LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO

vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 132601. October 12, 1998

FACTS :

On June 25, 1996, petitioner was convicted for the rape of his
common law spouses ten year old daughter and was sentenced
to death penalty. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time
the constitutionality of RA 7659 The Death Penalty Law, and
the imposition of death penalty for the crime of rape. The motions
were denied with the court finding no reason to declare it
unconstitutional and pronouncing Congress compliant with the
requirements for its imposition.

Act 8177 was passed amending Art. 8 of the RPC as amended by

Sec. 24 of RA 7659. The mode of execution was changed from
electrocution to lethal injection. The Secretary of Justice
promulgated the rules and regulations to implement R.A 8177 and
directed the Director of Bureau of Corrections to prepare the
Lethal Injection Manual.

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, injunction and TRO to

enjoin the Secretary of Justice and Director of Bureau of Prisons
from carrying out the execution, contending that RA 8177 and its
implementing rules are unconstitutional and void. The Executive
Judge of the RTC of Quezon City and Presiding Judge of RTC
Branch 104 were later impleaded to enjoin them from setting a
date of execution.
On March 3, 1998 , the court required respondents to comment
and mandated the parties to mantain status quo . Petitioner filed
a very urgent motion to clarify status quo and to request for TRO
until resolution of the petition.

The Solicitor General filed a comment on the petition dismissing

the claim that the RA in question is unconstitutional and
providing arguments in support of his contention. CHR filed a
motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and appear as Amicus
Curiae alleging that the death penalty is cruel and degrading
citing applicable provisions and statistics showing how other
countries have abolished the death penalty and how some have
become abolitionists in practice . Petitioner filed a reply stating
that lethal injection is cruel, degrading , inhuman and violative of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

ISSUE :

WON R.A. 8117 and its implementing rules are violative of the
unconstitutional proscription against cruel, degrading and
inhuman punishment, violative of international treaty and
obligations , discriminatory and an undue delegation of
legislative powers.

RULING :

I. LETHAL INJECTION, NOT CRUEL, DEGRADING OR

INHUMAN PUNISHMENT UNDER SECTION 19, ARTICLE
III OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution proscribes
the imposition of "cruel, degrading or inhuman" punishment.
This is the challenge thrown at RA 8177 and its implementing
rules and regulations.
The court explains that any infliction of pain in lethal injection is
merely incidental in carrying out the execution of death penalty
and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against
cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense,
anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and
since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may
be said that all punishments are cruel. The Constitution,
however, does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go
unpunished."
II.REIMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY LAW DOES NOT
VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS
Petitioner disputes that the reimposition of the death penalty law
violates the International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights,
which was adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations on December 16, 1996, signed and ratified by the
Philippines on December 19, 1966 and October 23, 1986,
respectively.
Although Article 6 of said covenant highlights an individuals right
to life, it also particularly recognizes that capital punishment is an
allowable limitation on the right to life, subject to the limitation
that it be imposed for the "most serious crimes".
The petitioner's assertion of our obligation under the Second
Optional Protocol has gone astray since dates and circumstances
related to its adoption prove that the Philippines neither signed
nor ratified said document.
III. THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER IN R.A. NO. 8177 TO THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
AND THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, BUT
SECTION 19 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO
IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS INVALID.
The separation of power is a fundamental principle in our system
of government and each department has exclusive cognizance of
matters placed within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its
own sphere. A consequence of the doctrine of separation of
powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers. In Latin
maxim, the rule is : potestas delegata non delegari potest." (what
has been delegated, cannot be delegated). There are however
exceptions to this rule and one of the recognized exceptions is
Delegation to Administrative Bodies
The Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of
Health and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections are
empowered to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of
lethal injection.
The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies
is the increasing complexity of the task of government requiring
expertise as well as the growing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention.

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the

Government the power to fill in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall
a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law:
(a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b)
fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.

Considering the scope and the definiteness of RA 8177, which

changed the mode of carrying out the death penalty, the Court
finds that the law sufficiently describes what job must be done,
who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.

RA 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the

legislative policy, mark its limits, map out its boundaries, and
specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried
out.
The Supreme Court has the constitutional power to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts (Art. VIII, Sec. 5[5], Constitution).

The power of Congress under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions to

repeal, alter or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure was taken away in the 1987 Constitution

SAN ILDEFONSO LINES, INC., and EDUARDO JAVIER vs.

COURT OF APPEALS

SAN ILDEFONSO LINES, INC., and EDUARDO JAVIER vs.

COURT OF APPEALS (Thirteenth Division) and PIONEER
INSURANCE and SURETY CORPORATION
G.R. No.119771. 24 Apr 1998.

FACTS: At around 3:30 in the afternoon of June 24, 1991, a Toyota

Lite Ace Van being driven by its owner Annie U. Jao and a
passenger bus of herein petitioner San Ildefonso Lines, Inc.
(hereafter, SILI) figured in a vehicular mishap at the intersection
of Julia Vargas Avenue and Rodriguez Lanuza Avenue in Pasig,
Metro Manila, totally wrecking the Toyota van and injuring Ms. Jao
and her two (2) passengers in the process.
A criminal case was thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig on September 18, 1991 charging the driver of the bus,
herein petitioner Eduardo Javier, with reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries.
About four (4) months later, or on January 13, 1992, herein
private respondent Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation
(PISC), as insurer of the van and subrogee, filed a case for
damages against petitioner SILI with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, seeking to recover the sums it paid the assured under a
motor vehicle insurance policy as well as other damages, totaling
P564,500.00 (P454,000.00 as actual/compensatory damages;
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 as attorney's
fees; P10,000.00 as litigation expenses; and P500.00 as
appearance fees.)

ISSUEs: 1) If a criminal case was filed, can an independent civil

action based on quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code
be filed if no reservation was made in the said criminal case?
2) Can a subrogee of an offended party maintain an independent
civil action during the pendency of a criminal action when no
reservation of the right to file an independent civil action was
made in the criminal action and despite the fact that the private
complainant is actively participating through a private prosecutor
in the aforementioned criminal case?

RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision

of the Court of Appeals dated February 24, 1995 and the
Resolution dated April 3, 1995 denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
"MANIFESTATION AND MOTION TO SUSPEND CIVIL PROCEEDINGS"
filed by petitioners is GRANTED.

RATIO: Now that the necessity of a prior reservation is the

standing rule that shall govern the institution of the independent
civil actions referred to in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, past
pronouncements that view the reservation requirement as an
"unauthorized amendment" to substantive law - i.e., the Civil
Code, should no longer be controlling. There must be a renewed
adherence to the time-honored dictum that procedural rules are
designed, not to defeat, but to safeguard the ends of substantial
justice. And for this noble reason, no less than the Constitution
itself has mandated this Court to promulgate rules concerning the
enforcement of rights with the end in view of providing a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases which should not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights. Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of
the reservation is, to borrow the words of the Court in "Caos v.
Peralta"
Clearly then, private respondent PISC, as subrogee under Article
2207 of the Civil Code, is not exempt from the reservation
requirement with respect to its damages suit based on quasi-
delict arising from the same act or omission of petitioner Javier
complained of in the criminal case. As private respondent PISC
merely stepped into the shoes of Ms. Jao (as owner of the insured
Toyota van), then it is bound to observe the procedural
requirements which Ms. Jao ought to follow had she herself
instituted the civil case.

[G.R. No. 152766. June 20, 2003]

LILIA SANCHEZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. VICTORINO S.

ALVARO as Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 120, Caloocan City, and VIRGINIA
TERIA, respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
annul and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 May 2001 as
well as its Resolution dated 8 January 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59182.

Lilia Sanchez, petitioner, constructed a house on a 76-square meter lot owned by

her parents-in-law. The lot was registered under TCT No. 263624 with the
following co-owners: Eliseo Sanchez married to Celia Sanchez, Marilyn Sanchez
married to Nicanor Montalban, Lilian Sanchez, widow, Nenita Sanchez, single,
Susana Sanchez married to Fernando Ramos, and Felipe Sanchez. 1[1] On 20
February 1995, the lot was registered under TCT No. 289216 in the name of
private respondent Virginia Teria by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale supposed to
have been executed on 23 June 19952[2] by all six (6) co-owners in her favor.3[3]
Petitioner claimed that she did not affix her signature on the document and
subsequently refused to vacate the lot, thus prompting private respondent Virginia
Teria to file an action for recovery of possession of the aforesaid lot with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City sometime in September 1995,
subsequently raffled to Br. 49 of that court.

On 12 February 1998, the MeTC-Br. 49 of Caloocan City ruled in favor of private

respondent declaring that the sale was valid only to the extent of 5/6 of the lot and
the other 1/6 remaining as the property of petitioner, on account of her signature in
the Deed of Absolute Sale having been established as a forgery.

Petitioner then elevated her appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City,
subsequently assigned to Br. 120, which ordered the parties to file their respective
memoranda of appeal. Counsel for petitioner did not comply with this order, nor
even inform her of the developments in her case. Petitioner not having filed any
pleading with the RTC of Caloocan City, the trial court affirmed the 27 July 1998
decision of the MeTC.

On 4 November 1998, the MeTC issued an order for the issuance of a writ of
execution in favor of private respondent Virginia Teria, buyer of the property. On 4
November 1999 or a year later, a Notice to Vacate was served by the sheriff upon
petitioner who however refused to heed the Notice.

3
On 28 April 1999 private respondent started demolishing petitioners house without
any special permit of demolition from the court.

Due to the demolition of her house which continued until 24 May 1999 petitioner
was forced to inhabit the portion of the premises that used to serve as the houses
toilet and laundry area.

On 29 October 1999 petitioner filed her Petition for Relief from Judgment with the
RTC on the ground that she was not bound by the inaction of her counsel who
failed to submit petitioners appeal memorandum. However the RTC denied the
Petition and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.

On 14 June 2000 petitioner filed her Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court a quo.

On 23 May 2001 the appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. On 18
June 2001 petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Court of Appeals
denied the motion in its Resolution of 8 January 2002.

The only issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing the challenged case before it.

As a matter of policy, the original jurisdiction of this Court to issue the so-called
extraordinary writs should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings
before the Court of Appeals or before constitutional or other tribunals or agencies
the acts of which for some reason or other are not controllable by the Court of
Appeals. Where the issuance of the extraordinary writ is also within the
competence of the Court of Appeals or the Regional Trial Court, it is either of these
courts that the specific action for the procurement of the writ must be presented.
However, this Court must be convinced thoroughly that two (2) grounds exist
before it gives due course to a certiorari petition under Rule 65: (a) The tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or
in excess of its or his jurisdiction; and (b) There is no appeal nor any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Despite the procedural lapses present in this case, we are giving due course to this
petition as there are matters that require immediate resolution on the merits to
effect substantial justice.
The Rules of Court should be liberally construed in order to promote their object of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding. 4
[4]

The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to aid the courts in
the speedy, just and inexpensive determination of the cases before them. Liberal
construction of the rules and the pleadings is the controlling principle to effect
substantial justice.5[5] Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their
merits and not on mere technicalities.6[6]

Verily, the negligence of petitioners counsel cannot be deemed as negligence of

petitioner herself in the case at bar. A notice to a lawyer who appears to have been
unconscionably irresponsible cannot be considered as notice to his client.7[7]
Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, it appears from the records that
counsel was negligent in not adequately protecting his clients interest, which
necessarily calls for a liberal construction of the Rules.

The rationale for this approach is explained in Ginete v. Court of Appeals - 8[8]

This Court may suspend its own rules or exempt a particular case from its
operation where the appellate court failed to obtain jurisdiction over the case
owing to appellants failure to perfect an appeal. Hence, with more reason would
this Court suspend its own rules in cases where the appellate court has already
obtained jurisdiction over the appealed case. This prerogative to relax procedural
rules of the most mandatory character in terms of compliance, such as the period
to appeal has been invoked and granted in a considerable number of cases x x x x

Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
4

8
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this
principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and
compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be
final, as we are now constrained to do in the instant case x x x x

The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from
the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held
that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice.

Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the
suspension of the Rules of the most mandatory character and an examination and
review by the appellate court of the lower courts findings of fact, the other
elements that should be considered are the following: (a) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances, (b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the
rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory, and (e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.9[9]

The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case since the procedural infirmity
was not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of petitioner. Besides,
substantial justice requires that we go into the merits of the case to resolve the
present controversy that was brought about by the absence of any partition
agreement among the parties who were co-owners of the subject lot in question.
Hence, giving due course to the instant petition shall put an end to the dispute on
the property held in common.

In Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation v. Tiongco10[10] we held:

There should be no dispute regarding the doctrine that normally notice to counsel
is notice to parties, and that such doctrine has beneficent effects upon the prompt
dispensation of justice. Its application to a given case, however, should be looked
into and adopted, according to the surrounding circumstances; otherwise, in the
courts desire to make a short-cut of the proceedings, it might foster, wittingly or
unwittingly, dangerous collusions to the detriment of justice. It would then be easy
for one lawyer to sell ones rights down the river, by just alleging that he just forgot

10
every process of the court affecting his clients, because he was so busy. Under this
circumstance, one should not insist that a notice to such irresponsible lawyer is
also a notice to his clients.

Thus, we now look into the merits of the petition.

This case overlooks a basic yet significant principle of civil law: co-ownership.
Throughout the proceedings from the MeTC to the Court of Appeals, the notion of
co-ownership11[11] was not sufficiently dealt with. We attempt to address this
controversy in the interest of substantial justice. Certiorari should therefore be
granted to cure this grave abuse of discretion.

Sanchez Roman defines co-ownership as the right of common dominion which two
or more persons have in a spiritual part of a thing, not materially or physically
divided.12[12] Manresa defines it as the manifestation of the private right of
ownership, which instead of being exercised by the owner in an exclusive manner
over the things subject to it, is exercised by two or more owners and the undivided
thing or right to which it refers is one and the same.13[13]

The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality of subjects, who are the co-
owners, (b) unity of or material indivision, which means that there is a single
object which is not materially divided, and which is the element which binds the
subjects, and, (c) the recognition of ideal shares, which determines the rights and
obligations of the co-owners.14[14]

In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners is

fiduciary in character and attribute. Whether established by law or by agreement of
the co-owners, the property or thing held pro-indiviso is impressed with a fiducial
nature so that each co-owner becomes a trustee for the benefit of his co-owners and
he may not do any act prejudicial to the interest of his co-owners.15[15]
11

12

13

14

15
Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the properties in co-ownership is
to create an express trust among the heirs as co-owners of the properties. Co-
ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the others.16[16]

Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-owner

can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal
or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing.17[17]

Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided interest in the
property the right to freely sell and dispose of it, i.e., his undivided interest. He
may validly lease his undivided interest to a third party independently of the other
co-owners.18[18] But he has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or
determinate part of the thing owned in common because his right over the thing is
represented by a quota or ideal portion without any physical adjudication.19[19]

Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property, the metes and
bounds of petitioners lot has not been designated. As she was not a party to the
Deed of Absolute Sale voluntarily entered into by the other co-owners, her right to
1/6 of the property must be respected. Partition needs to be effected to protect her
right to her definite share and determine the boundaries of her property. Such
partition must be done without prejudice to the rights of private respondent
Virginia Teria as buyer of the 5/6 portion of the lot under dispute.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

dated 23 May 2001 as well as its Resolution dated 8 January 2002 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 59182 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. A survey of the questioned lot with
TCT No. 289216 (formerly TCT No. 263624) by a duly licensed geodetic engineer
and the PARTITION of the aforesaid lot are ORDERED.

Let the records of this case be REMANDED to MeTC-Br. 49, Caloocan City to
effect the aforementioned survey and partition, as well as segregate the 1/6 portion
appertaining to petitioner Lilia Sanchez.

16

17

18

19
The Deed of Absolute Sale by the other co-owners to Virginia Teria shall be
RESPECTED insofar as the other undivided 5/6 portion of the property is
concerned.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.

Austria-Martinez, J., on official leave.

[G.R. No. 160753. June 28, 2005]

JIMMY L. BARNES, a.k.a. JAMES L. BARNES, petitioner, vs. HON. MA.
LUISA C. QUIJANO PADILLA, Presiding Judge, Br. 215, Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City and TERESITA C. REYES, ELIZABETH C. PASION, MA. ELSA C.
GARCIA, IMELDA C. TRILLO, MA. ELENA C. DINGLASAN and RICARDO
P. CRISOSTOMO, respondents.

RESOLUTION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is private respondents motion for reconsideration[1] seeking a

referral to the Court en banc and reversal of the Decision[2] of the Second Division
of this Court, dated September 30, 2004.

For a proper perspective of the issues on hand, it is necessary that the Court
reiterates the factual backdrop of the case.

A complaint for ejectment for non-payment of rentals was filed by private

respondents against petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch
34, Quezon City. After trial, the MeTC rendered judgment, finding that: petitioner
entered into a Contract of Lease with private respondents late mother, Natividad
Crisostomo, whereby the latter leased to the former the subject property from
January 1, 1995 to December 31, 1997 at P60,000.00 per month; in a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated December 5, 1995, petitioner and
Natividad extended the term of lease until December 31, 2007, whereby the
petitioner has the obligation to pay lease rentals and at the same time, he is given
the option to purchase a portion of the disputed property; petitioner has not been
paying rentals since September 1996. As a result, the MeTC ordered petitioner to
vacate the disputed premises. Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 227, Quezon City (Branch 227 for brevity).

In the interim, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 215, Quezon
City (Branch 215 for brevity) a complaint for specific performance with damages.
He prayed that judgment be rendered in his favor ordering private respondents to
abide with the MOA executed on December 5, 1995 between him and the late
Natividad with respect to all the terms and conditions of the contract to sell a
403.41-square meter portion of the subject property, the payment of P60,000.00 a
month as lease and P80,000.00 as amortization payment for the sale.

Later, Branch 227 set aside the MeTC decision and dismissed the case without
prejudice on the ground that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case since it is
not for ejectment but for specific performance of contract, cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court in its original and exclusive jurisdiction. When their motion
for reconsideration was denied, private respondents filed a petition for review with
the Court of Appeals (CA) docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55949.

Private respondents, in Branch 215, moved for outright dismissal of the complaint
for specific performance on the ground of forum-shopping in view of the pendency
of the appeal on the ejectment case with the CA. Branch 215 dismissed the
complaint for specific performance.

When his motion for reconsideration was denied by Branch 215, petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 69573 with the CA. The CA in
its Resolution, dated August 18, 2003, dismissed the petition for certiorari, ruling
that petitioner committed forum-shopping in view of the pendency of the appeal on
the ejectment case. Petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion
for Reconsideration but the CA, in its Resolution dated September 25, 2003,
denied the motion on the ground that the period for filing a motion for
reconsideration is non-extendible. Petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion to
Admit Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration with Leave of Court but the CA, in
its Resolution dated November 17, 2003, also denied it on the ground that the
motion for reconsideration was filed beyond the reglementary period.

Thus, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

On September 30, 2004, the Court, through the Second Division, promulgated
herein assailed decision setting aside the Resolution, dated November 17, 2003, of
the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 69573 which denied petitioners manifestation and
motion to admit his motion for reconsideration; and reversing and setting aside the
Resolution dated August 18, 2003 of the CA which affirmed the Resolution dated
April 20, 2001 of Branch 215, dismissing the complaint for specific performance
on the ground of forum-shopping. The Court remanded the case to Branch 215
with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with the case with all deliberate
dispatch.

Private respondents assail the decision of the Court arguing that while the Court
had categorically declared that the CAs resolutions had attained finality; yet,
despite their finality, the Court proceeded to set aside the same in violation of its
own rules and the law of the land. They claim that the Court erroneously decided to
relax procedural rules and the relaxation of the rules run afoul of the doctrine of
immutability of judgments. Moreover, they posit that the Court failed to realize
that its power to suspend or even disregard rules of procedure can only be
exercised if it is within its jurisdiction to act. They submit that the decision in this
case modified or reversed doctrines rendered by this Court, which can only be
done by the Court en banc.

On January 24, 2005, the Court required the parties to submit a report on the
present status of CA-G.R. SP No. 55949 (Teresita C. Reyes, Elizabeth C. Pasion,
Ma. Elsa C. Garcia, Imelda C. Trillo, Ricardo P. Crisostomo, and Ma. Elena C.
Dinglasan vs. Jimmy L. Barnes) and to discuss their respective positions on the
significance of said case on the issues raised before the Court.[3]

In his Compliance, petitioner manifests that he is awaiting the order of the CA in

CA-G.R. SP No. 55949 requiring him to comment on private respondents petition
for review therein after this Court in G.R. No. 144533 (Jimmy L. Barnes a.k.a.
James L. Barnes, Petitioner, versus Teresita Reyes, et al., Respondents) denied
petitioners petition for review of the Resolution of the CA dated May 25, 2000
giving due course to the private respondents petition for review, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 55949.[4] As to the significance of the said case on the issue of forum-
shopping, petitioner submits that there is none since said case involves the
ejectment case anchored on non-payment of rentals based on a pure lease
agreement only; that the ejectment suit calls for de facto possession, while the
specific performance case involves issues of ownership and enforcement of a right
or a de jure possession.

In their Compliance Memorandum, private respondents manifest that they are

awaiting the comment of the petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No. 55949. As to the
significance of the said case on the issue of forum-shopping presently before the
Court, private respondents submit that the principal issue before CA-G.R. SP No.
55949 is whether or not the MOA is valid. They contend that until said issue is
resolved, the action for specific performance on the provisions of the MOA is
premature. They emphasize that the action for specific performance is a mere off-
shoot of the decision rendered by Branch 227.

We are not persuaded by the arguments of private respondents.

Private respondents harp on the fact that the Court applied procedural rules
liberally in favor of the petitioner which they consider an injustice. They, however,
must realize that the Rules of Court itself calls for its liberal construction, with the
view of promoting their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding.[5] The Court is fully aware that
procedural rules are not to be belittled or simply disregarded for these prescribed
procedures insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. However, it is
equally true that litigation is not merely a game of technicalities. Law and
jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural
rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both
the need to put an end to litigation speedily and the parties right to an opportunity
to be heard.[6] In numerous cases, the Court has allowed liberal construction of the
Rules of Court with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting
appeals, when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the
exercise of equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.[7] As the Court has
expounded in Aguam vs. Court of Appeals:[8]

The court has the discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss an appellant's appeal. It is
a power conferred on the court, not a duty. The "discretion must be a sound one, to
be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind
the circumstances obtaining in each case." Technicalities, however, must be
avoided. The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court's
primary duty is to render or dispense justice. "A litigation is not a game of
technicalities." "Lawsuits unlike duels are not to be won by a rapier's thrust.
Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its
great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts."
Litigations must be decided on their merits and not on technicality. Every
party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. Thus,
dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy
of the court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of
procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of
procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice. It is a far
better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical
lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of
justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave
injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases
while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.[9]
(Emphasis supplied)

In the assailed decision, indeed, the Court upheld the general rule that the filing of
a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration in the CA does
not toll the fifteen-day period to appeal, citing Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. vs.
Japson.[10] However, we suspended this rule in order to serve substantial
justice in accordance with Ginete vs. Court of Appeals[11] and Sanchez vs. Court
of Appeals.[12]

In the Ginete case, the Court held:

The Court may suspend its own rules or exempt a particular case from its operation
where the appellate court failed to obtain jurisdiction over the case owing to
appellants failure to perfect an appeal. Hence, with more reason would this Court
suspend its own rules in cases where the appellate court has already obtained
jurisdiction over the appealed case. This prerogative to relax procedural rules of
the most mandatory character in terms of compliance such as the period to appeal
has been invoked and granted in a considerable number of cases.

Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this
principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and
compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be
final, as we are now constrained to do in the instant case.

The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party
litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his
cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court
has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to
override substantial justice.[13] (Emphasis supplied)

In the Sanchez case, the Court restated the range of reasons which may provide
justification for a court to resist a strict adherence to procedure, enumerating the
elements for an appeal to be given due course by a suspension of procedural rules,
such as: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the
rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.[14]
Elements or circumstances (a), (d), (e) and (f) exist in the present case.

A suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case since the procedural infirmity
was not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the petitioner. Petitioners
counsel was understandably confused with the absence of an explicit prohibition in
the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (IRCA) that the period of filing a
motion for reconsideration is non-extendible, which was expressly stated in the
Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals that was in effect prior to the IRCA.
The lawyers negligence without any participatory negligence on the part of the
petitioner is a sufficient reason to set aside the resolution of the CA.[15]

More significantly, a careful study of the merits of the case and the lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, dictated the setting
aside of the resolutions of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 69573 and Branch 215 in
Civil Case No. Q-99-37219, as both are patently erroneous. Both dismissed
petitioners complaint for specific performance on the ground of forum-shopping. It
is elementary that petitioner is not guilty of forum-shopping because there is no
identity of issues and causes of action between the ejectment case which was
appealed by petitioner from the MeTC to Branch 227, and the specific performance
suit filed by petitioner in Branch 215. Without pre-empting the decision of the CA
in CA-G.R. SP No. 55949, it cannot be ignored that the primary issue before
Branch 227, now pending review in CA-G.R. SP No. 55949, is not actually the
validity of the MOA, as advanced by private respondents, but whether, based on
private respondents allegations in their complaint, the MeTC has jurisdiction
over the case and whether private respondents have a cause of action for ejectment.
It is well to state, by way of reminder, that while petitioner may have brought up
the MOA in the ejectment suit, by way of defense, any ruling therein is merely
provisional, only for purposes of resolving the issue of physical possession and is
not res judicata or conclusive on the issue of the enforceability of the MOA, as
such determination is not clothed with finality.[16] This is so because an ejectment
case is simply designed to summarily restore physical possession of a piece of land
or building to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without
prejudice to the settlement of the parties' opposing claims of juridical possession in
appropriate proceedings.[17] The Court has long recognized that suits for
specific performance with damages do not affect ejectment actions; an
ejectment case for non-payment of rentals is not prejudicial to an action to
enforce the right of preemption or prior purchase of the leased premises.[18]
Moreover, the consistent case law is that a judgment rendered in an ejectment case
shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or
building nor shall it be conclusive as to the facts therein found in a case between
the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession.[19]

Furthermore, the private respondents will not be unjustly prejudiced by the

suspension of the rules. What is subject of the appeal is only a question of law,
involving the issue of forum-shopping, and not a factual matter involving the
merits of each partys respective claims and defenses relating to the enforcement of
the MOA, wherein petitioner was given an option to purchase the subject property.
Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on mere
technicalities.[20] Every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity
for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of
technicalities.[21]

In essence, the Court is convinced that the test for substantial justice and equity
considerations which we have set in Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals[22] has been
adequately met by petitioner to justify a suspension of procedural rules.

Thus, when the Second Division referred the issue on the suspension of the rule
that the filing of a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration
per the Habaluyas case, the Court en banc in its Resolution dated June 14, 2005
referred back the case to the Second Division and allowed it pro hac vice to relax
the case law on the matter in view of the merits of the present case.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration and referral to the Court en banc
is DENIED with finality.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-26449 May 15, 1969

LUZON STEEL CORPORATION, represented by TOMAS AQUINO CU, plaintiff-

appellant,
vs.
JOSE O. SIA, defendant,
TIMES SURETY & INSURANCE CO. INC., surety-appellee.

German A. Sipin for plaintiff-appellant.

Galicano S. Calapatia for surety-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Direct appeal from two orders, dated 19 May and 5 June 1965, issued by the Court of First
Instance of Manila (Judge Francisco Arca presiding), in its Civil Case No. 54913, entitled Luzon
Steel Corporation, plaintiff vs. Metal Manufacturing of the Philippines, Inc., and Jose O. Sia,
defendants, whereby the court aforesaid quashed a writ of execution issued against the Times
Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., and cancelled the undertaking of said surety company.

The essential and uncontroverted facts of the case may be summarized as follows:

Luzon Steel Corporation has sued Metal Manufacturing of the Philippines and Jose O. Sia, the
former's manager, for breach of contract and damages. It obtained a writ of preliminary
attachment of the properties of the defendants, but the attachment was lifted upon a P25,000.00
counterbond executed by the defendant Sia, as principal, and the Times Surety & Insurance Co.,
Inc. (hereinafter designated as the surety), as solidary guarantor, in the following terms:

WHEREFORE, we JOSE O. SIA, as principal and the TIMES SURETY &

INSURANCE CO., INC., as Surety, in consideration of the dissolution of attachment,
hereby jointly and severally bind ourselves in the sum of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00), Philippine Currency, to answer for the payment to the plaintiff of any
judgment it may recover in the action in accordance with Section 12, Rule 59, of the
Rules of Court. (pp. 32, 45, Rec. on Appeal.)

Issues having been joined, plaintiff and defendant (without intervention of the surety) entered
into a compromise whereby defendant Sia agreed to settle the plaintiff's claim in the following
manner:

1. That the defendant shall settle with the Plaintiff the amount of TWENTY FIVE
THOUSAND (P25,000.00) PESOS, in the following manner: FIVE HUNDRED
(P500.00) PESOS, monthly for the first six (6) months to be paid at the end of every
month and to commence in January, 1965, and within one month after paying the last
installment of P500.00, the balance of P22,000.00 shall be paid in lump sum, without
interest. It is understood that failure of the Defendant to pay one or any installment will
make the whole obligation immediately due and demandable and that a writ of execution
will be issued immediately against Defendants bond.lawphi1.et
The compromise was submitted to the court and the latter approved it, rendered judgment in
conformity therewith, and directed the parties to comply with the same (Record on Appeal, page
22).

Defendant having failed to comply, plaintiff moved for and obtained a writ of execution against
defendant and the joint and several counterbond. The surety, however, moved to quash the writ
of execution against it, averring that it was not a party to the compromise, and that the writ was
issued without giving the surety notice and hearing. The court, overruling the plaintiff's
opposition, set aside the writ of execution, and later cancelled the counterbond, and denied the
motion for reconsideration. Hence this appeal.

Main issues posed are (1) whether the judgment upon the compromise discharged the surety
from its obligation under its attachment counterbond and (2) whether the writ of execution could
be issued against the surety without previous exhaustion of the debtor's properties.

Both questions can be solved by bearing in mind that we are dealing with a counterbond filed to
discharge a levy on attachment. Rule 57, section 12, specifies that an attachment may be
discharged upon the making of a cash deposit or filing a counterbond "in an amount equal to the
value of the property attached as determined by the judge"; that upon the filing of the
counterbond "the property attached ... shall be delivered to the party making the deposit or giving
the counterbond, or the person appearing on his behalf, the deposit or counterbond aforesaid
standing in place of the property so released".

The italicized expressions constitute the key to the entire problem. Whether the judgment be
rendered after trial on the merits or upon compromise, such judgment undoubtedly may be made
effective upon the property released; and since the counterbond merely stands in the place of
such property, there is no reason why the judgment should not be made effective against the
counterbond regardless of the manner how the judgment was obtained.

Squarely on the point, and rebutting the appellee's apprehension that the compromise could be
the result of a collusion between the parties to injure the surety, is our decision in Anzures vs.
Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., et al., 92 Phil. 742, where this Court, through former Chief
Justice Paras, ruled as follows:

Under section 12, Rule 59, of the Rules of Court, the bond filed, as in this case, for the
discharge of an attachment is "to secure the payment to the plaintiff of any judgment he
may recover in the action," and stands "in place of the property so released". It follows
that the order of cancellation issued by the respondent judge is erroneous. Indeed,
judgment had already been rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila in civil case
No. 11748, sentencing Benjamin Aguilar to pay the sum of P3,500.00 to the petitioner;
and it is not pretended that said judgment is a nullity. There is no point in the contention
 of the respondent Surety Company that the compromise was entered into without its
knowledge and consent, thus becoming as to it essentially fraudulent. The Surety is not a
party to civil case No. 11748 and, therefore, need not be served with notice of the petition
for judgment. As against the conjecture of said respondent that the parties may easily
connive by means of a compromise to prejudice it, there is also the likelihood that the
same end may be attained by parties acting in bad faith through a simulated trial. At any
rate, it is within the power of the Surety Company to protect itself against a risk of the
kind.

Wherefore, the order of the respondent Judge cancelling the bond in question is set aside.
So ordered with costs against the respondent Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc.

The lower court and the appellee herein appear to have relied on doctrines of this Court
concerning the liability of sureties in bonds filed by a plaintiff for the issuance of writs of
attachment, without discriminating between such bonds and those filed by a defendant for the
lifting of writs of attachment already issued and levied. This confusion is hardly excusable
considering that this Court has already called attention to the difference between these kinds of
bonds. Thus, in Cajefe vs. Judge Fernandez, et al., L-15709, 19 October 1960, this Court pointed
out that

The diverse rule in section 17 of Rule 59 for counterbonds posted to obtain the lifting of a
writ of attachment is due to these bonds being security for the payment of any judgment
that the attaching party may obtain; they are thus mere replacements of the property
formerly attached, and just as the latter may be levied upon after final judgment in the
case in order to realize the amount adjudged, so is the liability of the countersureties
ascertainable after the judgment has become final. This situation does not obtain in the
case of injunction counterbonds, since the sureties in the latter case merely undertake "to
pay all damages that the plaintiff may suffer by reason of the continuance ... of the acts
complained of" (Rule 60, section 6) and not to secure payment of the judgment
recovered.1

It was, therefore, error on the part of the court below to have ordered the surety bond cancelled,
on the theory that the parties' compromise discharged the obligation of the surety.

As declared by us in Mercado vs. Macapayag, 69 Phil. 403, 405-406, in passing upon the
liability of counter sureties in replevin who bound themselves to answer solidarily for the
obligations of the defendants to the plaintiffs in a fixed amount of P912.04, to secure payment of
the amount that said plaintiff be adjudged to recover from the defendants,2

the liability of the sureties was fixed and conditioned on the finality of the judgment
rendered regardless of whether the decision was based on the consent of the parties or on
 the merits. A judgment entered on a stipulation is nonetheless a judgment of the court
because consented to by the parties.

But the surety in the present case insists (and the court below so ruled) that the execution issued
against it was invalid because the writ issued against its principal, Jose O. Sia, et al., defendants
below, had not been returned unsatisfied; and the surety invoked in its favor Section 17 of Rule
57 of the Revised Rules of Court (old Rule 59), couched in the following terms:

SEC. 17. When execution returned unsatisfied, recovery had upon bond. If the
execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, the surety or sureties on any
counterbond given pursuant to the provisions of this rule to secure the payment of the
judgment shall become charged on such counter-bond, and bound to pay to the judgment
creditor upon demand, the amount due under the judgment, which amount may be
recovered from such surety or sureties after notice and summary hearing in the same
action.

The surety's contention is untenable. The counterbond contemplated in the rule is evidently an
ordinary guaranty where the sureties assume a subsidiary liability. This is not the case here,
because the surety in the present case bound itself "jointly and severally" (in solidum) with the
defendant; and it is prescribed in Article 2059, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code of the Philippines
that excusion (previous exhaustion of the property of the debtor) shall not take place "if he (the
guarantor) has bound himself solidarily with the debtor". The rule heretofore quoted cannot be
construed as requiring that an execution against the debtor be first returned unsatisfied even if the
bond were a solidary one; for a procedural rule may not amend the substantive law expressed in
the Civil Code, and further would nullify the express stipulation of the parties that the surety's
obligation should be solidary with that of the defendant.

A second reason against the stand of the surety and of the court below is that even if the surety's
undertaking were not solidary with that of the principal debtor, still he may not demand
exhaustion of the property of the latter, unless he can point out sufficient leviable property of the
debtor within Philippine territory. There is no record that the appellee surety has done so. Says
Article 2060 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

ART. 2060. In order that the guarantor may make use of the benefit of excussion, he must
set it up against the creditor upon the latter's demand for payment from him, and point out
to the creditor available property of the debtor within Philippine territory, sufficient to
cover the amount of the debt.

A third reason against the thesis of appellee is that, under the rule and its own terms, the counter-
bond is only conditioned upon the rendition of the judgment. Payment under the bond is not
made to depend upon the delivery or availability of the property previously attached, as it was
under Section 440 of the old Code of Civil Procedure. Where under the rule and the bond the
undertaking is to pay the judgment, the liability of the surety or sureties attaches upon the
rendition of the judgment, and the issue of an execution and its return nulla bona is not, and
should not be, a condition to the right to resort to the bond. 3

It is true that under Section 17 recovery from the surety or sureties should be "after notice and
summary hearing in the same action". But this requirement has been substantially complied with
from the time the surety was allowed to move for the quashal of the writ of execution and for the
cancellation of their obligation.

WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are reversed, and the court of origin is ordered to
proceed with the execution against the surety appellee, Times Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. Costs
against said appellee.

Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Capistrano and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., took no part.
Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., are on leave.