beyond the statutory one-year
period; hence, petitioners title had become indefeasible, and cannot be affected by the decision made by
Barangay Captain Hadji Hassan Abato and his councilmen. Moreover, the appellate court held that
petitioners prayer for the cancellation of respondents title, OCT No. P-658, through a counterclaim included
in his Answer is a collateral attack, which the law does not allow, citing Cimafranca v. Court of
Appeals[22] and Natalia Realty Corporation v. Valdez.[23]

The allegation of fraud in securing OCT No. P-658 on the ground that the property in dispute is a
residential lot and not subject of a free patent was not given weight by the appellate court as it was
supported only by testimonial evidence that did not show how (by metes and bounds) and why the
property in dispute could not have been the subject of a free patent. The appellate court stated that a
mere preponderance of evidence is not adequate to prove fraud; [24] it must be established by clear and
convincing evidence.

The Court of Appeals also noted that petitioner claimed that the subject property is only part of his
larger property. Although petitioner introduced proof of payment of the real estate taxes of the said
property, as well as a previous mortgage of the property, petitioner did not show that the disputed
property is part of his larger property. Hence, the appellate court stated that under such circumstances, it
cannot rule that petitioner owned the land under litigation, since petitioner failed to show that it is part of
his larger property.

The Court of Appeals did not award actual and moral damages, because respondent failed to prove
the amount of any actual damages sustained, and the instances enumerated under Article 2219 of the
Civil Code warranting the award of moral damages were not present.

However, the Court of Appeals awarded attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00, considering
that respondent was forced to incur expenses to protect his right through the action to quiet title.

Petitioner filed this petition raising the following issues:

THE COURT OF APPEALS MISERABLY FAILED TO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT

THE TORRENS TITLE INVOLVED HEREIN WAS ISSUED PURSUANT TO A FREE PATENT WHICH
COULD NOT BE VALIDLY ISSUED OVER A PRIVATE LAND.
 II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE FACT THAT AS CERTIFIED TO

BY THE BUREAU OF LANDS ITSELF NO SUCH FREE PATENT OVER THE SUBJECT LAND WAS
ISSUED BY IT; HENCE, SAID FREE PATENT IS SPURIOUS.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
THAT THE SUBJECT LOT HAD LONG BEEN OWNED, POSSESSED AND CULTIVATED BY THE
DEFENDANT (PETITIONER HEREIN) OR HIS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST SINCE TIME
IMMEMORIAL IN THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PETITIONERS COUNTERCLAIM

FOR CANCELLATION OF RESPONDENTS TITLE IS BARRED.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE COUNTERCLAIM IN THE INSTANT
CASE IS A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON RESPONDENT-PLAINTIFFS TITLE.

VI

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION.[25]

The main issue is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the validity of OCT No. P-
658 and confirming respondent as owner of the property in dispute.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the fact that the Torrens title was
issued to respondent by virtue of a free patent covering a residential lot that is private land as it has been
acquired by petitioner through open, public, continuous and lawful possession of the land in the concept of
owner. Petitioner thus prayed for the cancellation of respondents title and the reconveyance of the subject
property. Hence, the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that the subject lot belongs to respondent.

The contention is without merit.

The Torrens title is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described therein,
and other matters which can be litigated and decided in land registration proceedings. [26] Tax declarations
and tax receipts cannot prevail over a certificate of title which is an incontrovertible proof of ownership.
[27]
An original certificate of title issued by the Register of Deeds under an administrative proceeding is as
indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under judicial proceedings. [28] However, the Court has ruled that
indefeasibility of title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation. [29]

In this case, petitioner alleged in his Answer to respondents Complaint in the trial court that
respondents title, OCT No. P-658, was secured in violation of the law and through fraud, deception and
misrepresentation, because the subject parcel of land is a residential lot, which cannot be subject of a free
patent, since only agricultural lands are subject of a free patent.

The trial court found that [t]he lot under litigation as clearly described in the complaint is a
residential lot and a free patent title thereto cannot validly be issued. This finding was one of the bases for
the trial courts declaration that the issuance of OCT was tainted with fraud and irregularities and is,
therefore, spurious; thus, OCT No. P-658 is null and void.

It should be pointed out that the allegation in the Complaint that the land is residential was made
only by respondent, but the true classification of the disputed land as residential was not shown to have
been made by the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources, pursuant to Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as The Public Land Act.
[30]
Hence, the trial court erred in concluding that there was fraud in the issuance of respondents free
patent title on the ground that it covered residential land based only on the Complaint which stated that
the property was residential land when it was not shown that it was the President who classified the
disputed property as residential, and OCT No. P-658 itself stated that the free patent title covered
agricultural land. It has been stated that at present, not only agricultural lands, but also residential lands,
have been made available by recent legislation for acquisition by free patent by any natural born Filipino
citizen.[31]Nevertheless, the fact is that in this case, the free patent title was granted over agricultural land
as stated in OCT No. P-658.

Moreover, petitioner contends in his petition that the Certification [32] dated July 24, 1987 issued by
Datu Samra I. Andam, A/Adm. Assistant II, Natural Resources District No. XII-3, Bureau of
Lands, Marawi City, certifying that the data contained in OCT No. P-658 in respondents name had no
records in the said office, showed that respondents Torrens title was spurious.

The Court holds that the certification, by itself, is insufficient to prove the alleged fraud. Fraud and
misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of patent and annulment of title, should never be
presumed, but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, mere preponderance of evidence not
being adequate.[33] Fraud is a question of fact which must be proved. [34] The signatory of the certification,
Datu Samra Andam, A/Adm. Assistant II, Natural Resources District No. XII-3, Marawi City, was not
presented in court to testify on the due issuance of the certification, and to testify on the details of his
certification, particularly the reason why the said office had no records of the data contained in OCT No. P-
658 or to testify on the fact of fraud, if any.

Thus, the Court holds that the evidence on record is insufficient to prove that fraud was committed
in the issuance of respondents Torrens title. Hence, respondents Torrenstitle is a valid evidence of his
ownership of the land in dispute.

On the other hand, petitioner claims ownership of the subject lot, which is merely a portion of a
larger property (1,800 square meters) that he allegedly inherited from his father in 1952, by virtue of open,
public and continuous possession of the land in the concept of owner making it petitioners private
property. Hence, petitioner prays for reconveyance of the said property.

Article 434 of the Civil Code governs an action for reconveyance, thus:
 Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff
must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendants claim.

Under Article 434 of the Civil Code, to successfully maintain an action to recover the
ownership of a real property, the person who claims a better right to it must prove two (2)
things: first, the identity of the land claimed; and second, his title thereto.[35]

In regard to the first requisite, in an accion reinvindicatoria, the person who claims that he has a
better right to the property must first fix the identity of the land he is claiming by describing the location,
area and boundaries thereof.[36]

In this case, petitioner claims that the property in dispute is part of his larger property. However,
petitioner failed to identify his larger property by providing evidence of the metes and bounds thereof, so
that the same may be compared with the technical description contained in the title of respondent, which
would have shown whether the disputed property really formed part of petitioners larger property. The
appellate court correctly held in its Resolution dated May 13, 2004 that petitioners claim is solely
supported by testimonial evidence, which did not conclusively show the metes and bounds of petitioners
larger property in relation to the metes and bounds of the disputed property; thus, there is no sufficient
evidence on record to support petitioners claim that the disputed property is part of his larger property.

In regard to the second requisite of title to property, both petitioner and respondent separately
claim that they are entitled to ownership of the property by virtue of open, public, continuous and
exclusive possession of the same in the concept of owner. Petitioner claims that he inherited the subject
property from his father in 1952, while respondent claims that he acquired the property from his
grandmother Intumo Pagsidan, a portion thereof from his grandmothers helper Totop Malacop pursuant to
a court decision after litigating with him. [37] Respondent has OCT No. P-658 to prove his title to the subject
property, while petitioner merely claims that the property is already his private land by virtue of his open,
public, continuous possession of the same in the concept of owner.

The Court holds that petitioner failed to prove the requisites of reconveyance as he failed to prove
the identity of his larger property in relation to the disputed property, and his claim of title by virtue of
open, public and continuous possession of the disputed property in the concept of owner is nebulous in the
light of a similar claim by respondent who holds a free patent title over the subject property. As stated
in Ybaez v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[38] it is relatively easy to declare and claim that one owns and
possesses public agricultural land, but it is entirely a different matter to affirmatively declare and to prove
before a court of law that one actually possessed and cultivated the entire area to the exclusion of other
claimants who stand on equal footing under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended)
as any other pioneering claimants.

Further, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioners counterclaim is
time-barred, since the one-year prescriptive period does not apply when the person seeking annulment of
title or reconveyance is in possession of the lot, citing Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano E.
Santiago.[39] Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the counterclaim in this
case is a collateral attack on respondents title, citing Cimafranca v. Intermediate Appellate Court.
[40]
Petitioner cites the case of Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano E. Santiago,[41] which held that
a counterclaim can be considered a direct attack on the title.

The Court notes that the case of Cimafranca v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[42] cited by the Court
of Appeals to support its ruling that the prayer for the cancellation of respondents title through a
counterclaim included in petitioners Answer is a collateral attack on the said title, is inapplicable to this
case. In Cimafranca, petitioners therein filed a complaint for Partition and Damages, and respondents
therein indirectly attacked the validity of the title involved in their counterclaim. Hence, the Court ruled
that a Torrenstitle cannot be attacked collaterally, and the issue on its validity can be raised only in an
action expressly instituted for that purpose.

Here, the case cited by petitioner, Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano E. Santiago,
declared that the one-year prescriptive period does not apply when the party seeking annulment of title or
reconveyance is in possession of the lot, as well as distinguished a collateral attack under Section 48 of PD
No. 1529 from a direct attack, and held that a counterclaim may be considered as a complaint or an
independent action and can be considered a direct attack on the title, thus:
 The one-year prescriptive period, however, does not apply when the person seeking
annulment of title or reconveyance is in possession of the lot. This is because the action
partakes of a suit to quiet title which is imprescriptible. In David v. Malay, we held that a
person in actual possession of a piece of land under claim of ownership may wait until his
possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, and
his undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity
to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on
his title.

xxxx

Section 48 of P.D. 1529, the Property Registration Decree, provides that a certificate of title
shall not be subject to collateral attack and cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except
in a direct proceeding. An action is an attack on a title when the object of the action is to
nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment or proceeding pursuant to which the title
was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of an action is to annul or set aside such
judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral
when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment or proceeding is
nevertheless made as an incident thereof.

x x x A counterclaim can be considered a direct attack on the title. In Development Bank of

the Philippines v. Court Appeals, we ruled on the validity of a certificate of title despite the
fact that the nullity thereof was raised only as a counterclaim. It was held that a
counterclaim is considered a complaint, only this time, it is the original defendant who
becomes the plaintiff. It stands on the same footing and is to be tested by the same rules as
if it were an independent action. x x x[43]

The above ruling of the court on the definition of collateral attack under Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529
was reiterated in Leyson v. Bontuyan,[44] Heirs of Enrique Diaz v. Virata,[45] Arangote v. Maglunob,
[46]
and Catores v. Afidchao.[47]

Based on the foregoing, the Court holds that petitioners counterclaim for cancellation of
respondents title is not a collateral attack, but a direct attack on the Torrens title of petitioner. However,
the counterclaim seeking for the cancellation of title and reconveyance of the subject property has
prescribed as petitioner has not proven actual possessionand ownership of the property due to his failure
to prove the identity of his larger property that would show that the disputed property is a part thereof,
and his claim of title to the subject property by virtue of open, public and continuous possession in the
concept of owner is nebulous in the light of a similar claim by respondent who holds a Torrens title to the
subject property.

Respondents original certificate of title was issued on May 22, 1981, while the counterclaim was
filed by petitioner on October 15, 1984, which is clearly beyond the one-year prescriptive period.

In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in confirming that respondent is the owner of the parcel of
land covered by OCT No. P-658.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals decision dated August 15, 2003, and its
Resolution dated May 13, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 63801, are hereby AFFIRMED.

No costs.SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 170677 October 24, 2012

VSD REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
UNIWIDE SALES, INC. and DOLORES BAELLO TEJADA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 30, 2005 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 69824 and its Resolution dated December 6, 2005, denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Caloocan City Branch 126 annulment of title and recovery of possession of property.

The facts are as follows:

On June 8, 1995, petitioner VSD Realty and Development Corporation (VSD) filed a Complaint 2 for
annulment of title and recovery of possession of property against respondents Uniwide Sales, Inc.
(Uniwide) and Dolores Baello3 with the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 126 (trial court). 4 Petitioner sought the
nullification of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (35788) 12754 in the name of Dolores Baello and the
recovery of possession of property that is being occupied by Uniwide by virtue of a contract of lease with
Dolores Baello.

Petitioner alleged that it is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Caloocan City, with an area of
2,835.30 square meters, more or less, and covered by TCT No. T-285312 5 of the Register of Deeds of
Caloocan City. Petitioner purchased the said property from Felisa D. Bonifacio, whose title thereto, TCT No.
265777, was registered by virtue of an Order6 dated October 8, 1992 authorizing the segregation of the
same in Land Registration Commission (LRC) Case No. C-3288. Petitioner also alleged that its right to the
subject property and the validity and correctness of the technical description and location of the property
are duly established in LRC Case No. C-3288.7

Petitioner alleged that respondent Baello is the holder and registered owner of a parcel of land covered by
TCT No. (35788) 12754 in the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal. By virtue of the said title, Baello
claims ownership and has possession of the property covered by petitioners title, and she entered into a
contract of lease with respondent Uniwide.

Petitioner alleged that its title, TCT No. 285312, is the correct, valid and legal document that covers the
subject property, since it is the result of land registration proceedings in accordance with law.

Petitioner alleged that Baellos title, TCT No. 35788, is spurious and can only be the result of falsification
and illegal machinations, and has no legal basis to establish any right over the subject property. Moreover,
the technical description of Baellos title is so general that it is impossible to determine with certainty the
exact location of the property covered by it. Petitioner further alleged that the technical description has no
legal basis per the records of the Lands Management Bureau and the Bureau of Lands. It added that
Baellos title described the property to be Lot 3-A of subdivision plan Psd 706, but an examination of Psd
706 shows that there is no Lot 3-A in plan Psd 706.8 Petitioner contends that in view of the foregoing
reasons, Baello has no legal basis to claim the subject property, and Baellos title, TCT No. 35788, is
spurious and illegal and should be annulled. Thus, petitioner sought recovery of possession of the subject
property.

Petitioner prayed that judgment be rendered:

1) declaring TCT No. 35788 (12754) to be null and void;

2) ordering respondent Baello and all persons/entity claiming title under her, including Uniwide, to
convey and to return the property to petitioner;

3) ordering respondents Baello and Uniwide, jointly and severally, to pay just and reasonable
compensation per month in the amount of P1.5 million for the occupancy and use of petitioners
 land from the time it acquired ownership of the land on September 12, 1994 until actual vacation
by respondents; and

4) ordering respondents, jointly and severally, to pay attorneys fees of P250,000.00 plus 20
percent of amounts or value actually recovered.

In its Answer,9 respondent Uniwide alleged that on July 15, 1988, it entered into a Contract of Lease 10 with
respondent Baello involving a parcel of land with an area of about 2,834 square meters, located in
Caloocan City, which property is covered by TCT No. 35788 in the name of Baello. As a consequence of the
lease agreement, it constructed a building worth at least P200,000,000.00 on the said property. It prayed
that judgment be rendered dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action against Uniwide; declaring
the contract of lease as valid and enforceable; and ordering petitioner to pay Uniwide moral and exemplary
damages, among others.

On the other hand, respondent Baello filed a Motion to Dismiss 9 on the grounds that the complaint stated
no cause of action, and that the demand for annulment of title and/or conveyance, whether grounded upon
the commission of fraud or upon a constructive trust, has prescribed, and is barred by laches.

In an Order11 dated December 5, 1995, the trial court denied Baellos motion to dismiss for lack of merit.
Baellos motion for reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of merit in an Order 12 dated February 27,
1996.

Subsequently, respondent Baello filed an Answer,13 alleging that the subject property was bequeathed to
her through a will by her adoptive mother, Jacoba Galauran. She alleged that during the lifetime of Jacoba
Galauran, the subject property was originally surveyed on January 24-26, 192314 and, thereafter, on
December 29, 1924.15Baello alleged that after

Jacoba Galauran died in 1952, her will was duly approved by the probate court, the Court of First Instance,
Pasig, Rizal. Baello stated that she registered the subject property in her name, and TCT No. (35788) 12754
was issued in her favor on September 6, 1954. In 1959, she had the subject property surveyed. 16 On July
15, 1988, she entered into a Contract of Lease17 with respondent Uniwide, which erected in full public view
the building it presently occupies. Baello stated that she has been religiously paying realty taxes for the
subject property.18

Baello alleged that during her open and public possession of the subject property spanning over 40 years,
nobody came forward to contest her title thereto. It was only in September 1994, when Baello was absent
from the Philippines that petitioner demanded rentals from Uniwide, asserting ownership over the land.

As an affirmative defense, respondent Baello contended that the Complaint should be dismissed as she
enjoys a superior right over the subject property because the registration of her title predates the
registration of petitioners title by at least 40 years.

The deposition of respondent Baello, which was taken on October 1, 1998 at the Philippine Consular Office
in San Francisco, California, United States of America, affirmed the same facts stated in her Answer.

On October 2, 2000, the trial court rendered a Decision 19 in favor of petitioner. The trial court stated that
the evidence for petitioner showed that it is the rightful owner of the subject lot covered by TCT No.
285312 of the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City. The lot was purchased by petitioner from Felisa D.
Bonifacio, who became the owner thereof by virtue of her petition for segregation of the subject property
from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal in LRC Case No. C-
3288.20 The trial court found no reason to deviate from the ruling of Judge Geronimo Mangay in LRC Case
No. C-3288, which was rendered after receiving all the evidence, including that of Engineer Elpidio de Lara,
who testified under oath that his office, the Technical Services of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), had not previously issued the technical description appearing on TCT No.
265777 (Felisa Bonifacios title), and he also certified to the records of the technical description of Lot 23-
A-4-B-2-A-3-A of subdivision plan Psd 706 on July 9, 1990, which refers to the same technical description
appearing on Felisa D. Bonifacios title. The trial court stated that it cannot question the Order in LRC Case
No. C-3288 issued by a co-equal court in this respect, considering that Regional Trial Courts now have the
authority to act not only on applications for original registration, but also over all petitions filed after
original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising from such applications
or petitions.

Moreover, the trial court stated that aside from the complete records of the land registration proceedings
(LRC Case No. C-3288), petitioner presented witnesses to support its causes of action, thus:
Norberto Vasquez, Deputy Register of Deeds of Caloocan City, testified that TCT No. 28531 2 (Exh. "A") in
the name of the plaintiff VSD Realty and Development Corporation originated from TCT No. 265777 (Exh.
"B") in the name of Felisa D. Bonifacio; that Felisa Bonifacio sold the property to VSD Realty and
Development Corporation, and the same was registered under the name of the plaintiff; that Felisa
Bonifacio came in possession of TCT No. 265777 by virtue of an Order (Exh. "C") issued by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 125, Kalookan City, dated May 31, 1993; that the Registry of Deeds received the Order
of the RTC Branch 125 and by virtue of said Order with finality, their office issued TCT No. 265777 in the
name of Felisa D. Bonifacio; that their office only issues titles if there is a court Order. He related the
derivative documents that were filed before their office such as the Court Order dated October 8, 1992, in
L.R.C. Case No. 3288; the Certificate of finality to said Order dated April 6, 1999 and the subdivision plan to
Lot No. 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A.

Evelyn Celzo, a Geodetic Engineer, DENR, NCR, testified that she was the one who conducted the survey of
the property of Felisa D. Bonifacio covered by TCT No. 265777; that she prepared a Verification Plan (Exh.
"D") duly approved by the DENR, NCR, Director; that before the survey was conducted, she notified the
adjoining owners that a survey will be conducted on the property of Felisa Bonifacio; that she was a
witness in that case filed by Felisa Bonifacio vs. Syjuco before RTC Br. 125, Kalookan City. She attested to
the verification survey she conducted of the subject lot as directed by her office. She confirmed that the
technical description approved and recorded in their office is Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A of Psd 706. The DENR,
NCR keeps a record of all technical descriptions approved and authorized by it under the Torrens system.
She pointed out that only one (1) technical description is allowed for one particular lot. The subject
technical description was submitted as Exhibit "F" for the plaintiff.

On January 27, 1997, witness Evelyn Celzo was subjected for cross-examination.

Witness testified that a request for verification survey was made by Felisa D. Bonifacio addressed to the
Chief, Survey Division of the DENR, NCR; that a survey order was given to their office by the Regional
Technical Director, Lands Management Service on August 22, 1994; that they conducted the verification
survey at the actual site of the property of Felisa D. Bonifacio; that they checked all the boundaries of the
property where they conducted the verification survey; that they likewise conducted actual visual
inspection on the monuments; that the whole area covered by TCT No. 265777 is occupied by Uniwide
Sales, Inc.; that she went to the office of the Registry of Deeds and inquired as to the address of the owner
of Uniwide Sales, Inc., but she was told by the people there that they do not know; that when she
conducted the survey, she tried to inform the owner of the adjoining buildings, but nobody answered; that
only one became the subject of the verification survey and this is the lot covered by TCT No. 265777 in the
name of Felisa Bonifacio.

Soccoro Andrade, in-charge of the records of Civil/LRC cases in Branch 125 of the Regional Trial Court,
Caloocan City, appeared bringing with her the records. She identified the pages of L.R.C. Case No. 3288,
submitted as Exhibit "G" in this case.

Atty. Kaulayao V. Faylona, Director and Corporate Secretary of VSD Realty and Development Corporation
testified on the details that led to the purchase of subject property. He verified the records of L.R.C. Case

No. C-3288, as well as the transcripts and exhibits submitted in the case. He checked with the Registry of
Deeds and was satisfied that the title was clean. Uniwide Sales, Inc., through its counsel Fortun and
Narvasa, stated that it was not the owner of the subject property. It was a mere lessee, but during their
talks on possible amicable settlement, Uniwide had to reveal the identity and address of the owner. This
matter was clearly stated in the letter of Fortun and Narvasa dated May 18, 1995. As suggested by
defendant Uniwide, the instant case was filed on June 8, 1995, to include the alleged lessor of the land,
Dolores Baello, care of ACCRA Law Office. He likewise testified on the damages suffered by VSD. Witness
testified that plaintiff VSD Realty and Development Corporation filed the instant case against the
defendants because plaintiff is the owner of the lot wherein Uniwide Sales is located x x x. 21

Further, the trial court found that the technical description in respondent Baellos title is not the same as
the technical description in petitioners title. A mere reading of the technical description in petitioners title
and that in Baellos title would show that they are not one and the same. The trial court averred that the
technical description of the subject lot in petitioners title is recorded with the Register of Deeds of
Caloocan City.22 It stated that Baellos claim to the same technical description cannot by itself alone be
given weight, and the evidence offered by Baello is not enough.

The trial court held that from the evidence adduced, petitioner is the registered owner of TCT No. 275312,
formerly TCT No. 265777 when Felisa D. Bonifacio was the registered owner, while respondent Baello is the
registered owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. (35788) 12754 and respondent Uniwide is a mere
lessee of the land. Baello is the holder of a title over a lot entirely different and not in anyway related to
petitioners title and its technical description. Petitioner proved its ownership and the identity of the
subject property.

The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
following:

1. Declaring TCT No. 35788 (12754) to be null and void;

2. Defendant Baello and all persons/entity claiming title under her, including UNIWIDE, to convey
and to return the property to plaintiff VSD on the basis of the latter's full, complete, valid and legal
ownership;

3. Defendant Baello and UNIWIDE, jointly and severally, to pay a just and reasonable compensation
per month of P1,200,000.00 with legal interest for the occupancy and use of plaintiff's land from
September 12, 1994, until actually vacated by them;

4. Defendants, jointly and severally, to pay attorney's fees of P200,000.00.

SO ORDERED.23

Respondents filed their respective motion for reconsideration. In its Order 24 dated January 12, 2001, the
trial court denied respondents motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, and it also denied petitioners
motion for immediate execution.

Respondents appealed the trial courts decision to the Court of Appeals.

On May 30, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision25 in favor of respondents and dismissed
petitioners complaint.

The Court of Appeals stated that the main issue to be resolved was whether or not there is a valid ground
to annul respondent Baello's TCT No. 35788 to warrant the reconveyance of the subject property to
petitioner.

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in declaring respondent Baello's TCT No. 35788 as null
and void. It stated that well settled is the rule that a Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of
ownership of the land referred to therein, and a strong presumption exists that it was regularly issued and
valid.26 Hence, respondent Baello's TCT No. 35788 enjoys the presumption of validity.

The Court of Appeals stated that based on existing jurisprudence, a certificate of title may be annulled or
cancelled by the court under the following grounds: (1) when the title is void because (a) it was procured
through fraud, (b) it was issued for a land already covered by a prior Torrens title, (c) it covers land
reserved for military, naval or civil public purposes, and (d) it covers a land which has not been brought
under the registration proceeding; (2) when the title is replaced by one issued under a cadastral
proceeding; and (3) when the condition for its issuance has been violated by the registered owner. 27

The Court of Appeals averred that while petitioner sought to annul respondent Baello's TCT No. 35788 on
the ground that the same was spurious, it failed to prove that Baellos title was indeed spurious. The
appellate court also noted that the trial courts decision never mentioned that Baello's title was spurious. It
further stated that any doubt or uncertainty as to the technical description contained in a certificate of title
is not a ground for annulment of title. It held that since there was no legal basis for the annulment of
Baello's TCT No. 35788, the trial court erred in declaring the said title null and void.

The Court of Appeals denied the cross-claim for moral damages filed by respondent Uniwide against
respondent Baello, since Uniwide failed to establish its claim of besmirched reputation so as to be entitled
to moral damages; hence, there was no basis to award the same. The other claims were likewise denied for
lack of merit.

The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 126, in Civil Case
No. C-16933 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING the instant complaint. 28
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals for lack of merit in the
Resolution29dated December 6, 2005.

Hence, petitioner filed this petition raising the following issues:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE BURDEN OF PROOF DID NOT SHIFT TO
RESPONDENTS, NOTWITHSTANDING THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY PETITIONER.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS MISCONSTRUED PETITIONERS ALLEGATION THAT THE "ISSUANCE OF TWO
TITLES OVER THE SAME PIECE OF LAND HAS NOT BEEN PROVED."

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN TREATING PETITIONERS COMPLAINT AS ONE ONLY FOR
ANNULMENT OF TITLE WHEN PETITIONER ALSO SOUGHT RECONVEYANCE OF THE LOT IN QUESTION.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT BAELLOS TITLE IS NOT SPURIOUS.

RESPONDENT UNIWIDE IS NOT A LESSOR IN GOOD FAITH.30

The pertinent issues raised by petitioner shall be discussed together with the main issues which are: (1)
whether or not petitioner is entitled to recovery of possession of the subject property; and (2) whether or
not the title of respondent Baello may be annulled.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the burden of proof did not shift to
respondents Baello and Uniwide, as it more than adequately proved its title to the lot in question by
testimonial and documentary evidence.

In civil cases, the specific rule as to the burden of proof is that the plaintiff has the burden of proving the
material allegations of the complaint which are denied by the answer; and the defendant has the burden of
proving the material allegations in his answer, which sets up new matter as a defense. 31 This rule does not
involve a shifting of the burden of proof, but merely means that each party must establish his own case. 32

In this case, petitioner seeks the annulment of respondent Baellos title and the recovery of possession of
property being occupied by Uniwide on the ground that it has the correct title to the subject property, with
the proper technical description, while respondent Baellos title is spurious and the technical description in
her title is in general terms and does not identify her land with certainty.

The Court holds that petitioner was able to establish through documentary and testimonial evidence that
the technical description of its Torrens title covers the property that is being occupied by respondent
Uniwide by virtue of a lease contract with respondent Baello. A comparison of the technical description of
the land covered by the title of petitioner and the technical description of the land covered by the title of
Baello shows that they are not the same.

TCT No. 285312 registered in the name of petitioner reads:

IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that certain land situated in Caloocan City, Philippines, bounded and described as
follows:

A parcel of land (Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A of the subd. plan Psd-706, LRC x x x situated in Balintawak,
Caloocan, Rizal. Bounded on the E., along line 1-2, by Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-D, on the SE., along line 2-3 by
Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B, both of the subd. plan and on the SW., NW., along line 3-4-1 by Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-6,
Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan being N. 69 deg. 07E.,
1,306.21m. from BLLM No. 1, Caloocan thence; S. 01 deg. 46W., 25.16 m. to point 2; S 65 deg. 116.78 m.
to point 3; N. 23 deg. 12W., 23.85 m. to point 4; N. 65 deg. 57E. 127.39 m. to the point of beginning;
containing an area of TWO THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY-FOUR

SQUARE METERS AND EIGHTY SQ. DECIMETERS (2,834.80) more or less. All pts. referred to are indicated
on plan and are marked on the ground by P.S. old points bearings true; date of original survey, Date of
subd. survey, Dec. 29, 1922.33

On the other hand, TCT No. (35788) 12754, registered in the name of respondent Dolores Baello, states:

IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that certain land situated in the Municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal,
Philippines, bounded and described as follows:

Un terreno (Lote No. 3-A del plano de subdivision Psd-706, parte del Lote No. 23-A, plano original Psu-2345
de la Hacienda de Maysilo), situado en el Barrio de Balintawak, Municipio de Caloocan, Provincia de Rizal.
Linda por el NE, con el Lote No. 3-D del plano de subdivision; por el SE, con el lote No. 3-B del plano de
subdivision; por el SO, con el Lote No. 7; y por el NO, con propiedad de Ramos Dane (Lote No. 1). x x x
midiendo una extension superficial de DOS MIL OCHOCIENTOS TREINTA Y CUATRO METROS CUADRADOS
CON OCHENTA DECIMETROS (2,834.80) mas o menos. x x x la fecha de la medicion original, 8 al 27 de
Septiembre, 4 al 21 de Octubre y 17-18 de Noviembre de 1911, y de la subdivision 29 de Diciembre de
1924. (Full technical description appears on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 10300/T-42). 34

From the foregoing, the title of petitioner covers a parcel of land referred to as Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A of the
subdivision plan Psd-706, while the title of respondent Baello covers a parcel of land referred to as Lot No.
3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-706. It should be pointed out that the verification survey of Lot 23-A-4-B-2-
A-3-A based on its technical description showed that Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A is the lot being occupied by
Uniwide.35 Baello claims that her Lot No. 3-A is the same as Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A. However, the claim
cannot be given credence because of the disparity of the lot description, and the technical description of
the land covered by Baellos title shows that it is not the same as the technical description of the land
covered by petitioners title. Moreover, the technical description of the land covered by Baellos title, or the
boundaries stated therein, are not the same as those indicated in the survey plans 36 which she adduced in
evidence. Since Baellos title covers a different property, she cannot claim a superior right over the subject
property on the ground that she registered her title ahead of petitioner.

As petitioner has proven that its title covers the property in dispute, it is entitled to recover the possession
thereof, the basis of which shall be discussed subsequently. The recovery of possession of the subject
property by petitioner is not dependent on first proving the allegation that Baellos title is spurious and the
annulment of Baellos title, since Baellos title does not cover the subject property and petitioner has
proven its title over the subject property and the identity of the property.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in treating its complaint as one only for annulment. It
asserts that it prayed not only for annulment of Baellos title, but also for the reconveyance of Lot 23-A-4-
B-2-A-3-B of subdivision plan Psd 706, which was the subject of lease between lessee Uniwide and lessor
Baello, and over which property Baello claims ownership. Petitioner contends that reconveyance is in order
as it has complied with the requisites of reconveyance under Article 434 of the Civil Code, thus:

Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength
of his title and not on the weakness of the defendants claim.

Petitioners contention is meritorious.

Article 434 of the Civil Code provides that to successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a
real property, the person who claims a better right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the
land claimed, and; second, his title thereto.37

In regard to the first requisite, in an accion reinvindicatoria, the person who claims that he has a better
right to the property must first fix the identity of the land he is claiming by describing the location, area
and boundaries thereof.38

In this case, petitioner proved the identity of the land it is claiming through the technical description
contained in its title, TCT No. T-285312; the derivative title of Felisa D. Bonifacio, TCT No. 265777; the
technical description39included in the official records of the subject lot in the Register of Deeds of Caloocan
City; and the verification survey conducted by Geodetic Engineer Evelyn Celzo of the DENR-NCR.
This conclusion is further supported by the finding of the trial court, thus:

The technical description of a titled lot registered under the Torrens system should appear on the face of
the title. x x x Exhibits "F," "F-1" (Technical description of the land appearing in plaintiff VSDs title, Exh.
"A") was acknowledged by the representative of the Register of Deeds as part of the records of TCT No.
28512. As testified by Engr. Evelyn G. Celzo of the DENR, NCR, the same certification was also established
as stated in L.R.C. 3288, a technical description as approved and recorded in DENR, NCR. The technical
description appearing in plaintiffs title shows the precise measurement, boundaries and location of the
plaintiffs property. These measurements/metes and bounds confirm the averments made by the plaintiff
that the title of defendant Baello does not even clearly show where the land is located.

Defendant BAELLO claimed that the technical description appearing on plaintiffs title belonged to her. In
support of her claim, she submitted Exhibits "2," "3," "3-B." Exhibits "3" and "3-B" were Survey Plans
alleged to have been as prepared the Technical Description for TCT No. (35186) 12754. Firstly, the
technical description appearing on her title is not the technical description alleged to be Exhibit "4," which
is the plan of Psd 706, Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A. Secondly, Exhibit "4," which she submitted separately from the
title, was not established by any competent witness. Said Exhibits could only be considered as part of the
testimony of defendant Baello, and not proof of the matters averred in said exhibits. No other witness was
presented to testify on BAELLOs claim to her technical description, being claimed. x x x 40

In addition, petitioner proved its title over the property by presenting in evidence its title, TCT No. T-
285312, which describes the metes and bounds of the subject lot covered therein, that is Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-
3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-706, which lot was acquired by VSD from Felisa D. Bonifacio, as evidenced
by a Deed of Absolute Sale.41

A background of the ownership of Felisa D. Bonifacio over Lot No. 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A of the subdivision plan
Psd-706 is contained in the Order42 dated October 8, 1992 of Judge Geronimo S. Mangay in LRC Case No. C-
3288,43 granting Felisa D. Bonifacios petition44 for authority to segregate an area of 5,680.1 square meters
covering Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A and Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B, Psd 706 (PSU-2345) of the Maysilo Estate, and for
issuance of a separate certificate of title in the name of Felisa D. Bonifacio. The Order dated October 8,
1992 stated that from the evidence presented, the court found that in Case No. 4557 for Petition for
Substitution of Names, in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 1, the then Presiding Judge
Cecilia Muoz Palma issued an Order dated May 25, 1962 substituting Maria de la Concepcion Vidal as one
of the registered owners of several parcels of land forming the Maysilo Estate and covered by, among
others, OCT No. 994 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal with, among others, Eleuteria Rivera Bonifacio to the
extent of 1/6 of 1-189/1,000 percent of the entire Maysilo Estate. 45

Moreover, the Order dated October 8, 1992 stated that Eleuteria Rivera Bonifacio executed in favor of
Felisa D. Bonifacio a Deed of Assignment assigning all her rights and interests over Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A
and Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B, both of Psd 706 and covered by OCT No. 994 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. 46 It
stated that even prior to the execution of the Deed of Assignment, but while negotiations with Eleuteria
Rivera Bonifacio were ongoing, Felisa Bonifacio already requested the Lands Management Sector, DENR-
NCR, to prepare and issue the technical descriptions of the two lots. Upon the finality of the Order and the
payment of the prescribed fees, if any, and presentation of clearances of the said lots, the Register of
Deeds of Caloocan City was ordered to issue a new transfer certificate of title in the name of Felisa D.
Bonifacio over Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A and Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B, both on Psd 706 of OCT No. 994 of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal.47

The evidence of petitioner, consisting of its Torrens title (TCT No. T-285312) and the derivativetitle of Felisa
D. Bonifacio (TCT No. 265777), the technical description issued by the DENR for the segregation of the
property of Felisa D. Bonifacio in LRC Case No. C-3288, and the testimonies of DENR representatives, show
that the title of petitioner covers the property therein referred to as Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A, which is being
occupied by Uniwide.

Hutchison v. Buscas48 held:

x x x It bears stress that in an action to recover real property, the settled rule is that the plaintiff must rely
on the strength of his title, not on the weakness of the defendants title. This requirement is based on two
(2) reasons: first, it is possible that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant is the true owner of the property
in dispute, and second, the burden of proof lies on the party who substantially asserts the affirmative of an
issue for he who relies upon the existence of a fact should be called upon to prove that fact. x x x

In this case, petitioner proved his title over the property in dispute as well as the identity of the said
property; hence, it is entitled to recover the possession of the property from respondents.
Considering that Uniwide constructed a building on the subject parcel of land, is Uniwide entitled to
recover from VSD the cost of its improvement on the land?

It is noted that when the contract of lease was executed, Uniwide was unaware that the property leased by
it was owned by another person other than Dolores Baello. Nevertheless, Uniwide cannot avail of the rights
of a builder in good faith under Article 44849 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 546 of the same Code,
which provides for full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until
reimbursement is made, as the said provisions apply only to a possessor in good faith who builds on land
with the belief that he is the owner thereof.50 It does not apply where ones only interest is that of a lessee
under a rental contract.51

Parilla v. Pilar 52
held:

Jurisprudence is replete with cases which categorically declare that Article 448 covers only cases in which
the builders, sowers or planters believe themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, have a claim of
title thereto, but not when the interest is merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or
usufructuary. A tenant cannot be said to be a builder in good faith as he has no pretension to be owner.

In a plethora of cases, this Court has held that Articles 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 546 of
the same Code, which allows full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises
until reimbursement is made, applies only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with
the belief that he is the owner thereof. It does not apply where ones only interest is that of a lessee under
a rental contract; otherwise, it would always be in the power of the tenant to "improve" his landlord out of
his property. (Italics supplied)53

Based on the foregoing, Uniwide cannot recover the cost of its improvement on the land from VSD under
Article 448 of the Civil Code.

Further, petitioner prays that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed and the Decision of the trial
court be reinstated. An examination of the dispositive portion of the trial courts decision shows that some
modifications are in order.

First, the trial court declared the title of respondent Dolores Baello, TCT No. (35788) 12754, to be null and
void.

The Court, however, holds that the title of respondent Dolores Baello cannot be nullified, because the
records show that petitioner failed to present any proof that the title was issued through fraud, and
Baellos title covers a different property from that described in petitioners title.1wphi1

Second, the trial court ordered respondents Baello and Uniwide to pay, jointly and severally, a just and
reasonable compensation of P1,200,000.00 per month with legal interest for the occupancy and use of
petitioners land from the time petitioner acquired ownership of the land on

September 12, 1994 until the land is actually vacated by respondents.

The Court notes that the trial court did not state in its decision how it determined the amount of P1.2
million as monthly compensation for the occupation and use of petitioners property from the time
petitioner acquired ownership of the property until it is vacated by respondents, particularly Uniwide which
is in possession of the property. Although petitioner, in its Complaint, prayed for the payment of P1.5
million as compensation for the occupancy and use of the subject property, it did not present evidence to
prove that it is entitled to such amount. The only basis for compensation for the use of the subject
property is the contract of lease between Uniwide and Dolores Baello covering a period of 25 years from
July 1, 1988 to June 30, 2013,54 renewable for another 25 years, with the agreement that upon termination
of the lease, the ownership of whatever buildings and improvements constructed by the lessee on the
leased premises shall automatically be owned by the lessor. 55The lease contract provides payment of rent
in the amount of P700,000.00 per annum, 56 or a monthly rental of P58,333.30. The Court holds that the
payment of P58,333.30 per month is a reasonable compensation for the occupation and use by
respondents of the subject property from the time petitioner acquired ownership of the land on September
12, 1994. The monthly compensation of P58,333.30 shall earn an interest of six percent (6% ) per
annum57 from the filing of the Complaint on June 8, 199558 until the award is final and executory, after
which the interest rate shall be 12 percent (12%) per annum from the date the award becomes final and
executory until fully paid.59
However, Uniwide should not be made to pay jointly and severally with Baello just compensation for the
occupancy and use of petitioners land from June 8, 1995, the date of the filing of the complaint, up to the
finality of this Decision, since Uniwide already paid rentals to Baello. However, Baello and Uniwide may be
held jointly and severally liable to VSD for the payment of rentals from the finality of this Decision until the
possession of the subject property is returned to VSD, since Uniwide would not yet have paid rentals during
that time.

Third, the trial court awarded attorneys fees to petitioner.

The Court holds that the trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees in the amount of P200,000.00 to
petitioner as it failed to state in the body of its decision the basis for such award. 60 The power of courts to
grant attorneys fees demands factual, legal and equitable justification; its basis cannot be left to
speculation or conjecture.61

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 30, 2005 and its
Resolution dated December 6, 2005, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69824, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 126, in Civil Case No. C-16933 is REINSTATED with
MODIFICATION as follows:

(1) Paragraph 1 of the dispositive portion of the Decision dated October 2, 2000 of the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City, Branch 126, in Civil Case No. C-16933, is deleted;

(2) Respondent Dolores Baello and all persons/entities claiming title under her, including
respondent Uniwide Sales, Inc., are ordered to convey and to return the property or the lot covered
by TCT No. T-285312 to petitioner VSD Realty and Development Corporation upon finality of this
Decision;

(3) Respondent Dolores Baello is ordered to pay just and reasonable compensation for the
occupancy and use of the land of petitioner VSD Realty and Development Corporation in the
amount of P58,333.30 per month from September 12, 1994 until the Decision is final and executory,
with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum reckoned from the filing of the Complaint on June
8, 1995 until the finality of this Decision. Thereafter, respondent Uniwide Sales, Inc. is jointly and
severally liable with Dolores Baello for the payment to petitioner VSD Realty and Development
Corporation of monthly rental in the amount of P58,333.30 from the finality of this Decision until the
land is actually vacated, with twelve percent (12%) interest per annum.

(4) The award of attorney's fees is deleted.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 198543 April 15, 2015

REPUBLIC OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CESAR C. PASICOLAN AND GREGORIO C. PASICOLAN, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Time and again, trial courts are reminded of their duty to carefully scrutinize the records of the case in
determining compliance with the requirements concerning Petitions for Reconstitution of a lost or
destroyed Original Certificate of Title (OCT). Extra precaution must be taken "lest they become unwitting
accomplices in the reconstitution of questionable titles instead of being instruments in promoting the
stability of our land registration system."1

This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 seeks to reverse the September 6, 2011 Decision3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 84120. The CA's assailed Decision affirmed the October 8, 2004
Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan which in turn, granted
respondents' Petition for Reconstitution of OCT No. 8450.

Factual Antecedents

Respondents Cesar C. Pasicolan (Cesar) and Gregorio C. Pasicolan (Gregorio) filed a Petition for
Reconstitution5of OCT No. 8450 in the name of Pedro Callueng (Pedro) before the RTC of Tuguegarao City.
Respondents claimed to be the legal and forced heirs of the late Pedro.

In support of their Petition for Reconstitution, respondents submitted the following evidence:

Description
A Decree No. 339880
B Technical Description
C Sepia Film Plan
D Certification issued by the Registry of Deeds
Certification issued by the Land Registration Authority,
E
Quezon City
F Report issued by the LandRegistration Authority
Certificate of Publication issued by the National Printing
G
Office
H Official Gazette Vol. 99 No. 39
I Official Gazette Vol. 99 No. 40
J Certification issued by the City Secretary, Tuguegarao City
K Certification issued by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
L Notice of Appearance ofthe Solicitor General
M Declaration of Real Property dated August 28, 1935
 N Declaration of Real Property dated October 24, 1947
O Official Receipt No. 4854586
P Official Receipt No. 6096680
Q Official Receipt No. 34107

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC granted the Petition in a Decision6 dated October 8, 2004, disposing thus:

WHEREFORE, finding this petition to be sufficient in form and substance and pursuant to the report of the
LRA[,] this petition is hereby granted. The Register of Deeds of the Province of Cagayan is hereby directed
to reconstitute the original copy of Original Certificate of Title No. 8450 in the name of Pedro Callueng in
exactly the same words and figures as the destroyed original copy based on the certified copy of the
Decree upon payment of the petitioners of the lawful fees and charges, subject to the encumbrances
mentioned in Decree No. 339880 in the absence of evidence showing that the same has already been
cancelled, and provided that no certificate of title covering the same parcel of land exists in the office of
the Register of Deeds of Cagayan.

Furnish copies of this Decision to the petitioners, the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cagayan, the
Land Registration Authority, Quezon City, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor and the Solicitor General.

The Register of Deeds of the Province of Cagayan is hereby directed to issue a new owners duplicate copy
of Original Certificate of Title No. 8450 in the name of Pedro Callueng in lieu of the lost/destroyed one upon
payment of the lawful fees and charges.

SO ORDERED.7

Believing that the RTC erred in granting the Petition for Reconstitution, petitioner Republic of the
Philippines (petitioner), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed to the CA ascribing
upon the court a quo the following error:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT [RESPONDENTS] FAILED TO PRESENT COMPETENT
EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT THE ALLEGED LOST CERTIFICATE OF TITLE WAS VALID AND SUBSISTING AT THE
TIME OF ITS ALLEGED LOSSAND THAT A MERE COPY OF DECREE NO. 339880 IS NOT A SUFFICIENT BASIS
FOR RECONSTITUTING ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 8450. 8

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

After both parties filed their respective Briefs, the CA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the appeal.
It gave credence to the pieces of documentary evidence presented by the respondents and the report of
the LRA which provides in part and quoted by the CA as follows: 2. From Book No. 52 of the Record Book of
Cadastral Lots on file at the Cadastral Decree Section, this Authority, it appears that Decree No. 339880
was issued for Lot 1921, Tuguegarao Cadastre on September 12, 1928, in Cadastral Case No. 4, GLRO Cad.
Record No. 415. However, copy of said decree is no longer available in this Authority; 9

It thus ratiocinated as follows:

We find no reason not to give the LRAs determination full faith and credit. The OSG ought to remember
that: the LRA exists for the sole purpose of implementing and protecting the Torrens system of land titling
and registration; it is the central repository of all land records involving registered or titled lands; it keeps
the title history or records of transaction involving titled or registered lands x x x and; it is specifically
called upon to extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings. x x x

Moreover, We constantly adhere to the established rule that factual findings of administrative officials and
agencies that have acquired expertise in the performance of their official duties and the exercise of their
primary jurisdiction are generally accorded not only respect but, at times, even finality if such findings are
supported by substantial evidence. x x x

What made the case stronger for the appellees was the lower courts granting of the prayer for the
reconstitution and issuance of certificates of title. After a thorough examination of the presented evidence
and testimony, pursuant as well on the report made by the LRA, the lower court concluded that the
petition was sufficient in substance.

Findings of fact made by a trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect by an appellate tribunal
and, absent a clear disregard of the evidence before it that can otherwise [a]ffect the results of the case,
those findings should not be ignored. In this case, We give great weight on the lower courts findings of
fact as the latter was in a better position to examine the real evidence, and observed whether the witness
was telling the truth or not. x x x
Upon the foregoing, We are persuaded to believe and so hold that sufficient basis thus exists to allow the
reconstitution and issuance of certificates of title in favor of the appellees. For failure of the OSG to prove
otherwise, the Court has no recourse but to deny its appeal. 10

Hence, this Petition.

Issue

The OSG interposed the present recourse anchored on the ground that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS FINDING THATRECONSTITUTION IS
JUSTIFIED ON THE BASIS OF A COPY OF AN UNAUTHENTICATED DECREE AND THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD. 11

The OSGs Arguments

The OSG contends that the CA erred in affirming the Decision of the trial court granting respondents
Petition for Reconstitution considering that "the decree which [the LRA] certified as a true copy did not
previously form part of its records." In refuting the lower courts finding of authenticity of the decree of
registration, the OSG argues, thus:

x x x The machine copy of the decree that was attached to the petition for reconstitution itself became the
source of a document that was forwarded to the LRA, which document was, in turn, made the basis of a
decree that was released by LRA as a certified true copy of its records. Indeed, there is no authentic decree
to speak of in the instant case. At best, the certification made by LRA on the decree submitted as Exhibit A
merely proves the subsequent appearance thereof in the records of the LRA. But it can never serve to
prove its authenticity for purposes of reconstitution under Section 2 (d) of Republic Act No. 26. 12

The OSG also insists that respondents failed to present competent proof of the loss of OCT No. 8450. It
maintains that the non-execution of an affidavit of loss before the Register of Deeds in accordance with
Section 1213 of Republic Act No. 26 (RA 26),14 as well as the absence of any "testimony on record setting
forth the circumstances that led to such loss"15 cast doubt on respondents claim that the owners
duplicate of OCT No. 8450 is indeed lost.

Respondents Arguments

For their part, respondents assert that petitioner never questioned the recommendation of the LRA,
"especially that portion of the report that the Honorable Court may use the authenticated decree as a
source of the desired reconstitution."16 This thus renders the OSGs objection to the same as "already late
in the day."17

Our Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

The absence of opposition from the

government does not bar it from
assailing the decision granting the
Petition for Reconstitution.

Before we delve into the merits of the Petition, it would bebest to address respondents argument that "no
person came forward to contest the reconstitution of the subject title even after the requirements of
posting and publication have been complied with," in light with our ruling in Macawadib v. Philippine
National Police Directorate for Personnel and Records Management, 18 thus:

On the question of whether or not respondent is estopped from assailing the decision of the RTC for failure
of the OSG, as government representative, to participate in the proceedings before the trial court or to file
an opposition to petitioners petition for correction of entries in his service records, this Court rules that
such an apparent oversight has no bearing on the validity of the appeal which the petitioner filed before
the CA. Neither can the State, as represented by the government, be considered in estoppel due to the
petitioners seeming acquiescence to the judgment of the RTC when it initially made corrections to some of
petitioners records with the PNP. This Court has reiterated time and again that the absence of opposition
from government agencies is of no controlling significance, because the State cannot be estopped by the
omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents. Nor is the Republic barred from assailing the decision
granting the petition for correction of entries if, on the basis of the law and the evidence on record, such
petition has no merit.19

That having been said, we now discuss the merits of this Petition.

The instant Petition falls under the

exceptions to the general rule that
factual findings of the appellate court
are binding on this Court.

"Ordinarily, this Court will not review, much less reverse, the factual findings of the CA, especially where
such findings coincide with those of the trial court. The findings of facts of the CA are, as a general rule,
conclusive and binding upon this Court, since this Court is not a trier of facts and does not routinely
undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the
case."20

"The above rule, however, is subject to a number of exceptions, such as (1) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the
finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the CA is
based on a misapprehension of facts;(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
parties; (7) when the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the CA manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion; and (10) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of
evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record."21

This case falls under the ninth exception; hence, we opt to take cognizance of the question brought to us
by the OSG.

Respondents failed to present a

competent source of reconstitution.

Section 2 of RA 26 enumerates the sources from which reconstitution of lost or destroyed original
certificates of title may be based:

SEC. 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from (such of) the sources hereunder enumerated
as may be available in the following order:

(a) The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;

(b) The co-owners, mortgagees, or lessees duplicate of the certificate of title;

(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal
custodian thereof;

(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to
which the original certificate of title was issued;

(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds by which the property, the description of which is
given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said
document showing that its original had been registered; and

(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for
reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.

Respondents predicate their Petition for Reconstitution on a decree of registration under Section 2(d) of RA
26. As both the original and the owners duplicate of OCT No. 8450 are lost or destroyed, it is only proper,
no doubt, that we scrutinize the authenticity of Decree No. 339880. A review of the records of this case
shows that the CA did not directly address the issue of the decrees authenticity. In fact, it merely stated
that the pieces of evidence presented before the trial court "were further sustained by the unmistakable
and reliable findings of the Land Registration Authority (LRA)." 22

However, a cursory reading of the LRAs report would reveal that the LRA made an admission only as to the
existence of Decree No. 339880.

Then, it went on to state that "[h]owever, [a] copy of said decree is no longer available in this
Authority."23 The Court cannot therefore help but wonder how can a decree that is undisputedly unavailable
with the LRA the "central repository of all land records involving registered or titled lands [which] keeps
the title history or records of transaction involving titled or registered lands." 24 be suddenly presented
before the trial court and accepted by it as authentic?

As if this was not disconcerting enough, what is more mind boggling would be the LRAs recommendation
that "if the Honorable Court, after notice and hearing, finds justification pursuant to Section 15 of Republic
Act No. 26 to grant the same, an authenticated copy of Decree No. 339880 may be used as a source of the
desired reconstitution pursuant to Section 2(d) of said Act"25 despite its admission of the decrees absence
in its records.
Now, the underlying question is: Where did respondents really secure Decree No. 339880 which they
presented before the trial court? As testified by Cesar, he was allegedly able to secure Decree No. 339880
from the LRA, to wit:

ATTY. AGUSTIN:

q When you discovered x x x the loss of said title[,] what did you do next?
a I tried to secure a copy of the Decree of this title, sir.
q Were you able to secure one?
a Yes, sir.
q I am showing to you a copy of this Decree No. 339880 of lot 1921[,] will you please go over it and tell if
this is the one?
a That is the same certified xerox copy I have taken from the Land Registration Authority[,]which was
already marked as Exhibit A, Sir.26

Clearly, this contradicts the LRAs admission that a copy of the decree is no longer available on its file.

Further, on the strength of the claim that the decree came from the LRA, respondents argue that it need
not be authenticated since it is in the nature of a public document.

While respondents may have raised a valid point, this Court, given the fact that the source of the subject
decree is questionable, finds the necessity of applying the requirements for authenticating a private
document to dispel or confirm any doubts on the decrees genuineness. Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court states:

Section 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.

Therefore, presentation of either the testimony of "anyone who saw the document executed or written" or
of "evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker" would have addressed the
issue before the Court. However, none was presented. Instead, what is glaring from the decree itself is that
it was not signed by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office (GLRO) who, by law, 27 is tasked to
issue decrees of registration. It only bears the signature of the Deputy Chief of the GLRO who merely
signed to certify that the document is a true copy. Even then, the genuineness of the said signature was
not ascertained. Further, the decree is without the signature of the witness Honorable Catalino Sevilla,
the Judge of First Instance of Cagayan who supposedly ordered its issuance. 28 The lack of evidence of its
authenticity, the above-mentioned flaws in the decree, the admission of the LRA that the said document is
not available in their records and, the conflicting testimony of Cesar as to the source thereof, all cast
serious doubts as to the genuineness of Decree No. 339880. In view of the same, respondents would then
have to present evidence under Section 2(f) of RA 26, i.e., any other document which, in the judgment of
the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the loss or destroyed OCT.

The next question, thus, is: Do the pieces of evidence presented by respondents constitute "[a]ny other
document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or
destroyed certificate of title?"29

We find that they do not.

Respondents other documentary evidence

such as the technical description, sepia
film and tax declarations are not sufficient
pieces of evidence to grant a Petition for
Reconstitution under Section 2(f) of RA 26.

This Court finds that the other pieces of documentary evidence submitted by respondents do not warrant
the reconstitution of their alleged lost title. The Court has pronounced in Republic v. Heirs of Julio Ramos, 30

Respondents predicate their Petition for Reconstitution on Section 2(f) of RA 26. And to avail of its benefits,
respondents presented survey plan, technical description, Certification issued by the Land Registration
Authority, Lot Data Computation, and tax declarations. Unfortunately, these pieces of documentary
evidence are not similar to those mentioned in subparagraphs (a) to (e) of Section 2 of RA 26, which all
pertain to documents issued or are on file with the Registry of Deeds. Hence, respondents documentary
evidence cannot be considered to fall under subparagraph (f). Under the principle of ejusdem generis,
where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying
only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. Thus, in Republic of the
Philippines v. Santua, we held that when Section 2(f) of RA 26 speaks of "any other document," the same
must refer to similar documents previously enumerated therein, that is, those mentioned in Sections 2(a),
(b), (c), (d), and (e).

Also, the survey plan and technical description are not competent and sufficient sources of reconstitution
when the petition is based on Section 2(f) of RA 26. They are mere additional documentary requirements.
This is the clear import of the last sentence of Section 12, RA 26 earlier quoted. Thus, in Lee v. Republic of
the Philippines, where the trial court ordered reconstitution on the basis of the survey plan and technical
description, we declared the order of reconstitution void for want of factual support. 31

Furthermore, the Certification32 issued by the LRA stating that Decree No. 339880 was issued for Lot No.
1921 would not serve to help respondents Petition for Reconstitution any better. Again, as we have
already discussed in Republic v. Heirs of Julio Ramos, 33 a vague Certification by the LRA without stating the
nature of the decree, as well as the claimant in such case cannot be considered as a sufficient and proper
basis for reconstituting a lost or destroyed certificate of title. 34 To reiterate our ruling there, we quote:

Moreover, the Certification issued by the LRA stating that Decree No. 190622 was issued for Lot 54 means
nothing.1vvphi1 The Land Registration Act expressly recognizes two classes of decrees in land
registration proceedings, namely, (i) decrees dismissing the application and (ii) decrees of confirmation
and registration. In the case at bench, we cannot ascertain from said Certification whether the decree
alluded to by the respondents granted or denied Julio Ramos claim. Moreover, the LRAs Certification did
not state to whom Lot 54 was decreed. Thus, assuming that Decree No. 190622 is a decree of
confirmation, it would be too presumptuous to further assume that the same was issued in the name and
in favor of Julio Ramos. Furthermore, said Certification did not indicate the number of the original
certificate of title and the date said title was issued. In Tahanan Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, we held that the absence of any document, private or official, mentioning the number of the
certificate of title and date when the certificate of title was issued, does not warrant the granting of such
petition.35 Neither do the tax declarations submitted support respondents cause. As held in Republic of the
Philippines v. Santua,36 a tax declaration can only be prima facie evidence of claim of ownership, which,
however, is not the issue in a reconstitution proceeding. A reconstitution of title does not pass upon the
ownership of land covered by the lost or destroyed title but merely determines whether a re-issuance of
such title is proper. Besides, the tax declaration submitted by respondents only serve to bolster the OSGs
claim that no such decree exists as to serve as basis of the alleged OCT of Pedro. This is considering that
the tax declarations submitted cover only the years 1974 to 2000. 37 Notably, no tax declarations for the
years 1928 to 1973 we represented. Needless to state, the submission of tax declarations for the year
1928 and the years immediately following could have supported respondents allegation that Pedro was
issued a decree in 1928 and eventually an OCT. However, no such documents were submitted. On the
other hand, the tax declarations submitted pertaining to years 1974 to 2000 were paid only on March 30,
2000 or just shortly before the filing of the petition for reconstitution. One can only reasonably conclude
that the same was made in anticipation of the filing of the petition.

We also share the OSGs observation that the non-submission of an affidavit of loss by the person who was
allegedly in actual possession of OCT No. 8450 at the time of its loss casts doubt on respondents claim
that OCT No. 8450 once existed and subsequently got lost. Under Section 109 38 of Presidential Decree No.
1529,39 the owner must file with the proper Registry of Deeds a notice of loss executed under oath. In this
case, the presentation of such affidavit becomes even more important considering the doubtful testimony
of Cesar that OCT No. 8450 was lost, viz:

q Where is the owners copy of this original certificate of title?

a It was lost, sir.

q Will you plese explain how that owners copy of OCT No. 8450 was lost?

a The title was in our possession and later on it was lost in our possession.

q What happened when you discovered the loss of said title?

a We exerted efforts to locate but we were not able to locate the same. 40

As can be gleaned from the above, Cesars testimony was very vague. It utterly lacks details as to how the
title got lost and fails to specify the efforts they supposedly undertook in searching for the titles
whereabouts. Indeed, his testimony is highly suspect and cannot be given the expected probative weight.
An affidavit of loss, in a way, could have helped explain the loss. But as mentioned, none was submitted.

At this point, it is imperative to remind trial courts that granting Petitions for Reconstitution is not a
ministerial task. It involves diligent and circumspect evaluation of the authenticity and relevance of all the
evidence presented, lest the chilling consequences of mistakenly issuing a reconstituted title when in fact
the original is not truly lost or destroyed.
Here, the. CA should have been more cautious in deliberating on the appeal taken by the OSG.1wphi1 It
should not have hastily denied the same merely because of the LRA's report recommending the
reconstitution of OCT No. 8450 and the trial court's approval of such recommendation. It should have taken
note that the same report contains a crucial admission on the part of the LRA that the decree of
registration which was the main evidence used for respondents' petition was not available in their records.

In fine, we are not convinced that respondents adduced competent evidence to warrant reconstitution of
the allegedly lost OCT.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The September 6, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 84120 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered DISMISSING respondents'
Petition for Reconstitution.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 184589 June 13, 2013

DEOGENES O. RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE CHINESE CHARITABLE ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision 1 dated May 26, 2008 and
Resolution2 dated September 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101789 for having been
rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Said Decision and Resolution
reversed and set aside the Orders dated April 10, 20073 and November 22, 200t of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 75, San Mateo, Rizal, in Land Registration (Reg.) Case No. N-5098 (LRC Rec. No. N-27619).

The Facts are as follows.

On January 29, 1965, Purita Landicho (Landicho) filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal an
Application for Registration of a piece of land, measuring 125 hectares, located in Barrio Patiis, San Mateo,
Rizal (subject property), which was docketed as Land Reg. Case No. N-5098. 5 On November 16, 1965, the
CFI rendered a Decision6 evaluating the evidence presented by the parties as follows:

It has been established by the evidence adduced by Landicho that the parcel of land under consideration
was formerly several smaller parcels owned and possessed by the spouses Felix San Pascual and Juanita
Vertudes, Ignacio Santos and Socorro Santos, Caconto Cayetano and Verneta Bartolome, Gavino Espiritu
and Asuncion Cruz, and Lucio Manuel and Justina Ramos, all of whom in January 1960, executed
instruments of conditional sale of their respective parcels of land in favor of Landicho, x x x, and on July 20,
1965 all of them executed jointly a final deed of absolute sale x x x which superseded the conditional sale.
Gavino Espiritu, one of the vendors, fifty-five years old, farmer, resident of Barrio Geronimo, Montalban,
Rizal, testified that he and his co-vendors have been in possession of the parcel of land since 1930 and
that the possession of Landicho, together with her predecessors in interest, has been open, peaceful,
continuous and adverse against the whole world in the concept of an owner. It has also been established
that the parcel of land is within the Alienable or Disposable Block-I of I.C. Project No. 26 of San Mateo,
Rizal, x x x; that the parcel of land is classified as "montaoso" with an assessed value of P12,560.00
under Tax Dec. No. 7081, x x x, taxes due to which for the current year had been paid, x x x; and that the
same is not mortgaged or affected by any encumbrance.

The oppositor did not present testimonial evidence but presented the report of investigation of Land
Investigator Pedro R. Feliciano dated August 23, 1965, x x x which stated substantially that during the
investigation and ocular inspection it has been ascertained that no public land application is involved and
that no reservation is affected thereby, and therefore, he believed that the opposition already filed can be
withdrawn; x x x, 1st Indorsement dated August 24, 1965 of the District Land Officer, District No. 7, Bureau
of Lands, to the Director of Lands, recommending that, in view of said report of investigation, the
opposition be withdrawn; and x x x, office memorandum of the Chief, Records Division, Bureau of Land,
addressed to the Chief, Legal Division, dated September 23, 1965, to the effect that according to the
records, plan Psu-201023 is not covered by any kind of public land application or patent.

It is therefore clear from the evidence on record that the applicant is entitled to the benefits provided by
Section 48, of C.A. No. 141, as amended.7

In the end, the CFI decreed:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby confirms the title of the applicant, Purita Landicho, of legal age, married to
Teodorico Landicho, Filipino, resident of 74-A South 19th St., Quezon City, to the parcel of land under
consideration and orders the registration thereof in her name and personal circumstances aforementioned.

The opposition of the Director of Lands is hereby dismissed.

Once this decision becomes final and executory, let the order for the issuance of the decree issue. 8

Upon finality of its Decision dated November 16, 1965, the CFI issued an Order 9 on December 22, 1965
directing the Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission (LRC) "to comply with Section 21 of Act
No. 2347"10 on the issuance of a decree and original certificate of title (OCT).

Eventually, on July 11, 1966, Jose D. Santos (Santos), Register of Deeds (ROD) for the Province of Rizal,
issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 16768111 in Landichos name covering the subject property.
Notably, ROD Santos issued to Landicho a TCT rather than an OCT for the subject property; and although
TCT No. 167681 stated that it was issued pursuant to Decree No. 1480, no other detail regarding the
decree and the original registration of the subject property was filled out.

The subject property was thereafter sold several times, and as the old TCTs of the vendors were cancelled,
new TCTs were accordingly issued to the buyers. The sale of the subject property could be traced from
Landicho to Blue Chips Projects, Inc. (BCPI), which acquired TCT No. 344936 in its own name on November
10, 1971; then to Winmar Poultry Farm, Inc. (WPFI), TCT No. 425582, November 5, 1973; and finally, to
herein respondent Philippine Chinese Charitable Association, Inc. (PCCAI), TCT No. 482970, July 15, 1975. 12

Meanwhile, A. Doronila Resources Dev., Inc. (ADRDI)13 instituted Civil Case No. 12044, entitled A. Doronila
Resources Dev., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, which was still pending before the RTC, Branch 167, of Pasig City
as of 2008. ADRDI asserted ownership over the subject property, which was a portion of a bigger tract of
land measuring around 513 hectares, covered by TCT No. 42999, dated February 20, 1956, in the name of
said corporation. This bigger tract of land was originally registered in the name of Meerkamp Co. under
OCT No. 301, pursuant to Decree No. 1480, GLRO Record No. 2429, issued on November 22, 1906. ADRDI
caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens (as regards Civil Case No. 12044) on TCT No. 344936 of
BCPI. Subsequently, based on the ruling of this Court in A. Doronila Resources Dev., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,14 ADRDI was also able to have its notice of adverse claim over the subject property annotated on
TCT Nos. 344936 and 425582 of BCPI and WPFI, respectively. ADRDI subsequently transferred the subject
property to Amado Araneta (Araneta) to whom TCT No. 70589 was issued on March 25, 1983.

On November 14, 1996, Landicho executed a Deed of Absolute Sales (sic) over the subject property in
favor of herein petitioner Deogenes O. Rodriguez (Rodriguez). Two years later, on June 1, 1998, Landicho
died.

Seven years hence, or on May 18, 2005, Rodriguez filed an Omnibus Motion before the RTC, Branch 75, of
San Mateo, Rizal, in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098. Rodriguez alleged therein that the Decision dated
November 16, 1965 and Order dated December 22, 1965 of the CFI in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 which
confirmed Landichos title over the subject property has not been executed. Rodriguez specifically stated
that no decree of registration had been issued by the LRC Commissioner (now the Administrator of the
Land Registration Authority [LRA]) and that no OCT had been ever issued by the ROD in Landichos name.
As Landichossuccessor-in-interest to the subject property, Rodriguez prayed that:

a. Upon the filing of the instant motion, the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City be
commanded to transmit to the Honorable Court the complete records and expediente of LRC No. x x
x N-5098 (LRC Rec. No. N-27619);

b. After hearing, the Honorable Court give due course to the instant motions and issue an Order as
follows:
 i. Directing the Administrator of the Land Registration [Authority] to issue the Decree of
Registration, in accordance with the tenor of the Decision dated November 16, 1965 x x x
and the Order dated December 22, 1965 x x x, in the name of the petitioner [Rodriguez];

ii. Thereafter, ordering the Register of Deeds for Marikina City, through the Administrator of
the Land Registration Administration as having direct supervisory authority there-over, to
issue the

Original Certificate of Title containing the Technical Description as duly confirmed in the said Decision and
Order x x x in the name of the herein petitioner [Rodriguez].

PETITIONER further prays for such other measures of relief as may be deemed just and equitable in the
premises.15

In the course of the proceedings concerning the aforementioned Omnibus Motion, Rodriguez himself
submitted as his Exhibit "GG" TCT No. 482970 of PCCAI but alleged that said certificate of title was
fictitious. Thus, the RTC issued on November 3, 2006 a subpoena commanding PCCAI to appear at the
hearing of Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 set on November 8, 2006 at 9:00 a.m.; to bring its TCT No. 482970
and Tax Declaration No. SM-02-0229; and to testify in connection therewith.

On November 17, 2006, PCCAI filed before the RTC a Verified Motion for Leave to Intervene in Land Reg.
Case No. N-5098. PCCAI justified its intervention by arguing that it was an indispensable party in the case,
having substantial legal interest therein as the registered owner of the subject property under TCT No.
482970. PCCAI likewise pointed out that Rodriguez himself submitted a copy of TCT No. 482970, only
alleging that said certificate was fictitious. PCCAI averred that Rodriguez maliciously failed to allege in his
Omnibus Motion that TCT No. 482970 remains valid and subsisting, there being no direct action or final
court decree for its cancellation. Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion constituted a collateral attack on the title of
PCCAI, which is not sanctioned by law and jurisprudence. Consequently, PCCAI asked the RTC to allow its
intervention in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 so it could protect its vested rights and interests over the
subject property; to note and admit its Answer-in-Intervention; and to deny Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion
for utter lack of merit.

The RTC favorably acted on Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion in an Order dated April 10, 2007, reasoning as
follows:

Initially, the issue of jurisdiction arose particularly as to whether this Court may take cognizance of the
instant case previously assigned to the CFI Pasig and, subsequently, rule upon the Omnibus Motion of
[Rodriguez] despite the lapse of more than forty (40) years after the finality of the Decision of November
16, 1965.

Clearly, this Court has jurisdiction because, as earlier stated, the proceedings in this Court is merely a
continuation of the land registration proceedings commenced in the CFI Pasig. More importantly, with the
creation of this Court under the provisions of the Judiciary Reorganization Law, all cases involving
properties within its territorial jurisdiction, specifically in San Mateo, Rizal, were transferred to this Court
(Sec. 44, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129).

Consequently, there is no legal impediment for this Court to reiterate the Decision dated November 16,
1965 and the Order dated December 22, 1966 because the Rules on execution of Judgment pertaining to
civil cases are not applicable to this kind of proceedings. A final and executory judgment in a land
registration case, being merely declaratory in nature, does not prescribe. (Sta. Ana vs. Menla, 1 SCRA
1294; Heirs of Cristobal Marcos vs. de Banuvar, 25 SCRA 316; vda. De Barroga vs. Albano, 157 SCRA 131;
Cacho v. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 159)

Secondly, a more important issue was put to forewhether this Court may issue a writ of execution
directing the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of registration over the subject property
and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal to issue an original certificate of title in the name of
[Rodriguez].

Consistency dictates and being a mere continuation of the CFI Pasig proceedings, this Court can only
reiterate the directives in the Order dated December 22, 196[5]. It cannot, however, issue, as prayed for, a
writ of execution directing the issuance of a decree of registration and an original certificate of title in the
name of [Rodriguez].
Finally, during the proceedings in this case, this Court was made aware of the existence of claimants to the
subject property. However, this Court cannot, at this time and in this proceedings, rule on the legality or
illegality of these claims of ownership. It is best that these claims be ventilated in appropriate proceedings
specifically sought to for this purpose.16 (Underscoring deleted.)

The RTC decreed thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated December 22, 1966 of the Court of First Instance of
Pasig, Branch 6, is hereby REITERATED. The Land Registration Authority is directed to issue a decree of
registration while the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal is likewise directed to issue an original
certificate of title of the subject property, both in favor and in the name of applicant Purita Landicho, of
legal age, married to Teodorico Landicho, Filipino and a resident of 74-A South 19th St., Quezon City, after
compliance with issuance requirements and procedures.17

PCCAI filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforequoted Order of the RTC. The RTC resolved both the
Motion for Leave to Intervene with the attached Answer-in-Intervention and Motion for Reconsideration of
PCCAI in another Order dated November 22, 2007. The trial court held:

This Court after receiving evidence that a Decision was rendered in favor of the applicants spouses
Landicho as owner in fee simple of the subject parcels of land, and that no title was issued pursuant to the
said Decision which has become final and executory even after an Order to that effect was issued, merely
reiterated the said Order for the implementation of the Decision dated November 16, 1966, signed by the
Hon. Andres Reyes as Judge. In other words, Intervention would not be allowed after the Decision has
become final and executory. The issue in the instant Petition is the issuance of a decree of registration and
nothing more is being tried.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion For Leave To Intervene and the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by the PCCAI are both DENIED.18

The LRA, upon receipt of a copy of the RTC Order dated April 10, 2007, filed a Manifestation dated February
4, 2008 informing the trial court that it cannot comply with said Order since there were already two
existing titles covering the subject property, i.e., TCT No. 70589 of Araneta (traced back to OCT No. 301 of
Meerkamp Co.) and TCT No. 482970 of PCCAI (traced back to Landichos TCT No. 167681); and to issue a
decree of registration and OCT in Landichos name would only further aggravate the problem of double
titling. The LRA also explained that the ROD issued a TCT, rather than an OCT, to Landicho for the subject
property in 1966, following the Order dated July 7, 1966 of then LRC Commissioner Antonio H. Noblejas
(Noblejas), who took cognizance of the fact that the subject property, as part of a bigger parcel of land,
was already registered under OCT No. 301 in the name of Meerkamp Co., pursuant to Decree No. 1480
under GLRO Record No. 2429 issued in 1906. LRC Commissioner Noblejas additionally stated in his Order
that:

The new transfer certificate of title to be issued by virtue hereof is deemed to have been derived from
Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-1. (Under Decree No. 1480 dated November 22, 1906) which should be
deemed cancelled with respect to the said property and that the issuance of the same has been effected
without the presentation of the owners duplicate of subsisting certificate of title. 19 (Emphasis deleted.)

At around the same time, PCCAI filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101789, assailing the Orders dated April 10, 2007 and November 22, 2007 of
the RTC for having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. PCCAI acknowledged that it is the ministerial duty of the RTC to
issue a writ of execution for a final and executory decision/order; however, PCCAI argued that when
subsequent facts and circumstances transpired which renders the execution of the final and executory
decision/order unjust or inequitable, then the trial court should refrain from issuing a writ of execution.
PCCAI likewise asserted that the RTC, as a land registration court, did not have the jurisdiction to resolve
conflicting claims of ownership over the subject property. PCCAI lastly maintained that it was an
indispensable party in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 and that it should have been allowed by the RTC to
intervene during the hearing of Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion for the execution of the Decision dated
November 16, 1965 and Order dated December 22, 1965 of the CFI.

The Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated May 26, 2008, found merit in the Petition of PCCAI. The appellate
court gave great weight and credence to the Manifestation dated February 8, 2008 of the LRA reporting the
double titling and conflicting claims over the subject property. The Court of Appeals held that:
The Land Registration Authority, being the repository of land registration documents and the
administrative agency with the necessary expertise concerning land registration matters, We cannot but
agree with the above-quoted Manifestation. Moreover, from the above facts admitted by the parties and
the LRA, it cannot be denied that there are conflicting claims on the ownership of the property which
cannot be passed upon by the lower court as a land registration court for lack of jurisdiction. 20

The Court of Appeals additionally opined that the intervention of PCCAI in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 was
proper given the circumstances:

Anent the issue of intervention, in the case of Information Technology of the Philippines vs. Comelec, G.R.
159139, August 22, 2006, the following doctrine was enunciated, to wit:

"The basic doctrinal rule is that final judgments may no longer be modified, except only to correct clerical
errors or mistakes, or when the judgment is void, or if supervening events or circumstances that transpire
after the finality of the decision render its execution unjust and inequitable. In the interest of substantial
justice, this Court has allowed exceptions to this rule. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an
officer thereof, may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action."

We are not unmindful that [PCCAI] filed its Intervention when the decision of the case was already final and
executory and during the execution stage of the case. However, the supervening event which is the
issuance of a decree of registration which was already implemented and enforced upon the order of the
Administrator of the LRC way back in July 11, 1966 when the LRC issued TCT No. 167861 in the name of
Purita Landicho instead of an OCT makes the said intervention proper and well-taken.

From the foregoing, it appears absurd and senseless that an OCT be issued in favor of Mr. Rodriguez.
Furthermore, it is in the paramount interest of justice that the assailed orders be not implemented, [PCCAI]
being an indispensable party in the execution and/or implementation of the said orders. The non-execution
of the said orders will prevent further disarray, confusion and complexity on the issue of who is or who
should be the real owner of the subject land which is a matter that can be threshed out in a proper case for
quieting of title between adverse claimants.21

Based on the foregoing, the appellate court adjudged:

All told, the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the assailed orders are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly, [Rodriguez, RTC Presiding
Judge Josephine ZarateFernandez, the LRA Administrator, and Marikina City ROD] are enjoined to cease
and desist from implementing the said orders pending the outcome of a proper case before an appropriate
court where the issue of ownership of the subject land can be put to rest. 22

Rodriguez moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision but was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated September 17, 2008.

Aggrieved, Rodriguez sought recourse from this Court through the present Petition, arguing that:

THE [COURT OF APPEALS] HAD ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION WHEN IT RENDERED AN OPEN-ENDED
JUDGMENT.

THE [COURT OF APPEALS] HAD ABDICATED ITS JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE DISPUTES ON THE MERE
MANIFESTATION OF THE LRA THAT THERE WERE ISSUES OF OWNERSHIP WHICH HAVE FIRST TO BE
RESOLVED.

THE [COURT OF APPEALS] HAS RESOLVED AN ISSUE WHICH WAS IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL OR
HAD OTHERWISE BEEN RESOLVED.
 II

THE [COURT OF APPEALS] HAD COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT THE [PCCAI] HAD LEGAL STANDING TO PREVENT OR SUSPEND THE
OPERATION OF THE LAND REGISTRATION LAWS BY WAY OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE ORDER DIRECTING THE
LAND REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATOR TO COMPLY WITH THE ORDER DATED DECEMBER 16, 1965.

THE [PCCAI] HAD NO RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN LRC NO. N-5098.

B.

THE [PCCAI] CANNOT CLAIM BUYER IN GOOD FAITH STATUS AS ITS TITLE WAS DEFECTIVE ON ITS
FACE.

III

[RODRIGUEZ] IS ENTITLED TO THE CORRECTIVE AND PREROGATIVE WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO INSURE THAT
THE LAND REGISTRATION LAWS ARE PROPERLY AND FULLY IMPLEMENTED. 23

The instant Petition has no merit.

At the outset, the Court finds unmeritorious Rodriguezs claim that the Court of Appeals rendered an open-
ended judgment. In the dispositive portion of its Decision dated May 26, 2008, the Court of Appeals clearly
and categorically "REVERSED AND SET ASIDE" the Orders dated April 10, 2007 and November 22, 2007 of
the RTC in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098. The cease and desist order of the appellate court in the second line
of the same dispositive portion is therefore a superfluity. Obviously, by reversing and setting aside the
foregoing Orders, there is nothing more to implement. The phrase "pending the outcome of a proper case
before an appropriate court where the issue of ownership of the subject land can be put to rest," 24 does not
mean that the very same Orders which were reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals could later on
be revived or reinstated; rather it means that the remedies sought by Rodriguez can be litigated and
granted in an appropriate proceeding by a court with proper jurisdiction.

To clarify matters, it must be stressed that the issue brought before the Court of Appeals did not involve
the question of the ownership. The appellate court only concerned itself with the proper execution of the
November 16, 1965 Decision in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 but, due to the intricacy of the matter, was
compelled to take notice of the controversy between Rodriguez and PCCAI, both of whom trace back their
titles to Landicho. In view of these conflicting claims, Rodriguez now avers that because ROD Santos issued
TCT No. 167681 for the subject property in Landichos name, the November 16, 1965 Decision in Land Reg.
Case No. N-5098 was not validly implemented since no OCT was issued. 25 Corollary to this, Rodriguez
posits that PCCAI is not a buyer in good faith of the subject property and that the latters TCT No. 482970 is
spurious. PCCAI, on the other hand, insists that the issuance of TCT No. 167681 to Landicho, from which its
own TCT No. 482970 may be traced back, was a valid execution of the said CFI decision.

The LRA, in its Manifestation dated February 4, 2008 filed before the RTC, explained that a TCT was issued
to Landicho because the subject property, as part of a bigger parcel of land, was already covered by
Decree No. 1480 and OCT No. 301 dated November 22, 1906 in the name of Meerkamp Co. In other words,
Landichos TCT No. 167681 is a derivative of Decree No. 1480 and OCT No. 301 of Meerkamp Co. which
were cancelled to the extent of the subject property.

Complicating the matter further is the pendency of Civil Case No. 12044 in the RTC, Branch 167, Pasig City.
Not only is PCCAI questioning the right of Rodriguez to the issuance of an OCT pursuant to the November
16, 1965 Decision and December 22, 1965 Order of the CFI in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098, it is also
defending the validity of TCT No. 482970 (which is a derivative of TCT No. 167681 issued to Landicho)
against Araneta who holds TCT No. 70589 (which is a derivative of Meerkamp Co.s OCT No. 301). In view
of the foregoing, issuing an OCT covering the subject property to Rodriguez would give rise to a third
certificate of title over the same property. Such act would only cause more confusion and complication,
rather than the preservation, of the Torrens system of registration.

The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to its
legality. Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the
portals of the court, or sitting on the "mirador su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. A Torrens
title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein. A strong
presumption exists that Torrens titles are regularly issued and that they are valid. 26 In this case, PCCAI is
the registered owner of the subject property under TCT No. 482970, which could be traced back to TCT No.
16781 issued to Landicho. As between PCCAI and Rodriguez, the former is better entitled to the protection
of the Torrens system. PCCAI can rely on its TCT No. 482970 until the same has been annulled and/or
cancelled.

Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, explicitly
provides that "a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or
cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law."

In Decaleng v. Bishop of the Missionary District of the Philippine Islands of Protestant Episcopal Church in
the United States of America,27 the Court declared that a Torrens title cannot be attacked collaterally, and
the issue on its validity can be raised only in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. A collateral
attack is made when, in another action to obtain a different relief, the certificate of title is assailed as an
incident in said action.

Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 was an application for registration of the subject property instituted by
Landicho before the CFI, which was granted by the CFI in its Decision dated November 16, 1965.
Rodriguez, asserting that he was Landichos lawful successor-in-interest, filed an Omnibus

Motion before the RTC in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 seeking the issuance of a decree of registration and
an OCT in his name for the subject property pursuant to the said CFI judgment. Rodriguez acknowledged
the existence of TCT No. 482970 of PCCAI for the same property, but he simply brushed aside said
certificate of title for allegedly being spurious. Still, Rodriguez did not pray that TCT No. 482970 be
declared void and/or cancelled; and even if he did, the RTC had no jurisdiction to grant such relief in a land
registration case. Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098, under the circumstances, is a
collateral attack on said certificate, which is proscribed under Section 48 of the Property Registration
Decree.

If Rodriguez wants to have a decree of registration and OCT issued in his (or even in Landichos name) for
the subject property, he should have directly challenged the validity of the extant TCT No. 482970 of PCCAI
for the very same property in an action specifically instituted for such purpose (i.e., petition for annulment
and/or cancellation of title, petition for quieting of title) and pray the said certificate of title be annulled or
canceled. The proper court in an appropriate action can try the factual and legal issues involving the
alleged fatal defects in Landichos TCT No. 167681 and/or its derivative TCTs, including TCT No. 482970 of
PCCAI; the legal effects of Landichos sale of the subject property to BCPI (the predecessor-in-interest of
PCCAI) in 1971 and also to Rodriguez in 1996; and the good faith or bad faith of PCCAI, as well as
Rodriguez, in purchasing the subject property. The resolution of these issues will ultimately be
determinative of who between Rodriguez and PCCAI is the rightful owner of the subject property.

Clearly, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for according weight and credence to the Manifestation
dated February 4, 2008 of the LRA.

The LRA exists for the sole purpose of implementing and protecting the Torrens system of land titling and
registration.28 In particular, it is tasked with the following functions:

(1) Issue decrees of registration pursuant to final judgments of the courts in land registration
proceedings and cause the issuance by the Registrars of Land Titles and Deeds of the
corresponding certificates of title;

(2) Be the central repository of records relative to original registration of lands titled under the
Torrens system, including subdivision and consolidation plans of titled lands; and

(3) Extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings and to the
other agencies of the government in the implementation of the land reform program. 29

The duty of LRA officials to issue decrees of registration is ministerial in the sense that they act under the
orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data
found in the record. They have no discretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in
relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, these officials ought to seek clarification from the
court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is
the act of the court. They are specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and
cadastral land registration proceedings."30
In Ramos v. Rodriguez,31 the LRA filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision and order of the land
registration court respectively granting registration of a parcel of land and directing the issuance of a
decree of registration for the same. According to the LRA, there was already an existing certificate of title
for the property. The land registration court granted the motion for reconsideration of the LRA and set
aside its earlier decision and order. On appeal, the Court declared that the land registration court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in reversing itself because it was merely following the recommendation
of the LRA, which was then acting as an agent of the court.

In another case, Spouses Laburada v. Land Registration Authority,32 the Court refused to issue a writ of
mandamus compelling the LRA to issue a decree of registration as ordered by a land registration court. The
Court took into account the LRA report that the parcels of land were already registered and held:

That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable. Rather than a sign of
negligence or nonfeasance in the performance of its duty, the LRAs reaction is reasonable, even
imperative. Considering the probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, such issuance may
contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of
registration.33

The LRA, in this case, filed the Manifestation dated February 4, 2008 to inform the RTC that the subject
property is already covered by two TCTs, both "uncancelled and extant[;]" and for this reason, the LRA
cannot comply with the RTC Order dated April 10, 2007, directing the issuance of a decree of registration
and an OCT for the same property in Landichos name, as it would "further aggravate the already existing
problem of double titling." In filing said Manifestation, the LRA was only faithfully pursuing its mandate to
protect the Torrens system and performing its function of extending assistance to the RTC as regards Land
Reg. Case No. N-5098. Contrary to Rodriguezs assertion, the Court of Appeals did not abdicate its
jurisdiction when it granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition of PCCAI largely based on the
Manifestation of the LRA, since the LRA filed such a Manifestation as an officer of the court.

Finally, intervention is governed by Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, pertinent provisions of which read:

SECTION 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by
a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with
leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether
or not the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.

SECTION 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of
judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and
served on the original parties.

The subject property is presently covered by TCT No. 482970 in the name of PCCAI.1wphi1 As the
registered owner, PCCAI clearly has a legal interest in the subject property. The issuance of another
certificate of title to Rodriguez will adversely affect PCCAI, constituting a cloud on its TCT No. 482970.

Although Rule 19 is explicit on the period when a motion to intervene may be filed, the Court allowed
exceptions in several cases, viz:

This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been allowed even beyond the period prescribed in
the Rule, when demanded by the higher interest of justice. Interventions have also been granted to afford
indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been
rendered by the trial court, when the petition for review of the judgment has already been submitted for
decision before the Supreme Court, and even where the assailed order has already become final and
executory. In Lim v. Pacquing, the motion for intervention filed by the Republic of the Philippines was
allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice and injury and to settle once and for all the substantive
issues raised by the parties.

In fine, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of the court
after consideration of the appropriate circumstances. We stress again that Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is
a rule of procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and completely available for
justice. Its purpose is not to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice.34 (Citations omitted.)
The particular circumstances of this case similarly justify the relaxation of the rules of procedure on
intervention. First, the interests of both PCCAI and Rodriguez in the subject property arose only after the
CFI Decision dated November 16, 1965 in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 became final and executory. PCCAI
bought the subject property from WPFI on November 13, 1973 and was issued TCT No. 482970 for the
same on July 15, 1975; while Rodriguez bought the subject property from Landicho on November 14, 1996.
Second, as previously discussed herein, both PCCAI and Rodriguez trace their titles back to Landicho.
Hence, the intervention of PCCAI could not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of
Landicho, the original party in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098. Third, the latest proceedings in Land Reg. Case
No. N-5098 involved Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion, filed before the RTC on May 18, 2005, in which he
prayed for the execution of the November 16, 1965 Decision of the CFI. PCCAI moved to intervene in the
case only to oppose Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion on the ground that the subject property is already
registered in its name under TCT No. 482970, which originated from Landichos TCT No. 167681. And
fourth, after learning of Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 via the November 3,
2006 subpoena issued by the RTC, PCCAI was reasonably expected to oppose the same. Such action was
the most opportune and expedient remedy available to PCCAI to prevent the RTC from ordering the
issuance of a decree of registration and OCT in Rodriguezs name. For this reason, the RTC should have
allowed the intervention of PCCAI.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The Decision dated May 26, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 101789, reversing and setting aside the Orders dated April 10, 2007 and November 22,
2007 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 75 of San Mateo, Rizal in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098, is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION deleting the second sentence of the dispositive portion for being a superfluity.

Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 185604 June 13, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
EDWARD M. CAMACHO, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before this Court is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, seeking the reversal of the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 87390,
which affirmed the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Villasis, Pangasinan, Branch 50 in Land
Registration Case No. V -0016.

The facts follow.

On March 6, 2003, respondent Edward M. Camacho filed a petition 4 denominated as "Re: Petition for
Reconstitution of the Original Title of O.C.T. No. (not legible) and Issuance of Owner's Duplicate Copy"
before the RTC.

In support thereof, respondent alleged that the Original Certificate of Title 5 (OCT) sought to be
reconstituted and whose number is no longer legible due to wear and tear, is covered by Decree No.
444263, Case No. 3732, Record No. 221416 issued in the name of Spouses Nicasio Lapitan and Ana
Doliente (Spouses Lapitan) of Alcala, Pangasinan. Respondent also alleged that the owners duplicate copy
of the OCT is in his possession and that he is the owner of the two parcels of land covered by the
aforementioned OCT by virtue of a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition with Absolute Sale 7 (the Deed) executed
on December 26, 2002 by the heirs of Spouses Lapitan in his favor. Said OCT covers two parcels of land
located in San Juan, Alcala, Pangasinan, (Lot No. 1) and Namulatan, 8Bautista, Pangasinan (Lot No. 2) with
the following technical descriptions:
A parcel of land (Lot No. 1, plan Psu- 53673), situated in the Barrio of San Juan, Municipality of Alcala.
Bounded on the NE. by property of Benito Ferrer; on the S. by an irrigation ditch and property of Marcelo
Monegas; and on the W. by Lot No. 2. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan, being S. 0 deg. 53 W.,
3830.91 m. from B. L. L. M. No. 1, Alcala; thence S. 87 deg. 22 W., 44.91 m. to point "2"; thence N. 5 deg.
25 W., 214.83 m. to point "3"; thence S. 17 deg. 06 E., 221.61 m. to the point of beginning; containing an
area of four thousand eight hundred and eighteen square meters (4,818), more or less. All points referred
to are indicated on the plan and on the ground are marked by old P. L. S. concrete monuments; bearings
true; declination 0 deg. 40 E.; date of survey, April 19-21, 1926; and

A parcel of land (Lot No. 2, plan Psu-53673), situated in the Barrio of Namulatan, Municipality of Bautista.
Bounded on the N. by properties of Hipolito Sarmiento and Ciriaco Dauz; on the E. by Lot No.1; and on the
SW. by property of Nicasio Lapitan vs. Felix Bacolor. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan, being S. 2
deg. 40 W., 3625.25 m. from B. L. L. M. No. 1, Alcala; thence N. 80 deg. 47 E., 3.50 m. to point "2"; thence
N. 86 deg. 53 E., 40.64 m. to point "3"; thence S. 5 deg. 25 E., 214.83 m. to point "4"; thence N. 16 deg.
57 W., 220.69 m. to the point of beginning; containing an area of four thousand seven hundred and
fortyfour square meters (4,744), more or less. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and on the
ground are marked by old P. L. S. concrete monuments; bearings true; declination 0 deg. 40 E.; date of
survey April 19-21, 1926.9

Respondent attached to his petition photocopies of the Deed; the OCT; Tax Declaration No. 4858 10; a
Certification11 dated January 13, 2003 issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds of Lingayen,
Pangasinan stating that the file copy of the OCT could not be found and is considered lost and beyond
recovery; and Decree No. 444263.12

Upon a Show-Cause Order13 of the RTC, respondent filed an Amended Petition 14 dated May 21, 2003,
alleging that the subject properties bear no encumbrance; that there are no improvements therein; that
there are no other occupants thereof aside from respondent; and that there are no deeds or instruments
affecting the same that had been presented for registration. He further alleged that "the land in issue is
bounded on the North by the land covered by Plan Psu-53673; on the North by the properties of Hipolito
Sarmiento and Cipriano Dauz,15 residents of Anulid, Alcala, Pangasinan; on the West by Lot No. 3; and on
the Southwest by the properties of Nicasio Lapitan vs. Felix Bacolor who are also residents of Anulid,
Alcala, Pangasinan."16 Respodent intimated that he desires to have the office/file copy of the OCT
reconstituted based on the Technical Description provided by the Chief of the General Land Registration
Office and thereafter, to be issued a second owners duplicate copy in lieu of the old one.

On May 30, 2003, the RTC issued an Order17 finding the respondents petition sufficient in form and
substance and setting the same for hearing on September 29, 2003. The said Order is herein faithfully
reproduced as follows:

ORDER

In a verified petition, petitioner Edward Camacho, as vendee of the parcels of land located in San Juan,
Alcala, Pangasinan, and Namulatan, Bautista, Pangasinan, covered by Decree No. 444263, Case No. 3732,
G.L.R.O. No. 22141, formerly issued in the names of spouses Nicasio Lapitan and Ana Doliente, of Alcala,
Pangasinan, under an Original Certificate of Title the number of which is not legible due to wear and tear,
seeks an order directing the proper authorities and the Registrar of Deeds, Lingayen, Pangasinan, to
reconstitute the office file copy of said Original Certificate of Title based on the technical description
thereof and to issue a second owners duplicate copy of the same in lieu of the old one.

Being sufficient in form and substance, the petition is set for hearing on September 29, 2003, at 8:30 in
the morning, before this Court, on which date, time and place, all interested persons are enjoined to
appear and show cause why the same should not be granted.

Let this order be published twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette at the expense of the
petitioner.

Likewise, let copies of this Order and of the Amended Petition be posted in conspicuous places in the
Provincial Capitol and the Registry of Deeds, both in Lingayen, Pangasinan, the Municipal Halls of Alcala
and Bautista, Pangasinan, and the Barangay Halls of San Juan, Alcala, Pangasinan and Namulatan,
Bautista, Pangasinan, and the Office of the Solicitor General, Manila.

Finally, furnish copies of this Order, by registered mail, at the expense of the petitioner, to the following:

1. Hipolito Sarmiento;
 2. Cipriano Dauz;

3. Nicasio Lapitan; and

4. Felix Bacolor.

all of Brgy. Anulid, Alcala, Pangasinan.

SO ORDERED.18

Thereafter, copies of the said order were posted on seven bulletin boards: at the Pangasinan Provincial
Capitol Building, at the Alcala and Bautista Municipal Buildings, at the San Juan and Namulatan Barangay
Halls, at the office of the Register of Deeds in Lingayen, Pangasinan and at the RTC. 19 The order was also
published twice in the Official Gazette: on August 18, 2003 (Volume 99, Number 33, Page 5206), and on
August 25, 2003 (Volume 99, Number 34, Page 5376).20

However, on January 22, 2004, respondent filed his second Amended Petition 21 averring that "the land in
issue is bounded on the North by the land of Ricardo Acosta, a resident of Laoac, Alcala, Pangasinan; on
the South by the property of Greg Viray,22 a resident of Laoac, Alcala, Pangasinan; on the West by the land
of Roque Lanuza,23 a resident of Laoac, Alcala, Pangasinan; and on the East by the lot of Juan Cabuan, 24 a
resident of Laoac, Alcala, Pangasinan."25 On March 4, 2004, respondent filed a Motion26 with Leave of Court
to admit his second Amended Petition, which the RTC granted in its Order 27 dated March 4, 2004, directing
therein that the persons mentioned in the second Amended Petition be notified by registered mail.

During the hearing, the following witnesses were presented: (1) respondent 28 who, among others,
presented the original owners duplicate copy of the OCT before the RTC; 29 (2) the tenant of the adjoining
lot (Western portion) Roque Lanuza who testified that he tilled the adjoining lots, that he has personal
knowledge that respondent bought said lots from the heirs of the Spouses Lapitan, and that he was
present when the lots were surveyed;30(3) adjoining owners Gregorio Viray31 and Ricardo Acosta32 who
testified that they were notified of the proceedings and interposed no objection to the petition; and (4)
Arthur David (Mr. David), Records Custodian of the Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan who testified
that Atty. Rufino Moreno, Jr., Registrar of Deeds had issued the Certification that the OCT subject of the
petition can no longer be found in the Office of the Register of Deeds. 33 In his subsequent testimony, Mr.
David reported to the RTC that the name of Nicasio Lapitan cannot be located in the Index Cards of titles as
some are missing and destroyed. Upon questioning, Mr. David testified that the number of the OCT sought
to be reconstituted may be referred to in the decree issued in the name of Nicasio Lapitan which allegedly
could be found in the Land Registration Authority (LRA).34

On May 23, 2005, the LRA rendered a Report35 addressed to the RTC which pertinently stated, to wit:

(1) The present amended petition seeks the reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title No. (not
legible), allegedly lost or destroyed and supposedly covering Lot Nos. 1 and 2 of plan Psu-53673,
situated in the Barrio of San Juan, Municipality of Alcala and Barrio of Namulatan, Municipality of
Bautista, respectively, Province of Pangasinan, on the basis of the owners duplicate thereof, a
reproduction of which, duly certified by Atty. Stela Marie Q. Gandia-Asuncion, Clerk of Court VI, was
submitted to this Authority;

(2) Our records show that Decree No. 444263 was issued on July 18, 1931 covering Lot Nos. 1 and 2
of plan Psu-53673, in Cadastral Case No. 3732, GLRO Record No. 22141 in favor of the Spouses
Nicasio Lapitan and Ana Doliente;

(3) The technical descriptions of Lot Nos. 1 and 2 of plan Psu-53673, appearing on the reproduction
of Original Certificate of Title No. (not legible) were found correct after examination and due
computation and when plotted in the Municipal Index Sheet No. 451/1027, do not appear to overlap
previously plotted/decreed properties in the area.

The government prosecutor deputized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) 36 participated in the trial
of the case but did not present controverting evidence. 37

On March 9, 2006, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, 38 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court, finding the documentary as well as the parole (sic) evidence adduced to be
adequate and sufficiently persuasive to warrant the reconstitution of the Original Certificate of Title
covered by Decree No. 444263, Cadastral Case No. 3732, GLRO Record No. 22141, and pursuant to Section
110, PD No. 1529 and Sections 2 (d) and 15 of RA No. 26, hereby directs the Register of Deeds at Lingayen,
Pangasinan, to reconstitute said original certificate of title on the basis of the decree of registration
thereof, without prejudice to the annotation of any subsisting rights or interests not duly noted in these
proceedings, if any, and the right of the Administrator, Land Registration Authority, as provided for in Sec.
16, Land Registration Commission (now NALTDRA) Circular No. 35, dated June 13, 1983, and to issue a new
owner's duplicate copy thereof.

SO ORDERED.39

On April 4, 2006, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration40which was denied by the RTC in its Resolution41 dated May 24, 2006 for lack of merit. The
RTC opined that while the number of the OCT is not legible, a close examination of the entries therein
reveals that it is an authentic OCT per the LRAs findings. Moreover, the RTC held that respondent complied
with Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 2642 considering that the reconstitution in this case is based on the
owners duplicate copy of the OCT.

Petitioner appealed to the CA.43 By Decision44 dated July 31, 2008, the CA affirmed the RTCs findings and
ruling, holding that respondents petition is governed by Section 10 of R.A. No. 26 since the reconstitution
proceedings is based on the owners duplicate copy of the OCT itself. The CA, invoking this Courts ruling in
Puzon v. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc.,45 concluded that notice to the owners of the adjoining
lots is not required. Moreover, the CA opined that Decree No. 444263 issued on July 18, 1931 covering Lot
Nos. 1 and 2 in the name of Spouses Lapitan exists in the Record Book of the LRA as stated in the LRAs
Report. The CA ratiocinated that the LRAs Report on said Decree tallies with the subject OCT leading to no
other conclusion than that these documents cover the same subject lots. Petitioner filed its Motion for
Reconsideration46 which the CA, however, denied in its Resolution47 dated November 20, 2008.

Hence, this petition based on the following grounds, to wit:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED
THE PETITION FOR RECONSTITUTION EVEN IF THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OFTITLE NUMBER IS NOT
LEGIBLE; and

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED
THE PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A SECOND OWNERS DUPLICATE.48

Petitioner through the OSG avers that respondent does not have any basis for reconstitution because the
OCT per se is of doubtful existence, as respondent himself does not know its number. According to the
OSG, this fact alone negates the merits of the petition for reconstitution as held by this Court in Tahanan
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al.49 Moreover, the OSG highlights that the Deed, the tax
declaration for the year 2003, and the Register of Deeds Certification all indicated that the number of the
OCT is not legible. The OSG also stresses that nowhere in the records did the LRA acknowledge that it has
on file the original copy of Decree No. 444263 from which the alleged OCT was issued and that said Decree
did not at all establish the existence and previous issuance of the OCT sought to be reconstituted. The OSG
notes that the RTC erred, as found in the dispositive portion of its decision, in basing the reconstitution of
the OCT under Section 2(d) of R.A. No. 26. Finally, the OSG submits that respondent cannot seek the
issuance of the second owners duplicate of the OCT because he himself alleged in his own petition that he
is in possession of the same owners duplicate certificate.50

On the other hand, respondent counters that the OSGs reliance in Tahanan and Republic of the Phils. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,51 is unavailing. He argues that in Tahanan, the petitioner therein merely
relied on documents other than the owners duplicate copy of the certificate of title, while in Republic, this
Court ruled that reconstitution cannot be based on statutes which do not confer title over the property.
Respondent claims that in these aforementioned cases, petitioners therein do not have other sources to
support their respective petitions for reconstitution while in this case the owners duplicate copy of the
OCT sought to be reconstituted truly exists albeit its number is not legible. Respondent submits that the
documentary as well as the parol evidence he adduced are adequate to warrant the reconstitution of the
OCT as it is covered by Decree No. 444263. Respondent also submits that since there is a valid title in this
case, there is legal basis for the issuance of the owners duplicate copy of the reconstituted title. 52

Notwithstanding the numerous contentions raised by both parties, this Court finds that the fundamental
issue to be resolved in this case is whether the RTC properly acquired and was invested with jurisdiction in
the first place to hear and decide Land Registration Case No. V-0016 in the light of the strict and
mandatory provisions of R.A. No. 26.
We resolve the sole issue in the negative.

Section 11053 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, as
amended by R.A. No. 6732,54 allows the reconstitution of lost or destroyed original Torrens title either
judicially, in accordance with the special procedure laid down in R.A. No. 26, or administratively, in
accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 6732.55

As the case set before this Court is one for judicial reconstitution, we limit the discussion to the pertinent
law, which is R.A. No. 26, and the applicable jurisprudence.

The nature of the proceeding for reconstitution of a certificate of title under R.A. No. 26 denotes a
restoration of the instrument, which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed, in its original form and
condition. The purpose of such a proceeding is merely to have the certificate of title reproduced, after
proper proceedings, in the same form it was in when its loss or destruction occurred. The same R.A. No. 26
specifies the requisites to be met for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over a petition for reconstitution
of a certificate of title. Failure to comply with any of these jurisdictional requirements for a petition for
reconstitution renders the proceedings null and void. Thus, in obtaining a new title in lieu of the lost or
destroyed one, R.A. No. 26 laid down procedures which must be strictly followed in view of the danger that
reconstitution could be the source of anomalous titles or unscrupulously availed of as an easy substitute
for original registration of title proceedings.56

It bears reiterating that respondents quest for judicial reconstitution in this case is anchored on the
owners duplicate copy of said OCT a source for reconstitution of title provided under Section 2 (a) of R.A.
No. 26, which provides in full as follows:

SEC. 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated
as may be available, in the following order:

a. The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;

b. The co-owners, mortgagees, or lessees duplicate of the certificate of title;

c. A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal
custodian thereof;

d. An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to
which the original certificate of title was issued;

e. A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which is
given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said
document showing that its original had been registered; and

f. Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for
reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title. (Emphasis supplied.)

In this aspect, the CA was correct in invoking our ruling in Puzon v. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development,
Inc.,57that notices to owners of adjoining lots and actual occupants of the subject property are not
mandatory and jurisdictional in a petition for judicial reconstitution of destroyed certificate of title when the
source for such reconstitution is the owners duplicate copy thereof since the publication, posting and
notice requirements for such a petition are governed by Section 10 in relation to Section 9 of R.A. No. 26.
Section 10 provides:

SEC. 10. Nothing hereinbefore provided shall prevent any registered owner or person in interest from filing
the petition mentioned in section five of this Act directly with the proper Court of First Instance, based on
sources enumerated in sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and/or 4(a) of this Act: Provided, however, That the
court shall cause a notice of the petition, before hearing and granting the same, to be published in the
manner stated in section nine hereof: And, provided, further, That certificates of title reconstituted
pursuant to this section shall not be subject to the encumbrance referred to in section seven of this Act.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Correlatively, the pertinent provisions of Section 9 on the publication, posting and the contents of the
notice of the Petition for Reconstitution clearly mandate:
SEC. 9. x x x Thereupon, the court shall cause a notice of the petition to be published, at the expense of
the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of
the provincial building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land lies, at
least thirty days prior to the date of hearing, and after hearing, shall determine the petition and render
such judgment as justice and equity may require. The notice shall specify, among other things, the number
of the certificate of title, the name of the registered owner, the names of the interested parties appearing
in the reconstituted certificate of title, the location of the property, and the date on which all persons
having an interest in the property must appear and file such claim as they may have. x x x (Emphasis
supplied.)

In sum, Section 10, in relation to Section 9, requires that 30 days before the date of hearing, (1) a notice
be published in two successive issues of the Official Gazette at the expense of the petitioner, and that (2)
such notice be posted at the main entrances of the provincial building and of the municipal hall where the
property is located. The notice shall state the following: (1) the number of the certificate of title, (2) the
name of the registered owner, (3) the names of the interested parties appearing in the reconstituted
certificate of title, (4) the location of the property, and (5) the date on which all persons having an interest
in the property, must appear and file such claims as they may have. 58

Verily, while the CA invoked the appropriate provisions of R.A. No. 26, it failed, however, to take note that
Section 9 thereof mandatorily requires that the notice shall specify, among other things, the number of the
certificate of title and the names of the interested parties appearing in the reconstituted certificate of title.
In this case, the RTC failed to indicate these jurisdictional facts in the notice.

First. The Notice of Hearing issued and published does not align with the in rem character of the
reconstitution proceedings and the mandatory nature of the requirements under R.A. No. 26. 59 There is a
mortal insufficiency in the publication when the missing title was merely identified as "OCT No. (not
legible)" which is non-compliant with Section 9 of R.A. No. 26.

Moreover, while the LRA confirmed the issuance of Decree No. 444263 in its Report, it perplexes this Court
that the LRA failed to state that an OCT was actually issued and mention the number of the OCT sought to
be reconstituted. In Republic of the Phils. v. El Gobierno De Las Islas Filipinas, 60 this Court denied the
petition for reconstitution of title despite the existence of a decree:

We also find insufficient the index of decree showing that Decree No. 365835 was issued for Lot No. 1499,
as a basis for reconstitution. We noticed that the name of the applicant as well as the date of the issuance
of such decree was illegible. While Decree No. 365835 existed in the Record Book of Cadastral Lots in the
Land Registration Authority as stated in the Report submitted by it, however, the same report did not state
the number of the original certificate of title, which is not sufficient evidence in support of the petition for
reconstitution. The deed of extrajudicial declaration of heirs with sale executed by Aguinaldo and Restituto
Tumulak Perez and respondent on February 12, 1979 did not also mention the number of the original
certificate of title but only Tax Declaration No. 00393. As we held in Tahanan Development Corp. vs. Court
of Appeals, the absence of any document, private or official, mentioning the number of the certificate of
title and the date when the certificate of title was issued, does not warrant the granting of such petition.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Second. Respondent and the RTC overlooked that there are two parcels of land in this case. It is glaring
that respondent had to amend his petition for reconstitution twice in order to state therein the names of
the adjoining owners. Most importantly, the Notice of Hearing issued by the RTC failed to state the names
of interested parties appearing in the OCT sought to be reconstituted, particularly the adjoining owners to
Lot No. 1, namely, Benito Ferrer and Marcelo Monegas. While it is true that notices need not be sent to the
adjoining owners in this case since this is not required under Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. No. 26 as
enunciated in our ruling in Puzon, it is imperative, however, that the notice should specify the names of
said interested parties so named in the title sought to be reconstituted. No less than Section 9 of R.A. No.
26 mandates it.

Well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Verba legis
non est recedendum. From the words of a statute there should be no departure. 61 In view of these lapses,
the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction to proceed with the case since the mandatory manner or mode of
obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by R.A. No. 26 had not been strictly followed, thereby rendering the
proceedings utterly null and void.62 As such, while petitioner overlooked these jurisdictional infirmities and
failed to incorporate them as additional issues in its own petition, this Court has sufficient authority to pass
upon and resolve the same since they affect jurisdiction. 63
Apropos is our ruling in Castillo v. Republic64 where we held that:

We cannot simply dismiss these defects as "technical." Liberal construction of the Rules of Court does not
apply to land registration cases. Indeed, to further underscore the mandatory character of these
jurisdictional requirements, the Rules of Court do not apply to land registration cases. In all cases where
the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute, and when the manner of obtaining
jurisdiction is prescribed by a statute, the mode of proceeding is mandatory, and must be strictly complied
with, or the proceeding will be utterly void. When the trial court lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of a
case, it lacks authority over the whole case and all its aspects. All the proceedings before the trial court,
including its order granting the petition for reconstitution, are void for lack of jurisdiction. 65

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 31, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87390 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for reconstitution
docketed as LRC No. V-0016, RTC, Villasis, Pangasinan, Branch 50, is DISMISSED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.