Tacc Matc II 2017

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
Civil Aviation Regulatory Commission
Air Navigation Services
Manual of Air Traffic Control Part II

Terminal Area Control Centre
TACC MATC II
Operational Procedures
Issued in accordance with Jordan Civil Aviation Regulations

On the Authority of the Chief Commissioner of the Civil Aviation Regulatory
Commission.
Capt. Haitham Misto

Chief Commissioner
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION SHEET
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
Manual of Air Traffic Control Part II
Document Identifier EDITION No. EDITION DATE
MATC II Sixth Edition 10/03/2017
The main purpose of this document is to provide guidance to cover the Operational needs for
Air Traffic Controllers in Amman TACC.
Keywords
CONTACT PERSON TEL: DIVISION
Chief of AMMAN TACC 00962 6 4452689 TACC
DOCUMENT STATUS AND TYPE
STATUS CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION

Working Draft Safety Regulatory Requirement General Public
Draft Comment/Response Document Restricted ATS
Proposed Issue Advisory Material Restricted ANSP
Released Issue Policy Document Restricted CARC
ELECTRONIC BACKUP
INTERNAL REFERENCE NAME :

SOFTWARE(S) MEDIA HOST SYSTEM
Adobe PDF Type : Hard disk
Printing Date: 05/03/2017
MS WINDOWS XYZ Media Identification :
i
DOCUMENT APPROVAL
The following table identifies all authorities that have successively edited,
accepted, endorsed and approved the present issue of this document.
AUTHORITY NAME and SIGNATURE DATE
Signature:
Prepared Chief of AMMAN
By TACC
Name:
Signature:
Reviewed Director of ATM

Name:
Signature:
Endorsed Director of QSMS

Name:
Signature:
Regulatory Director of
Approval ANSSD
Name:
ii
AMENDMENTS
Its the responsibility of each controller to keep his copy of MATC II fully
amended and available for inspection by the chief of TACC.
RECORD OF AMENDMENTS
SECTION
NO ITEM DESCRIPTION DATE
AFFECTED
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER ONE : Introduction
1.1 Forwarded . 1
1.2 Purpose ........ 1
1.3 Authority/responsibility for Changes ... 2
1.4 Review 2
1.5 Interpretation of Words ....... 2
1.6 Change History 3
1.7 Controlling the Manual 3
1.8 Distribution of the Manual ....... 3
1.9 Master Copy 3
1.10 Enquiries . 3
1.11 Layout . 3
1.12 General Instruction .. 4
1.13 Symbols and abbreviations 5
1.13.1 General ... 5
1.13.2 Symbol 6
1.13.3 Abbreviations ... 9
CHAPTER TWO : Terminal Area Control Center
2.1 General Description 13
2.2 THALES RADAR Center 13
2.2.1 THALES RADAR System Description .... 13
2.2.2 THALES RADAR Control Sectorization .... 13
2.2.3 Sector Manning Level ... 15
2.2.4 Strip Layout .. 16
iv
2.3 INDRA RADAR Center .. 16
2.3.1 INDRA RADAR Control Sectorization . 16
2.3.2 Merging / Splitting Sectors Procedure in Amman TACC .......... 19

2.3.3 Sector Manning Level .. 19
2.3.4 Strip Layout ..... 21
2.4 Frequencies .... 22
2.4.1 Navigation Aids Frequencies .... 22
2.4.2 Voice Communication System " VCS " Frequencies ......... 24
2.5 Unit Administration 24
2.5.1 Responsibilities and Duties .... 25
2.5.2 Control Room Administrations ... 29
2.5.2.1 Hours of Operation .. 29
2.5.2.2 Duty Restriction in the Influence of Alcoholic and Drugs ... 29
2.5.2.3 Confidentially .. 29
2.5.2.4 Visitor(s) . 29
2.5.2.5 Private telephone calls .. 29
2.5.2.6 Leave ... 29
2.5.2.7 Control Room Discipline .. 30
2.5.2.8 Radio / Telephone Discipline .... 30
2.5.2.9 Taking Over Watch .... 30
2.5.2.10 Read-Back of clearances & Implementation .. 31
2.5.2.10.1 Purpose .. 31
2.5.2.10.2 Read back of ATC clearances 31
2.5.2.10.3 Air Traffic Control mechanism for implementation of read-back clearance .. 33
v
CHAPTER THREE : RADAR Control
3.1 General ....... 35

3.2 Surveillance Identification of aircraft ....... 35
3.2.1 Establishment of identification .. 35
3.2.2 SSR identification procedures .. 35
3.2.3 ADS-B identification procedures 37
3.3 Surveillance Separation Minima 37
3.4 Mode C Verification and Errors 38
3.4.1 Mode C Verification 39
3.4.2 Mode C Errors ....... 39
3.4.3 Phraseology ........... 40
3.5 SSR Codes ........... 40
3.5.1 General 40
3.5.2 SSR Code Failure 40
3.5.3 Inbound SSR code assignment ... 40
3.5.4 Over fly SSR code assignment .. 40
3.5.5 Outbound SSR code assignment . 40
3.5.6 Domestic SSR Codes . 41
3.5.7 Regional SSR Codes assignment .. 42
CHAPTER FOUR : TMA and Area Procedure
4.1 General .. 43
4.2 Departure Flights Procedure . 43
4.2.1 Outbound Silent RADAR Handover .. 43
4.2.2 Standard Outbound Levels 44
4.3 Arrival Flights Procedure 44
vi
4.3.1 Inbound Silent RADAR Handover . 45
4.3.2 Standard Inbound Levels 45
4.4 PBN Procedure within AMMAN FIR " RNAV Procedure " ... 45
4.4.1 Description .. 45
4.4.2 General Procedures .. 46
4.5 Holding Areas 47
4.6 Co-ordination Procedures ... 49
4.6.1 General Procedures and Flight planning between Approach Unit and Tower Unit 49
4.6.2 Visual Approach ... 50
4.6.3 Runway Change Procedure ... 50
4.6.4 VFR Traffic Procedures ...... 51
4.6.4.1 Operating Rules ...... 51
4.6.4.2 Visual Flight Rules .... 51
4.6.4.3 SVFR at Amman / Marka CTR 51
4.6.5 Diversion Procedure ... 52
4.6.6 Miscellaneous Operations ........ 52
CHAPTER FIVE : AMMAN MARKA Airport Procedures
5.1 General ... 53

5.2 Co-ordination Procedures ... 53
5.2.1 Departure Flights Release Procedure ... 53

5.2.2 Conventional Arrival Flights Release Procedure .. 53
5.2.3 RNAV Arrival Procedures ... 54
5.3 Landing Intervals 55
5.4 Training Flights Procedure 55
5.5 Approach Procedures .. 56
5.5.1 Runway 24 .. 56
vii
5.5.2 Runway 06 .. 57
CHAPTER SIX : Queen Alia Airport Procedures
6.1 General .. 59
6.2 Co-ordination Procedures 59
6.2.1 Departure Flights Procedure ... 59
6.2.2 Conventional Arrival Flights Release Procedure 59

6.2.3 RNAV Arrival Procedures ... 60
6.2.4 Visual Approach ................. 61
6.3 Landing Intervals ................ 62
6.4 Training Flights Procedure ............... 62
6.5 Approach Procedures ......... 63
6.5.1 Runway 26L ....................... 63
6.5.2 Runway 26R ....................... 64
6.5.3 Runway 08L ....................... 65
6.5.4 Runway 08R ....................... 65
CHAPTER SEVEN : Failures
7.1 Partial Service Failure 67

7.1.1 INDRA or THALES RADAR Technical Failure ... 67
7.1.2 System Data Integrity 67
7.2 Complete RADAR Technical Failure .. 67
7.3 VHF Communication System Failure .. 67
7.4 Telephone System Failure 68
7.5 Electrical Failure .. 68
7.6 AFTN Line Failure .. 69
7.7 Facility Damage .. 69
viii
7.8 RADAR Failure Procedure . 70
CHAPTER EIGHT: Royal Flights
8.1 Introduction . 71
8.2 Special Air Traffic Services Procedures for VVIP Flight ... 71
General ATC procedures are as follows for VVIP Flight and

8.3 Distinguished guests and Transient Services . 72
8.4 Take over Watch (TOW) to handle the VIP flight . 73

8.5 ESCORT 73
8.6 Runway in use 73
8.7 Helicopter Flights ... 74
8.8 Aerodrome Control Tower Procedures . 74
8.9 Controlled Airspace 74
CHAPTER NINE : Reduced Vertical Separation Minima
9.1 The Benefits of RVSM . 75

9.2 RVSM Implementation Needs .. 75
9.3 RVSM Flight Levels 75
9.4 Flight in RVSM Airspace . 75
9.5 RVSM Flight Planning Requirements ..... 75
9.6 RVSM Airborne Systems Requirement . 76
9.6.1 Transponder Requirements 76
9.7 System Support .. 77

9.8 Contingency Procedures 77
9.8.1 Meteorological Coordination . 77
9.8.2 Height Keeping Errors 77
9.9 RVSM Transition Procedures .. 78
ix
9.10 Vertical Separation Minima .. 79
9.10.1 Controller / Pilot Radiotelephony Phraseology 80

9.11 RVSM Alarm in INDRA RADAR . 80
CHAPTER TEN : Emergency Procedures
10.1 General ... 83

10.2 Fuel Dumping ... 83
10.2.1 Separation ... 83
10.2.2 Local Fuel Dumping Outside Controlled Airspace ... 84
10.2.3 Local Fuel Dumping Inside TMA 84
10.3 Emergency Descent 84
10.3.1 Phraseology 85
10.4 Strayed Aircraft 85
10.5 Unidentified Aircraft . 85
10.6 Interception of Civil Aircraft .. 86
10.7 Local Standby ... 86
10.8 Full Emergency 87
10.9 Bomb Threat " Aircraft in flight " .. 88
10.10 Hi-Jack 88
10.10.1 Hi-jack in the air within Amman airspace 88
.
Hi-jacked aircraft within adjacent FIRs expected to
10.10.2
proceed to Amman FIR ....... 89
10.11 Aircraft Accident .. 89

Aircraft Emergencies Suspected Communicable Disease,
10.12
or Other Public Health Risk
.. 90
10.13 Other ATC Contingency Procedures .. 90

10.13.1 Emergency Separation .. 90
10.13.2 Short-term conflict alert (STCA) Procedures 91
x
CHAPTER ELEVEN: ON JOB Training
11.1 General Procedures ... 93
11.2 Phase of Training 93

11.3 Trainees . 94
11.4 Progress Tests . 94

11.5 Training Report 94
11.6 Examination .. 94
11.7 General Description of Rating Phases .. 95
11.7.1 TMA Approach Procedural Non-RADAR 95
11.7.2 TMA Approach RADAR . 96

11.7.3 En-route Procedural Non-RADAR .. 97
11.7.4 En-route RADAR ... 98
11.8 TACC Forms .. 98
APPENDIX 1
RNAV Charts
1. OJAI RNAV Charts 99

2. OJAM RNAV Charts 126
3. OJAQ RNAV Charts 141
APPENDIX 2
Conventional SID & STAR
1. Terminal Procedures AMMAN/Marka .. 152

2. Terminal Procedures Queen Alia ... 160
3. Terminal Procedures AQABA/ King Hussein 176
xi
APPENDIX 3
TACC FORMS
1. ATC Performance Check Form.

2. Evaluation Form.
3. Rating Validity Report and Practical Assessment Form.
4. Practical Training Record Form.
5. ATC Final Practical Assessment Form.
6. OJT Training Assessment Form - Phase one.
7. OJT Training Assessment Form - Phase two.
8. OJT Training Assessment Form - Phase three.
9. INDRA Training Form.
10. Coordination Failures Form.
11. Read Back Form.
APPENDIX 4
INDRA SYSTEM
1. Definitions .... 193

2. Abbreviations .... 193
3. General System Description ... 195
4. Main Components . 196
5. Controlling Positions . 196
6. Auxiliary Equipment .. 197
7. Simulator Environment 197
8. Plot and Track Symbols . 198
9. Labels and Track Colors .. 199
10. Situation Data Display .. 201
11. Flight Data Display ... 213
xii
12. Control and Monitor Display 216
13. Mouse button relation with our different displays .. 219
APPENDIX 5
National Contingency Plan
APPENDIX 6
AIP Charts
REFERENCES
1. Aeronautical Information Publication of Jordan Third Edition
2. Manual Air Traffic Control PART I Sixth Edition
3. Manual Air Traffic Control PART II Fifth Edition
4. Jordan Civil Aviation Regulations (JCAR) Edition 2004
5. Air Traffic Management (DOC 4444-ATM/501) Fifteenth Edition
6. Airport Emergency Plan Version 5 Nov.2012
7. Local ATC Instructions.
xiii
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Intentionally Left Blank
TACC MATC II INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Forwarded:
Civil Aviation Regulatory Commission of Jordan provides air traffic services in

accordance to ICAO Annexes and Documents to the Chicago Convention. These
services are flight information service, alerting service and air traffic control service. In
order to achieve the objectives of air traffic services there is a need to specify
procedures necessary for the safety of air navigation for uniform application
throughout Jordan air space.
Maintaining the acceptable levels of safety calls for standardization and quality
assurance in every sub systems of Air Traffic System at one end and maintain the
ICAO standards and recommended practices at the others. This Manual of Air Traffic
Control " MATC " Part II for AMMAN TACC has been developed by AMMAN
TACC UNIT in corporation with DANS of QAIA as a part of comprehensive
documentation to achieve this objective.
AMMAN TACC MATC Part II is published for the guidance and information for air
traffic control in AMMAN FIR including all local instructions and all information's
concerned the Air Traffic Controllers in AMMAN TACC.
The purpose of AMMAN TACC MATC Part II is to establish procedures, provide
information and instructions which are essential for the provision of safe and efficient
air traffic services in AMMAN airspace and at the Jordanian airports where air traffic
services are provided by AMMAN TACC. It is published for the use and guidance of
its ATS personnel.
DANS of QAIA will ensure the provision of air traffic service under his jurisdiction
comply with the processes, procedures and instructions contained in this manual.
AMMAN TACC MATC Part II will fulfill the requirements for the best practices in
provision of Air Traffic Services according to international & national standards and
recommended practices and in meeting with the ICAO Universal Safety Audit
Oversight Programme requirements.
1.2 Purpose:
The purpose of this document is to establish procedures, provide information and
instructions which are essential for the provision of safe and efficient air traffic
services at AMMAN TACC where air traffic services are provided by ATM\CARC. It
is published for use and guidance of its ATS personnel.
The chief of AMMAN TACC in QAIA will ensure that the provision of air traffic
services under his jurisdiction are provided in compliance with the processes,
procedures and instructions contained in this manual.
EDITION No. 6 Effective Date: 10/03/2017 Page 1

1.3 Authority/responsibility for Changes:
DATM, DANS of QAIA or Chief of TACC may ask for incorporating amendments to
the MATC II, when necessary, after endorsement by document approval process.
Each holder of a hard-copy of MATC II is responsible for ensuring that the Manual is
kept up to date. This includes inserting new chapters or chapter amendments in a
timely manner and complying with any instructions on amendment advice.
The user of MATC II will be responsible for verifying the currency of documentation
in the Manual.
1.4 Review:
DANS of QAIA or Chief of TACC will conduct every six month a general review of
this Manual to ensure accuracy and updating of all its contents and reference data. The
results of such review and action taken thereupon will be documented and presented
through DATM for document approval process.
DATM will ensure;

1. Changes being incorporated are properly approved by the competent authority,
2. Relevant pages in the Manual are revised.
3. Amendment/ advice are issued in time to all concerned in respect of new
chapter(s) and the same is inserted in the Manual.
4. Master- copy of the Manual is updated.
1.5 Interpretation of Words:

To avoid any misunderstanding within MATC II, certain words are to be interpreted as
having specific meanings when they are the operative words in an instruction.
Words Meaning
'shall' 'is to, are to'

The instruction is mandatory
and 'must'
It is only used for informative or descriptive writing, e.g.

'will
'pilots will file . . . . . ' is not an instruction to the controller
It means that the instruction is permissive, optional or

'may' alternative, e.g. 'a controller may seek assistance . . . . . 'but
would not if he did not need it.
It means that it is strongly advisable that an

instruction is carried out;
It is recommended or Discretionary. It is applied
'should'
where the more positive 'shall' is unreasonable but
nevertheless a controller Would have to have a
good reason for not doing so.
It always refers to nautical

'miles'
miles

Note: In the interests of simplicity, any reference to the masculine gender can be
taken to mean either male or female.
1.6 Change History:

This is sixth edition of TACC MATC II. Subsequent changes will be indicated on
Record of Amendments page.
1.7 Controlling the Manual:
DANS of QAIA will control this Manual through direct contact with DATM.
1.8 Distribution of the Manual:
DANS of QAIA should produce hard copies and control the distribution of these
copies, as they deem appropriate.
1.9 Master Copy:
An electronic and a hard Master Copy of each chapter contained in the manual will be
held and maintained by the DATM and DANS.
1.10 Enquiries:
Any ATC can report to AMMAN TACC Chief for any enquiries, clarifications or
suggestions.
1.11 Layout:
The manual is laid out in Eleven Chapters each chapter is divided into several
sections which are applicable to particular aspects of the ATC services.

Chapter Number Title
Chapter One Introduction
Chapter Two Terminal Area Control Center
Chapter Three RADAR Control
Chapter Four Terminal and Area Procedure
Chapter Five AMMAN / Marka Airport Procedures
Chapter Six Queen Alia Airport Procedures
Chapter Seven Failures
Chapter Eight Royal Flights
Chapter Nine RVSM Procedures
Chapter Ten Emergency Procedures
Chapter Eleven On Job Training
1.12 General Instruction:

1. All ATC instructions in this manual shall be written clearly and concisely in
English in such a way that there is no ambiguity or doubt in the meaning.
2. All instructions that affect other agencies or units will be in accordance with the
agreement with the other unit or agency and where possible the same words shall
be used by either units or agencies.
3. All publications shall be contained in a suitable cover that will facilitate
amendment.
a) Each page will contain the following information:

i. Document title.
ii. Chapter Number.
iii. Page number.
iv. Effective Date.
b) All publications will contain an index.
c) All publications will contain an amendment record.
d) All publications will contain a page/date record sheet.
4. All publications will be distributed to each controller; TACC Chief will make a
record of the documents held by each controller.

5. Each controller will sign the reception for each document and all future
amendments.
6. Amendments will be displayed on control room notice board(s) for one month
after date of publication.
7. Processed Documents, when a document is processed the following procedures
apply:
a) Three copies will be created:
i. Working copy, for actual amendment.

ii. Backup copy, to be made when a document is fully amended
iii. Master (original) copy, to be revised annually.
b) Annually. Copy the backup copy and retain as insurance of damage to both
working and backup.
i.e.: Power failure during transfer of data working to backup.
c) Storage of copies:
i. The master copy will be held by DANS and will only be released for
annual copy or if other copies are damaged.
ii. If other copies are damaged the master will immediately be copied before any
amendment is made.
iii. If the master is copied to replace lost or damaged diskettes the copy will
be upgraded to the last stage by comparison with the paper master (hard
copy).
d) Amendments of TACC manual are the responsibility of AMMAN TACC

Chief.
i. All amendments will be submitted to DATM for his acceptance.

ii. The purpose of approval is to ensure that the procedures at TACC meet
the general standard and policy of the CARC.
1.13 Symbols and abbreviations:
1.13.1 General:
The following symbols and abbreviations should be used for strip marking at AMMAN
TACC.
Aircraft type designators are listed in ICAO Doc. 8643, Company abbreviations in
ICAO Doc. 8585 and indicators in ICAO Doc. 7910.

1.13.2 Symbols:
Meaning Symbol
AIRCRAFT INSTRUCTED TO HOLD H
AIRCRAFT GIVEN APPROPRIATE ALTIMETER

Q
SETTING
AIRCRAFT GIVEN TIME CHECK T
CLEARANCE EXPIRES (time) CE (time)
ALTERNATIVE INSTRUCTIONS ()
ABOVE FL +
BELOW FL -
FL OR ABOVE +
FL OR BELOW -
AFTER (time or level) /
BEFORE (time or level) /
AIRCAFT REPORTED AT WRONG LEVEL (shown in circle)
CLEARED TO CROSS AIRWAY (arrow indicates direction)
CLIMB
DESCEND

CLIMB AND MAINTAIN
CLIMB COORDINATED (with another ATC unit)
DESCENT COORDINATED (with another ATCU)
CRUISE CLIMB CC
MAINTAIN
(call sign)
CLIMB 1000 FT BELOW (aircraft)
1
REPORT LEAVING (level) RL
REPORT REACHING (level) RR
REPORT PASSING (level) RP
REQUEST LEVEL CHNGE ENROUTE RCLE
COMMUNICATION FAILURE CF
COORDINATION EFFECED
CROSS X
AIRCRAFT GIVEN WEATHER WX
DELAY NOT DETERMINED Z
DIVERTED TO DIV

ESSENTIAL TRAFFIC IS TFC
EXPECTED APPROACH TIME EAT
ILS I
INFORMATION PASSED AND ACKNOWLEDGED
JOINING FLIGHT
LEAVING CONTROLLED AIRSPACE
AISSED APPROACH MA
>
NO DELAY EXPECTED
OVERHEAD (beacon of airfield) QFG
OVER FLIGHT (through ) V
RELEASE NOT BEFORE Time
RELEASE SUBJECT TO RS /
RELEASE SUBJECT YOUR DISCRETION (with regard to) RS YD
RELEASE SUBJECT TO APPROACH RS APP
RADAR IDENTIFICATION R
RADAR HAND OVER COMPLETED

RADAR SERVICE TERMINATED R

RADAR VECTOR RV
RADAR VECTORING ILS APPROACH R/I
RADAR VECTORING VISUAL APPROACH R/V
RADIAL (when followed by an ident 3 figures) R
1.13.3 Abbreviations:
AAD Assigned Altitude Deviation

ACC Area Control Center
ACT Activation ( OLDI Message )
ADEP Aerodrome Of Departure
ADES Aerodrome of Destination
ADOC Air Defense Operation Center
ADS - B Automatic dependent surveillance broadcast
AFDO Automatic Flight Data Operator
AFL Actual Flight Level
AFS Airport Fire Service
AFTN Aeronautical fixed Telecommunication Network
AIP Aeronautical Information Publication
ALT Altitude
ANS Air Navigation Service
AOC Accept Of Control ( Function )
APP Approach
APPP Approach planning controller
APPR Approach radar controller
ARR Arrival
ASAP As Soon As Possible
ASC AFTN Switching Center
ASE Altimetry System Errors
ASR Air Safety Report
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATCC Air Traffic Control Center
ATCO Air Traffic Control Officer
ATIS Automatic Terminal Information Service
ATM Air Traffic Management
ATS Air Traffic Services
BPN Boundary Point : Entry Point
BPX Boundary Point : Exit Point
BRS Built-In Radio Switch
CAS Controlled Air Space
CATC Chief of Air Traffic Control ( TACC )

CD Civil Defense
CFL Cleared Flight Level
CH Channel Check Message ( AFTN )
CIDIN Common ICAO Data Interchange Network
CLM Claim
CSCI Computer Software Configuration Item
CTACC Chief Of Terminal Area Control Center
DA/H Decision Altitude / Height
DAIW Danger Area Infringement Warning
DANS Director Of Air Navigation Services
DATM Duty Air Traffics Management
DCT Direct Route
DEC Digital Equipment Corporation
DEP Departure
DLA Delay
DRC Data Recording
EAT Estimated Arrival Time
EET Estimated Elapsed Time
ELEV Elevation
ERVCC Emergency Radio Voice Communication Console
EST Estimated Flight Plan ( Function )
ETA Estimated Time Of Arrival
ETB Estimated Time Boundary
ETD Estimated Time Of Departure
ETN Estimated Time Next Point
ETO Estimated Time Of Over flight
ETX Estimated Time Of Exit Point
FDO Flight Data Operator
FDP Flight Data Processor
FIR Flight Information Region
FL Flight Level In Hundreds Of Feet
FPL Flight Plan
FPPS Flight Plan Processing System
FPS Flight Progress Strip
FT Feet
GMC Ground Movement Control
HMI Human Machine Interface
HND Hand-over (Function )
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IFR Instrumental Flight Rules
ILS Instrument landing System
KBD Keyboard
LAM Logical Acknowledgement Message ( OLDI)
LAN Local Area Network
LOA Letter of agreement
LOC Localizer
LPL Local Flight Plan
MATC Manual of Air Traffic Control
MDA(H) Minimum Decision Altitude ( Height )
MFT Multi-Function Terminal

MSA Minimum Safe Altitude

MSAW Minimum Safe Altitude Warning
MSSR Mono pulse Secondary Surveillance Radar
MVA Minimum Vectoring Altitude
NDB Non Directional Beacon
NM Nautical Mile
NOTAM Notice To Airmen
OCC Operation Control Center
OH Operational Handbook
OJAI Queen Alia International Airport
OJAM Amman / Marka Airport
OJAQ King Hussein International Airport
OJT On The Job Training
OJTI On The Job Training Instructor
OLDI ON- Line Data Interchange
OPS Operational
PABX Private Automatic Exchange
PAC Preliminary Activate Message (OLDI )
PCP Planner Control Position
PD Pointing Device
PFL Planned Flight Level
PIRC Processor Of Interface For Radars And Communication
PS Procedure Separation
PSR Primary Surveillance Radar
PUSH It is a sensitive area drawn on the screen used to perform BUTTON
QAIA Queen Alia International Airport
QFE Height reference to threshold elevation
QNH Barometric Pressure
RCP RADAR Control Position
RDF Radar Data Function
RDP Radar Data Processor
REP Reporting Point
RFL Requested Flight Level
RFP Radar Front Processor
RJAFLO Royal Jordanian Air force liaison officer
RPL Repetitive Flight Plan
RTE Route Of Flight
RVSM Reduction Vertical Separation Minimum
SDD Situation Data Display
SDF Step Down Fix
SDR Security Data Recording
SFP Stored Flight Plan
SMPO System Manger Position
SPI Special Pulse Information
SSDD System Software Design Document
SSR Secondary Surveillance Radar
SSS System Segment Specification
STAR Standard Terminal Arrival
STCA Short Term Conflict Alert
STP Strip Printer

SUP Supervisor
SUPP Supplementary
SVC Service Messages (AFTN )
TACC Terminal Area Control Center
TAS True Air Speed
TCH Touch Down
TCP/IP Transport Control Protocol / Internet Protocol
THR Threshold
TL Transition Level : It is the flight level ( in hundreds of feet) under
which a barometric correction is performed to deal with local pressure
TLS Target level of Safety
TMA Terminal Maneuvering Area
TMCS Technical Management And Control System
TOGGLE Push button that enables a limited set of predefined values
TVE Total Vertical Error
TWR Tower
UIR Upper Information Region
UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply
VCS Voice Communication System
VFR Visual Flight Rules
VHF Very High Frequency
VIP Very Important Person
VOR VHF Omnidirectional Range
VSM Vertical Separation Minima
VVIP Top VIP
WKS Work Station

CHAPTER TWO
TERMINAL AREA
CONTROL CENTER
TACC MATC II Terminal Area Control Center CHAPTER 2
2. TERMINAL AREA CONTROL CENTER

2.1. General Description:
TACC Operation Room is an ATS unit providing the following Air Traffic Control
services:
1. Approach Control Service.

2. Area Control Service.
3. Flight Information Service.
4. Alerting Service.
Note: In the event of complete failure of the ATS surveillance system the necessary
action shall be taken to establish RADAR Failure Procedure (Chapter 7).
The number of aircraft simultaneously provided with ATS surveillance services within
AMMAN terminal area, shall not be exceed more than the level which will not be adverse
impact on safety, taking into account:
1. The structural complexity of the control area or sector concerned.
2. The functions to be performed within the control area or sector concerned.
3. Assessments of controller workloads, taking into account different aircraft
capabilities, and sector capacity; and
4. The degree of technical reliability and availability of the primary and backup
communications, navigation and surveillance systems, both in the aircraft and on
the ground.
2.2. THALES RADAR Center:

2.2.1. THALES RADAR System Description:
THALES RADAR is a Secondary Surveillance RADAR MSSR " the MSSR is Monopuls
surveillance RSM 9701 of 256 NM range ".
2.2.2. THALES RADAR Control Sectorization:

THALES TACC consist a number of autonomous Air Traffic control sectors, the following
sectors are the main sectors only:
I. Approach Sector:
Approach Sector is responsible for the provision of ATS within Amman TMA below
FL 255, excluding the Amman Control Zone and QAI Control Zone below 5500 FT,
and the following segments:
1. ATS route L513 till BUSRA point.
2. ATS route R652 till KIPAS point.
3. ATS route N318 till GENEX point
4. ATS route R652 till LOSIL point.
5. ATS route L513 south till MAZAR point.

6. MOUAB and OSAMA points.
7. ATS route A412 till ASLON point.
Approach sector contains the following Equipments:
1. RADAR Controller Position (RCP).
2. Planner Controller Position (PCP).
3. Two VCS Communications, for Controller and for planner.
4. Navigation aids Monitor.
5. Emergency Radio SELEX.
6. Recording system RC 2000.
7. Meteorological information display.
II. West Sector:
West Sector will be responsible for all controlled airspace within Amman FIR
which is located West of the Western boundary along the extension between
DAXEN point and the point located 20 NM west of RASLI on the center line of
ATS route R652 to the Western boundary of Jordan political boundary from
altitude 7000 up to and including FL 340 excluding Amman TMA and Aqaba
Approach below FL255.
The West sector contains the following Equipments:
3. One VCS Communications for controller.
5. Recording system RC2000.
III. East Sector:

The East Sector is responsible for all controlled airspace within Amman FIR which
is located East of the Eastern Boundary of the west sector from its intersection with
Amman FIR boundary at OTILA to SOKAN or NAMBO then ZELAF to RASLI
from ALT 13000 up to and including FL 340 and for all controlled airspace within
Amman FIR, within Jordan political boundaries from FL 350 and above.
The East sector contains the following Equipments:
3. Two VCS Communications, for controller and planner.
5. Recording system RC2000.
6. Meteorological information display.
IV. TACC Supervisor:

Operational Supervisor position contains the following equipments and the
following special functions:
1. Control display.
2. Modification QNH, TL & QFU.

3. Sectorization.
4. Information pages.
5. Alert area selection.
6. VCS Communications.
2.2.3. Sector Manning Level:

Its the responsibility of TACC Supervisor or Watch Supervisor to ensure that
sectors are manned to meet traffic demand. The following manning levels are
given for guidance but the minimum manning levels shall not be reduced.
Controllers allocated to a control position or workstation will carry out a full
handover with the controller they are taking over from and remaining at their
position until relieved.
Note: The hand over shall be not less than 10 minutes.
It is required that supervisors publish a list of controllers work positions and relief
breaks for each duty shift.
Console Working
Required Control Service Min.M.L Max.M.L
Endorsement Hours
# Name
RADAR Control
Terminal For IN & OUT
1 APSE Bound TFC 24 HRs 1 ATCo 2 ATCo
APP PSN
and over flying
RADAR Control
West For IN & OUT
2 ASE 24 HRs 1 ATCo 2 ATCo
WEST PSN Bound TFC
and over flying
RADAR Control
En route For IN & OUT
3 ASE Bound TFC
24 HRs 2 ATCo 2 ATCo
EAST PSN
and over flying
ADMINSTRATIVE
TACC All Positions
4 & 24 HRs 1 ATCo 1 ATCo
SUPERVISOR OPERATIONAL
APSE: Approach Surveillance Endorsement.

ASE: Area Surveillance Endorsement.
Min.M.L: Minimum Manning Level.
Max.M.L: Maximum Manning Level.
Notes:
1. One FDO shall be available in the TACC for 24 HRS, WHEN AVAILABLE.
2. When the Supervisor or his Deputy is on leave; the most Senior ATC
will take over on the Supervisor CONSOLE.

2.2.4 Strip Layout:
1. Call sign category. 10. Route in the F/P.
2. Registration. 11. Destination.
3. Type of the ACFT. 12. ATC Estimate.
4. RVSM status. 13. Position Report.
5. Flight plan speed. 14. Pilot Estimate.
6. Flight plan ETD. 15. Actual time over head the

reporting position.
7. SSR code. 16. Corrected FL.
8. Point of Departure. 17. Date of Flight.
9. Flight plan FL.
2.3. INDRA RADAR Center:

INDRA RADAR is an AIRCON 2100 system developed by INDRA " Spain ", a
Secondary Surveillance RADAR with Mode S using RED HAT ENTERPRISE
LINUX 5 with 256 NM range.
2.3.1. INDRA RADAR Control Sectorization:

Every sector in INDRA RADAR center contains the following:
1. Two SDD.
2. Two FDD.
3. Two VCS GAREKS System units.
4. VAIZLA Weather Display for Queen Alia Airport.
5. VAIZLA Weather Display for Amman Airport for TMAA Sector only.
6. Strip Printer.
7. DRC SELEX Communication (Aqaba sector not equipped).
I. Approach Sector "TMAA":
Approach control is responsible for the provision of ATS within Amman TMA
below FL 255, excluding the Amman Control Zone and QAI Control Zone below
5500 FT, and the following segments:

1. ATS route L513 till BUSRA point.
2. ATS route R652 till KIPAS point.
3. ATS route N318 till GENEX point
4. ATS route R652 till LOSIL point.
5. ATS route L513 south till MAZAR point.
6. MOUAB and OSAMA points.
7. ATS route A412 till ASLON point.
Note: For TMA Shape and MVA chart, check Appendix 6.
II. Lower West Sector "ACCW":
Lower West Sector will be responsible for all controlled airspace within Amman FIR
which is located West of the Western boundary along the extension between
DAXEN point and the point located 20 NM west of RASLI on the center line of
ATS route R652 to the Western boundary of Jordan political boundary from altitude
7000 up to and including FL 340 excluding Amman TMA and Aqaba Approach
below FL255.
III. Aqaba Sector "AQAP":

The Aqaba approach control Sector is responsible for the provision of ATS in the
Aqaba control area SEMI-CIRCUIT, lateral limits is 45 NM from AQB/VOR and
the upper ceiling is FL255 and lower limit is ALT 7000 WHEN APPROVED.
Note: Item III above will be applicable when Aqaba Sector is transferred to TACC
operation Room.
IV. Lower East Sector "ACCE":
The East Lower Sector is responsible for all controlled airspace within Amman FIR
which is located east of the eastern boundary of the lower west sector from its
intersection with Amman FIR boundary at OTILA to SOKAN or NAMBO then
ZELAF to RASLI from ALT 13000 up to and including FL 340.
V. Upper East Sector "ACCU ":
East Upper Sector is responsible for all controlled airspace within Amman FIR,
within Jordan political boundaries from FL 350 and above.

Westbound / Northbound and southbound / eastbound, table of cruising levels:
# West/North Bound Table South/Eastbound Table

Sector
of Cruising Level of Cruising Levels
A7000, A9000, A11000,
A8000, A10000, A12000,
Aqaba A13000, FL150, FL170,
FL160, FL180, FL200,
1. App FL190, FL210, FL230,
FL220, FL240 ONLY
( AQAP ) FL250. ONLY WITHIN
WITHIN (AoR).
(AoR)
A7000, A9000, A11000,

A6000, A8000, A10000,
A13000, FL150, FL170,
TMA App A12000, FL160, FL180,
2. FL190, FL210, FL230,
( TMAA ) FL200, FL220, FL240.
FL250ONLY WITHIN
ONLY WITHIN (AoR)
(AoR).
FL260, FL280, FL300, FL270, FL290, FL310,

FL320, FL340 Within area FL330. Within area of
of responsibility all levels responsibility all levels
Lower
below FL250, can be below FL250, can be
3. West
assigned, provided that assigned, provided that
( ACCW )
prior coordination with prior coordination with
TMA approach controller TMA approach controller
or Aqaba approach control or Aqaba approach control
FL240, FL260, FL280, FL250, FL270, FL290,

Lower FL300, FL320, FL340. FL310, FL330FL250 only
4. East Fl240 only for overflying for overflying traffic.
( ACCE ) traffic. Between ZELAF-TRF
Between OTILA-SOKAN
Upper
FL360, FL380, FL400, FL350, FL370, FL390,
5. Control
FL430 FL410, FL450
( ACCU )
VI. TACC Supervisor:

Operational Supervisor position contains the following equipments:
1. CMD.
2. DBM.
3. Main SDD with special features and FDD.
4. Two HP printers.
5. Two separate telephones.
6. Door monitor camera.

VII. Additional sectors:
1. Flight Data Position: this sector for FDO in Amman TACC, no Sectorization in
this sector.
2. Military Data Position: this sector for military officer in Amman TACC, no
Sectorization or VCS in this sector.
2.3.2. Merging / Splitting Sectors Procedure in Amman TACC:
Due to low volume of traffic, the TMAA sector will be in one sector and
ACCE, ACCW and ACCU sectors will be merged together which is covered
by local instructions.
When Amman TACC Supervisor is considering merge / split sectors, the following
items should be taken into consideration:
1. Complexity of anticipated traffic.

2. Number of aircraft anticipated (e.g. indicated by number of Flight Progress
Strips, pending departures flight plan in the system).
3. Weather conditions.
4. Non Standard Flights or any other unusual activity within sector jurisdiction,
(e.g. Danger Areas).
5. Equipment redundancies (e.g. RADAR, frequencies), Controllers should
confirm with TACC Supervisor before Merging/Splitting the sector.
6. TACC Supervisor should inform the adjacent ATC unites of the merging /
splitting of a sector if necessary.
When the merging or splitting of a sector has been performed, the following
actions should be taken:
1. Ensure correct frequency/frequencies are selected.
2. Deselect / select telephone lines as appropriate.
3. Advise FDO positions (when available) / assistant as appropriate.
2.3.3. Sector Manning Level:
It is the responsibility of the TACC Supervisor to ensure that sectors are manned to
meet traffic demand. The following manning levels are given for guidance but the
minimum manning levels shall not be reduced.
Controllers allocated to a control position or workstation will carry out a full
handover with the controller they are taking over from and remaining at their
position until relieved.
It is required that supervisors publish a list of controllers work positions and relief
breaks for each duty shift.

Manning level for two sectors (merging):
Console
Required Control Service Working
Min.M.L Max.M.L
Endorsement Hours
# Name
RADAR Control For IN

1 TMAA APSE & OUT Bound TFC 24 HRs 1 ATCo 2 ATCo
and over flying
ACCE RADAR Control For IN

2 ACCW ASE & OUT Bound TFC 24 HRs 1 ATCo 2 ATCo
and over flying
ACCU
ADMINSTRATIVE
3 TACC All Positions & 24 HRs 1 ATCo 1 ATCo
SUP OPERATIONAL
Manning level for five sector (splitting):
Console
Required Control Service Working
Min.M.L Max.M.L
Endorsement Hours
# Name

1 TMAA APSE & OUT Bound TFC 24 HRs 1 ATCo 2 ATCo
and over flying

2 ACCE ASE & OUT Bound TFC 24 HRs 1 ATCo 1 ATCo
and over flying
3 AQAP WHEN AVAILABLE will be running 24 HRs 1 ATCo 1 ATCo

from Amman TACC

4 ACCW ASE & OUT Bound TFC 24 HRs 1 ATCo 2 ATCo
and over flying

5 ACCU ASE & OUT Bound TFC 24 HRs 2 ATCo 2 ATCo
and over flying
ADMINSTRATIVE
6 TACC All Positions & 24 HRs 1 ATCo 1 ATCo
SUP OPERATIONAL
APSE: Approach Surveillance Endorsement.

ASE: Area Surveillance Endorsement.
Min.M.L: Minimum Manning Level.
Max.M.L: Maximum Manning Level.

Notes:
1. One FDO will be available in the TACC for 24 HRS, WHEN AVAILABLE.
2. When the Supervisor or his Deputy is on leave; the most Senior ATC will
take over on the Supervisor CONSOLE.
3. The hand over shall be not less than 10 minutes.
2.3.4 Strip Layout:

I. Departure Strip:
1. Call sign category. 9. Flight plan FL.

2. Type of the ACFT and Weight Category. 10. Route in the F/P.
3. Flight plan speed. 11. Destination Aerodrome.
4. Surveillance Equipment plus SSR Code. 12. Position Report.
5. Flight Rules. 13. ATC Estimate.
6. Flight Type. 14. Airborne Time.
7. Departure Aerodrome. 15. Actual Level.
8. RVSM Status. 16. Date of Flight.
II. Arrival Strip:
1. Call sign category. 9. RVSM Status.

2. Type of the ACFT and Weight Category. 10. Flight plan FL.
3. Flight plan speed. 11. Route in the F/P.
4. Registration. 12. Destination Aerodrome.
5. Surveillance Equipment plus SSR Code. 13. Position Report.
6. Flight Rules. 14. Estimate Time.
7. Flight Type. 15. Actual Level.
8. Departure Aerodrome. 16. Date of Flight.

2.4. Frequencies:
2.4.1. Navigation Aids Frequencies:
Nav.Aids / RWY Frequency ID CH
LLZ CAT II 110.9 MHZ IQA
RWY 26 L G.P 330.8 MHZ
DME 100.7 MHZ IQA 46 X
LLZ CAT II 109.3 MHZ IQAN
RWY 08 L G.P 332.0 MHZ
DME 991 MHZ IQAN 30 X
LLZ CAT II 111.1 MHZ IQAR
RWY 26 R G.P 331.7 MHZ
DME 100.9 MHZ IQAR 48 X
QA NDB 410 KHZ
MDB NDB 399 KHZ
VOR 115.2 MHZ

QAA
DME 118.6 MHZ QAA 99 X
VOR 112.9 MHZ 76 X

QTR
DME 116.3 MHZ 76 X

Nav.Aids / RWY Frequency ID CH
LLZ CAT I 109.5 MHZ IAM
RWY 24 G.P 332.6 MHZ
DME 993 MHZ IAM 32X
AMN DVOR/DME 116.3 MHZ AMN 110X
110.1 MHZ IAQA

LLZ CAT I
RWY 01
G.P 334.4 MHZ
DME 999 MHZ IAQA 38 X
LLZ CAT I 110.9 MHZ IKHA
RWY 19 G.P 330.8 MHZ
DME 100.7 MHZ IKHA 46 X
AQC NDB 326 KHZ
113.1 KHZ 78 X
AQB DVOR/DME

2.4.2. Voice Communication System " VCS " Frequencies:
2.5. Unit Administration:

Amman TACC provides air traffic control service, flight information service and
alerting service, with the aim of achieving air traffic services objectives such as
separating aircraft to prevent collisions, to organize and expedite and maintain an
orderly flow of traffic, and to provide information and other support for pilots such as:
a) Information on the status of navigation aids and other supporting services.

b) MET information as provided by the MET office.
c) Search and rescue when necessary. (Coordination& notification only).
EDITION No. 6 Effective Date:10/03/2017 Page 24

2.5.1. Responsibilities and Duties:
I. TACC Chief Responsibilities "C/ TACC":
TACC Chief is responsible to DANS of QAIA for operation and administration of the
Air Traffic Service, technical standard and management of Amman TACC.
TACC Chief shall:

1. Issue and amend TACC MATC II.
2. Follow up the serviceability and efficiency of the ATC facilities.
3. Prepare and conduct the annual refresher course to all ATC in Amman TACC to
maintain ATC personnel performance and prepare training plans.
4. Prepare and issue the ATCo Rosters one week before the effective date with the
minimum required shift numbers in accordance of national and international
standard regulations.
5. Recommend the required exams to maintain the validity of unit endorsements,
medical certificates and English proficiency test.
6. Mange Search and Rescue Center and issue SAR manual in accordance of
national and international standard regulations.
7. Activate Search and Rescue Center as specified in SAR Manual.
8. Inspect ATC log book daily.
9. Maintain and ensure the quality and safety of air traffic service in Amman TACC in
accordance of national and international standard regulations.
II. TACC Shift Supervisor Responsibilities:

TACC Supervisor is responsible to the Chief of TACC for the safe and efficient
operation of the ATC facility by the duty controllers.
TACC Shift Supervisor shall:
1. Shift Supervise ensure that ATC services are provided in accordance of TACC
MATC II, SAR Manual and national standard regulations.
2. Ensure that all operational equipment & NAV. Aids are serviceable or under
maintenance and the status is recorded in the ATC Logbook and brought to the
attention of controllers.
3. Provide ATC staff by any necessary instructions to meet the traffic demand before
shift hand over.
4. Ensure that all NOTAMs are up to date and preserved in NOTAM folder.
5. Ensure all occurrence reports are filed during the period of watch.
6. Ensure that all Emergency and VVIP & VIP flights are closely supervised under his
control or under the control of the most competent controller available.
7. Take over watch from other Supervisors and ensure that all staff is briefed between
watches.
8. Be sure that all inbound flights to Jordanian airports have been permitted to land in
Jordanian airports after receiving the flight plan.

III. TACC Shift Supervisor Duties:

TACC Shift Supervisor shall:
1. Ensure all shift members holding a valid ATC License and valid medical
certificate.
2. Provide guidance to subordinate personnel.
3. Evaluate personnel performance and make recommendations concerning their
suitability, efficiency and potential.
4. Maintain discipline during the watch.
5. Handle all incoming phone calls to Amman TACC to ensure that no information is
given about any unusual situations within AMMAN FIR.
6. Record absence or sick leave in the ATC Logbook.
7. Coordinate and implement flow control.
8. Ensure that all staff is briefed and a full complete handover is carried out between
watches.
Note: The hand over shall be not less than 10 minutes.
9. During weekend holidays, public holidays and out of the daily official duty hours
the TACC supervisors are responsible to manage and activate the RCC
10. Sign and approve all the annual and official leaves of ATC staff in his shift.
11. Select Sectorization.
12. Grant over flight and /or landing permissions for the following:
a) Emergency.
b) Humanitarian.
c) Technical.
d) Re fuelling.
IV. Deputy Shift Supervisor Duties:

Deputy Supervisor shall perform the same responsibilities and duties of TACC supervisor.
V. Supervisor of OJT Duties:
OJT supervisor is responsible to TACC chief for training of the OJT at QAIA TACC.
OJT supervisor shall:

1. Implement all the training plans to achieve Amman TACC objectives.
2. Flow up all ATC ratings, endorsements and examinations and naming all the
supervisors, examiners and trainers.
3. Flow up the trainee and the instructors in every training process.
4. Coordinate all procedures for unit endorsements, medical certificates and English
proficiency test.

5. Ensure that OJT is carried out in accordance with MATC I, MATC II and Training
Manual and recommend the not qualified ATC.
VI. SMS Officer Responsibilities:
The SMS Officer is responsible to the SMSU Director in close coordination with
DANS of QAIA and Amman TACC Chief for:
1. Work in close consultation and cooperation with the Head of ANS at the airport,
and the various airport ANS supervisors.
2. Follow up the compliance of ANS units and staff, with all SMS responsibilities and
obligations.
3. Act as a proactive focal point for safety issues of ATM aspects at the airports ANS
units.
4. Assist in the Airport ANS units to comply with national requirements , international
standards and recommended practices
5. Assist in personnel training in safety management.
6. Participate in the Implementation of procedures for hazard reporting, analysis,
monitoring of safety performance and assessment.
7. Follow up ICAO recommendations of amendments regarding Annexes and safety
issues.
VII. RADAR Controller Responsibilities:

RADAR controller is responsible for the executive control of traffic within the sector.
The RADAR controller duties are:

1. Identifying and tracking inbound, outbound and/or overflying traffic under his area
of responsibility to maintain an up-to-date safe efficient traffic flow and accepting /
transferring aircraft to other sectors.
2. Applying RADAR Failure Procedure when RADAR is not efficient or failed and
prevent collision between aircraft.
3. Ensuring that coordination has been carried out before aircraft is transferred and
facilitates the flow of traffic.
4. Adjusting RADAR display by Carrying out adequate checks on accuracy to maintain
the quality and safety of traffic in reference to national and international regulations.
VIII. Planner Controller Duties:
The main task is to assist the RADAR controller to the maximum extent possible.
The planner controller is responsible for the receipt and dissemination of all data relating to
aircraft movements within the sector. The planner controller duties are:

1. Receiving and processing estimates and revisions and manual preparation of FPLSs
in the event of any degradation in the system or failure.
2. Monitoring the frequency and assisting the RADAR controller in maintaining an
up-to-date flight progress display.
3. Passing estimates, revisions and EATs to the relevant sectors.
4. Alerting the RADAR controller of any apparent conflict evident from the traffic
display, which requires solution.
5. Coordination with the relevant Sectors.
6. In the event of full RADAR failure, assist the RADAR controller in re-establishing
RADAR Failure Procedure.
IX. Flight Data Operator Duties " FDO ":

The Flight Data operator " FDO " duties are:
1. Receive and print estimates from adjacent.
2. Create, modify and amend flight plan items.
3. Insert the registration mark in Plan Window for each flight plan when so available.
4. He is fully responsible for the AFTN receptions.
5. Validate the ATIS messages.
6. Amend and update the meteorological information using area forecast reception
bulletins.
7. Archive the over flying permissions, when needed.
8. Archive the overflying FPSs at the end of the day (2359) UTC for TRF, OTILA,
ULINA and GRY positions strip.
Note: When the FDO position not manned, the FDO duties will be assigned to the
Planner Controller.
X. TACC Examiner Duties:

The TACC examiner is responsible for the conduct of an examination board for a unit
endorsement examination, must ensure:
1. The candidate is fully briefed on:
a) The schedule for the examination board and its constituent parts.
b) The persons involved and their roles in the examination.
2. The candidate and those involved in the examination are appropriately licensed.
3. The unit ATC examiners meet all the licensing requirements to act as a member of
the board.
4. During the oral element of the examination the questions asked conform to
designated approved document.
5. The candidate is fully debriefed following the examination with, if appropriate, the
reasons for failure.
6. The necessary licensing documentation is completed.

7. CARC will issue an official letter of authorization to confirm that a controller is

authorized to act as the TACC Examiner responsible for the conduct of unit
endorsement examinations.
8. The controller who is appropriately licensed supervises the candidate during the
Practical element of the examination.
2.5.2 Control Room Administrations:

2.5.2.1 Hours of Operation:
Amman TACC operates 24/7 as the following table:
SHIFT START END

First \ Morning 0800 1500
Second \ Evening 1500 2100
Third \ Night 2100 0800
Note: The time is in Local Time.
2.5.2.2 Duty Restriction in the Influence of Alcoholic and Drugs:

No ATC shall undertake his functions while he is under the influence of any alcoholic
beverages or any stimulant substances including drugs.
2.5.2.3 Confidentially:
All ATC shall adhere to the confidentiality agreement signed with the Jordan Civil
Aviation Regulatory Commission CARC. Moreover, any ATC shall not discuss any
pertinent issues in the public to VIP, traffic, incidents, accidents, etc.
2.5.2.4 Visitor(s):
Absolutely no unauthorized visitor(s) shall be allowed to have access to Amman TACC
operation room. Only the management shall have the authority to arrange visitation into
Amman TACC operation room by the following:
1. Student tour group(s);
2. Guests for fact finding;
3. Any other group(s) as may be deemed necessary.
Before bringing visitors into Amman TACC operation room, a check shall be made
with the TACC Chief and TACC Supervisor to ensure the traffic situation convenient
or not.
2.5.2.5 Private telephone calls:

No private telephone calls shall be made or accepted in Amman TACC operation
room.
2.5.2.6 Leave:
1. All leave applications must be submitted to TACC Supervisor for approval.

2. TACC Shift Supervisor should not approve more than ONE LEAVE request
from the same watch on the same day unless there are special circumstances.
3. ATC shall be granted sick leave when the employee is unable to perform his
duties because of illness or injury provided that:
a) The employee has the necessary sick leave approve.
b) The ATC satisfies the TACC chief or duty supervisor of this condition in such
manner and at such time as may be determined by the chief of TACC.
c) Otherwise informed by the chief of TACC before or during the period of
illness, a statement signed by the clinician stating that because of illness the
employee was unable to perform the employee's duties.
2.5.2.7 Control Room Discipline:
1. The TACC Shift Supervisor will compile a duty roster at the commencement of
the shift and this will be displayed on the Operations Room notice board.
2. The duty roster will show the sector manning requirements and hours and will
only be varied on the authority of the TACC Shift Supervisor.
3. Smoking, Eating of Food or Drinking are prohibited in the Operation Room.
4. ATCo shall not leave his allocated control position until relieved by another
ATCo or unless the control position is closed down on the instructions of the
Chief of TACC.
5. All staff not allocated to control positions on the Duty Roster will leave the
Operations Room.
6. It is the responsibility of controllers to reach the TACC by any means in the event
that they miss the TACC official transport.
7. On arrival at the TACC, controllers must proceed direct to the control room;
notify their arrival to the TACC Shift Supervisor and be assigned their duty.
2.5.2.8 Radio / Telephone Discipline:

Good R/T Discipline will be observed at all times.
REMEMBER YOU ARE REPRESENTING JORDAN
1. Use Standard Phraseology at all times.
2. DO NOT ARGUE.
3. DO NOT BE AGGRESSIVE.
4. Accept any criticism or abuse with Standard Phraseology.
"ROGER YOUR MESSAGE IS COPIED"
5. Report any incidents or violations to the TACC Chief.
2.5.2.9 Taking Over Watch:

On taking over watch, controllers shall carry out the following actions:
1. Check the current weather at OJAI, OJAM and OJAQ.
2. Check the Amman Area forecast weather for the period of watch.

3. Check the serviceability and maintenance periods of facilities and Nav. Aids
relevant to Approach Control.
4. Check NOTAMs in force.
5. Check any revisions to procedures.
6. Check the details of any special operations planned during the period of watch.
7. Check the runways in use at OJAI and OJAM and the terminal flow direction.
8. Check the accuracy and completeness of the prepared flight plan data and flight
progress board.
9. Check the traffic situation.
10. Check the serviceability of the ATC equipment and report all deficiencies to the
Chief of TACC.
11. Sign the watch log sheet for the sector.
2.5.2.10 Read-Back Procedure:
Read back requirements have been introduced in the interests of flight safety. The
noncompliance of the read back requirement is directly related to the possible
seriousness of a misunderstanding in the transmission and reception of ATC
clearances and instructions. Strict adherence to read back procedures ensures, not
only that the clearance has been received correctly but also that the clearance was
transmitted as intended. It also serves as a check that the right aircraft, and only that
aircraft, will take the proper action on the clearance.
To enhance the safety and to use our equipment usefully the RADAR controller
must watch the extended label of the concerned flights to check if the pilots are
complain with ATC clearance or not.
2.5.2.10.1 Purpose:
1. To develop read back procedures and Implementation process.
2. To ensure the effective mechanism for the implementation of read back
procedure.
2.5.2.10.2 Read back of ATC clearances:

a) Flight crew responsibility:
1. The flight crew shall read back to the air traffic controller safety-related parts of
ATC clearances and instructions which are transmitted by voice.
2. Pilot should briefly read back the contents of the following items, included in
ATC clearances, instructions or approvals, transmitted through voice
communication by ATC facility, Mobile Communication Service facility or
International Air-ground Communication Service facility unless ATC facility
instructs not to reply:
a) Clearances or instructions to take-off, land on, cross, taxi on, line up and
hold short of any runway.

b) Clearances or instructions regarding a route of flight including (SID,

Transition and STAR.
c) Clearances or instructions regarding altitude, altitude restrictions, heading
and speed.
d) Holding instruction, approach clearance or go-around instruction.
e) Radio frequency instruction.
f) Conditional clearances or instructions.
3. The use of the term ROGER or WILCO is not an acceptable read back as it
does not allow the controller to confirm or correct the clearance or instruction.
4. The read back message shall always include the flight call sign (flight number \
call sign). The pilot shall not switch immediately to the next sector frequency
following read back of controllers instruction.
5. A pilot should ensure confirmation of read-back is received:
a) Clearances or instructions, including conditional clearances, shall be read
back or acknowledged in a manner to clearly indicate that they have been
understood and will be complied with.
b) SSR codes and Runway in use (except when transmitted simultaneously to
all aircraft hearing the same frequency.)
b) Controller responsibility:
1. The controller shall listen to the read-back to ascertain that the clearance or
instruction has been correctly acknowledged by the flight crew.
2. The controller shall listen to the read-back to as certain that the clearance or
instruction has been correctly acknowledged by the flight crew and shall to
take immediate action to correct any descriptions reverted by the read-back..
3. The Controller should pass a clearance slowly and clearly since the pilot needs
to write it down and wasteful repetition will thus be avoided. In any case
controllers should avoid passing a clearance to a pilot engaged in complicated
taxiing maneuvers and on no occasion should a clearance be passed when the
pilot is engaged in line up or take-off maneuvers.
4. The word "take-off" are used only when an aircraft is cleared for take-off, or
when cancelling a take- off clearance. At other times the word "departure" or
"airborne" is used.
5. If an aircraft read back of a clearance or instruction is incorrect, the controller
shall transmit the word "NEGATIVE" followed by the correct version.
6. If there is a doubt as to whether a pilot can comply with an ATC clearance or
instruction or not, the controller may follow the clearance or instruction by the
phrase "if not possible advice", and subsequently offer an alternative.
c) Air Traffic Management Responsibility:

1. The ATM establishes appropriate supervisory means to ensure the correct
application of standard phraseology procedures by ATCOs.

2. The ATM implements the recommendation by the International Civil Aviation

Organization (ICAO) in Annex 11 Air Traffic Services, paragraph 3.3.3.
stating that: air traffic control units should be equipped with devices that
record background communication and the aural environment at air traffic
controller work stations, capable of retaining the information recorded during
at least the last twenty-four hours of operation.
3. The ATM should review the MATC I & II to ensure that common practices
and local instructions are contained in MATC I & II and that they are not in
contradiction.
4. The ATM should establish written instructions in the MATC I & II and
supervise their operational implementation to ensure the clear and
unambiguous.
5. The ATM should implement back-up communication means.
2.5.2.10.3 Air Traffic Control mechanism for implementation of read-back clearance:

1. Randomly check to the recorded audio tapes, for all air traffic control units at
least one time monthly.
2. Supervision by the Chiefs of Units to review the Read back.
3. Issuance of corrective action (instructions).
4. Develop of a training program for refined violations of the Procedures.
5. Send and distribute a Read back form for the reviewed tapes for all concerned
units.


CHAPTER THREE
RADAR CONTROL
TACC MATC II RADAR Control CHAPTER 3
3. RADAR CONTROL
3.1. General:
RADAR controller shall be responsible for adjusting RADAR display and for carrying
out adequate checks on the accuracy; RADAR controller shall satisfy himself that the
information presented on RADAR display is adequate for the functions to be
performed.
RADAR controller shall report to TACC supervisor any degradation in the equipment
or any circumstances which makes impractical to provide RADAR service.
While using SSR system, especially those utilizing mono pulse technique (TAHLAS)
or having Mode S capability (INDRA), may be used alone in the provision of
separation between aircraft provided:
1. The carriage of SSR transponders is mandatory within the area.
2. Identification is established and maintained.
3.2. Surveillance Identification of aircraft:

3.2.1 Establishment of identification:
Before providing an ATS surveillance service to an aircraft, identification shall be
established and the pilot informed. Thereafter, identification shall be maintained until
termination of the ATS surveillance service.
If identification is subsequently lost, the pilot shall be informed accordingly and, when
applicable, appropriate instructions issued.
3.2.2 SSR identification procedures:

Where SSR is used for identification, aircraft may be identified by one or more of the
following procedures:
I. Recognition of the aircraft identification in a SSR label;
Note: The use of this procedure requires that the code/call sign correlation is
achieved successfully, taking into account the Note following II) below.
II. Recognition of an assigned discrete code, the setting of which has been verified, in
a RADAR label; and
Note: The use of this procedure requires a system of code assignment which
ensures that each aircraft in a given portion of airspace is assigned a discrete
code.
III. Direct recognition of the aircraft identification of a Mode S-equipped aircraft in a
RADAR label;
Note: The aircraft identification feature available in Mode S transponders
provides the means to identify directly individual aircraft on situation displays
and thus offers the potential to eliminate ultimately the recourse to Mode A

discrete codes for individual identification. This elimination will only be achieved
in a progressive manner depending on the state of deployment of suitable ground
and airborne installations.
IV. By transfer of identification , by one of the following methods:
1. Designation of the position indication by automated means, provided that only

one position indication is thereby indicated and there is no possible doubt of
correct identification;
2. Notification of the aircrafts discrete SSR code or aircraft address;
Note: Aircraft address would be expressed in the form of the alphanumerical

code of six hexadecimal characters.
3. Notification that the aircraft is SSR Mode S-equipped with an aircraft

identification feature when SSR Mode S coverage is available;
4. Notification that the aircraft is ADS-B-equipped with an aircraft identification
feature when compatible ADS-B coverage is available;
5. Direct designation "pointing with the finger" of the position indication, if the two
situation displays are adjacent, or if a common conference type of situation
display is used;
Note: Attention must be given to any errors which might occur due to parallax
effects.
6. Designation of the position indication by reference to, or in terms of bearing and
distance from, a geographical position or navigational facility accurately indicated
on both situation displays, together with the track of the observed position
indication if the route of the aircraft is not known to both controllers;
Note: Caution must be exercised before transferring identification using this
method, particularly if other position indications are observed on similar
headings and in close proximity to the aircraft under control.
Inherent RADAR deficiencies, such as inaccuracies in bearing and distance of the
RADAR position indications displayed on individual situation displays and parallax
errors, may cause the indicated position of an aircraft in relation to the known point
to differ between the two situation displays. The appropriate ATS authority may,
therefore, prescribe additional conditions for the application of this method, e.g.:
i. A maximum distance from the common reference point used by the two
controllers; and
ii. A maximum distance between the position indication as observed by the
accepting controller and the one stated by the transferring controller.
7. Where applicable, issuance of an instruction to the aircraft by the transferring
controller to change SSR code and the observation of the change by the accepting
controller; or

8. Issuance of an instruction to the aircraft by the transferring controller to

squawk/transmit IDENT and observation of this response by the accepting
controller.
Note: Use of procedures 7) and 8) requires prior coordination between the
controllers, since the indications to be observed by the accepting controller are of
short duration.
V. Observation of compliance with an instruction to set a specific code.
VI. Observation of compliance with an instruction to squawk IDENT.
Notes:
1. In automated RADAR systems, the "IDENT" feature may be presented in
different ways, e.g. as a flashing of all or part of the position indication and
associated label.
2. Garbling of transponder replies may produce "IDENT"-type of indication,
nearly simultaneous IDENT transmissions within the same area may give
rise to errors in identification.
3.2.3 ADS-B identification procedures:

Where ADS-B is used for identification, aircraft may be identified by one or more
of the following procedures:
I. Direct recognition of the aircraft identification in an ADS-B label.

II. Transfer of ADS-B identification.
III. Observation of compliance with an instruction to TRANSMIT ADS-B
IDENT.
Notes:
1. Some aircraft equipped with first generation ADS-B avionics do not have the
capability of squawking IDENT while the emergency and/or urgency mode is
selected.
2. In automated systems, the IDENT feature may be presented in different
ways, e.g. as a flashing of all or part of the position indication and associated
label.
3.3 Surveillance Separation Minima:

The RADAR separation minima to be applied as the following table, the RADAR
controller is responsible for increasing the prescribed Minimum in the event of
RADAR technical limitation or prevailing weather conditions, controller workload
and any difficulty caused by communication problems or traffic congestion.
In low visibility conditions, the RADAR controller shall increase the Horizontal
RADAR Separation Minima.
The Horizontal RADAR Separation Minima " HRSM " prescribed for use in
Amman TACC:

THALES INDRA
ADS-B
Sector HRSM Sector HRSM

RADAR APP 5 NM TMAA 5 NM
Control Monitor
Service West 5 NM AQAP P.S only
East 5 NM ACCW 5 NM
-- -- ACCE 5 NM
-- -- ACCU 5 NM
PS: Procedure Separation.
Traffic flying via Talaviv FIR the Longitudinal RADAR separation for overflying
traffic shall be 10 NM provided that both aircraft is at constant speed or the preceding
aircraft is faster by 20 KTs or more, but with CAIRO, Saudi Arabia and Syria FIRs
should be 20 NM provided that both aircraft is at constant speed or the preceding
aircraft is faster by 20 KTs or more.
Cairo Saudi Arabia Iraq Syria Talaviv
RADAR
20 NM 20 NM 20 NM 20 NM 10 NM
Separation
RADAR
Failure 5 MIN 5 MIN 5 MIN 5 MIN 10 MIN
Procedure
National
Contingency 15 NM 15 NM 15 NM 15 NM 15 NM
Plan
Note: Jeddah and Riyadh ACCs require if the UPS equipment is not operative
from one side, the RADAR separation will be increased from 20 NM to 30 NM.
3.4 Mode C Verification and Errors:

Verification of pressure-altitude-derived level information displayed to the controller
shall be effected at least once by each suitably equipped ATC unit on initial contact
with the aircraft concerned or, if this is not feasible, as soon as possible thereafter. The
verification shall be effected by simultaneous comparison with altimeter-derived level
information received from the same aircraft by radiotelephony.

The pilot of the aircraft whose pressure-altitude-derived level information is within the
approved tolerance value need not be advised of such verification. Geometric height
information shall not be used to determine if altitude differences exist.
3.4.1 Mode C Verification:
The accuracy of Mode C reporting is affected by: aircraft altimeter accuracy and
pressure setting. Aircraft deviation from the nominal cleared level ATC system
processing.
1. The criterion which shall be used to determine that a specific level is occupied by
an aircraft shall be 60 m (200 ft) in RVSM airspace.
In other airspace, it shall be 90 m (300 ft), except that the appropriate ATS
authority may specify a smaller criterion, but not less than 60 m (200 ft), if this
is found to be more practical.
2. Aircraft maintaining a level: An aircraft is considered to be maintaining its
assigned level as long as the pressure-altitude-derived level information indicates
that it is within the appropriate tolerances of the assigned level, as specified in
Point 1.
3. Aircraft vacating a level: An aircraft cleared to leave a level is considered to

have commenced its maneuver and vacated the previously occupied level when
the pressure-altitude-derived level information indicates a change of more than 90
m (300 ft) in the anticipated direction from its previously assigned level.
4. Aircraft passing a level in climb or descent: An aircraft in climb or descent is

considered to have crossed a level when the pressure-altitude-derived level
information indicates that it has passed this level in the required direction by more
than 90 m (300 ft).
5. Aircraft reaching a level: An aircraft is considered to have reached the level to

which it has been cleared when the elapsed time of three display updates, three
sensor updates or 15 seconds, whichever is the greater, has passed since the
pressure-altitude-derived level information has indicated that it is within the
appropriate tolerances of the assigned level, as specified in Point 1.
3.4.2 Mode C Errors:

1. The displayed level information is not within the approved tolerance value or
when a discrepancy in excess of the approved tolerance value is detected
subsequent to verification, the pilot shall be advised accordingly and requested to
check the pressure setting and confirm the aircrafts level.
2. If following confirmation of the correct pressure setting the discrepancy continues
to exist, the following action should be taken according to circumstances:
a) Request the pilot to stop Mode C or ADS-B altitude data transmission,
provided this does not cause the loss of position and identity information, and
notify the next control positions or ATC unit concerned with the aircraft of the
action taken; or

b) Inform the pilot of the discrepancy and request that the relevant operation
continue in order to prevent loss of position and identity information of the
aircraft and, when authorized by the appropriate ATS authority, override the
label-displayed level information with the reported level. Notify the next
control position or ATC unit concerned with the aircraft of the action taken.
3.4.3 Phraseology:
ATC: CHECK ALTIMETER SETTING, CONFIRM the (level).
ATC: STOP SQUAWK CHARLIE WRONG INDICATION.
Reference: DOC 4444, Chapter 12, point 12.4.3.12
3.5 SSR Codes:
3.5.1 General:
Jordan is part of the Middle East Region SSR code allocation plan. All states in the
region are allocated code blocks from the Mode A codes.
3.5.2 SSR Code Failure:

If known traffic is not identified due to aircraft SSR failure, non-RADAR separation
must be used, and coordination is required with the next control unit for acceptance.
3.5.3 Inbound SSR code assignment:

Inbound traffic to any Jordanian aerodrome will be code allocated by either:
1. Origination control unit or from the first country in the region and will be
accepted when receiving the estimate message.
2. Amman TACC will allocate a code to any inbound aircraft that does not have an
allocated code, or conflicts with any other assigned code, from the block 0400
0477.
3.5.4 Over fly SSR code assignment:

1. Amman TACC will accept this code as a part of the estimate message, and use it
for the flight in Amman FIR, and pass it with the estimate message to the next
FIR.
2. Amman TACC will allocate a code to any overflying traffic that does not have
an allocated code, or conflicts with any other assigned code, from the block 0700
0777.
3.5.5 Outbound SSR code assignment:

1. Amman TACC will allocate a code for outbound traffic from the block 0700
0777.
2. All outbound traffic via Talaviv FIR, Talaviv ACC will pass the code to Amman
TACC.

3.5.6 Domestic SSR Codes:

1. Local flights will be allocated a code from the block 1101 1177.
2. Military flights will be allocated a code from the block 2400 2477.
Note: SSR code 2401 is reserved for VVIP helicopter flight.

3. Aviation training academies flights will be allocated a code from the block 2200
2277.

3.5.7 Regional SSR Codes assignment:
Domestic Domestic
STATE FIR Transit Code Transit Code
Code Code
0400 0477
Amman 2400 2477 0700 0777
1101 1177
Baghdad 7400 7477 1000 1077
2100 2177 2200 2277

Bahrain 1200 1277 2600 2677
2700 2777 4400 4477
Beirut 2500 2577 4300 4477
0600 0677 1600 1677

Cairo 2300 2377 3300 3377
2700 2777 7300 7377
Damascus 3000 3077 5700 5777
0400 0477 0600 0677 0500 0577 1700 1777

Emirates
6000 6077 6100 6177 3400 3477 6200 6277
0100 0177
0200 0277 3100 3177 4500 4577
Jeddah 3500 3577
5000 5077 5200 5277 4200 4277
3000 3077
1200 1277
Khartoum 5300 5377 0100 0177
5200 5277
Kuwait 0600 0677 1400 1477
6600 6677
Muscat 6500 6577 4000 4077 4700 4777
4600 4677
Sanaa 3700 3777 7001 7077
1101 1177 1500 1577

Tehran 4100 4177 3600 3677
6700 - 6777 6300 6377
Tripoli 1300 1377 4000 4077
Reference: ANSIG / 1 WP / 20 ( 03/02/2015 )

CHAPTER FOUR
TMA and AREA

PROCEDURES
TACC MATC II TMA & Area Procedure CHAPTER 4
4. TMA and AREA Procedure

4.1. General:
Amman TMA inbound and outbound traffic will be cleared on the system of SID's
or STAR's or RNAV procedures.
Traffic will only be cleared on non standard routes in the following circumstances:
1. Emergency.
2. Medical Flights.
3. Weather Conditions.
4. If RADAR Service is provided.
Classification of Jordan Airspace:
1. Class A: Class A comprises all controlled airspace within Amman FIR above
FL150.
2. Class C: Class C comprises all controlled airspace within Amman FIR
at FL 150 or below.
3. Class G: Class G comprises the rest of Amman FIR.
4.2. Departure Flights Procedure:

Departures are the responsibility of Approach Unit.
Ground controller shall request startup clearance from Approach Unit for all
departing IFR. Approach Unit will issue ATC clearances as early as practicable and
shall include:
1. SID designators " Conventional or RNAV ."
2. Standard outbound level or a lower level if required.
3. Any other restrictions such as "take-off time."
4. Any other information or restrictions such as "SSR code, level restrictions,
speed or rate of climb restrictions."
Traffic proceeding via RALNA or MUVIN SIDs, Approach Unit will request SSR
code and QNH from Tel Aviv and pass it to the Tower unit as soon as possible.
Tower Unit shall obtain release clearance from Approach Unit for all departing IFR
traffic.
Approach Unit shall release traffic for departure subject to traffic situation.
4.2.1. Outbound Silent RADAR Handover:

1. It is clear of traffic holding in the TMA.
2. It is climbing to the standard outbound or agreed level.
3. RADAR is fully serviceable with Mode C functioning.
4. It is not subject to any restriction of speed or heading " own navigation".

5. "10 NM" should be between successive departures.

6. Otherwise, normal RADAR handover must be carried out.
4.2.2 Standard Outbound Levels:
Outbound traffic will only be climbed to the standard outbound levels shown
below " Table 5-1 ".
Traffic will only be climbed above these levels under the following conditions:
a) Traffic is airborne and satisfactory two-way radio communication has been

established.
b) Either RADAR Failure Procedure is established or traffic is under RADAR
control.
c) Coordination has been established with the en-route sector before traffic
climbs above the standard outbound levels.
Table 5-1
Standard
TMA ENTRY FIX Outbound Level
LOSAR FL 250
LUDAN FL 250
QTR FL 250
KULDI FL 250
ELOXI FL 250
If the pilot unable to comply with the ATC instructions, the pilot should advice ATC
ASAP, the ATC can instruct the pilot to proceed to the nearest hold or RADAR
vectoring to gain height.
4.3. Arrival Flights Procedure:

1. INDRA system will automatically print all the arrival flight plans and all
inbound estimates in sufficient time prior to the ETA.
2. In case INDRA system is unserviceable. Approach Unit shall pass EAT to
the Tower Unit 15 MIN earlier; any revision more than 3 min shall be
passed.
3. Approach Unit will pass Tower check before the release of traffic.

4. Any other information requested shall be passed as soon as possible, like:

POB, reason of flight.
5. Approach Unit passes final approach checks " TWR check, Sequence and
Revisions more than 3 minutes "
4.3.1. Inbound Silent RADAR Handover :
a) Inbound Traffic must be released to Approach Unit vertically separated at entry

point otherwise RADAR handover procedure shall take effect.
b) Inbound Silent RADAR Handover:
1. Aircraft descending to a standard inbound level or agreed level.

2. Aircraft flying " own navigation " and is not subject to any heading or speed
restrictions.
3. RADAR is fully serviceable with Mode C functioning.
4. "10 NM" should be between successive arrivals.
5. Traffic should be released at or before TMA entry points. Otherwise, normal
handover must be carried out.
6. Otherwise, normal RADAR handover must be carried out.
4.3.2. Standard Inbound Levels:

To ensure separation from outbound traffic, inbound traffic will not be cleared
below the following standard inbound levels shown below " Table 5-2 " until clear
of the SIDs unless coordinated with Approach Unit.
Table 5-2
Standard
TMA ENTRY FIX Inbound Level
LOSAR FL 260
LUDAN FL 260
QTR FL 260
KULDI FL 260
ELOXI FL 260
4.4. PBN Procedure within AMMAN FIR " RNAV Procedure ":
4.4.1 Description:
Amman is implementing PBN Procedures, RNAV 5 for en-route and RNAV 1 for
SIDs and STARs profiles and RNP 0.3 for approaches.

PBN operations satisfy required track accuracy for at least 95% of the flight time in
accordance with the requirements set out in ICAO Doc.7030 and Doc. 9613.
Equipped aircraft will operate within PBN airspace and shall be certified for PBN
operation that based on navigation sensors of GNSS.
4.4.2. General Procedures:
All published RNAV TMA instrument flight procedures are based only on GNSS, and
doesnt depend on any ground navigational equipment.
RNAV procedures are available to those aircraft with RNAV capability. This could be
confirmed by checking the FPL item 10ANavigation Equipment and the
corresponding details item 18 which is reflected on INDRA RADAR System on
NAV/COM field and field 18, or by RADIO call.
Controllers should confirm the compliance of the traffic to perform an RNAV

procedure by refer to item 10 in the flight plan:
Traffic shall be within RADAR coverage and identified.
Traffic could be vectored prior to the IAFs (Initial Approach Fixes) for sequencing
purposes, considering the Surveillance Minimum Altitude chart (SMA), and then
cleared to resume navigation to the IAF for either to continue the RNAV Approach or
to enter the associated holding pattern for further delaying actions, further more traffic
could be vectored to the IAFs (Initial Approach Fixes) directly.
In case of any failure of the GNSS system reported or performance degradation below
the required navigation performance, the APP controller will carry on an alternative
mean of navigation; subsequent ATC action will take place with the respect to the
nature of the failure to other traffic and to over all traffic situation and might revert to
a conventional means of navigation, phraseology to be used to indicate deficiency of
GNSS system:
1. GNSS REPORTED UNRELIABLE (or GNSS MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE

[DUE TO INTERFERENCE]);
2. IN THE VICINITY OF (location) (radius) [BETWEEN (levels)]; or IN THE
AREA OF (description) (or IN (name) FIR) [BETWEEN (levels)];
3. BASIC GNSS UNAVAILABLE FOR(specify operation) [FROM (time) TO
(time) (or UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE)]; ) BASIC GNSS UNAVAILABLE
[DUE TO (reason, e.g. LOSS OF RAIM or RAIM ALERT)];
4. UNABLE RNP (specify type) (or RNAV) [DUE TO (reason, e.g. LOSS OF
RAIM or RAIM ALERT)].
In reference to PBN applications in Amman FIR as a supplemental mean of
navigation, most of commercial aircraft found to be able to comply with RNAV SIDs
and STARs, and prefer to follow these procedures as published.

4.5. Holding Areas:
1. AMN VOR Hold:

Holding fix AMN VOR
Inbound R241 (track 061o)
Turns direction Left
Outbound 1 MIN
MHA 6000 FT
Maximum holding level 13000 FT
2. QAA VOR "LOW LEVEL Hold":

Holding fix QAA VOR
Turns direction Right
Outbound 1 MIN
Minimum holding level 6000 FT
Maximum holding level FL 180
3. QAA VOR "HIGH LEVEL Hold":

Holding fix QAA VOR
Outbound 1 MIN
Minimum holding level FL 190
4. QTR VOR Hold :

Holding fix QTR VOR
Outbound 1 MIN
Note: Holding must be contained within 15NM to the East of QTR for separation
purposes.

5. MDB NDB / QAA DME Hold:

Holding fix MDB NDB
Inbound bearing 077 (track 077o)
Outbound 1 MIN
Maximum holding level 11000 FT
6. BAKIR FIX Hold:
Holding fix BAKER (AQB R042 07NM)

Turns direction Left
Outbound 1 MIN
Emergency holding level 7000 FT
Restriction: The hold must be contained within Aqaba APP Control Area
boundaries, and associated hold shall serve traffic proceeding to or departing
from Aqaba/King Hussein International Aerodrome.
BAKIR FIX: 293930N 0350530E, AQB R042-07NM, QTR R206-107NM.

METSA to BAKIR Track 206 -14NM.
Notes:
1. Pilots are requested to relay their messages to King Hussein Tower on FREQ
118.1 or 119.2MHz whenever they are unable to maintain two ways
communication with Amman Terminal Area Control Center (TACC).
2. All operations below 7000FT ALT will be in accordance with Visual Flight
Rules, and controlled by King Hussein Tower within CTR and controlled by
Aqaba Approach within CTA.

7. Separation between holding areas:
Holds Altitude
AMN QAA MAX ALT 13000
MDB - QAA MAX ALT 11000
AMN - MDB MAX ALT 11000
MDB QTR MAX ALT 11000
QTR QAA MAX FL180
4.6. Co-ordination Procedures :

4.6.1. General Procedures and Flight planning between Approach Unit and Tower
Unit:
1. Safety and expedition are the prime responsibilities of both ATC units.
2. Adequate coordination between ATC units is to be maintained to ensure continuity
in service and a safe, expeditious flow of air traffic.
3. When attempting to increase expedition, consideration must always be given to the
possible detrimental effect on safety.
4. Where controllers work together, every effort should be made to monitor each
other's actions, thus providing an additional safeguard against errors or omissions.
5. A controlled flight shall be under the control of ONLY ONE air traffic control
unit at any given time.
6. The Approach controller is responsible for coordination of IFR and controlled
VFR flights inbound and outbound.
7. Prevailing weather, Runway condition, Equipment, Navigational Aids and any
other information essential to aircraft operation shall be exchanged between the
two units.
8. In case of Emergency both Units should follow the procedures in TACC MATC
II, Chapter 11, Airport Emergency Plan and amendments.
9. Tower Unit is responsible for:
a) Modifying and updating the departure FPL according to the ATC clearance.
b) Creating any departure flight plan from Amman / Marka Airport which is
not available or lost from the RADAR system for any reason.
10. Amman TACC is responsible for any modification in the "Q Summary" in
FDDs.

4.6.2. Visual Approach:
Visual approach may only be approved when requested by the pilot provided that:
1. The aircraft is number ONE for Approach.
2. The controller is satisfied that a visual Approach is acceptable in the
prevailing traffic and possible in prevailing weather.
3. Coordination is affected with Tower Unit.
4. Traffic will be cleared to the minimum vectoring altitude (for Amman Marka
Airport 6000 FT), Traffic will be released to TWR after passing 5 DME
AMN or having " airfield or runway" in sight and clear from APP traffic.
5. Traffic will be cleared to the minimum vectoring altitude (for Queen Alia
Airport 4000 FT) and will be released to the Tower Unit as coordinated or
having " airfield or runway" in sight and clear from APP traffic.
Note: Succeeding arrival traffic will not be cleared for visual approach until
preceding one is landed or landing is assured, and each request for visual
approach will be handled individually (traffic shall not be sequenced behind
each other as they might loss visual contact).
4.6.3. Runway Change Procedure:

1. Runway change will be initiated by Tower Unit.
2. Coordination will be effected with Approach.
3. Runway changes will take-effect when traffic situation permits.
4. ATC clearances for departure traffic should be revised.
5. Alternative course of action will be considered, if so required, but if the wind
component urged, the change of the runway would normally occur, arrivals
will be subject to delay action.
Notes:
1. Tailwind component shall not exceed 5 KTS. lCAO doc 4444.
2. When the crosswind component, including gusts, exceeds 28 km/h
(15 KTS), or the tailwind component, including gusts, exceeds 9 km/h
(5KTS).
3. Tailwind shall not exceed more than 5 KTS, when nomination runway
in use, if the tailwind is more than 5 KTS and less than 10 KTS it should be
pilot request and his responsibilities to use runway other than runway in use,
if the traffic permits, when the tail wind is more than 10 KTS its forbidden
and the main RWY for operation is the one its QFU is against wind direction.
4. Crosswind component shall not exceed l0 KTS according to the table and
lCAO Doe 4444. With pilot approval.

4.6.4. VFR Traffic Procedures:

It is the direct responsibility of the pilot using VFR corridor V1 to avoid collision
with other Aircraft and maintain VFR.
For light aircraft and military fixed wings:
1. South bound ( 4000 FT QNH ).
2. North bound ( 4500 FT QNH ).
For helicopters north and south bound ( 3500 FT QNH ).
4.6.4.1. Operating Rules:

Pilots are required to comply with the following operating rules:
1. Maintain VMC.
2. Maintain a continuous listening watch on the required ATC frequency.
3. Make Visual position reports at the mandatory reporting points.
4. Follow ATC instructions.
5. Advice ATC if unable to comply with ATC instructions.
6. Pass "Operation Normal" reports to Queen Alia Control Tower every 15
minutes while operating within the training area.
4.6.4.2. Visual Flight Rules:

a) VFR flights shall not be operated:
1. Between 30 minutes after Sunset until 30 minutes before Sunrise.
2. Above FL 150.
b) Night VFR Flights within Amman/Marka Airport may be authorized by

CARC CEO provided that;
1. VFR minimum exists in the aerodrome traffic circuit.
2. Only 3 Aircraft are cleared for night flying in the circuit and 2 Helicopters.
3. At least 48 hours notice is provided.
4.6.4.3. SVFR at Amman / Marka CTR:

SVFR flights may be authorized to operate locally within a Control Zone, enter a
Control Zone for the purpose of landing , take off and depart from a Control Zone
provided that :
1. Ground visibility is not less than 1500 meter.
2. Traffic condition permit.
3. Approval from Approach Unit " request shall be handled individually" .
4. The aircraft is equipped with two way radio communications.
5. FPL shall be submitted to ATS reporting office at least 15 minutes before
EOBT.
6. SVFR should be clear of clouds.
7. Clearance to aircraft will be issued as follows:

"CLEARED TO ENTER CONTROL ZONE BOUNDARY SVFR MAINTAIN

CLEAR OF CLOUDS AND IN SIGHT OF THE SURFACE."
4.6.5. Diversion Procedure:

In case of any traffic request to divert to Amman / Marka Airport or Queen Alia
Airport, the Approach Unit shall:
1. Inform the concerned Tower unit stating the diversion reason and diverted
flight information.
2. The Tower Unit should inform the Approach unit if this flight has a valid
landing permission or not.
3. Any other essential information.
4.6.6. Miscellaneous Operations:

4.6.6.1. The following information shall immediately be coordinated between Tower
Unit and Approach Unit:
1. Missed approach.
2. Diversion.
3. Closure of the airport.
4. Fuel Spillage.
5. Maneuvering area situation.
6. Bird constraint.
7. Runway condition, Status of equipment, if degraded.
8. NOTAM.
9. Equipment status.
10. Any other relevant information.
4.6.6.2. Communication between the Approach Unit and Tower Unit shall be
carried out by any means of:
1. Direct Lines Available.
2. AFTN When necessary.
3. Other means available.

CHAPTER FIVE
AMMAN / MARKA
AIRPORT PROCEDURES
TACC MATC II OJAM Procedures CHAPTER 5
5.Amman / Marka Airport Procedures:

5.1. General:
Amman Control Zone
AMMAN CTR
320356.10518N 355159.09688E
320356.10741N 361059.12258E
1. Designation and lateral limits 321026.11481N 362759.14456E
320426.11076N 363659.15768E
315256.09991N 362529.14390E
315256.09547N 354659.09195E
2. Vertical limits SFC to 5500 FT ALT

3. Airspace classification C
ATS unit call sign Amman TWR
4.
Language(s) English, Arabic
5. Transition altitude 13000 FT AMSL

5.2.1. Departure Flights Release Procedure :
TWR shall release departure traffic to Approach Unit as soon as possible when
clear from aerodrome traffic, or as follows:
1. At or before ORKAB point for Runway 24, for Runway 06 at or before
AMN.
2. Immediately after airborne when IMC prevails or entering IMC conditions.
3. When requested by APP as soon as possible after it is clear from circuit traffic.
Academy Traffic requesting to proceed IFR to QTR, JAFER Airbase or AQABA
should submit flight plan and to follow standard instrument departure.
Tower shall coordinate SVFR with Approach Unit.
5.2.2. Conventional Arrival Flights Release Procedure :

Inbound traffic will be released to Approach Unit at the TMA entry point, or at any
other point agreed by coordination (Conventional or RNAV entry point), otherwise
Approach Unit shall release arrival traffic to AMM TWR, when:
1. Out bound AMN VOR leaving 6000 FT on the instrument approach.
2. During straight in approach for ILS Runway 24, Tower check will be made at
20 NM and release of control at 10 NM from touchdown and over NIVLU
point for RNAV Approaches.

3. In poor weather condition traffic will not be released until " field or runway " is
in sight provided that cloud base and RVR not less than aerodrome minima
according to CAT I requirements.
4. In visual approach the traffic will maintain 6000 FT and TWR will advise 6000
FT vacant, release of control to TWR after passing 5 DME AMN.
Notes:
1. During IMC conditions where the minima below the CAT I requirements
ATC shall indicate the attention by not able to issue and ATC clearance
and the aerodrome in such conditions will be considered closed.
2. Take off weather minimums for IFR flights are as follows:
a) AIRCRAFT CAT A AND B RVR 400M.
b) AIRCRAFT CAT C AND D RVR 400M.
5.2.3. RNAV Arrival Procedures:

Approach Unit should:
1. If the traffic is commencing an RNAV Approach, Approach Unit should pass
this information to the TWR as soon as possible, not later than IAFs (IVADO,
LOXER, MUSAL and EMILO).
2. Tower check is required shortly prior the traffic leaves the IAFs (IVADO,
LOXER, MUSAL, EMILO).
3. Approach Unit will release the traffic to the TWR on final approach track, in
these cases:
a) Passing waypoint NIVLU.
b) Passing waypoint SOLOL.
4. Landing interval for successive inbound traffic for both RWYs is: 10NM.
5. In case of traffic cleared to enter MUSAL hold either for the APP RWY06 or
Missed APP RWY24, coordination shall take place with the ADOC by APP.
As the holding pattern could extend outside the TMA to the north.
6. MUSAL EMILO holds are considered as one hold, traffic in these holding
patterns shall be vertically separated from each other.
7. EMILO RESOS holds are considered as one hold, traffic in these holding
patterns shall be vertically separated from each other.
Notes:
1. In case of RWY24 is in use, traffic should be at NIVLU at 7200 ft descending,

APP will keep monitoring the traffic until it vacating 6000ft.
2. In case of RWY06 is in use, traffic should be at SOLOL at 5500ft descending.
3. If the traffic is performing RNAV RWY24 APP via IVADO, close
coordination shall take place between the two units as this procedure has no
holding pattern fits, and this traffic shall be cleared for the approach upon
reaching IVADO.

4. In case of missed approach, TWR shall clear the takeoff path from any other
traffic may be operating in the vicinity of the aerodrome, and shall advice APP
immediately.
5.3. Landing Intervals:
1. 7 minutes procedural, RWY 24 in use.

2. 5 minutes when RADAR in use, RWY 24 in use.
3. 10 minutes procedural or RWY 06 in use.
4. 10 NM in RNAV.
5. For straight-in approaches:
a) 10 NM provided RADAR in use.
b) 20 NM procedural.
Note: Priority will be given for arrival traffic over the departure, except for VIP
flight and for those which are experiencing weather deterioration and up normal
situations, Such as (certain military flights, urgent ambulance etc.
Succeeding aircraft will be released for Amman tower when preceding aircraft is:
1. RWY 24: Passing VOR inbound.
2. RWY 06: Traffic in base leg and landing is assured.
5.4. Training Flights Procedure:
IFR Training request standard SID to QTR, JAFER Airbase or AQABA will be
approved subject to traffic situation, considering the following:
1. QTR hold shall not exceed 3 Aircraft at the same time.
2. Practicing Instrument approaches will only be permitted if it does not cause
delay to IFR traffic.
Coordination between the Approach Unit and AMM TWR as appropriate shall be
effected also in the following cases:
1. Aerobatics and parachute jumping.
2. Suspension of VFR.
3. Operation of SVFR.
4. Night flying.
5. Glider operation.
6. Military exercises, or special operations.
7. Recall of academy flights due to deteriorating weather conditions.
Air force traffic joining from the North or from the East requesting straight in
approach, shall be coordinated between the two ATC units, Amman tower and
Approach Unit.

5.5. Approach Procedure:

Instrument Approach/Missed Approach Procedures, Amman/Marka
International Airport (OJAM)
Aerodrome elevation: 2556 FT,
RWY 24 THR ELEV: 2459 FT,
RWY 06 THR ELEV: 2556 FT,
MSA: 5400FT, 25NM FROM ARP.
CIRCLING: All aircraft types 4000 FT (1445FT QFE), both RWYs.
5.5.1. Runway 24 :
5.5.1.1. ILS RWY 24:

When cleared for the approach, commence a 45o / 180o procedure turn from AMN
to establish the ILS as follows:
- Outbound AMN R061, for 1 MIN. (AMN 03 DME), descends to 4600 FT.
- Turn right 45o, track 106o, for 1 MIN.
- Turn left 180o to establish ILS RWY 24. Descend on the glide path to DA/H
ALT (Height)
Initial Approach Altitude FT 6000
Minimum Holding Altitude 6000
Descend in procedure turn to 4600 (2142)
No GP (LOC ONLY) Cross AMN (3.4 3650 (1190)
NM TCH)
MDA 2850 (392)
DA/H A B C D
straight-in CAT 1 2728(270) 2738(280) 2748(290) 2758(300)
No GPApproach
(LOC ONLY) 2848 (390)
5.5.1.2. VOR RWY 24:

When cleared for the approach, commence a 45o / 180o procedure turn from AMN
to establish the inbound track as follows:
- Outbound AMN R061, for 1 MIN. (AMN 03 DME), descends to 4600FT.
- Turn right 45o, track 106o, for 1 MIN.
- Turn left 180o to intercept AMN R061 inbound.
- After passing AMN continue on AMN R241, descend to MDA.
ALT (Height) FT
Initial Approach Altitude 6000
Descend in procedure turn to 4600 (2142)
SDF AMN 3.55 DME 4600 (2142)
SDF AMN 3650 (1190)
MDA 3260 (802)
3261

5.5.1.3. Missed Approach RWY 24:

Aircraft initiating missed approach will climb on RWY heading to 5000FT (2542FT
QFE) then turn right to 360 and contact ATC for further instructions.
5.5.2. Runway 06 :
5.5.2.1. VOR RWY 06:

When cleared for approach, leave AMN VOR on outbound Radial 061 after one minute
(03 DME), Commence procedure turn, turn right continue descent to intermediate
approach altitude to intercept radial 061 inbound to AMN VOR after passing AMN /
VOR break to right to join left hand down wind (circle to land left base ).
Initial Approach Altitude 6000 FT ALT

Minimum Holding Altitude 6000 FT ALT
Descend in procedure turn to 4600 FT ALT (2142 FT QFE)
AMN/VOR 4000 FT ALT (1192 QFE)


CHAPTER SIX
QUEEN ALIA AIRPORT

PROCEDURES
TACC MATC II OJAI Procedures CHAPTER 6
6. Queen Alia Airport Procedures:

6.1. General:
Queen Alia Control Zone

QUEEN ALIA CTR
315256.09991N 362529.14390E
313126.08290N 362959.15323E
1. Designation and lateral limits
312826.07583N 354859.09862E
314256.08680N 354259.08822E
315256.09547N 354659.09195E
2. Vertical limits SFC to 5500 FT ALT
3. Airspace classification C
ATS unit call sign Queen Alia TWR

4.
Language(s) English, Arabic
5. Transition altitude 13000 FT AMSL

6.2.1. Departure Flights Procedure:
TWR shall release departing traffic to Approach Unit as soon as possible when clear
from aerodrome traffic, or as follows:
1. Passing 5000 FT.
2. Immediately after airborne when IMC prevails or entering IMC.
3. When requested by APP.
Airborne time shall be passed immediately to Approach Unit, when RADAR system
is not serviceable.
Before vectoring any departure traffic, Approach Unit will consider V1 corridor is
active and assure procedural separation unless otherwise coordinated.
6.2.2. Conventional Arrival Flights Release Procedure:
A special check of position will be made to the Tower either:

1. Beacon inbound " QAA or MDB ".
2. 8 - 10 NM when RADAR is in use.
3. Before entering the aerodrome traffic area 5 NM for visual approach and
passing 6000 FT if RADAR is not in use.
4. Over IAF for RNAV ( Refer to Para 7.2.4).

Approach Unit shall release arrival traffic to Queen TWR when:

1. On final approach before QAA on westerly operation when RADAR in use.
2. On final approach before MDB on easterly operation when RADAR in use.
3. In poor weather condition traffic will not be released until " field or runway " is
in sight provided that cloud base and RVR not less than aerodrome minima
according to CAT I requirements.
4. Down wind or base leg on visual approach not before 5 NM or as coordinated.
Notes:
1. During IMC conditions where the minima below the CAT I requirements
ATC shall indicate the attention by not able to issue and ATC clearance and
the aerodrome in such conditions will be considered close.
2. Take off weather minimums for IFR flights are as follows:
a) AIRCRAFT CAT A AND B RVR 400M / VIS 1500M.
b) AIRCRAFT CAT C AND D RVR 400M / VIS 800M.
3. For runway 26 L only:
a) ILS 26L: For inbound flights for ILS CAT II the RVR reading for
touchdown shall not be less than 400 Meters and ceiling is not less than
decision height 140 FT, and for departure flights the RVR reading shall
not less than 400 Meters.
b) The ATC shall pass this minimum to the aircraft concerned early
enough and also should be transmit through the ATIS.
6.2.3. RNAV Arrival Procedures:

1. Tower check is to be made prior the traffic leaves IAFs as follows:
a) Runway 26R / 26L: ORDUN or ASPAL.
b) Runway 08R / 08L: LOTES or RESOS.
2. APP will release the traffic to the TWR after turning IFs (on final approach
track) as follows:
a) Runway 26L: GENIS.
b) Runway 26R: ENADA.
c) Runway 08L: OBSAL.
d) Runway 08R: GEVUP.
3. RESOS LOTES holds are considered as one hold, traffic shall be vertically
separated.
4. ASPAL ORDUN holds are considered as one hold, traffic shall be vertically
separated.
5. RESOS EMILO holds are considered as one hold, traffic shall be vertically
separated.

6.2.4. Visual Approach:

6.2.4.1. RADAR Vectoring for Visual Approach:
Upon pilot request RADAR vectoring for visual approach, Approach Unit is
required to bring the aircraft to a point where the pilot can see the runway , then will
continue visually provided that:
1. Approach Unit may initiate RADAR vectoring for visual approach provided
the reported ceiling is above the minimum altitude applicable to RADAR
vectoring and metrological conditions are such that, with reasonable assurance,
a visual approach and landing can be completed.
2. Clearance for visual approach shall be issued only after the pilot has reported
the airfield or the runway is insight, at that time RADAR vectoring would
normally be terminated, successive arriving aircraft would be cleared for visual
approach after coordination with tower.
6.2.4.2. Visual approach on Westerly or Easterly operations:

1. Traffic on visual approach will be cleared down to the minimum vectoring
altitude, with no restriction to join base leg of the runway in use except if there
is traffic on V1 route.
2. Approach Unit will release the traffic leaving the initial approach level/or the
minimum vectoring altitude (when RADAR in use), joining downwind or base
leg, as early as possible.
Note: Succeeding arrival traffic will not be cleared for visual approach until
preceding one is landed or landing is assured, and each request for visual
approach will be handled individually.
3. When the VFR corridor " V1 " is active, visual approach clearance will be
subject to close coordination and approval by the tower, considering traffic
situation within this corridor, such clearances will not be a matter of dispute,
but priority will be given to IFR traffic to the extent possible.
Note: Visual approach maybe approved via QAA or MDB if traffic permit's.
4. Tower will consider the precise estimation of arrival traffic inbound to QAA
& MDB, VFR traffic request VFR clearances, issuance of such, will be based
on the estimation of arrival traffic.
Note: For runway 08R; the controller may initiate vectoring of an aircraft for
visual approach provided the reported ceiling is above the minimum altitude
applicable to vectoring and the meteorology conditions are such that with
reasonable assurance a visual approach and landing can be completed
Clearance for visual approach shall be issued only after the pilot has reported
the aerodrome in sight at which time vectoring would normally be terminated.

6.3. Landing Intervals:

1. For runway 08R and 26R: 7 NM.
2. For runway 08L and 26L: 5 NM provided the following:
a) The aircraft shall use minimum occupancy time and vacate the Runway via the
rapid exit taxiway; if unable the pilot shall inform ATC ASAP and should be
transmit through the ATIS.
b) If the preceding aircraft is a training aircraft for touch and go, succeeding one
will be separated by 5 NM behind, for the same runway, provided that
succeeding a/c performing same speed or less than the preceding aircraft.
c) During IMC conditions landing interval will be increased to 10 NM for all
runways.
3. The landing interval for QAA VOR Procedure is 5 minutes; succeeding aircraft
will be cleared for Approach when the preceding aircraft is QAA inbound leaving
4600 FT.
4. The landing interval for MDB NDB Procedure landing interval 5 minutes,
succeeding aircraft will be cleared for approach when the preceding aircraft is
MDB inbound on Final Approach passing 4500 FT.
6.4. Training Flights Procedure:

1. TWR shall coordinate all training operation in the circuit with Approach Unit
previously to avoid the peak landing hours.
2. Only one training aircraft allowed at the same time.
3. Circuit direction is left-hand on the left runways " 26L / 08L " and right-hand on
the right runways " 26R / 08R ".
4. Circuit altitude for the training traffic at Queen Alia is 3500 FT QNH.
5. 4000 FT QNH Circuit altitude for the training traffic at Queen Alia could be
permitted, prior coordination must be established between TWR and Approach
Unit.
6. Training traffic carrying out IFR Approaches will be coordinated with TWR, but
normal retained back to the approach frequency.
7. If there is any arriving aircraft within the TMA boundary, the training aircraft
will be released to Approach Unit for sequencing.
Note: For Runway 08R; the controller may initiate vectoring of an aircraft for
visual approach provided the reported ceiling is above the minimum altitude
applicable to vectoring and the meteorology conditions are such that with
reasonable assurance a visual approach and landing can be completed
Clearance for visual approach shall be issued only after the pilot has reported
the aerodrome in sight at which time vectoring would normally be terminated.

6.5. Approach Procedures:
INSTRUMENT APPROACH / MISSED APPROACH PROCEDURES, QUEEN

ALIA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (OJAI)
Aerodrome elevation 2397 FT,

RWY 26L THR ELEV: 2367 FT, RWY 26R THR ELEV: 2397 FT,
RWY 08L THR ELEV: 2362 FT, RWY 08R THR ELEV: 2359 FT,
MSA: 4900 FT, 25NM FROM ARP.
CIRCLING: All aircraft types 3500 FT (1105 FT QFE), All RWYs.
6.5.1. Runway 26L:
6.5.1.1. ILS RWY 26L:

When cleared for approach, descend in the QAA holding pattern to the intermediate
Approach Altitude and intercept the ILS on the inbound leg. Descend on the Glide
path to DA/H.
ALT (Height) FT
Intermediate Approach 4600 (2235)
ILS DA/H 2567 (200)
SDF No Glide Path (LOC ONLY): 4NM to TCH 3600 (1233)
(3.4NM from QAA)
MDA/H No Glide Path (LOC ONLY) 2670
)
6.5.1.2. ILS RWY 26L CAT II:
When cleared for approach, descend in the QAA holding pattern to the intermediate
Approach Altitude and intercept the ILS on the inbound leg. Descend on the Glide
path to DA/H.
ALT (Height) FT
ILS DA/H 2507 (140)

6.5.1.3. VOR RWY 26L :
When cleared for approach, descend in QAA holding pattern to the intermediate
altitude, Leave QAA on R257 (track 077o) to the THR 26L (QAA 7.3NM).
ALT (Height) FT
SDF: 4NM to TCH (3.4NM from 3600 (1235)
QAA)
MDA/H 2865 (500)
6.5.1.4. Visual Approach RWY 26L:
Visual Approach will be approved subject to Meteorological and traffic condition,

when requested by pilot. Initial clearance to descend to 4600FT ALT will be given
on passing 10d QAA.
6.5.1.5. Missed Approach RWY 26L:
Climb on RWY heading to 5000FT (QNH), Turn left to QAA or QA maintaining

5000FT (QNH) or as directed by ATC.
Restriction: Turn must be contained within TMA.
6.5.2. Runway 26R:

6.5.2.1. ILS RWY 26R:
When cleared for the approach, leave QAA, to establish QAA R050, to 6.5 NM,
descend to 4600FT, and turn right to establish the ILS RWY 26R.
ALT (Height) FT
ILS DA/H 2605 (210)
SDF No Glide Path (LOC ONLY): abeam QAA 4600 (2205)
SDF No Glide Path (LOC ONLY): 3.5 NM TCH 3400 (1003)
MDA/H No Glide Path (LOC ONLY) 2650 (255)
Speed: 180 KTS or less.

Missed Approach Procedure: Climb RWY heading to 5000FT (QNH), turn right,
and proceed to QAA VOR maintaining 5000FT or as directed by ATC.
RESTRICTION: Turn must be contained within TMA.
6.5.2.2. Visual Approach RWY 26R:

Visual Approach will be approved subject to Meteorological and traffic condition,
when requested by pilot. Initial clearance to descend to 4600FT ALT will be given
on passing 10d QAA.
6.5.3. Runway 08 L :
6.5.3.1. ILS RWY 08L:
When cleared for the approach, descend in MDB holding pattern to the intermediate
approach altitude, intercept the ILS RWY 08L, descend to DH/A.
ALT (Height) FT
ILS DA/H 2610 (250)
MDA/H No Glide Path (LOC ONLY) 2940 (580)
Note: Parallel Instrument RWY is not applied.
6.5.3.2. NDB RWY 08L:

Overhead MDB NDB at 6000FT AMSL, fly outbound on track 257 DEG MAG for
one minute descending to 4500 FT, establish inbound track 077 DEG MAG to
MDB NDB, on passing MDB NDB, establish track 077 DEG MAG descending to
2960 (QNH).
Initial Approach Altitude 6000 FT (QNH).
6.5.3.3. Missed Approach RWY 08L:
Missed Approach point 11 DME QAA (4.6 NM from MDB NDB) climb straight
ahead to 5000FT(QNH) turn left to MDB/NDB maintaining 5000FT (QNH) or as
directed by ATC.
6.5.4. Runway 08 R:
6.5.4.1. NDB RWY 08R:
When cleared for the approach, descend in MDB holding pattern to the intermediate
approach altitude, leave MDB on bearing 276 o (track 084o) towards the missed
Approach point (5 NM MDB, 10.6 DME QAA), descend to MDA/H.

ALT (Height) FT
SDF MDB 4500 (1235)
MDA/H 2960 (603)
6.5.4.2. Missed Approach RWY 08R:

Missed Approach Point 10.6 DME QAA (5 NM from MDB NDB) climb straight
ahead to 5000FT (QNH), Turn right to MDB/NDB maintaining 5000FT (QNH) or
as directed by ATC.

CHAPTER SEVEN
FAILURES
TACC MATC II Failures CHAPTER 7
7. FAILURES:
TACC Supervisor must record any failure in the Log Book or/and occurrence report.
7.1. Partial Service Failure:

7.1.1. INDRA or THALES RADAR Technical Failure:
TACC Supervisor shall:
1. Inform RADAR maintenance and try to determine the duration time of failure
if it is possible.
2. Inform TACC Chief and DANS.
3. Inform control towers.
4. Take any necessary actions to ensure RADAR service provided up to standard.
7.1.2. System Data Integrity:
TACC Supervisor shall Inform all ATC in duty to increase lateral and vertical
separation and if necessary to use procedural separation.
7.2. Complete RADAR Technical Failure:

TACC Supervisor shall:
1. Stop all departures and will be released subject to traffic situation.
2. Inform all concerned flights immediately and try to pass the ETA ASAP.
if it is possible.
4. Inform TACC Chief, DANS and ADOC.
6. Inform adjacent control units.
7. Apply non-RADAR emergency procedures in accordance to MATC I or apply
500 FT and 10 minutes separation when required.
8. Check THALES center in order to establish TACC operation.
9. Inbound traffic may be held as appropriate over the published holds.
10. Broadcast through ATIS regarding the RADAR service within AMMAN FIR.
11. Issue NOTAM if necessary.
12. Re-establish RADAR identification before providing the RADAR service
again.
7.3. VHF Communication System Failure:
TACC Supervisor shall follow the following instructions:

1. Inform communication maintenance and try to determine the duration time of
failure if it is possible.


5. Try to establish the communication by using the CAREX EMERGENCY
FREQUANCY.
6. If the CAREX EMERGENCY fails too, the ATC should try to establish the
communication by using the SELEX DRC.
7.4. Telephone System Failure:

In case the direct lines between Amman TACC and the adjacent or the local airports
or other local departments unserviceable, TACC Supervisor shall follow the
following instructions:
1. Try to establish the communication by using the CAREX EMERGENCY Dial

Telephone.
2. To call the adjacent ACC units check the National Contingency Plan , to call
other local departments, the controller should use one of two land lines in the
supervisor desk:
Name Telephone # Name Telephone #
DANS 0799767779 OCC 064793589
TACC Chief 0798373130 Permissions 0797511158
ADOC 064885814 Amman Tower 064891801
Talaviv ACC 0097246980210 Queen tower 064452699/599
Ben-Gurion ACC 0097239756320 Aqaba Tower 032031424
Jeddah ACC 0096626850560 Riyadh ACC 0096612215493
Damascus ACC 00963115400540 Cairo ACC 0020222650716
Baghdad ACC 009744503481
7.5. Electrical Failure:

In case the main electrical supply lost, there are two generators will work instantly
until the main supply back normally.

if it is possible.


7.6. AFTN Line Failure:
In case the two AFTN lines failure, the ATC should exchange the flight plan data or
any other required data with the adjacent units by one of the following means:
1. Direct lines.
2. Fax.
3. Any other means available.

1. Inform communication maintenance and try to determine the duration time of
failure if it is possible.
7.7. Facility Damage:

In case of uncontrolled fire in the ANS / Queen Alia building, TACC supervisor shall:
1. Ensure that the fire extinguisher system is activated.
2. Inform the Queen Tower.
3. Inform the civil defense either by telephone or through the tower or any other
means.
4. Initiate National Contingency Plan if required (Annex 5).
In case part of INDRA Center building destroyed, initiate TACC operation in

THALES Center, if not applicable initiate National contingency plan.
In case major destruction of the building initiate National Contingency Plan and the
evacuation plan.
The following evacuation NOTAMs should issue as follow:
Due to emergency evacuation of Amman TACC all ATC services are
terminated. Flights within Amman FIR should continue as cleared and
contact the next ATC agency as soon as possible.
Flights not in receipt of an ATC clearance should land at an appropriate
airfield or request clearance to avoid Amman FIR. Flights should monitor
frequency 128.3 MHz
Broadcast an evacuation message on appropriate frequencies:
Emergency evacuation of Amman TACC is in progress. No air traffic
control service will be provided by Amman TACC. Use extreme caution and
monitor frequency 128.3 MHz, emergency frequencies and air to air
frequencies. Contact the next air traffic control unit as soon as possible.

7.8. RADAR Failure Procedure:
In the event of total failure of the ATC RADAR System the following will be
undertaken:
1. ATC shall advise pilots-in-command of the RADAR failure via the
appropriate air-ground channels.
2. All departures may be suspended until aircraft in flight have been provided
with standard separation based on a procedural control (vertical separation)
environment or have landed.
3. As an emergency measure, the use of flight levels spaced by half the
applicable vertical separation minimum (500 FT) may be resorted to
temporarily if standard Non-RADAR Separation cannot be provided
immediately.
4. Inbound aircraft will be held over QTR VOR or AMN VOR and inward
clearance will leave the holding areas for an approach to land will be subject
to the position of the preceding aircraft.
5. Departing aircraft may be continued to be regulated according the FPL or
SIDs with the appropriate Slot Time. To assist ATC in providing separation,
pilots-in-command of aircraft departing on SIDs shall report established on
the flight plan ATS routes as soon as possible.
6. When RADAR services are re-established, ATC shall notify pilots via the
assigned frequency and the ATIS System. ATC will also take action to re-
establish aircraft identification before providing RADAR services.
7. Pilots shall take note that extended delays to operations may result depending
on the traffic and weather conditions. ATC will attempt to notify pilots of
inbound aircraft of the extent of the delay to enable pilots to decide whether
to hold or to divert without delay.
8. ATC shall transmit on the ATIS advising all pilots-in-command that RADAR
Failure Recovery Procedures are in Operation; all aircraft are to adhere
strictly to ATC instructions.
9. Longitudinal separation will be extended to 10-15 minutes as appropriate as
Non-RADAR Separation.
10. Flow control may impose during RADAR Failure Procedures if the
prevailing situations will be extended due to long periods malfunction of the
surveillance systems, and submission a NOTAM should be considered.

CHAPTER EIGHT
ROYAL FLIGHTS
TACC MATC II ROYAL FLIGHTS CHAPTER 8
8. ROYAL FLIGHTS
8.1. Introduction:
Royal Flight Definition (VVIP Flight):

The Royal flight within Jordan airspace is defined as the movement of an aircraft
specifically tasked to carry one or more members of The Royal Family afforded such
status by the Head of Royal Travel, the Royal Household.
The term (VVIP Flight) refers to the flights of the following persons:
1. His Majesty the King; HMK.
2. Her Majesty the Queen; HMQ.
3. Heads of Foreign Government or states.
4. As coordinated by Royal Flight ( RF ) operations.
VIP Flights within Jordan airspace by members of other Royal Families, Prime
Ministers and Heads of States of foreign countries, may also be afforded Royal Flight
status by the air traffic service units, when notified by the Royal Flight Operation .
The term ( VIP Flight ) refers to the flights of the following persons:
1. The Royal Family;
2. Distinguished guests.
8.2. Special Air Traffic Services Procedures for VVIP Flights (Air Traffic
Restrictions):
Procedures for Royal Flights in Fixed-wing Aircraft:
Royal Flights in fixed-wing aircraft will, whenever possible, be planned to take place
within the national ATS route structure. Non Standard ATC procedures shall be
applied to Royal Flights when pirating in permanent Class A and C airspace. In all
other instances the airspace around the route will be designated CAS-T (CONTROL
AIR SPACE Temporary).
Class G Operations may be conducted under IFR or VFR. ATC separation is not
provided. Traffic Information may be given as far as is practical in respect of other
flights.
CAS-T will be notified as Class G airspace; applicable access criteria and separation
standards apply.
Note: Class G Airspace is Uncontrolled airspace which is the portion of the

airspace that has not designated as CLASS A,B,C,D or E. Class G airspace
extends from the surface to unlimited level, and outside controlled airspace
within Amman FIR. Air Traffic Control (ATC) has no authority or
responsibility over this airspace, but there are VFR minimums which apply.

Class G. IFR and VFR flights are permitted and receive flight information service if
requested. (Annex 11).
CAS-T of appropriate height/width bands, and levels, will be established to

encompass any portion of the track and flight level of the Royal aircraft, which lies
outside of permanent Class A and C airspace.
Control zones for Royal Flights (VVIP flight) will extend between + 5NM and - 10
NM radiuses from the center of the aerodrome intended to land in.
When a Royal Flights (VVIP flight) is made within AMMAN FIR either inside or
outside controlled airspace, special temporary airway normally 10 NM wide will be
established for that part of the route designated for VVIP flight.
Blocked altitude 2000 FT above and below flight level specified by flight plan for
the Royal Flight VVIP.
Pass ETAs, ETDs and other information concerning VVIP flights to the CEO of
CARC through the appropriate ATM\ANSP authority or their designated
representatives.
Note: Director of air navigation of QAIA directorate will be informed for ETAs,
ETDs and other information concerning VVIP, VIP flights.
Flight plan of VVIP flight, irrespective of whether condition, must be filed in IFR as
much as practicable.
When the VVIP flight is flying in Amman FIR, no other aircraft shall be cleared to
operate in the block of controlled airspace detailed below:
1. 2000 feet above and below cruising level.
2. The restriction will not be applicable when it is known that horizontal
separation based on current flight plans will exist between the VVIP Flight
and other aircraft.
8.3. General ATC procedures are as follows for VVIP Flight and Distinguished
guests and Transient Services:
TACC Supervisor is responsible for ensuring proper courtesies and services are
provided to VVIP, distinguished visitors and VIPs and transient personnel using
airfield facilities.
In order to facilitate the movement of VVIP flight and distinguished guests and
Transient Services into and out of QAIA airport to conform to the times shown in the
Ceremonial Reception Schedule, the Air Traffic Service Units concerned are
authorized to provide special priority for all VIP flights over all other normal traffic
within their area of responsibility.
All other flights will be subjected to 15 minutes delay prior to or after, the scheduled
movement of the VIP aircraft except:
1. At Queen Alia Airport when there is two runways are available and runway
26L is designated for VIP landing or departure Operations.
2. Period of operation 15 minutes before estimated time of departure and 15
minutes after the VIP aircraft will be suspended air traffic other in
collaboration with the Royal Flight Operations.
The most senior controller is the only one who handles the VVIP and VIP
movement.
No clearance given to aircraft in the vicinity of a VVIP flight.
8.4. Take over Watch (TOW) to handle the VIP flight:
Prior to taking over watch or an operating position, a controller must:

1. Ensure that she/he has a full understanding of the air traffic situation including
an awareness of clearances issued but not yet acted upon and any developing
situation requiring early attention;
2. Familiarize himself with the serviceability of all equipment under her/his
charge and responsible to be used during VIP flight keeping (e.g. radio,
approach aids, telephone lines and aerodrome lighting);
3. Obtain all relevant information and be familiarized with the meteorological
condition and trends for the period of VIP flight and where practicable get a
personal briefing from a meteorological office;
4. Ensure she/he is fully conversant with the latest promulgated orders,
instructions, notices and information, particularly with reference to the
serviceability of aerodromes and other air navigation facilities;
Note: Should be taken of details regarding any presidential, VVIP or other
special flights expected during the period of watch.
5. Inspect the airfield (including runways and taxiways) for maintenance for the
use of VVIP flight.
6. Delay of other flight will be notified every 10 minutes by unit concerned.
8.5. ESCORT:
The ADOC and the commander of the escort flight shall have coordination of final
authority for conduction flight in and out of the controlled air space\ Airways \
control zone as necessary to fulfill the coordination Escort need.
8.6. Runway in use:

The aerodrome has one runway available for VVIP \ VIP arrivals and departures
RADAR Controller will give clearance for the runway to be used based on wind
velocity and traffic condition.

Variable direction circuits may be used at times in accordance with local air traffic
control instructions in the interest of noise abatement, mostly in favors of VVIP
movement.
8.7. Helicopter:
VIP Helicopter routes for flights inbound and outbound aerodrome Control Zone as
follows:
1. Are identified alphabetically using geographical separation not less than 5
minutes apart
2. A minimum vertical separation of 1000 feet and are instructed by ATC
controllers.
3. ATC clearance for the runways to be used based on wind velocity and traffic
condition.
8.8. Aerodrome Control Tower procedures:

No aircraft shall be allowed to land or depart from the aerodrome or operate in the
circuit for the period:
1. 15 minutes before ETA of VVIP Flight till Door Open Time.
2. Door Close Time or starting up time, till 5 minutes after take-off.
Note: The ATM headquarter may adjust the above timings to ensure that there is
no disturbance during the period of ceremonies at the airport and if required they
may close the airfield to other operations.
8.9. Controlled airspace:

Standard separation shall be provided in Controlled Airspace. When vertical
separation is applied, the vertical separation minimum shall be 2000 feet at all levels.
No VFR operations shall be allowed during the period of the VVIP Flight is expected
to operate in Controlled Airspace.

CHAPTER NINE
REDUCED VERTICAL
SEPARATION MINIMA
TACC MATC II RVSM CHAPTER 9
9. REDUCED VERTICAL SEPARATION MINIMA
9.1. The Benefits of RVSM::

1. Decrease en route delays.
2. Increase flight profiles.
3. Reduces en route congestion by adding six new flight levels.
4. Provides more flexibility to the ATC controllers; reduces workload, less RADAR
Vectoring.
5. More effective and increased options for re-routing flights e.g. around weather.
6. Increased ATM efficiency.
7. Reduce fuel burn consequently fuel saving of approximately 1%P/H "per hour".
9.2. RVSM Implementation Needs:

1. Increase airspace capacity.
2. Obtain more operational flexibility.
3. To reduce traffic congestion.
9.3. RVSM Flight Levels:

1. FL 280 and below are Non RVSM Flight Levels.
2. 001-179 FL " 290- 310-330-350-370-390-410 " is RVSM Eastbound levels.
3. 180-360 FL " 300-320-340-360-380-400 " are RVSM Westbound levels.
4. FL 430 and above are Non RVSM Flight Levels.
9.4. Flight in RVSM Airspace:

In summary, the rules for flight in RVSM airspace are that ATC shall:
1. Provide a 1000 FT vertical separation minimum between RVSM Compliant
aircraft.
2. Provide a 2000 FT vertical separation minimum between Non-RVSM Compliant
aircraft and any other aircraft.
3. Provide 2000 FT vertical separation minimum between all formation flights of
civil or State aircraft from any other aircraft.
9.5. RVSM Flight Planning Requirements:

1. Flight Priority:
I. It should be noted that RVSM Compliant aircraft will be given priority for
level allocation over Non-RVSM Compliant aircraft.
II. Specific Flight Planning procedures have been developed for RVSM flights.
These are included in ICAO Doc 7030/4, MID Regional Supplementary

Procedures.

2. The flight plan " FPL" shall include:

I. Operators of RVSM Compliant aircraft shall insert " W " in item " 10 a " of
the FPL Regardless of requested Flight Level.
II. Operators of Non-RVSM Compliant State aircraft with a RFL of 290 or above
shall insert " STS/NONRVSM " in item 18 of the FPL.
III. Operators of formation flights of RVSM-Compliant State aircraft shall NOT
Insert " W " in item " 10 a " of the FPL.
IV. Operators filing Repetitive Flight Plans " RPLs " shall include in item Q of the
RPL the RVSM Compliant status " EQPT/W " for RVSM Compliant aircraft,
and " EQPT/ " for Non-RVSM Compliant aircraft.
V. If a change of aircraft on an RPL results in a modification of the RVSM
Compliant status in item Q, the operators shall submit a change Message
" CHG ".
9.6. RVSM Airborne Systems Requirement:
The following systems must be fully operational prior to entering RVSM airspace:
1. Two altitude measurement systems.
2. Automatic altitude keeping device.
3. At least one altitude-reporting transponder.
4. One altitude alerting system.
Note: Should any of the required equipment fail prior to entering RVSM airspace,
the pilot should request a new clearance to avoid flight in this airspace.
9.6.1. Transponder Requirements:
1. An operating Mode C transponder is required for flight in all airspace in the

Amman FIR airspace.
2. The tolerance value used to determine that pressure-altitude-derived level
information displayed to the controller is accurate shall be 60 m "200 ft " in
RVSM airspace.
In other airspace, it shall be 90 m " 300 ft ", except that the appropriate ATS
authority may specify a smaller criterion, but not less than 60 m " 200 ft
", if this is found to be more practical. Geometric height information shall not be
used for separation.
3. After confirmation of the aircrafts level, Mode C readout continues to differ from
the cleared flight level by 60 m " 200 FT " or more, ATC will follow the existing
ICAO procedures prescribed for the failure of Mode C in flight or as prescribed in
TACC MATC II ,Chapter 3.

9.7. System Support:

The requirement for ATC to provide two different VSM in the same RVSM
airspace 1000 FT and 2000 FT VSM generates safety critical system support
requirements:
1. RADAR display systems, if available, must provide controllers with continuous
and unambiguous information on the RVSM compliant status of all flights under
their responsibility.
2. Flight strips must display for controllers the Non-RVSM compliant status of all
civil and State aircraft.
3. Where applicable, the indication that a Non-RVSM compliant aircraft is a State

aircraft should be displayed, both on the radar display and on the flight Strip.
4. Automatic conflict alert systems modified to use the RVSM compliant or Non-
RVSM Compliant status of the aircraft and apply the appropriate VSM of 1000
FT or 2000 FT alerting trigger.
9.8. Contingency Procedures:

If an RVSM compliant aircraft cannot comply with RVSM height-keeping
requirements because of equipment failure, weather, turbulence, etc, ATC will
provide a 2000 FT VSM or an appropriate horizontal separation from all other
aircraft. Normally, such aircraft should be cleared out of RVSM Airspace,
" FL 280- or FL 430+ ".
Note: In case of RADAR Failure Procedure still we can accept RVSM flights
within RVSM layers.
9.8.1. Meteorological Coordination:
Close coordination between ATS and MET is very important, especially in RVSM
airspace, to get early information on severe weather activity and clear air turbulence
" CAT " for areas where it may affect the safe operation of RVSM flights.
9.8.2. Height keeping errors:

There are two categories of Errors:
1. Technical Errors, or Altimetry System Errors " ASE ", caused by inaccuracies in
the height-keeping equipment of aircraft.
2. Operational Errors, or Assigned Altitude Deviation " AAD ", caused by mistakes,
by ATC or Flight Crews, which result in aircraft being flown at incorrect flight
levels.
3. ASE and AAD are the main components of Total Vertical Error " TVE " the target
level of Safety " TLS " must count for the risk analysis from both technical and
operational errors in specific form in Amman TACC.

9.9. RVSM Transition Procedures:

ATC Sectors controlling airspace in the RVSM Transition Area shall:
1. Apply Flight Levels appropriate to direction of flight, in accordance with the table
below.
2. Apply 1000 FT VSM between RVSM Compliant aircraft and 2000 FT VSM
" Vertical separation minima " between RVSM Non-Compliant aircraft.
3. Establish Non-RVSM compliant civil aircraft below FL290, if landing at an
Aerodrome below the RVSM airspace.

4. Establish Non-RVSM compliant civil aircraft above FL410, if transiting above

the RVSM airspace and landing at an aerodrome outside RVSM Airspace.
5. For aircraft leaving RVSM airspace, apply 2000 FT VSM and establish them at
the appropriate Non-RVSM levels.
9.10. Vertical Separation Minima:

1. The applicable vertical separation minimum between RVSM Compliant aircraft
operating within the RVSM airspace shall be 1000 FT Within AMMAN RVSM
airspace, a vertical separation Minimum of 1000 FT is applicable only when both
aircraft are RVSM Compliant.
2. The applicable vertical separation minimum between Non-RVSM Compliant
aircraft and any other aircraft operating within the AMMAN RVSM airspace shall
be 2000 FT.
3. Within AMMAN RVSM Transition Area, the applicable vertical separation
minimum shall be 1000 FT between RVSM Compliant aircraft and 2000 FT
between any Non-RVSM Compliant aircraft and any other aircraft.
4. The applicable vertical separation minimum between all formation flights
operating within the AMMAN RVSM airspace shall be 2000 FT.
5. Formation flights of State aircraft shall be considered as Non-RVSM Compliant,
regardless of the RVSM Compliant status of the individual aircraft concerned.
Formation flights of State aircraft will be accommodated within the AMMAN
RVSM airspace on the basis of an applicable vertical separation Minimum of
2000 FT.
6. Since ATC is unable to determine the extent of any equipment failure for an
aircraft experiencing a communication failure in flight, the applicable vertical
separation minimum between an aircraft experiencing a communication failure in
flight and any other aircraft, where both aircraft are Operating within AMMAN
RVSM airspace, shall be 2000 FT, unless an appropriate horizontal Separation
minimum exists.

9.10.1. Controller/Pilot Radiotelephony Phraseology:
Circumstances Phraseologies
... to ascertain RVSM approval
a) CONFIRM RVSM APPROVED;
status of an aircraft
... to report RVSM approved status *b) AFFIRM RVSM;
... to report RVSM non-approved *c) NEGATIVE RVSM

status followed by supplementary [(supplementary information,
information e.g. State aircraft)];
d) UNABLE ISSUE CLEARANCE

... to deny ATC clearance into INTO RVSM AIRSPACE,
RVSM airspace
MAINTAIN [or DESCEND TO, or
CLIMB TO] (level);
... to report when severe turbulence

affects the capability of an aircraft *e) UNABLE RVSM DUE
to maintain height-keeping TURBULENCE;
requirements for RVSM
... to report that the equipment of an

aircraft has degraded below *f) UNABLE RVSM DUE
minimum aviation system EQUIPMENT;
performance standards
...to request an aircraft to provide

information as soon as g) REPORT WHEN ABLE TO
RVSM-approved status has been
RESUME RVSM;
regained or the pilot is ready to
resume RVSM operations
... to request confirmation that an

aircraft has regained h) CONFIRM ABLE TO RESUME
RVSM-approved status or a pilot is RVSM;
ready to resume RVSM operations

*i) READY TO RESUME RVSM.

... to report ability to resume RVSM
operations after an equipment or
weather-related contingency * Denotes pilot transmission.
... to verbally supplement estimate

messages of aircraft non-approved
for RVSM or to verbally
a) NEGATIVE RVSM
supplement an automated estimate
[(supplementary information, e.g.
message exchange that does not
State
automatically transfer information
aircraft)];
from Item 18 of the flight plan
followed by supplementary
information, as appropriate
... to communicate the cause of a

contingency relating to an aircraft
that is unable to conduct RVSM
b) UNABLE RVSM DUE
operations due to severe turbulence TURBULENCE (or EQUIPMENT,
or other severe meteorological
as applicable).
phenomena or equipment failure, as
applicable
Refer to DOC4444, Chapter 12.
9.11. RVSM Alarm in INDRA System:
INDRA System provides the possibility to define if the aircraft RVSM approved or
not from the adaptation database " from flight plan information ". If so, the aircraft
between the FL 290 and FL 410 must be equipped with RVSM to make better use of
the airspace.
When the RVSM alarm is displayed, the track label includes "R" or "S" symbol as
defined in the following:


CHAPTER TEN
EMERGENCY
PROCEDURES
TACC MATC II EMERGENCY PROCEDURES CHAPTER 10
10. Emergency Procedures

10.1. General:
An incident report shall be filled by the unit in which the incident took place in its
area of responsibility.
TACC supervisor shall inform TACC Chief; TACC Chief will inform DANS, DANS
will inform the Safety Departments " Investigation, Airworthiness, and Aircraft
Operation " accordingly.
Tower supervisor shall inform TACC Supervisor regarding any of the following
cases:
1. Local standby.
2. Full emergency.
3. Aircraft accident.
4. Weather standby.
5. Hi-jacking or bomb threat.
6. Strayed aircraft, overdue position report.
The message will contain the following details:
1. Type of the case.
2. Aircraft call sign and type.
3. Nature of flight " DEP , ARR , Circuit .etc ".
4. ETA " for local traffic ".
5. Time of accident.
6. Position of accident.
7. When normal operation is resumed
10.2. Fuel Dumping:
An aircraft in emergency or other urgent situations may need to dump fuel so as to

reduce to maximum landing mass in order to affect a safe landing.
When an aircraft operating within controlled airspace needs to dump fuel, the flight
crew shall advise RADAR Controller.
RADAR Controller unit should then coordinate with the flight crew the following:
1. The route to be flown, which, if possible, should be clear of cities and towns,
preferably over water and away from areas where thunderstorms have been
reported or are expected;
2. The level to be used, which should be not less than 1 800 m (6000 ft); and
3. The duration of the fuel dumping.
10.2.1. Separation:
Other known traffic should be separated from the aircraft dumping fuel by:

1. At least 19 km (10 NM) horizontally, but not behind the aircraft dumping fuel;
2. Vertical separation if behind the aircraft dumping fuel within 15 minutes flying
time or a distance of 93 km (50 NM) by:
a) At least 300 m (1000 FT) if above the aircraft dumping fuel; and
b) At least 900 m (3000 FT) if below the aircraft dumping fuel.
Note: The horizontal boundaries of the area within which other traffic requires
appropriate vertical separation extend for 19 km (10 NM) either side of the track
flown by the aircraft which is dumping fuel, from 19 km (10 NM) ahead, to 93
km (50 NM) or 15 minutes along track behind it (including turns).
Refer to DOC 4444-Paragraph 15.5.3
10.2.2. Local Fuel Dumping Outside Controlled Airspace:

1. Fuel dumping if outside controlled airspace, will be carried out in an Area
agreed with the ADOC, the agreed position shall be defined by VOR/DME.
2. The area defined shall be clear of airways and holding areas.
3. The level to be used which should be not less than 1 800 m " 6000 FT ".
4. At least 19 km (10 NM) horizontally, but not behind the aircraft dumping fuel.
time or a distance of 93 km (50 NM) by Vertical separation at least 3000 FT
below and 1000 FT above the aircraft dumping fuel.
6. The pilot should report the duration of the fuel dumping.
10.2.3. Local Fuel Dumping Inside TMA:

This procedure for any inbound or outbound traffic, RADAR Controller should
implement the following:
1. Fuel Dumping will be carried out in QTR VOR at 9000 FT.
2. For King Hussein Airport traffic, the fuel dumping will be carried out over
BAKIR Point at 8000 FT and Aqaba Approach shall inform TACC " West
Sector " and ADOC.
time or a distance of 93 km (50 NM) by Vertical separation at least 3000 FT
below and 1000 FT above the aircraft dumping fuel.
4. At least 19 km (10 NM) horizontally, but not behind the aircraft dumping fuel.
5. ATC shall pass all necessary instructions prior to the commencement of Fuel
Dumping Operation " Reduce Radio during fuel dumping ".
6. Amman TACC will inform ADOC.
7. The pilot should report the duration of the fuel dumping.
10.3. Emergency Descent:

Upon receipt of advice that an aircraft is making an emergency descent through other
traffic, all possible action shall be taken immediately to safeguard all aircraft
concerned.

When deemed necessary, ATC shall immediately broadcast by means of the

appropriate radio aids, or if not possible, request the appropriate communications
stations immediately to broadcast an emergency message.
Immediately after such an emergency broadcast has been made, the ATC shall
forward further clearances to all aircraft involved as additional procedures to be
followed during and subsequent to the emergency descent.
ATC shall additionally inform any other ATS units and control sectors which may be
affected.
10.3.1. Phraseology:
*a) EMERGENCY DESCENT (intentions);
b) ATTENTION ALL AIRCRAFT IN THE VICINITY OF [or AT] (significant
point or location) EMERGENCY DESCENT IN PROGRESS FROM (level)
(followed as necessary by specific instructions, clearances, traffic information, etc.).
* Denotes pilot transmission.
Refer to DOC 4444-Paragraph 15.1.4
10.4. Strayed Aircraft:

If RADAR Controller notices an aircraft deviated from its intended track which
reports that its lost, RADAR Controller shall:
1. Inform ADOC and keep them posted with the situation progress.
2. Attempt to establish contact with such aircraft by any means.
3. Use all available means to determine its position.
4. Inform special security protection unit and civil defense at each airport
concerned VIA relevant ATC units.
5. Inform TACC Chief.
6. Inform DANS.
7. When state of emergency is over, all concerned will be informed.
10.5. Unidentified Aircraft:
An aircraft observed on RADAR not coordinated with adjacent ATS units and no
radio communication established shall consider being unidentified target and
immediately RADAR Controller shall:
1. Inform ADOC.
2. Inform special security protection unit and civil defense at each airport
concerned VIA relevant ATC units.
3. Try to establish two-way communication with the aircraft.
4. Attempt to obtain information from aircraft in the area.
5. Attempt to obtain information from adjacent ATS units.
6. When state of emergency is over; all concerned people will be informed.

10.6. Interception of Civil Aircraft:
As soon as an ATS unit learns that an aircraft is being intercepted in its area of
responsibility, it shall take such of the following steps as are appropriate in the
circumstances:
1. Attempt to establish two-way communication with the intercepted Aircraft on
any available frequency, including the emergency frequency 121.5MHZ, unless
such communication already exists.
2. Inform the pilot of the intercepted Aircraft of the interception.
3. Establish contact with the intercept control unit maintaining two-way
communication with the intercepting Aircraft and provide it with available
information concerning the Aircraft.
4. Relay messages between the intercepting Aircraft or the intercept control unit
and the intercepted Aircraft, as necessary.
5. In close co-ordination with the intercept control unit take all necessary steps to
en-sure the safety of the intercepted Aircraft.
6. Inform ATS units serving adjacent FIRs if it appears that the Aircraft has strayed
from such adjacent FIRs.
7. As soon as an ATS unit learns that an Aircraft is being intercepted outside its
area of responsibility, it shall take such of the following steps as are appropriate
in the circumstances:
a) Inform the ATS unit serving the airspace in which the interception is taking
place, providing this unit with available information that will assist in
identifying the aircraft and requesting it to take action in accordance with
DOC 4444-Paraghraph 15.5.2.
b) Relay messages between the intercepted aircraft and the appropriate ATS
unit, the intercept control unit or the intercepting aircraft .
10.7. Local Standby:

S
10.7.1. Local Standby will be implemented when the pilot reports he is experiencing
difficulty which might affect the safe operation of the aircraft but not likely to
cause an accident or incident and when the pilot reports:
1. Loss of 25% or 33% of the engines.
2. Cockpit indication of fire warning in the aircraft.
3. Undercarriage warning light on.
4. Flapless landing.
5. Pressurization failure.
6. Partial hydraulic failure.
10.7.2. When receiving the pilot reports, RADAR Controller shall:
1. Inform the TACC supervisor.
2. TACC supervisor will act as chief of search and rescue centre, will activate
the search and rescue plan.

10.7.3. TACC supervisor will inform the following:

1. Unit concerned.
2. TACC Chief.
3. Aircraft Operator.
4. DANS.
10.7.4. The message will contain the following:
1. Nature of emergency.
3. ETA.
4. Total number on board.
10.8. Full Emergency:
10.8.1. Full emergency will be implemented when the pilot reports that he is
experiencing a difficulty that will affect the operation of the aircraft, when there is
a possibility of an accident and when pilot reports:
1. Loss of 50% or more of the engines.
2. Complete hydraulic failure.
3. Landing with burst tires.
4. Undercarriage malfunction.
5. Abandoned take-off.
6. Hi-jacking.
7. Bomb on board.
8. Shortage of fuel.
10.8.2. When receiving the pilot reports the ATC shall:

1. Approve pilot request.
2. Advice all traffic under control.
10.8.3. TACC supervisor will inform the following:

1. Unit concerned.
2. TACC Chief.
4. DANS.
5. ADOC.
10.8.4. Message will contain the following:

1. Nature of Emergency.
3. ETA.
4. Name of the airport and runway in use.

10.9. Bomb Threat " Aircraft in flight ":

ATC will consider a bomb threat when receives information by the pilot or by any
other sources that a bomb onboard.
Separate the aircraft concerned 2000 FT from other traffic.

ATC will not grant permission for landing, unless authorized by security unit related;
" follow instructions from the ADOC ".
10.9.1. RADAR Controller shall Inform:

1. DANS.
2. ADOC.
3. ATC Supervisor at Amman/Marka, Queen Alia and King Hussein Tower.
4. Inform any traffic maybe affected.
5. Inform special security protection unit and civil defense at each airport concerned
VIA relevant ATC units.
10.9.2. If such aircraft has approval to land, RADAR Controller shall:

1. Implement full emergency.
2. After landing the aircraft should continue to the end of the runway.
10.9.3. RADAR Controller shall obtain the following information to the extent possible:
1. Aircraft nationality.
3. Number of causalities.
4. Type of bombs.
5. Crew member physical conditions.
6. Intended landing aerodrome and E.T.A.
10.10. Hi-Jack:
10.10.1. Hi-jack in the air within Amman airspace:
When the aircraft displays Mode A " 7500 " or pilot reports or advised by adjacent
ATS unit, that an specific aircraft is experiencing unlawful interference, immediately
RADAR Controller shall:
1. Separate the concerned aircraft with vertical separation 2000 FT above and
below if traffic situation permits, and if not alternative course of action will be
considered to take the aircraft outside controlled airspace. Throughout
coordination with ADOC.
2. Inform special security protection unit and civil defense through ATC units at
each airport.

3. Further action to be taken within Jordanian Airports, through coordination with

ADOC.
4. ATC units will comply with state instructions & runway will be blocked by
vehicles for each airport.
5. When state of emergency is over all concerned will be informed.
10.10.2. Hi-jacked aircraft within adjacent FIRs expected to proceed to

Amman FIR:
When the aircraft displays Mode A " 7500 " or advised by adjacent ATS unit that an
specific aircraft is experiencing unlawful interference and its rerouting to Amman
FIR , RADAR Controller shall:
1. Inform ADOC.
2. If the Aircraft within the coverage of Amman RADAR, RADAR Controller
shall plot the progress of the path of the aircraft concerned.
3. Inform special security protection and civil defense units at Jordanian Airports
through ATC units at each Airport.
4. Will keep 2000 FT vertical separation below and above the flight level of the
aircraft concerned.
5. Alternative course of action should be taken through intensive coordination with
ADOC, if the situation prevails.
10.11. Aircraft Accident:

Aircraft accident will be implemented when the pilot reports that he is experiencing a
difficulty that will affect the operation of the aircraft, when there is a possibility of an
accident and when pilot reports RADAR Controller shall:
1. Advice all traffic under control.
2. Consider diversion and traffic holding.
10.11.1. TACC supervisor will inform:
1. DANS.
2. TACC Chief.
3. Units concerned.
4. ADOC.
10.11.2. Message will contain the following details:

2. Time of accident.
3. Total number on board if known.

10.12. Aircraft Emergencies Suspected Communicable Disease, or Other Public

Health Risk:
Upon notification by a pilot of a suspected communicable disease, or other public
health risk, RADAR Controller shall notify the appropriate authorities with the
following informations:
1. Aircraft identification.
2. Departure aerodrome.
3. Destination aerodrome.
4. Estimated time of arrival.
5. Number of persons on board.
6. Number of suspected case(s) on board; and
7. Nature of the public health risk, if known.
When a report of a suspected case(s) of communicable disease, or other public health

risk, on board an aircraft is received by an ATS unit serving the destination /
departure, from another ATS unit or from an aircraft or an aircraft operator, the unit
concerned shall forward a message below as soon as possible to:
1. ATS unit serving the destination/departure,

2. Appropriate authority designated by MOH.
3. Aircraft operator or its designated representative.
4. The public health authority (PHA).
5. The appropriate authority designated in the Airport Emergency Plan.
6. Aerodrome authority.
10.13. Other ATC Contingency Procedures:
10.13.1 Emergency Separation:
If during an emergency situation, it is not possible to ensure that the applicable

horizontal separation can be maintained, emergency separation of half the applicable
vertical separation minimum may be used, i.e. 150 m (500 ft) between aircraft in
airspace where a vertical separation minimum of 300 m (1000 ft) is applied, and 300
m (1000 ft) between aircraft in airspace where a 600 m (2000 ft) vertical separation
minimum is applied.
When emergency separation is applied the flight crews concerned shall be advised
that emergency separation is being applied and informed of the actual minimum
used.
Additionally, all flight crews concerned shall be provided with essential traffic
information.

10.13.2. Short-Term Conflict Alert (STCA) Procedures:
In the event an STCA is generated in respect of controlled flights, RADAR

Controller shall without delay assess the situation and, if necessary, take action to
ensure that the applicable separation minimum will not be infringed or will be
restored.
Following the generation of an STCA, RADAR Controller should be required to
complete an air traffic incident report and in TACC log book.
TACC Chief should retain electronic records of all alerts generated. The data and
circumstances pertaining to each alert should be analyzed to determine whether an
alert was justified or not. Non-justified alerts, e.g. when visual separation was
applied, should be ignored. A statistical analysis should be made of justified alerts in
order to identify possible shortcomings in airspace design and ATC procedures as
well as to monitor overall safety levels.


CHAPTER ELEVEN
ON JOB TRAINING
TACC MATC II On Job Training CHAPTER 11
11. ON JOB TRAINING
11.1. General Procedures:
1. OJT at Amman TACC will be carried out in accordance with the following
procedures:
a) Supervisor of OJT is responsible to Amman TACC Chief for implementation
and management of OJT.
b) OJT instructors will carry out the monitoring and training of trainee controllers,
and will brief the trainee of the objectives of each training period.
2. OJTI is responsible for:

a) Safety at all times during operational instructions, and will carry out OJT in
accordance with these instructions, and will ensure that accurate records are
kept in the training record sheet.
b) Prepare training reports as required, and submits the report to Supervisor of
OJT within ascertain time.
11.2. Phase of Training:
The phases of training are three phases:

I. Phase One:
1. Unit induction:
a) Objective is to familiarize the trainee with unit administration and procedures.
b) Administration by discussing the role and procedures that affect RADAR
controllers.
2. Procedures. Ensure that the trainee is aware of his/her responsibilities
including:
1. Transport.
2. Leave.
3. Sickness.
4. Shift rosters.
5. Logbooks
6. Conduct and discipline.
7. Incident reporting.
8. Amman TACC manual.
Supervisor of OJT will check that the trainee is in possession of Manual of Air
Traffic Services and Amman TACC both correctly amended.

II. Phase Two " Equipment and Operating Procedures ":
1. Objective is to familiarize the trainee with the RADAR equipment and

operating procedures to be used.
2. Equipment: ensure that the trainee is competent to use the equipment will
proceed the next phase 3 which will cover the following:
a) Voice communication system "VCS" including ATIS.

b) RADAR system.
c) Weather system.
III. Phase Three " Practical Training ":
The Objective of this phase to demonstrate the trainee is capable of effectively

controlling air traffic in a safe, orderly and expeditious manner, and has the
knowledge of the equipment and procedures relevant to the rating and/or rating
validity.
11.3. Trainees:
1. Will attend training, briefing and instructional work period as instructed by their
OJT instructor.
2. Will work in periods when they are not engaged in practical instruction to learn
the relevant procedures.
11.4. Progress Tests:

OJTI will conduct a progress test on completion of phase 2, and Supervisor of OJT
will conduct a progress test on completion of phase 3, and final assessment.
Note: Supervisor of OJT may delegate the task of phase 3 and final assessment to
independent Examiner.
11.5. Training Report:

OJTI will prepare a training report on completion of phase 2 of training and every 10
hours during phase 3. Using the standard and /or approved form by the DANS for
ATC training report form.
11.6. Examination:
1. The Practical test shall be conducted by ANS safety inspector and designated
examiner who shall have the valid rating for the traffic control and Air Traffic
Management safety officer.
2. The knowledge examination for rating and Validation shall be prepared and
conducted by ANS safety inspector
3. The oral test shall be conducted by ANS safety inspector.

11.7. General Description of Rating Phases:

ATC shall satisfy the Jordan Civil Aviation Regulatory Commission regulations
" JCAR- Part 65 " " ATC MATC I and MATC II " and AIP , as to his skill in the
provision of RADAR control service and in his knowledge of:
1. Airspace structure.
2. Applicable rules, regulations and source of information.
3. Air navigation facilities.
4. Air traffic equipment and its use.
5. Terrain and prominent landmarks.
6. Characteristics of air traffic and traffic flow.
7. Weather phenomena.
8. Emergency and Search and rescue plans.
9. Principles use and limitations of RADAR, other surveillance systems and
associated equipment.
10. Procedures for the provision of approach or area RADAR control services
as appropriate.
11. Procedures to ensure terrain clearance as appropriate.
11.7.1. TMA Approach Procedural Non-RADAR:
1. Phase One: As detailed in general description phase 1 " procedures ".
2. Phase Two: In addition to general description phase 2 " equipment ", the
trainee will be briefed on the following:
1. Area of responsibility.
2. Taking over watch.
3. Out bound procedures
4. Estimates.
5. Level restrictions.
6. Stack levels and EATs.
7. Coordination inbound and outbound.
8. Visual approach procedures.
9. Instrument approaches, and landing interval.
10. Approach /terminal flow direction.
11. Diversions.
12. Royal flights.
13. Radio failure procedures.
14. Navigational aids.
15. Holding procedures.
16. Emergencies:
I. General
II. Local standby.

III. Full emergency.
IV. Aircraft accident.
V. Hi-jack or bomb threat.
VI. Fuel dumping.
17. VFR procedures.
18. Job description of approach procedural controller.
19. AQABA procedures, " approach and / or west sector " as appropriate.
3. Phase Three: The trainee will be able to demonstrate the practical skill
including:
1. Allocating STAR clearance, holding stack levels, receiving, releases and

calculating EATs.
2. Receiving, processing estimates revisions and manual preparation of FPS.
3. Monitoring the TMA frequency and assisting the approach RADAR
controller in maintaining an up-to-date flight progress strip.
4. Passing estimates, revisions and EATs to the relevant ATC unit.
5. Alerting the TMA approach RADAR controller of any apparent
confliction evident from the traffic display, which requires resolution.
6. Coordination with the relevant En-route sector.
7. Pass departure clearances to tower.
8. Assisting the TMA approach RADAR controller in re-establishing
procedural separation in case of RADAR failure.
9. Performing other related duties which may be assigned by Supervisor of
OJT.
Note: These duties could be also included within the task of TMA approach
procedural planner controller.
11.7.2. TMA Approach RADAR:

1. Phase One: As detailed in general description phase 1 " procedures ".
2. Phase Two: In addition to general description phase 2 "equipment ", the
1. General RADAR specifications and limitations.
2. RADAR setting up procedures.
3. SSR code allocations.
4. RADAR separation standards.
5. RADAR coordination procedures.
6. RADAR identification procedures.
7. Mode C verification procedures.
3. Phase Three: The trainee will be able to demonstrate the practical skill,
including:
1. Identifying and tracking aircraft under control, by the use of RADAR.

2. Applying non-RADAR separation, when RADAR equipment is failed.
3. Maintaining an up to-date flight progress strip, in case of RADAR failure.
4. Hand-over procedure " transferring and accepting ".
5. Co-ordination procedure has affected, before the aircraft leaves area of
Responsibility.
11.7.3. En-route Procedural Non-RADAR:

1. Phase One: As detailed in phase 1 general description " procedures ".
2. Phase Two: In addition to general description phase2 " equipment " the trainee
will be briefed on the following:
1. Area of responsibility
2. Taking over watch.
3. Control of traffic.
4. Coordination with TMA approach control.
5. Coordination inbound/outbound.
6. Separation standards.
7. High level holding.
8. Coordination with adjacent ATC units and/or ACCs.
9. Diversions.
10. Royal flights.
11. VVIP and / or VIP flights.
12. Radio failure procedures.
13. Navigation AIDs.
14. Emergencies, high-jack, bomb threat and fuel dumping.
15. Duties of E-n-route procedural controller.
16. AQABA procedures " approach and/or west sector " as appropriate.
3. Phase Three: The trainee will demonstrate that he/she is capable to carry out
the following duties:
1. Receiving and processing of estimates and revisions from/to other sector
or ATC units and the manual preparation of flight progress strip in case of
FDO failure.
2. Monitoring the sector frequency and assisting the En-route RADAR
controller in maintaining an up to date flight progress display.
3. Pass all estimates and revisions to the relevant sector or ATC units.
4. Alert the En-route RADAR controller of any apparent confliction evident
from the traffic display, which require resolution.
5. Coordination all traffic entering or leaving the sector area of responsibility,
and all allocation of clearances to provide procedural separation, unless
RADAR separation is to be provided in accordance with agreed
procedures.

6. In the event of full RADAR failure to assist the En-route RADAR
controller in re-establishing procedural separation.
7. Allocating SSR codes as required by RADAR controller and ensuring that
the correlation process is achieved.
8. Assisting the En-route RADAR controller and file flight progress strip.
9. Performing other related duties which may be assigned by the Supervisor
of OJT.
Note: These duties could be also included within the task of OJT En-route
RADAR controller.
11.7.4. En-route RADAR:
1. Phase One: As detailed in phase1 " general description procedures ".
2. Phase Two: In additions to general description phase 2 " equipment " the
1. General RADAR specifications and limitations.
2. RADAR setting up procedures.
3. SSR code allocation.
4. RADAR separation standards.
5. RADAR coordination procedures.
6. RADAR identification procedures.
7. Mode C verification procedures.
3. Phase Three: The trainee will demonstrate that he/she is capable to carry out
the following duties:
1. Identifying and tracking aircraft under his control, effecting RADAR
control and/or RADAR separation as necessary.
2. Applying non-RADAR separation criteria when RADAR separation is not
desirable or not possible.
3. Maintaining an up to date flight progress display.
4. Accepting aircraft from and transferring aircraft to TMA terminal RADAR
unit.
5. Where co-ordination is required, ensuring that this has been carried out
before aircraft leaves sector area of responsibility.
6. Performing other related duties assigned by the Supervisor of OJT.
Note: For more information refer to ATM Training manual.
11.8. TACC Forms:
Attach in APPINDEX 3.

APPENDIX 1
RNAV Charts
1. OJAI:
ATIS 127.600
INSTRUMENT AD ELEV 2397 FT AMMAN/Queen Alia Intl (OJAI)
HEIGHTS RELATED TO
APP 128.900
APPROACH RNAV (GNSS) RWY 08L
THR RWY 08L ELEV 2362 FT TWR 118.100
CHART - ICAO
INSTRUMENT AD ELEV 2397 FT ATIS 127.600 AMMAN/Queen Alia Intl (OJAI)
APPROACH HEIGHTS RELATED TO APP 128.900 RNAV (GNSS) RWY 08R
CHART - ICAO THR RWY 08R ELEV 2359 FT TWR 118.100
INSTRUMENT AD ELEV 2397 FT ATIS 127.600 AMMAN/Queen Alia Intl
APPROACH HEIGHTS RELATED TO APP 128.900 (OJAI)
CHART - ICAO THR RWY 26L ELEV 2367 FT TWR 118.100 RNAV (GNSS) RWY 26L
INSTRUMENT AD ELEV 2397 FT ATIS 127.600 AMMAN/Queen Alia Intl
APPROACH HEIGHTS RELATED TO APP 128.900 (OJAI)
CHART - ICAO THR RWY 26R ELEV 2397 FT TWR 118.100 RNAV (GNSS) RWY 26R
STANDARD DEPARTURE AD ELEV 2397 FT ATIS 127.600
CHART-INSTRUMENT Trans Alt 13000 APP 128.900 AMMAN/Queen Alia Intl (OJAI)
Trans Level FL 150 SID RNAV (GNSS) RWY 08R
(SID) - ICAO TWR 119.800
STANDARD AD ELEV 2397 FT ATIS 127.600
DEPARTURE Trans Alt 13000 APP 128.900 AMMAN/Queen Alia Intl (OJAI)
Trans Level FL 150 SID RNAV (GNSS) RWY 26L
CHART-INSTRUMENT TWR 119.800
(SID) - ICAO
STANDARD AD ELEV 2397 FT ATIS 127.600
DEPARTURE Trans Alt 13000 APP 128.900 AMMAN/Queen Alia Intl (OJAI)
CHART-INSTRUMENT Trans Level FL 150 TWR 119.800 SID RNAV (GNSS) RWY 26R
(SID) - ICAO
STANDARD ARRIVAL AD ELEV 2397 FT ATIS 127.600
CHART-INSTRUMENT Trans Alt 13000 APP 128.900 AMMAN/Queen Alia Intl (OJAI)
Trans Level FL 150 STAR RNAV (GNSS) RWY 26L/R
(STAR) - ICAO TWR 119.800
2. OJAM:
INSTRUMENT AD ELEV 2556 FT AMMAN/Marka Intl (OJAM)
ATIS 127.600
APPROACH RNAV (GNSS) RWY 24
HEIGHTS RELATED TO APP 128.900
CHART - ICAO THR RWY 24 ELEV 2459 FT TWR 118.100
Amendment: New procedure.
STANDARD DEPARTURE AD ELEV 2556 FT ATIS 127.600
Trans Alt 13000 APP 128.900 AMMAN/Marka Intl (OJAM)
CHART-INSTRUMENT
(SID) - ICAO Trans Level FL 150 TWR 118.100 SID RNAV (GNSS) RWY 24
CHART-INSTRUMENT Trans Alt 13000 APP 128.900 AMMAN/Marka Intl (OJAM)
Trans Level FL 150 STAR RNAV (GNSS) RWY 24
3. OJAQ:
CHART-INSTRUMENT Trans Alt 13000 APP 119.200 AQABA/King Hussein Intl (OJAQ)
Trans Level FL 150 STAR RNAV (GNSS) RWY 01
APPENDIX 2
Conventional SID & STAR

( Charts Page number related to AIP )
TACC MATC II Conventional SID & STAR APPENDIX 2
1. Terminal Procedures AMMAN/Marka:
DEPARTURES AMMAN/Marka RWY 24
ROUTE NAVIGATION ALT/FL RESTRICTIONS
LOSAR4D Climb on runway heading until passing Cross d7 AMN R080 8500FT or above.
ALT 5000FT then turn right to Cross LOXER 9000FT or above.
AMN/VOR, intercept AMN R080 to Cross LOSAR 13000FT or above.
LOXER then turn left to establish QAA
R029 to LOSAR.
LUDAN4D Climb on runway heading until passing Cross d7 AMN R080 8500FT or above.
ALT 5000FT then turn right to Cross LUDAN 11000FT or above.
AMN/VOR intercept AMN R080 to
LOXER then to LUDAN.
QTR4D Climb on runway heading until passing Cross AMN 10d (R 209) 7000FT or
ALT 5000FT then turn left to intercept above. Cross QTR 9000FT or above.
AMN R209 to MDB NDB then intercept
QTR R336 to QTR/VOR
KULDI4D Climb on runway heading until passing Cross AMN 10d (R 209) 7000FT or
ALT 5000FT. Turn left to intercept above. Cross QTR 9000FT or above.
AMN R209 to MDB NDB intercept QTR Cross KULDI FL150 or above.
R336 to QTR turn left to intercept QTR
R077 to KULDI.
RALNA4D Climb on runway heading until 10d Cross 14.5d AMN R250 at 6000FT or
AMN/VOR, then turn right to OSAMA above. Cross OSAMA
then to RALNA Maintaining 8000FT.
MUVIN4D Climb on runway heading proceed to Cross 15d. AMN on runway heading at
MOUAB then turn right to MUVIN track 6000FT or above.
286 then proceed to TALMI. Cross MOUAB at 11000FT or above.
Cross MUVIN 12000FT then proceed to
TALMI.
NOTES:
1. Aircraft unable to comply with the SID profile restrictions MUST request Non-
Standard departure clearance on start up.
2. Aircraft unable to achieve SID profile restrictions when airborne should carry out
the following contingency: Turn left or right as appropriate at 5000FT fly to
AMN/VOR to enter the holding pattern.
3. Departure traffic on RALNA SID and MUVIN SID shall call TEL-AVIV ACC on
FREQ 121.4 or 132.05MHz as early as possible and in any case traffic should not
cross 10 NM East of SALAM or TALMI without establish contact with TEL-
AVIV ACC.
ADVISE ATC IMMEDIATELY THE CONTINGENCY IS COMMENCED.

RMK: See related chart (AIP - AD 2-31).

ARRIVALS AMMAN / Marka RWY 24
LOSAR4A At LOSAR intercept QAA Cross LOSAR 13000FT or

R029.After QAA. Intercept AMN above.
R160. Cross LOXER 9000FT or above.
Cross 10d QAA 8500FT
LUDAN4A At LUDAN intercept QAA R048 Cross LUDAN 11000FT or

After QAA intercept AMN R160. above. Cross QAA 13d 8500FT
or above.
REPORT QAA 20d.
QTR4A At QTR intercept QAA R186 After Cross QTR 9000FT or above.
QAA intercept AMN R160. Cross QAA 15d 7000FT or
above.
REPORT QAA 15d.
KULDI4A At KULDI intercept QAA R140. Cross KULDI FL150 or above.

After QAA intercept AMN R 160. Cross QAA 15d 7000FT or
above.
REPORT QAA 20d.
RALNA4A At RALNA intercept AMN R258, Cross RALNA 11000FT.

proceed to AMN/VOR Cross AMN 13d 6000FT or
above.
KINUR4A AT KINUR intercept QAA R105. Cross KINUR FL150.

After QAA intercept AMN R160. Cross ALNOR 7000FT or above.
Cross QAA 6000FT or above.
NOTE: Follow ATC descent clearance instructions. But not below published profile
altitude restrictions which are minimum safety profiles.
AMMAN INBOUND TRAFFIC WILL BE INITIALLY CLEARED TO QAA TO

AWAIT ONWARD CLEARANCE.

DEPARTURS AMMAN/Marka RWY 06
LOSAR5D Climb runway heading on track Cross AMN above 4000FT Turn left
to AMN Turn left to re- cross climbing to re-cross AMN at 5500FT
AMN/VOR, intercept QAA or above.
R340. Turn left to establish Cross QAA at 6000FT or above.
QAA R029 to LOXER then to Cross QAA 10d 8500FT or above.
LOSAR Cross LOXER 9000FT or above.
Cross LOSAR 13000FT or above.
LUDAN5D Climb runway heading on track Cross AMN above 4000FT Turn left
to AMN Turn left to re- cross climbing to re-cross AMN at 5500FT
AMN/VOR, intercept QAA or above.
R340 Turn left to establish QAA Cross QAA at 6000FT or above.
R048 to LUDAN. Cross QAA 13d 8500FT or above.
Cross LUDAN 11000FT or above.
QTR5D Climb runway heading on track Cross AMN above 4000FT turn left
to AMN turn left to re-cross climbing to re-cross AMN at 5500FT
AMN/VOR. Intercept QAA or above.
R340. Turn Right to intercept Cross QAA at 6000FT or above.
QTR R006. Cross QAA 15d 7000FT or above.
Cross QTR at 9000FT or above.
KULDI5D Climb runway heading on track Cross AMN above 4000FT turn left
to AMN turn left to re-cross climbing to re-cross AMN at
AMN/VOR. Intercept QAA 5500FT.
R340 Turn left to intercept QAA Cross QAA at 6000FT or above.
R140 to KULDI. Cross QAA 15d 7000FT or above.
Cross KULDI FL150 or above.
RALNA5D Climb on track to AMN/VOR Cross AMN/VOR at 4000FT or

then turn right to OSAMA then above. Cross AMN R180 at 5000FT
proceed to RALNA. or above.
Cross AMN 14.5d R250 at 6000FT
or above. Cross OSAMA
maintaining 8000FT then proceed to
RALNA.
MUVIN5D Climb runway heading to Cross AMN/VOR at 4000FT or

AMN/VOR then turn right to above. Cross AMN R180 at 5000FT
intercept AMN R239 to or above.
MOUAB then turn right to Cross AMN 15d. R241 at 6000FT or
MUVIN above. Cross MOUAB at 11000FT
or above.
Cross MUVIN 12000FT.

KINUR5 D Climb runway heading to AMN Cross AMN above 4000FT Turn left
turn left to re- cross AMN/VOR. climbing to re-cross AMN at 5500FT
Intercept QAA R340 Turn left to or above.
intercept QAA R105 to ALNOR Cross QAA at 6000FT or above.
then to KINUR. Cross ALNOR 7000FT or above.
Cross KINUR FL150 or above.
NOTES:
1. Turn must be completed within 5NM. AMN/VOR/DME to avoid OJD2.

2. All departures via MUVIN and RALNA SIDs profiles, shall call TEL-AVIV ACC on
FREQ 121.4 or 132.05MHz as early as possible, and in any case traffic should not
cross 10 NM East of SALAM or TALMI without establishing contact with TEL-
AVIV ACC.
3. Low level arrival traffic from BEN-GURION to AMMAN/Marka or Amman/Queen
Alia Airports shall follow RALNA STAR profile.
4. Aircraft unable to comply with the SID profile restrictions MUST request NON-
STANDARD departure clearance on start up.
5. Aircraft unable to achieve SID profile restrictions when airborne should carry out the
following CONTINGENCY - Turn left or right as appropriate at 5000 FT fly to
AMN/VOR to enter the holding pattern.
RMK: See related chart (AIP - AD 2-31A).

ARRIVALS AMMAN/Marka RWY 06
LOSAR5A At LOSAR intercept QAA R029 Cross LOSAR 13000 FT or

at LOXER intercept AMN R080 above.
to AMN/VOR. Cross LOXER 9000FT or above.
Cross AMN 07d 8500FT or
above.
LUDAN5A At LUDAN intercept AMN Cross LUDAN 11000 FT or

R080 to AMN. above.
Cross AMN 07d 8500 FT.
QTR5A At QTR establish QTR R336 to Cross QTR 9000FT or above.

MDB. Intercept AMN R209 to Cross QTR 15d 7000FT or
AMN. above.
above.
KULDI5A At KULDI establish QTR R077 Cross KULDI FL150 or above.

to QTR turn right to intercept Cross QTR 9000 FT or above.
QTR R336 to MDB intercept Cross QTR 15d R336 7000FT or
AMN R209 to AMN. above.
above.
RALNA5A At RALNA Intercept AMN Cross RALNA 11000FT.

R258, proceed to AMN/VOR. Cross AMN 13d 6000 FT or
above.
REPORT 13d INBOUND TO AMN/VOR.
NOTE: Follow ATC decent clearance instructions but not below published profile altitude
restrictions, which are Minimum safety profiles.
Initial holding clearance may be issued for QTR or AMN.
RMK: See related chart (AIP - AD 2-35A)

2. Terminal Procedures Queen Alia:
DEPARTURES Queen Alia RWY 26L
LOSAR2D Climb Runway Heading until Cross 13.5NM QAA (or AMN
crossing 13.5d QAA. Turn right to R206 or QTR R341) at
intercept AMN R209. Intercept 3200FT or above.
AMN R080 to LOXER. Turn left to Cross AMN 10d R209 7000FT
intercept QAA R029 to LOSAR or above. Cross 07d AMN
(R080) 8500 FT or above.
Cross LOXER 9000FT or
above.
Cross LOSAR 13000FT or at
assigned level.
LUDAN2D Climb Runway Heading until Cross QAA 13.5d at 3200FT

crossing 13.5d QAA. Turn right to or above. Cross AMN 10d
intercept AMN R209 to AMN. R209 7000FT or above. Cross
intercept AMN R080 to LUDAN AMN 07d R080 8500FT or
above. Cross LUDAN
11000FT or at assigned level.
QTR2D Climb Runway Heading until Cross QAA 13.5d at 3200FT

crossing 13.5d QAA turn left to or above. Cross QTR 15d
intercept QTR R336 to QTR R336 7000FT or above. Cross
QTR at 9000 FT or above.
KULDI2D Climb Runway Heading until Cross QAA 13.5d at 3200FT

crossing 13.5d QAA turn left to or above. Cross QTR 15d
intercept QTR R336 to QTR. turn R336 7000FT or above. Cross
left to intercept QTR R077 to QTR at 9000FT or above
KULDI Cross KULDI FL150 or above.
RALNA2D Climb Runway Heading until Cross 13.5d QAA or AMN

crossing 13.5d QAA then turn right R206 at 3200FT or above.
to OSAMA then turn left to Cross QAA 21d R277 at
RALNA. 7000FT or above. Cross
OSAMA maintaining 8000FT.
MUVIN2D Climb Runway Heading to 13.5d Cross 13.5d QAA or AMN

QAA turn right to MOUAB then R206 at 3200FT or above.
turn left to MUVIN. Cross QAA 22d R269 at 7000
FT or above. Cross MOUAB
11000FT or above.
Cross MUVIN maintaining
12000FT.

NOTES:
1. Aircraft unable to comply with SID profile restrictions MUST request non-standard
departure clearance on start up.
2. Aircraft unable to achieve SID profile restrictions after airborne should carry out
the following contingency: Turn left or right as appropriate at 5000FT fly to
QAA/VOR to enter the holding pattern.
3. In case of VFR traffic is flying on V1 Corridor between GHARBIYA and
QUARRY, ATC shall instruct the appropriate departure traffic to maintain on track
until passing MDB/NDB or passing ALT 5000FT.
4. Departure traffic on RALNA and MUVIN SIDs shall call TEL-AVIV ACC on
FREQ 121.4 or 132.05MHz as early as possible, and in any case traffic should not
cross 10 NM East of SALAM or TALMI without establish contact with TEL-
AVIV ACC.
RMK: See related chart (AIP - AD 2-31C).

DEPARTURE Queen Alia RWY 26R
ROUTE NAVIGATION ALT/FL

RESTRICTIONS
LOSAR2D Climb Runway Heading until crossing Cross 14d QAA (AMN
(14d QAA) then turn right to intercept R206) at 3200FT or above.
AMN R209 to AMN/VOR intercept Cross AMN 10d (R209)
AMN R080 to LOXER, then turn left 7000FT or above. Cross
to intercept QAA R029 to LOSAR. AMN 07d (R080) 8500FT
or above. Cross LOXER
9000FT or above.
Cross LOSAR 13000FT or
above.
LUDAN2D Climb Runway Heading until crossing Cross 14d QAA at 3200 FT
QAA 14d then turn right to intercept or above.
AMN R209 to AMN intercept AMN Cross AMN 10d R209
R080 to LUDAN . 7000FT or above. Cross
AMN 07d R080 8500FT or
above. Cross LUDAN
11000FT or above.
QTR2D Climb Runway Heading until 14d Cross 14d QAA at 3200FT
QAA, then turn left to intercept QTR or above.
R336 to QTR. Cross QTR 15d 7000FT or
above.
Cross QTR at 9000FT or
above.
KULDI2D Climb Runway Heading until 14d Cross 14d QAA at 3200 FT
QAA, turn left to intercept QTR R336 or above.
to QTR, then turn left to intercept Cross QTR 15d 7000FT or
QTR R077 To KULDI. above.
Cross QTR 9000FT or
above.
Cross KULDI FL150 or
above.
MUVIN2D Climb Runway Heading to Cross 14d QAA at 3200

MDB/NDB, turn right to intercept FT or above.
MDB bearing 291 to MOUAB then Cross QAA 22d R269 at
turn left to MUVIN. 7000 FT or above. Cross
MOUAB 11000FT or
above.
12000FT.

RALNA2D Climb Runway Heading until crossing Cross 14d QAA at 3200FT
14d QAA, then turn right on track 315 or above.
to OSAMA then turn left to RALNA. Cross QAA 21d R277 at
7000FT or above. Cross
OSAMA maintaining
8000FT then to RALNA
point.
NOTES:
1. Aircraft unable to comply with SID profile restrictions MUST request non-
standard departure clearance on start up.
the following contingency: Turn left or right as appropriate at 5000FT to
ADVISE ATC IMMEDIATELY THE CONTINGENCY IS COMMENCED

QUARRY, departing traffic shall maintain on track until passing 5000FT QNH,
or until passing by MDB/NDB or abeam MDB/NDB.
FREQ 121.4 or 132.05 MHz as early as possible, and in any case traffic should
not cross 10 NM East of SALAM or TALMI without establish contact with TEL-
AVIV ACC.
RMK: See related chart (AIP - AD 2-31B).

WESTERLY ARRIVALS Queen Alia RWY 26R/26L
LOSAR2A At LOSAR ,intercept QAA R029 to Cross LOSAR 13000FT or

LOXER then to QAA/VOR above. Cross LOXER at
QAA 10d 8500 FT or
above.
LUDAN2A At LUDAN intercept QAA R048 to Cross LUDAN 11000FT or

QAA. above. Cross QAA 13d
8500 FT or above.
QTR2A At QTR intercept QAA R186 to Cross QTR 9000FT or

QAA.. above.
Cross QAA 15d 7000FT or
above.
KULDI2A At KULDI intercept QAA R140 to Cross KULDI FL150 or

QAA. above.
Cross QAA 15d 7000FT or
above.
RALNA2A AT RALNA intercept AMN R258 to Cross RALNA 11000FT.

AMN then turn right to intercept AMN Cross AMN 10d R160 at
R160 to QAA. 6000FT or above.
KINUR2A AT KINUR intercept QAA R105 to Cross KINUR FL150 or

QAA above.
Cross ALNOR 7000FT or
above.
NOTE:
1. ACFT not able to comply with STAR profile. It will be subject to radar control.
2. ACFT on KINUR2A not able to comply with the arrival profile, may ask to Proceed
via KULDI2A.
3. Follow ATC descent clearance instructions. But not below published profiles, which
are Minimum safety profiles.

DEPARTURES Queen Alia RWY 08L
ROUTE NAVIGATIONS ALT/FL RESTRICTIONS
LOSAR3D Climb Runway Heading until Climb to cross AMN R174 (3.1d
crossing 3.1d QAA turn left to to QAA/VOR/DME) at 3200FT
intercept QAA R029 to LOXER. or above. Cross 10d QAA at
Continue to LOSAR. 8500FT or above.
Cross LOXER 9000FT or above.
Cross LOSAR 13000FT or above.
LUDAN3D Climb Runway Heading until Climb to cross 3.1d to QAA at

crossing 3.1d QAA turn left to 3200FT or above.
intercept QAA R048 to LUDAN Cross QAA 13d at 8500FT or
above,
Cross LUDAN 11000FT or
above.
QTR3D Climb Runway Heading until Climb to cross 3.1d to QAA at

crossing 3.1d QAA turn right to 3200FT or above.
intercept QAA R186 to QTR Cross QAA 15d 7000FT or above.
Cross QTR 9000FT or above
KULDI3D Climb Runway Heading until Climb to cross 3.1d to QAA at

crossing 3.1d QAA turn right to 3200FT or above.
intercept QAA R140 to KULDI Cross QAA 15d 7000FT or above.
Cross KULDI FL150 or above
RALNA3D Climb Runway Heading until Cross 3.1d to QAA at 3200FT or

crossing 3.1d QAA then turn left above. Cross QAA 12d R290 at
to intercept QAA R290 proceed 6000FT or above. Cross OSAMA
to OSAMA, then turn left to maintaining 8000FT.
RALNA.
MUVIN3D Climb Runway Heading until Cross 3.1d to QAA at 3200FT or

crossing 3.1d QAA. Turn left to above. Cross QAA 12d at
intercept QAA R273 proceed to 6000FTor above.
MOUAB then turn right to Cross MOUAB 11000FT or
MUVIN. above.
12000FT.
KINUR3D Climb runway heading until Climb to cross 3.1d to QAA at

crossing 3.1d QAA. Turn right to 3200FT or above.
intercept QAA R105 proceed to Cross ALNOR 7000FT or above.
ALNOR then KINUR. Cross KINUR FL150 or above.
NOTES:
1. Aircraft unable to comply with the SID profiles restrictions MUST request non-

2. Aircraft unable to achieve SID profile restrictions when airborne should carry out the
following contingency: Turn left or right as appropriate at 5000FT fly to MDB/NDB
to enter the holding pattern.
3. In case of VFR traffic is flying on V1 Corridor between GHARBIYA and QUARRY,

departing traffic shall maintain on track until passing 5000FT QNH, or until passing
by QAA/VOR or abeam QAA/VOR.
4. Departure traffic on RALNA and MUVIN SIDs shall call TEL-AVIV ACC on FREQ
121.4 or 132.05MHz as early as possible, and in any case traffic should not cross 10
NM East of SALAM or TALMI without establish contact with TEL- AVIV ACC.

DEPARTURE Queen Alia RWY 26R

RESTRICTIONS
LOSAR2D Climb Runway Heading until crossing Cross 14d QAA (AMN
(14d QAA) then turn right to intercept R206) at 3200FT or above.
AMN R209 to AMN/VOR intercept Cross AMN 10d (R209)
AMN R080 to LOXER, then turn left 7000FT or above. Cross
to intercept QAA R029 to LOSAR. AMN 07d (R080) 8500FT
or above. Cross LOXER
9000FT or above.
Cross LOSAR 13000FT or
above.
LUDAN2D Climb Runway Heading until crossing Cross 14d QAA at 3200 FT
QAA 14d then turn right to intercept or above.
AMN R209 to AMN intercept AMN Cross AMN 10d R209
R080 to LUDAN . 7000FT or above. Cross
AMN 07d R080 8500FT or
above. Cross LUDAN
11000FT or above.
QTR2D Climb Runway Heading until 14d Cross 14d QAA at 3200FT
QAA, then turn left to intercept QTR or above.
R336 to QTR. Cross QTR 15d 7000FT or
above.
Cross QTR at 9000FT or
above.
KULDI2D Climb Runway Heading until 14d Cross 14d QAA at 3200 FT
QAA, turn left to intercept QTR R336 or above.
to QTR, then turn left to intercept Cross QTR 15d 7000FT or
QTR R077 To KULDI. above.
Cross QTR 9000FT or
above.
Cross KULDI FL150 or
above.
MUVIN2D Climb Runway Heading to Cross 14d QAA at 3200

MDB/NDB, turn right to intercept FT or above.
MDB bearing 291 to MOUAB then Cross QAA 22d R269 at
turn left to MUVIN. 7000 FT or above. Cross
MOUAB 11000FT or
above.
12000FT.

RALNA2D Climb Runway Heading until crossing Cross 14d QAA at 3200FT
14d QAA, then turn right on track 315 or above.
to OSAMA then turn left to RALNA. Cross QAA 21d R277 at
OSAMA maintaining
8000FT then to RALNA
point.
NOTES:
1. Aircraft unable to comply with SID profile restrictions MUST request non-
the following contingency: Turn left or right as appropriate at 5000FT to

QUARRY, departing traffic shall maintain on track until passing 5000FT QNH,
or until passing by MDB/NDB or abeam MDB/NDB.
FREQ 121.4 or 132.05 MHz as early as possible, and in any case traffic should
not cross 10 NM East of SALAM or TALMI without establish contact with TEL-
AVIV ACC.
RMK: See related chart (AIP - AD 2-31B).

ARRIVALS Queen Alia RWY 08R/08L
LOSAR3A At LOSAR intercept QAA R029. At Cross LOSAR 13000FT or

LOXER turn right to intercept AMN above.
R080. At AMN turn left to intercept Cross LOXER 9000FT or
R209 to MDB NDB. above.
above.
above.
LUDAN3A At LUDAN intercept AMN R080. At Cross LUDAN 11000FT or

AMN turn left to intercept AMN R209 above.
proceed to MDB NDB. Cross AMN 07d R080
AMN 10d R209 7000 FT or
above.
REPORT over LOXER
QTR3A At QTR turn left to intercept QTR Cross QTR 9000FT or

R336 to MDB NDB. above.
Cross QTR 15d at 7000FT
or above.
REPORT 15d OUTBOUND QTR/VOR.
KULDI3A AT KULDI establish QTR R077 to Cross KULDI FL150 or

QTR then over QTR turn right to above.
intercept QTR R336 to MDB NDB. Cross QTR 9000FT or
above.
Cross QTR 15d R336 at
7000FT or above.
REPORT 15d OUTBOUND QTR/VOR.
RALNA3A At RALNA intercept AMN R258 to Cross RALNA 11000FT.

AMN. Turn right to intercept AMN Cross AMN 10d R209
R209 to MDB/NDB. 7000FT or above.
NOTE: Initial holding clearance may be issued for QTR or AMN follow ATC descent
clearance instructions, but not below published profiles which are minimum safety
profiles.

3. Terminal Procedures AQABA/ King Hussein:
ARABA DEPARTURE RWY 01

AQC/NDB Climb on track until passing ALT Dont initiate right turn before
R652 7000FT then turn right to join R652 passing ALT 7000FT.
QTR/VOR to QTR/VOR
NOTE: Right turn at ALT 6500FT may be approved if there is no traffic on V4 route.
RAHMA DEPARTURE RWY 01
AQC/NDB Climb on track until passing ALT Dont initiate right turn before
R652 7000FT turn right to BAKIR FIX (turn passing
METSA should be completely contained within ALT 7000FT. Cross METSA
CAIRO FIR AQABA Approach Control Area) then at
proceed to METSA. ALT 12000FT or above.
NOTE: Right turn at ALT 6500FT may be approved if there is no traffic on V4 route.
RMK: See related chart (AIP - AD 2-31)

PETRA DEPARTURE RWY 19
BAKIR FIX Climb on track until passing ALT Dont initiate left turn
R652 5000FT (minimum climbing gradient before passing ALT
QTR 5%) turn left to join ATS Route R652 5000FT. Cross AQB/VOR
to QTR/VOR. Cross AQB/VOR. R090 at ALT 7000FT or
R090 at ALT 7000FT or above (turn above.
should be completely contained within
Aqaba Approach Control Area).
Maximum IAS 210 KTS.
METSA DEPARTURE RWY 19

RESTRICTIONS
BAKIR FIX Climb on track until passing ALT Dont initiate left turn
R652,METS 5000FT (minimum climbing gradient before passing ALT
A 5%) turn left proceeds to BAKIR 5000FT. (don't exceed 7
hold. Cross AQB/VOR R090 at ALT NM from AQB). Cross
7000FT or above Climb in the hold to AQB/VOR R090 at ALT
cross METSA at ALT 12000 FT or 7000FT or above.
above then to the assigned level.
Maximum IAS 210 KTS.
NOTES:
1. The turns to the left after departure should be completely contained within Aqaba
Approach Control Area.
2. All traffic departing or arriving Aqaba/King Hussein International aerodrome shall
adhere to the standard SIDs and Approach IFR joining instructions as published in
Jordan AIP.
3. ACFT unable to comply with the SID profiles restrictions must request non-

APPENDIX 3
TACC FORMS
The Hashemite kingdom of Jordan
Directorate ANS Division / Queen Alia
Amman / TACC
ATC Performance Check Form .
APPS
Name: Position Date: / /
ACS
Assessment Items Evaluation factors A S B
Legibility
1. Position Management Updating information
a. Display Management
Reviewing of accuracy
b. Board Management
Use of equipment
Planning
Controlling
Clarity of voice
Priorities of tasks
2. Traffic Control Operating
Corrective action
Technique
Attention to duties
Adjustment to meet changing conditions
Adherence to SARPS and local procedures
Working speed
Vectoring Techniques
3. RADAR Sequencing
Adherence to procedures
Correct phraseology
4. Radio and direct lines Voice intelligibility
Correct techniques
Adherence to procedures
Response to information receivers
5. Coordination
Forwards required information
Effectiveness of operation
Selection of type to be applied
Aircraft capabilities
6. Separation Standards
Adherence to separation standards
Use of Navigational Aids
Motivation of sub staff
Assignment of man power
Instruction techniques
7. Staff management supervision Management techniques
Leadership
Performance of liaison duties
Evaluation of performance of sub staff
Examiner comments Name & signature
TACC Chief comments Name & signature
A : Above average , S: Satisfactory , B: Below average CARC\ANS\TACC\Form # 1

Amman / TACC
Evaluation Form
Name: Date: / /
APPS From To
Time
ACS From To
Strengths/ APPS Strengths/ ACS Weaknesses/ APPS Weaknesses/ ACS
Supervisor comments: Supervisor & Signature:
Other data and information ( for TACC Chief use )

Approval ..
Objection ..
Reservation ..
TACC Chief comments: TACC Chief & Signature:
Correction plan (Recommendations and follow-up ):
Copy to:
CARC\ANS\TACC\Form #2
Copy to:
Amman / TACC
Rating Validity Report & Practical Assessment Form.
Name: Date: / /
APPS From To
Position Time
ACS From To
Satisfactory Unsatisfactory
Evaluation Factors
APPS ACS APPS ACS
1. Separation
2. Traffic Management and Control Judgment
3. Coordination and Communication
4. Operation and procedures
5. Equipment
6. Board Management
Final Result Passed Passed Failed Failed
Examiner Comments: Name & Signature
OJT Chief Comments: Name & Signature
Amman / TACC
RADAR Practical Training Record.
Trainee Name:
Traffic Position
Date Start End Duration OJTI
Volume Approach Area
Surveillance Surveillance
/ /20 L M H
/ /20 L M H
/ /20 L M H
/ /20
L M H
/ /20
L M H
/ /20 L M H
/ /20 L M H
/ /20 L M H
/ /20 L M H
/ /20 L M H
/ /20 L M H
/ /20 L M H
/ /20 L M H
/ /20 L M H
/ /20 L M H
/ /20 L M H
/ /20 L M H
/ /20 L M H
/ /20 L M H
/ /20 L M H
/ /20 L M H
/ /20 L M H
/ /20 L M H
/ /20 L M H
Total CARC\ANS\TACC\Form # 4
Amman / TACC
ATC Final Practical Assessment Form .
Trainee Name: Position: Date: / /
Date of birth: / / License NO:

1. Knowledge and application of ATC procedures:
2. R/T phraseology and telephone technique:
3. Staff relationship (Coordination , flexibility , initiative and reaction to criticism):
4. Assessment of performance covered:
5. Equipment management:
( ) Satisfactory ( ) Unsatisfactory
OJT Supervisor Comments: Name & Signature
Trainee name & signature:
Passport copy is required. CARC\ANS\TACC\Form #5

Amman / TACC
OJT Training Assessment Form.
Name: Date: / /
APPS From To
Position Time
ACS From To
Training Phase: One Workload: Light Traffic
APPS ACS
SUBJECT EVALUATION FACTOR
S U S U
1-Use of standard phraseology
2-Use of good voice quality
PHRASEOLOGY
3-Speech rate
4-Make necessary transmission
1-Accuracy
STRIP 2-Legibilty
MARKING
3-Completeness
1-RT channel selection
EQUIPMENT 2-NAV aids Monitor

HANDLING 3-Weather information
4-Adjusment of radar control
Final Result Passed Failed Passed Failed
S: Satisfactory. U: Unsatisfactory. CARC\ANS\TACC\Form #6

Amman / TACC
Name: Date: / /
APPS From To
Position Time
ACS From To
Training Phase: Two Workload: Light to Medium Traffic
APPS ACS
S U S U
PHRASEOLOGY
3-Speech rate
1-Accuracy
STRIP MARKING 2-Legibilty
3-Completeness
1- Coordination procedures
2-Phraseology
COORDINATION
3-Coordination through proper channels
4-Interphone communication clear and concise
1-Awareness and preplanning
TRAFFIC 2-Control Judgment
MANAGEMENT &
3-Control of situation
CONTROL
JUDGMENT 4-Action to correct error
5-Effective traffic flow is maintained

Amman / TACC
Name: Date: / /
APPS From To
Position Time
ACS From To
Training Phase: Three Workload: Medium to Heavy Traffic
APPS ACS
S U S U
PHRASEOLOGY
3-Speech rate
1-Accuracy
STRIP MARKING 2-Legibilty
3-Completeness
1- Coordination procedures
2-Phraseology
COORDINATION
3-Coordination through proper channels
4-Interphone communication clear and concise
1-Awareness and preplanning
TRAFFIC 2-Control Judgment
MANAGEMENT &
CONTROL 3-Control of situation
JUDGMENT 4-Action to correct error
5-Effective traffic flow is maintained
1-Adherance to unit procedures and instructions
2-Adherance to standard
3-Hand Over procedure (silent)
OPERATIONS &
4-Expedtion
PROCEDURES
5-Applying safety
6-ATC clearances
7-Sequencing

Amman / TACC
INDRA Training Form
Name: Date: / /
Session Type Start Time End Time Duration
SDD
Situation Data Display
FDD
Flight Data Display
CMD
Control Monitoring
Display
Total Duration:
Remarks:
Trainer Name/Sign: Trainee Name/Sign:
Amman / TACC
COORDINATION FAILURES FORM
Month:
Call singe + ACFT SSR COOR Actual FIR Entry FIR Exit
No. Date Route Dep. Dest. Fault
Registration Type Code Level Level Point Time Point Time
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
CARC\ANS\TACC\Form # 10
Directorate ANS Division / Queen Alia Airport
AMMAN TACC
Read Back of Clearances and Safety Related Information.
SDD Tape Listening

Date / / Number Number period
Tape (Per Hour)
Time From : To : Sector / /
Date
Findings
Recommendations
Follow Up and Corrective Action
TACC Chief Name SMS Officer Name

& Signature & Signature
Copy: DANS
CARC \ ANS \ TACC \ Form # 11
Copy: SMS Officer
APPENDIX 4
INDRA SYSTEM
TACC MATC II INDRA SYSTEM APPENDIX 4
1. INDRA SYSTEM
1.0 Definitions:
Full Flight Plan :

Complete flight plan, normally associated to a commercial airline, with slight
differences up to the actual airplane performing service .
Physical Screen :
The physical monitor used by the system to interact with controller, where every
Window is displayed .
Pop-up Menu :
Menu displayed upon clicking once on the icon. Menu display is kept after button
release and selection is performed pointing and clicking .
Pull Down Menu :
Menu will keep display while pressing mouse button (normally LEFT button).
Desired option is selected by dragging pointer to the option while pressing. Upon
button release, the menu is removed .
Reconfiguration :
A change in the roles assigned to each Workstation to set a different number of
controllers, different distribution ...
Role :
Any category of controller working in the Visual Control Room and classified by the
controlled aerodrome zone. Typical roles are Tower, Ground and Clearance .
Screen Layout :
Windows distribution and appearance when displayed on the Integrated Work
Station. It is different according to the roles assigned to each ICW .
Variable System Parameter :
Its a certain value entered in the system in order to regulate processes such as timing
for FP insertion in Pending Lists, waiting for terminating a flight after arrival to
gate...Etc.
2.0 Abbreviations:
AAI AFTN aeronautical identifier or header

ACID Aircraft Identification
ADEP Aerodrome of Departure
AIW Aerodrome Information Window
ATA Actual Time of Arrival
ATCC Air Traffic Control Center
ATD Actual Time of Departure
ATFMC Air traffic flow management control
ATG Air traffic generator
ATIS Airport Terminal Information Service
AW Minimum safe altitude warning
BYP By pass mode

CCC Central Computing System

CFMU Central of flow management unit
CFL Cleared Flight Level
CL Clearance
CMD Control & Monitoring Display
CNL Cancel
CNF Conflicted flights
CTF Common timing facility
CTOT Calculated Take-Off Time
DBM Data base management
DCT Direct
DEST Destination Aerodrome
DME Distance Measurement Equipment
DRF Data Recording Facility
EPP Exercise planner position
EFS Electronic Flight Strip
EOBT Estimated Off-Block Time
ETA Estimated Time of Arrival
FDD Flight data display
FDPS Flight Data Processing System
FIFO First in first out theory
FP Flight Plan
FPL Flight Plan
GND Ground
H/O Hand-Off
HFS Horizontal future situation
ICW Integrated Controller Workstation
IFR Instrument Flight Rules
ILS Instrumental Landing System
LAN Local area network
LB Clam alert cleared level adherence and monitoring
LLZ Localizer
LMG Local map generator
MET Meteorological
MIS Missing
NAVAID Navigation AID
NTZ Non Transgression Zone
OS Obstruction Symbole
PEL Planned entry level
PO Position report
PSRT Primary search RADAR tracks
RDCU Radar data communications unit
RDPS Radar Data Processing System
RISC Reduced instruction set computing
RFL Requested Flight Level
RWY Runway
SAR Search And Rescue
SDP Surveillance data processor
SDD Situation Data Display
SIM Simulator

SID Standard Instrument Departures

SMC System Monitoring & Control
SMGCS Surface Movement Guidance and Control System
SFS Survey function selected
SRA Single Radar Access
SSRC Secondary Surveillance Radar Code
STAR Standard Terminal Arrival Route
STCA Short term conflict alert
SU Supervisor
XFL Exit flight level
TAF Terminal Area Forecast
TIS Traffic Information System
TMA Terminal Maneuvering Area
TWR Tower
UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply
VFR Visual Flight Rules
VFS Vertical future situation
VOR VHF Omni directional Range
VSP Variable System Parameter
W Wake Turbulence
ZN Area proximity warning
3.0 General System Description:
The AIRCON 2100 System is based on a standard product developed by Indra. At the
same time, an autonomous simulator addressed to controllers for training purposes to
allow analysis of new operational procedures provides the operational system .
AIRCON 2100 represents the last product generation and its architecture is based on
the experience gained in the development of open systems for the displaying and
processing of radar data and flight plans, found on numerous systems installed in
Spain (SACTA System), Canada, Germany, Norway, Holland, India and now in
Jordan, One of the main characteristics of the system is its availability, due to the
employment of redundant elements on a distributed scenario, and to the use of tested
and highly reliable commercial equipment .
The system modularity and distribution determines the software architecture, which
uses distributed discrete processes for the different subsystems for its organization. At
the same time, the system makes use of communication by messages, both for inter
communications between tasks and for its synchronicity. In order to assure a
maximum level of maintenance, communications and application tasks have been
isolated .
The software running in the system has been tested and proved extensively in different
emplacements and during longs periods and, therefore, Indra can guarantee that no
additional developments of any kind are required for its correct and stable operation .
The Operating System used is RED HAT ENTERPRISE LINUX 5 .

AIRCON 2100 includes all the necessary functionality required in a modern ATC
system.
3.1 INDRA RADAR Coverage:
RADAR system will be able to detect and process targets from .025 up to 256 NM
except for geographical restrictions in distance and more than 66.000 feet in height,
in a 360 degrees azimuth.
3.2 The integration of all its subsystems is performed via :
Local Area Network (LAN): A redundant five (5) category with a 1-Gigabyte
bandwidth capacity LAN is used and, therefore, future updates of the system can be
easily implemented making use of standard communication protocols .
4. Main components :
4.1 Flight Data Processing (FDP):

It is based on RISC redundant computers. It manages the flight plans generated within
the System or coming from external sources, including the Repetitive Flight Plans
(RPLs). It confirms all flight data inputs, calculates the flights progression and keeps
all controllers inform by means of screen displays and flight plan strips printing.
Redundant configuration designs the System, having an FDP as operative and another
one as reserve, with the possibility to switch them.
4.2 Surveillance Data Processor (SDP):
It is based on RISC redundant computers. It receives and processes data (primary,

secondary and meteorological) coming from the radar sites. Next, it performs the
merge all the received information to create a coherent airspace picture for controllers
(SDD) presentation. It also performs surveillance tasks (STCA, MTCD) between
aircraft and integrates the radar information and the flight plan information in order to
get a precise tracking. The System is duplicated (operative/reserve) being possible to
switch them .
4.3 RADAR Communications Processor (RDCU):
It centralizes the System radar communications to interpret and convert the received
radar formats to join them. The System is composed of two RDCU units working
parallel. It is possible to carry out the received radar data reproduction during an
established period .
5.0 Controlling positions:
5.1 Situation Data Display (SDD):

It is based on powerful workstations that receive data processed by both the SDP and
the FDP. Later on, it manages all these information for a coherent displaying at the

controllers screens (SDD). At the same time, it displays additional relevant

information such as geographic maps, meteorological data.
5.2 Flight Data Display (FDD):

It displays information concerning flight plans not supplying data display of data on
air situation. It allows controllers to perform adjustments on flight plans and other
significant data.
5.3 Control and Monitoring Display (CMD):

It performs a continuous real time supervision of the System. It also allows monitoring
and System elements status change, Sectorization modification, management of
certain configurable parameters, etc.
6.0 Auxiliary equipment:

6.1 Common Timing Facility (CTF):
It receives the GPS time, spread to all the subsystem (via LAN) and all clocks (via
Terminals) with NTP protocol.
6.2 Data Recording Facilities (DRF):

It performs the continuous recording of tracks; flight plans data and controller actions
to allow a later reproduction and analysis.
6.3 Data Base Management (DBM):

It provides the necessary facilities the creation and modification of the adaptation
databases to supply the system with the precise knowledge of its geographical
environment to achieve the required efficiency. From this database, all necessary data
to define the control center characteristics are defined (fix points, aerodromes,
airways, Sectorization, adjacent control centers, QNH zones, etc.).
7.0 Simulator environment:

7.1 Simulator (SIM):
It provides to the controllers an operational replica of the real scenario for training
purposes. It is a multiple exercise simulator system and allows the use of several
exercises, simultaneously and independently. It allows the analysis of new operational
procedures as well as the management and maintenance of the full set of sessions and
exercises recorded in the Simulation Library. It also allows the creation of new
exercises, the selection of training scenarios and provides a complete set of interactive
capacities in order to guarantee full control and management.
7.2 Instructor Pilot Position (PILOT SM):
It allows training scenarios selection, session control and control of aircraft simulated
interactively in such a way that it generates the communication answer to the control
positions from this position.

7.3 Exercise Manager (ATG/EPP):

This unit manages the exercises.
8.0 Plot and Track symbols:
The plots which not created a track yet can be displayed for selected radar. Once the
track is created, the plot symbol is no longer displayed.
The plot symbol is a shape associated to a unique plot, its location in the SDD is
automatically moved by the system in order to present the actual position of the flight.
The symbols to each type of plot are described in following table:
The track symbol is a shape associated to a unique track, its location on the SDD
Area is automatically moved by the system in order to represent the actual position of
the flight, the symbols to each type of track are described in following table:

9.0 Labels and track colors:
The system provides the capability of classify the tracks by means of color codes.
The color code is an adaptation data and it is applied to the symbol, leader, track, past
positions, and tracks velocity vector. The below table states the colors used to
distinguish the different types of tracks.
LABEL COLOUR MEANING
GREEN LABEL CONTROLLED IFR
YELLOW LABEL CONTROLLED VFR
LIGHT BLUE+ GREEN CALLSIGN INBOUND SECTOR IFR
LIGHT BLUE+ YELLOW CALLSIGN INBOUND VFR
NOTE: light blue color was installed to indicate uncontrolled flights inside,
outside sectors shown in the picture:

LINE # FIELD DISPLAYED INFO VALID DATA
A SECTOR NAME 4 CHARACTERS
2 CHARACTERS
B ROF/RAM/SSR/HEADING FQ/RO/SQ/HG YELLOW
COLORED
1 CHARACTERS
8 YELLOW: 8.33 WARNING
C 8.33/UHF WARNINGS
8 RED: 8.33 ALERT
U YELLOW : UHF EQUIPPED
1 CHARACTERS
R RED : RVSM ALERT
D RVSM R YELLOW : RVSM WARNING
S YELLOW: NON RVSM
ONE S GREEN : RVSM EQUIPPED
2 CHARACTERS
AW: MSAW (YELLOW: prediction;
RED: violation)
MSAW/ APW/ RAW/ MTCD/PO ZN: APW (YELLOW: prediction;
E RED: violation)
ZN: RAW (GREEN)
MC: MTCD (YELLOW: prediction;
RED: violation)
PO: Position Report
2 CHARACTERS
EM (RED): Emergency
HJ (RED): Hijack
F Distress
RF (RED): Radio Communication
Failure
LB (YELLOW): CLAM alert
COORDINATION
A 1 CHARACTER
REQ.MARK
B Call sign 7 CHARACTERS

TWO
C ^ mark 1 CHARACTER
Ground speed/ Vertical

D 3 CHARACTERS
speed
A Altitude indicator 1 CHARACTER
B Mode C 3 CHARACTERS
THREE
1 Character
=> Aircraft climbing ,
Vertical Speed Indicator
=> Aircraft descending
C Space => Aircraft maintaining altitude

Cleared flight level (CFL)

3 Characters
D CFL value for controlled tracks
Planned entry level(PEL) PEL value for inbound tracks
E Exit flight level (XFL) 3 CHARACTERS
F Free Text ---------
A Aircraft type/ Mode A 3 CHARACTERS
B Wake turbulence category 1 CHARACTER

FOUR
C Last point/SID/STAR/DEST 5 CHARACTERS
Assigned heading (Only for 3 CHARACTERS

A
extended mode)
Assigned speed (Only for 3 CHARACTERS

B
extended mode)
FIVE
Assigned vertical rate 1 CHARACTER
C indicator (Only for extended mode)
Requested flight level (RFL) (Only 2 CHARACTERS

D for extended mode)
10.0 Situation Data Display SDD :
The following informations will guide the new users of the SDD Position to all
available windows with its description; the SDD screen is divided into three main
areas:
10.1 General Information Area (Upper Menu):

1. Minimum Safe Altitude Warning [MSAW] Icon:
The Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW) is defined in adaptation and it is
activated /deactivated at CMD. When it is activated, the icon text color is GREEN
and, when it is deactivated, the icon text color turns to YELLOW. When Safety Net
is not available, this functionality is not operative, and its color turns to RED.

2. Short Term Conflict Alert [STCA] Icon:
The Short Term Conflict Alert (STCA) is also defined in adaptation and it is
activated /deactivated at CMD. When it is activated, the icon text color is GREEN
and, when it is deactivated, the icon text color turns to YELLOW. When Safety Net
is not available, this functionality is not operative, and its color turns to RED.
3. Area Proximity Warning [APW] Icon:
The Area Proximity Warning (APW) is defined in adaptation and it is activated /

inhibited by the CMD. When it is activated, the icon text color is GREEN and,
when it is inhibited, the icon text color turns to YELLOW.
4. Medium Term Conflict Detection [MTCD] Icon:

The Medium Term Conflict Detection (MTCD) it is activated /deactivated by the
CMD. When it is activated, the icon text color is GREEN and when deactivated
YELLOW.
5. Primary Search Radar Tracks [PSR T] Icon:

The [PSR T] icon allows the activation of the PSR to initiate the tracking of PSR
plots falling in a system, following colors represents the icon status:
Activated: BLACK on LIGHT GREY Deactivated: WHITE on GREY
6. [OPTIONS] Icon: options included are:

a) HISTORY: Activate / deactivate the tracks past positions display,
the activation status can be also selected by means of the key
combination <Alt> + <H>.
b) PSR PLOT: Activate/deactivate the primary plots display.
c) PSR BYP: Activate/deactivate the primary tracks display.
d) SSR PLOT: Activate/deactivate the secondary plots display.
e) SSR BYP: Activate/deactivate the non-correlated secondary tracks
display.
f) CORR: Activate/deactivate the correlated secondary tracks display.

g) REPORT: Activate/deactivate the ADS position reports, activating the "PO" alert
in track label when an expected report is not received.
h) FILLED: Activate/deactivate the display of under-control sectors in a different
background color.
7. Survey Function Selected [SFS] Icon:

This icon is used to select the operational mode:
I. (INT) Integrated Mode or Multi RADAR: The Position displays multi radar
tracks processed by the SDP coming from all System radars, which are operative.
Thus, the plot position is calculated taking into account the information sent by
several radars.
II. (MON) Mono-RADAR Mode: The position displays the mono-RADAR tracks
received from the SDP of radar selected by the controller from the radar sites
defined by adaptation.
III. (BYP) By-Pass Mode: (BYP) By-Pass Mode the SDP does not process the
received RADAR information. It comes directly from the RDCU system of the
radar site selected to the SDD. The SDD position is the one in charge of the
received information process, track creation, etc. The FDP information is still
accessible but as the SDP is not a part of the process, all relation between the FDP
and the SDP is cancelled.
Following functions are not available when the mode of operation is (BYP):
1. Correlation of track with Flight Plan.
2. STCA.
3. Mode C Tracking.
4. Synthetic Tracks.
5. APW Prediction and Intrusion.
6. Hand-over.
8. RADAR Source [RADAR] Icon:

This icon displays the selected current RADAR source.
9. Weather Radar Data Source Information [Wx: ] Icon:

Select the weather RADAR whose data will be displayed if available.
10. [Presentation Range] Icon:

This icon displays the current selected range in NM and by pressing on it you can
select different ranges.
11. Altitude Filters Activation/ deactivation [FALT] Icon:

The [FALT] icon allows the activation/deactivation of the altitude filter for the
SDD SIT Area.
Its activation status is shown by the icon text color: YELLOW if it is activated, and
WHITE if deactivated,

12. See plots [ST] Icon:

To select the color of the plots belonging to a selected RADAR (only if the SDD in
supervisor mode) in other hand this icon shows the mode of the SDD.
13. Sectors Display: It displays the sectors assigned to the position.
14. Expansion [EXP+ F9] , Contraction Scale [EXP- F10] Icons:

To increase the presentation range of the SDD SIT area, to contract an area of the
SDD SIT Area.
15. Centering [CEN] , De-Centering [DCEN] Icons:

Centering icon performs a return of the SDD SIT Area to geographical center
determined by the system, De-centering or drifted center this icon performs the
change of current SIT Area center display to another point.
16. Flight Plan [FPL] Icon:

Allows the controller to select the type of FP-operation to be performed.
17. Flight plan Action Window: This window allows choosing different actions or just
information displays (View and Hist.) for an existing FP or creation of a non-
existing FP, upon selection of the corresponding command. Editable fields depend
on the selected command/action.

Field Description Valid Data
Aircraft Identification or
Flight ID 2 to 7 alphanumeric characters
ACID
Up to 20 characters.
Radio Call sign Phonetic Airline Opera Non-editable field. Defined in
DBM.
NO Number of Aircrafts Up to 2 numerical characters

(1-99)
2 to 4 alphanumeric characters.
The first one shall be an
A/C TYPE Type of Aircraft alphabetic character.
It shall be known by the
system.
L = light
M = medium
W Type of wake turbulence
H = heavy
J = super-heavy
Four alphabetic characters.

If unknown, then enter the
ZZZZ keyword.
DEP Departure Aerodrome
If created while aircraft is
airborne, then enter the AFIL
keyword.
DEST Destination Aerodrome Four alphabetic characters.
Up to 20 alphabetical characters
N = Non-equipped
S = Equipped
A = LORAN A
Navigational/ C = LORAN C
Communications D = DME
NAV/ COM
Equipment E = Decca
H = HF RTF
I = Inertial Navigation
L = ILS
M = Omega
O = VOR

P = Doppler
R = RNAV
T = TACAN
U = UHF RTF
V = VHF RTF
W = RVSM
Y = Frequency 8.33 Mz
EQ = equipped
NO = non-equipped (for civil
flights)
RVSM RVSM Capability Status UN = unknown
EX = exempted (for military
flights)
Up to 20 alphabetical characters
N=> None. (The aircraft do not
carry transponder equipment).
It is not allowed this value if an
SSR Code is assigned.
A=> Mode A (Transponder
equipment can send positional
information but without altitude
information)
C=> Mode C (Transponder
equipment can send both
positional and altitude
information)
X=> Mode S (nor aircraft
identification transmission
SURVEILLANCE neither
SSR Equipment.
EQUIPMENT pressure altitude information)
P=> Mode S (Transponder
equipment can send pressure
altitude transmission but it
cannot sent aircraft
identification
transmission)
I=> Mode C (Transponder can
send aircraft identification
transmission but it cannot send
pressure altitude transmission)
S=> Mode S (Transponder can
send both aircraft
identification and pressure
altitude transmission)
Blank = C

4 numerical characters (octal)

Blank = It allows the FDP to
CSSR ICAO SSR Code
automatically assign an SSR
Code
I = IFR
V = VFR
Flight Rules Y = IFR followed by VFR
R
Z = VFR followed by IFR
Blank = I
S = scheduled
N = non-scheduled
G = general aviation
FT Flight Type
M = military
X = other
Blank = other
Alphanumeric characters (2 to
SID Standard Instrumental
Departure Procedure 7). Must be a known SID.
Up to 480 characters.
FP route See following NOTE on Route
FIR ROUTE
Field Validation Rules.
STAR Standard Terminal Arrival Alphanumeric characters (2 to

Route Procedure 7). Must be a known STAR.
YYMMDD (00 to 99 and 01 to

EOBD Estimated Off-Block Date 12 and 01 to 31) date of
departure.
EOBT Estimated Off-Block Time HHMM (00 to 23 and 00 to 59)
AFTN message; e.g.: FPL,

DLA, CHG,
Last AFTN Received If the FPL only has the first
MSG Message AFTN message(the FPL
message),
on the field appear FPL

HHMM (00 to 23 and 00 to 59)

Calculated Take-Off Time Updated with the last received
CTOT
CFMU message.
Type of the last received

Last CFMU Received CFMU message; e.g.: SAM,
ATFMC Message SRM, SLC,
FLS, DES,
ATD Actual Time of Departure HHMM (00 to 23 and 00 to 59)
EET/ ETA Estimated Elapsed Time HHMM (00 to 23 and 00 to 59)

Estimated Time of Arrival
Kxxxx: 4 numerical characters

(Km/h)
Nxxxx: 4 numerical characters
CRUISING SPEED Cruise Speed (Knots)
Mxxx: 3 numerical characters
(Mach number)
Flight level (hundreds of feet):

Fxxx where xxx 000 to 999.
Altitude (hundreds of feet):

Axxx where xxx 000 to 999.
CRUISING
Requested Flight Level Level (tents of meters): Sxxxx
LEVEL where xxxx 0000 to 9999.
Altitude (tents of meters):
Mxxxx where xxxx 0000 to
9999.
Up to five alphabetic
characters.
ESTIMATE FIX Estimate Fix Point
It shall be known by the
system.
Estimated time over a HHMM (00 to 23 and 00 to 59)

ESTIMATE TIME
significant point
ESTIMATE 3 digits (hundreds of feet)

Cleared Flight Level
LEVEL

Indicated Speed on the Position

Pos Report SPEED Speed Report
Next Fix point to overfly

Pos Report FIX Fix point indicated on the Position Report
Indicated time to overfly the fix

Pos Report ETO Estimated Time Overfly point on the Position Report
9 alphanumeric characters:
ALT AD(S) Alternate Airports Airport(Space)Airport
(Each airport 4 characters)
FIELD 18 Additional information Defined Field from ICAO
Free text
Notes This Free text is visible from
FREE TEXT
the lists on the SDDs
Clearance Flight Level

Clearance Flight Level Flight level (hundreds of feet):
CFL
En-Route Cruise Level

Requested Level Flight level (hundreds of feet):
ECL
4 alphanumeric (number of the

S Strip sector to print the strip, only
applicable on the SDD position)
REG Aircraft Register 8 alphanumeric characters
STS Status 20 alphanumeric characters
6 hexadecimals characters (0-9,

MODE S Aircraft Identification A-F)
ORIGINAL Original Route from Field Up to 480 characters.

ROUTE 15
NOTE: item ATFMC stands for AIR TRAFFIC FLOW MANAGEMENT CONTROL,
CFMU is the central of flow management unit, item used in EURO CONTROL.

18. FPLs Retrieval:
This option triggers all FPLs retrieval procedures for subsequent actions on them.
19. Conflict:
The controller can request the list of FP pairs if detected to be in conflict by the
MTCD (Medium Term Conflict Detection) function, you will be able to check the
conflict by pressing directly on the window or by clicking with the LB on the
MTCD indicator of the track label; conflict window has two main areas:
a) List area titled by CNF CONFLICTED FLIGHTS: Shows the list of flight
plans in conflict.
b) Chart Area: it is a graphic display of the conflict represented in X-Y chart,
where X= time in minutes and Y= represents the distance between flights
projected to be in conflict.
The conflicts in the chart are displayed in two colors RED high severity or
YELLOW medium severity and also the chart area box titled either by:
a) Horizontal Future Situation Window (HFS):
The HFS window represents a Radar Data Display window, which is similar to
the SDD SIT Area.
b) Vertical Future Situation Window (VFS):
The VFS window represents the traffic over-flying a determined correlated track
at a determined time.
20. Maps [MAP] Icon:

This icon allows the activation/deactivation of map settings by clicking with left
button.
21. Fixed Configuration [CONFIG] Icon:

To allow the selection of a fixed configuration or programming of a new one,
LOAD to load an old one, SAVE to save a new programming.
22. Quick-Look Sectors Selection [QL SC] Icon:

Allows the selection of sectors to show you the flights with that sector.
23. Quick-Look [QLOOK] Icon:

Is used to activate/deactivate the Quick-Look function to visualize the selected
sector tracks, YELLOW if it is activated and WHITE deactivated.

24. Filter OFF [FILTER OFF] Icon:

It allows the activation/inhibition of all current filters defined for the SDD SIT Area.
25. [Menu] Icon:
This icon displays or closes the Main Menu area, which is displayed at the bottom
of the SDD screen, YELLOW if it is activated, and WHITE if deactivated.
10.2 MAIN MENU AREA FUNCTIONS:

Main Menu area is located at the bottom of the SDD screen; it is composed of icons
and switches, which perform the different functions.
ITEM TYPE DESCRIPTION
SECTOR LIST ICON FP LIST

INBOUND ICON SECTOR INBOUND LIST
DEPARTURES ICON DEPARTURES LIST
ARRIVALS ICON ARRIVALS LIST
IN/OUT ICON CPDLC messages List.
ADS AIR ICON flights equipped with ADS
VIEW 1 ICON AUXILIARY WINDOW 1
CLOCK ICON System Clock
BRIGHT ICON BRIGHTNESS CONTROL
LAST POS ICON LAST POSITION WINDOW

SECTORS ICON ASSIGNED SECTORS LIST
LMG ICON LOCAL MAP GENERATOR
DATBLK ICON DATA BLOCK SETTINGS
RBL OFF ICON DELETE ACTIVE RBLS

RETURN LABELS TO DEFAULT
ORI OFF ICON
POSITION
RANGERINGS ICON RANGE RINGS
ROU OFF ICON DELETE FP ROUTES
ALM CNL ICON Cancel all aural alarms
QNH ICON QNH window

ACTIVATE OR DEACTIVATE
OVERLAP ICON AUTO ORIENTATION OF
LABELS
ACTIVATE OR DEACTIVATE
CONFL ICON
MTCD ALARM IN LABELS
ACTIVE RESTRICTED AREAS
AREAS ICON
ON/OFF
VELVECT ICON VELOCITY VECTOR
PRIMARY PLOTS WITH MET
METEO ICON
INFO
RANGE BEARING LINE ALERTS
RBL ALM ICON
ON/OFF
QUICK EST ICON ESTIMATE WINDOW
MET MSGS ICON METEO MSGS WINDOW
SYS MSGS ICON SYSTEM MSGS WINDOW

FINDER OPTIONS WINDOW
FINDER ICON TO FIND ELEMENTS ON
DISPLAY
SSR F ICON SSR FILTER WINDOW
F3D ICON 3D FILTER WINDOW
ICON DECREASE SCREEN RANGE
ICON INCREASE SCREEN RANGE

ICON LEFT MOVEMENT
ICON RIGHT MOVEMENT
ICON UP MOVEMENT
ICON DOWN MOVEMENT
PRINT SDD POSITION

PRINT LISTS ICON
TABULAR
PRINTERS ICON AVAILABLE PRINTERS
LOGIN WINDOW TO FREE
LOGIN ICON
SCREEN
LOGOUT & FREEZE ALL
LOGOUT ICON
ACTIONS ON THAT POSITION
NOTE:
II. Inbound list means the flight lists inbound to the assigned sector and does not
mean the arrivals.
III. The flight plan lists that Indra system brings can be treated as ELECTRONIC
FLIGHT STRIPS.
IV. DATBLK: stands for DATA BLOCK CONFIGURATION that can be reflected
on the SDD.
V. LMG: stands for LOCAL MAP GENERATOR.
11.0 Flight Data Display FDD:

This chapter provides information for new users of the FDD Position. It presents every
work available window with a description; the screen has two main area:
1. General Information Area (GI_A).

2. Main Menu Area (MM_A):
The FDD Position allows the controller mainly to handle flight plans during the
strategic planning phase. That is, the controller of this position manages future flight
plans (Flight plans received trough AFTN and Repetitive Flight Plans (RPL).
The main functions of the FDD position are :

1. FPL handling.
2. RPL handling.
3. AFTN messages handling.
4. Access to FPLs and RPLs databases.
5. Wind Data input.
6. Restricted Areas handling.

7. Flow Planning (FPLs).

8. AFTN Lines Configuration.
9. NOTAM and Meteorological messages handling.
11.1 General information area:
This area is always displayed at the FDD position, that is, no device can close it. It is
located on the left top side of the screen to access the AFTN messages correction. There
are two different queues to manage the received messages:
1. Q Queue FP Messages (FPM) and they are:

a) Body erroneous messages.
b) Correct and erroneous messages, when the processing for a type of messages has
been conditioned from the CMD position to a manual confirmation.
c) FP status non suitable for automatic processing
d) Correct and erroneous NOTAM messages (always).
e) MET messages (METAR, SPECI, TAF, SIGMET, ATIS, AIRMET, SNOWTAM
and GAMET) with errors.
NOTE:
1. When you receive an estimate message or CPL the counter color comes RED .
2. The queue operates on a FIFO basis (first in, first out).
3. Q Queue are prioritized, that is, depending on the message type, the
insertion criterion is different. This happens for NOTAM messages which
have top priority. So these messages are included firstly in the queue (both
corrected and erroneous) so the operator can acknowledge as soon as possible .
4. If there is no error in FPL, the modification messages cause the FP updating.
If any field (not the ones marked as optional) cannot be detected nor has
errors, the message is sent to the Q Queue for manual correction .
2. AAI Queue:
Erroneous AFTN Header messages and they are: AFTN Messages with erroneous
header and the service (SVC) message, which are not of repetition. Up to 30 messages
are displayed .
11.2 MAIN MENU AREA: Main Menu Area is located at the bottom of the FDD Position
screen. It is composed of icons that perform different functions

Meaning of each function described in the table:
i ICON DESCRIPTION
FP ACT. FP OPERATION WINDOW
FP RTr FP RETRIEVAL WINDOW
FP MIN MINIMAL FP WINDOW
HIST RTR HISTORICAL RETRIEVE
RPL ACT REPETITIVE FLIGH PLANS WINDOW
RPL RTr REPETITIVE RETRIEVAL WINDOW

RUNW RUNWAYS WINDOW
AFTN TX AFTN MSGS WINDOW
ARCHIVE AFTN RETRIEVAL WINDOW
QNH AIRPORT PRESSURE WINDOW
WINDS WIND DATA TO VIEW OR MODIFY
AREAS RESTRICTED AREAS WINDOW
FLOW MENUE TO CHOOSE THE TRAFFIC TYPE
METEO METEO INFO WINDOW

NOTAM OPERATION / RETRIEVAL
NOTAM
WINDOW
T.FLOW TRAFFIC FLOW OPTIONS
LINES AFTN LINE STATUS
INFO DOCUMENTS ENTRY KEY / HELP KEY
EST QUICK ESTIMATE WINDOW
FREE TEXT FREE TEXT MSGS WINDOW
CLOCK SYSTEM TIME / DATE
LOGOUT LOCK THE POSITION
PRINTER AVAILABLE PRINTERS

NOTE: When no FDP is available, a warning window will be displayed in FDD to warn
about the failure and following picture appears:
12.0 Control and Monitor Display CMD:
The Control and Monitoring Display Position (CMD) is one of the components of the
Tower and Approach Integrated System. Its main aim is to offer help to technical staff
in the Traffic Control Centre, providing a work environment able to monitor the whole
system in an easy but precise way in real time. For that reason, the position is connected
to the other subsystems. Its main element is a computer with screen, mouse and
keyboard.
The CMD provides the function to monitor the whole ATM system and the external
data input environments (sensors, AFTN lines, etc.).
The system has the capability to support up to two (2) CMD positions. Both positions
have the same functions, but these functions can be limited depending on the user
profile by the use of different access passwords.

12.1 The CMD Screen has three main areas:

1. General Information Area (GI_A) at the top of the window:
It shows the alarm messages and current time and date. Alarm messages are
warnings about modifications, adjustments or malfunctions concerning the
system.
2. Controller Monitoring Area (CM_A) in the middle of the window:

This area shows the design of the system and the status of each component is
denoted by a set of color codes, as shown in tables:
ALL SUBSYSTEM COLOR CODES
COLOUR STATUS
DARK GREEN WORKING
RED NOT WORKING
ORANGE MANUALLY STOPPED
SDD COLOR CODES
COLOUR STATUS
DARK GREEN WORKING
LIGHT GREEN WORKING IN MONO RADAR MODE
RED NOT WORKING
PURPLE BY PASS MODE
BLUE PLAYBACK MODE
FDP, SDP and DRF CODES
COLOUR STATUS
DARK GREEN WORKING
RED NOT WORKING
YELLOW STAND IN
AFTN LINES STATUS
COLOUR STATUS
DARK GREEN WORKING
RED NOT WORKING/FAILURE
YELLOW OFF-LINE

LAN1, LAN2 codes
COLOUR STATUS
BLACK LAN1 WORKING
GRAY LAN2 WORKING
RED NOT WORKING

WHITE VANILLA To be checked
3. Main Menu Area (MM_A) :

The main menu is situated at the bottom of the screen and it has a set of icons to
get access to its functionality.
ICON FUNCTIONALITY
SECTORIZATION SECTORIZATION PLANNING WINDOW
SNET STATIST SAFETY NETS STATISTICS
LINES STATIST AFTN LINES STATISTICS

SDP RADAR SUPERVISE SET OF RADARS
OPE.FUNCTIONS OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS WINDOW
SYS.PARAM SYSTEM PARAMETERS
TANDEM SWICH BETWEEN FDPs , RDPs &DRFs
GLOBAL FUNC. REINITIALISE/CLOSE/START UP CMD
EVENTS EVENT WINDOW
LOCKS THE POSITION / LOG IN WINDOW
LOGOUT
APPEARS
NOTE: ATC'Os are allowed to check on the SECTORIZATION function

ONLY in the CMD.

13.0 Mouse button relation with our different displays:

13.1 Mouse button functions over the SDD:
BUTTON FUNCTION
Request information operations and
low-level local actions.
LEFT BUTTON
Copy data from a field.
Move windows.
Create/Erase RBLs
CENTER
Close edition windows.
BUTTON
Paste data to a field.
RIGHT map selection and RBL creation
BUTTON acceptance
13.2 Mouse button functions over the FDD:
BUTTON FUNCTION
Data entering, display pull-down menus
Drag a window by pressing and hold the
LEFT BUTTON
mouse central button on the window title
Copy data field
CENTER BUTTON Paste data field
RIGHT BUTTON Without a defined use
13.3 Mouse button functions over the CMD:
BUTTON FUNCTION
Selection, menus access, data
LEFT BUTTON
input
CENTER BUTTON None
Present the user window in
RIGHT BUTTON certain subsystems (SDD, FDD,
DRF and CMD)


APPENDIX 5
National Contingency Plan

Air Traffic Management National Contingency Plan
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
CARC
Air Traffic Management Department
ATM National Contingency Plan for Amman FIR
0 Edition No.1 Effective Date:1st of November 2013

Distribution list
This document will be distributed to all whom concerned the following list:
1. ICAO-MID office in Cairo

2. All Adjacent ACCs, Cairo ACC, Jeddah&Riyadh ACC, Baghdad ACC, TelaAviv
ACC and Damascus ACC.
3. Royal Jordanian Air force.
4. Amman Terminal Area Control Center TACC.
5. QAIA Tower.
6. Amman Marka Tower
7. KHIA Tower.
8. QSMS Unit.
9. Investigation Department.
10. ANSSD department.
11. CEO.
12. ANS commissioner.
13. Planning and Studies.
14. Director of communication.

Intentionally left Blank

ATM National Contingency Plan

Within Amman FIR
1. OBJECTIVE
This contingency plan contains arrangements to ensure the continued safety of air
navigation in the event of partial or total disruption of air traffic services (ATS). The
contingency plan is designed to provide alternative routes, using existing airways in most
cases, which will allow aircraft operators to fly through or avoid airspace within the Amman
FIR. This contingency plan is for the implementation in the event of disruption, or potential
disruption, of air traffic services and related supporting services within Amman AoR for the
provision of such services.
Note: the Facility Contingency Plan includes procedures for alternative Aiding units in case the
main facilities are failed to operate, these procedures are included in APPENDIX A of this
contingency plan.
2. Applicability:
This Contingency plan prescribes rules governing the operation of aircraft within Jordan in
the event of partial or total disruption of air traffic services (ATS).
Major conflicts might effectively close one or more FIRs in the region; the following
procedures have been formulated, in the event of direct involvement of the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan in a hostile activities, which might require closing down of part or all
Airports, Navigational facilities and Surveillance facilities in addition to part or all of Jordan
Territorial Airspace.
3. AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT

3.1 ATS Responsibilities
Tactical ATC considerations during periods of overloading may require re-assignment of

routes or portions thereof.
3.2 In the event that ATS cannot be provided within Amman FIR:
a) All units will immediately advise affected aircraft of possible rerouting or diversion
options due to the closure.
b) Amman ACC will inform all affected adjacent FIRs accordingly of the airspace
closure advising affected routes and available rerouting possibilities and any flow
control restrictions taking effect at the time of the closure of the airspace.
c) This information will be passed by NOTAM and all other means of communication
ensuring that operators and all relevant ATC Units have received the information.
d) All aircraft approaching the affected area under Amman Control will be advised
immediately of available options.
3.3 The Civil Aviation Regulatory Commission shall publish the corresponding NOTAM
indicating the following:

a) Time and date of the introduction of the contingency measures and the airspace
closure;
b) Airport and airspace available for landing and overflying traffic, and airspace to be
avoided;
c) Airports within the affected area and their status.
d) Details of the facilities and services available or not available and any limits on ATS
provision (e.g., ACC, APP, TWR including details of available NAV aids for rerouting
of traffic), including an expected date of restoration of services if available;
e) Information on the provisions made for alternative services;
f) Establishment of ATS contingency routes;
g) Procedures to be followed by pilots; and
h) Any other details with respect to the disruption and actions being taken that
aircraft operators may find useful.
i) Procedures to be followed by coordination with neighboring ATS units at a time;
j) Specific instructions to aircrew e.g. monitoring of additional frequencies and relay
of position reports.
k) If possible, provide an estimate for the duration of the airspace closure.
4. Separation
Separation criteria will be applied in accordance with the Procedures for Air Navigation
Services-Air Traffic Management (PANS-ATM, Doc 4444) and the Regional Supplementary
Procedures (Doc 7030), and 15 minutes longitudinal separation shall be applied.
5. Level Restrictions
Where possible, aircraft on long-haul international flights shall be given priority with respect
to cruising levels.
6. Other measures
Other measures related to the closure of airspace and the implementation of the contingency
scheme within the Amman FIR may be taken as follows:
a) Suspension of all VFR operations;

b) Delay or suspension of general aviation IFR operations; and
c) Delay or suspension of commercial IFR operations. (Departures)
7. TRANSITION TO CONTINGENCY SCHEME
During times of uncertainty when airspace closure seems possible, aircraft operators should
be prepared for a possible change in routing while en-route, familiarized of the alternative
routes outlined in the contingency scheme as well as what may be promulgated by Amman
TACC via NOTAM.
In the event of airspace closure that has not been promulgated, Amman TACC should, if
possible, broadcast by (ATIS) to all aircraft in Amman airspace, what airspace is being closed
and to stand by for further instructions.
Recognizing that when closures of airspace or airports are promulgated, individual airlines
might have different company requirements as to their alternative routings, therefore
Amman TACC will be alerted to respond to any request by aircraft and react commensurate
with safety.
8. TRANSFER OF CONTROL AND COORDINATION
The transfer of control and communication shall be at the common FIR boundary between
ATC units unless there is mutual agreement between adjacent ATC units. ATC units within
Amman FIR should also review current coordination requirements in light of contingency
operations or short notice of airspace closure.
9. PILOTS AND OPERATOR PROCEDURES
Pilots need to be aware that in light of current international circumstances, a contingency

routing requiring aircraft to operate abnormal traffic flows, could result in an intercept by
military aircraft. Aircraft operators must therefore be familiar with international
interception procedures contained in ICAO Annex 2 Rules of the Air, paragraph 3.8 and
Appendix 2, Sections 2 and 3, and CARC regulations Part 91 section 195.
Pilots need to continuously guard the VHF emergency frequency 121.5 MHz and should
operate their transponder at all times during flight, regardless of whether the aircraft is
within or outside airspace where secondary surveillance radar (SSR) is used for ATC
purposes. Transponders should be set on a discrete code assigned by ATC or select code
A2000 if ATC has not assigned a code. If an aircraft is being subject to interception, the pilot
shall immediately:
Follow the procedures prescribed In Jordan AIP ENR-1.12 and:
a) Follow the instructions given by the intercepting aircraft, interpreting and
responding to visual signals in accordance with international procedures;
b) Notify, if possible, the appropriate ATC unit;
c) Attempt to establish radio communication with the intercepting aircraft by making
a general call on the emergency frequency 121.5 MHz and 243 MHz if equipped;
and
d) If any instructions received by radio from any source conflict with those given by
the intercepting aircraft, the intercepted aircraft shall request immediate
clarification while continuing to comply with the instructions given by the
intercepting aircraft.
10. OVERFLIGHT APPROVAL
Aircraft operators should obtain over flight approval for flights operating through Jordanian
airspace, where required. In a contingency situation, flights may be rerouted at short notice
and it may not be possible for operators to give the required advanced notice in a timely
manner to obtain approval. Amman TACC responsible for the airspace in which contingency
routes are established should consider making special arrangements to expedite flight
approvals in these contingency situations.
11. Communications and Radar Failure.

11.1. Total or Partial Radar Failure
1. The TACC controller shall inform immediately all traffic flying within Jordan airspace
2. Implement contingency procedures if necessary (emergency separation procedure)
may be applied during the recovery time until deemed separation or standard
procedural separation is established.

3. Inform the adjacent ACCs and ADOC immediately and all Jordanian aerodromes
control towers to stop all departure traffic temporarily until recovery procedures are
achieved.
4. In the event of complete failure of radar equipment, the radar controller shall apply
the following duties stated in MATC 1 CHAPTER 8 Para 8.8.4:
Plot the position of all identified aircraft,
Establishing Non-radar separation.
5. The controller shall send all arrival traffic to the published holding patterns as
appropriate AMN /VOR hold and QTR/VOR HOLD, QAA/VOR hold and MDB/NDB
hold provided up to the required level as published in AIP & MATCII.
6. Holding separation shall be applied according to MATC II & AIP.
7. The ATCO shall implement SIDs & STARs procedures and to use the deemed
separation, as published in TACC MATC II.
8. Supervisors shall give priority for implementing the procedures included in
APBENDIX A, when the main TACC fails to operate, such alternative procedures may
enhance the prevailing situation.
11.2 Radio Communication Failure
a) For any pre-planned disruption of communication, all adjacent FIRs will be advised
accordingly.
a) Otherwise, if the failure affects Direct Telephones and AFTN (AFS) communication
with adjacent units, all possible means of communication should be attempted, dial
up telephones, relay, fax and e-mail and defined cellular whenever available.
b) NOTAM will be issued to all affected agencies including operators stipulating
expected duration and ATC services available.
c) The above NOTAM would also include rerouting instructions, procedures to be
followed by adjacent units and pilots if applicable.
d) In the event of total communication failure the FIR would have to be considered as
temporarily closed until such time that relay facilities would enable aircraft to transit
without air to ground communications.
e) Flow control restrictions would be implemented to the appropriate extent.
11.3 Loss of Facilities Due to any Cause.
Amman TACC will advise adjacent ATC Units of the disruption and the extent it is going to
affect normal operating procedures.
12. CONTINGENCY UNIT
The TACC supervisor is assigned the responsibility of monitoring developments that may
dictate the enforcement of the contingency plan and coordination of contingency
arrangements:
Contact Person:
TACC supervisor
Telephone: + 962 6 4451672, +962 6 4451607
Fax: + 962 6 4451667
During a contingency situation, the TACC supervisor will liaise with the involved adjacent
centers.

The ICAO MID Regional Office will:
a) Closely monitor the situation and coordinate with CARC and the IATA Regional Office,
so as to ensure air navigation services are provided to international aircraft operations
in the MID Region.
b) Take note of any incidents reported and take appropriate action.
c) provide assistance as required on any issue with CARC/CEO involved in the
contingency plan; and
d) Keep the President of the Council of ICAO, the Secretary General, D/ANB and C/ATM
continuously informed on developments, including activation of the contingency plan.
13. REROUTING
In the event of closure of AMMAN FIR, the aircraft operators should file their flight plans
using the alternative contingency routes listed below to be followed incase that the current
airways system is affected.
13.1. Contingency Routes
In case the closure of the following ATS routes:
1. UL768 and UR785 and the ATS route B544, all traffic will be rerouted via the
following ATS routes:
a) Overflying , Westbound traffic via:
- ATS route G662 segment ALKOT-BUSRA

- ATS route UM449 segment GIBET-BUSRA
- ATS routes N318 and L513 segments GENEX-QAA and QAA-
BUSRA
- ATS route UB411 segment DEESA-ULINA
- ATS route N318 and A412 segments GENEX-QAA then QAA-
ZELAF.
- ATS route UM690, segment ULINA-ZELAF
b) Overflying, Eastbound traffic via:
- ATS route G662 segment BUSRA-ALKOT
- ATS route UM449 segment BUSRA-GIBET
- ATS route A412 and L513, R652 and N318 segment
- ZELAF-QAA-QTR-KULDI-PARAM.
- ATS route UB411 segment ULINA-DEESA-ASH
- ATS route UM690 segment ZELAF-ULINA.
2. ATS route A412/L200 and L513 in case of closure:
a) Departures traffic will be cleared via:

- MOUAB, then via TELAVIV FIR,
- ATS route L513 and M319, segment QTRLOXUS-SESMO-
ULINA via CAIRO FIR.

- ATS route R652 and UL768, segments GRY-TRF-OVANO-

OTILA-SOKAN.
b) Arrivals traffic will be cleared via:
- SALAM,
- ATS route M319, ULINA-SESMO-LOXUS-QAA
- ATS route UR785 and ATS route R652, segments
ZELAF-TRF-GENEX-QAA.
3. South border ULINA via M319 to/from CAIRO FIR: in case of closure.
- Departures or arrivals have to use L513 to QAA-LOSAR-BUSRA or ATS
route A412 LUDAN-ZELAF, and vice versa. OR via TELAVIV FIR instead.
4. Contingency agreements with Cairo ACC:
In the event that ATS cannot be provided within AMMAN FIR:
A. Flights from AMMAN FIR to CAIRO FIR
Westbound: ULINA FLs 280 & 300
B. Flights from CAIRO FIR to AMMANFIR
Eastbound: ULINA FLs 270 & 310
5. In the event that ATS cannot be provided within Cairo FIR:
A. Flights from Cairo FIR to AMMAN FIR
Eastbound: ULINA: NIL
B. Flights from AMMANFIR to Cairo FIR
Westbound: ULINA: FLs 360& 240
6. In the event that ATS cannot be provided within the AMMAN/Cairo FIRs,
A. Flights from AMMAN FIR to Cairo FIR
Westbound ULINA FL 280
B. Flights from Cairo FIR to AMMAN FIR
Eastbound ULINA: NIL
7. Contingency agreement with Jeddah&Riyadh ACCs
In the event that ATS cannot be provided within Jeddah FIR:
A. Flights from JEDDAH FIR to AMMAN FIR
Westbound: GRY: FL280, FL320, FL340, FL360, and FL380.
TRF: FL320, FL360.
OTILA: FL280, FL340 & FL380.
B. Flights from AMMAN FIR to JEDDAH FIR
East bound: TRF: (B544) FL290, FL330, And FL370
TRF: (UP559) FL 290, FL330,
8. In the event that ATS cannot be provided within Amman FIR,
A. Flights from AMMAN FIR to JEDDAH FIR:
East bound: GIBET FLs 290,310 and FL330.
RASLI or SODAR FL290, FL310, FL350
PARAM, GENEX and ALKOT FLs250, 270&330
DEESA FLs270.290
B. Flights from JEDDAH FIR to AMMAN FIR
West bound GIBET FL280, 300, 320
OTILA GENEX, PARAM and ALKOT FL260, 300, & 340
TRF FL300, 320,340
DEESA FLs280, 300
9. In the event that ATS cannot be provided within the Jeddah/Amman
FIRs:
A. Flights from JEDDAH FIR to AMMAN FIR

Westbound OTILA FL340, FL380

TRF FL320, FL360,
GRY FL260, FL280
B. Flights from AMMAN FIR to JEDDAH FIR
Eastbound TRF FL 290,330.
Note 1. Initiation: AMMAN TACC SUPERVISOR will initiate and activate this plan when
circumstances require, in-coordination with DANS and DATM.
Chart AMMAN FIR is attached.
All aircraft should establish and maintain contact on published VHF frequencies with
AMMAN TACC listed below:
No Sector Frequency Remarks

1 Upper sector 128.5 MHz
2 Lower east sector 132.525 MHz
3 Lower west sector 132.425 MHz
4 Queen Alia Approach sector 128.9 MHz
5 Aqaba approach 119.2 MHz
6 Stand by frequency 128.3 MHz
14. Focal Points for Contact:
State/Jordan
International Organization Point of Contact Telephone/Fax E-mail
DIR/ ATM TEL: +962 6 4897729
Mr. Nayef Al- FAX: +962 6 4891266 datm@carc.gov.jo
Civil Aviation Regulatory Marshoud Mobile: +962 7 97498992
Commission / Jordan TEL: + 962 6 44 51672
TACC/Supervisor + 962 6 44 51607
FAX: +962 6 44 51667
DIR/ QAIA-DANS TEL: + 962799767779
Mr. Sameer Abu- Fax: + 962 6 4451
alfoul dans-qa@carc.gov.jo
Note 2.
The above-mentioned procedures should be used as a guideline for Supervisors and

Managers to foremost ensure safety to aircraft already within or approaching Amman FIR,
and will not by no means cover all possible contingency situations. In all cases there is bound
to be different scenarios where common sense and optimizing of resources will be at a
premium.

Amman FIR chart

APBENDIX A
Facility contingency plan
CONTENTS
1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
1.2 Scope
2 Objective
2.1 Obligations under Chicago Convention
3 CNS system
3.1 Ground/Ground Communication
3.2 Surveillance equipment
3.3 Flight Data Processing
3.4 Surveillance Data Processing
4 Available Assets
4.1 TACC 1
4.2 TACC 2
4.3 TACC 3
4.4 Voice communication system
5 Test and maintain
6 Initiation of contingency plan

6.1 Requirements
6.2 Initiation plan
6.3 Initiation procedures
7 AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT (ASM)
8 Technical Operations Support during OCP Activation
9 Crisis focal points contact numbers

1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose of this Contingency Plan
Air Traffic Operational Contingency Plan, includes the following: -

- Procedures
- Requirements
- responsibilities to develop
- coordinate
- support
- Maintain
- Revise
- Test
- Train
- Document
- Implementation.
1.2 Scope
The purpose of this OCP known as the Facility Contingency Plan (FCP) is to
reduce the impact and risk to the Amman TACC in the event a facility is, or
facilities are, unable to safely and efficiently provide ATC services as required
by Jordan JCAR regulations & MATC I and MATC II (Amman TACC). Also, it can
be triggered by a natural disaster, major system failure (Amman TACC 1) or
other event that directly affects personnel, the delivery of operational ATC
services, or other technical capabilities. In the event the Parent Facility or
facilities become incapacitated, all affected airspace must be assumed by
(Amman TACC 2 or 3) which are the alternative Supporting facilities for the
continuation of ATC services, to the extent possible, must also be assumed by
other Support facilities as the neighboring ACCs (Jeddah & Riyadh ACCs). The
event may require activation of the OCP, the facility Emergency Operations
Plan.
Note: when transferring from TACC1 to TACC2 or TACC3, if the duration of the
transfer is more than 10 minutes supervisor shall notify Jeddah&Riyadh ACCs to
take over, until the transfer is completed.
- TACC1: INDRA system, the main location of the ACC center.
- TACC2: THALES system, located near to TACC1, in the same
building.
- TACC3: INDRA simulator software and hardware equipment,
located in Amman Marka Airport.
2 Objective
This contingency Plan includes details of the arrangements will take place to
ensure the continued safety of air navigation in the event of partial or total
disruption of Air Traffic Services (ATS) within Amman FIR, due to the outages
of different systems.
3 CNS system (The availability of the aiding facilities)

It is not feasible to provide guidance on every aspect of CNS systems as it would

affect contingency operations. However, a list of the essential considerations
covering CNS and other technical requirements are provided below for the
continuation of air traffic services at the aiding facilities which will be used as
alternative actions, the following requirements are available in TACC2 and TACC3:
3.1 Ground/Ground Communication
- Telephone, Intercom and hotline communication requirements.
- (Strip) printers and respective connections.
- Voice and data communications with airports, adjacent Centers and flow
management units AMHS.
- OLDI connections. When available
- Fax devices.
3.2 Surveillance equipment requirements:
- Surveillance Infrastructure.
- Availability, new connections/links.
- Surveillance data sharing agreement. (When available).
- Adaptation of existing or setting up of new agreement (when available).
- Surveillance coverage requirements.
- Evaluation of radar performance is Dual/triple coverage provided.
(Coverage is provided Amman FIR and the overlapping Areas with adjacent
states to comply with handover procedures, this is provided by more than
one resource).
3.3 Flight Data Processing
- Controller Working Positions.

- Sectorization schemes potential implications for standing procedures.
- Flight data management and distribution rules.
- Flight data update eligibility.
- Interfaces with: adjacent ACCs (not available), TMAs, TWRs, Military control
units are available.
3.4 Environment Data processing (off-lines-tools)
- Environment data management and distribution rules, Environment data

- Update eligibility.
3.5 Surveillance Data Processing
- Sensor configuration and coverage.

- Potential implications for separation minima or type of service provided.
- SSR Code allocation - potential implications for allocation rules.
These considerations stated above are quite adopted in THALES ACC (TACC
2), and TACC 3 is still (in the-process).
4 Available assets at the aiding facility TACC1 & 2 and 3

4.1 TACC 1:

- This facility is supported with different inputs; the main system is INDRA
software and hardware (AIRCON2100). INDRA radar is a Secondary
Surveillance Radar with Mode S using Red Hat enterprise LINUX 5, designed
to five sectors, ACCU, ACCLE, ACCLW, TMAA and AQB/APP, also it includes
supervisor and two FDO positions, also the system supported with
additional inputs according to the following:
- Thales input, mono pulse system, conventional surveillance system.
- Two Military inputs from different locations. (QTR and RASELNAQAB)
- ADS-B system input from different locations Arreesha, MARKA/AP, Safawi
area and KHIA airport.
- AMHS Terminal Input.
- INDRA ATM system Interfaces with Tower units in the airports for the
purpose of flight plan data exchange and situation awareness.
- One Working station at military ADOC.
4.2 Backup system TACC 2, supported with EURCAT1000, THALES system,
designed of three control sectors: Approach, West and East sector, In
addition to supervisor and FDO positions.
4.3 TACC 3 (pending).
INDRA software and hardware, (AIRCON2100). A Secondary Surveillance
Radar with Mode S using Red Hat enterprise LINUX 5 includes three sectors:
Approach, West and East sector, also in addition to supervisor position.
4.4 Voice Communication System, supporting TACC 1, 2 and 3.

5 Test and maintain
TACC 2 will be on silence mode (available) and must be tested each one
month for two hours within the morning shift, to ensure availability and
readiness of this facility.
During shift rotations, 24/7, supervisors are requested to periodically update
all flight plans in the queue and non-queued windows of the FPPS system, for
the purpose of maintaining TACC 2 system updated and well prepared.
6 Initiation of contingency plan
6.1 Requirements
When on duty supervisor experiences outages of current TACC 1, shall evaluate
the situation before initiates the contingency plan according to the following:
a) A dangerous situation has been identified.
b) Focuses on the safe handling of aircraft in the airspace of the failing unit
TACC 1.
c) Using all technical means still operationally available to:
o Secure actual traffic situation
o Consider possible options
o Delegation of ATS, when appropriate (stated below).
o CFLAS. (cleared flight level allocation scheme) (OCP LoAs) stated in
the OCP above item No.4, 5,6,7,8.
o Try to determine the magnitude of problem and the duration of the outage.

o Prepare fall-back instructions to ensure the safety of operations.
6.2 Initiation plan

This contingency plan can be triggered by a natural disaster, major system
failure(s) or other event(s) that directly affects personnel, the delivery of
operational ATS services, or other technical capabilities.
a) When the following events occur, contingency requirements must be

initiated:
Total loss of TACC1 room due to object collision (aircraft, vehicle...),
severe damage of building.
Total loss of TACC1 room due to weather conditions (earthquake,
Lightning, wind, snow, flooding ....) Leading to evacuate the personnel of
the building, severe damage of the building.
Total loss of TACC1 room due to hostile action leading to evacuate the
Personnel of the building. Security measures.
Total loss of TACC1 room due to chemical pollution, leading to loss of the
staff.
Total loss of TACC1 room due to pollution (exterior fire smoke) leading
to evacuate the staff.
Total loss of TACC1 room due to electromagnetic irradiation.
Total loss of TACC1 room due to:
i. Loss of all Power Supply resources (power failure)
ii. Total loss of TACC data (voice, radar, network, phone)
Total loss of power supply due to:
i. Water, fire, flood, earthquake, lightning,
ii. Equipment failures (wiring damages...)
Note: Any other occurrences might occur and expected to have major impact on
the TACC room; henceforth the supervisor will coordinate with chief of TACC
and DANS to activate the contingency requirement on immediate action.
6.3 Initiation procedures
When the contingency measures have been initiated by the on-duty

supervisor, the following steps shall be followed:
a) Focuses on stabilizing the situation(recovery action) and, if necessary,

preparing for longer term contingency arrangements:
o Contingency measures should be initiated;

o Complete notification of all concerned, according to the list below.
o Determine and coordinate flow control measures. (OCP LoAs)
o Initiate delegation of ATS, where appropriate. (Jeddah&Riyadh ACC).
b) Starts when staff of the failing unit(TACC 1) arrives at the aiding unit(TACC 2
or 3):
Assign staff to the 'aiding' unit (TACC 2 or 3).

Open contingency working positions at 'aiding' unit (TACC 2 or 3).

Stabilize new situation; (assume control gradually)
Staff of the failing unit (TACC 1) should become familiar with the
operational facilities of the aiding unit (TACC 2 or TACC 3).
(Furthermore, training refresher program will include practicing on the
system).
Improve the flow capacity. Start to clear traffic to the intended operation
and to carry on normal coordination.
Maintain the published or introduce a reduced ICAO route structure and
Sectorization in the failing unit (TACC 1). According to the OCPs
agreements with adjacent units.
Utilize all technical means to establish and maintain communication
necessary to provide ATS in the 'failing' unit TACC 1.
c) Determine and coordinate flow control measures.
1. In this stage, the controllers shall adhere to the Flight Allocation Scheme
(FLAS) in the LoAs (OCPs) that agreed with adjacent centers, Jeddah, Cairo
and Baghdad ACCs, when assigning flight levels in such circumstances.
2. During the situation prevails, the minimum horizontal separation will be15
minutes.
Note: OCPs agreement shall be available in the operation room, all the time and
available for the supervisors in such circumstances.
7 AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT (ASM)
During partial or total outages of an ACC the FUA might be affected

depending on system availability and foreseen contingency agreements. The
AMC (Airspace Management Cell) or Civil/Military Coordination, would
continue with its responsibilities pending system and staff availability which
might affect the access to airspace.
8 Technical Operations Support during OCP Activation
a) Upon notification of a triggering event, the supervisor must notify and

coordinate the OCP response with the Technical Support division.
b) TACC 1 is the primary control center; the supervisor will be authorized to
reduce level of ATC services provided that a facility can provide requiring
activation of an OCP.
c) The supervisor must coordinate the status quo with the adjacent ACCs, to
ensure Technical Operations Support for the affected facilitys OCP.
Delegation of responsibility will be considered with Saudi Arabia Jeddah & Riyadh
ACCs who will takeover in case of malfunction of TACC 1, 2 and 3.
9. Action plan
Partial or total failure of TACC1:

In case of TACC1 is partially failed, the following scenario is accepted for the
supervisors to follow:
a) The lower east sector is considered to be as an upper sector in case of the

main upper sector is failed to achieve the required rule within the area of
responsibilities. Also it happens that the same situation fits when the lower
east sector is failed, the upper sector will represent the main rule for the
failed sector as lower sector in addition to its main functionality.
b) The lower west sector is considered to be as TMA approach sector in case of

the main TMA radar approach sector is failed.
c) The TMA radar approach sector is considered to be the lower west sector
when the main sector is failed.
d) Aqaba approach sector can be run by the lower west sector when it fails to
provide approach services for KHIA airport.
e) When three sectors in TACC 1 are failed to perform, the supervisors shall
consider transferring plan to the aiding unit TACC2 with immediate effect.
a) Communication failure
TACC1 is supported with the following communication system, and each
sector has assigned a separate frequency:
All sectors in TACC1 are supported with five frequencies according to the
function to be performed, - upper sector 128.5 MHz-lower sector
132.525MHz-lower sector-132.425MHz-approach radar sector 128.9MHz-
aqaba sector-119.2 MHz- standby frequency for all sectors 128.3MHz.
Each sector is provided with stand by frequency to avoid any un-expected
communication failure, the 128.3 MHz, is available for all sectors to replace
failed frequency.
Each sector is equipped with DRC devices to support the failed
communication sector. At least 4 sectors will be equipped with DRC devices.
Verbal coordination with all ATC units concerned can be done through short
code dial system, if the main hotlines are considered to be out of service.
Two dialing PSTN (Public Service Telephone Network) telephones are
available for coordination, (+ 962 6 4451672) (+ 962 6 4451607)(+962 6
4451693)(+962 6 4451631) with all units concerned, are set in case of the
main VCS system fails.
b) Surveillance system failure
The main surveillance system INDRA is supported with three main data
resources, representing back up options for controllers to switch over, in
case of the main resource is unable to provide the data required, the
following steps are to be followed:
- In case of the main ATM ACC system INDRA is working properly, and no
data input regarding traffic situation progress, controllers are asked to adopt
the following inputs as stand by requirement:

- Mono-pulse radar conventional Thales system.

- Military QTRANNEH input only, where standard procedure for minimum
separation using this system has been clarified, referring to local instructions
in this regard.
- ADS-B system is located in different places of Amman FIR to fill the required
coverage.
c) The following procedure shall be considered when other event may have
direct impact on personnel delivery which will create Staffing issue due to
the follows:
- No Staff
- Illness (Seasonal Influenza)
- Weather
- Industrial Relations issues
TACC chief or any other representative who has been assigned instead, to
coordinate all staffing issues, to deliver the maximum number of personnel to
perform their duties in such events.
As mentioned above, many resources are available according to the

availability of the different systems in use, basically supervisors can
nominate the best solutions when partially system is failed to perform
according to the stand by sectors.
When two sectors are reported out of service in TACC1, supervisors shall
consider running the failed sectors through TACC2; migration to the aiding
unit is possible and shall be considered, according to item 6.3. When three
sectors or more, migration to TACC2 is a must.

1 Crisis focal points contact numbers
Telephone Title Name
+962 795533553 CEO
+962 79 749 8992

DATM
+962 6 489 7729

+962 799767779 DANS QAIA

+962 79 8373130 Chief of TACC

+962 6 445 2699 QAIA TWR

+962 6 489 1801 Amman Marka TWR

+962 32031424 KHIA TWR
/
+962 6 488 5814 RJAF
+966 1 221 5493 Riyadh ACC /
+966 2 685 0560 /

Jeddah ACC
+974 4 503 481 /

Bagdad ACC
+202 2 265 0716 /

Cairo ACC
+963 11 540 0540 /

Damascus ACC
+972 4 698 0210 /

Tel Aviv ACC
+792 3 975 6320 /

Ben-Gurion ACC
+962 6 479 3589 RJ OCC

+962 6 479 3587 RJ dispatch
+962 6 489 4460

MET Office
CNS contact personnel list:
Thales Radar Search Head +962 6 4451674

Thales Technical Room +962 6 4451673
Radar Workshop +962 6 4451665
INDRA Technical Room 06-4892282-Ext-5675 cisco
AFTN Center 06-4892282-Ext-3500 cisco
Radar Chief (ENG. NAIM) 0795800470
Radar Supervisor (HUSSEIN) 0777910134
Radar Engineer (Eng. SULEIMAN) 0799874955
Radar Engineer (Eng. Wisam) 0797012346
Radar Engineer (Eng. Ibrahim) 0795057006
Radar Technician (Muhannad) 0777784764
Both TACC1+2 +962 6 4451672

Appendix B
ATC Contingencies to ensure public health and Communicable Diseases
1.0 PURPOSE
1.0.1. The objective of this circular is to guide national and international

supervisory authorities in the execution of the supervision of air
navigation service providers compliance with the provisions of Jordan
Regulation, ICAO DOCs and Air Traffic Services Manuals. It also aims to
ensure the coordinated and rapid introduction of new agreed and
validated concepts of operations or technology in air traffic
management.
1.0.2. To clarify the implementation process of procedures in regards of
public health and communicable diseases).
1.0.3. This Advisory Circular provides Air Navigation Service Providers
(ANSPs) with procedure for the execution of contingency in the event of
public health and Communicable Diseases.
2.0 References
2.0.1 Jordan Regulations.

2.0.2 Manual of Air Traffic Control Part I & II.
2.0.3 ICAO Doc 4444.
2.0.4 Article 14 ICAO Chicago conventions.
3. Introduction:
3.1. It is important to keep in mind that in the case of airborne communicable

diseases, Respiratory Protection is but one of several lines of defense.
Control measures that should be developed and implemented to prevent and
control the spread of such diseases will vary with the situation and may
range from the application of basic hygiene rules to the provision of
appropriate protective procedure not limited to Respiratory Protection. If a
pandemic situation is declared or an outbreak of an airborne communicable
disease becomes known, control measures recommended by public health
authorities must be implemented. Nonetheless, should Respiratory
Protection be recommended, an air navigation service provider shall set up
procedure to carry out the roll of air navigation in the event of
communicable diseases and public health issues.
3.2. The ANS contingency plan shall cover all aspects of ATS including
Communicable Diseases.
3.3. The procedures outlined below are intended as a general guide to air traffic
services personnel.
3.4. All ATC units are involved in the entire process of this procedure.
3.5. Article 14 ICAO Each contracting State agrees to take effective measures
to prevent the spread by means of air navigation of cholera, typhus,
smallpox, yellow fever, plague and any other such communicable disease as
the contracting States shall from time to time decide to designate.

3.6. ATC contingencies related to Communicable Diseases:

3.6.1. The purpose of Jordan contingency plan is to assist in providing ATSs
for the safe and orderly flow of international air traffic in the event of
disruptions of air traffic services and related supporting services and in
preserving the availability of ATS routes within the Amman FIR in
Communicable Diseases incident.
3.6.2. Notification of suspected communicable diseases, or other public
health risk, on board an aircraft:
3.6.2.1. The pilot in command shall notify ATS unit as soon as he/she
becomes aware of a suspected case of a communicable disease on
board his/her aircraft The flight crew of an en-route aircraft shall,
upon identifying a suspected case(s) of communicable disease, or
other public health risk, on board the aircraft, promptly notify the
ATS unit with which the pilot is communicating, the information
listed below:
3.6.2.1.1. Aircraft identification;
3.6.2.1.2. Departure aerodrome;
3.6.2.1.3. Destination aerodrome;
3.6.2.1.4. Estimated time of arrival;
3.6.2.1.5. Number of persons on board;
3.6.2.1.6. Number of suspected case(s) on board; and
3.6.2.1.7. Nature of the public health risk, if known.
3.6.3. The ATS unit, upon receipt of information from a pilot regarding
suspected case(s) of communicable disease, or other public health risk,
on board the aircraft, shall forward a message as soon as possible to the
ATS unit serving the destination/departure aerodrome.
3.6.4. Notify the appropriate authority designated by the State and the
aircraft operator or its designated representative.
3.6.5. When a report of a suspected case(s) of communicable disease, or
other public health risk, on board an aircraft is received by an ATS unit
serving the destination/departure, from another ATS unit or from an
aircraft or an aircraft operator, the unit concerned shall forward a
message as soon as possible to the public health authority (PHA) or the
appropriate authority designated by the State as well as the aircraft
operator or its designated representative, and the aerodrome authority.
3.6.6. Where the destination aerodrome is outside of an ATC Units
jurisdiction clear coordination shall be maintained between the ATC
units involved stating the nature of the suspected case of the
communicable disease on board the flight and such notification actions
conducted by the ATC units.
3.6.7. Each ATC unit shall maintain a list of contact numbers of the relevant
Airport Authorities within their jurisdiction.
Note 1: See Annex 9 Facilitation, Chapter 1 (Definitions), Chapter 8, 8.12 and 8.15,
and Appendix 1, for relevant additional information related to the subject of
communicable disease and public health risk on board an aircraft.
Note 2: The PHA is expected to contact the airline representative or operating agency
and aerodrome authority, if applicable, for subsequent coordination with the aircraft
concerning clinical details and aerodrome preparation. Depending on the

communications facilities available to the airline representative or operating agency,

it may not be possible to communicate with the aircraft until it is closer to its
destination. Apart from the initial notification to the ATS unit whilst en-route, ATC
communications channels are to be avoided.
Note 3: The information to be provided to the departure aerodrome will prevent the
potential spread of communicable disease, or other public health risk, through other
aircraft departing from the same aerodrome.
Note 4: AFTN (urgency message), telephone, facsimile or other means of transmission

may be used.
Note 5: It is accepted that the designated Airport Authority and/or the operator will in
turn notify other relevant parties concerned in accordance with pre-established
procedures as laid down by that Airport Authority.

APPENDIX 6
AIP CHARTS
( Page number related to AIP )
AIP ENR 6-1
JORDAN 08 DEC 2016
EN-ROUTE CHART-ICAO
3500'E 3600'E 3700'E 3800'E 3900'E 3930'E 33

33 40'
40' N
N
TANF
V OR/DME114. 0
(
TAN )
3328'56"N
SU LAF 03839'11"E
_
SEA
3327'18"N 2500
03810'27"E
#
7 #
7 22
1
2016
ABBAS
12
14
3326'0"N
A4 23
15
8
03743'30"E
UL 16
0
EAN
N AMBO
76
S 3318'26"N
5 E
8
RAFIF 1 03839'39"E
04
173 17 353
32
3312'47"N SOKAN
#
7
8
03819'19"E 338'9"N P ASIP
UB544
1
R7
FL240
FL600
22 03822'7"E 336' 0"N
V AR
33 12
85
60
5
03856' 0"E
AN
L200
A4 23 S L2 0
0
00' 33
14 FL6 40
14
S
247 0
UL 1 328
8 1 00
60
0
FL
L2 0
067
N
Z ELAF
00'
T
7
00 F
130
R
68
=
FL
ERR
3256'56"N 247
1 11 DAP U K
33
2
03759'59"E 04 067
N
DAMASCUS FIR
60 0 331'39"N
0
R
173
= FL
0 247
T
L202
0F
03840' 26"E
S 1300
FL6
8
BA G
FL2
22
14
2
20
00
12
21
6
40
KU MLO
066
9
A4 20
329
FL60
AMM
0
11
DAXEN 0 247 3258'12"N
L20
FT
13000
DIT
R
=
UB544
FL240
FL600
KAREM 03828'8"E
2
3244'45"N
26
1
03
03741'5"E 067 FL600 3251'
10"N
8
R
246
HDA
14
04 10
= FT 0383'
24"E
U 5
13000
AMMAN FIR
6
9
06
L7
2 00
# SW I
DA
7 S
21
FL
8 ORN AL
0
0
FL
22
68 329
20
19 69
3243'0"N
240
3247'55"N
AN F
2\L
ME
353
M
03634'0"E
169
03751'53"E
1
3 U
0
A4
60
2800
D FI
0
FL
31
FL
6
03
FL T
0F
L513 13
00
MODAD R
=
IR
23
R
=
R
3235'40"N
14
8 KODER
04 03841'38"E
2
BU SRA
9
173
21
GI
BOX 3233'0"N
N ADEK
3220'0"N R
=7 03738'1"E
UR
22
327'0"N
3227'28"N
03637'0"E
00
03633'8"E
349
63
\L2
785
FL
03714'29"E
FL
OJP 1 12 25
600
240
A4
P.N.A.
U N L
60 3
OJD4 S
UL 8
FL 51
00
13 3000 0
6
L
FL
10000FTAMSL
FT
GN D
0F
14
3
189 09
768
00
FL
2
UB544
2
13
GN D
G6 4
FL
600
FL240
FL600
1
40
04
240
AMMAN
62
1
ASLON
FL 0F T
11000FT
FL600
1100
\
60
LOSAR 12
13
0
49
A4 00 3212'11"N
DV OR/DME( AMN )
R
=
9
55 690
329'30"N L2
02
32
03651'11"E
U M4
AMN 01 3200'15"N 03628'50"E

6
009
03603'58" E
R
=
20
0
UM
3200'15"N FIR
32
LOXER
R
= 20
9
\L 227
KU P RI
13
03603'58"E AMMAN
R 12 9 00
0
=
FT
FL60
2300
00
328'26"N
L5
321'48"N
A4047 FL6 00 FT
FL600
14
6
9
9000
10
FL
03645'30"E
03622'51"E
L200
GND
32
#
7
5
3
00'
5
9
AMMAN\Marka
FL
32
02
L200 SODAR
0
OTILA
L200 254 _= 080 16 260
R = R= =
R 8
22
7
11
LU DAN
9
12
3156'2"N 321'31"N

A4
+R 00'
7 322'57"N
N
G623
353
0
OSAMA 03843'26"E
04
7 60 T
S 0391'53"E
4
23
FL600
9
FL 0F 03637'13"E
074
20
3155'50"N
9000FT
R= 0
RASLI
62
U N L
90
7
FL 50
22
32
OJD2
0
R N
FL
14
FL60
03537'6"E
S
= 10
60
3154'24"N
2
13
8
OJP 9GN D
0
7000FT
52
GETU P
189
41
MESLO
UL
9
9
03836'48"E
5000FTAGL
21
S S
L5
R6
3158'33"N 322'31"N
A4 A 2300
19 49
7 68 329
MOU AB
12
03630'37"E
2
15
03631'48"E
GN D
32
03
009 UM 4
3147'58"N 3
FL6 0
6
N318
FL 0FT
OJP 1
1
5
15 UP55
0
03535'59"E 90
R
S
= 093 00
UB544
DESLI
28 7 4000FTAMSL
7000
R
00
9
=
04
0
FT
FT
8
02
29
FL 6
_ 3149'0"N
#
7
3
0
2 249 UL
500
R65
14
N3 1 GN D
273
21
14
FL600 03659'1"E
14
8 76
8
R 104
SEA
=
2
6000FT
KIN U R
19 690
AMMAN\Queen Alia
14 3136'26"N OV AN O 8
FL60
284
_ 069
G619
9
185
= 104 N318
0
03637'13"E
3 UM
3148'01"N
6000
QUEEN ALIA
FT
252
R
00
62
FL 50
QAA01 03909'51"E
FL
6
10
60
11
FL
DV OR/DME115.2
2
0
OJ
D5
3
3144'23"N
189
FL
33
(
QAA)
30 13
03609'27"E
FL30
174
03
3144'23"N
7000
0
R
= 8
N3 1
R652
TURAIF
0 144
FT
284 10000FTAMSL
32
TMA
8
L5
03609'27"E FL30
104 GN D
AMMAN ALN OR
R =
2
FL15
0
ALKOT V OR/DME116. 1
2800
DEAD
00
FL255 0
14
3139'55"N
S (
TRF)
FT
3132'54"N
FL 6
6000FT 284
21
2449
03625'8"E
14
3141'36"N
7000
N
FL30
G6 10
U
03711'22"E
318
0
4
FL15
F L 0F T
03844'05"E
S 105
P5
U M4
0
0
OJP 10
0
62 324
Y
60
70
69
072
GEN EX
59
0
15
M3 1
2900
0
0F T
19
4
FL 6
ELOXI 285
2 M
3129'35"N
60 9
5000FTAGL
850
FL 1
3134'1"N
GURIAT
03 U
0370'52"E
9 257
03645'34"E 11
0
GN D EGLOT 257
S 2
10
V OR/
TAC1 14.7
009
3116'57"N
005
30
FL
077 (
GRY)
R652
0
03618'24"E
R652 KIP AS
UB5 44
32
3124'45"N
QATRANEH 12 25
7
R
=
R2
= 077
13
QTR01
_= 076 1
3 256
R KU LDI FL 300 3123' 24"N 03717'12"E
0
DV OR/
DME112. 9
1
3114'54"N FL600
3
03706' 41"E
21
3118'47"N
(QTR) 03603'34" E
R FL600 9000FT
03632'14"E FL 150
193
3114'54"N 9000FT
166
03603'34"E
203
35 690
2700
N3
UM
28 9
18
4
31
00
G
U M4
6
10
2
FL
66
3
31
65
FL
OJD7U N L
2
0
00'
\R
0
0
FL 6
9000FT
26
5
L513
FL 600
FL 2
GN D
00'
19
29
N
M3
700 00
T
6
32
0F
N
FL
29
346
354
4
2
03 3
O
01
0
LOSI
L
JD
023
3048'51"N
3 G
LEGEND
FIR
MU N RA
FL N D
03547'41"E
R
=
R
=
3049'44"N
30
0
21
203
03608'35"E
166
#
7
0
31
FIR
IV
FIR
-AV
2
65
N
\R
19
TMA
MA
M3
TEL
51 90
40
UM449
800 00
FL 250
38
FL 600
T
6
6
0F
FL
UM
00
ATS ROUTS
6
AM
10
FL
3
FL
LOXU S
OJD8
#
7
3013'1"N
OJD6 FL600 P.D AREA
HF R
03526'1"E FL150 GN D
I
023
346
GN D
NF
IR
R
=
CIVIL AERODROME
0
R
MA
03
=

3
LON OL
20
KI
N OD
193
R
166
= 3008'01"N
2
3012'0"N
_
5
30
03535'00"E
R6
DA
19
03616'1"E
AM
20
30

CT
00' CIVIL/MILILTARY AERODROME

QATI
M
A
JE D
3
+
00'
02
2956'00"N
45
254
N
9
03516'00"E
UB411
0
30
FL250
FL600
N
UM44
_
69
R
M
VOR/DME N
=
UM
074
700
3
39
#
7
20
254
19
600
UB411
250
Y
0F
FL
40
2
FL
M3
600
5
OBSOT
0F T
47
VORTAC
T-
R6
BAKI
R
17
FL
800
2954'51"N
P ETRA
346
FL2
2940'53"N
800 00
AQABA 03734'55"E
T
6
074
0F
FL
UB411 55
03507'08"E 2942'6"N
3
ON REQUEST
DV OR/
DME113. 1
02
03622'10"E 2 S 099
5
75 17
(AQB)
2934'59"N
R
= UB411 255
0 R
=
WAY- POINT
013
=
R
027
03500'29"E FL 600 DEESA

20 2
SESMO
30 Y41
3
5
#
7AQABA\King Hussein
R6
075 5
200
_
CT R 6500F T
11
FL 250 2945'09"N
6 167
UB4 250 =
SF C
2934'58"N 70
FL 600
COMPULSARY
8 NM A Q B
R 03641'02"E S
-
14
03511'59"E
METSA
R
S
= 0 18 BOSAL
1:
1,700,
000
69 225 FL 250
070 FL600
FL250
TAMI
M
FL600
UM449
M
11 2929'12"N
3
2927'07"N
UB4
REPORTING POINT
\U 16 00
347 1
02
251 R
03459'03"E 9
= 2936'40"N 03759'33"E
31
#
7 UB4 1
1
S 1 M
FL
6
80
00
FT
28 ELETA
FL 250 03548'40"E
GI
BET
279 #
7
5
7
S0 #
04
FL 600 2932'01"N
2926'20"N 7 ROUTE DESIGNATOR
KM
KARI
K 03529'00"E
U LI
N A 8000FT
03625'1"E S R41
1
10 0 102030405060708090100
0
MAGNETIC TRACK
21
2926'33"N 073
2924'51"N V
U
167
13
03445'41"E
03458'17"E
5
DISTANCE IN NM
U N L
1
1500FT
28 90
UPPER LIMIT
U M4 4 9
6
UM
21
2.
5 LOWER LIMIT
50 25 EGSIS 5 0 5 10 15202530354045 50 N M
347
N W B
29
0
2901' 56"N 2905'15"N

03
03440' 16"E
#
7 29
03628'50"E
00' #
7
N 00'
3500'E 3600'E 3700'E 3800'E 3900'E 3930'E N
CIVIL AVIATION REGULATORY COMMISSION AIRAC AMDT 14/2016

TACC MATC II AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES AIRSPACE APPENDIX 7
AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES AIRSPACE
CALL SIGN
NAME
LANGUAGES
LATERAL LIMITS UNIT PROVIDED FREQUENCY/PURP
AREA AND REMARKS
VERTICAL LIMITS SERVICE OSE
CONDITIONS
CLASS OF AIRSPACE
HOURS OF SERVICE
1 2 3 4 5
AMMAN FIR
Includes the territory of the H.K.J

29 21 26N 034 57 43E
29 11 03N 036 04 20E
29 30 03N 036 30 21E
29 52 03N 036 45 21E AMMAN ACC AMMAN CONTROL
30 00 03N 037 30 21E Upper Sector
30 20 03N 037 40 21E
ENGLISH , ARABIC
30 30 03N 038 00 21E H24 128.5MHz
31 30 03N 037 00 21E Lower East Sector
32 00 02N 039 00 22E 132.525MHz
32 09 15N 039 12 03E
Lower West Sector
At Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iraqi
132.425MHz
boundaries.
Then the point 321349N 391804E
At the Southern corner of the
Jordanian-Iraqi boundaries
NOTE 1 : No alternate occurred to Jordanian Airspace Boundaries which will remain as published in ICAO Regional Plans (EUR,MID And AFI)

NAME UNIT CALL SIGN FREQUENCY/PURPOSE REMARKS

LATERAL LIMITS PROVIDED LANGUAGES
VERTICAL LIMITS SERVICE AREA AND CONDITIONS
CLASS OF AIRSPACE HOURS OF SERVICE
1 4 3 2
Thereafter the points

322120N 391536E
321815N 390237E
322840N 385910E
323006N 390510E
And point 332229N 384737E AMMAN CONTROL
ENGLISH , ARABIC Upper Sector 128.5MHz
AMMAN ACC H24 Lower East Sector 132.525MHz
At the Jordanian Iraqi Syrian Lower West Sector
boundaries. 132.425MHz
Thereafter to the point 321834N
365017E
follow the Jordanian-Syrian
political boundaries to the point
324107N 353809E
AT Jordanian-Syrian-Israeli
boundaries
FL600
GND
Class of Airspace: A,C,G
NOTE 1 : No alternate occurred to Jordanian Airspace Boundaries which will remain as published in ICAO Regional Plans (EUR,MID And AFI)


WAY-POINT
ROUTE DESIGNATOR UPPER LIMITS DIRECTIONS OF
IDENT OF REMARKS
(RNP/RNAV) LOWER LIMITS CRUISING LEVELS
VOR/DME DISTANCE
NAME OF SIGNIFICANT POINTS BRG &DIST NM CONTROLLING
AIRSPACE
COORDINATES ELEV DME ODD EVEN UNIT CHANNEL
CLASSIFICATION
ANTENNA
1 2 3 4 5 6
G662 (RNAV 5) For continuation, refer

to Saudi AIP
FIR BDRY (ALKOT) FL600 Transfer of CTL
QAA 19NM
FL250
313254.00N 0371122.00E R102 54.1NM
CLASS A
2800FT Amman Upper Sector

128.5MHz
QAA 23NM FL600 Amman Lower West
DESLI Sector 132.425MHz
R084 45.5NM FL250
314900.10N 0365900.60E 2800FT CLASS A According to ENR.1.6-
KUPRI QAA 14NM FL600 5 Para 2.7
320825.87N 0364530.21E R052 39.0NM ALT 11000 FT
2800FT CLASS A+C
QAA
FIR BDRY (BUSRA) R033 42.6NM
Transfer of CTL
322000.00N 0363700.00E 2800FT
For continuation, refer
to Syria AIP.

WAY-POINT
IDENT OF REMARKS
LOWER LIMITS CRUISING LEVELS
(RNP/RNAV) VOR/DME DISTANCE
NAME OF SIGNIFICANT POINTS BRG &DIST NM CONTROLLING UNIT
AIRSPACE
COORDINATES ELEV DME ODD EVEN CHANNEL
CLASSIFICATION
ANTENNA
1 2 3 4 5 6
L200 (RNAV5) For continuation, refer to
FIR BDRY (OSAMA) QAA 23NM FL600 Israel AIP
315550.00N 0353706.00E R288 29.8NM ALT 7000FT Transfer of CTL
2800FT CLASS A+C
AMN01 16NM FL600
AMMAN DVOR/DME (AMN) ALT 9000FT

320014.65N 0360357.55E CLASS A+C
LOXER QAA 8NM FL600

320147.76N 0362251.46E R029 20.8NM ALT 9000FT
2800FT CLASS A+C
MESLO QAA 5NM FL600

320231.00N0363148.00E R042 26.3NM ALT 9000FT All traffic shall adhere to
2800FT CLASS A+C airway centerline

LUDAN QAA 9NM FL600 ATS Route Segment LUDAN-
320256.60N 0363713.29E R047 30NM ALT 11000FT DAXEN
2800FT CLASS A+C Non-ICAO Standard according
KUPRI QAA 6NM FL600 to the table of cruising level
320825.87N 0364530.21E R047 38.9NM ALT 13000FT
2800FT CLASS A+C
ASLON QAA 25NM FL600
321211.02N 0365111.25E R047 45NM ALT 13000FT
2800FT CLASS A+C
NADEK QAA 28NM FL600
322728.00N 0371429.00E R047 69.9NM ALT 13000FT
2800FT CLASS A+C
DAXEN QAA 10NM FL600
324444.79N 0374105.26E R047 98.2NM ALT 13000FT
2800FT CLASS A+C


UPPER LIMITS DIRECTIONS OF

ROUTE DESIGNATOR WAY-POINT IDENT REMARKS
LOWER LIMITS CRUISING LEVELS
(RNP/RNAV) OF VOR/DME BRG DISTANCE
NAME OF SIGNIFICANT POINTS &DIST ELEV DME NM CONTROLLING UNIT
AIRSPACE
COORDINATES ANTENNA ODD EVEN CHANNEL
CLASSIFICATION
1 2 3 4 5 6
L513 (RNAV5) FL600
MUNRA QAA ALT 9000FT
304944.29N 0360834.88E 26NM ATS Route Segment QTR01-
R175 56.4NM CLASS A+C
2800FT BUSRA
Non-ICAO Standard according
QTR01 30NM FL600 to the table of cruising level
QATRANEH DVOR/DME (QTR) ALT 7000FT
311454.41N 0360334.31E CLASS A+C
QAA01
QUEEN ALIA DVOR/DME (QAA) 21NM FL600

314423.41N 0360926.59E ALT 9000FT
CLASS A+C
LOXER QAA 9NM FL600
R029 20.8NM ALT 9000FT
320147.76N 0362251.46E 2800FT CLASS A+C
QAA 13NM FL600
LOSAR R029 30NM ALT 13000FT
320930.06N 0362849.77E 2800FT CLASS A+C
QAA Transfer of CTL

FIR BDRY (BUSRA) R029 42.6NM For continuation, refer to
322000.00N 0363700.00E 2800FT Syria AIP

DIRECTIONS OF
UPPER LIMITS
ROUTE DESIGNATOR CRUISING REMARKS
WAY-POINT IDENT OF LOWER LIMITS
(RNP/RNAV) DISTANCE LEVELS
VOR/DME BRG &DIST
NAME OF SIGNIFICANT POINTS NM CONTROLLING UNIT
ELEV DME ANTENNA AIRSPACE
COORDINATES ODD EVEN CHANNEL
CLASSIFICATION
1 2 3 4 5 6
For continuation, refer to
M319 (RNAV5) FL600 Egypt AIP
QAA 16NM ALT 8000FT Transfer of CTL
FIR BDRY (ULINA) R080 125.9NM CLASS A+C
292451.00N 0345817.00E 2800FT SESMO is a mandatory
reporting, own navigation
from ULINA-LOXUS is
forbidden
QAA 40NM
SESMO R197 138.3NM FL600
ALT 8000FT
293458.00N 0351159.00E 2800FT
CLASS A+C
QAA 40NM
LOXUS FL600

R198 98.7NM
ALT 7000FT
301300.90N 0352600.70E 2800FT
CLASS A+C
QAA 29NM
LOSIL R194 58.6NM FL600
ALT 7000FT
304851.20N 0354741.31E 2800FT
CLASS A+C
41NM
QTR01 FL600
ALT 7000FT
QATRANEH DVOR/DME CLASS A+C
(QTR)
311454.41N 0360334.31E
QAA
MOUAB R273 28.8NM Transfer of CTL
314758.00N 0353559.00E 2800FT For continuation, refer to
Israel AIP



ROUTE DESIGNATOR
WAY-POINT IDENT OF LOWER LIMITS CRUISING REMARKS
(RNP/RNAV) DISTANCE
VOR/DME BRG &DIST LEVELS
NAME OF SIGNIFICANT POINTS NM
ELEV DME ANTENNA AIRSPACE CONTROLLING UNIT CHANNEL
COORDINATES ODD EVEN
CLASSIFICATION
1 2 3 4 5 6
UB411 (RNAV5)
QAA 28NM FL600 For continuation, refer to Egypt AIP
FIR BDRY (ULINA) R200 152.4NM ALT 8000FT
292451.00N 0345817.00E Transfer of CTL
2800FT CLASS A+C
ELETA Aqaba Approach Sector 119.2MHz
293200.80N 0352900.10E QAA 18NM FL600 Amman Lower West Sector
R190 136.9NM FL 250 132.425MHz
2800FT CLASS A Amman Upper Sector 128.5MHz

According to ENR.1.6-5 Para 2.7
TAMIM QAA FL600
293640.00N 0354840.00E R184 129.0NM FL 250
2800FT 30NM CLASS A
PETRA QAA FL600
294206.00N 0362210.00E R170 122.8NM 17NM FL 250
2800FT CLASS A
QAA
FIR BDRY (DEESA) R163 122.3NM Transfer of CTL
294509.00N 0364102.00E 2800FT For continuation, refer to Saudi AIP
UB544(RNAV5) For continuation, refer to Saudi AIP
Transfer of CTL
FIR BDRY (SODAR) QAA 40NM FL600 Amman Upper Sector 128.5MHz
R080 131.3NM FL240 Amman Lower West Sector
315602.00N 0384326.00E 2800FT CLASS A 132.425MHz
According to ENR.1.6-5 Para 2.7
MODAD
323539.88N 0384138.14E
QAA
R063 138.7NM
2800FT
26NM
FL600
FL 240
CLASS A

DAPUK QAA FL600
330139.44N 0384026.29E R054 149.1NM 17NM FL 240
2800FT CLASS A
FIR BDRY (NAMBO) QAA
331825.68N 0383938.59E R048 157.7NM Transfer of CTL
2800FT For continuation, refer to Syria AIP.

ROUTE DESIGNATOR WAY-POINT

IDENT OF REMARKS
(RNP/RNAV) LOWER LIMITS CRUISING LEVELS
VOR/DME DISTANCE
NAME OF SIGNIFICANT POINTS BRG &DIST NM CONTROLLING UNIT
AIRSPACE
ELEV DME ODD EVEN CHANNEL
COORDINATES CLASSIFICATION
ANTENNA
1 2 3 4 5 6

For continuation, refer to Saudi
UL768 (RNAV 5) AIP
FIR BDRY (OTILA) QAA FL600 Transfer of CTL
38NM
320131.00N 0390152.84E R078 147.8NM FL 240
2800FT CLASS A
Amman Upper East Sector
128.5MHz
Amman Lower East Sector
132.525MHz
MODAD QAA 25NM

R063 138.9NM FL600
323539.88N 0384138.14E FL 240
2800FT
CLASS A
KUMLO QAA 11NM FL600
325811.82N 0382807.67E R053 138.7NM FL 240
2800 CLASS A
FIR BDRY (SOKAN) QAA

Transfer of CTL
R048 140.0NM
330809.00N 0382207.00E For continuation, refer to Syria
2800FT
AIP

ROUTE DESIGNATOR UPPER LIMITS DIRECTIONS OF REMARKS
(RNP/RNAV) WAY-POINT IDENT OF
DISTANCE LOWER LIMITS CRUISING LEVELS
NAME OF SIGNIFICANT POINTS VOR/DME BRG &DIST
NM AIRSPACE CONTROLLING UNIT
ELEV DME ANTENNA ODD EVEN
COORDINATES CLASSIFICATION CHANNEL
1 2 3 4 5 6
UM449 (RNAV5) For continuation, refer to Saudi
QAA AIP
FIR BDRY (GIBET) 16NM FL600
R170 138.4NM Transfer of CTL
292620.00N0362501.00E FL 250
2800FT Amman Upper Sector 128.5MHz
CLASS A
PETRA QAA 30NM Amman Lower West Sector
FL600
294206.00N 0362210.00E R170 122.5NM 132.425MHz
FL 250 Amman Approach 128.9MHz.
2800FT CLASS A According to ENR.1.6-5 Para 2.7
KINOD QAA 38NM FL600
301200.30N 0361600.60E R172 92.4NM FL 250
2800FT CLASS A

MUNRA QAA 28NM FL600 ATS Route Segment MUNRA-
304944.29N0360834.88E R176 91.45NM FL 250 BUSRA
2800FT CLASS A Non-ICAO Standard according to
EGLOT QAA 24NM the table of cruising level.
FL600
311656.94N 0361823.86E R160 28.4NM ALT 8500FT
2800FT CLASS A +C
ALNOR QAA 19NM FL600
313955.26N 0362507.52E R104 14.1NM ALT 8500FT
2800FT CLASS A +C
GETUP QAA 4NM FL600
315833.47N0363037.47E R047 22.9NM ALT 8500FT
2800FT CLASS A +C
MESLO QAA 5NM FL600
320231.00N0363148.00E R042 26.3NM ALT 8500FT
2800FT CLASS A +C
GIBOX QAA 13NM FL600
320700.00N0363308.00E R037 30.3M ALT 11000FT
2800FT CLASS A +C
FIR BDRY (BUSRA) QAA Transfer of CTL
322000.00N 0363700.00E R029 42.6NM For continuation, refer to Syria
2800FT AIP

WAY-POINT IDENT OF REMARKS
(RNP/RNAV) DISTANCE LOWER LIMITS CRUISING LEVELS
VOR/DME BRG &DIST
NAME OF SIGNIFICANT POINTS NM AIRSPACE
ELEV DME ANTENNA CONTROLLING UNIT CHANNEL
COORDINATES CLASSIFICATION ODD EVEN
1 2 3 4 5 6
For continuation, refer to Egypt AIP
UM690 (RNAV5)
Transfer of CTL
FIR BDRY (ULINA) QAA FL600
R200 152.0NM 16NM
292451.00N 0345817.00E ALT 8000FT Amman Upper Sector 128.5MHz
2800FT CLASS A Amman Lower West Sector 132.425MHz
SESMO QAA 39NM Aqaba Approach Sector 119.2MHz
FL600 According to ENR.1.6-5 Para 2.7
293458.00N 0351159.00E R197 138.3NM FL 250
2800FT

CLASS A
LONOL QAA 51NM FL600 Hours of Operation (LT):
300800.60N 0353500.10E R193 100.6NM FL 310
2800FT CLASS A SUN 1600-0600 Next Day
MUNRA QAA 35NM MON 1600-0600 Next Day
FL600
304944.29N 0360834.88E R176.3 54.5NM TUE 1600-0600 Next Day
FL 310
2800FT WED 1600-0600 Next Day
CLASS A
THU 1600-0600 Next SUN
KULDI QAA 19NM FL600
311847.07N 0363214.16E R138 32.1NM FL 310
2800FT CLASS A

ELOXI QAA 19NM FL600 ATS Route Segment ELOXI-ZELAF
313400.99N0364534.23E R104 32.5NM Non-ICAO Standard
FL 310
2800FT CLASS A
DESLI QAA 55NM FL600

314900.10N 0365900.60E R079 42.5NM FL 310
2800FT CLASS A
KODER QAA 19NM FL600
323300.00N 0373800.50E R052 89.5NM FL310
2800FT A CAA C
ORNAL QAA 11NM FL600
324754.59N 0375152.73E R049 107.5NM ALT 13000FT
2800FT CLASS A
FIR BDRY (ZELAF) QAA Transfer of CTL
R047 118.4NM
325656.20N 0375959.26E For continuation, refer to Syria AIP
2800FT


ROUTE DESIGNATOR REMARKS
WAY-POINT IDENT OF LOWER LIMITS CRUISING LEVELS
(RNP/RNAV) DISTANCE
VOR/DME BRG &DIST
NAME OF SIGNIFICANT POINTS NM CONTROLLING UNIT
ELEV DMEANTENNA AIRSPACE
COORDINATES ODD EVEN CHANNEL
CLASSIFICATION
1 2 3 4 5 6

For continuation, refer to Syria AIP
UR785 (RNAV 5)
Transfer of CTL
QAA FL600
FIR BDRY (ZELAF) R080 125.9NM
6NM
FL 240 Amman Upper East Sector
325656.20N 2800FT CLASS A 128.5MHz
0375959.26E
KAREM QAA 63NM FL600 Amman Lower East Sector
R050 117.4NM FL 240 132.525MHz According to
325110.40N 2800FT ENR.1.6-5 Para 2.7
CLASS A
0380324.38E
FIR BDRY (RASLI) QAA
R047.3 118.4NM Transfer of CTL
315424.00N 2800FT For continuation, refer to Saudi
0383648.00E AIP.

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The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

Civil Aviation Regulatory Commission

Air Navigation Services

Manual of Air Traffic Control Part II

Issued in accordance with Jordan Civil Aviation Regulations

Capt. Haitham Misto

Manual of Air Traffic Control Part II

Document Identifier EDITION No. EDITION DATE

MATC II Sixth Edition 10/03/2017

Chief of AMMAN TACC 00962 6 4452689 TACC

DOCUMENT STATUS AND TYPE

STATUS CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION

Draft Comment/Response Document Restricted ATS

Proposed Issue Advisory Material Restricted ANSP

Released Issue Policy Document Restricted CARC

INTERNAL REFERENCE NAME :

AUTHORITY NAME and SIGNATURE DATE

Reviewed Director of ATM

Endorsed Director of QSMS

CHAPTER ONE : Introduction

CHAPTER TWO : Terminal Area Control Center

2.1 General Description 13

2.2 THALES RADAR Center 13

2.2.1 THALES RADAR System Description .... 13

2.2.2 THALES RADAR Control Sectorization .... 13

2.2.3 Sector Manning Level ... 15

2.2.4 Strip Layout .. 16

2.3.1 INDRA RADAR Control Sectorization . 16

2.3.2 Merging / Splitting Sectors Procedure in Amman TACC .......... 19

3.1 General ....... 35

CHAPTER FOUR : TMA and Area Procedure

CHAPTER FIVE : AMMAN MARKA Airport Procedures

5.1 General ... 53

5.2.1 Departure Flights Release Procedure ... 53

CHAPTER SIX : Queen Alia Airport Procedures

6.2 Co-ordination Procedures 59

6.2.1 Departure Flights Procedure ... 59

6.2.2 Conventional Arrival Flights Release Procedure 59

CHAPTER SEVEN : Failures

7.1 Partial Service Failure 67

CHAPTER EIGHT: Royal Flights

General ATC procedures are as follows for VVIP Flight and

8.4 Take over Watch (TOW) to handle the VIP flight . 73

8.9 Controlled Airspace 74

CHAPTER NINE : Reduced Vertical Separation Minima

9.1 The Benefits of RVSM . 75

9.5 RVSM Flight Planning Requirements ..... 75

9.6 RVSM Airborne Systems Requirement . 76

9.6.1 Transponder Requirements 76

9.7 System Support .. 77

9.8.1 Meteorological Coordination . 77

9.8.2 Height Keeping Errors 77

9.9 RVSM Transition Procedures .. 78

9.10.1 Controller / Pilot Radiotelephony Phraseology 80

CHAPTER TEN : Emergency Procedures

10.1 General ... 83

10.11 Aircraft Accident .. 89

10.13 Other ATC Contingency Procedures .. 90

11.1 General Procedures ... 93

11.2 Phase of Training 93

11.4 Progress Tests . 94

11.7.1 TMA Approach Procedural Non-RADAR 95

11.7.2 TMA Approach RADAR . 96

11.7.4 En-route RADAR ... 98