Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
and
BODIES
PHILOSOPHY O F M I N D SERIE S
SF.I.F E X P R E S S I O N S
Mind, Morals , an d th e Meanin g o f Lif e
Owen Flanaga n
THE CONSCIOU S M I N D
In Searc h o f a Fundamenta l Theor y
David J. Chalmer s
DECONSTRUCTING TH E MIN D
Stephen P . Stic h
M I N D S AN D BODIE S
Philosophers an d Thei r Idea s
Colin McGin n
MINDS
and
BODIES
Philosophers and Their Ideas
COLIN MCGINN
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed i n th e Unite d State s o f Americ a
on acid-fre e pape r
Preface
I have not reprinte d al l my book reviews in this volume, omitting those tha t
are more technical and o f less general interest . Bu t I have included virtually
all those that have appeared i n nonspecialist journals. The y are reproduce d
here i n thei r origina l form . I hav e no t though t i t worthwhil e t o rewrit e
earlier pieces in the light of later reflections, though there i s in fact very little
of a substantiv e nature I woul d wish to alter . Th e title s of th e piece s wer e
originally supplie d b y m y editors , neve r b y me; sinc e thes e generall y me t
with m y approval I have let them stand. I am grateful to my various editors
for allowing me to reprint thes e reviews, and fo r inviting me to write them in
the firs t place . I a m als o gratefu l t o Catherin e M e Keen fo r photocopyin g
above and beyon d th e cal l of duty.
New York C. M.
January 1997
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Contents
Introduction 3
I. PHILOSOPHICA L LIVE S
1. Wittgenstein : My Wicked Heart 1 1
2. Wittgenstein : Soul on Fire 1 8
3. Wittgenstein : Seething 2 7
4. Russell : Loftily Earthy and Earthily Lofty . . . 3 3
5. Russell : You Would Not Want to Be Him 3 5
6. Russell : The Machine in the Ghost 4 1
7. Peirce : Logic and Sadness 4 7
8. Ayer : Old Scores 5 4
II. MIN D
9. Penrose : Past Computation 6 5
10. Humphrey : Getting the Wiggle into the Act 7 4
11. Churchland : A Problem Ignored 8 0
12. Marce l an d Bisiach : The Language of Awareness 8 5
13. Nagel : The View from Nowhere 8 8
14. Chalmers : Wise Incomprehension 10 0
15. McGinn: Out of Body, Out of Mind 10 5
16. Lyca n e t al. : Imagining an Orgasm 11 2
17. Fodor : Mental Representations 11 8
Vlll CONTENTS
III. ETHIC S
33. Singer : Eating Animals Is Wrong 20 7
34. Frey : Beyond the Moral Pale 21 5
35. Pluhar : Born Free 21 8
36. Hel d an d Baier : Mothers and Moralists 22 4
37. Foot : Good Things 23 3
38. Collingwood : Homage to Education 24 0
39. Putnam: In and Out of the Mind 24 7
Index 25 5
MINDS
and
BODIES
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Introduction
3
4 INTRODUCTION
ing for attention that it is important t o put th e good stuf f across to people. I n
short, I believe in my subject, and I want to educate peopl e i n it as best I can.
The troubl e i s that boo k review s in such publication s tend t o have a very
short "shel f life"a matte r o f weeks usually. They ar e comparativel y widely
read whe n they appear, bu t the y soon disappea r int o th e misty past. I have
always foun d thi s dispiriting : s o muc h effor t fo r a resul t tha t last s suc h a
short time . An d I ofte n pu t idea s int o m y review s tha t I d o no t expres s
anywhere else , s o tha t idea s I woul d lik e t o hav e som e permanenc e ar e
quickly forgotten. I am therefore happ y to be able to prolong the life of some
of these pieces by resurrecting the m no w in book form . I hope that genera l
readers wit h a taste for philosoph y wil l find th e collectio n useful, a s provid-
ing a n accessibl e windo w int o wha t mus t sometime s see m lik e a wilfull y
arcane world . Since I have reviewed books by many of th e leadin g philoso -
phers of our time , it is to be hoped that the collection offers a picture of what
has been going on in philosophy for the last twenty years or so. This book can
thus be seen a s a rather unorthodo x introductio n t o contemporary philoso -
phy.
I a m sometime s charge d wit h havin g a n excessivel y acerbic reviewin g
style. And i t is quite true tha t I can be severely critical of what I am reviewing.
I must confess that I have a somewhat visceral reaction t o work I perceive t o
be shoddy or dishonest, an d I see no point in concealing m y opinion. I have
therefore mad e many "enemies" durin g the course of the last twenty years of
criticism. The plai n fact is that every author want s to be reviewed in terms of
absolutely unqualifie d prais e ( I includ e myself) , eve n thoug h the y d o no t
want everyone t o be s o lauded. O n severa l occasions I hav e bee n congratu -
lated b y A for havin g spoken th e unflatterin g truth abou t B' s book, only to
find myself th e objec t of an angr y communicatio n fro m A for havin g dared
to criticize his latest effortwhile th e standard s I have applied ar e precisel y
the sam e i n th e tw o cases. That , a s the y laughingl y say , is human nature .
Nevertheless, I have often fel t that the cost in terms of personal enmity is not
worth it. There is a constant conflict in book criticism between the urge to be
truthful an d awarenes s of the consequences of candor. An d th e better on e is
at detecting the faults in someone else' s work, the greate r the resentment a t
having done so . I see no way out o f this dilemma excep t t o cease reviewing,
but tha t seem s to o cowardl y a solution . I ca n onl y plea d t o thos e I hav e
criticized that m y intentions hav e always been t o tell the trut h a s I see it. If I
am wron g o r unfair , tha t wil l ultimatel y reflect badly o n meno t on them .
The mirro r imag e of this, and also something I have experienced mor e than
once, is the tendenc y to be overgenerous i n one's assessment of a book. This
produces a peculia r naggin g feeling , a s i f on e ha s betraye d one' s highe r
ideals. The mora l risk s in book reviewin g are ver y real; an y reviewer wort h
her sal t feels the m keenly. I can assure anyone whose book I have negatively
reviewed (o r positivel y reviewed!) tha t thes e risk s have alway s bee n upper -
most i n m y mind . I dislike unfairness a s much a s anyone, bu t I also dislike
craven mealy-mouthe d back-scratching .
O INTRODUCTIO N
This is a very mixed collection, ranging across pretty much the whole field
of philosophy , a s wel l a s dippin g int o intellectua l biography. Bu t th e ma -
jority of the pieces have to do with the mind, in one way or another. I t might
be helpful if I identify some the theme s that have governed m y treatment o f
the issues covered; thes e characterize my general approac h t o philosophica l
questions. First , an d leas t controversially, I stoutl y affirm th e principle s o f
rationality and objectiv e truth. Dispassionat e reason i s the righ t wa y to deal
with th e question s tha t puzzl e us, no t rhetori c o r politica l convenience . I
apply thi s metho d a s muc h t o ethic s a s to metaphysic s and philosoph y o f
mind. Relativis m an d subjectivis m never rais e thei r ugl y head s i n thes e
pages. Clarit y an d rigo r o f argumen t ar e th e standard s adhere d to . But,
second, I also oppose scientismth e tendency to think that all genuine ques-
tions are scientific in nature and are to be settled by empirical methods. I take
philosophical questions to be a distinctive type o f question, not to be answered
by th e prevailin g paradigm s o f science . I n ethics , too , I rejec t scientism ,
taking ethica l question s t o b e sui generis, and no t i n an y wa y inferio r t o
scientific questions. Taking thes e two principles together, then , I believe in a
form of rationality that is not scientific in nature. I t is not that there is science
on the one hand an d irrationalism on the other. Rather, th e notion o f ratio-
nality has subvarieties, of which scientific rationality is only one. Philosophy,
including ethics, exhibits its own kin d of rationality, in which argument is the
key method , no t empirica l investigation . To thos e reader s wh o hav e ru n
away with the idea that twentieth-century philosophy has done away with the
notions o f objectiv e truth an d universa l reason, le t m e asser t categorically
that tha t i s not th e case . Such a position i s the propert y o f an irresponsibl e
(and confused ) few; it is very far fro m orthodox .
More substantively, I am guide d i n these essays by a commitment t o what
is sometime s called metaphysica l realism. That is , I tak e bot h th e externa l
world and th e world of the mind to be equally and full y rea l domains. I thus
reject, on the one hand, all forms of idealism about the physical world: there
is no sens e in which the worl d of planets and plant s and platypuse s is mind-
dependent, stil l less "socially constructed." And , o n th e other hand, I rejec t
behaviorism and instrumentalism about the mind: thoughts an d feelings are
as real a s anything else we refer to , and the y are no t t o be reduced t o mere
behavior or treated as dispensable constructs. The univers e thus contains two
sorts of entityphysical things and menta l thingsneither being assimilable
to the other . An d thi s means, obviously , that ther e is a problem abou t ho w
these equall y rea l bu t distinc t thing s are relate d t o eac h otherth e mind -
body problem . Tha t proble m doe s no t exis t i f eithe r o f th e tw o ca n b e
analyzed in terms of the other , o r if the reality of either i s doubted. Man y of
the essay s that follo w deal wit h this proble m i n on e for m o r another . M y
general positio n i s to take th e proble m a s genuine an d a s extremely hard . I
do not believe that any current theor y make s a significant den t in the mind -
body problem. I thus hold that the relation between the mind and the body is
a deep mystery. More than that, there are hints in these essays that I take it to
INTRODUCTION 7
11
12 PHILOSOPHICAL LIVES
This lifelon g struggl e wit h hi s prid e too k a for m tha t ough t t o hav e
seemed t o hi m mor e doome d tha n i t did . Hi s metho d wa s that o f direc t
assault: fierce self-scrutiny, merciless self-condemnation, exposure t o experi-
ences calculated to chasten and humiliate. He approached hi s own soul like a
kind o f mora l engineer : ther e wa s a faul t i n th e desig n an d i t ha d t o b e
dismantled, tinkered with , reconstructed, possibl y scrapped altogether . Gaz-
ing inward, poking around inside , was the way to rid the spiritual machine of
its imperfections. Such directness of approach t o a problem wa s quite alien to
his announced philosophica l method : fo r obliquenes s an d indirectio n wer e
to b e th e essenc e o f philosophica l advancement . Th e obviou s fla w i n thi s
approach t o himself was that it inevitably ran th e very risk it was supposed t o
eliminatethe narcissisti c absorption i n hi s ow n bein g tha t stoo d betwee n
himself an d th e outer world . Another methodi f metho d ther e must be
would b e to try turning a bored eye and ea r awa y from one' s own soul an d
toward th e live s an d feeling s o f others , hopin g tha t one' s ow n mora l im -
provement wil l occur whil e one is , as it were, otherwis e engaged .
One of the mos t shocking and revealing of Wittgenstein's remarks occur s
late in his life when he is reflecting on his love for Ben Richards, which struck
me a s the mos t outward-directed affectio n of his life. I n hi s late fiftie s now ,
he writes , as though th e though t wer e new to him : "I t i s the mar k of a true
love that one thinks of what the other suffers. Fo r he suffers too , is also a poor
devil." What alarms here is the very banality of the thought, an d indee d on e
looks in vai n for an y simila r sentiment i n hi s earlier romanti c attachments .
"Perhaps th e fl y ha d a t las t foun d it s way out o f th e fly-bottle, " Mon k re -
marks, trenchantl y an d rathe r tragically . Not tha t Wittgenstei n manage d
even i n thi s case to translat e hi s stron g feeling s into a n ordinar y romanti c
relationship with the young ma n i n question.
This bear s o n th e dispute d questio n o f Wittgenstein's alleged perio d o f
homosexual promiscuity, reported by William Bartley III. I n a finely judged
appendix Mon k addresses himsel f to Bartley's claim that Wittgenstein used
to avail himself o f th e sexual favors of "rough young men" i n a certain par k
in Vienna, casting considerable doubt o n the veracit y of this claim. As Monk
argues, Wittgenstein' s obvious discomfort with his sexual nature, hetero - o r
homosexual, make s th e ide a o f suc h freewheelin g promiscuit y seem quit e
incredible. It would, moreover, be extremely surprising if such activities ha d
been confine d to a single, short period o f his life, neve r to resurface. Often ,
in the course of reading about Wittgenstein's romantic involvements, I found
myself heartil y wishing the h e had been homosexuall y promiscuous.
That woul d certainly have eased th e lo t of th e unluck y Franci s Skinner ,
whose love for Wittgenstein clearly included a desire fo r sexua l contact that
Wittgenstein apparentl y did hi s best to avoidthough, happily , he wa s not
totally successful i n this. One suc h "lapse " is reported in Wittgenstein's note-
books, an d incidentall y shows Redpath t o b e wron g in hi s belief that ther e
was nothin g mor e "lurid " betwee n Skinne r an d Wittgenstei n tha t a clos e
male friendship . The tw o were vacationin g together i n Norwa y and Witt -
16 P H I L O S O P H I C A L LIVES
genstein report s himself as being "sensual , susceptible , indecent " with Skin -
ner: "La y with hi m tw o or thre e times. Alway s at first with the feelin g tha t
there was nothing wron g i n it, then with shame. Hav e als o been unjust , edgy
and insincer e toward s him , an d als o cruel. " Thes e ar e disturbin g word s i n
more ways than one. Were cruelty and lovelessness his only possible response
to actual huma n intimacy ? Did his need fo r th e affectio n o f anothe r alway s
have t o tur n int o a refusa l o r incapacit y t o la y his own hear t o n th e line ?
My impressio n i s that sexua l promiscuit y wa s about th e las t thin g Witt -
genstein coul d toleratean d also that ethically, it would hav e been a definite
step in the right direction . Unfortunately , h e didn't see it that way. A story is
told that a close friend o f his once said of him that "h e never ha d a good fuc k
in hi s life. " I canno t vouc h fo r th e trut h o f thi s stor y bu t i t seem s t o m e
infinitely mor e probable , an d infinitel y mor e woeful , than th e ide a tha t h e
once indulge d a taste for roug h trade. It marks a real lac k in his conceptio n
of th e spiritua l lif e o f a huma n being , a s well as being sa d i n itself .
This is of a piece wit h the stor y that i s told, amusin g i n its way, about th e
one femal e lov e o f hi s life , Marguerit e Respinger , who m h e a t on e tim e
wished to marry and , with a proposal in mind, invited on a holiday with him.
She turned u p i n remotes t Norwa y only t o fin d tha t he r suitor' s ide a o f a
prenuptial vacatio n wa s that the y shoul d se e very littl e o f eac h othe r an d
spend th e tw o weeks in prayer an d meditation , fo r whic h purpose Wittgen -
stein ha d lef t a marke d Bibl e i n th e roo m i n whic h sh e wa s t o stay . Sh e
decided, amazingly , that Ludwi g was not th e ma n fo r her . I n an y case, hi s
wish wa s for a childles s platoni c marriagethough , oddl y enough , h e en -
joyed kissin g her fo r hour s o n end .
And wha t o f th e philosophy ? Mon k handle s thi s expertly , seamlessl y
weaving it into the narrative, showin g the intimate relationship between th e
ethical concern s o f Wittgenstein's lif e an d hi s philosophica l ideas . There is
much interestin g scholarl y material abou t Wittgenstein' s readin g an d intel -
lectual influences , an d abou t th e compositio n o f hi s two major works . Per -
haps th e mos t strikin g item , from a biographica l poin t o f view , i s Wittgen-
stein's lat e remark : "Nearl y al l my writing s ar e privat e conversation s wit h
myself. Thing s tha t I sa y to mysel f tete-a-tete." Her e hi s personal solipsis m
finds it s natural counterpar t i n hi s philosophica l style : always a turnin g in -
ward, as if only his own thought s are ultimatel y worth heeding . An d this , of
course, is part of the strengt h an d char m of his philosophical writing, and o f
him a s a personality: an enclose d worl d o f numbered paragraphs , bot h po -
etic an d mathematical , where n o alie n voic e intrudes . Ther e i s beauty bu t
also desolatio n i n thi s ideal.
I began b y asking whether Wittgenstei n was a spiritual genius . That ques-
tion reall y ha s tw o parts : wa s h e th e spirituall y sublim e individualth e
"saint"people ofte n sai d h e was ? An d di d h e kno w how to b e suc h a n
individual, whether or not he was one himself? I think the answer must be no
to both questions . His vanity, emotional solipsism, and coldnes s put hi m well
outside th e category o f the saint; and hi s engineering (o r surgical) approach
WITTGENSTEIN: M Y WICKED HEAR T 1 7
18
WITTGENSTEIN: SOU L O N FIR E 1 9
the teacher mus t rely on the learner's taking his instructions i n a certain way
and actin g appropriately . Fo r the sam e reason , th e analysi s of one sentenc e
by means o f another sentence canno t escap e the circle of signs, and th e slack
must be taken u p b y modes o f natural respons e tha t resis t codification. Lan-
guage i s possible onl y because i t is not self-reliant , because i t is parasitic on a
foundation o f nonlinguistic abilities and dispositions . I n thi s sensehere we
see the ghos t o f th e Tractatuslanguage canno t communicat e it s own pre -
suppositions.
This ambivalence abou t th e power s o f language reveal s itself in Wittgen-
stein's pros e style . There i s great confidenc e i n th e expressiv e capacitie s of
language, even th e pared-down, monosyllabi c vernacular tha t he preferred ;
but hi s style is also halting and allusive , discontinuous and metaphorical . H e
writes as if he i s determined not t o ask more of language tha n i t can deliver ,
not to give the reader the illusion that things ar e clearer an d straighte r tha n
they really are. Certainl y his prose require s the utmost scrutiny, as well as an
ability t o engag e creativel y wit h wha t i s bein g said . An d i t strive s fo r a n
intellectual effec t that goes beyond discursive formulatio n t o alter one's "way
of seeing." "Say what you choose," he says at one point, "so long as it does not
prevent you from seein g the facts." This can sound odd , comin g from some -
one who ceaselessly reminds philosopher s o f their perilou s tendenc y to mis-
use language; bu t it fits the deeper aim of curing distortions o f vision caused
by languag e itself . For al l his obsessio n wit h language, Wittgenstein' s hear t
was not exactly there. He was as much concerned wit h what language canno t
do a s with what i t can .
In Philosophical Occasions, Jame s Klagg e an d Alfre d Nordman n hav e
usefully an d skillfull y assemble d variou s writings by Wittgenstein tha t hav e
been scattere d an d har d t o obtain. Th e variet y is such as to permit a synoptic
view of his several concernsfrom comment s on Frazer' s The Golden Rough,
to piece s o n ethics , sense-data , caus e an d effect , fre e will , th e natur e o f
philosophy. Ther e are als o some revealin g letter s an d a n informativ e essay
by Henri k vo n Wrigh t o n th e writing s that Wittgenstei n lef t behind . Th e
book i s an excellen t source , an d i t provides a nourishing supplemen t t o th e
Investigations.
Particularly interestin g ar e th e remark s o n th e natur e o f philosophy ,
which expand illuminatingly on theme s pursue d i n the Investigations. Philo-
sophy, fo r Wittgenstein , is not t o b e conceive d i n th e traditiona l wa y as a
maximally general science , so that the task of the philosopher i s to develop a n
entirely universa l theory o f reality . Instead , philosophica l wor k consist s in
dismantling confusions and mythologie s by paying careful attentio n t o ou r
ordinary concepts , resistin g th e fals e analogie s suggeste d b y ou r form s o f
expression. Th e problem s ar e difficult , no t becaus e the y concern especiall y
deep features o f reality, but rathe r because it is hard fo r u s to obtain a clear
view o f wha t w e already kno w ver y well . Philosophy, o r th e searc h fo r th e
ultimate theory , i s over, bu t philosophizin g mus t go on .
"Philosophical problem s ca n be compared t o locks on safes , which can b e
22 PHILOSOPHICA L LIVE S
scorching the human surround . Yo u can see this white-hot demon patrollin g
behind his eyes, unsleeping and merciless, missing nothing. I t bears down on
the man, the mere man, refusing to cut him the slightest moral slack . People
are stirred b y this vision, but als o frightened b y it. They see what it might d o
to the usua l moral mush .
Much was required o f Wittgenstein by his steely god. First he must escap e
the comfortable embrac e of his rich and cultured Viennes e family an d g o to
Manchester, wher e he studie s engineering. The n he i s called upon to aban-
don tha t caree r fo r the philosoph y of mathematics, though profoundl y un -
certain o f hi s capacities i n thi s area. Havin g mad e a resounding succes s of
this new vocation, he i s obliged t o remove himsel f fro m hi s friends an d hi s
supporters in Cambridge t o live alone in a self-made hut i n deepest Norway.
During Worl d Wa r I , naturally , he ha s no alternitiv e but t o enlist i n active
service, t o pu t hi s lif e a t seriou s peri l wit h a vie w t o self-purification . (He
reads Tolstoy an d Augustine at the front.) Only this proximity to death put s
thoughts o f suicide out o f his mind.
When he completes the Tractatus, he feels the need to abandon altogethe r
the fiel d i n whic h he ha s excelled, giv e away all his money, and becom e a n
elementary schoo l teacher, which he quickl y come s t o hate. H e flees again,
and reluctantl y returns, afte r a perio d a s a monaster y gardener , t o Cam -
bridge, where he develops a new philosophy, repudiating th e work for which
he ha s become famous . Then h e decide s tha t a job a s a manual labore r i n
Communist Russia is what his soul craves. Sadly, they will employ him only as
a professor, unskille d labor no t bein g a scarce commodity, so he declines to
go, glumly resuming his Cambridge professorship , which he describe s as "a
living death." A spell doing menia l work as a hospital porter during Worl d
War I I i s the n indicated , followe d by mor e solitar y hut-livin g in Ireland .
Finally, he spends his last days, penniless, in the house of his doctor, working
on th e subjec t of certainty , dying of prostat e cancer .
All this is interspersed wit h spasms of self-loathing, force d confession s of
his supposed sin s to friends and tireless perfectionism about hi s work and his
moral state . Spiritua l struggl e i s the unrelentin g theme : struggl e wit h th e
philosophical incubus , with his ow n pride , wit h a soile d an d compromise d
world. N o wonde r h e describe d himsel f as like a ma n glimpse d throug h a
window i n a n unsee n storm , appearin g t o wal k quit e normally , but i n fac t
keeping his balance only with the greatest exertion. This is heroism of a sort,
despite the invisibility of the opposing forces. I t carries the idea that decency
(a favorit e word o f Wittgenstein's ) is something tha t come s a s a hard-won
achievement, an d tha t it must fight a constant battle with the corruptio n o f
the soul . Purity costs. I t hurts . I t ca n mak e you d o peculia r things.
The dram a o f Wittgenstein' s life an d personalit y make s hi m a uniquely
suitable subjec t for a philosophical film. I once discusse d th e ide a o f suc h a
film with Jonathan Miller , bu t w e decide d i t woul d b e to o difficul t t o ge t
right. Recentl y the projec t ha s been execute d b y the literar y theoris t Terr y
Eagleton an d Dere k Jarman , wh o die d thi s year. The y hav e attempte d t o
WITTGENSTEIN: SOU L O N FIR E 2 5
convey Wittgenstein's life and though t in visual form. The film consists of an
album o f cinemati c paragraphsvisua l remarks , a s i t werean d i t i s a n
imaginative an d seriou s attemp t t o rende r it s subject's life i n for m an d i n
color. Especiall y in color : Jarman render s th e auster e philosophe r o f lan -
guage fro m a painterl y standpoint . I t i s not a pris m o f Wittgenstein' s own
devising; he wa s interested i n color fo r it s logical grammar, no t it s aesthetic
or expressiv e possibilities.
Spatially, the film is confined and claustrophobic, shot against a uniformly
black background. Optical interest is supplied by the vivid hues of the clothes
worn by everyone except th e protagonist , wh o remains steadfastly gray and
dowdy. H e wil l no t brighte n up . (Kar l Johnson's portraya l o f Wittgenstein
accumulates t o an eeri e reincarnation o f the original . Johnson present s an
uncanny physical resemblance to Wittgenstein, in both face and physique ; he
has Wittgenstein's eyes and mout h exactl y right, th e fragil e ferocit y of th e
gaze, th e sensua l rejection o f th e thin , inturne d lips . An d th e voic e i s th e
perfect blend of the military, the preacherly, and th e childlike.) Russell wafts
about in bright red, Ottoline Morrell traverses most of the spectrum, Keynes
mixes an d matche s lik e a chromati c polymath . There i s even a loquacious
Martian sporting the reptilian green that is standard in that community. This
method of representation i s quite successful, an d i t aptly projects an impres -
sion of floating abstractness on the characters, condensing them into concep-
tual beacons , animated categories . That i s probably how Wittgenstein him-
self tende d t o see people, despit e hi s advice that on e shoul d stud y people's
faces with the utmos t care. It is a mark of his personal solipsism , as well as his
extreme sensitivity to the presenc e o f others. (H e always chose to live alone.)
Yet he himself stands in no need of chromatic heightening, having a natural,
if somewha t glacial, internal iridescence.
There is a fai r amoun t o f philosophical tal k interpolated int o the narra -
tive. My unease peaked at these points. It is not that what is said is inaccurate,
but i t give s th e impressio n tha t philosophica l discussio n i s just a clas h o f
portentous profundities , a duel o f gnomi c pronouncements; an d th e mor -
dant tone of the film encourages this impression. But philosophical discourse
is nothing like that: it consists of argument , counterargument, clarification,
detail, restatement, recantation. Philosophy is not intrinsically incomprehen-
sible o r faintl y silly . I not e tha t n o philosophe r appear s t o hav e been con -
sulted i n the makin g of the film, which is really quite amazing. Did anybody
involved in making the film actually study Wittgenstein's works, or the com-
mentaries on them ? I fear tha t the y took the vie w that Wittgenstei n is what
you make of him. If so, they were wrong: his philosophy does not consist of a
series of "inspire d suggestions, " fro m whic h the reade r i s invited t o deriv e
his own lessons, or t o indulge his own fancy. I t i s a tightly constructed bod y
of doctrine .
Eagleton's origina l scrip t wa s substantially altered b y Jarman , no doub t
because o f it s dramati c inertia : i t i s al l spoutin g heads . Apar t fro m th e
amateurish wa y in whic h th e philosoph y i s presented , th e centra l fla w i n
26 P H I L O S O P H I C A L LIVE S
27
28 PHILOSOPHICAL LIVES
Wittgenstein t o G . E. Moore :
Your lette r annoye d me . When I wrote Logik I didn't consult the regulations,
and therefor e I thin k i t would onl y be fai r i f you gav e m e m y degree with-
out consultin g the m s o much either ! As to a Preface an d Notes ; I thin k my
examiners wil l easil y see how muc h I hav e cribbe d fro m Bosanquet.I f I' m
not wort h you r makin g a n exceptio n fo r m e even in some STUPID details
then I ma y as well g o t o Hel l directly , and i f I am worth i t an d yo u don' t d o
it then you migh t g o there .
The whol e busines s i s too stupi d an d to o beastl y t o g o o n writin g abou t i t
soL. W .
He does not appear t o have ever sought psychiatric help, and was sceptical of
Freudian theory , but thes e word s clearly signify menta l suffering of an ex -
treme degree. Nor i s it clear quite what it was that caused him such agony of
30 PHILOSOPHICAL LIVES
mind. H e seems to have found refug e in his work, if it was going well, and i n
certain intens e friendships ; and i f these failed him, there was always solitude
and isolation , whic h he sough t a t differen t period s o f hi s life.
We als o learn somethin g o f Wittgenstein' s conception o f genius , i n tw o
stray remarks. Of one of Schubert's works he ways that it has "a fantastic kin d
of greatness"; an d speakin g of the bizarre Otto Weininger he says: "It is true
that h e is fantastic but h e is great and fantastic. " I take Wittgenstein to mean
that tru e geniuso r a t leas t on e specie s o f itconsist s i n wrenche s o f th e
imagination, journeys int o th e phantasmagoric . Ther e mus t be somethin g
shocking in the work , something tha t bursts th e bound s o f the orderl y an d
controlled an d familiar . And hi s ow n work display s this: the Tractatus rig-
orously declares its own meaninglessness in granite-like sentences, while the
Investigations profoundly rejects philosophical profundity as just "a house o f
cards." Bot h book s tak e fantasti c journeys in thei r ow n way : they conjur e
alien world s tha t lur k withi n th e obviou s an d mundane ; the y sti r th e
imagination a s much a s the intellect . Eve n whil e celebratin g th e ordinary ,
they strike a fantastic note. Indeed, Wittgenstein himself has a kind of fantas-
tic greatness : h e i s hard t o believ e in , an d woul d b e impossibl e t o invent .
It i s clear fro m thes e letter s ho w clos e th e Tractatus came t o no t bein g
published. Withou t Russell' s generou s backin g i t would no t hav e been . A t
one poin t Wittgenstei n feel s compelled t o write , after havin g th e boo k re -
jected:
I've alread y comforte d mysel f on tha t score , b y means of th e followin g argu-
ment, which seems to m e unanswerable . Either m y piece is a work of th e
highest rank , or i t is not a work of the highes t rank. I n th e latte r (an d mor e
probable) cas e I mysel f a m i n favou r of its not bein g printed . An d i n th e
former cas e it's a matte r o f indifferenc e whether it's printed twent y o r a
hundred year s sooner o r later . Afte r all, who ask s whether th e Critique of
Pure Reason, for example , was written in 17 x o r y . So really i n th e forme r
case to o m y treatise wouldn' t nee d t o be printed .
Since he ha d a strong nee d fo r people, one can only assume that th e loneli -
ness he must have endured was intentionally inflicted. Perhaps h e disdaine d
his dependence o n othe r people , feelin g it to be a weakness that ha d t o be
purged b y cold , deprivation , an d isolation . O r perhap s the y wer e a to o
tempting distractio n fro m dealin g wit h his own spiritual difficulties.
As I wa s reading thes e letter s I als o happene d t o b e readin g a fin e ne w
study b y Rober t Norton , The Beautiful Soul: Aesthetic Morality in the 18th
Century. Th e boo k trace s th e histor y o f th e concep t o f mora l beaut y fro m
Plato an d Plotinus , throug h Shaftesbur y an d Hutcheson , an d int o Kant ,
Schiller, an d Goethe . Norto n explore s th e wa y this concep t merge d wit h
Pietist religious tradition s i n German-speaking countrie s an d suffuse d thei r
moral culture. Simply put, th e idea was that each perso n shoul d b e engage d
on th e tas k o f radica l self-transformatio n i n th e directio n o f a "beautifu l
soul," thi s being though t tantamoun t t o mora l perfection . Give n Wittgens-
tein's own heritage, it is very tempting to place him in this tradition. Certainly
he often speaks as if his soul exists in some state of ugliness"my life is FULL
of th e uglies t an d petties t thought s an d action s imaginabl e (thi s is not a n
exaggeration)," he write s to Russellan d was clearly engaged o n a lifelong
project o f spiritua l reconstruction . Whe n i n th e Tractatus h e write s tha t
"ethics and aesthetics are one and the same" it is possible to hear him express -
ing th e identit y of inner beaut y and mora l goodnes s tha t wa s such a domi -
nant par t o f the ethica l tradition i n which he gre w up. Thi s makes sense of
what must seem t o many British observers t o be an eccentricit y of Wittgen-
stein alone : h e i s her e simpl y bein g tru e t o hi s cultura l origins . Morall y
speaking, h e i s a mixtur e o f Pietis t German mora l aestheticis m an d Cam -
bridge-style mal e Hellenis m (i f I ma y b e excuse d thes e weight y isms). His
aesthetic tastes tended toward th e austere and unadorned, as with the house
he designe d fo r hi s sister an d hi s own spare pros e style ; and tha t seem s t o
have bee n th e kin d o f aestheti c objec t h e wante d hi s sou l t o be , too . Th e
danger o f this approach t o virtue is, of course, th e temptatio n towar d spiri -
tual narcissism and mora l inactionand these, too, seem to be traits of which
he wa s not wholl y innocent.
Wittgenstein wa s famous for hi s abrasiv e honesty , hi s reckles s truthful-
ness. In a striking early letter to Russell he states his opinion o f a work highly
esteemed b y the Cambridg e community :
I hav e just been readin g a par t o f Moore' s Principia Ethica: (now please
don't b e shocked ) I d o no t lik e it at all . (Mind you, quite apart fro m dis -
agreeing wit h mos t of it. ) I don' t believeo r rathe r I a m suretha t it can-
not drea m o f comparing wit h Frege's or you r own works (except perhap s
with som e the Philosophical Essays). Moor e repeats himsel f dozens of times ,
what he say s i n 3 pages could I believeeasil y b e expressed i n hal f a page .
Unclear statuement s don't ge t a bit clearer b y being repeated! !
It is not that what he says here isn't true, but I doubt tha t many other peopl e
at the time would have had th e courage t o say sostill less a new postgradu -
32 PHILOSOPHICAL LIVES
ate student , a s Wittgenstein the n was . What i s also notable, thoug h les s sa-
lient, is the oblique negative evaluation of some of Russell's own work, which
Wittgenstein plainl y implies is of th e sam e lo w quality as Moore's book .
Why thi s compulsion t o expres s opinion s h e kne w woul d woun d thei r
object an d migh t lea d t o hi s ow n rejection ? Intellectua l honest y i s on e
answer, but it seems a more pointed thin g than that. I n Wittgenstein: The Duty
of Genius Ray Monk reports tha t a s a child Wittgenstein was unusually com-
pliant an d solicitou s of other people' s affection , even a t the expens e o f th e
truth. Perhaps h e was aware of this tendency in himself and fel t compelled t o
resist it on every possible occasion. It was an act of purificationa deliberat e
mortification o f his desire t o be liked. Unwelcome truthfulness was a means
of beautifyin g his ow n soul . Th e damag e don e t o other s wa s presumabl y
their ow n affair .
These letters provide a fascinating glimpse of Wittgenstein and his friends
at a n intimat e an d revealin g level . I a m sur e thei r publicatio n would hav e
horrified him .
4
33
34 P H I L O S O P H I C A L LIVE S
Bertrand Russell' s first and formativ e love affair wa s with symbolic logic. But
the relationship , thoug h fertile , wa s troubled. Beginnin g i n rapture , a s h e
molded an d extende d th e ne w concepts and techniques , sweeping away th e
barren detritu s o f two millennia, the affai r eventuall y foundered o n a sting-
ing paradox, unexpecte d an d intractable , which abruptly took the shin e off
the whol e thing. Hi s devotion crumbled , an d h e was driven t o seek comfort
elsewhere, never quite regaining his former idealism. It must have been very
disillusioning, and n o doubt tainte d hi s other romantic involvements, whic h
also began i n ecstasy and the n became mired i n refractoriness of one kind or
another. Fo r th e antinomia l i s not adorable . An d i f logi c can't b e trusted ,
what can?
Along wit h Frege , Peano , an d others , Russel l constructe d th e basi c ma-
chinery o f moder n mathematica l logic, clearing u p th e defect s of the olde r
syllogistic logic, and puttin g the new logic to use in the analysi s of mathemat-
ics itself. Th e progra m wa s to provide a rigorous demonstration o f classical
mathematics i n purel y logica l (includin g set-theoretic ) terms , thu s settin g
mathematics o n a transparentl y secure foundation . Russell also applied hi s
bright new tool to ordinary language, notably in the Theory of Descriptions,
which enabled hi m to keep meaning denotational whil e avoiding ontological
inflation, an d i n th e treatmen t o f epistemologica l an d metaphysica l ques-
tions, where he thought it could be used to reconstruct our empirica l knowl-
35
36 P H I L O S O P H I C A L LIVE S
Reprinted with permission fro m the Times Higher Education Supplement (May 24, 1996) .
41
42 PHILOSOPHICAL LIVE S
He did in his youth try actually to strangle his friend Edwar d Fitzgerald , and
had murderou s impulse s at other times too. Some of the sudden callousnes s
he could sho w to people mus t hav e ha d a similar source .
Monk's thesi s i s tha t th e fea r o f madnes s wa s a controllin g them e i n
Russell's life, causing him to restrain and flagellate his deepest emotions , an d
to retreat int o cloistered abstractions . Part o f the appea l o f Joseph Conrad' s
work fo r Russel l lay in hi s understandin g o f madness , a s wel l a s hi s acut e
sense o f huma n loneliness .
Russell's lov e lif e veere d exhaustingl y fro m fleetin g ecstac y to dee p de -
spair. To be loved by Russell was no picnic. He was clearly starved of norma l
female affection as a child and thereafte r sough t i t with a ferocity that coul d
44 PHILOSOPHICAL LIVES
only backfire . I n th e cas e of hi s first wife , Alys , he move d swiftl y fro m joy-
ously kissing her breast s i n a treehous e t o somethin g clos e t o smoulderin g
disgust, thoug h h e staye d wit h he r fo r nin e lon g year s i n a sexles s an d
loveless marita l prison . Hi s nex t love , o f Ottoline , wa s powerfu l an d sus-
tained, bu t (a ) sh e wa s happily married , (b ) she ha d othe r lovers , (c ) she
found Russel l physicall y unattractive. Fo r Russell , th e relationshi p wa s
mostly pai n an d sexua l frustration , wit h som e ecstati c interludes , an d a n
inability to free himself from hi s feelings for her. With Colette the proble m
was he r itineran t actin g caree r an d he r affair s wit h other men , whic h lef t
Russell ravaged by jealousy. H e wanted marriage an d children , no t the od d
weekend wit h someon e wit h disperse d romanti c interests . Hi s affai r wit h
Helen Dudley was a sudden flop: having asked her to England to marry him,
he los t interes t a s soo n a s Ottolin e manifeste d he r rivalr y with Hele n b y
stepping u p he r sexua l interes t i n poo r Bertie . H e undoubtedl y treate d
Helen shabbily, especially in not explaining to her th e seriousness of his prior
affection fo r Ottoline . Meanwhil e Helen tol d Ottolin e everythin g that ha d
happened betwee n her an d Russell , which was not quite what he had admit -
ted t o Ottoline ; th e resul t wa s that Ottolin e los t he r affectio n fo r Russell .
Etc., etc.
In all this mess, Monk finds Russell culpable on many counts. But I think
he underestimate s th e emotiona l desperatio n tha t le d Russel l to thes e tan-
gled relationships. He did not manage to have a halfway satisfactor y love life
till hi s forties . Sex was a powerfu l force i n hi s life , bu t i t was granted ver y
restricted outlet , leavin g hi m emotionall y starve d t o th e poin t o f near -
insanity. It is also exceedingly difficult t o have any confidence in one's judg-
ments about suc h matters , the huma n hear t bein g a mysterious organ, an d
the realitie s of romance s o complex and impenetrable . I do no t mysel f find
Russell's behavior i n this respect particularl y low or extraordinary . No r di d
Russell far e muc h bette r wit h his male friends ; and her e I thin k h e reall y
does com e ou t badly . On a pai r o f occasion s he coldl y smiles as two of hi s
closest friendsG. E . Moore and Wittgensteinsuffe r fro m his insensitivity
and lac k o f huma n sympathy . He evidentl y found thei r ver y rea l distres s
amusing, an d i t is hard t o escap e a n impressio n o f unsavor y sadism in hi s
responses. Moor e ended u p wantin g to avoid hi s company whenever possi-
ble, an d Wittgenstei n becam e remot e an d condemnatory . Hi s relationshi p
with Conrad was much better, as Monk insightfully explains, but then Russell
hardly ever saw him an d the y were not i n the sam e game . D . H. Lawrenc e
wrote hi m a stingingl y critical letter , pointin g ou t hi s laten t violenc e an d
dishonesty, which caused Russell to contemplate suicide momentarily; but h e
solved th e proble m b y severin g hi s relationshi p wit h the write r an d with -
drawing eve r deepe r unde r hi s intellectua l carapace . Ther e i s littl e evi-
dence i n Monk' s book o f goo d an d clos e friendship s betwee n Russel l an d
other men ; his loneliness was not t o be relieve d b y ordinary huma n com-
panionship. All the intensit y and nee d i s there, bu t someho w he lacked th e
humanity t o covert i t into th e bal m o f friendship .
RUSSELL: TH E MACHIN E I N TH E GHOS T 4 5
47
48 PHILOSOPHICA L LIVE S
another academi c position , despit e man y efforts. And al l the whil e he was
generally acknowledge d t o be a genius .
What strikes me now about Peirce's career, reading Brent's account of it, is
the amount of time that h e spen t not doing philosophy. As a young man h e
trained i n chemistry and physics , and hi s first da y job wa s in geodesy, work-
ing for th e Unite d State s Coast Survey. His specialty there was gravimetrics,
and h e spen t enormous amount s of time i n the compan y of pendulums, t o
the stud y o f whic h he mad e importan t contributions . H e als o worke d i n
astronomy an d photometry , publishin g a book in the latter field . H e wa s an
internationally renowned scientis t before he reached hi s forties. Recognition
he had , an d soli d achievement , too ; bu t employmen t h e coul d no t sustain ,
and eventuall y could no t eve n secure .
He wa s fired fro m th e Coas t survey , it seems , because o f delay s in th e
production o f hi s scientifi c reports , backe d u p b y th e malig n blindnes s of
some supposed expert s who were invited to comment on his work. The nadi r
came when , despit e a recommendatio n fro m Presiden t Roosevel t himself,
and strong support fro m leading scientists and philosophers , h e was refused
a Carnegi e gran t t o complet e hi s work i n logic . Thereafte r h e scratche d a
living fro m writin g reviews , mainl y fo r The Nation, an d relie d upo n th e
charity of friend s an d relatives . For period s h e ha d t o slee p roug h i n New
York, having lost his house, and h e ofte n went for day s without food. Natu -
rally hi s already precariou s healt h wa s ruined, no t t o spea k o f hi s sensitiv e
spirit. Bu t h e carrie d on , a s best he could , with hi s logic.
The ironie s of Peirce's life are of a numbingly predictable kind . The grea t
pragmatist, stressing the practical instrumental character of thought, prove d
unable t o realiz e hi s own mos t cherishe d goal s through th e exercis e o f his
own practica l reason. H e wa s a procrastinator, a n evade r o f ugly realities, a
reckless spender of money. He once characterized perception, arrestingly , as
the "outward clash, " castigating Hegel fo r excessive inwardness; but his own
brushes with the external world were abrupt collisions, his own perception o f
reality being minimal.
For all his obsession with methodology, his own schemes tended to be high
on madnes s an d lo w on method . Som e o f hi s awkwardnes s in th e worl d
Peirce put dow n to the cerebral consequence s o f left-handedness, including
his convolutions of speec h (h e was not, t o pu t i t mildly, a clear writer) , an d
some may have come fro m drugs , bu t the quixotic and impulsiv e side of his
character goe s fa r beyon d suc h causes . He seeme d ofte n t o conniv e in hi s
own undermining, as if challenging the world to take a swipe at him. And fo r
all his championing of th e cooperativ e i n intellectual inquiry, his own work
was largel y solitar y an d idiosyncratic ; hi s grou p instinct s wer e no t well -
developed. Th e ide a o f communit y wa s pretty notiona l a s fa r a s Peirce' s
actual practic e wa s concerned. On e migh t b e forgive n fo r suspecting , i f it
does no t soun d to o pop-psychological , tha t hi s emphasi s o n metho d an d
agreement wa s a form of compensation fo r the opposite qualitie s in himself.
The mos t salien t fact about Peirc e a s a thinker i s his early and persisten t
52 PHILOSOPHICAL LIVES
fascination with logic, formal and informal . He ranked himsel f at the level of
Leibniz and ofte n sai d h e was put o n Eart h b y God in order to do logic . I n
this fascination he resembles the pioneers o f twentieth-century philosophy
Frege, Russell , Wittgenstein, and others . Muc h o f thi s work, however , ha s
now been done . I t is hard to see how anyone today could be gripped in such a
fanatical manner b y a desire to set logic straight. Now logic is straight, thanks
to thes e earlie r obsessives .
I suspec t tha t a large par t o f Peirce' s career proble m wa s simply that h e
was constantly preoccupied b y something that cried ou t for preoccupation
the discoverie s i n logi c wer e rip e fo r plucking , beckonin g hi m t o them .
Instead o f laboring ove r his tedious pendulu m calculations , he was straining
to think about logica l matters; bu t h e never foun d th e tim e or th e peac e o f
mind t o put i n the effor t neede d t o bring hi s ideas t o fruition. H e was thus
continually thwarte d i n hi s ow n stronges t inclinations , always setting u p a
kind of split or instability in his own activities. (How hard it would have been
on the young Russell if he had been prevente d fro m writing Principia Mathe-
matical) Onl y durin g the short period of teaching logic at Johns Hopkins do
the signs of strain recede, resultin g in an important an d collaborative treatis e
on hi s deepest interest .
Speaking of the thwarting of work, Brent's account of the troubled histor y
of his own book is a case in point. Writte n thirty years ago as a doctoral thesi s
in history , it took th e effort s o f th e note d linguis t Thomas Sebeo k t o trac k
down th e autho r an d arrang e fo r th e origina l versio n t o b e revise d fo r
publication. This is a strange business , for the book i s excellent in every way,
and Peirc e i s a subject of extraordinary interest . Th e explanation , a s Bren t
gives it , woul d appea r t o b e tha t th e philosoph y departmen t a t Harvar d
University denie d acces s t o certai n paper s o f Peirce' s containe d i n th e
Houghton Library , and woul d no t permi t Bren t t o quote fro m Peirce' s let-
ters. H e di d no t obtai n persmissio n unti l 1991 . Bren t says :
While the dela y in publishin g Peirce's philosophica l manuscripts can b e at-
tributed almos t entirely to skepticis m or disinteres t [sic] o n th e on e hand ,
and lac k of fund s o n th e other , th e dela y in producin g a biography wa s di-
rectly cause d b y the inaccessibilit y of th e biographica l portio n o f th e Har-
vard Peirc e collection . This suppressio n wa s justified by its owners, the
Harvard departmen t o f philosophy , on th e ground s tha t there was informa-
tion i n the letter s that woul d seriousl y damage Peirce' s reputatio n an d tha t
must, therefore, be withheld in order t o protec t hi s reputation an d th e sensi-
bilities o f hi s famil y (an d perhap s thos e of Harvar d University ) . . . Th e
restrictive polic y led t o rumor s abou t homosexuality , sexual promiscuity,
chronic drunkenness, violenc e and dru g addiction , an d sinc e there wa s no
published evidenc e t o either suppor t o r disprov e suc h accusations, Peirce's
reputation ha s varied accordin g t o rumor abou t th e content s of hi s letter s
and th e taste s o f th e person s concerne d wit h it. I n fact , man y of the rumor s
were true , bu t becaus e o f the decisio n t o deny access , the researc h whic h
would hav e pu t hi s life int o it s true light , that o f th e dignit y of deep
tragedy, wa s discouraged o r forbidden .
PEIRCE: LOGI C AN D SADNES S 5 3
It is clear, after reading Brent' s valuable book, that whoever it was at Har -
vard who made the decision to impede a biographical stud y of Peirce mad e a
grave mistake . And i t is a sad irony tha t thi s misguided polic y should com e
from th e ver y institution tha t di d s o much to ruin Peirce' s lif e an d career
even to the poin t o f forbidding hi m for decades fro m lecturin g t o Harvar d
students, despit e Willia m James's recommendations . Wa s he reall y so diffi -
cult and controversia l a man tha t he deserves this double blo w to his reputa -
tion? I t is hard no t to feel the forc e of Sebeok's commen t tha t Brent's boo k
reveals "a seamy side to American academic polity, its sometime brutality and
mendacity, an d th e ofte n cruell y corrup t machination s o f highe r politica l
authority." Yes, Peirce wa s a wayward and singula r man, who played a lead-
ing part i n engineering hi s own downfall: but h e was also the victim of some
mean-spirited an d merciles s individuals . H e ende d miserably , whil e the y
prospered an d n o doubt congratulate d themselves . Readin g thi s biograph y
leaves one wit h a bad tast e i n the mouth ; an d i t is the mor e worth readin g
because o f it . That pai n i n Peirce' s fac e sum s it up .
8
Ayer: Ol d Scores
The Meaning of Life, and Other Essays
by A . J. Aye r
Weidenfeld, 199 0
54
AVER: OL D SCORE S 5 5
given," but then we are never quite told what other words we might use. No r
is it clear how his own account of how we move inferentially from perceptua l
data to the world is supposed t o quell the sceptic's doubts. Okay, we can think
of ou r ordinar y belief s a s constitutin g a theor y i n respec t o f th e sensor y
evidence, bu t wha t i s to exclud e th e claim s of riva l theoriesth e one s w e
have no tendency to believe? For example, what is it about the evidence that
rules out the theory that we are all brains in vats being fed these very sensory
inputs b y a godlike Martia n physiologist ? We are no t told , s o the common -
sense theor y ha s not ye t been vindicated .
Philosophers are often rebuked fo r not askin g what the meaning o f life is
or fo r failin g t o offe r a n answer . I n hi s 198 8 lecture Aye r bot h ask s an d
answers this question. Predictably enough, h e denies that life has meaning in
virtue of a presiding deity , and h e locates its meaning i n the actua l project s
and fulfilment s o f mortal existence . He say s a number o f sensible and famil -
iar things, but I do not think he quite puts his finger on the essential consid -
erations, which I tak e to be as follows. T o begi n with , we need t o scrutinize
that little phrase "the meaning o f life": what kind o f meaning is being envis-
aged here ? I t canno t b e what Paul Gric e called natura l meaninga s whe n
clouds mean rainsinc e the questio n is not wha t causal or lawlik e relation s
our live s stand in to other occurrences. Neither can it be a question of seman-
tic meaningas when a certain Englis h sentence mean s tha t i t is raining
since my life clearly does no t express an y kind of proposition. Wha t must be
intended i s probably bes t pu t b y dropping th e wor d "meaning " altogethe r
and substitutin g a word lik e "point" o r "purpose": th e question then i s what
point o r purpos e ther e is to huma n life .
It seems to be very tempting to feel, as a matter o f metaphysical exigency,
that i t mus t hav e som e pointtha t ther e mus t b e somethin g externa l t o it
that give s it a point . An d her e religiou s ideas ar e commonl y invoked: i t is
either th e existenc e of God that gives human lif e a point, or the fac t of some
more o r les s supernatura l previou s o r subsequen t life . Thes e extramorta l
entities ar e suppose d t o injec t a poin t int o ou r lif e tha t i t would otherwis e
wholly lack . No w the essentia l thing t o notice abou t thes e point-conferrin g
beings is that the y are themselve s instances of kind s of life , eithe r divin e or
supernatural i n som e othe r way. And th e ide a i s that the y are i n some way
"unmeant meaners" : they give point to our live s without themselves needin g
to have point conferre d upo n theirs . But now the flaw should b e apparent :
why should these lives be allowed to have meaning intrinsicall y while our lives
are required t o have meaning conferred extrinsicall y upon them ? If the lives
of some beings must carry meanin g withi n themselves, as God's i s suppose d
to, or th e selve s of th e afterlife , the n wh y can't ou r live s achieve that now?
Clearly it is no us e t o postulate furthe r lives a God fo r Go d o r a n afterlife
for ou r afterlifeo n pai n o f a n infinit e regress . S o i f ther e i s a genuin e
metaphysical proble m abou t wha t give s human lif e meaning , th e religiou s
answers d o no t solv e it; the y just pus h i t back a stage . The logica l positio n
here i s precisel y paralle l t o Wittgenstein' s argumen t agains t th e temptin g
AVER: OL D SCORE S 5 9
idea tha t linguisti c sign s ge t thei r meanin g fro m othe r (possibl y super -
natural) signs. As he saw, since this process has to terminate somewhere , why
not halt it at the first stage? The onl y legitimate sense in which supernatura l
lives could give natural live s a point is the trivia l sense in which the existenc e
of othe r morta l live s gives poin t t o m y life: bu t the n w e have that already .
There is no metaphysical problem o f the meanin g o f human lif e tha t coul d
be solve d b y multiplyin g lives , howeve r supernatura l thos e othe r live s
may be .
Once thi s logical poin t ha s been clearl y grasped, the onl y point tha t hu -
man lif e could have is to be found in what is internal to it. Ayer takes this view
too, bu t I thin k h e onl y partiall y locate s th e interna l fact s i n question . H e
tends, though he is not entirely consistent in the matter, to locate the value of
life in the kinds of fulfilment availabl e to a person leadin g the kin d of life h e
leadswhich bring s hi m t o deny , o r underestimate , th e valu e o f lif e fo r
people no t belongin g t o wha t h e call s a "privilege d minority. " "Th e vas t
majority of the human race, " he says, "in Asia, in Latin America, in Africa, in
the so-called underclasses of the mor e affluen t Wester n societies , are fa r too
fully occupie d i n waging a losing struggle t o achieve a tolerable standar d o f
living fo r i t to be rationa l fo r the m t o wish their miserie s prolonged." An d
presumably, for muc h the sam e reasons, he would deny value to the lives of
animals, o n accoun t o f th e povert y o f their lif e projects .
Now it is not tha t I dispute th e miserie s and limitation s in question, but I
suggest tha t Ayer' s inferenc e fro m the m betray s a lopside d conceptio n o f
what makes life worthwhile. In a word, he ignores, o r downplays, the impor-
tance o f wha t migh t b e calle d "basi c experiences" : enjoyin g a coo l drink ,
hearing a friend' s voice , eve n takin g a shit . Thes e experience s constitut e
what lif e mos t primitivel y isfor Oxfor d dons , Amazonia n bushmen, chil-
dren, dog s and snakesan d i t stays that way even when your nove l doesn't
get published o r your favorite team loses the World Cup . And doesn't every-
one a t som e tim e feel , especially when thei r lif e ha s bee n threatened , tha t
these basi c experiences ar e infinitel y precious , tha t i t wil l b e a terrible da y
when yo u ca n fee l the m n o more ? Th e fil m Robocop, abou t a ma n wh o
survives comprehensive violence by being made mainly robot, i s precisely an
exploration of this theme: th e metallic man longs for the days when ordinary
experiences were available to him; he wants his "lower nature" back, because
without it life is hollow. What we need, I think, is a kind of two-layer theory
of th e valu e of life : o n to p w e have th e project s an d satisfaction s we think
mostly about ; beneat h that , th e foundatio n o f biologica l consciousnes s we
tend t o take for granted. Fo r a man not averse to the offerings of the senses,
it i s surprisin g tha t Aye r neglect s thi s latte r sourc e o f value . Was ther e a
repressed asceti c lurking beneath th e frankl y sybariti c exterior ?
The boo k ends with two pieces recounting hi s experience o f four minute s
of heart failure , caused b y a piece of smoked salmo n goin g down th e wron g
way. I t seem s tha t durin g thes e fou r minute s h e ha d a n experienc e a s of
being confronted b y an exceedingl y bright re d ligh t which he was somehow
60 PHILOSOPHICAL LIVES
65
66 M I N D
For, in view of the non sequitu r just identified , he now has no argument fo r
that thesis : any old standby property o f current physic s might do the job, s o
long a s i t i s no t a programmin g property . Th e Gode l argumen t b y itself
cannot motivate the search fo r a new physics, since it has no implications for
the power s o f currentl y recognize d physica l properties t o confe r under -
standing o n a system.
It might be retorted that Penrose has a way around this criticism, which is
at leas t implici t in hi s discussion . H e migh t sa y that everythin g i n curren t
physics i s itself computabl e an d henc e ca n b e simulate d o n a Turin g ma -
chine; so any physical property tha t is now ascribed to machines or brains can
be represented a s an algorithmi c property . An d i f that i s so, then w e can just
repeat th e Godel argument wit h respect to that simulating algorithm: it, too,
will necessaril y fail t o yield mathematical truth.
This countermov e is, however, irrelevan t t o th e poin t a t issue . I t migh t
have been relevant , if the claim had bee n tha t mathematica l understandin g
actually consists in the algorithmi c simulation that i s alleged t o hold fo r th e
physical propertie s o f th e system ; then w e might hav e bee n abl e t o appl y
the Godel argumen t t o show that mathematical truth mus t reach beyon d th e
capacities of this simulating algorithm. Bu t that was not th e claim; the claim
was tha t th e physica l property itsel f is what confers understandin g o n th e
device in question . W e shoul d no t confus e a physica l system with its corre-
sponding Turin g simulation : th e colo r o f a n object , say , i s no t th e same
property a s the interna l stat e of som e compute r tha t simulates the color s of
things, say with zeros and ones . Only a kind of bizarre pancomputationalism
could blu r thi s distinction. Bu t w e must always distinguis h clearl y between
following a program an d being simulable by a program. My computer run s a
word-processing progra m specified in its software; it may or may not be suc h
that it s myriad hardwar e propertie s ca n be simulated by some furthe r pro -
gram, sa y one tha t simulate s its behavior whe n droppe d fro m a bridge . I
cannot ri d mysel f of the impressio n tha t Penros e ha s tacitly conflated thes e
two relations t o an algorithm , which is what enables hi m t o jump from th e
Godelian limits of programs to what the physical world itself can bring about.
He mus t someho w b e thinkin g o f th e ordinar y physica l world a s itsel f a
formal syste m that i s bounded b y the Gode l result . But , of course , i t is n o
such thing .
The notio n of simulation can be mischievous in this regard. If I simulate
the weathe r o n a computer , I d o not , o f course , creat e a syste m in which
winds howl and rai n falls; rather, I create forma l analogues of those physical
phenomena. T o clai m tha t th e win d blow s things ove r i n virtu e o f distur -
bances of air molecules is, therefore, no t to claim that the simulation of thes e
disturbances i s wha t blow s things over . I n th e sam e way , to clai m tha t i t
is the neural structure of the brain that produces consciousness is not to claim
that a forma l simulatio n o f tha t neura l structur e i s wha t produce s it .
The reaso n fo r thi s is just tha t simulatio n i s merely isomorphis m i n a spe -
cific respect ; i t i s no t tota l duplicatio n o f th e syste m simulated . S o fro m
70 M I N D
the fac t tha t brai n processe s hav e algorithmi c simulation s we cannot infe r
that the y hav e n o productiv e power s beyond thos e o f th e simulatin g algo-
rithm.
Accordingly there is no way out for Penrose, alon g these lines, in spanning
the logica l gap I hav e alleged. Besides , a simulation of th e physica l basis of
mathematical understanding could hardly play the role of a formal system as
that occurs in Godel's proof, since it will not consist (like, say, Peano's axioms)
of a set of axiom s and rule s o f inferenc e concerning arithmetic. In addition ,
the Penros e argumen t require s tha t th e algorithm use d b e knowably sound
and b e employed as a proof procedur e for mathematica l truth; an d thi s will
not be true of a putative algorithm that merely simulates the physical proper-
ties o f th e syste m we are considering . Th e upsho t i s that, whil e the Gode l
argument migh t disprove computationalism, it is made o f the wrong stuff t o
disprove orthodo x materialism . Such materialis m has it s own problems , o f
course; my point is just tha t Penrose i s overreaching in deploying th e Gode l
result agains t it. H e ha s thu s no t shown that consciousnes s requires a ne w
physics.
There is a less technical worry about the first half of the book. As Penrose
is well aware, mathematical understanding is not th e onl y kind of conscious-
ness ther e is ; there ar e als o sensations , emotions, perceptions , thought s o f
many kinds . Ye t hi s argumen t applie s onl y t o th e mathematica l case ; h e
offers n o argument agains t computationalism for those other areas . It is not
that h e thinks computationalism is true for nonmathematica l consciousness;
but nothin g h e say s count s agains t it s being true . Thi s i s surely ver y odd :
should no t th e underlyin g failur e o f th e computationa l approac h t o con -
sciousness appl y quit e generall y an d no t merel y t o thi s on e specifi c (an d
peculiar) area? Penrose cannot , by invoking the Godel result , have got to the
root of what makes the mind generall y insusceptible to computational treat -
ment. I t i s the propert y o f consciousnes s that i s the nemesi s o f computa -
tionalism, bu t tha t propert y crop s u p al l over th e place , no t just i n mathe -
matical reasoning .
Further, I thin k Penros e underestimate s th e difficult y fo r hi s approac h
occasioned b y the phenomenon o f subconscious mathematical reasoning. H e
assumes that consciousness and mathematical understanding are inseparably
connected, s o that result s concerning th e latte r necessaril y bear o n th e for -
mer. But , a s i s well known , mathematicians ofte n achiev e thei r result s b y
means o f subconsciou s mentation , an d thi s mus t involv e a recognitio n o f
genuine mathematical truthwhich the Godel argument show s must exceed
computational resources. Thus nonalgorithmic mathematical understandin g
can procee d withou t benefi t o f consciousness , which suggests tha t i t i s no t
consciousness itself that is responsible for the failur e of the f ormalistic recon-
struction o f mathematica l understanding . On e suspect s that , eve n fo r hi s
chosen bes t case, Penrose ha s not pu t hi s finge r o n wh y it is that conscious -
ness per s e poses a special problem fo r artificial intelligence. Couple this with
the fac t tha t h e offer s n o positiv e suggestion s concernin g what i t i s about
PENROSE: PAS T COMPUTATIO N 7 1
74
HUMPHREY: GETTIN G TH E WIGGL E INT O TH E AC T 7 5
80
CHURCHLAND: A PROBLE M IGNORE D 8 1
at different levels of abstraction; and at the more abstract level talk of prepo-
sitional machiner y come s int o theoretica l focus . I t i s th e existenc e o f thi s
more abstrac t levelth e "software " levelthat secure s a certain autonom y
for th e science s of min d wit h respect t o neurobiology. Thi s is, roughly, th e
Standard View .
But there i s another, mor e radical view, namely Eliminative Materialism,
which urge s tha t invisibilit y i n th e hardwar e i s a sig n o f outrigh t nonexis -
tence. W e strain ou r eye s seeking for th e brain' s propositions onl y because
we ar e shackle d b y obsolet e prescientifi c conception s o f wha t th e min d is .
Folk psychology , a theory o f the min d develope d befor e peopl e kne w what
science was all about, has created theoretica l figments that we are tempted t o
hypostatize into scientifically real structures and processes . A long hard loo k
at th e biologica l brai n shoul d serv e t o disabus e u s o f ou r ancien t folk -
psychological superstitions, and ope n the way for a genuine scienc e of what
goes o n i n ou r heads . Thi s is , roughly , th e vie w hel d b y Patrici a Smit h
Churchland (an d other s o f her persuasion) . Their mott o migh t b e crudely
put: i f you can't fin d i t in neuroscience, that's because it isn't there.
N'europhilosophy i s a five-hundred-pag e dithyram b t o th e brai n sciences .
Churchland's mission is to convince philosophers an d psychologist s that de -
tailed knowledg e o f th e biologica l working s of th e nervou s syste m i s th e
answer to their problems. Instead o f theoretical autonomy, they should seek
integration, reductionor, failing that, elimination. Psychology, philosophi-
cal or scientific , shoul d thus be prosecuted a s a branch o f neurobiology. Sh e
conducts her crusade with impressive zeal; tremendous energ y has gone into
the campaign, and there is something awesome about her conviction. But the
excesses o f evangelis m obtrude disturbingly : mesmeric repetitiveness, hec-
toring th e audience , rhetori c masqueradin g a s argument , blindnes s (o r
blind-sightedness!) t o th e opposit e poin t o f view . O f thi s sales-resistant
reader, a t least, she has not mad e a convert to the faith . The sparklin g new
discipline of "neurophilosophy" does not liv e up t o its advertising. It fail s t o
vanquish th e competitio n fro m mor e traditiona l approaches .
The boo k ha s thre e parts . Par t 1 , the lengthiest , offer s a fairl y potte d
survey of the histor y and curren t stat e of neurophysiology. We learn abou t
the behavio r o f individua l neurons, abou t th e functiona l architectur e o f
grosser structures , about the various techniques that have been develope d t o
figure ou t wha t is going o n dee p insid e th e brain . Naturally , this i s all fas-
cinating stuffespecially , perhaps , th e impressiv e progress tha t ha s bee n
made i n understanding th e precis e natur e of the nerv e impulse. As far a s I
can judge, Churchlan d doe s a competent jo b of presentin g thi s material
though I suspect that many philosophical readers wil l find the details a bit too
technical fo r thei r taste . On e wonders , however , quit e wha t th e poin t o f
reproducing thi s material is, since it can be readil y foun d i n standar d text -
books of neurophysiology. And there is no real attempt to locate the scientifi c
facts in a philosophical context . It serve s t o demonstrate Churchland's cre -
dentials as a philosopher o f neuroscience who has done her homework , but
82 M I N D
raison d'etre, since logic is the means by which people's prepositiona l reason-
ing gets evaluated: if there is no such thing as prepositional reasoning, logi c
loses its point an d purpose . No r i s it clear tha t anythin g recognizable a s ar t
could surviv e the repudiatio n o f the categorie s o f folk psychology : for how,
without thes e categories , coul d w e characterize th e artist' s intention ? Cer -
tainly the major (and minor ) works of literature woul d not have existed ha d
their authors bee n persuade d o f the truth o f eliminative materialism. How ,
too, ar e w e t o apportio n blam e an d responsibilit y withou t th e notion s o f
motive and intention? And what would ordinary huma n relationship s be like
if we could onl y talk brain physiology ? It sound s lik e a very dystopian pros -
pect indeed. (Thi s is not t o say that scientific psychology must slavishly follo w
the contours of folk psychology ; it is only to insist upon th e value and utility
of th e latte r a s an autonomou s mod e o f perso n understanding. )
Churchland is on much firmer ground i n part 3, unfortunately much th e
shortest sectio n o f th e book . Her e sh e expounds a theor y o f sensorimoto r
coordination develope d b y Pellionisz and Llina s know n a s "tensor networ k
theory." The basi c idea is that perception an d action might be coordinated i n
the brain by means of metrically deformed mappin g relations between bank s
of neurons. This theory is philosophically interesting because it characterizes
the underlyin g neura l machiner y i n nonsentential terms . I t is presented i n
some detail, but Churchlan d doe s littl e to put i t into theoretical contex t an d
derive appropriate genera l conclusions . She does not see that it is compatible
with propositiona l psychology , even whe n generalize d t o highe r cognitiv e
processes, a s a glanc e a t th e relevan t philosophica l literatur e woul d hav e
made clea r (w e just need th e ide a o f propositions indexing underlying non -
propositional structures) . Neither doe s sh e relate th e tensor networ k theory
to other theorie s i n psychology of th e sam e genera l shapenotabl y menta l
model theor y and th e analo g theor y o f mental imagery . These ar e area s in
which th e synopti c vision of a philosophe r migh t hav e been expected , bu t
Churchland's vision is too tunneled o n to the detail s of the neurophysiolog y
to suppl y this kind o f perspective .
A disturbingl y antiphilosophical vei n run s throughou t th e book ; begin -
ning with its very first sentence: "I n th e mid-seventie s I discovered tha t m y
patience with most mainstream philosophy had ru n out. " I t would be widely
agreed, I think , tha t th e perio d i n questio n wa s an exceptionall y ric h on e
philosophically: Davidson, Kripke, and Putnam, to choose just three philoso-
phers, were doing important wor k around tha t time, much of it centering on
the mind-bod y problem . Churchland , however , wa s impatien t wit h it . I t
emerges late r tha t sh e is impatient wit h philosophical metho d i n general
she sees nothing coherent o r valuable in the kind of conceptual investigatio n
typically undertake n b y philosophers , pas t an d present . (Th e presen t re -
viewer is mockingly berated fo r believin g that i t is possible to do interestin g
philosophy o f min d i n thi s traditiona l way. ) She thu s consign s mos t o f th e
best wor k i n philosoph y o f min d thi s centur y (an d earlier ) t o th e rubbis h
heap. N o remotely convincin g justification is given fo r thi s hubristic dismis-
84 M I N D
siveness, and on e can only assume that she has succumbed to a severe case of
scientism. Churchlan d is , of course , quit e withi n her right s t o fin d scienc e
more interesting than philosophyin which case she should hav e become a
scientist. But i t seems t o me deplorabl e t o convert thi s personal preferenc e
into a wholesale condemnation o f philosoph y as a serious subject. There is
really no need t o downgrade philosoph y in order to proclaim the importanc e
of neuroscience . I n fact , I thin k he r attitud e t o philosoph y i n thi s book i s
simply absurd .
It migh t have been differen t i f she had succeede d i n showing how som e
standard philosophica l problems could be solved by means of neuroscience ;
but nothin g of the kin d is shown in the course of this very long book. So far,
then, "neurophilosophy" is the nam e o f a nonexistent subject, at least if it is
intended t o offer a new approach t o the ol d problem s o f philosophy. As it
stands, i t amounts rather t o a proposal t o ignore mos t o f the problem s tha t
have occupied philosophers . Like the old discredited positivists , Churchland
will have none but empirical questions; but unlike them, she has no colorabl e
philosophical motivation fo r this parochial view. It is certainly no defense o f
her neuroscientis m to cite Quine as having "shown" that there is no analytic-
synthetic distinction. Nor doe s it cut any ice to go on as if traditional philoso -
phers are constitutionally "antiscientific." It really shouldn't need sayin g that
both philosoph y an d scienc e ar e perfectl y respectable enterprises , eac h i n
their ow n distinctive way: but apparentl y it does.
This book is clearly intended t o appeal both to philosophers and to neuro -
scientists (as well as to psychologists), but there is a real question whether it is
necessary at all. The grea t bulk of the materia l covered i s readily available in
standard work s of neurophysiology and philosophy ; putting it between th e
same pai r o f cover s seems no t t o be a very great advantage . An d Church -
land's own contribution t o the issues could have been condensed int o a much
shorter book . A s i t is , the boo k contrive s t o b e bot h lon g an d superficial .
There are, t o be sure, some worthwhile ideas in it, but they are swamped by
irrelevant technical detail an d b y the fervi d excesses o f th e proselytizer .
12
Marcel and Bisiach :
The Languag e o f Awareness
Consciousness in Contemporary Science
edited b y A. J . Marcel an d E . Bisiach
Clarendon Press , 199 2
Reprinted wit h permissio n fro m th e Times Literary Supplement (Apri l 14-20 , 1989) .
85
86 M I N D
ter authors produce paper s in which one detects a lurking agenda behind th e
inevitable caveat s and retreats . The y clearly distrus t th e ide a o f conscious -
ness, fearin g i t will temp t u s int o ba d science , bu t the y canno t brin g them -
selves simply to forswear it, as the old-styl e behaviorists did. Allport bring s a
somewhat chaotic positivis m to bear o n th e proble m o f defining conscious -
ness, smothering som e of his more interestin g point s in bad ol d philosophy.
Churchland issue s dar k warning s abou t clingin g to o fondl y t o fol k psy -
chology; she has a dream in which consciousness has gone th e wa y of calori c
fluid or vita l spirits (i.e., there i s no such thing). I don't know whether Den -
nett thinks his eliminativist nibbles at the taste of soup remov e al l the myste -
ries from consciousness, but it does not seem to me that we need t o believe in
"qualia" in hi s sense (a s ineffable, private , intrinsic , self-proclaiming) in or -
der t o believe in the essentia l subjectivity of consciousness. Wilkes hints (he r
word) tha t ou r term s "mind " and "consciousness " lea d u s into harmfu l re -
ifications, an d tha t a loo k a t othe r language s (Greek , Chinese , Croatian )
should stop us worrying about the phenomena seemingl y referred to . Here I
cannot bette r he r ow n word s upo n concludin g thi s linguisti c survey : i t
"proves nothing." I f this is the best that can be said for eliminating conscious-
ness from respectable society , then I think I will hang on to mine for the time
being.
Among th e othe r contributors , som e embrac e consciousnes s an d se e no
special scientifi c proble m i n doin g s o (Marcel Kinsbourne, Phili p Johnson -
Laird), whil e other s accep t i t a s a difficul t challeng e t o natura l scienc e
(Anthony Marcel, Tim Shallice , Richard Gregory , Robert van Gulick). Kins-
bourne think s it is enough t o say that consciousnes s is an "interactive" prop-
erty o f group s o f neurons , n o mor e mysteriou s i n principl e tha n macro -
properties o f matter. Johnson-Lair d finds the secre t of consciousness in th e
hierarchical parallel processing of computers. Sceptic s will wonder whethe r
their confidence is misplaced: is it really that easy to see how a physical system
could be conscious? Van Gulic k has a useful discussion of subjective experi-
ence and intentionality, effectively criticizin g Searle, and makin g some inter -
esting (thoug h sketchy) suggestions of hi s own tha t lin k consciousnes s with
the degre e t o which a system understands it s own internal representations .
I ma y have seemed somewha t negative in my assessment o f these contri -
butions. It is true tha t a number o f the papers ar e routine , ground-grazing ,
confused. The y sometime s seem t o have been compose d t o mee t a confer -
ence deadlin e rathe r tha n becaus e the autho r ha d anythin g origina l t o say.
But th e boo k is worth reading a s a survey of how science and consciousnes s
now stand to each other. N o consensus emerges. An d it brings out the intrac-
tability of th e proble m o f consciousness , how difficul t i t is to sa y somethin g
illuminating on it .
13
Nagel: Th e Vie w from Nowher e
The View from Nowhere
by Thomas Nage l
Oxford Universit y Press, 198 6
88
NAGEL: TH E VIE W FRO M NOWHER E 8 9
the world and cannot satisfactorily integrate them into a coherent conceptio n
of things . Becaus e o f thi s spli t philosopher s ar e pron e t o accor d undu e
dominance eithe r t o th e subjectiv e or t o th e objective , thu s producin g a
distorted pictur e of reality; the proper course i s to acknowledge both stand -
points and tr y to live with the intellectua l discomfort. "Absurdity comes with
the territory , an d wha t we need i s the wil l to put u p wit h it" (p. 11) . I think
Nagel is remarkably successful i n bringing this general structur e t o bear on a
variety of seemingl y disparate problems , and th e benefit s of reciprocal illu -
mination ar e considerable . Wh o woul d hav e though t tha t th e mind-bod y
problem, scepticis m and th e meanin g of lif e migh t al l exhibit th e sam e ab -
stract form !
The topic s treate d fal l naturall y int o thre e groupsmind , knowledge ,
valueand f shal l discuss Nagel's views on thes e i n turn , concentratin g o n
the first group, wher e m y disagreements ar e mos t substantial.
Mind
does not need i t for his claim about person s and thei r brains, and it flies in the
face o f hi s own antireductionism. 1
In chapte r 4 Nagel invites the reader to be startled abou t wh o he is. How
could it be that / a m CM, that "small and concrete and specific" (p . 61) particu-
lar person? By what metaphysical miracle could th e centerless world of indi-
vidual person s com e t o contai n me! The connexio n betwee n m e an d C M
must strike me as deeply "accidental." I have to confess right away that I have
never reele d a t the thought tha t I am CM, so I bring n o antecedent intuitiv e
perplexity with me t o Nagel's discussion. And eve n after studyin g it with as
open a mind a s I can muster I stil l do no t fee l the forc e o f the problema t
least not a s Nagel elucidates it. My own identity with CM still strikes me a s a
rather boring fact . 1 can, of course, imagine circumstances in which it would
not be boring: I might have amnesia and live in a hospital where trick mirrors
prevent m e from recognizing which reflection is mine; it might then com e as
a considerable surprise that the person I have learned t o call CM on the basis
of hi s reflection is in fac t me . Bu t Nagel' s claim is not tha t suc h a n identity
judgment could b e startling ; i t i s that i t is (metaphysically) startling , eve n
when al l th e fact s ar e in . S o w e mus t no t le t th e though t o f suc h specia l
circumstances cree p int o ou r assessmen t o f th e surpris e valu e o f suc h
judgments. Th e proble m i s said t o b e analogou s t o th e proble m o f ho w a
particular time can be now (he says nothing about the judgment tha t Oxfor d
is here, and I don' t kno w whethe r h e think s thi s raise s th e sam e kin d o f
question).
Casting around fo r a suitable perplexity to associate with "I am CM," one
naturally turns to Cartesian intuitions: it is remarkable tha t I, this conscious-
ness, shoul d be a particula r spatiotempora l physica l organism. Thi s at leas t
gives us a sens e i n which it might see m tha t I a m "accidentally " linked t o a
particular public person. A Cartesian will certainly profess incredulity at th e
suggestion tha t he can satisf y bot h menta l and physica l predicates. Bu t thi s is
not Nagel' s point: h e i s not merel y approachin g hi s earlier concern s fro m a
fresh direction . I can also agree tha t there i s something vertiginous about th e
recognition tha t I am fo r others n o more tha n the y are fo r me : all this vivid
pressing consciousnes s reduced i n thei r eye s t o a mer e behavin g physica l
organism, a s if my consciousnes s shrinks when conceived fro m a n objectiv e
standpoint. Bu t thi s feelin g seem s t o b e a reflectio n o f th e asymmetr y be-
tween first person an d third person acces s to a mental life: I subjectively seem
to mysel f t o b e th e hu b o f th e univers e becaus e o f th e shortnes s o f th e
epistemic distanc e betwee n m e an d myself . But agai n thi s i s no t Nagel' s
point. Wha t h e find s remarkabl e i s the fac t tha t m y "objectiv e self appre -
hends th e worl d throug h th e subjectiv e viewpoint of CM . That is to say, "I"
refers t o me under the mode o f presentation "beare r of an objective concep -
tion," whil e "CM" refer s t o m e unde r th e mod e o f presentatio n "creatur e
1
1 am indebte d her e t o discussion with Anit a Avramidcs.
94 M I N D
with this specific subjectiv e point of view." What is held t o be surprising then
is the thought that Ione thingcan represent th e world in these two ways.
No doubt m y capacity for bot h sort s of representation i s remarkable an d i n
need of philosophical account, but I can see no intuitive force in the idea that
this thought i s what "I a m CM " naturally evokes. Sinc e this diagnosis is no t
offered a s an accoun t of the meaning of "I am CM," it is hard t o disagree with
Nagel about whether he has interpreted th e statement correctly: all I can say
is that it seems to me overly contrived to suggest that the identity judgment is
naturally or spontaneously associated with the kind of thought Nagel pins on
it. The Cartesia n thought seem s t o m e much mor e naturall y expressible i n
this way . Indeed Nagel' s own earlie r formulatio n o f th e problemho w a
centerless world can contain "the poin t of view from which I observe and ac t
on th e world " (p . 56)seems closer t o the Cartesia n though t tha n hi s own
preferred diagnosi s is. I therefor e remai n puzzle d a t Nagel' s puzzlement.
But perhaps I have lived with myself for too long to still be amazed at whom I
am.
Nagel's use of the notion of an objective self calls for comment. He is apt t o
speak o f i t a s another self, numericall y distinct from th e subjectiv e self, bu t
coexisting with it. The questio n the n i s how to bring harmony to the uneas y
relations between thes e two competing selves . Bu t in his more cautiou s mo -
ments h e repudiate s thi s suggestion : he prefer s t o spea k o f ou r objectiv e
capacity, thoug h h e stil l says that "the objectiv e self functions independently
enough t o hav e a lif e o f it s own" (pp . 65-66). What is not clea r i s whether
Nagel relies essentially upon th e incautious formulation, at least rhetorically,
in his treatment of problems: coul d he reformulate his theses without loss in
terms of the sober literal interpretation of the phrase? I think he needs to say
more about ho w exactly he conceive s the ontologica l status of the objectiv e
self. He tends to waver between the dramatic idea of a conflict between selves
and th e more prosaic idea of a conflict between ways of thinking possessed by
the sam e self. Ho w muc h mileag e does h e ge t out o f thi s wavering?
Knowledge
thus brings with it the threa t o f scepticism. Scepticism is, indeed, a sane an d
sensible reactio n t o our actua l predicament i n the world .
I find myself in considerable sympath y with these views . Nagel provides a
powerful correctiv e t o certai n idealis t trend s i n contemporar y philosophy ,
Kantian, Wittgensteinian , Davidsonian . H e make s som e goo d criticism s of
current attempts to foil the sceptic by invoking causal theories o f meaning (in
particular, Putnam): these theories suspiciousl y resemble earlier verification -
ist attempt s t o sto p th e scepti c i n hi s tracks ; the y fai l t o demonstrat e th e
unavailability t o the envatte d brai n o f th e genera l concep t o f independen t
existence i n spac e an d time ; suc h semanti c theorie s ar e actuall y refute d by
scepticism, rathe r tha n refutin g it . These point s ar e wel l taken , bu t Nage l
does no t attemp t t o sho w what is wrong wit h these semanti c theories inde -
pendently o f thei r relevanc e t o scepticism ; an d unles s thi s is done propo -
nents of such theories wil l regard Nagel's position a s mere assertio n (indee d
there are a number of places in the book where this charge ma y be expected).
But chapters 5 and 6 come like a breath o f fresh air across the somewhat arid
wastes o f contemporar y epistemology .
I do , however , hav e a coupl e o f relativel y minor misgiving s about thes e
two chapters. The firs t i s that the sanit y of scepticism is apt t o seem less solid
when w e inquire what its logical consequences ar e fo r th e trut h o f our ordi -
nary epistemi c claims . I t seem s fin e t o sa y that w e ca n neve r ge t outsid e
ourselves t o certif y tha t ho w thing s see m t o u s i s how the y reall y are , bu t
acute discomfort sets in when we are told tha t non e o f us knows anything or
has any justified beliefsthat i t is simply false t o say (e.g.) that I know that I
am typin g a review. Nagel does, i t is true, sa y that th e sceptica l standpoint i s
not one that we can happily integrate with our ordinary confiden t beliefs: but
he does no t reall y confront th e question whethe r realist-inspire d scepticis m
contradicts our ordinary epistemic assertions; he tends t o describe the conflic t
in psychologica l (not logical ) terms. Recen t discussion s about th e closur e o f
knowledge under known logical implication are relevant to this question, but
Nagel says nothing abou t suc h attempts t o protect commonsens e knowledg e
claims fro m th e ravage s o f scepticism . His discussio n proceed s a t a rathe r
lofty an d genera l level ; I would have welcomed a bit more analytic detail o n
the consequence s o f scepticism . Technicality i s not alway s t o b e shunned .
Secondly, Nage l advocate s a significantl y rationalis t epistemology : h e
thinks ther e i s an indispensabl e an d nontrivia l a prior i componen t i n ou r
knowledge of the external world. His reason fo r this is that the huma n min d
is capable o f generatin g fro m withi n itself hypothese s abou t ho w th e worl d
might be : experience ca n select among these bu t i t cannot creat e them . (H e
compares hi s positio n her e wit h Chomsky and Popper. ) I t i s true tha t thi s
conception o f knowledge is contrary t o certain traditiona l brand s o f empiri -
cism, notabl y crude Baconia n inductivism ; but i t doe s no t follo w tha t th e
conception i s genuinely rationalist, that is, assigns a nontrivial role to a priori
knowledge. Nagel (like most philosophers) say s little about what he means by
"a priori," but a s a first shot we can say that a priori knowledg e is knowledge
96 M I N D
follow tha t thei r conten t als o doesthis relates rathe r t o what in the worl d
makes the thought true . I n othe r words , thoughts necessaril y have a subjec-
tive form but their truth-conditiona l conten t can yet be completely objective.
This distinction is not entirel y perspicuous , bu t I think I understand i t well
enough t o disagre e wit h it: indeed i t seems t o m e a n abnegatio n o f on e o f
Nagel's own main theses, which is importantly correct. For , i f the subjective
point o f vie w inevitably colors ou r thoughts , s o that the y alway s represen t
facts from our poin t of view, then after all we cannot really be said to possess a
view from nowhere. It i s as i f Nagel i s incorporating th e huma n perspectiv e
into ou r ostensibl y most objectiv e thoughts i n rathe r th e wa y our peculia r
perceptual perspectiv e enter s int o our perceptio n o f primar y qualities : th e
"form" of our experienc e i s admittedly subjective but what is perceived migh t
yet be entirely objective. It i s true enoug h tha t we need no t thin k about th e
point of view/row which we think, but so long as our poin t of view enters into
the way in whic h we represen t th e worl d i t wil l mak e tha t representatio n
subjective. I woul d sa y that ou r objectiv e thoughts, sa y in physics , contain
conceptual constituents that are wholly innocent of subjective invasions: they
represent th e world from no point of view, and s o the very same thoughts ar e
available t o creature s wh o d o no t shar e ou r poin t o f view . It is , of course ,
tautologically true that any thought ha d by a human bein g must be accessible
to huma n beings ; bu t i t doe s no t follo w tha t th e though t incorporate s th e
human perspective , eithe r i n for m o r content , fo r th e sam e concept s ar e
available to other perspectives too. In the relevant sense, the objective self has
no poin t o f view , s o its characteristic mod e o f thinkin g is untainted b y an y
point o f view . (Thi s i s no t t o sa y tha t Nage l i s wron g t o scotc h th e no n
sequitur fro m for m t o content: i t certainly does no t follo w fro m th e subjec -
tivity of our wa y of representing somethin g that that thing itself is subjective,
or els e we could neve r perceiv e what is objectively there. )
Value
The secon d hal f o f The View from Nowhere explore s th e tensio n betwee n
objective and subjectiv e standpoints i n relation t o intentional action, motiva-
tion, an d ethics . Parallel s with the earlie r discussion s are dul y noted. Thu s
the subjectiv e perspective o f th e autonomou s agen t i s brought fac e to fac e
with an objectiv e account of the causa l antecedents o f action: free wil l is the
main casualty in this collision. From th e objectiv e point of view it is not eve n
clear wha t freedom woul d be; yet we seem unable t o shed th e convictio n of
freedom i n our engage d doings . We seek to enlarge ou r freedo m by taking a
more objectiv e view of the determinant s o f our actions , but a t the limi t this
search undermines itsel f and freedo m seem s to evaporate. Nagel's presenta-
tion of incompatibilism is vivid and compelling ; attempts (lik e Strawson's) to
save fre e wil l simpl y fai l t o address themselve s to the rea l problem . Bu t th e
whole issu e i s s o difficul t an d perplexin g tha t on e canno t bu t agre e wit h
98 M I N D
the objectiv e self s impersonal moralit y is itself a form o f "sel f sacrifice. " S o
the imperiou s claim s of moralit y need no t b e looked upo n a s completely un -
natural.
The boo k ends , appropriatel y enough , wit h a chapter o n "Birth , Death ,
and th e Meanin g o f Life. " I n thi s chapte r Nage l dwell s upo n th e awfu l
contingency of his birth, the insignificanc e of his life, and th e outright evi l of
his death. Again, it is the objective sel f that is responsible for producing these
disturbing feelings. Anyone incline d t o be unperturbed b y such reflections
should read this chapter (o r perhaps shoul d not) . While not at all wishing to
dissent from Nagel's bleak conclusions, I think there i s a respect in which our
objective insignificance can be quite soothing: it can make us more reconcile d
to ou r man y misfortunes , persona l a s wel l a s universal . I t i s consoling t o
reflect tha t fro m a cosmic standpoint non e of it really matters all that much ,
even ou r ow n death . I t i s something o f a relie f t o recal l tha t al l those to o
human problem s don' t objectivel y count for much . Imagin e bein g a chil d
again when all your worries and disappointment s too k on the dimensions of
the universebette r t o b e abl e t o detac h yoursel f fro m you r project s an d
passions once i n a while. Too muc h meanin g i n lif e ca n be a burden; insig -
nificance ca n lighte n th e heart . W e nee d no t worr y tha t ou r desire s an d
ambitions will crumble under the objective gaze: they are resilient enough t o
take care o f themselves. Objectivit y make s us aware of the absurdit y o f ou r
mortal plight , bu t i t als o enable s u s t o fin d som e consolin g iron y i n thi s
absurdity.
14
Chalmers: Wis e Incomprehension
The Conscious Mind
by Davi d Chalmer s
Oxford Universit y Press, 199 6
Reprinted with permission from th e Times Higher Education Supplement (Apri l 5, 1996).
100
CHALMERS: WIS E INCOMPREHENSIO N 10 1
like this at one point , correctly attributin g it to me. But he does no t se e how
serious ar e th e consequence s o f rejectin g it , sinc e i t seem s t o b e th e onl y
viable way to avoid the twi n problems o f epiphenomenalism and disembodi -
ment, while accepting tha t we cannot reduc e experienc e t o physical proper-
ties. It is not dogmatic materialis m tha t prompts insistenc e on strong super -
venience but the need to escape the two problems cited. Indeed, th e thesis of
opaque logica l supervenience i s not materialis t at all, if that mean s tha t th e
terms o f current o r foreseeabl e physic s are adequat e t o explain conscious -
ness. Th e vie w i s actuall y quit e compatibl e wit h theorie s tha t regar d th e
physical as itself just th e appearanc e o f some deeper currentl y unconceive d
realityor with idealism for that matter. Of course, the view assumes that we
do no t know th e concept s tha t ar e necessar y for a satisfyin g explanatio n o f
consciousness; what it does i s use this fact t o explain wh y it is that w e can b e
misled int o denying logical supervenience, with al l the problem s tha t ste m
from this .
It helps here not to be too wedded t o the old framework of "materialism "
versus "dualism. " Bot h notion s assum e tha t materialis m i s a usefu l well -
defined doctrine , bu t i t is not, sinc e the notio n o f the "material " i s entirely
theory-relative. We don't wan t to limi t ou r theoretica l concept s t o thos e o f
current physics , but i f we make the notio n mor e inclusive it comes to include
anything tha t migh t b e relevan t i n explainin g what happen s i n th e world .
There ar e reall y just a lot of propertie s tha t migh t b e identifie d an d use d
in explanation s o f consciousness . Perhap s becaus e h e stick s t o th e ol d
materialism-dualism dichotomy , Chalmer s find s i t har d t o imagin e ho w
there coul d b e concept s tha t transcen d thos e no w used i n physic s or com -
monsense psychology , and henc e find s th e ide a o f opaque logica l necessita-
tion difficul t t o accept . Th e firs t orde r o f busines s her e i s not t o declar e
materialism false , but t o question it s very significance .
The speculation s on informatio n an d panpsychis m are admitte d t o be a
bit on the wild side, but the problems go beyond mere incredibility . Not only
do w e se e n o evidenc e i n natur e o f th e experientia l propertie s allegedl y
associated wit h ever y causal process; i t is also not th e cas e that physic s finds
any need t o postulate such properties i n explaining the behavior of matter. If
all matte r ha s experientia l properties , shoul d no t thi s b e relevan t t o th e
correct scienc e o f matter ? Ye t ther e seem s n o ga p i n th e physic s of th e
inanimate that call s for th e ascriptio n of mental properties t o things. Thes e
alleged propertie s mak e no difference t o the way a rock fall s o r wate r flows
or an y other purel y physica l interaction. Th e onl y motivatio n fo r invokin g
them is in order to provide an explanatory account of consciousness; they are
idle otherwise . Subtrac t the m fro m tha t thermomete r an d yo u will no t ob -
serve any chang e i n it s behavior .
Chalmers's defense of a weak form of functionalism use s some intriguin g
thought experiments , bu t th e conclusio n tha t ther e i s a lawlike relation be -
tween functiona l propertie s an d consciousnes s is too wea k t o b e o f muc h
interest. We might equally claim that ther e is also a lawlike relation betwee n
104 M I N D
experiences and underlyin g neural states: if you keep these constant you will
always get, a s a matter o f law, the sam e experiences. N o asymmetry i s estab-
lished between the functional and th e neural if lawlike dependence i s all that
is asserted; s o it is wrong t o suppose that any interesting for m of functional-
ism has been established. All we have is a three-way lawlike relation betwee n
the mental , the neural, and th e functional.
The onl y way to avoi d bein g checkmate d b y consciousness is to assum e
you d o no t understan d it . Chalmers has done hi s level best t o understan d
consciousness, but th e result , despit e it s many merits, shows the wisdo m of
incomprehension.
15
McGinn: Ou t o f Body , Ou t o f Min d
Reprinted wit h permissio n fro m Lingua Franca: The Review of Academic Life
(November-December 1994) .
105
106 MIND
cause of knowledge. But let me observe that knowledge of our limit s is, after
all, on e sor t of knowledge, and quit e an interesting sort. Psychologist s study
perceptual and memor y limits: why can we not study the limits of theoretica l
reason? And whoever said that the human mind, at this transient evolution-
ary moment , has been s o constructed a s to be able to deliver th e answe r t o
any question about that vas t intricate worl d we live in? I t is amazing that we
know as much as we do, but we should be wary of epistemic greed. There is a
lot t o be sai d fo r specie s modesty.
16
Lycan e t al. : Imaginin g an Orgasm
Mind and Cognition: A Reader
edited b y William Lycan
Blackwell, 199 0
Acts of Meaning
by Jerome Brune r
Harvard, 199 0
112
LYCAN E T AL. : I M A G I N I N G A N ORGAS M 11 3
phers; indeed , the theory o f meaning might justly be regarded as the centra l
concern o f twentieth-centur y philosophy . Together , th e tw o concepts ar e
definitive o f wha t we ordinarily mea n b y "mind. " I t i s largely because psy -
chology is turning again to these constitutive marks of mentality that philoso-
phers have once more becom e intrigue d b y that science . They found littl e to
grip them while psychology perversely define d itself as the "science of behav-
ior," entirely eliminating the notion s of meaning and consciousnes s fro m its
purview. Put differently , now that scientifi c psycholog y is acknowledging its
continuity wit h commonsens e o r fol k psychology , i n whic h philosopher s
have maintaine d a stead y interest , psychologica l theorie s contai n concept s
that provok e difficul t philosophica l questions . Ther e i s no sham e fo r th e
scientists i n this : i t wa s misguide d t o defenestrat e th e min d jus t becaus e
the concepts that characterize it are philosophically rich and demanding. O n
the contrary , i t i s goo d t o se e on e o f th e mor e philistin e legacie s o f an -
tiphilosophical positivis m finally melting from th e scene .
I do not mean to imply that the notions of meaning and consciousness are
in good odor with all philosophers of psychology: the y are certainly not. Bu t
the philosophica l issues that surroun d thes e notion s are no w part of what a
reflective psychologis t needs t o be sensitiv e to: the y can n o longer b e left t o
those reactionary old philosophers. For these issues determine th e shape and
content o f empirica l theories . A centra l questio n her e i s whether theorie s
that make serious use of these notions can be properly "scientific"whether ,
that is, their employment calls for a distinctive methodology. Specifically, can
the study of meaning and consciousness conform to the theoretical paradig m
set by th e natura l physica l sciences? The physica l sciences deal wit h quit e
different sort s of phenomenon, at least on the face of it: does this mean that a
psychology s o conceive d canno t tak e th e for m assume d b y physica l
theorieswith thei r laws , causes, mechanisms? What happen s t o th e struc -
ture o f psychologica l theories, an d th e empirica l procedure s tha t lea d t o
them, whe n yo u mak e psycholog y go consciousl y semantical ? How doe s a
psychology of belief and desir e compar e t o a physics of gravit y and electri c
charge?
There ar e basicall y three school s o f though t o n thi s issue , wit h muc h
variation within them. One school, which we may call the nomothetic realists,
holds tha t (ideal ) psycholog y consist s o f a n explanator y se t o f content -
involving causal laws: psychology is just one mor e specia l science, but on e i n
which intentional properties ar e the domain of interest, as factual and nomi c
as geology or biology. General statement s like "If an agent desires that/) and
believes that makin g it the cas e that q is a good wa y to bring i t about tha t p,
then that agent will, ceteris paribus, bring it about that q" are thus comparabl e
in status to causal laws like "Free-falling bodies accelerate to earth a t a rate of
thirty-two feet per secon d squared. "
This i s the schoo l of which Fodor i s the mos t forthrigh t an d formidabl e
member: o n his view, psychological attributions are made tru e b y real inter -
nal sententially structured state s of the subjec t that stan d in certain kind s of
114 MIND
touch too interesting. On the one hand, there are those who insist, startlingly
enough, that , appearance s notwithstanding , state s of consciousnes s reduc e
without residue t o neural state s or physical causal roles of such states. On th e
other hand , ther e ar e thos e wh o stoutl y declar e i t a s self-eviden t that n o
amount of physical information about the brain could ever imply the posses-
sion o f a state o f consciousness , so that consciou s experienc e fall s radically
outside the domain of physical science. This dispute has recently centred o n
the questio n o f what one's own experiences teac h on e abou t consciousnes s
that coul d no t b e taugh t otherwise : Mind and Cognition contains a usefu l
section on this. Nagel and Jackson hold that there are real features of experi-
ence tha t onl y direct acquaintance wit h i t can reveal : thes e feature s canno t
then be comprised i n physical information about the experiencer, whic h can
be taught discursively. Nemirow and Lewis , on the other hand, contend tha t
undergoing a n experience confer s only an ability to imagine experiences; i t
does not reveal special nonphysical properties o f experience tha t are accessi-
ble only by acquaintance. The questio n dividing these disputant s is whethe r
what i s referre d t o b y on e sid e a s a n irreducibl e subjectiv e state ca n b e
exhaustively explaine d b y the othe r i n term s o f a n abilit y t o imagine . As a
student of mine remarked, th e latter thinkers hold, in effect, tha t the feelin g
of an orgasm i s equivalent to imagining an orgasman equation tha t she felt
(perceptively) no t t o be ver y plausible.
As t o th e plac e o f consciousnes s i n theoretica l psychology , it i s almost a
reflex amon g psychologist s to cry "Epiphenomenalism!" and reac h fo r Oc -
cam's razor. However, it is far fro m clea r that conscious events suffer causal
inertness i n an y sens e beyon d tha t tru e o f event s describe d i n an y o f th e
special sciencesbiology , geology , eve n chemistry . Fro m th e explanator y
universality of basic physics we cannot infe r that other modes of explanatio n
fail t o captur e causall y significant patterns i n nature : th e hierarchica l ar -
rangement o f the science s should no t b e confused wit h epiphenomenalis m
about al l but th e botto m layer . What is wanted her e is not a priori dismissal
but a seriou s investigatio n into th e propertie s an d processe s o f conscious -
ness: its developmental history, both phylo - and ontogenetic; its contribution
to ou r mode s o f cognitiv e processing ; th e natur e o f it s pathologie s (e.g. ,
blindsight). Psychologist s should she d thei r date d philosophica l hang-up s
about consciousness , a s i n fac t the y ar e no w beginnin g t o do , an d appl y
themselves t o carryin g ou t som e empirica l wor k o n wha t thei r forebear s
regarded a s taboo. I f nothin g empiricall y worthwhile turns up , that will b e
the tim e t o abjur e interes t i n th e topi c an d leav e it to th e philosopher s t o
puzzle over .
A questio n seldo m raise d i n thes e discussion s is whether meanin g an d
consciousness are susceptibl e of deep investigation by human knowers . (Ad-
mittedly, I discuss it myself at some length in The Problem of Consciousness.) A
properly genera l naturalis m shoul d leav e ope n th e possibilit y that huma n
cognition i s not designe d i n suc h a way that w e can gai n an y rea l scientifi c
insight int o th e underlyin g working s of ou r ow n mind s (o r thos e o f othe r
LYCAN E T A I , . : I M A G I N I N G A N O R G A S M 117
animals). Certainly, it is painfully plai n that we have not achieved in this area
anything lik e th e theoretica l dept h w e have attained i n understandin g th e
physical world : there appear s t o be a systematic elusiveness about th e ulti -
mate scienc e o f menta l phenomena . Despit e ou r fairl y advance d under -
standing of brain function , fo r example, we seem n o neare r than Descarte s
was to explaining how conscious state s result from neura l excitations . As an
ancillary investigation t o the science of meaning and consciousness, then , we
should als o try t o develop a higher-order scienc e of our capacit y to under -
stand thes e phenomena a scienc e of ou r abilit y to arriv e a t psychological
knowledge. I t ma y be th e case , not tha t meanin g an d consciousnes s are i n
themselves suspect or mythical since our scienc e cannot plumb their depths ,
but rather that our science , as a natural produc t o f human cognitiv e capaci-
ties, has the wron g kind o f structure t o take in all that th e worl d objectively
contains. Transcenden t nomotheti c realis m ma y in th e en d b e the trut h o f
the matter . Th e philosophica l interest o f menta l notion s migh t thu s b e a n
artifact of the human inaccessibilit y of the ultimately correct menta l science.
Psychology might be philosophically boring after all , objectively speaking, if
only we could com e t o kno w its deep principles. Bu t give n th e limitin g pa-
rameters o f huma n cognition , i t is possible that th e scienc e of min d i s con-
demned t o perpetual philosophica l interest .
17
Fodor: Menta l Representations
Representations: Philosophical Essays on the
Foundations of Cognitive Science
by Jerry A . Fodo r
Harvester, 198 1
118
FODOR: MENTA L REPRESENTATION S 11 9
too crude a use of the idea that for both empiricists and nativis t experience is
needed t o "trigger" the acquisitio n of concepts. Fo r the nativist , experienc e
functions merel y to activate concepts that are already latently present i n the
intellect; bu t fo r th e empiricist , concept s ar e attaine d b y abstraction fro m
what i s sensorily given an d ar e no t presen t i n th e intellec t before suc h ab -
straction gets to work. Experience is, it is true, necessary under both theories ,
but it s "triggering" rol e i s conceived quite differently by them .
Fodor i s encourage d t o overloo k thi s obviou s poin t b y a tendenc y t o
conflate th e idea o f innatel y determined constraint s on whic h qualities ar e
perceptible t o a n organis m wit h the ide a o f innatel y given concepts: tha t a
certain concept is accessible to an organism only because of its innate sensory
capacities does no t impl y that th e concep t itself is innately present ; an d a n
empiricist who accepts innate constraints of the first kind will stil l think that
abstraction o n experienc e i s required befor e an y concepts ar e possesse d by
the organism. Once this point of difference between empiricists and nativist
is clearl y acknowledged , Fodor' s nove l reconstructio n o f th e disput e col -
lapses. H e does , however , hav e othe r worthwhil e thing s t o sa y about th e
acquisition o f conceptsparticularl y abou t th e ol d doctrin e o f "menta l
chemistry."
Fodor's pros e style , though heavil y larded wit h jargon, i s very informal
and facetious . After the initia l shock, the jocose manne r become s just abou t
bearable; bu t i t is not a style to be imitated .
18
Fodor: Usin g Common Sense
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in
the Philosophy of Mind
by Jerr y A. Fodor
MIT Press , 198 7
122
FODOR: USIN G COMMO N SENS E 12 3
is to look more critically at the original demand to make psychology the study
of th e causa l powers of menta l states.
Holism take s the conten t o f a belief t o b e fixe d b y the totalit y of belief s
with which the given one has "epistemic liaisons." It thus blocks generalizing
over believers, since believers will always differ in their total belief sets. Fodor
convincingly demolishe s a numbe r o f argument s fo r thi s extrem e holisti c
thesis, an d opt s fo r a loca l denotationa l theor y o f content . H e als o reject s
theories tha t regar d conten t a s the fusio n o f interna l an d externa l factors ,
though fa r les s convincingly. First, he mistakenl y assumes that "two-factor "
theories tak e each facto r t o determine a unique proposition : bu t th e whol e
point of such theories is that this is not so . Second, hi s own earlier notio n o f
narrow content supplies precisely what the two-factor theorist need s to rebut
Fodor's criticism . Third, Fodor's reluctanc e to allow any place for functional
role i n th e fixatio n o f conten t sit s ill with his previou s claim that conten t i s
conferred b y a harmony between inferential propensities an d logica l conse-
quence.
Naturalism would be a threat i f we could no t explain mental reference i n
naturalistic terms. Fodor trie s to develop a causal covariation theory of refer-
ence, thu s explainin g wher e meanin g fits in th e natura l order . Thi s i s an
ingenious discussion , bu t problem s bristlei n particular , th e proble m o f
explaining the possessio n o f content i n the absenc e o f appropriate environ-
mental entities. What would he say about th e brain in a vat? It looks as if he
has t o say , implausibly, that th e causall y isolated term s i n it s language o f
thought either hav e no content or some very bizarre sort of content concern -
ing nerve-endings o r som e such . I think Fodor shoul d reconside r th e pros -
pects fo r a ideological theory , whic h he dismisse s too quickly . Pure causa l
theories face formidable problems , especiall y with respect t o the phenome -
nological content o f perceptual experience a type of content h e conspicu -
ously fail s t o discuss.
Fodor ma y not have the last word o n all issues, as he would be the first to
admit. But his forthrightness and intellectual daring are the best way to push
our understandin g forward . Psychosemantics i s a notable contributio n t o th e
old question o f how the min d represent s th e world .
19
Davidson: Cooling It
Donald Davidson
by Simo n Evnin e
Polity, 199 2
125
126 MIND
some clear sense ultimately made o f matter? And i s not formal logic an object
of grea t beaut y an d power , givin g undeniable insigh t int o th e structur e o f
thought, whos e service s w e should solici t and exploit ? Henc e th e classi c di-
lemma: ho w can w e both b e an d no t b e an objec t o f natura l science ?
Davidson's key idea is that the dilemma is unreal; we can enjoy the benefits
of bot h conception s withou t incurrin g th e disadvantage s eac h appear s t o
entail. Wha t w e must d o i s compromise, no t pushin g eithe r conceptio n be -
yond its legitimate sphere . Yes , but th e question ha s always been how exactly
that i s to be achieved. Th e beaut y of Davidson' s philosophy o f min d i s that
this massiv e questio n i s hel d t o tur n o n a simplebu t neglectedlogica l
point. Once thi s point i s made plai n we can be all we want to be. No ideologi -
cal posturing wil l be necessary; no spurning of the obvious; no deep unifying
revisionary metaphysics will have to be generated. Al l we need to recognize is
(a) that there ar e event s and (b ) that events, like material objects, admit o f a
type-token distinction (about which more in a minute). We don't even need a
theory specifi c t o th e mental : onc e w e get clea r abou t ou r tal k of events i n
general we will already have the necessar y resources with whic h t o explain
how th e min d ca n b e bot h rationa l an d natural , irreducibl e an d physical ,
causal and lawless . To pu t i t differently, once w e properly gras p the distinc-
tion between events and thei r description s we will be in a position t o be bot h
materialists and mentalists .
It works like this. First, it is obvious that we talk of events as well as objects,
as when w e say that th e bridg e collapse d becaus e o f th e explosion , o r tha t
Smith wen t t o th e shop s becaus e i t occurre d t o he r tha t sh e neede d som e
milk. Tha t is , we routinely includ e menta l an d physica l event s in ou r on -
tology. Secondly, and onl y slightly less obviously, we allow that ther e ca n b e
different instance s o f th e sam e genera l typ e o f event, a s when tw o bridge s
collapse on different days, or when the same milk y thought occur s to Jones.
These instances are th e even t token s and th e universal s they exemplif y are
the event types. You have to count types differently from tokens , since many
tokens ca n correspon d t o th e sam e typ e an d a give n toke n ca n exemplify
many types . In othe r words , distinc t particular date d event s can fal l unde r
the same general description, an d one and the same particular even t can fal l
under man y descriptions. Accordingly, mental events , too, admi t o f a type-
token distinction , requiring a s to distinguish particula r event s from th e de -
scriptions that appl y to them .
And no w Davidson's master strok e is just this: every mental-event token is
identical with some physical-event token in the brain, but mental-event types
are no t identica l wit h physical-event types, nor ar e the y reducibl e t o them .
Ontologically, then, every mental particular i s a physical thing (fall s under a
physical description) , bu t i t i s no t possibl e t o reduc e menta l concept s o r
properties t o physica l concepts o r properties . Accordin g t o thi s position ,
which Davidso n christene d "anomalou s monism, " ever y menta l even t fall s
under a physica l law , but ther e ar e n o law s o f psychology ; indeed , psy -
chology i s not reall y a science a t all . The reaso n i s that menta l description s
128 MIND
powers the whol e argument i s the initia l claim that interpretatio n ca n onl y
get goin g i f w e mak e a charitabl e assumptio n abou t belief , sinc e mer e
holding-true i s mute as to what is believed. But isn't there something David-
son is forgetting? Agreed, mer e assent to sentences will never by itself decide
between differen t hypotheses about wha t is believed, s o that somethin g els e
must take up th e slac k if we are t o interpret a t all. But we are not compelle d
to leap to a fixed policy of charity, since we can always appeal to the speaker' s
nonlinguistic behavio r t o narro w th e option s down . Suppos e ou r speake r
assents to "it's raining" i n broad sunshine : we might be inclined t o suppos e
that h e can' t reall y believe it' s rainings o w e charitably assig n t o hi m th e
belief tha t it' s sunny , reinterpreting hi s word s accordingly . O f cours e hi s
assent is not all we have to go on: we might observe hi m scampering unde r a
tree, swearing, dabbing at his face with a hankygiving all the signs of a man
who i s convinced it' s pourin g down . Well , that woul d be evidenc e tha t h e
actually believe s it' s raining , i n plai n contraventio n o f th e facts . An d w e
might the n g o o n t o assembl e furthe r evidenc e tha t h e i s suffering fro m
delusory perceptions , perhap s cause d b y malnourishmen t o r whatever .
None o f thi s woul d b e conclusiveh e might b e tryin g t o deceiv e u s int o
thinking he believes it's raining when he knows it isn'tbut then n o empiri-
cal evidence for anythin g is ever conclusive.
The poin t is that we are not, as interpreters, stuc k merely with inscrutable
assent, s o that w e have t o g o by the charitabl e assumptio n o r no t g o at all:
there i s other behavio r t o appeal to . I take this to be a Wittgensteinian point:
mere ostensio n i s always multiply interpretable, an d th e onl y way to giv e it
specific conten t i s to bring i n a n extensiv e range o f behavior an d "form s of
life." Furthermore , sinc e it is certainly coherent t o keep a subject's behavio r
fixed while varying his environment, we have here a basis for interpreting his
speech tha t doe s no t presuppose tha t his beliefs fit the facts . Beliefs are no t
just cause d b y things outsid e us : the y are als o that o n whic h we act, so that
how someone act s gives purchase i n deciding what he believes. The upsho t is
that Davidson' s antisceptical argumen t doe s no t g o through: ther e ca n b e
true an d warrante d attribution s o f predominantl y fals e beliefs . Th e goo d
news, s o fa r a s Davidson' s overall schem e i s concerned, i s that i t become s
possible t o accept hi s semantics without embracing hi s epistemology .
Davidson's work combines rigor wit h imagination, cautio n with boldness.
He shows what analytic philosophy can be like at its best. In tackling head on
some of the most profound an d perplexing question s he has opened up new
areas o f inquiry, and i t is impossible not to learn fro m thinkin g through hi s
ideaseven when one disagree s wit h them. There is a well-known genre o f
philosophical joke"X's proof that p"tha t parodies a given philosopher' s
characteristic style of argument. Davidson' s proof tha t p goes: "Consider th e
bold conjecture that p. Therefore p." (That, for a disciple of Davidson, goes:
"Davidson ha s considere d th e bol d conjectur e tha t p . Therefor e p." ) O f
course, thi s is as unfair a s it is meant t o be (i t is actually a good dea l milde r
132 M I N D
than othe r examples o f the genre): bu t it does signal one very commendabl e
feature o f Davidson's workit s courage. Davidso n want s to answer th e bi g
questions, an d h e i s no t afrai d t o muste r whateve r degre e o f boldnes s i s
requisite to the task. What is amazing is that he has done this while remainin g
as scrupulousl y analytical as even th e mos t inhibite d o f thinkers . Rea d "I n
Defence o f Convention T. "
20
Davidson: Wea k Wills
Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events
edited b y Bruce Vermaze n an d
Merrill Hintikka
Oxford, 198 5
133
134 MIND
139
140 M I N D
the slayer of Laiusreplacing "he himself wit h "Oedipus" does not preserv e
truth conditions . Tha t intentio n necessaril y involve s thi s kin d o f attitud e
toward onesel f suggest s tha t self-awarenes s i s integra l t o th e concep t o f
agencyas integral a s causation. Bu t Davidso n doe s no t pursu e th e conse -
quences o f Castaneda' s observationperhap s w e shal l als o hav e t o mak e
room fo r th e sel f in our fina l accoun t o f intentional action .
Thirdly, ther e i s the questio n i n virtue of what reasons caus e actions; in
particular, ho w does th e propositiona l conten t o f a n attitud e pla y a causal
role i n producing behavior ? To answe r this questionwhich seems essentia l
if we are to know what sort of causal nexus we are dealin g withwe will nee d
a theor y o f wha t constitute s propositiona l content , an d o f ho w th e trut h
conditions of an attitude ar e connected t o its explanatory force . I t would be
churlish to chide Davidso n with failing t o answer these questions , but thos e
working in his wake must come t o grips wit h the problem s h e leave s open.
Reading these essay s it is not difficul t t o understand th e mesmeri c effec t
Davidson's writings are apt to produce. Th e combinatio n o f logical rigor with
belles lettres , o f gran d theor y wit h attentio n t o detail , o f seriousnes s wit h
lightness o f touch , o f clarit y with arc h allusivenessthes e mak e fo r a n in -
toxicating mixture . Bu t whe n th e intoxicatio n wear s of f Davidson' s work
stands fort h a s a major contributio n t o analytical philosophy.
22
Putnam: Idea l Justifications
Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers,
volume 3
by Hilar y Putna m
Cambridge Universit y Press, 198 5
142
PUTNAM: IDEA L JUSTIFICATIONS 14 3
nation; he does not need t o make the further claim that causation and expla -
nation themselve s have stric t physica l definitions.
Not all of this book is concerned wit h realism^ it also treats of reason. An d
here too Putnam ha s changed hi s views: he used to hold (with Quine) that n o
propositions ar e rationall y unrevisableanythin g w e no w believ e w e ca n
envisage rationally giving up as theory develops. Now Putnam is prepared to
allow that there ar e absolutely unrevisable beliefs, notably the minimal prin-
ciple of noncontradiction, "no t ever y proposition i s both tru e an d false. " T o
give up this principle would simply be to cease to reason, s o there is no sens e
in the idea of rationally abandoning th e principle. This certainly seems to me
like a step i n the righ t direction , thoug h i t must b e said tha t Putna m offer s
rather little in the wa y of a detailed articulatio n of why reason shoul d enjoy
such absolut e presuppositions . (Thi s typ e o f unrevisabilit y thesis ha s als o
been pu t forwar d an d develope d b y the Danis h philosophe r Pete r Zinker -
nagel, bu t Putna m evidentl y does no t kno w of hi s work.)
Putnam's new views are manifestl y still in their formativ e phase, it is to b e
hoped tha t futur e wor k wil l clarif y an d sharpe n hi s position, bu t I suspec t
that onc e the proces s o f critical reflection has been pushe d further , w e shall
witness yet another chang e o f view .
23
Chomsky: Rule s an d Representation s
Rules and Representations
by Noa m Chomsky
Columbia Universit y Press, 198 0
Psychological Realit y
147
148 M I N D
thing important and peculiar about the relation between mental and physical
facts, something not assimilable to the relation between homogeneous set s of
facts suc h as we find i n th e astrophysica l example. Case s of inverte d quali a
seem t o sho w tha t menta l fact s ar e radicall y independen t o f functional -
behavioral facts ; an d Quinea n permutation s o f prepositional attitude s an d
meanings might be similarly viewed. At least it is not obvious that such failure
of determination is a matter of mere evidential exiguity. Chomsky also misses
the point of those (e.g., Dummett) who require meanin g to be publicly mani-
festable: h e asks , rhetorically, why meaning should mee t this condition an d
mental images (say) not. Th e answe r would be that meaning , i n contrast t o
some other aspects of our psychologica l life, cannot consist in what is hidden
from view , or else it could no t be a communicable object of knowledge. This
requirement o n meanin g ma y be unacceptable , bu t th e issu e is not settle d
simply by a general endorsemen t o f psychologica l unobservables.
Chomsky's analogy with solar physics invites scrutiny on another score . As
he at one point acknowledges (p. 197), the theoretical entities and propertie s
invoked i n tha t cas e an d i n th e cas e o f gramma r ar e rathe r differen t i n
character: i n th e linguisti c case, w e ar e imputin g abstract condition s an d
structures t o the speaker , no t themselve s physical but presumabl y instanti-
ated somewher e i n th e brain ; i n th e astrophysica l case, w e are dealin g i n
actual physical entities and processes . Now this asymmetry may have greate r
significance than Chomsky recognizes, since it appears t o require u s to inter-
pret the explanatory forc e of the theoretical terms in the respective theories
somewhat differently : in th e astrophysica l case, we have causally operative
unobservables conforming to causal laws; but in the linguisti c case the rule s
of gramma r do no t see m t o enjoy that statussuch abstrac t condition s wil l
not enter causa l explanations in any straightforward way. This is not (yet ) to
say tha t grammatica l representations ar e an y les s real tha n physica l unob-
servables, bu t i t doe s mak e i t intelligibl e wh y someon e shoul d hol d tha t
grammars are mor e descriptiv e tha n explanatory . I am not a t all sure what
should b e said of the theoretica l an d explanator y status of abstract rule s of
grammar, bu t i t does see m tha t ther e i s a real questio n her e abou t tha t i n
virtue of which grammars enter int o the explanation o f behavior: along with
different level s of description we might have to recognize differen t types of
theoretical explanation. This issue connects with Chomsky's view of the rela -
tion betwee n interna l gramma r an d th e brain , abou t whic h he seem s no t
entirely clear. In response t o the asymmetry just mentioned, he has recours e
to th e in-principl e availabilit y of th e neurophysiologica l fact s underlyin g
grammatical competence. Thi s would help remove th e asymmetr y if gram-
mar wer e reducible t o neurophysiology , fo r the n th e differenc e fro m th e
astrophysical cas e woul d com e dow n t o a merel y empirical-ethica l infea-
sibility. Bu t Chomsk y elsewhere indicate s tha t h e doe s no t believ e i n suc h
reducibility, a s i n hi s referenc e t o variabl e physical realization o f interna l
grammar (p. 226). So it is not just a matter o f practical infeasibility, but o f the
very nature o f the fact s i n question. A s the functionalis t literature has mad e
152 MIND
Ontogenesis of Language
1
He remarks that "scientific knowledge does not grow in the mind of someone placed in
an appropriate environment " (p . 140) , adding that the study of human knowledge should
allow for "abductive " theory construction as well as innate predetermination an d environ-
mental shaping.
154 M I N D
child t o learn a s a human languag e (othe r thing s equal), that would sugges t
that ther e i s n o restrictiv e innat e schematis m o f th e sor t envisage d b y
Chomsky. Less fancifully an d mor e positively , if the chil d were observed t o
make grammatical mistakes , at th e leve l of universal grammar, whic h were
not accountabl e t o performanc e deficiencies , this would b e som e evidenc e
for th e suggestion that he was trying out interim grammars for confirmation
and modifyin g them accordingly ; excludin g performance factors , such mis-
takes would not be predicted b y the innateness proposal. Non e of this would
be conclusive , but i t doe s a t leas t indicat e th e kind s o f consideratio n tha t
might hel p decid e betwee n th e proposals .
One poin t that seem s to me already t o favor the creativit y proposal con -
cerns th e connectio n betwee n knowledg e an d justification. Chomsk y con -
siders th e followin g objectio n to his view of linguistic knowledge: if compe -
tence ha d th e ontogenesi s h e suggests , the n i t would hav e n o justification
or ground s an d s o could no t properl y qualif y a s knowledge . His repl y t o
this objection is to den y tha t knowledg e require s grounds ; i t is better con -
ceived simply in terms of "mental structures." But the creativity proposal ca n
accommodate ou r tal k of knowledg e an d learnin g her e withou t such revi -
sionism: linguistic knowledge will rest upon a n interna l theor y (a grammar)
of the speech to which the child has been exposed an d will receive its justifica-
tion fro m it s success in coping with the linguisti c data. I conjectur e tha t we
think o f childre n a s learning languag e an d knowin g wha t i s grammatical
because w e inchoately recognize that the y are engaged upo n th e enterpris e
of constructin g a theory o f the linguisti c data provide d b y adults.
The creativit y proposal, a s I have hitherto formulate d it, faces a n obvious
objection: if that is the wa y grammar is acquired, then childre n should know
grammar i n just the wa y a scientist knows the laws of quantum physics; but,
by m y own showing, they do notconstructin g a n explici t grammar i s no t
child's play. This is a serious objection, but I do not thin k it is unanswerable:
what we need i s a notion of subdoxastic hypothesis formation. The chil d does
not, it is true, undertake conscious and deliberate theor y construction; yet he
may b e s o constituted as to generate hypothese s a t a n unconscious , indee d
subdoxastic, level . Her e w e migh t appea l t o a n analog y wit h wha t som e
psychologists sa y abou t vision . They sa y tha t th e visua l syste m generate s
hypotheses about the presented arra y which determine ho w things are see n
(what they are seen as); this is done on the basis of scanty visual cues, and th e
process is wholly unconscious.2 How this capacity to interpret visua l arrays in
terms of hypotheses comes about in the course of ontogenesis i s not generally
accessible t o th e individual' s consciousness; it is , i n th e relevan t sense , a n
exercise of subdoxastic creativity. Somewhat so, we might postulate a similar
capacity relating t o what is heard: sentence s may be heard as grammatical or
ungrammatical accordin g a s the y confor m t o th e gramma r tha t ha s bee n
2
See, e.g., R. L. Gregory, The Intelligent Eye (Ne w York: McGraw-Hill, 1970) .
CHOMSKY: RULE S AN D REPRESENTATION S 15 5
3
Chomsky has reminded m e (in correspondence) tha t he does consider and rejec t such
a hypothesis-generatio n account i n earlier publications , e.g., Reflections on Language (New
York: Pantheon, 1975) . The groun d o f his rejection is the significan t qualitative difference
between language acquisition an d th e development s of (say) physics with respect t o spee d
of acquisition, general intelligence, and applicatio n required, an d uniformit y of final state.
These difference s must be admitted, but i t is unclear (to me) how much weight should b e
attached to them. I am inclined to suspect that human beings are capable of different kinds
of "creativity, " and tha t w e may be predispose d t o generat e hypothese s a t a subdoxasti c
level during certain "sensitiv e periods" o f ontogenesis . This ha s been claime d of the visua l
system; but it also appears tha t we need t o invoke such a capacity to explain the acquisition
of particular grammar, fo r th e followin g reason . Th e rule s of language-specific grammar
are not (I believe) held by Chomsky to be innate, but, equally, they are not extractable from
the stimulu s by classical mechanisms of learning: they are comple x t o state explicitl y and
not easil y assimilated at a conscious level later i n lif e (tr y learning Finnish) . So some thir d
method o f grammar acquisitio n has to be attributed t o the child to account for its eventual
competence i n particula r grammar ; an d hypothesi s generation seem s t o b e th e natura l
suggestion. I f so, we are anywa y compelled t o recognize a species of "creativity" implicated
in languag e acquisitio n that differ s importantl y from tha t involve d in th e constructio n o f
scientific theories ; an d the n th e questio n i s whethe r universal gramma r migh t no t b e
similarly acquired. At any rate, I do no t think we should rus h dogmaticall y to dismiss the
creativity proposal just becaus e languag e acquisitio n does no t exactly duplicate th e devel -
opment o f physics.
156 M I N D
157
158 MIND
disquieting; for just as Hume's naturalism fails to provide any rational release
from hi s scepticism , so Quine' s naturalis m leave s u s wonderin g ho w ou r
habitual ontology and "robust realism" can rationally withstand the impact of
the scepticis m generate d b y hi s pluralisti c instrumentalism . Inasmuc h a s
Quine is attacking a naive attitude we have toward our tal k of external things,
he is undermining the confidence we commonly repose in such talk: sceptical
reflections at the philosophical level thus make themselves felt at the ground
level of ordinary belief , whether common sens e or scientific. Pending a goo d
answer to the question ho w naturalism and th e "immanenc e o f truth" man-
age to justify ou r habitua l ontology and exclud e the deviant ontologies deliv -
ered by proxy functions , I cannot see how Quine's realis m is ultimately to be
squared wit h his relativistic instrumentalism. (Perhaps ther e ar e philosophi -
cal perspectives of a Kantian cast that allow such a conjunction o f views, bu t
I doub t tha t Quin e woul d b e happ y t o res t hi s philosoph y o n suc h Kan -
tianism.)
In "Tw o Dogmas " wha t lay at th e peripher y o f th e fabri c o f sentence s
comprising science was described a s "experience"experience was the tribu-
nal face d b y scientific theory . Subsequently , experience gav e way to neura l
input a t th e sensor y receptors : "surfac e irritations " becam e th e poin t a t
which theory mad e empirica l contact with the world . A s Quine is careful to
explain, h e doe s no t equate experience with receptor triggerings ; rathe r h e
offers th e triggerings as a naturalistic surrogate for experience. Thus sensory
triggerings ar e to do the job assigne d by the old empiricists to experience
the tribunal is now the scientist's nerve endings (p. 40). The job of experienc e
was, o f course , t o provid e evidenc e o n whic h the scientis t ma y reasonabl y
base his beliefs; and Quin e makes the same claim on behalf of his physiologi-
cal surrogate: "By sensory evidence I mean stimulation of sensory receptors"
(p. 24). This account of empirical evidence prompts a number o f questions,
to which I cannot se e that Quin e ha s given satisfactor y answers.
Perceptual experience, a s construed b y the old empiricists, had tw o prop-
erties suiting it to the role of evidence: first, its availability to cognition suited
it to serve as that on which a scientist might base his beliefsexperience was
"given" t o th e scientist ; second, a normativ e principle , neede d fo r rationa l
inference, wa s plausibly satisfied by experience, tha t is , "If yo u perceiv e (o r
seem to perceive) that/), then you ought (ceterisparibus) t o believe that/?." In
effect, thes e are constraints upon anythin g that can serve as evidence, at least
for anyon e who calls himself an empiricist; and experienc e ha s the virtue of
meeting them. But does Quine's surrogat e notio n meet them? It seems suffi -
ciently obvious that sensor y triggerings do not meet the first constraint; for ,
as Quine himself remarks (p. 40), the scientist typically knows nothing o f th e
physiological processes a t hi s surface that (partially) cause his beliefs. But if
such processe s ar e no t ordinaril y availabl e to cognition, how can they func -
tion as evidence upon which beliefs may be based? Quine's surrogat e seem s
to lack the essential property that , in the eyes of the old empiricists, qualified
experience as a suitable evidential base. This seems an obvious enough point,
160 M I N D
way that excludes the claime d possibility: "when I say there i s no fac t of th e
matter, a s regards, say , the tw o rival manuals of translation, what I mean is
that both manuals are compatible with all the same distributions of states and
relations over elementary particles. In a word, they are physically equivalent"
(p. 23) . This formulatio n certainl y rules ou t th e respons e t o th e Word and
Object formulatio n just mooted, but it leaves us wondering what the argument
is fo r th e indeterminac y thesis a s so formulated: w e need t o kno w why th e
compatibility of tw o manuals with a given set of behavioral disposition s im-
plies the stronge r thesi s concerning physica l equivalence. Compare th e fol -
lowing case: i t is argued tha t ther e is no (physical ) face o f the matte r abou t
which color experience s someon e has , on the groun d tha t two incompatible
schemes of color-experience ascriptio n may be compatible with all the sam e
behavioral dispositions (inverted spectra) . Clearly such an argumen t woul d
fail to reach its conclusion, since differentiating internal physical states might
be compatibl e wit h th e sam e behaviora l dispositions . I n th e sam e way ,
Quine's argumen t fo r indeterminac y need s shorin g u p wit h further (hith -
erto unspecified) considerations.
There i s a helpfu l essay , "O n th e Individuatio n o f Attributes, " whic h
clarifies Quine' s attitud e towar d classe s and attribute s i n respec t o f thei r
identity conditions. The individuatio n of classes is clear once th e individua-
tion of their members is, but not otherwise; attributes, however, want in clear
identity condition s n o matte r ho w wel l individuate d thei r extension s are .
Quine consider s an d reject s necessar y coextensivenes s o f predicate s a s a
criterion of identity for the expressed attributes , on the ground tha t modality
is too infirm a thing to bear suc h explanatory weight. He might have objected
also on grounds of insufficiency: th e determinable attributes expressed b y "x
has a size" and "x has a shape" ar e presumabl y distinct yet necessarily coex-
tensive, an d th e sam e i s true o f th e determinat e attribute s expresse d b y "x
has thre e sides " an d "x ha s thre e angles. " A suggestio n Quin e doe s no t
consider, which makes no (explicit) use of modality and look s fairly promis -
ing, i s this : tw o predicate s expres s th e sam e attribut e if f the y ar e inter -
substitutable i n al l causal-explanator y context s (i n a sufficientl y ric h lan -
guage) salva veritate; or, withou t the appea l t o languages , iff the attribute s
are causally equivalent. I mention this suggestion because Quine at one point
(p. 107 ) remarks upon th e possible need o f attributes in the theory of causa-
tion, immediately adding tha t the need could b e filled only if the individua-
tion questio n wer e satisfactoril y answered .
At a number o f places in Theories and Things Quine expresses his distaste
for modalit y and it s logic: thus "[a]nalyticity, essence , and modalit y are no t
my meat" (p . 116) . But it is hard to make out wha t his reason is . It is not tha t
modal locution s are irreparabl y tainte d wit h nonextensionality, for i n "In -
tensions Revisited" 1 Quin e show s how modality can b e delivere d fro m this
1
1 have reviewed this article elsewher e (Philosophia, July 1982 ; submitte d 1978 ) and wil l
not repea t her e what I sai d there .
QUINE: THEORIE S AN D THINGS 16 3
2
Oxford: Blackwell , 1980 . Field' s claim is that sentences about physical-theoretical enti-
ties contribut e t o physica l theory i n a radicall y different wa y fro m sentence s ostensibly
about mathematica l entities . I t woul d b e interestin g t o kno w Quine's reactio n t o Field' s
defence o f a nominalist interpretation o f applied mathematics .
25
Strawson an d Warnock : Reputation
The Secret Connection: Causation, Realism,
and David Hume
by Gale n Strawso n
Oxford, 198 9
J. L. Austin
by G. J. Warnoc k
Routledge, 198 9
164
STRAWSON A N D W A R N O C K : R E P U T A T I O N 165
letting the ideational contents of our mind s determine wha t the world might
really containthough he did indee d thin k there was a problem abou t ou r
achieving an adequate gras p of the nature o f objective necessary causal rela-
tions. Hume, then, is a sceptical realist about causa l necessity, contrary to the
widely received idealis t interpretation; an d sceptica l realism i s a view much
favored i n thi s postpositivis t era . The positivist s were righ t i n thei r hig h
estimate of Hume , bu t fo r exactl y the wron g reasons .
J. L . Austin was a philosopher wit h a legendary reputation. Althoug h h e
published little , he i s revered, especiall y in Oxford, fo r hi s critical acumen,
withering good sense , originality, and talent fo r hitting the nail on the head .
He wa s made White' s Professo r i n Oxfor d a t th e tende r ag e o f forty . Hi s
intellectual powers ar e sai d t o have struc k terror into th e heart s o f his con-
temporaries, t o the poin t o f deterring som e of them fro m daring t o put pe n
to paper, o r mout h t o thought. Indeed , i t might fairl y b e said tha t Austin's
reputation depend s largel y upo n hi s reputation: on e tend s t o hea r mor e
about hi s philosophica l reputatio n tha n abou t hi s philosophica l ideas . I t
therefore come s a s a bit of a shock t o read Geoffre y Warnock' s study . Th e
impression here conveye d is that Austin was almost pathologically incapable
of gettin g anythin g right . Tim e and agai n Warnoc k ha s to correct obviou s
mistakes, apologize for unclarities, expose ground-floo r misconceptions . It is
all very puzzling. Even as Warnock attempt s t o celebrat e hi s subject we see
the man' s reputatio n sin k wanl y over th e horizon . H e ma y hav e initiate d
some fruitfu l line s o f inquiry , late r develope d b y others , bu t h e himsel f
seems to have been unabl e t o pursue thes e line s with any surefootedness o r
perspicacity. You begin t o understand wh y he wrot e s o little. Funny things,
reputations. Stee r clea r o f the m i f you can.
Attend no w to a typical causal sequencesay, Mike Tyson's fist colliding
with his opponent's ja w and the opponent droppin g t o the canvas. The blow,
we say, caused th e fall . No w we can distinguis h three view s about wha t this
causal connectio n involves . One claim s tha t ther e i s n o kin d o f necessit y
relating the event s to each other: all that occurs in reality is that one even t is
succeeded by another. A second view insists that a species of necessity under-
lies the savagery of the nexus: the opponent had to fall, given that his jaw was
subject t o the forc e unleashed o n i t (and the circumstantia l conditions wer e
as they were). However, this second vie w concedes, we cannot kno w or per-
ceive the natur e o f this binding necessity : we can assert tha t i t exists but w e
can hav e n o prope r conceptio n o f what it ultimately involves. A third vie w
agrees that causal relations carry objective necessitation, but thi s view is more
sanguine abou t ou r capacit y to understan d suc h necessitation ; scienc e can
tell us what the nexu s depends on, if it is not alread y clear to common sense.
These three view s of causation and our acces s to it may be labeled antirealist,
sceptical realist , an d naiv e realist, respectively.
Strawson contends , agains t th e commo n antirealis t interpretation , tha t
Hume believes something like the second view. His main ground for attribut-
ing this view to Hume i s that Hum e repeatedl y assert s the view, especially in
166 MIND
live verb. These objections are (a) elementary and (b ) definitive. Ten minutes
reflection shoul d hav e made it clear tha t th e assimilatio n is simply a mistake,
prompted by the most superficial of similarities between the two verbs as they
(sometimes) occu r i n the firs t person .
Austin's paper "Truth" defines truth as follows: "A statement is said to be
true whe n the histori c state of affairs t o which it is correlated b y the demon -
strative convention s (the one to which it 'refers') i s of a type wit h which th e
sentence use d i n makin g i t i s correlate d b y th e descriptiv e conventions. "
Warnock struggle s to clarify what Austin might hav e meant by the two kinds
of "convention," but i t remains unclear whether thi s is just a confused way of
talking about indexicality in natural language, having little to do with truth in
general. Certainl y th e accoun t i s hard t o exten d beyon d simpl e indexica l
subject-predicate sentences: genera l statements , hypotheticals, mathematical
statements, an d analyti c truths canno t b e force d int o th e Austinia n mould .
Isn't thi s the very kind o f overgeneralization o n whic h he heaped scorn ? I n
comparison wit h Tarski's semanti c theor y o f truth , availabl e at the tim e h e
was writing his paper, Austin' s version of the correspondence theor y looks at
best quain t an d a t worse mire d i n obscurit y an d intractabl e difficulty .
The tw o chapters o n actio n an d abilit y fin d Austi n frequentl y unclear ,
careless o f importan t distinctions , and fa r to o read y t o dismis s defensibl e
ideas for inadequat e reasons . I mention tw o examples: hi s conflation of th e
question whether i t is normally superfluous to append "intentionally " after a
verb of action with the question whethe r it is true to append tha t adverb; an d
his no t noticin g tha t yo u ca n hav e a n abilit y whic h you d o no t successfull y
exercise ever y time you try to . No t ver y difficult points , really .
We turn then , hopefully , to the final long chapte r "Word s an d Deeds, "
which addresses itsel f to what is commonly regarded as Austin's most impor-
tant an d endurin g work . An d indee d hi s treatmen t o f th e performativ e
aspect of speech ha s been fertil e enough, givin g rise to what has come t o be
called "speec h ac t theory. " Th e centra l ide a t o begi n wit h i s that use s o f
language are not exclusively "fact-stating": some utterances als o enable u s to
perform action s of various sortspromising, betting, bequeathing , naming ,
acquitting, and s o forth. We do these things by uttering appropriat e indica -
tive sentences, but the sentences (Austin claimed) do not describe us as doing
what we thereby do. (Why we cannot do something with language a t the same
time a s describin g ourselve s a s doin g just tha t i s never mad e clear. ) So , it
initially seems , Austi n i s directing u s t o distinguis h the "constative " us e o f
language fro m th e performativ e use : there ar e tw o kinds of speec h ac t t o
consider.
However, a s Warnoc k i s a t pain s t o poin t out , this allege d dichotom y
subsequently evaporate s int o th e insistenc e that al l uses of language hav e a
performative aspect . I t turns out, on close examination o f Austin's text, that
he has been roundl y conflating at least three different definitions of "perfor -
mative," and their demonstrable inequivalenc e ends up pulling the notion in
opposite directions , eventually causing its disintegration. There is the notio n
170 M I N D
171
172 M I N D
the weekend, thus allowing his old manic and excitable self to reemerge. Thi s
odd inversio n o f th e usua l drug-taker' s schedul e apparentl y le d to a mor e
balanced an d satisfyin g lif e fo r Ray .
A cas e o f transportatio n i s provide d b y Stephe n D. , a medica l studen t
constantly high on cocaine and amphetamines: h e dreamt h e was a dog with
a dog's olfactory gift, and when he woke up he retained th e heightened sense
of smell . No w h e coul d smel l people's emotions , recogniz e hi s friend s b y
their aroma , find his way around Ne w York City with his nose. Three weeks
later h e reverted , wit h mixed feelings , to olfactory normal. H e ha d know n
what i t i s like t o b e a dog . Th e Twins , retarded , misshapen , undersized ,
severely myopic , nevertheles s hav e remarkabl e power s o f computation ,
earning the m regula r television appearances. Sa y any date during the nex t
forty thousand years and they will tell you instantly on what day of the week it
falls. The y ca n remembe r three-hundred-digi t numbers , wher e mos t o f u s
are taxe d t o th e limi t by seven. They can generat e six-figur e prime s at wil l
and are not defeated by the task of going up to ten figures. Yet their IQs are a
mere sixty and the y cannot even perform elementar y addition and subtrac -
tion. They seemed, Sack s reports, t o see numbers and t o read off their prop-
erties without performing calculations. When they were separated "fo r thei r
own good, " the y los t thei r mathematica l power s an d th e enjoymen t the y
derived fro m thei r exercise .
All this is very striking and remarkable , like strange tale s from a fabulous
foreign land. Sacks relates his case histories with great vividness and obvious
compassion. The boo k is a fascinating read all right. But doubts assail one on
almost ever y page. Ther e is , first, the questio n o f Sack' s prose style . I t ha s
been lavishly praised by some critics ("beautifully written"). Lush, belletristic,
edifying, competentthi s is the bes t I could say for it . For th e mos t part it is
embarrassingly overlyrical , gushing, pretentious, an d sentimental . Try say -
ing thi s out lou d wit h a straight face :
"Watch Jimmie in chapel," they said, "and judge fo r yourelf. "
I did , an d I wa s moved, profoundly moved an d impressed , becaus e I saw
here a n intensit y and steadines s of attention and concentratio n tha t I ha d
never see n befor e i n hi m o r conceive d him capabl e of. I watche d him knee l
and tak e the Sacramen t on hi s tongue, and coul d no t doub t th e fullnes s an d
totality of Communion , the perfec t alignment of hi s spiri t wit h th e spiri t of
the Mass . Fully , intensely, quietly, in the quietud e o f absolut e concentration
and attention , he entere d an d partoo k o f th e Hol y Communion. He was
wholly held , absorbed , by a feeling . Ther e was no forgetting , n o Korsakov's
then, nor di d i t seem possibl e or imaginabl e that ther e shoul d be ; fo r h e was
no longe r a t th e merc y of a fault y an d fallibl e mechanismtha t o f meaning-
less sequence s and memor y tracesbu t wa s absorbed i n a n act , an ac t of hi s
whole being , which carried feelin g and meanin g in a n organi c continuity
and unity , a continuity and unit y so seamless it could no t permi t an y break .
This passage is entirely typical of the kin d of windy rhapsodizing with which
Sacks embellishe s the bar e (an d sufficientl y eloquent ) fact s o f eac h case .
174 MIND
I cannot know that I am not dreaming now, because I could have experience s
just lik e these in dreaming slee p and suppos e mysel f t o be awake. If I canno t
know that I am not dreaming now , then I cannot kno w that I am now seate d
before a fire writing. Therefore I cannot know that I am now seated befor e a
fire writing. So Descartes famously argued, thus raising the general proble m
of scepticism about the externa l world. The argumen t i s apt to strike one as
both preposterous an d compelling . What is the sourc e of its power? Where,
if anywhere , doe s i t go wrong? And wha t does i t show about epistemolog y
and philosoph y in general?
These ar e th e question s t o whic h Barr y Stroud' s boo k i s devoted . H e
begins by expounding th e Cartesia n argument wit h exemplary patience an d
care, making its steps as explicit as possible. His aim is to exhibit its strength
and innocenc e o f obvious fallacy. W e can alread y appreciat e tha t th e argu -
ment i s not goin g t o admi t o f simpl e refutation , and tha t i t get s a t dee p
questions abou t th e natur e o f knowledge and it s relation t o the world . Pro -
fessor Stroud the n goes on to consider a number of responses that have been
made t o this kind of scepticism, finding each of them i n some respect inade -
quate.
J. L . Austi n trie d t o convic t th e scepti c o f misusin g th e wor d "know" ;
Stroud argue s tha t Austin confused truth with appropriateness. G . E. Moore
insisted tha t he knew he had tw o hands because he could hol d the m up an d
178
STROUD: NO T KNOWIN G WHA T W E KNO W 17 9
Saul Kripke' s brilliant and ver y influential article, "Namin g and Necessity,"
appeared i n 197 2 in Semantics of Natural Language (edite d b y Davidson an d
Harman), having been transcribed fro m a series of unscripted lecture s deliv-
ered a t Princeto n Universit y i n 1970 . No w w e hav e th e recor d o f thos e
lectures i n book form , accompanie d b y a ne w preface, i n whic h the autho r
dates th e origi n o f hi s ideas fro m 196364 .
As Kripk e anticipates , thos e acquainte d wit h th e origina l articl e wil l b e
disappointed b y th e presen t publication , fo r th e tex t i s virtually unaltered
and th e preface is mainly given over to repeating point s already contained i n
the earlie r wor k for th e benefi t of reader s fo r who m the y wer e no t crystal
clear. It is not that Kripke thinks there are no genuine objection s to take up
he admits to certain "substantive problems with the monograph"but we are
not told what these problem s are , no r whic h passages he would (if he could)
revise or expand . Indeed , h e invite s readers t o judge fo r themselve s which
criticisms o f hi s views ar e frivolou s and whic h serious. I t woul d hav e bee n
interesting t o kno w Kripke' s own assessmen t o f som e o f th e man y querie s
that hav e been raise d ove r th e pas t decade .
The concep t o f rigid designatio n i s the mai n topi c dealt wit h in the pref -
ace. Kripk e begin s b y distinguishin g the necessit y o f th e identit y relatio n
from th e ide a o f a rigidl y designatin g expressio n (on e tha t designate s th e
same objec t in ever y possibl e world), and thi s i n tur n fro m th e thesi s tha t
Reprinted with permission from th e Times Higher Education Supplement (Jun e 13, 1980).
181
182 M I N D
184
AVER: SIGNIFICANTL Y SENSELES S 18 5
187
188 M I N D
grasp what we mean. Budd is sensitive to the apparent paradox this presents
and doe s hi s best t o explai n ho w Wittgenstei n live d with it . I fee l tha t thi s
issue coul d stan d furthe r work : di d Wittgenstei n reall y have a n adequat e
account of the depth o f error he attributed t o our reflectiv e understanding ,
given that h e took ou r ground-floo r conceptua l grasp t o be essentially flaw-
less?
Chapter 2 set s out Wittgenstein' s positio n o n meaning , rules , consciou s
processes, menta l mechanisms , capacities , reasons , an d communication .
These topic s hav e bee n hotl y conteste d i n recen t philosophy , stimulate d
largely by Saul Kripke's "community interpretation" o f Wittgenstein' s posi -
tion. Budd show s definitively, I think, that this misrepresents th e essence o f
Wittgenstein's view; he stresses instead the contrast between inner and outer.
The mai n target of Wittgenstein's critique is the idea that meaning is a quality
of consciousnesssomething that happen s in you.
Wittgenstein i s surel y righ t abou t this , bu t i t doe s no t follo w tha t th e
concepts of meaning and consciousness are unconnected, no r tha t the latte r
is not a necessary condition o f th e former . Meanin g can b e (an d b e essen -
tially) somethin g w e do consciousl y without thereby consistin g in a n intro -
spectible quality of consciousness. Wittgenstein seems no t t o have explored
other les s direc t way s i n whic h meanin g an d consciousnes s migh t inter -
sect.
Budd's presentatio n o f th e private-languag e argumen t i s impressively
clear an d thorough . Sinc e first-perso n ascription s ar e criterionless , privat e
sensations coul d no t affor d th e constrain t o n correc t us e tha t govern s ou r
actual practice of ascribing behaviorally expressed sensations. The would-b e
private linguis t is thus bereft o f an y mean s of establishin g a reference rela -
tion. Budd appear s to accept this argument, while plausibly criticizing Witt-
gensein fo r extrudin g causalit y fro m hi s accoun t o f sensatio n concepts . I
would sa y that th e introductio n o f a causal relation betwee n sensation s an d
self-ascriptions provides one way of resisting the argument. W e should, first,
remind ourselve s of ho w surprising th e conclusio n of Wittgenstein' s argu-
ment ought t o seem. H e invites us to believe that someone whose sensations
happen to have no behavioral expression is semantically impotent in respec t
of those sensations. The subjec t has the sensations, she can speak a languag e
for publi c objects, but somehow she just cannot ge t her words to refer t o he r
sensations. Only if her bod y offers u p potentia l criteri a for other s t o detec t
her sensations can she succeed in homing in semantically on those sensations.
Suppose th e sensation s ar e publicl y undetectable u p t o time t and the n ac-
quire behaviora l manifestations at t, only t o rever t t o privac y ten minute s
later. According to Wittgenstein, the subject could not refer to her sensations
before t, thoug h sh e ca n onc e he r bod y start s t o sho w thei r presenc e t o
others; and when the behavioral manifestations go her sensation words lapse
back int o mer e empty sounds . Surel y this is a remarkable result : i t ties m y
semantic abilities with respect to my own mental life to the epistemic powers
of other s i n detectin g wha t it is I a m experiencing .
BUDD: WITTGENSTEIN' S PHILOSOPH Y O F PSYCHOLOG Y 18 9
191
192 M I N D
mysterious in that they result completely from the raw materials and mecha -
nisms tha t h e identifies , which are themselve s sufficientl y perspicuou s an d
anterior t o what they are used t o explain. And the y are remarkable becaus e
what w e fondl y thin k o f a s civilizatio n depends o n th e existenc e o f thes e
constructions, whic h ar e hel d i n plac e b y nothin g othe r tha n a kin d o f
groundless collectiv e contract .
Society would collapse if people wer e to cease agreeing to assign appropri -
ate function s to thing s lik e weddin g ceremonies , dolla r bills , English sen -
tences. And since all of these assignments are essentially arbitrary, there is, in
a sense, nothing stoppin g us from ceasing to accord the m th e statu s that we
now accord them . Mountain s will stay there no matte r ho w much we might
wish them away , but it would take nothing more tha n a collective decision t o
dismantle totall y the institutiona l fabric of society.
This, Searl e surmises , is the reaso n w e tend t o invest certain ceremonie s
with s o much pom p an d glitter : w e recognize tha t i t all comes dow n t o on e
person agreein g wit h another , an d w e don' t lik e th e netles s feelin g tha t
results. The emblem s o f authorit y ar e ther e t o reassur e u s that i t won't all
come tumbling down around ou r ears . Huma n agreemen t i s a fragile thing,
and i t is hard t o accept that i t is the onl y barrier tha t stand s between us an d
chaos. Imagine what it would be like if people bega n t o deny that th e word s
you utte r mea n wha t yo u tak e the m t o mean , o r i f you r diploma s wer e
decreed invalid , or i f peopl e treate d you r dolla r bill s a s bit s o f worthles s
paper. Wha t i f the institutio n o f citizenshi p were t o b e abrogated ? Ther e
would be nothing to fall back on, in observer-independent reality , to enforc e
the kind s of right s tha t w e normally take fo r granted . Thes e socia l institu-
tions work, fundamentally, only because w e say they do .
At th e roo t o f Searle' s treatmen t o f socia l fact s i s a distinctio n betwee n
brute fact s an d humanl y constructed facts . Ther e ar e tw o kind s o f brut e
facts: th e physica l entities onto which we impose institutional functions, an d
the mental capacities that mak e this imposition possible. Neither sort o f fac t
is itself humanl y constructed. Rather, we construct social facts on th e basis of
such brute facts . Socia l reality thus presupposes a reality whose origin i s not
social. It cannot be, then, that reality in general is socially constructed; o n th e
contrary, social reality is nonsocially constructed. There cannot be social facts
without th e logicall y prior existenc e o f brute fact s tha t ar e no t th e resul t of
any socia l mechanism . Societ y i s constructe d o n a bedroc k o f anteceden t
realities, both physica l and mental , which are entirel y objective in the sense
that they are not product s o f human actio n or cognition. The ra w materials
of socia l construction ar e independen t o f al l such construction .
Indeed, i f we conjoin Searle' s theor y o f societ y with the view s about th e
mind that he has expressed elsewhere , we get, in effect, a reduction o f social
facts t o physica l and biologica l ones . Fo r h e maintain s tha t state s o f con -
sciousness, whic h ar e wha t intentionalit y depend s on , ar e jus t biologica l
properties o f the brain, no different in principle from neura l an d biochemi -
cal properties . Thu s collectiv e intentionality, whic h i s th e mai n engin e o f
194 MIND
197
198 M I N D
to destroy it. Another mountain , a sandier one, may last less long, being mor e
easily eroded into nonexistence b y wind and water . This is primitive natura l
selectionthe differential surviva l of individual things in the fac e of destruc-
tive forces. Plainly there is no telos here; it is just the force s of nature destroy -
ing some things while others endurethi s depending o n the physical consti-
tution o f th e thin g i n relatio n t o it s environment . Welcom e t o efficien t
causation blindl y executin g its winnowing work.
According t o Darwin' s theory , th e surviva l o f animat e thing s i s just a s
unplanned an d mechanical . Some organism s are destroye d mor e efficientl y
by natur e tha n others . Th e notio n o f "selection " her e ha s n o purposiv e
connotation; w e could equall y (and les s misleadingly) speak o f evolutio n by
natural destruction . Th e survivor s are just th e organism s tha t ar e left over
when natur e ha s done it s destructive work. They ar e selected , bu t the y arc -
not selected/or anything . Of course, in both the animate and inanimat e cases
it i s th e structur e o f th e entit y tha t determine s it s talen t fo r continue d
existencethe form o f it s matter i s what enables th e objec t to cling t o exis-
tence. Matter come s in vastly different forms , an d som e forms persis t in th e
presence of destructive forces more robustl y than other forms . The form s of
elementary particle s see m particularl y resistan t t o bein g selecte d out ; the y
are th e ultimate survivors. Some of the most robus t of existents, the hardes t
to kill, are some of the simplest natural objects. Natural selection is simply the
differential applicatio n o f th e force s o f materia l disassembly , and particle s
are notabl y toug h t o break down .
Since the concept of natural selection is so universally applicable, it cannot
be what distinguishes organic existence from other kinds. What marks plants
and animal s off ar e th e mechanisms whereby they exis t t o be selecte d fo r o r
against. The y reproduce , generatin g clos e copies o f themselves , and gene s
are wha t accoun t fo r thi s proces s o f duplication . The y als o mutate , which
provides variatio n in th e bod y type s that compet e fo r survival . But i t is still
ultimately a question of which physical structures ar e most robust in warding
off natural destruction. The outpu t of the mechanisms is just a natural objec t
like a mountain, which endures o r does not, depending o n the natural force s
it encounters . Ther e i s no mor e teleolog y involve d i n th e existenc e o f on e
thing than the other. Natur e no more aim s to make cheetahs or humans tha n
it aim s t o mak e mountains .
Daniel Dennett i s keen t o stress the purposelessnes s o f natura l selection ,
to rub ou r nose s in our ow n contingency. It is a blind mechanica l algorithm ,
he says , but no t a n algorith m for anything . Natura l selectio n simply runs its
algorithmic course , throwin g u p whateve r materia l form s ar e leas t perish -
able, mos t replicable . There are n o "skyhooks, " only "cranes"mechanisti c
processes whic h happen t o lead t o complex organism s lik e ourselves: "Th e
theory of natural selectio n shows how every feature o f the natural world can
be th e produc t o f a blind , unforesightful , nonteleological , ultimatel y me -
chanical process of differential reproductio n ove r lon g period s o f time." Hi s
DENNETT: LEFTOVE R LIF E T O LIV E 19 9
conclusion that I can see, though Dennet t does not mention it, is to show how
receptivity to the altruis m meme migh t be a necessary by-product o f some -
thing with a significant genetic advantage, so that selecting it out wil l remov e
a trai t o f overridin g biologica l value. Thus i t migh t b e suggeste d tha t yo u
cannot enjoy the benefits of general intelligence without being susceptible to
occupation b y the altruis m meme . Bu t thes e ar e issue s Dennett fail s t o ad -
dress i n his rather unfocuse d an d disappointin g chapter s o n evolutio n an d
ethics. Once again, the issues are not as straightforward as he likes to suggest.
Dennett spend s som e tim e defendin g th e analog y betwee n gene s an d
memes, and does s o quite plausibly, but he does not take the next logical step
and not e tha t in fact gene s are a type of meme. This is simply because a gene
is best defined a s a unit of information, s o that what is passed o n t o offspring
is itsel f a semanti c vehicle , containin g instruction s fo r bod y construction .
Some meme s sprea d b y intentiona l communicationth e cultura l ones
while others spread throug h biologica l reproductionthe ones embodied in
DNA. Th e entir e proces s o f biologica l an d cultura l evolutio n i s therefor e
information-driven. Cultur e an d biolog y are unite d b y the centra l mecha -
nism of th e copyin g of information fro m on e sit e to anotherwhethe r ge -
nome or brain. Genes are selected according to whether the information they
contain builds bodies that work as effective protectiv e archives . We can thu s
think of genes as DNA-based memes enclosed in mobile biological libraries
animal bodies .
Dennett refers to Darwin's theory as a "dangerous idea" and a s a "univer-
sal acid" that remorselessly eats through our cherished system s of belief. I am
not convinced that it is as dangerous a s he suggests. Of course, it undermine s
religious creationism, but it does not threaten anything that a secular human -
ist might independently value. It certainly does not decrease one's respect for
the anima l world , includin g it s human members . No r nee d i t chang e th e
content of one's moral outlooksince you cannot deduce a moral ought from
a biologica l is. I t i s reall y n o mor e dangerou s tha n ou r post-Copernica n
astronomical ideas . I t i s high tim e tha t we stopped treatin g Darwinis m as a
battleground i n som e religiou s o r politica l war an d se e it fo r wha t it is a
profound an d true empirical theory, abundantly confirmed, but with several
areas in which there are problem s stil l unresolved. B y advertising Darwin's
theory as a dangerous acid , Dennett doe s the theor y a disservice; it is simply
the sober trut h an d nothin g t o be afraid of . Dennett's hyperboli c styl e may
well b e found excitin g by some, but ther e wil l be others wh o fin d th e over -
heated rhetori c mor e off-puttin g tha n stimulating . He ha s give n u s a per -
fectly adequate expositio n o f Darwin, brimming with boyish enthusiasm, but
many readers will find the controlle d passio n an d crystallin e purity o f Rich-
ard Dawkins' s writings more t o their taste .
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Ill
ETHICS
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33
Singer: Eatin g Animals I s Wrong
Animal Liberation, 2nd editio n
by Pete r Singe r
Cape, 199 0
207
208 E T H I C S
it a deal? The basi c argumentative strategy of the book is simple. First, Singer
establishes that speciesism is a morally unacceptable standpoint. Secondly , he
demonstrates tha t nothin g coul d justify ou r actua l treatment o f animals ex-
cept implici t adherence t o the speciesist attitude. Therefore , ou r treatmen t
of animals is morally wrong. Speciesism , for thos e wh o haven't heard, i s the
assumption tha t a mere differenc e o f biologica l species is sufficient t o war-
rant differential moral treatment, s o that the suffering and death o f animals
of species other tha n our ow n is ipso facto o f negligible moral weight. Species-
ism stands opposed t o the following principle, cogently defended b y Singer:
indistinguishable sufferin g shoul d b e accorde d comparabl e mora l weight ,
even when the sufferers belong to different species. Thus, speciesism makes
moral equalit y turn upo n biologica l taxonomy, irrespectiv e o f a creature' s
actual psychologica l capacities ; rathe r a s racis m an d sexis m invok e mer e
racial o r sexua l differenc e (themselve s biological distinctions ) a s a basis fo r
moral discrimination . Th e speciesis t is someone wh o want s to kno w what
zoological kind a sentient being belongs to before h e can decide whether it is
right to cause it pain; and if he happens t o be a human speciesist , he elevates
the huma n specie s above all othersbiological affinit y t o him is the decisive
qualification fo r seriou s mora l consideration .
Speciesism as a normative ethical principl e is easily refuted. I t is palpably
absurd t o tie moral concer n t o zoologica l classification instea d o f to th e ca-
pacities an d condition s i t directl y involvespain , pleasure , freedom , con -
finement, life , death. Sentienc e is what matters when it comes to the badnes s
of inflicting unnecessary suffering, not the geneti c makeu p o r evolutionar y
history o f th e organis m tha t doe s th e suffering . I f thi s i s not self-evident ,
then conside r th e followin g hypothetical cases . Martians invade Eart h an d
proceed t o enslave and exploit human beings: they do to us all the things we
now do to our fello w species on earth. Ou r live s accordingly become a hell of
fear, imprisonment, pain and earl y death. W e protest t o the militarily supe-
rior Martians , who are clearl y an intelligen t and compassionat e species : we
point out that they could get on perfectly well without ruining our lives . They
don't disagre e wit h thi s an d conced e tha t w e human s ar e sometime s a bit
roughly handled . However , the y insist , we have n o goo d mora l argumen t
against their flagrant exploitation of our species, since we are not of the same
biological kind, so that our sufferin g and death don' t count fo r muc h as far
as they are concerned . Thei r attitude towar d us, they point out , i s really no
different fro m ou r attitud e towar d specie s othe r tha n ou r ownan d the y
are, when al l is said, appreciably clevere r than us . Thus, thanks to the spe -
ciesist principle , the y needn' t scrupl e abou t brutall y killin g ou r factory -
farmed childre n fo r breakfast , instead o f having cereal.
Another case: suppose that in a few million years monkeys have evolved to
become a s intelligen t an d civilize d a s w e ar e now , whil e remainin g o f a
distinct species from us . Meanwhile human being s have persisted wit h their
monkey vivisection , oblivious t o th e psychologica l change s tha t hav e oc -
curred i n th e monkey . No w the monkey s ca n protes t abou t thes e huma n
210 ETHIC S
evil, revealing it for what it is. What we have here, I suggest, is an ol d enem y
bolstered b y a peculiar featur e of interspecies concern . Th e ol d enemy is the
First Law of Power Relations: the more powerful will always tend t o oppres s
the les s powerful, if they can ge t awa y with it. Where ther e i s vulnerability,
you wil l fin d tha t vulnerabilit y exploited an d magnified . Violenc e is invari-
ably th e ultimat e mean s o f subordination . Thi s la w hold s historicall y fo r
races, children , women , . . . an d animals . Dominatio n an d enslavemen t
are regularly visited on the relatively helpless: and animals are just one more
powerless group tha t ha s fallen victim to this law. Nor ca n the y s o much a s
speak out against their exploitation (thoug h they are quite capable of making
their feeling s know n t o thei r exploiters) . O f course , i t i s common t o fin d
some religiou s o r othe r ideolog y invoke d t o legitimiz e this kin d o f nake d
exercise o f power : bu t w e are no t no w so easily duped by this ploy in cases
other than tha t of animalswe are wis e to the way s of "false consciousness. "
In th e cas e o f animals , peopl e stil l fee l i n thei r bone s tha t thei r exploite d
position i s somehow writte n int o th e orde r o f things , tha t thi s i s what th e
universe intendsinstea d o f recognizin g i t fo r goo d old-fashione d power -
mongering. W e do it because we can and w e like it, and that' s really the en d
of the matter. Conjoi n this with the sadisti c impulses that are never fa r away
from th e abus e o f power , an d yo u hav e a profoundl y satisfyin g state o f
affairs fo r th e huma n species : w e get to fuc k animal s u p royall y and the y
can't so much as talk back to usnot even a stray rebel or terrorist t o handle .
Perfect! W e can the n flatte r ou r vanit y wit h the deliciou s though t o f ho w
much they have to sacrifice in order to gratify our trivia l fancies. "I must b e
very importan t becaus e m y coa t too k te n tormente d rar e wil d animal s t o
make it. As I am lord of all creation, i t is my God-given right to use animals in
any fashio n I se e fit. Why, it's the nex t bes t thin g t o being God! "
The specia l feature of animal exploitation, which makes the law of powe r
so ingrained i n thei r case , is that th e countervailin g forc e o f empath y i s so
much weaker here than elsewhere. Because other species live lives that diffe r
in variou s respect s fro m ours , an d becaus e the y loo k differen t an d mak e
different noises , it is less natural fo r u s to enter int o their poin t o f view and
appreciate ho w things are fo r them. I t takes an imaginative effort to see the
world as a turtle doesindeed, to recognize that a turtle sees the world in any
way. Just so , my invading Martians may have limited empathy when it comes
to understandin g ho w i t i s for u s t o b e locked i n tin y stalls, malnourished ,
experimented on , hunted , killed . Empathy is the chie f foe of discriminative
harm, and huma n empath y ca n be withheld from an exploited grou p i f that
group differs from us in some salient (though superficial) respect. I n the case
of animals, our capacit y for empath y tend s t o be fitful and arbitrary , senti -
mentally selective where i t is not barbarically absent. Here , the mora l bridg e
of identificatio n is apt t o b e shak y at best . Accordingly , i f speciesism , a s a
reflexive attitude beyond rationa l critique, is to be effectively undermined , i t
will be necessary to extend an d deepe n our capacit y for interspecifi c empa -
thy: we need to be able to look upon animal s with fresh eyes, unconditione d
SINGER: EATIN G ANIMAL S is WRON G 21 3
by the rol e i n which we have historically placed them , thu s to engage more
fully wit h their distinctiv e "forms o f life. " An d th e ke y to thi s is not som e
willed increas e i n th e amoun t o f affection we feel for othe r species : it must
come, rather , fro m a respec t base d upo n impartia l appreciatio n o f thei r
intrinsic nature. I t is a cognitive change mor e than an affectiv e on e that we
need. I n m y view, full y absorbin g th e idea tha t w e are al l contingent crea -
tures o f Darwinia n evolution, subject to it s laws and constraints , i s the bes t
way o f attaining the righ t perspectiv e o n th e live s of other animals : we are
just on e species among others, makin g our way in a not terribly sympathetic
world. Ther e i s n o sense i n whic h other animal s wer e mad e fo r u s (pace
Genesis). Wha t distinguishe s us fro m the m i s our abilit y t o injec t a mora l
dimension int o thes e natura l facts : an d s o not g o right ahea d an d exploi t
whatever w e can at whatever cost to our victim . Animals are no t inherentl y
our tools , and w e have the mora l capacity to recognize tha t the y should no t
be reduced t o that status. Instead, think of other species as existing indepen -
dently of our species , and a s having their ow n enormously long evolutionary
history; the n remembe r tha t the y hav e a mod e o f sentienc e tha t goe s with
their biologica l nature , just a s we do. Don' t thin k of animal s as convenient
natural artifacts whose existence is exhausted b y their relation to us: they are
autonomous beings . W e onc e gav e u p a geocentri c conceptio n o f th e uni -
verse, i n whic h we sa t at th e cosmi c centre; no w w e need t o complet e th e
Darwinian revolution and accep t that the anima l creation i s not fundamen-
tally anthropocentric. Speciesis m wil l end onl y when this kind o f informe d
modesty has been properl y achieved .
Singer completes the argumen t of Animal Liberation with a telling chapter
on th e histor y o f anima l abus e an d th e gradua l recognitio n tha t th e la w
should prohibit at least some of the grosser form s of human cruelty. He deals
also with all the counterarguments t o his position that he has heard, however
fatuous these may be. He concludes with a challenge to the reader: "through -
out this book I have relied on rationa l argument . Unles s you can refute th e
central argumen t o f this book, yo u shoul d now recognize tha t speciesis m is
wrong, and thi s means that, if you take morality seriously, you should tr y t o
eliminate speciesis t practice s fro m you r ow n life , an d oppos e the m else -
where." I ca n only reiterate thi s challenge.
What doe s th e futur e hol d fo r animals ? Twenty year s ag o I wa s very
pessimistic about th e possibility of fundamental change, because at that time
even morally alive people foun d the very idea of animal rights merely quaint.
Today thi s is a respectabl e par t o f th e politica l agenda. I t i s nice to b e re -
garded no longer as a naive eccentric, a squeamish sentimentalist with mysti-
cal leaning s (me , mystical!) . Perhap s th e progres s tha t ha s alread y bee n
made, suc h as it is, will continue and accelerate , leadin g t o radical improve-
ments for animals . It is arguable tha t we are no w in a transitional period, in
which ol d prejudices an d ideologie s abou t th e cosmi c place of animals have
crumbled, yet our mora l reactions are lagging behind; that it is only a matter
of tim e befor e w e wak e up ethicall y to wha t we alread y implicitl y believ e
214 ETHIC S
215
216 E T H I C S
Strange t o say, not all human institutions owe their existence to sound mora l
reasoningnot even those that have proved themselves most durable. Mon-
archy, slavery, patriarchy, dictatorship, child labor: these practices were sus-
tained b y power an d advantage , no t b y their invulnerabilit y to mora l criti -
cism. Spuriou s mora l defenses , ofte n bizarrel y ingenious, hav e grow n u p
around thes e practices , enablin g thei r beneficiarie s to sooth e thei r con -
sciences o r t o war d of f thei r critics , bu t fe w would no w pretend tha t thes e
exercises of power enjoy any defensible ethical rationale. The suggestio n that
slaves wer e made t o b e exploited , b y God o r nature , woul d no t no w b e re -
ceived a s anything other tha n self-servin g delusion. Enslave d persons have
their inherent mora l rights to life, liberty, and th e pursui t of happiness, an d
the institutio n of slaver y violates these rights . This ma y no t hav e bee n ob -
vious then , but i t i s a platitud e now.
In recen t decades , w e have grow n use d t o hearin g a comparabl e claim
made o n behalf of animals. It is said that they, too, are th e victim s of unjust
exploitation. We humans use them a s means to our ends , without regard fo r
their inalienabl e rights. W e treat animal s in way s tha t ar e contrar y t o thei r
interestsas whe n w e eat them , confin e them, experimen t o n them , hun t
them, wear their skinsan d thi s is a plain violatio n of mora l principle . W e
are, i n effect , discriminatin g agains t animal s on th e basi s of thei r species .
Isn't this really just an exercise o f brut e power, devoid o f moral foundation ?
218
PLUHAR: BOR N FRE E 21 9
Held an d Baier :
Mothers an d Moralist s
Feminist Morality: Transforming Culture,
Society, and Politics
by Virginia Hel d
University o f Chicag o Press , 199 4
Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics
by Annette C. Baier
Harvard Universit y Press, 199 4
224
HELD AN D BAIER : MOTHER S AN D MORALIST S 22 5
David Hume, two hundred years earlier, had proclaimed tha t the founda-
tion of morality is not reason, but emotion . Reason may direct the "passions "
in moral contexts, but i t is fundamentally their slave . Moral altruism towar d
others originates in a "natural sympathy" with which we are endowed, and it
spreads outward from th e famil y t o more impersonal kind s of human rela -
tion. Our mora l sense, said Hume, is governed b y innate fellow feeling , not
by the affectless cognition of abstract truths; and despit e Kant's opposition to
this vie w o f morality , it became th e dominan t conception . I n ou r century ,
indeed, "emotivism" came to be the received view. Moral philosophy has thus
been awas h with emotion fo r a considerable time, and thos e dispensin g all
this affec t hav e been mainl y men.
Bernard Williams , among livin g moral theorists , is noted fo r hi s opposi-
tion t o the impersona l character o f certai n ethica l theories, especiall y utili-
tarianism. Such theories invite us to act solely on the principle of maximizing
the total of human happiness, without regard to our own personal relation to
those bein g benefited o r harmed . A s Williams observes , this sor t o f mora l
reasoning confers n o special statu s upon those with whom we are intimately
involvedfamily, friends , neighbors . Bu t suc h relations , argues Williams,
carry thei r ow n mora l value , whic h should no t b e swallowe d up i n som e
global calculation of th e likel y effect s o f m y actions on peopl e in general . I
owe special duties to my intimates; and therefore impersona l moral theorie s
distort th e patter n o f obligation s that define s m y mora l space . Williams's
maleness does no t see m t o have impeded hi m from appreciating thi s point,
which seem s appreciable b y anyone with huma n intelligence .
I adduce these three moral theorists because they constitute something of
an embarrassment for the historical and psychological theory put forward by
some feminist mora l philosophers, including Virginia Held an d Annett e C.
Baier. That theory is simple: moral philosophy has been produced mainl y by
men, unde r conditions of patriarchy, and s o it has neglected o r rejected th e
moral insights that are the prerogative of women. Each of the three contribu-
tions'cited (Moore's, Hume's, and Williams's ) is routinely arrogated b y femi-
nist mora l theorists to themselves, as somehow uniquely their province : the
value of affection betwee n people, the emphasis on moral emotion as a guide
to judgment, th e importanc e o f th e famil y an d othe r intimate s in shapin g
one's mora l world.
Clearly, then , mal e mora l philosopher s hav e bee n abl e t o overcom e
whatever malig n intellectual effects ste m from malenes s and mal e domina-
tion. For it is a raw historical fact that it did no t take feminism to make these
ideas possible. Moreover, there is nothing distinctively feminist about thes e
ideas, beyon d th e fac t tha t the y appea l t o certai n feminists . Thes e philo -
sophical notion s ar e gender-neutral , availabl e in principl e to an y reflectiv e
person; the y ar e base d o n intellectua l grounds tha t i n n o wa y owe thei r
origins to anything specific t o women. As in other areas o f philosophy, you
can hav e worthwhile ideas n o matte r wha t se x you are. Yo u nee d onl y th e
brains an d th e patience.
226 E T H I C S
lies, then w e are all under a n obligation to be mothers, since we should striv e
to be a s good a s possible; bu t sinc e "ought" implie s "can, " onl y women fal l
under thi s edict, and s o alland onlywome n ar e oblige d t o be mothers ,
assuming tha t the y ar e biologicall y capable. Bu t thi s assign s to wome n th e
patriarchal obligatio n o f havin g childre n an d bringin g the m up , wit h this
obligation morall y trumping an y other project s that they might entertain. I
doubt tha t Hel d woul d welcom e thi s resul t o f he r position , bu t i t follow s
logically fro m wha t she i s saying. Held's vie w i s also reactionary, a t leas t by
implication, in a more genera l way. Insofar as it selects the famil y as the focus
of ou r mora l concern , i t is only too likel y t o lead t o indifferenc e an d wors e
when i t comes t o thos e no t relate d t o u s b y blood ties , since famil y feelin g
cannot be simply willed into existence. In order to extend ou r mora l concer n
beyond th e fiel d o f our intimates , we need impersona l principle s o f justice
and consideration , o r th e despise d apparatu s o f "male " mora l thinking .
Held has some subsidiary concerns to which she thinks a feminist perspec-
tive wil l contribute . Sh e ha s a chapte r deplorin g th e commercializatio n o f
culture in capitalist countries suc h as the United States, and sh e suggests that
feminists wil l shar e he r condemnation . Maybe , but agai n ther e i s nothin g
distinctively feminis t about th e complaint , righ t o r wrong , tha t contempo -
rary culture has been debased b y the power of big economic interests. There
is also a rather tire d and unconvincin g chapter abou t violence and gender, in
which it is predictably maintained tha t men ar e responsible fo r violence and
war, while women are pacific and nurturing. Th e empirica l grounds fo r this,
as always, are inconclusive, and Hel d certainl y oversimplifies the attitudes of
men and women toward violence and its prevention. I t is odd, too, to sugges t
that the family is the place to look for a nonviolent culture when, as we know,
there i s so much violence within families, and no t all of it committed b y men.
Families are a s much a part of the proble m a s a part of the solution . But th e
wickedness of women seem s not t o appear i n her worldview , except, I sup-
pose, a s the resul t o f mal e domination .
Held's idea l societ y would b e dedicated , sh e says , t o th e "flourishin g of
children," with that aim being accorded a higher priorit y than i t is now. It is
hard t o disagree wit h the sentiment behind this , but it should no t be forgot-
ten tha t th e well-bein g o f adult s i s als o o f importance . Childre n becom e
adults, after all, and thei r problem s don' t sto p when the y do. I t is idiotic t o
suppose tha t i f childre n wer e give n mor e attention , th e ill s o f th e worl d
would disappear. Indeed , fro m Held' s poin t o f view, it is not easy to see how
more motherin g coul d b e th e solutio n t o ou r problems , sinc e sh e believes
that i t is women, not men , wh o now shape th e mora l outloo k o f the youn g
during thei r developmen t (th e men bein g of f a t wor k an d war) . On e ca n
readily imagine a dystopian future in which the young are catered t o lavishly
while th e ol d ar e lef t t o rack an d ruin .
And the n ther e i s a mor e strictl y philosophical matter , whic h i s Held' s
persistent denigratio n o f the us e of abstract rule s in morality, viewing them
as someho w cu t of f fro m contex t an d feeling . This i s a tendentious carica -
230 ETHIC S
ture. Abstract rules can be rules about feeling and action, and they can always
be qualified t o allow for variations of context. The rul e that one should trea t
others a s one woul d wish to be treated onesel f i s by no means an abstractio n
removed fro m concrete reality. Such rules play an indispensable moral role.
A moralit y without them woul d b e vulnerabl e t o caprice , specia l pleadin g
and shee r chaos . If genera l rule s ar e someho w characteristic of male mora l
thinking (which I doubt), then men have made a contribution to morality of
great moment , whic h it would be foll y t o repudiate o n ground s o f feminist
ideology.
Annette C . Baler's boo k i s more successfu l tha n Held's . She , too , write s
from a feminis t standpoint, bu t sh e i s much les s anxious t o conver t ever y
insight into a victory for feminism . I t must also be said that her book is clearly
superior t o Held' s fo r intellectua l substance an d literar y style. This i s no t
because she is any less of a feminist than Held; she is just a more circumspect
and war y philosopher. Sh e know s what it takes to establis h a philosophical
position. He r discussion s of trust, in particular, constitute a serious effort at
understanding; and her treatment of Hume and Kant on the role of emotion
and reaso n i n ethic s shows real scholarl y ability.
But she, too, occasionally lapses into ideological bias and dubious rhetoric .
Take her discussio n of Hume. Unlik e Held, Baier has the grace to acknowl-
edge that many of Hume' s centra l doctrines prefigure themes that are dea r
to contemporary feminis t philosophers, and sh e discusses Hume with sensi-
tivity and resourcefulness. There is no tendency here to disagree wit h Hume
because he was a man. In a pair of essays called "Hume, th e Women's Moral
Theorist?" and "Hume , the Reflectiv e Women's Epistemologist?" Baier con-
tends tha t Hume' s philosoph y fits the kin d o f mora l outloo k tha t Gilliga n
claimed t o fin d exemplified by females, suggesting that Hum e i s "an unwit-
ting virtual woman." But surely it is a contortion t o infer from Hume' s moral
theory that he has a female moral faculty, rather than inferring that his (and
her) kind o f positio n is intrinsically gender-neutral. B y Baier's method, any
good ide a coul d b e pu t dow n t o femaleness . Th e attraction s o f Hume' s
thought ar e purel y intellectual ; they ar e no t th e consequence s o f som e fe -
male essenc e tha t occasionall y takes up residenc e i n men' s bodies . Hume' s
position avoid s th e nonnaturalis m o f mor e "cognitivist " positions , an d i t
carries al l the appea l o f empiricist theories i n general. That is why it was so
strongly favore d b y logical positivism, a male bastion i f ever ther e was one.
Baier's main theme is trust. Her plain t is that trust has not been accorde d
the plac e i n mora l theor y tha t it s importance warrants . Trust , sh e thinks,
should be the centra l concep t of ethics. She sees it as woven into virtually all
human encounters , fro m th e mos t warml y personal t o th e mos t austerel y
economic. Sh e also appreciate s it s intense psychologica l significance for us ,
both a s a source of well-being and a s a possible source of emotional distress .
We can't do withou t trust, but it s abuse can be devastating. Trust is not th e
same as merely believing that someone wil l behave reliably, since that migh t
depend upo n a mutuall y know n powe r t o tak e reveng e o n violation s of
HELD AN D B A I E R : M O T H E R S AN D MORALIST S 23 1
contract. Trust is faith in the goo d wil l and th e good sens e of others, a sort of
leap in the dark. One of the things it seems to take at least a lifetime to learn is
whom t o trust, an d when . Mistakes as to who is trustworthy are amon g th e
most emotionall y costl y that huma n being s ca n make .
The importanc e o f trust is surely one of the few areas o f moral agreemen t
that w e have. Fo r thi s reason, an y philosophica l attemp t t o clarif y th e con-
cept, and t o enable us to do better a t trusting and being trusted , ca n only be
to th e good . Afte r readin g Baier' s hundre d o r s o page s o n th e subject ,
however, I did not feel particularly enlightened. Th e proble m i s that it is very
hard t o say anything philosophicall y interesting abou t trust , despit e it s hu-
man significance . W e ar e bette r educate d i n th e way s o f trus t b y works of
literature an d b y experience tha n b y quasi-conceptual investigation s o f it s
necessary an d sufficien t conditions . I suspec t tha t thi s i s th e rea l reaso n
behind th e relativ e neglect o f th e topi c i n mora l philosophy . I t i s not tha t
trust is a concept o f more interes t t o women than men, no r tha t i t somehow
conflicts wit h othe r mora l idea s favore d b y men; it is simply difficult t o d o
any goo d philosoph y o n th e concept . Onc e trus t ha s been free d fro m th e
narrow domain o f contractual obligation, as Baier rightly says it should be, it
is hard t o come u p wit h anythin g genera l an d illuminatin g to sa y about it .
The mos t political chapter o f Baier's book, called "Ethic s in Many Differ -
ent Voices, " has some curiou s an d disturbin g moments . Her e sh e is at he r
most self-consciously feminist. Speakin g of the presenc e o f women philoso -
phers i n academi c institutions , she writes:
Wow. I don't kno w what kind of seminars Baie r has been attending , bu t my
own femal e colleagues simpl y proceed b y makin g thei r point s a s incisively
and civill y a s is appropriate. I hav e neve r fel t tha t m y eg o wa s being pro-
tected b y women, beyond wha t any tactful perso n woul d do, nor hav e I fel t
imperiled, i n th e semina r roo m o r i n th e boudoir , b y castratin g teet h o r
postmenopausal predators . I s it really necessary to say that i n philosophy we
try to seek the truth, and tha t hones t criticism, constructive and destructive ,
is part of that enterprise? Seriou s philosopher s o f either se x remember onl y
that simple rule when wondering ho w to comport themselve s in the semina r
room.
Later in the same essay Baier raises the question o f tenure for women. She
tells us that women "tend t o get into thei r writin g stride a s men o f the sam e
232 ETHIC S
233
234 ETHICS
giving money to charity is good I have a reason t o do it, but that reason hold s
whether o r no t I wan t to giv e mone y t o charity. I ma y not car e abou t th e
people wh o will be benefited, but ther e i s still a reason fo r m e to do ittha t
they wil l b e benefited . S o moral reason s d o no t appea r t o depen d o n m y
contingent desires . T o man y philosopher s tha t i s hard t o take : ho w coul d
reasons no t involv e desires?
Philippa Foo t i s foremost amon g thos e wh o have jibbed a t the notio n o f
reasons tha t are independent o f desires. Sh e doesn't believ e in goodness a s a
property that , once recognized , provide s reasons fo r action . Moralit y itself
does not , fo r her , suppl y any reasons fo r action ; reasons com e in only when
agents hav e desires tha t happe n t o conform t o morality's prescriptions :
Moral judgments are, I say , hypothetical imperatives in the sens e that they
give reason s for actin g only in conjunction with interest s and desires . W e
cannot chang e that, though w e could kee p u p th e pretenc e tha t it is other-
wise. T o han g onto th e illusion , and trea t mora l judgments a s necessarily
reason-giving, i s something I woul d compare t o a simila r choice i n matter s
of etiquette; an d indee d w e do find some wh o treat th e consideration tha t
something is "bad form " o r "no t done " a s if it had a magical reason-giving
force.*
That a n actio n i s morally good i s thus not a reason wh y I shoul d d o it . I
have no more reason t o refrain from murder o n account of its badness than I
do t o refrai n fro m holdin g m y for k i n m y righ t han d whe n i n England ,
where it isn't done. Reasons enter th e picture only if I happen t o desire to act
in accordance wit h the rul e in question. Morality thus has no intrinsic ratio-
nal authorit y over ou r wills . There is nothing contrar y to reason abou t no t
doing the right thing, and irrationality can only consist in not doing what will
best satisf y ou r desire s (which may be egoisti c or altruistic).
This doctrin e is rightly seen a s subversive and disturbing . The mer e fac t
that something is good i s not, accordin g to Foot , eve n a start at providin g a
reason t o do it; it is the wron g kind of consideration altogether . W e get into
the real m o f reason s onl y when w e dig around i n someone' s actua l desire s
and decid e tha t h e happen s t o want to do variou s things, a s it might b e t o
keep promises. Reasons are internal to the agent an d variable across agents;
morality's apparent universalit y is a fiction. Thi s i s a radical view. Instead o f
being able to say to the miscreant, "You should do such and such" and expec t
this to supply him with a reason, we can only say, "If you look inside yourself,
you wil l se e that yo u reall y want to do suc h and such. " Rational persuasio n
then come s t o an en d i f he retorts , "Actually , I don' t wan t to do suc h an d
such, than k you very much. "
Such a vie w put s Philipp a Foot , th e mode l o f propriety , n o sor t o f wil d
woman, into the same camp as the most extreme mora l nihilist. She does no t
reject th e content of ordinary moralit y or favo r existentia l choice as the way
*Philippa Foot , Virtues and Vices, Berkeley : Universit y of California Press , 1978 , p . 29 .
FOOT: GOO D THING S 23 5
But whic h propositions abou t desires? There seem t o be only two serious
options: first, the proposition that I have the desire; second, th e propositio n
that satisfyin g th e desir e woul d b e a goo d thin g i n som e way . Th e firs t
possibility is surely inadequate: wh y should the mere fact that I have a desire
be a reason t o act on it? Quinn give s the example of a brute desire to turn o n
any radi o I com e across . Surel y a reason shoul d mak e i t apparent tha t m y
action has some good attache d t o it. But the mere fac t that I have the desir e
fails t o delive r that . An d wha t abou t desire s i t i s no t goo d t o ac t on , sa y
jumping of f a hig h buildin g whe n unde r th e influenc e o f vertigo ? Isn' t i t
really because satisfying a given desire is good that it is reasonable (when it is)
to ac t on it ?
So we move on t o the secon d alternative: the proposition tha t if satisfyin g
my desire is a good thing, this gives me a reason t o act on it. But this explicitly
assigns a valu e to something : t o th e satisfactio n of a desire . S o the desir e
theory is not an alternative to the theory tha t locates reasons i n values them-
selves; i t i s simply a specia l case o f tha t theory . W e nee d a n independen t
ascription of value for a desire t o become a reason. Th e reaso n fo r acting on
the desire is that some good wil l come of it. The desir e causes the action, but
its reasonableness depend s o n th e non-causa l property o f goodness .
This shows that even for egoistic desires an ascription of value is needed if
they ar e t o becom e reasons . Bu t the n th e obviou s commonsense poin t t o
make about moral reasons is that they can function simply in virtue of moral
values, or the recognition of such. My reason for giving money to charity was
that I saw it as morally good; just as my reason fo r eating a banana would be
that I saw it as prudendally good. If I am asked to justify these actions I do so
in th e sam e basic way: by showing that the y have goo d results , morally o r
prudendally. I certainly don't justify the m by simply recording th e presenc e
of an urge, though I might cite this as their cause ; and i f I do so this is really
an elliptical form of the fulle r proposition tha t it was a desire whose satisfac-
tion would be a good thing . Even if. some good attache s to th e satisfactio n of
any desire at all, the point stil l standsthat it is this goodness that constitutes
the reaso n fo r actin g on it . Suppos e w e were t o identif y ou r desir e wit h a
particular brain state; can it then be seriously maintained that our reaso n fo r
doing somethingour justificationis simply that we are in this brain state?
That migh t wel l b e what causes us to act , but i t is not i n virtu e of thi s tha t
desires supply reasonsthey do so only because they meet certain evaluative
conditions. I t i s reasonable t o ac t on ou r desire s whe n an d onl y when i t is
good t o satisf y them . Thu s value s enter int o reason s fro m th e start . Th e
upshot o f Quinn' s pape r i s that Foot' s desir e theor y ha s misconceive d th e
nature o f reason s quit e fundamentally , and i n doin g s o ha s generate d a
pseudoproblem abou t mora l reasons . Practica l reaso n i s concerned b y it s
nature wit h value s as such: they ar e it s proper subjec t matter.
Gavin Lawrence arrives at a similar position, though a t greater and mor e
diffuse length . It is odd that he makes no mention of Quinn's work in view of
the similarit y between the m an d th e fac t tha t the y wer e colleague s unti l
FOOT: GOO D THING S 23 7
Warren's tragic early death b y suicide as this volume was being prepared. (I
became friend s with Warren a t UCLA in 1979 : that a person o f his charm,
kindness, and integrity , as well as intellectual talents, should take his own life
is the kin d of thing to which it is impossible to become reconciled.) Lawrence
makes th e sam e goo d poin t abou t th e foundationa l rol e o f value s in th e
operation o f practical reason. It would have been interestin g to know Foot's
reaction to these arguments an d it is a pity that she hasn't contributed replies
to the paper s i n this volume.
Of the other contributions those by Simon Blackburn and John McDowell
make an opposing pair. McDowell, writing with the preacherly obscurity that
has come, regrettably, to characterize his work, offers t o defend a new kind
of moral naturalism that reaches back to Aristotle. His point seems to be that
since the ris e of science in the seventeent h century we have become steepe d
in a vie w o f th e natura l worl d a s comprising onl y the kind s o f fact s men -
tioned by the physical sciences, but that the Greeks would have found a place
for a wide r set , includin g fact s involvin g moral values . The ideolog y sur -
rounding scienc e has made u s tunnel-visioned, so that w e suppose values to
be grounded merel y i n subjectiv e human responses .
So far, not s o unreasonable. But , in opposition t o this , McDowell argues
for a view o f nature tha t ha s "intelligibl e order" built into it : "the worl d of
nature is internal to th e spac e o f logos, in which thought ha s it s being," h e
intones. Bu t what could thi s mean? How "internal"? Th e idea i s in obvious
danger of reducing either to a triviality or to an obvious falsehood (assuming
we rejec t idealism , a s McDowel l wants us to) . Eithe r i t mean s simpl y that
thought succeeds in representing th e worldour thoughts sometimes corre-
spond t o ho w things are; which is trivial. Or i t means tha t natur e contain s
thought itself, which is idealism o r mayb e panpsychism. I t is of course true
that objectiv e reality must b e suc h tha t though t ca n represen t it , i f it doe s
represent it ; but i t surely doesn't follo w that "the natural world is not consti-
tutively independent o f the structur e of subjectivity," in the sense that there
would be no such world if there were no such subjectivity. Kantian idealism
does not follo w fro m the correspondence theor y of truth. McDowell is push-
ing for the idea (I use the phrase advisedly) that thought and natur e shar e a
common feature or structure, but it is notoriously hard t o make sense of this
without implyin g idealism. Hume sai d w e spread ou r mind s o n th e world ;
McDowell's view appears t o be that th e worl d i s already sprea d wit h mind.
Finding values in the world is then nothin g but finding that our mind s have
got there before us. It is difficult t o see what any of this could mean, unless it
is a frank espousal of the Kantian doctrine that the world of our experience is
really an experientia l world , that is , idealism. McDowell's discussion of this
central issue is so obscure, metaphorical , an d undevelope d tha t one ha s n o
idea whether anything can be made t o rest on it on behalf of moral realism.
Blackburn defends th e opposit e poin t of view: that values are reflections
of human sentiment, are subjective to the core. You know where you are with
Balckburn; at least you know where he wants you to be. His doctrine is that
238 ETHIC S
240
COLLINGWOOD: HOMAG E T O EDUCATIO N 24 1
What Collingwood doe s no t say , so I will say it for him , is that peopl e d o
not reall y like the truth ; the y fee l coerce d b y reason, bullie d b y fact . I n a
certain sense , this is not irrational, since a commitment to believe only what is
true implies a willingness to detach your beliefs from your desires. You won't
always get to believe exactly what you want to believe if you insist on believing
only what is true. Fro m th e poin t of view of maximizing desire satisfaction , a
commitment to truth i s a poor strategy, at least in the shor t term, since truth
is inherentl y indifferen t t o desire . Trut h limit s your freedom , i n a way,
because i t reduce s you r belie f options ; i t i s quite capabl e o f forcin g you r
mind to go against its natural inclinations. This, I suspect, is the root psycho-
logical cause of the relativisti c view of truth, for that view gives me license to
believe whatever it pleases me to believethe truth is always my truth. Objec-
tive nonrelativ e trut h tend s t o b e fel t a s inhuman, lackin g in compassion .
There is thus a basic endogenous obstacl e to our reachin g that level of cogni-
tive healt h require d fo r flawles s conformit y to epistemi c norms ; an d i f so,
democracy itself come s into conflic t wit h a deep fact abou t huma n nature
our reluctance , in a word, to follo w th e trut h whereve r it may lead. (Henc e
Plato's suggestion that philosophers be kingsthey being specially trained o r
tuned t o the truth.) One of the central aims of education, as a preparation fo r
political democracy , shoul d b e to enable peopl e t o get on bette r term s with
reasonto learn to live with the truth . And thi s will involve, as Collingwood
stressed, an educatio n tha t produce s critica l self-knowledge. It i s a substan-
tive, and neglected, and I would say unsolved, problem o f educational theor y
to conside r ho w thi s huma n accommodatio n wit h trut h migh t b e brough t
about. Certainly, twentieth-century man (an d woman) is very far fro m meet-
ing thi s essential condition fo r a well-functioning democracy. Indeed , I d o
not thin k tha t th e urgenc y an d importanc e o f th e tas k ar e a t al l widely
appreciated. Th e cognitiv e health o f moder n democracie s lag s fa r behin d
their bodil y health, ye t thi s i s scarcely even perceive d a s a seriou s political
problem.
On on e issu e I think Collingwood oversteps the mark : h e seem s t o have
taken it to be a corollary of his conception o f civilizatio n that there is such a
thing as "right imperialism. " He cites the supposedly beneficial effects o f the
Roman domination o f Europe, and he wonders what untold advances British
imperialism migh t confe r o n Asi a an d Africa . Tha t is , he think s tha t a n
allegedly higher leve l of intellectual and politica l attainment o n th e par t of
one state can legitimate an imperialist policy with respect to another. Her e he
shows himself to be a man o f his time (an d o f much earlie r times ) in a way
that Russell , say, was not. I t i s true enoug h tha t i f you instantiat e a highe r
level of civilization than m e the n i t would be a kindness for yo u t o offe r t o
improve my lot, but i t does no t follow tha t you have the right t o force me to
accept your tutelag e agains t my will; and th e sam e poin t hold s for relation s
between mor e an d les s civilized states (assuming such a ranking t o b e fea -
sible). Collingwood is making the mistake, natural to a don, of conceiving the
246 ETHICS
Renewing Philosophy
by Hilar y Putna m
Harvard, 199 2
247
248 E T H I C S
255
256 INDEX
fact, 9 0 Godel, K. , 36
brute, 19 3 incompleteness theorems , 66 , 67, 68, 69
humanly constructed, 19 3 Godlovitch, R. , 207
intention-dependent, 19 5 Godlovitch, S., 207
language-independent, 19 4 Goethe,]., 20 , 31
ontological dependence o f thesocial o n goodness. See ethics
the nonsocial , 19 1 Gould, S., 19 9
social, 192- 5 ghost, 41 , 42, 43, 45, 46
stipulated, 19 6 grammar, 20 , 147-56 , 18 7
and use , 191 gravimetrics, 5 1
faith, 25 3 gravitational theor y o f quantum action ,
family, 225 , 227-9 71
Farrell, B., 10 6 Gregory, R. , 87, 15 4
fathers, 227-8 Grice, H. , 58 , 134
feelings. See emotio n
Field, H. , 16 3 Haldol, 17 1
first-person ascription , 188 , 189 "Hard Cor e Mysterian, " 109 , 110
Fitzgerald, E., 43 Harman, G. , 18 1
Flanagan, O. , 10 7 Harris, J., 207
Fodor,J., 107 , 113, 118-24, 129 , 189, Harvard Universit y philosophy depart -
190, 19 9 ment, 52-3, 133
folk psychology , 80-3, 87, 103 , 113, 122 - Hegel, G. , 48, 24 1
4, 248 Hegelian monism , 3 6
Foot, P. , 233-9 Held, V. , 224-32
forgiveness, 24 2 heroism, 23 , 24 , 45
formal semantics , 23 Hintikka, M. , 13 3
formalism, 6 7 history, 240-6
Foucault, M. , 26 holism, 123 , 124, 129, 161
foundationalism, 3 7 Honderich, T., 61
Foundations of Arithmetic, 17 0 Horizon magazine , 5 6
free will , 88, 97 , 109 , 110, 126 , 234 humanism, 5 6
freedom, 56 , 82, 97, 126 , 209, 215, 222 , Hume, D . 158-9, 164-8 , 175 , 225, 227 ,
243, 24 5 230, 25 0
Frege, G. , 12 , 14 , 23, 26, 35 , 36 , 49 , 52 , Humphrey, N. , 74-9
126, 170 , 174, 183 Hutcheson, F. , 31
Fregean sense , 119 , 12 0
Freud, S. , 242 idea, 164-5 , 166
Freudian theory , 29 , 16 8 idealism, 6, 35, 48, 96, 237, 241
Frey, R., 215-7 identity claims , 93, 94, 18 3
function, 191-6 , 202 and necessity , 181
functionalism, 77 , 91 , 101 , 103, 104, 120 , image, 18 7
151 immortality, 17 7
machine, 249 , 251 imperialism, 245-6
impressions, 16 6
indeterminacy thesis , 150 , 161-2
Gazzaniga, M. , 8 6 see also referenc e
Geach, P., 11 8 indexicality, 16 9
genes, 109 , 202-3 indexing, 83
genius, 11 , 16 , 23, 26 , 29 , 30 , 31 , 38 , 40 , indirect discourse , 12 9
50, 5 1 induction, 48, 134,248
Gentile, G. , 24 1 inductivism, 9 5
geodesy, 5 1 inference t o the best explanation, 4 8
Gilligan, C., 226, 230 information/informational, 80 , 101 , 103,
God, 42 , 45 , 52 , 57, 58 , 14 5 137, 202-3 , 217
INDEX 259
inquiry, 49 of language , 24 9
see also Peirce , C . limits of, 15 6
innateness, 120 , 121 , 152-6 , 24 8 of logic, 24 9
instrumentalism, 114 , 137, 157-9 of mathematics , 24 9
intelligence, 107 , 200 objective, 48, 88 , 247
intensionality, 137 , 162 psychology of , 4 9
see also content; meanin g scientific, 247-5 3
intention, 83, 134 , 135, 141, 169, 251 self-knowledge, 190 , 245
and action , 97 , 139-40 , 169 sociology of , 4 9
collective, 192- 5 see also epistemology
intentionality, 137 , 187, 19 0 Korsakov's syndrome , 172 , 173
causal accoun t of , 25 1 Kripke, S. , 83, 181-3 , 188 , 250
ideological account of , 25 1
see also content ; meaning ; min d L-dopa, 17 1
interest, 25 2 Laing, R. , 17 6
see also animals; marginal humans Lamarck, J-B., 201-2
internal speech , 18 7 language, 19 , 20, 21 , 22 , 126 , 149, 162,
interpretationalism, 11 4 187, 216 , 248
introspection, 78 , 85 , 86 , 10 6 see also speec h ac t theor y
Ireland, 13 , 24 language acquisition , 147-5 2
creative theor y thesis , 153 , 154, 155
Jackson, F. , 11 6 ontogenesis o f th e languag e faculty , 15 2
James, W. , 50, 53, 56, 25 3 poverty of th e stimulu s thesis, 152
Jarman, D., 18 , 24, 25 language-game, 20, 187
jock nerd , 60- 1 language o f thought, 114 , 118, 119, 120 ,
Johns Hopkin s University , 50, 52 123
Johnson, K. , 25 Language, Truth and Logic, 55
Johnson-Laird, P. , 87, 12 3 law, 129 , 244, 251-2
Journal of Philosophy, 10 6 of nature , 60 , 126 , 137, 197
Joyce, J., 2 6 of non-contradiction , 5 7
judgment, 118 , 239 psychological, 12 8
justice, 22 6 psychophysical, 128 , 137
justification, 129 , 145, 159 , 180, 235, 244 see also causation ; Davidso n D. ; fol k
empirical, 130 , 131, 161 psychology
Lawrence, D. H., 33 , 44
Kant, I. , 31 , 95 , 109 , 159, 166, 179, 225 , Lawrence, G. , 236-7
227, 230, 237, 250 Leibniz, G., 52 , 25 0
Keynes, J., 27 Lepore, E. , 13 3
Kierkegaard, S. , 251, 253 Lewis, D. , 11 6
Kinsbourne, M. , 87 life, 22 2
Klagge.J., 18,2 1 good, 9 8
knowledge, 26 , 89 , 95 , 107 , 111, 147, happy, 88 , 98
149-50, 167 , 168, 179, 183, 185 , meaning of, 56 , 58-9, 89 , 97
186, 244-5 moral, 88 , 98
analyses of, 179-8 0 linguistic theory, 14 7
causal, 17 9 "linguistic turn, " 4 9
information-theoretic, 17 9 Llinas, R. , 8 3
a posteriori , 18 3 Locke, J., 11 , 119, 164, 166
a priori , 95 , 182-3 , 247, 24 9 John Lock e Prize, 54, 55
contingent a priori, 18 2 logic, 12 , 26, 29 , 35 , 37 , 48 , 49 , 52 , 65 ,
by acquaintance , 24 7 82-3, 96 , 125 , 126, 127, 130, 143,
concept of , 17 9 145, 148-9 , 235, 238
by description , 24 7 indexical, 16 3
ethical, 24 7 informal, 5 2
260 INDEX