APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS NOT DEEMED

RESIGNED UPON FILING OF COC (QUINTO VS.

COMELEC)
The rule in elections, as people know it, is that an appointed official is deemed
automatically resigned from their positions once he/she files the Certificate of
Candidacy (CoC) for any elective position. This rule on automatic resignation
does not apply to elected officials. There is now a new rule. Appointed officials
are NO longer deemed resigned upon the filing of the CoC. This is the ruling of
the Supreme Court in Eleazar Quinto vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, 1
December 2009.
Background of the Case
In preparation for the 2010 elections, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
issued Resolution No. 8678 the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of
Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political
Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections.
Section 4 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.a) Any person holding a
public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered
resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other
elective office or position.

Two appointive officers of the government who were planning to run in the 2010
elections sought the nullification of Section 4(a) on the ground, among others,
that it is discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

Applicable Laws
Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 is a reproduction of the second proviso in
the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9369, which reads:
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate
of candidacy/petition for registration/manifestation to participate in the election.
Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be
considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed
his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable
to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign
period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers and
employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered
ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of
the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.
The proviso, on the other hand, was lifted from Section 66 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881, or the Omnibus Election Code, which reads:
Sec. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position.Any person holding a
public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Ruling of the Supreme Court
According to the majority, with Justice Nachura as the ponencia, Section 4 (a) of
the Resolution is null and void for being violative of the equal protection clause
and for being overbroad. The second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13
of R.A. 9369, and Section 66 of theOmnibus Election Code were also declared
as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Challenged provision discriminatory
There used to be a similar provision in the Election Code and R.A. 8436relating
to the automatic resignation of elective officials upon the filing of their CoCs, but
this was repealed by R.A. 9006, also known as the Fair Election Act. There was,
thus, created a situation of obvious discrimination against appointive officials who
were deemed ipso factoresigned from their offices upon the filing of their CoCs,
while elective officials were not.

Four (4) requisites of valid classification must be complied with in order that a
discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal
protection:

(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;

(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.

The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences
between the classes treated differently. Nevertheless, the classification would still
be invalid if it does not comply with the second requirementif it is not germane
to the purpose of the law. The third requirement means that the classification
must be enforced not only for the present but as long as the problem sought to
be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the classification
would be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not treated
similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

According to the Supreme Court, the differential treatment of persons holding

appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to
the purposes of the law.

The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a
governmental position to promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous
or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at
promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by
eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by
political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is
also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral
arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the
performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather
than to their office work.

If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed
provision cannot be constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification.
Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane to the
purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an
elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For
example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter,
could wield the same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is
appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were
appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior
and local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head
executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently when both
file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice-
President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his
position during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his
office to support his campaign.

As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the

functions of his appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and
compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be
driven by a greater impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for the
position aspired for.

In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from

their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other
civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against
the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those
who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not
justify such differential treatment. The classification simply fails to meet the test
that it should be germane to the purposes of the law.
Challenged provision overbroad
First, the provision pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without
distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not.
Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be considered as ipso
facto resigned once he files his CoC for the 2010 elections. This scenario is
absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the
government to wield influence in the political world.

While it may be admitted that most appointive officials who seek public elective
office are those who occupy relatively high positions in government, laws cannot
be legislated for them alone, or with them alone in mind. For the right to seek
public elective office is universal, open and unrestrained, subject only to the
qualification standards prescribed in the Constitution and in the laws. These
qualifications are, as we all know, general and basic so as to allow the widest
participation of the citizenry and to give free rein for the pursuit of ones highest
aspirations to public office. Such is the essence of democracy.

Second, the provision is directed to the activity of seeking any and all public
offices, whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in character, whether they be in
the national, municipal or barangay level. Congress has not shown a compelling
state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale.

Specific evils require specific treatments, not through overly broad measures that
unduly restrict guaranteed freedoms of the citizenry. After all, sovereignty resides
in the people, and all governmental power emanates from them.

Dissenting Opinions: Chief Justice Puno, Justice Carpio and Justice Carpio-
Morales. Full text of Eleazar Quinto vs. COMELEC.
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4. National Economy and Patrimony
5. The 1-year bar in filing an Impeachment complaint

This ruling in the case of QUINTO vs. COMELEC has been reversed after a
reconsideration on 22 February 2010 and reverted back to the FARIAS vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY doctrine. Please find full text of the SC Resolution
penned by C.J. Puno in this link: