Doubt

We often make claims to knowledge I know thats my stolen hat

When our knowledge is challenged we seek ways to justify it; appealing to
further beliefs
Sometimes we make mistakes I know thats my stolen hat, but we
might be wrong, it might be an identical hat and circumstances mightve
led you to believe it was yours. How certain is knowledge then?
Ordinary doubt is where we can be sceptical about what our senses tell us
or about beliefs in single, specific situations. For example, thats John in
the distance. We might be sceptical of believing this if it is foggy or John
looks very generic.
But often we have no reason to distrust our senses; i.e. our eyes

Descartes and doubt; first meditation

Descartes notes that many things he believed he had knowledge of as a

child turned out false
He has a lot of false beliefs hes not sure how much true knowledge he
has, so how can he go about finding out?
He employs waves of doubt in order to withhold assent, doubting
everything so that he can start over, finding, hopefully, foundational
knowledge as the foundationalist he is

Descartes first wave of doubt

Descartes remarks that many times his senses have deceived him and
questions whether they are deceiving him all of the time
However he says that because something has deceived us once, it would
be silly to think they are deceiving us all the time. If he were to doubt
that his hands were in front of him for this reason he would be no better
than madmen.

Descartes second wave of doubt

Descartes notices that he has been convinced of things being real when
asleep; for example that he was dressed in purple and gold when he was
in fact wearing nothing in bed
He questions; what if we were dreaming all of the time? How do we know
what is certain if everything could be a dream
This idea is rejected for 3 reasons:
1) The existence of condition n requires n~, that is to say dreaming
requires a state of not dreaming to exist and so he cannot be dreaming all
of the time
2) Like painters model paintings on real life, dreams must be modelled on
something real
3) Whether dreaming or awake, 2 + 3 = 5. He cannot call this serious
doubt if he cannot doubt logic.
Austin notes that it is not true that we cannot distinguish between dreams
and waking states, saying that dreaming that one is being presented to
the pope is qualitatively different from the same in real life; for if it were
not then every waking experience would be like a dream
Curley challenges Austin saying that at least some dreams are so vivid
they are like real life. This is enough to hold up Descartes argument.

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 William rejects this wave of doubt as we can study dreaming from a
waking state; there is asymmetry between dreaming and not dreaming.

Descartes third wave of doubt

Descartes imagines that there was a deceiving, all powerful God; an evil
demon
Though extremely contrived, this notion is possible
A demon could deceive him of anything even the logical truths of 2 + 3
= 5 (although this kills his argument, for if he says that logic is flawed
then the Meditations are worthless)
This is, ergo, a suitable method of doubt for withholding assent on
everything

Descartes and doubt; second meditation

As Descartes is thinking, he realises this very notion he is thinking

What are the necessary qualities of existence then? To look at this from a
transcendental argumentative perspective: existence
To think we must exist so Descartes summarises I am, I think (I think
therefore I am/Cogito Ergo Sum)
Descartes neglects the second premise; everything that is thinking exists
because he regards it as obvious as we construct premises like this in our
mind on the basis of other premises and the conclusion.
Descartes actually denies that the Cogito is an inference, remarking that it
is an analytical self evident truth, like those of mathematics. (yet he said
he could doubt those earlier on silly Descartes)

Further developments in the second meditation

Descartes tries to think what he is

He detaches everything he thought he was before and see what remains
What does remain is the fact that he thought
So what is he? A thinking thing.
Descartes makes a distinction between substance and essence
substance is something that can capably exist independently; for example
the mind. The essence of the mind is thinking, or other modes of thinking

Descartes and the wax (ooh!)

Descartes pays attention to a piece of wax

He remarks that it is hard, cold, emits a sound when tapped
But when placed near the fire, these properties change
Does the still wax remain? Yes, he argues
So what is that we know of the wax if it is not what we perceive it to be
The wax is known by the intellect by our judgement
He notes a second example looking out of the window to see people,
when all he really sees is coats and hats that may be operated by springs
He realises at this point we must be careful with words we dont see
people outside, we judge that there are people
Descartes concludes that matter can be defined as occupying geometrical
space. He says that there is only one material thing the whole
universe. There are therefore, two substances mind and matter.

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 He says that we know the mind better than the wax, as we can be certain
of its properties, unlike the waxs which change.
However this is odd as Margaret Dauler Wilson points out as he says
we know the mind by listing its properties, despite saying that we cannot
know the wax by listing its properties.

Scepticism

Global sceptics argue that we cannot know anything about the external world
as how can we be truly certain? A key question of Philosophy therefore, is
how to defeat the sceptic.
G.E.Moore says that the sceptic is wrong because he denies the common
sense view of the world. He says that if we assert of ourselves; there exists
at present a living human body, which is my body, this is undeniably true.
Against the philosophers who argue that we cannot know this to be true;
Moore retorts with the notion that if these philosophers really thought it open
to question; for whom are they writing their Philosophy bokos?
Furthermore; Moore says that when sceptics say; we cannot know, they are
implying that there are other people who disagree with him, despite claiming
that we cannot know that people exist. Its all a bit contradictory.
He also presents another argument. Raising one hand; says this is one hand,
then the other, noting this is another. These are his two premises. His
conclusion is that two hands exist now.
Wittgenstein responds to Moores hands argument by saying that it does not
make sense to say that he has two hands, as he had no real reason to doubt
it. It makes as little sense to say this as it does to say good morning in the
middle of a conversation with a friend.
This does not mean Scepticism wins however, Wittgenstein says that
philosophers who doubt that motorcars do not grow from trees have lost a
real sense of doubt and are bordering on insanity. The fact that we have two
hands is not something we learn, but just accept.
Scepticism, according to Wittgenstein, is neither true nor false, but is lacking
a proper sense of what counts as doubt and is therefore empty.

Putnam on Scepticism

Imagine theres a planet called twin earth where everything is identical to

our earth.
When Marcel on Earth refers to water, he refers to the chemical composition
H2O
When Twin Marcel on Twin Earth refers to water (which we shall call twater),
he refers to the chemical composition XYZ. The appearance, taste, etc of
water and twater are identical.
This shows that meanings are outside the mind they are affected by their
physical environments.
Let us suppose that you are a brain in a vat, being fed information. When you
refer to tables and chairs, youre not referring to real tables and chairs, but
your images of them.
Now imagine the brain in the vat says to himself: I am a brain in a vat. He
is not referring to real vats, just as it cant be referring to real tables, but
images of vats that are being fed to him as he sits in the vat.
So when a brain in a vat says I am a brain in a vat it is false.
Generalising, then, if we are all brains in a vat, then we said we are all brains
in vats, this would be false.
So it is false that we are all brains in a vat, we are not brains in a vat.
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 Therefore scepticism is false.
Indeed this argument can be confusing. This type of argument is a
reductio ad absurdum - a reduction to absurdity, as it starts of with the
assumption of a proposition; p and reduces it to absurdity, the negation of p,
disproving it.
This argument, of course, would collapse if we proved that meanings are in
the head. But for now this stands.

Weaknesses

G.E. Moore says that the sceptic is wrong because he denies the common sense
view of the world. He says that if we assert of ourselves; there exists at present
a living human body, which is my body, this is undeniably true. Many
Philosophers argue we cannot know this, yet who are they writing their philosophy
books for? They can't take their own scepticism seriously.
Furthermore; Moore says that when sceptics say; we cannot know, they are
implying that there are other people who disagree with him, despite claiming that
we cannot know that people exist. Its all a bit contradictory.
He also presents another argument. Raising one hand; says this is one hand,
then the other, noting this is another. These are his two premises. His conclusion
is that two hands exist now.
Wittgenstein responds to Moores hands argument by saying that it does not
make sense to say that he has two hands, as he had no real reason to doubt it. It
makes as little sense to say this as it does to say good morning in the middle of a
conversation with a friend.
This does not mean Scepticism wins however, Wittgenstein says that philosophers
who doubt that motorcars do not grow from trees have lost a real sense of doubt
and are bordering on insanity. The fact that we have two hands is not something
we learn, but just accept.
Scepticism, according to Wittgenstein, is neither true nor false, but is lacking a
proper sense of what counts as doubt and is therefore empty.
Putnam against scepticism:
Imagine theres a planet called twin earth where everything is identical to our
earth.
When Marcel on Earth refers to water, he refers to the chemical composition H2O
When Twin Marcel on Twin Earth refers to water (which we shall call twater), he
refers to the chemical composition XYZ. The appearance, taste, etc of water and
twater are identical.
This shows that meanings are outside the mind they are affected by their
physical environments.
Let us suppose that you are a brain in a vat, being fed information. When you
refer to tables and chairs, youre not referring to real tables and chairs, but your
images of them.
Now imagine the brain in the vat says to himself: I am a brain in a vat. He is not
referring to real vats, just as it cant be referring to real tables, but images of vats
that are being fed to him as he sits in the vat.
So when a brain in a vat says I am a brain in a vat it is false. Generalising,
then, if we are all brains in a vat, then we said we are all brains in vats, this
would be false.
So it is false that we are all brains in a vat; we are not brains in a vat.
Therefore scepticism is false.
Indeed this argument can be confusing. This type of argument is a reductio ad
absurdum - a reduction to absurdity, as it starts of with the assumption of a
proposition; p and reduces it to absurdity, the negation of p, disproving it.
This argument, of course, would collapse if we proved that meanings are in the
head. But for now this stands.

Strengths:

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 Stops any assumptions used by Descartes to (supposedly) find indubitable
knowledge
The grounds for knowledge are challenged until we arrive at certainty (if any)
It is impossible to eliminate subjectivity, as we cannot have a view from nowhere
and thus scepticism is inescapable

Rationalism

Rationalism is the tendency to regard reason, as opposed to sense experience

as the primary source of knowledge.
It often argues that we have innate ideas of things; Plato in meno discusses
Socrates asking a slave boy with no education mathematical questions. He
answers them correctly. It is said that he must have known these truths a
priori.

Terms in Rationalism

A priori knowledge knowledge prior to experience, i.e. we can know 2 + 2 =

4 prior to experience.
A posteriori knowledge knowledge from (sense-)experience, i.e. we can
know the rug is red after seeing it.
Analytical propositions propositions whose verity can be established through
the meaning of the words alone, i.e. this red book is this red book or all
sisters are female. One does not have to go out and examine the world to
check if all sisters are female, it just is the case.
Synthetic propositions a proposition in which the predicate is not contained
in the subject. All crows are black the idea of black (predicate) is not an
intrinsic part of crows (subject), whereas the predicate female cannot be
detached from the subject of sisters.
Necessary something that is true in all possible worlds. For example,
something cannot be blue all over and red all over at the same time. This
assertion is necessary, it cannot be false.
Contingent A contingent truth is something that is true, but could
conceivably not have been. For example the rug is red might be true, but it
is quite possible it could be blue or green. Its not necessary that it should
be red.

Kant says that 7 + 5 = 12 is synthetically a priori. Indeed this seems a

contradiction, for a priori truths are usually attached to the idea of necessity.
He notes that the predicates of 7 and 5 are not necessarily contained within
the subject of 12.

Kripke says that there are contingent a priori truths. Suppose someone sets
up the metric system. He takes a stick S and says that this stick is 1m long.
How did he know it was 1m long? He knew it a priori because he did not have
to investigate the world to determine it. However, he couldve chosen any
stick he liked, so 1m mightve been otherwise.

Kripke further argues that there are necessary a posteriori truths. We know
gold has an atomic number 79, for if it did not have this atomic number, it
would not be gold. But we did not know this a priori, we had to investigate
the world; and gold, to determine this. This, therefore is an example of a
necessary a posteriori truth.

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Weaknesses

Provides us with nothing really useful about the external world

Gives no knowledge of contingent truths
Gives no empirical knowledge
Gives no knowledge of natural sciences
Presupposes the laws of logic are infallible (evil demon, anyone?)
How could you have the concept of a triangle without ever seeing one?
Locke on innate ideas nations ignorant of the concept of God, fools who
do not know logical truths which are supposedly a priori

Strengths:

Rational truths are eternally true

They are necessary
They can be known just by thinking about them innate; Platos dialogue
between Socrates and the slave boy.
They are self justifying
Has advantages over empiricism and a posteriori sense deception

Empiricism

Contrasted with Rationalism

It is the idea that the most important source of our knowledge is from
sense-experience, not rational thought
John Locke said that we are all born as tabula rasas (blank slates) on
which we assimilate knowledge through sense experience. He denies that
ideas, such as God are innate because there are entire nations who are
ignorant of the idea of God or fools who cannot comprehend 2 + 3 = 5

Hume and causality

David Hume takes to the limit the idea that we derive knowledge from
experience in his theory of causality.
We tend to believe as humans that an event throwing a brick at a
window (E1) will cause the window to break (E2)
We think that it is necessary that the window breaks.
Hume denies this; he says that we observe two things
1) One event happening before another, which he labels: priority
2) The collision of two objects, which he labels contiguity
However, he notes that we have not observed the supposed part where E1
necessitates E2.
He therefore denies that there is a necessary connection between cause
and effect. There are simply events which happen in time.
No matter how small the chances, atomic phenomena, for example, might
cause the brick to cease existence before it reached the window. Indeed,
something could always intervene.
We humans think that there is a necessary link between cause and effect
just as a matter of convenience.
Just because something has always happened in the past does not mean
that it will continue to happen this way. Just because the sun has always
rose in the morning does not mean it will rise tomorrow morning.

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 This is an attempt to explain our understanding of causal relations strictly
within empiricist terms

Empiricism vs A Priori knowledge

So how do empiricists respond to supposed a priori truths, such as 2 + 2 =

4?
AJ Ayer says that though it might be true that mathematical truths for
instance are a priori, they tell us nothing of importance about the world
AJ Ayer calls them tautological i.e. this red book is this red book.
A more radical view is propounded by J S Mill who says that mathematical
truths are not necessary. He says that, like science, we have observed
many instances of 2 + 6 equalling 8, but indeed we may have made a
mistake all of these times. It could be according to J S Mill, that 2 + 6
indeed equals 9, weve just been miscounting all this time.
Ayer rejects Mills argument, saying that even if he thought he had 5 pairs
of something (10 items) and counted to find 9.. it would not be that 5 * 2
= 9, it would still remain that 5 * 2 = 10, he just miscounted.

Weaknesses

Concept formation not fully explained. I have a concept of red, and

according to empiricism my concepts are kinds of copies of sensations.
Yet my concept of red isnt a particular shade of red.
I have a concept of a chair; not any particular chair, but according to
empiricism since I have derived this concept from experience it should
really be a specific chair (one that I have experienced).
I have a concept of justice, how did I form this concept? I cant have
through sense-experience; after all, justice doesnt smell of flowers or
look shiny.
How does it explain innate ideas, i.e. Platos dialogue between Socrates
and slave boy
As Locke says we only perceive the world indirectly. If so, how do we
make the jump to experiencing the real world? If all I can be absolutely
certain of is my experiences of sense data then I cant be certain other
minds exist! SOLIPSISM!!
Conflict with a priori truths, empiricism has two general responses to
them:
1) Yeah! But they dont tell us anything of interest about the external
world!
2) Ah but two apples plus three apples = 5 apples, we form concepts from
experiences of seeing 2 + 3 = 5

Classical Foundationalism

We often justify our beliefs by appealing to other beliefs

However, this would mean there would be an endless infinite regress of
justifying beliefs
So foundationalists believe that there are beliefs which are self-supporting
and self evident which are placed as the foundations as our belief system
In empiricism, the foundation is in the notion that one cannot be
mistaken about how things seem to one now.
H.H.Price: When I see a tomato I can doubt whether it is a tomato that
I am seeing, and not a cleverly painted piece of wax one thing however I
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 cannot doubt: that there exists a red patch of a round and somewhat
bulgy shape.
This sense data is known as the given.

Assessment of Classical Foundationalism

A J Ayer points out that one can make a mistake in ones description of
ones experience I might mistake magenta as scarlet.
J L Austin replied to this there might be any number of reasons why I
might misdescribe something as magenta in such a way as to show that
I actually made a mistake about which colour it was I was seeing, and not
simply in the words I was using. So there is nothing incorrigible
about the given.
However if he watches for some time an animal in front of him, in good
light, prod it, sniff it, listen to the noises and declare thats a pig this is
incorrigible!
There is nothing incorrigible about statements referring to sense-data, and
there is nothing corrigible about statements referring to material bodies.
Sellars myth of the given:
o We tend to utter this is green in front of green objects because
we have authority
o One comes to gain this authority to say this is green in front of
green objects by acquiring a general knowledge that in the
presence of green objects the right thing to utter is this is green
o What comes to this is the idea that knowledge of particular matters
of facts depend on general knowledge
o And how does one acquire this general knowledge? By being
taught to utter this is green in front of green objects.
o So when one is an infant or child, one observed green objects but
this observation did not constitute knowledge, as it lacked
authority!
o Ergo, Foundationalism is mistaken! For the given is meant to stand
on its own feet, yet as we have seen in Sellars argument, it
depends on authority!

Coherentism

The theory that beliefs are justified in terms of how well they cohere with
other beliefs in the system
Suppose an envelope arrives at my house, its empty. The only person
silly enough to do this is Aunt Dotty, who lives in Exeter. But the letter is
from Edinburgh and the writing is not hers. Im not justified in believing
the letter is from Aunt Dotty, because the beliefs dont cohere. However, I
recall my brother was going to take Dotty to Edinburgh and the writing is
his! So she mustve forgotten to put the letter in and got my brother to
address it, so I am coherently justified in believing the letter is from her.
It is a holistic theory; looks at the belief system as a whole.

Assessing Coherentism

Beliefs might internally cohere, but might all be wrong! This is illustrated
by science fiction stories; everything coheres, but its far from the truth!
Bradley rejected this saying that Coherentism isnt designed to test
anything, but things we have a motivation to believe in. I have no reason
to want to believe in science fiction, so even it internally coheres with
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 other beliefs in its set, it doesnt cohere with my entire system and I have
no motivation to believe in it.
Davidson formulated an argument against this criticism of Coherentism,
indeed it is a little difficult to follow:
o Imagine a speaker of English, comes across speakers of L, a
newly discovered, unknown language only they know.
o How will the English speaker ever understand the Ls? Davidson
says he has to operate on the principle of charity, that is; he will
have to assume that the beliefs of the speakers of L are by and
large true. Otherwise, he wont have enough common ground to
compare beliefs and see which ones they disagree on
o But! Even if the interpreter must assume that he and the speakers
of L share more or less the same beliefs, perhaps they are both
completely wrong! How does he know his beliefs are not mistaken?
o Davidson says imagine there is an Omniscient Interpreter (God-
like). This Interpreter will have to assume that he and the Ls share
the same standards of truth. But if this is the case, then it
follows because his standards of truth cannot be mistaken, that the
interpreter and the Ls cannot be wholly mistaken!
o Ergo, there is only one coherent set of beliefs
Because we are giving up the search for absolute certainty, it gives us a
more pragmatic and workable theory of knowledge
It allows us to have knowledge of empirical truths, something rationalist
Foundationalism could not achieve with its tautologies

Justified true beliefs; the tripartite theory of knowledge

This is the theory that knowledge is a justified true belief. That is, you
must believe it, it must be true and you must be justified in your belief.
Argument against: are the conditions necessary?
o Colin Radford argues its possible to know without believing.
Suppose John learned in school that Elizabeth died in 1603. On a
quiz show, he is asked when Elizabeth died. However, he has since
forgotten he learned this, considering all his answers to be guesses.
He would deny that he believes that Elizabeth died in 1603 despite
giving the correct answer. Radford argues that he knows but
doesnt believe. This would argue that belief is not necessary
to constitute knowledge
o D.M. Armstrong argues against this saying that John consciously
doesnt believe he knows she died in 1603, but unconsciously does.
Ergo, he believes p (that he believes) and ~p (that he does not
believe); this is a contradiction, so it must be the case that belief
is necessary.
Argument against: are the conditions sufficient?
o Gettier argument:
Imagine Smith & Jones are applying for a job at a bank. As
they are sitting in the waiting room, they start chatting.
Jones has far more qualifications and experience than Max
and he is friends with the interviewer.
Smith is aware Jones has 10 coins in his pocket
Jones concludes that: the man who will get the job has 10
coins in his pocket
However, Smith gets the job! Smith then discovers he has
10 coins in his pocket so; his proposition was true, he
believed it and he was justified in believing it. Yet was this
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 knowledge? No! It was an accident that he had the
justified true belief.
o Another argument:
Henry and William work in the same office. Henry believes
William owns a ford, because he drives around in one and
has given him lifts in one. Henry also has another
colleague; Martha. Henry comes up with the random
proposition: either Henry owns a ford, or Martha is in
Berlin.
Now suppose that Henry does not own a ford, and by
strange co incidence Martha is in Berlin! The proposition is
true; he believes it and it was justified. However, it was
justified by the ford element, yet the tripartite account still
classifies it as knowledge!
o Criticism:
Justified true belief what the hell counts as justification?
Looking it up in a book? Word of mouth? Or do I need to
prove that Smith & Jones or Martha and Berlin exist first!
Attempts to fix this theory; reliabilism:
o The Causal theory
Suppose that Volcano, V, erupted many centuries ago and
left lava all over the countryside. Suppose then that
someone, A, removed all this lava. Even later, let us
imagine, someone else, B, who does not know about the
original eruption, put a lot of lava all over the countryside to
make it look as if V had erupted. Nelson sees the lava and
concludes that V erupted. Does he *know* this?
Knowledge, then, is an appropriately caused true belief.
This fixes the Gettier cases.
There is a problem though universal propositions. We
might know that all tin openers are made by human beings,
but this does not seem to be causally supported by the fact
that all tin openers are made by human beings. It is unclear
how my general belief about the mortality of all men can be
caused by a belief that this man has died, and that one,
however many men I believe to have died.
o Tracking the truth
In the Gettier examples, if the propositions werent true, the
people would still believe them. So, we must add this
condition:
if p were not true, then a would not believe p
However, take Dancys argument: Hannah believes there
is a police car outside because she hears sirens, and indeed
there is. However, the sirens are coming from her sons
high fi, and if the high fi had been silent, she would not have
believed it was there, so we must add this condition:
If in changed circumstances, p were still true, a
would still believe p.
It can be concluded that justified true beliefs do not constitute
knowledge, as this can be refuted by asking if the conditions are necessary
or sufficient. Other reliabilist theories have attempted to fix this,
introducing new conditions such as the causal theory and tracking the
truth, but there are still problems with these.

Common sense realism; nave realism; direct realism

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 The material world exists, and causes us to perceive it directly. Things are
how we perceive them.
Arguments against:
o Railway lines seem to get shorter in width as they go into the
distance, yet we know they dont! How can the world be as we
perceive it then!
o Berkeleys dialogue between Hylas and Philonous: clouds appear
red, but on closer inspection, appear a different colour, and through
a microscope, a different colour again! What is the true colour?
Who knows, but we can conclude that these colours are merely
apparent
o Hallucinations and illusions!
o Nave realists argue in circles:
We perceive things as they are
So, we know what physical objects are like
So, we perceive things as they are
So, we know what physical objects are like
Arguments in defence:
o Strawsons realism: it is simply a part of common sense realism
to allow for variation in the way things look. There mere fact that
an object looks purple to me but green to you provides no reason
to introduce sense data.
o However, this theory does not allow room to confront
hallucinations. After all, when someone hallucinates there is a tree
in front of him his experience is just as it would be were there a
real tree there.
o Does this not show that even in the case of veridical perception a
tree that the perceiver sees is a tree via a sense datum?
o John McDowell disputes this, arguing that our account of what is
going on in a person who has an hallucination should be different
from an account we give of what is going on in someone really
seeing a tree.
o There is no difference from the inside but is from an external
perspective.

Representative realism

Our perceptions are merely representations of the real world; there is a

veil of perception.
We see sense data directly and the real world indirectly
John Lockes ideas can be summarised as follows:
o Those without sense organs never have experiences of sense data
(ideas). From this, Locke infers that sense organs do not produce
the ideas, these ideas must be caused by objects outside.
o I cannot smell a rose when I want, it must be called by something
external. Therefore the material world must exist.
o However, Locke talks about sense organs, how do we know
these arent just ideas in themselves? Also, the smell of roses
could be produced by an idea-creating God, and not material
objects.
Strengths:
o Deception can be explained, unlike in Nave realism
o Explains secondary qualities (subjectivity of perceivers)
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 Agrees with the sciences; that only light waves exist and not
o
colours, which are simply concepts.
Weaknesses:
o How do we know when were being deceived if we are not
perceiving the world directly?
o It assumes the existence of a real world (see Lockes argument &
criticism above)
o It is unclear what properties sense data are supposed to have, it
is supposed to be non-physical. Yet if I see a green cube in front
of me, could it be said I am seeing a non physical green cuboid?
This seems silly! Ridiculous!
o Matter is an empty concept since we never experience it
Idealism

There is no material world, only minds and their ideas! :D

To be is to be perceived; esse est percipi
Strengths:
o Material world cant exist because we never experience matter, so
the concept of it is empty!
Weaknesses:
o Solipsism all that exist are minds and ideas, so maybe all the
other minds are simply ideas in your mind! Agh!
o Has to explain the problem that, the idea of a tree in my mind is no
different then an idea of a conscious phone box I have imagined.
Berkeley explains this by saying that ideas of the imagination are
not stable and voluntary. That is, I have no choice of what to
see when I open my eyes and what I see remains consistent,
unlike in the imagination.
o Unperceived objects does a chair stop existing when no one
perceives it? Berkeley said they continue to exist, because they are
ideas in Gods mind:
There was a young man who said God
Must think it exceedingly odd
If he finds that this tree
Continues to be
When theres no one about in the quad
Reply:
Dear Sir:
Your astonishments odd;
I am always about in the quad.
And thats why the tree
Will continue to be,
Since observed by yours faithfully,
God.
o This does however depend upon the existence of God!
o However, Berkeley seems to be bordering on phenomenalism at
one point (odd :s ):
The table I write on, I say, exists, that is, I see and feel it;
and if I were out of my study I should say it existed,
meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive
it (to be is to be perceivable)

Phenomenalism

Dagmar Makara
Philosophy
Theories of Knowledge
Page 12 of 13
 Several types. Mills phenomenalism talks of permanent possibilities of
sensation
AJ Ayers linguistic phenomenalism: every empirical statement about a
physical object is reducible to a statement, or a set of statements which
refer exclusively to sense-data.
Strengths:
o Closes the gap between experience and the real world, as it is anti-
realist
o Doesnt rely on God
Weaknesses:
o Isnt the same miracle that Berkeley needed God to explain
required for why objects exist unperceived and are consistent in
existence? Surely its not enough just to declare them permanent
possibilities of sensation.
o Phenomenalists usually respond to this by appealing to regularities
in past experience
o This can still be refuted. Trees dont reappear when I walk into the
forest because it has reappeared in the past, rather it has
reappeared in the past because it was there all along. It exists,
independently. The realist says the phenomenalist just gets things
the wrong way around.
o All spatial language is gained from the public world, which is then
rejected! Yet use of words like on continues! Hypocrisy!
o Linguistic phenomenalism makes our lives hell by forcing us to
translate into phenomenalese; it would be impossible to talk fully in
terms of sense data!
o Surely if things are permanent possibilities of sensation this is
hinting at the existence of a material world
o Sense data being indeterminate: if I was not paying attention to
what colour something was, I am not sure what colour it was; does
this mean it has no colour or no fixed colour?

Dagmar Makara
Philosophy
Theories of Knowledge
Page 13 of 13