Personality and Persistence

North American Philosophical Publications
Personality and Persistence: The Many Faces of Personal Survival

Author(s): Marya Schechtman
Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Apr., 2004), pp. 87-105
Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American Philosophical
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American Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 41, Number 2, April 2004
PERSONALITY AND PERSISTENCE:

THE MANY FACES OF
PERSONAL SURVIVAL
Mary a Schechtman
xVlthough not universally accepted, the conflation of these two concepts, mistak?
idea that psychological continuation is a enly conferring upon identity the impor?
crucial element of diachronic personal iden? tance that actually attaches to survival.
tity is well-entrenched. Any satisfying ac? Once this has been recognized, Parfit con?
count of personal continuity must somehow cludes, attention can be turned directly to
be responsible to this powerful intuition, and the question of what constitutes survival.
neo-Lockean views have enjoyed great suc? This allows the employment of relations
cess. Those who inherit Locke's basic in? which do not have the logical form of an
sight, however, also inherit the well-known identity relation.
difficulties with his theory. One of the most This move has been widely influential.
serious of these is the fact that the relation Even some theorists who believe that iden?
in terms of which this account defines iden? tity is ultimately necessary to survival have
tity does not conform to the logical require? allowed that what really matters to us is
ments of an identity relation. Psychological the survival and not the identity. Many psy?
continuation, for instance, admits of degrees chological continuity theorists have there?
or can be a one-many relation, while nei? fore changed their emphasis from the
ther is true of identity. question of personal identity to the ques?
There have been a variety of attempts to tion of survival, and in particular to "what
respond to this problem. One of the most matters" in survival. Although this repre?
intriguing?and successful?has found its sents a fairly radical change in orientation,
way into the modern literature largely the discussion has not changed as radically
through the work of Derek Parfit. Parfit as one might have anticipated, nor as radi?
suggests that we deflect attention from the cally as it should have. While it is allowed
question of identity per se and address it that the relation which defines survival
instead to the question of real interest, the might have a logical form different from
question of survival. In everyday life, Parfit the identity relation, it is still assumed that
allows, survival usually requires identity, survival, like identity, is a relation between
but he argues that it need not always do a present and (at least one) future person
so. The ordinarily close association be? which allows the present person to con?
tween survival and identity causes the tinue as the future one(s).
87
88 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
The concept of survival, however, di? theories are able to express. Understand?
verges even further from that of identity ing survival in terms of the continuity of a
than this project suggests. "Identity," at life provides the resources to capture both
least if it is understood as the logical iden? the different contributions to survival made
tity relation, is fairly well-defined. "Sur? by these two types of continuity, and the
vival," on the other hand, if it is to represent dynamics of their interactions with one
something beyond the persistence condi? another.
tions for the numerically same object, is a To begin there is a brief account of how
much more diffuse concept which deserves the amnesia case has been described by psy?
some consideration in its own right. Instead chological continuity theorists, showing
of being conceived in terms of a relation how the standard treatment runs together
between a present and (one or more) fu? continuity of consciousness and of person?
ture person(s) it should be defined instead ality. The next section discusses the inter?
in terms of the continuity of a person's life. connections between these two types of
On this understanding, a person survives continuity, interconnections that psycho?
as long as her life goes on, and fails to sur? logical continuity theories cannot capture.
vive when it ends. The focus should thus Finally, there is a discussion of how rethink?
not be directly on defining the survival re? ing survival in terms of the continuity of a
lation, but rather on understanding what it life can overcome these shortcomings.
means for a person's life to continue, which
I
is quite a different question.
In what follows this claim will be sup? One common way of introducing the psy?
ported and clarified through a concrete chological continuity theory is to describe
example of a case in which the standard John Locke's view of personal identity
picture of survival cannot fully capture the (read, roughly, as a memory theory), re?
phenomena and an understanding in terms hearse well-known objections, and offer
of the continuity of a life can; the case of remedies. The modified Lockean account
amnesia. It is ultimately more difficult than represents the basic psychological continu?
has been appreciated for psychological ity theory, which is then differently custom?
continuity theorists to give a clear-cut an? ized by its various proponents. One of the
swer about personal survival in this case. moves standard in this revamping of
This is because there are two distinct ele? Locke's theory is the addition of psycho?
ments of psychological continuity that logical connections besides memory to the
come apart here. On the one hand psycho? definition of personal identity. Whether
logical continuity is conceived as the con? Locke is taken to claim straightforwardly
tinuation of a single experiencing subject that memory constitutes personal identity
or stream of consciousness; and on the or to offer a somewhat more complicated
other as the continuation of a set of char? theory, it is undeniable that he gives memory
acter traits, dispositions and psychologi? a central role. Psychological continuity
cal features?a continuity of personality.1 theorists question the justification for this
Both of these types of continuity contrib? privilege, and propose a similar role for
ute to personal survival, but in different other types of psychological connections.
ways. Moreover, while these two sorts of Parfit, for instance, says that "besides
continuity are indeed intimately intercon? direct memories, there are several other
nected, the connections are of a more com?kinds of direct psychological connection.
plex nature than psychological continuity One such connection is that which holds
PERSONALITY AND PERSISTENCE: THE MANY FACES OF PERSONAL SURVIVAL / 89
between an intention and the later act in involve these other sorts of psychologi?
which it is carried out. Other such direct cal connections as well.
connections are those which hold when a Shoemaker's argument is convincing
belief, or a desire, or any other psychologi? enough on the surface, but it deserves more
cal feature, continues to be had."2 He as? scrutiny than it has been given. In particu?
serts that Locke's theory should be revised lar, he moves rather too quickly from the
to include these other connections as well.
question of whether a person who loses
Sydney Shoemaker, also introduces his memory but retains other psychological
psychological continuity theory in this characteristics would survive to the as?
way. He gives a similar, but somewhat sumption that she would. It is not obvious
more detailed, argument for the inclusion that a person could survive such a change;
of non-memory psychological connections it is also not obvious that she could not.
in his criterion of personal identity, which Intuitions are genuinely conflicted in this
rests on the question of what happens when case. Understanding that conflict will re?
a person suffers total, irreversible amne? veal two distinct ideas of psychological
sia. Obviously this is not survivable on a continuation which are typically conflated
straight memory theory, but Shoemaker in psychological continuity theories.
asks us to reconsider.
Memory theorists seem right in judg?
II
ing amnesia to be death, he says, if am? To begin, it is useful to point out that al?
nesia is understood as a complete "'brain though the addition of non-memory psycho?
zap'?the total destruction of all of the logical connections is generally presented
effects of the person's past experience, as a friendly amendment to Locke's crite?
learning, reasoning, deliberation, and so rion of personal identity?a simple expan?
on."3 Shoemaker suggests, however, that sion of his basic insight?a look at Locke's
amnesia need not be thought of as such a text makes it fairly clear that this is not the
radical psychological transformation. "A case. Locke is emphatic that no action or
person's personality, character, tastes, in? experience to which a person cannot extend
terests and so on are," he says, "the prod? his consciousness can be his. More impor?
uct (at least in part) of his past experi? tant for our purposes than Locke's own view,
ence, and it is not obvious that the loss of however, is the general pull of a memory
all memories would necessarily involve based account of identity. There is a strand
the loss of all such traits as these."4 A per? of thought about personal identity in which
son might5 be able to remember nothing the insistence on memory connections in
of her past, Shoemaker suggests, and yet particular as the basis of survival makes
remain psychologically similar along all perfect sense. Personal continuation, on this
other dimensions. In such a case, he says, view, depends crucially on having access
judgments of survival are less clear. If to one's history and recognizing the con?
some traits of personality could survive, nections between one's present and one's
"such a loss of memory would not neces? past. Learning that she will be stripped of
sarily amount to a total brain zap; and then all memories of her current life and passions
it becomes more plausible to suppose that beyond the possibility of retrieval could
such a loss of memory is something a per? quite plausibly lead a person to write a will,
son could survive?in which case the quickly finish up her pet projects, or write
memory theory ... is false."6 This theory letters to her loved ones?just as if she were
must thus be amended, he concludes, to indeed going to die.
The intuition at work here is nicely ex? Well, who am I talking to now? Who is the
pressed in the notion of the "perceiver-self ' ghostly audience for the long tale I tell
outlined by Raymond Martin in his book through every minute of the day? This silent
Self-Concern. We experience the world, judge sitting, face shrouded, in perpetual
closed session?8
Martin says, as if one part of the self was
split off from the flux of events as an ob? The "perceiver self then should just be
server, watching and recording the stream thought of as a stable observer who views
of our experience. Martin argues that the and records the passing flux of experience,
perceiver-self is an illusion, and of course and recognizes it as part of a single life.
in some sense it must be?there is no On one understanding of personal survival,
homuncular entity within people who is the it is the persistence of this self which un?
observer of their experience. Nevertheless, derlies survival. This is the understanding
as Martin indicates, the sense that there is which emerges powerfully from Locke's
such a self is a robust and pervasive ele? discussion of identity. Since the perceiver
ment of experience, and a central feature of self is not an entity (neither a material nor
human psychological organization. He also immaterial substance as Locke says), its
suggests that in thinking about personal identity over time can consist in nothing
survival it is the continuation of this self in more than its recognition of continuity; the
which people are interested; they think they fact that it has access to, and claims as its
have survived if the perceiver-self contin? own, the range of experiences ultimately
ues, and died if it does not. attributed to a single person. This seems
Obviously there are many issues to be to require memory. Total and irreversible
settled about the nature and function of the amnesia must signify the replacement of
perceiver-self before any forceful claims one perceiver-self with another, and so, on
can be made about its role in personal iden? this view, personal death.
tity. Martin says a great deal on this sub? This is not, however, the whole story
ject, and there will doubtless be much more about what is involved in personal continu?
discussion to come.7 For present purposes, ation. Ordinary talk about "personal iden?
however, it is not necessary to put too much tity" more often evokes thoughts of
metaphysical weight on this concept, it can continuity of personality or character than
simply be used to represent a widespread of stream of consciousness. Think, for in?
and familiar picture of psychological con? stance, of the common ritual associated
tinuation and personal survival. A some? with birthdays and other milestones in
what more whimsical version of this which friends and associates from differ?
picture is found in Michael Frayn's novel ent phases of the celebrant's life recount
Headlong, where the protagonist under? anecdotes of her past. Often an important
takes a common sort of internal dialogue feature of such celebrations is the emer?
in order to convince himself to do what he gence of patterns?traits, quirks, and man?
knows to be wrong: ners?which define the person in her
Odd, though, all these dealings of mine with stability through change.
myself. First I've agreed to a principle with What is especially important to note is
myself, now I'm making out a case to myself that the existence of these "defining traits"
and debating my own feelings and intentions and their contribution to identity do not
with myself. Who is this self this phantom require that the person so-defined have
internal partner, with whom I'm entering into conscious access to the fact of their exist?
all of these arrangements? (I ask myself.) ence or continuation. The stories that il
lustrate the stability of personality may document which transfers the land?a
have been completely forgotten by their document that can be revoked only with
subject, and the persisting traits that be? his wife's consent?and tells her not to
come clear through the course of many revoke it even if he later requests it. He
such stories may be ones of which she is says "I regard my ideals as essential to me.
totally oblivious. People can and do sur? If I lose these ideals, I want you to think
prise themselves by discovering just how that I cease to exist. I want you to regard
longstanding certain proclivities, aptitudes, your husband then, not as me, the man who
likes, dislikes, talents, and traits can be. asks you for this promise. . . ."9 Parfit ac?
Looking over old journals or school papers, knowledges that in this case the change in
finding old documents or family movies, character may not be radical enough to lit?
may be occasions for recovering informa? erally cause death. However, he does think
tion long lost, or perhaps never possessed. that for important practical purposes?
The kind of continuity that is at issue here such as assessing what it means for his wife
cannot, therefore, be the same as that em? to be loyal?the young Russian's pro?
phasized by Locke. It is not a continuity nouncement should be taken seriously. At
of a conscious subject?the experience of the very least, then, this case suggests that
a continuing point of view?rather, it is the changes in character or commitment are
stability of traits represented in a person'ssurvival-threatening quite independent of
thoughts and actions. what happens to memory.
The idea that personal persistence con? This same impulse is expressed in more
sists in continuity of personality (where general terms by David Lewis in his dis?
this includes, e.g., character traits, com? cussion of what is required for personal
mitments, mannerisms, and patterns of at? survival. Lewis's work is, moreover, par?
tachment) is not limited to popular thought, ticularly good at displaying the ambiguity
it has also been prominent in philosophi? in this conception. Take, for instance, his
cal discussions of personal identity. Psy? hypothetical case involving Methuselah?
chological continuity theorists depend like people who live thousands of years,
heavily on the use of examples to demon? changing gradually over time. He asks us
strate the importance of psychological fea? to imagine that the life of such a person is
tures to personal survival. While some of "punctuated by frequent amnesias, brain?
these do ask us to imagine an interruption washings, psychoanalyses, conversions,
of consciousness, a great many also involve and what not, each of which is almost (but
a radical change in personality or commit? not quite) enough to turn him into a differ?
ments with no implication of a loss of ent person."10 Here amnesia is lumped to?
memory. It is assumed that in these cases, gether with the kinds of changes brought
too, a threat to identity will be perceived. about by psychoanalysis (which presum?
Parfit, for instance, tells a story about a ably enhances memory but changes per?
nineteenth-century Russian couple. It re? sonality) and conversion (which need not
volves around a young Socialist who interfere with memory), and all are taken
knows that he will inherit vast estates and to be identity-threatening in roughly the
fears that this change of fortune will alter same way.
his values. To protect his current ideals he There are, then, two distinct conceptions
tries to insure that the land he inherits will of personal continuation at work both in
be given to the peasants even if he is cor? popular thought and in philosophical work
rupted by his new wealth. He signs a legal on personal identity. In order to provide
continuity of consciousness, memory con? sciences contain a wealth of information

nections seem crucial; continuity of per? both about the specific question of whether
sonality seems to rely upon other forms of it is really possible to lose memory and
psychological connection. Because these retain personality, and about the relations
two types of continuity are not treated as of interdependence between memory and
importantly distinct by psychological con? personality more generally. This discussion
tinuity theorists, neither is the demand for will pursue an investigation into points of
memory and for other psychological con? conceptual convergence between them,
nections. The result is a criterion like which will provide a valuable start in re?
Parfit's (or the one implied by Lewis), in thinking the scope and features of a psy?
which all psychological connections count chologically based answer to the question
more or less the same amount, and in the of personal survival.
same way, toward the constitution of per? Although the earlier claim that focus on
sonal survival. Shoemaker's amnesia case providing continuity of consciousness leads
reveals, however, that a simple amalgam? naturally to a memory-based account of
ation of this sort will not work. If memory survival stands, it is also important to rec?
is lost but personality retained, a view which ognize that pure memory theories have felt
places survival in the continuity of con? unsatisfactory even within the context of
sciousness and a view which places it in the this focus. A variety of objections have been
continuity of personality simply give oppos? raised that in one way or another suggest
ing answers, and there is no way to string that memory by itself is not a strong enough
together a criterion which will satisfy both. relation to constitute personal survival. One
These two cases represent different kinds way of getting at what seems lacking in
of survival. Losing memory and retaining memory alone is to return to a case de?
personality allows survival in one sense but scribed earlier, Parfit's story of the young
totally undermines it in another. The same Russian who is afraid of losing his Social?
is true in cases where personality is radi? ist ideals. Originally this case was put for?
cally disrupted but memory is retained. The ward as an example of the way in which
psychological continuity theory as it stands psychological continuity theorists make use
has no way of expressing this fact, and so of our intuition that personal survival re?
stands in need of at least some revision. quires continuity of personality. A more
Before considering how that revision detailed consideration of the case can, how?
should look, however, it is important to see ever, also reveal insights into the nature of
that the situation is even more complicated the continuity of consciousness that is re?
than this since these two types of continu? quired for personal survival. In particular,
ity, though distinct, are not unconnected, it can show that there is a thinner and a
as the next sections will show. thicker sense of continuity of conscious?
ness; that the thicker sense is important to
Ill personal survival, and that that sense de?
An investigation into the connections pends crucially on stability of personality.
between continuity of consciousness and Recall, then, the case of the young Rus?
continuity of personality is a monumental sian, who claims that a change of ideologi?
task. Not only are there an enormous num? cal commitment is tantamount to death.
ber of possible connections to explore, but Even if his claim seems hyperbolic, the
a wide variety of methodologies for explor? basic sentiment makes sense. It is easy to
ing them. Psychology and the neuro see how someone might believe that the
loss of a passion which is the organizing for the Socialist cause as well-meaning and
principle of his life would make him a dif? responsive to real injustices, but ultimately
ferent person, and certainly one strand of naive. In any of these cases the conclusion
thought about personal survival allows that might well be that the change in even such
these kinds of dramatic psychological an ardent commitment poses no real threat
change can indeed be survival-undermin? to survival.
ing in a very real way.11 It is, however, not Put more generally, with respect to psy?
just the fact of the change in itself which chological change there is a difference be?
makes this transition seem identity-threat? tween personal development and the loss
ening; it is more fundamentally the sense of self, and this difference is not always
that this man would have to suffer a radi? simply a matter of the degree of alteration.
cal revision in sensibility or perspective to What seems far more important is the na?
believe otherwise on this issue. A better ture and impetus for change. This is usu?
understanding of this fact will lead us to ally expressed by saying that change which
one significant connection between conti? is internally motivated is survival-preserv?
nuity of consciousness and continuity of ing, while change which is imposed from
memory. the outside is survival-threatening. The
It is important to recognize first off that question of just what it means for a change
even though it is common to allow that to be internally motivated is obviously
change with respect to central psychologi? highly vexed and has produced a great deal
cal features can undermine survival, it is of interesting philosophy. Naturally that
also a truism that in some cases it does not. question cannot be answered here. It is still
When the young Russian imagines his pos? possible, however, that one important as?
sible change he is envisioning a story of pect of internality in these cases is the pres?
corruption and the irresistible allure of ervation of a certain kind of phenomeno
money. The document he draws up is the logical and motivational access to one's
legal version of the ropes that bind Ulysses past psychological life?the continued rep?
to the mast; and his instructions to his wife resentation of (to use this term loosely) a
the counterpart of Ulysses' instructions to "past self." The suggestion is that this con?
his crew. Our young Russian knows the nection to the past is crucial to distinguish?
story of how the possession of a large store ing between cases in which change is to
of capital impels a person to greedy be? be viewed as personal development and
havior, and he is doing his best to safeguard cases in which it is to be viewed as a loss
against this form of coercion. We can, how? of self.12
ever, imagine his transformation quite dif? Reconsider the young Russian. The dif?
ferently. Perhaps he learns that his com? ference between the case he imagines (in
rades are themselves corrupt or that the which he is co-opted by greed and social
peasants are going to use the wealth he pressure), and the alternatives suggested
would give them to somehow perpetuate above can be cast in just this light. In his
their own subjugation. Maybe he invents imagined scenario, the young Russian's
or discovers a new economic system which current passions and commitments have no
he believes would better serve the goals say in the decisions made by his older,
he hoped to achieve through Socialism; or more conservative successor. These ideals
he comes to believe that other matters more have been discarded and exert no pull ei?
urgently require his resources. Or perhaps ther emotionally or behaviorally. In these
he simply comes to view his enthusiasm alternatives, however, things are different.
The old passions are not entirely lost, they sciousness. At one extreme she can have
are just placed in a new context where they cognitive access to her past but no phenom
take on a different cast and lead to differ? enological access or sympathy for past
ent results. In these cases the older Rus? personality features. Such a person knows
sian can not only remember that he felt a what her psychological life used to be like,
certain way as a youth; he still has sympa? but she cannot recapture that life from the
thy for his old values, and feels their force, inside. Although she may in some sense
even if they are now outweighed by other view what she remembers as her own psy?
considerations. chological past, there is clearly a wedge
This connection to one's past personal? between the person that she was and the
ity features provides a link that simple person that she is. What has been described
awareness of one's past does not. The im? as empathie access to the past offers a far
portance of this connection can be seen by richer connection, and leads to a different
noting that when it is absent it is easy to level of continuity of consciousness. At this
view other temporal portions of a shared level a person is also able to experience
human life as alien competitors. This kind salient elements of the past, to see through
of alienation is described, among other the same eyes as she did before, and so to
places, in Sartre's examples of the con? relive her experiences from the inside
sciousness of anguish. He tells, for in? rather than simply knowing that she had
stance, the story of a person walking on a them. This, in turn, will have behavioral
narrow mountain path who initially feels implications which lead to further conti?
fear that he might stumble. As soon as he nuities.
notices that fear and decides to take pre? Clearly, both levels of continuity are rel?
cautions to avoid falling, says Sartre, he evant to survival in some sense. While the
faces a new problem?anguish. What he first may seem somehow more basic, the
recognizes is that although he is now re? second is also philosophically significant,
solved to be careful, there is nothing he in some ways more so than the first. When
can do to ensure that he will continue to personal survival is placed in continuity of
do so?to guarantee that in ten minutes consciousness?the continuation of a
time he will not become overly confident, single experiencing subject?it seems
or seized with a perverse impulse to rush more plausible to hold that what is at is?
to the edge, even with full memory of his sue is the continuation of a particular point
present resolution to be careful.13 Whatever of-view, or way of experiencing the world,
one thinks of the metaphysical doctrine of or behavioral orientation toward it. Of
radical choice on which Sartre builds this course there must be room for growth,
example, the psychological fact remains change, and development, but in consider?
that if one does suspect that one's "future ing what is required for one's persistence
self will lack even a modicum of sympa? into the future, something like the future
thy for one's current desires and goals this phenomenological and behavioral repre?
is enough to make that future self seem like sentation of one's present passions, values
an other?someone against whom one is and desires provided by the second level
defenseless and who could potentially act of continuity of consciousness seems cru?
against one's interests. cial. Even though there is some sense of
There are thus different levels at which continuity of consciousness associated
a person can experience continuity of con with merely cognitive recollection of one's
past, then, it seems at most partial.
The richer sense of continuity of con? IV

sciousness built on empathie access de? The idea that continuity of personality
pends, however, on a certain degree of depends, at least sometimes, on memory
stability of personality; it is this which is not completely novel. In fact, it is sug?
makes the real difference between the
gested by Shoemaker himself when he dis?
purely cognitive connection to the past cusses the amnesia case. He says, for
found in cold memory and the richer asso?
example, "to be sure, to a certain extent
ciations found in empathie access. Only if character and personality traits do seem
some of the passions, values, commitments inseparable from memories of certain
and traits of the past persist into the present kinds. It is hard to see how someone's paci?
can memory be infused with the phenom fism could survive his loss of all of his
enological character that brings the past beliefs about the effects of warfare."14 Yet
alive. It is important to understand, more? this obvious?and obviously important?
over, that this form of continuity of con?
insight is never really followed up. Instead
sciousness can be more than a simple con Shoemaker asks the reader to "suppose, for
junction of memories and persistent the sake of argument, that at least some
personality features. At its richest it is an traits of personality could survive complete
integration of stability of personality into memory loss."15 While it is certainly legiti?
memory. When this happens the kind of mate to simplify in this way as a tempo?
memory at issue is different from cold,
rary measure, it is also worth asking what
cognitive memory. It is the sort of memory kinds of traits are likely to survive total
at issue when a teenager challenges a par? amnesia, and whether these are sufficient
ent that she no longer "remembers" what for personal survival. Answering these
it is like to be young and in love. Typically questions will reveal that as with continu?
such a protest involves no claim about cog?
ity of consciousness there is also a thicker
nitive deficits. The parent may well retain
and a thinner sense of continuity of per?
faithful recall of her biography, including sonality; that the thicker sense is impor?
the details of her early romances and the tant to identity, and that it depends
foibles of her youth. What she lacks is the crucially on memory connections.
ability to recapture from the inside the af? To begin, it is important to note that the
fect and dispositions which went with various connections so far lumped together
those biographical facts, and in this sense under the term "personality feature" or
her memory is a knowing that a person "non-memory psychological connection"
she identifies as herself had certain expe?
are in fact a highly heterogeneous group.
riences rather than a full-blown recollec?
Beliefs, desires, values, goals, and traits
tion from the inside of what those experi? of character can be as different from one
ences are like.
another?and play as different a role in
One very important type of continuity of
constituting personal survival?as any of
consciousness thus has some degree of these and memory. It is thus just as impor?
continuity of personality as its condition. tant to consider differences among this
The next section will show that the depen? group as between this group and memory
dence goes the other way as well.
connections. Among the many ways in
which psychological connections can be
classified, one is by the degree to which
they depend upon their placement in a
particular biography and on the existence what it offers is incomplete. One way to
of autobiographical memories. Clearly see this is just to note that the paradigmatic
some psychological features are far more cases of identity-threatening psychologi?
memory-dependent than others. The goal cal change in the literature revolve around
of completing planned revisions to a manu? the loss of specific ideals, goals, values,
script and finally sending it off, the desire beliefs, or desires. Reconsider, for ex?
to surprise a friend with the sports car she ample, Parfit's young Russian. He declares
always wanted on her fiftieth birthday or that the loss of his intention to give his land
ferocious love for one's children, all in? to the peasants would amount to a failure
volve particular knowledge of one's life in of personal survival. Certainly this inten?
a way that the more general, correspond? tion depends critically on a whole host of
ing features of a creative impulse, loyalty memories specific to his life, so initially it
and a generous nature, or a particular at? seems as if the kinds of psychological con?
tachment style do not. Personality features nections that involve autobiographical
which are highly intertwined with a par? memories are crucial to personal survival.
ticular biography can be called "specific Admittedly, however, the inference from
features" and those which are more inde? cases like that of the Young Russian are
pendent "generic features." Obviously not so straightforward. His pronouncement
there is a continuum from the most generic almost certainly involves an assumption
to the most specific features. It will sim? that his loss of his intention to support the
plify matters, however, to speak of features peasants would be due not to amnesia, but
well toward the specific end of the spec? to a change in more fundamental traits,
trum as "specific" and those well toward possibly even generic ones. The loss of his
the generic end as "generic." intention is assumed to signify that he has
With respect to personality as well as become, more broadly, a different kind of
consciousness, then, we can describe dif? person; a person who does not care about
ferent levels of continuity. There is a thin the downtrodden, who is driven by greed
kind which involves the persistence of gen? and lacks respect for his fellow human be?
eral traits of character and those psycho? ings. What needs consideration, then, is
logical features which do not depend on whether one should expect the Young
memory, and progressively richer forms of Russian's judgments about identity to
continuity involving traits which are in? change if one assures him that his failure
creasingly intertwined with the details of to give his land to the peasants would be
a particular biography. Presumably the caused by a lapse of memory and not by
psychological connections that survive a an alteration of his personality.
total loss of memory will be only the most This question is actually quite compli?
generic, and so the only continuity of per? cated. As mentioned before, the level of
sonality which it is coherent to imagine in entanglement of a given psychological fea?
the amnesia case is the very thinnest sort. ture with the rest of a person's life is obvi?
The question that remains is whether this ously a matter of degree, and the Young
is enough for personal survival. Russian's reaction to the loss of his inten?
The answer here parallels the answer to tion will almost certainly depend at least
the corresponding question in the case of somewhat upon just how generic his sur?
continuity of consciousness. The existence viving traits are. If he retains his commit?
of even the thinnest sorts of continuity pro? ment to bettering the plight of the com?
vides some type of personal survival, but mon man, his distrust of those who control
the means of production, and his interest if post-amnesia he developed a commitment

in politics and economics, he may well to Liberal Democracy and gave his inherit?
view his prospects of personal survival as ance to "Nineteenth-Century Russians for
more or less undamaged by the loss of his the Democratic Way," his pre-amnesia per?
specific intention to give his land to the spective would count this a loss of self ev?
peasants. In fact, even if that intention is ery bit as profound as if he remembered his
wiped clean by some kind of amnesia he commitment but simply became greedy and
is likely to reformulate it anew from the kept his land. While stability of even the
traits he has left. And even if he does not most generic traits thus contributes to some
reformulate this very intention, the deci? level of personal survival, the traits which
sions he makes will be close enough to are interwoven with autobiographical
those lost that he is unlikely to judge them memory seem crucial to a robust or com?
a serious threat to his survival. But what plete survival.
about at the extremes of generality? It might be objected that it is only a con?
Shoemaker's case relies on the possibility tingent matter that our most unique person?
that a person might survive the loss of all ality traits involve memory-connections.
autobiographical memories. It is thus nec? The brain is a complicated organ, and it is
essary to imagine the Young Russian left well-documented that damage to it can
with only the very most general traits?a cause some bizarrely selective deficits.
passionate outlook, perhaps, a social ori? Shoemaker's case could then be made by
entation, a tendency toward active involve? imagining a type of amnesia where memo?
ment, a generous nature. Is the retention ries are wiped clean but even very specific
of only these traits enough for personal psychological connections persist, now
survival? entirely devoid of context. The amnesiac
Again the answer is "yes" and "no." At might have no memories of his past, but
some level it does seem that even these very feel nonetheless an overpowering urge to
generic continuities afford a kind of per? give money to a particular group of peas?
sonal continuation. Parents are fond of pro? ants. This would, of course, be unusual, but
nouncements of the form "even as a then so is amnesia. Perhaps, then, a quite
newborn she was always smiling (anxious, intense sort of similarity of personality
demanding, relaxed, curious, moody . . .)," could, in strange circumstances, survive
and this kind of information is important. the loss of autobiographical memories al?
The recognition of stability of temperament together.
at the most fundamental level does seem to While this objection does not, in the end,
provide some kind of identity through time. undermine the connection that has been
However, it also seems clear that a tremen? urged between continuity of consciousness
dously important element of what we typi? and continuity of personality, showing this
cally take to be required for continuity of takes some argument. Of course Shoe?
personality?let alone personal survival? maker is right in his assertion that the fea?
is missing if only these very general traits tures of our personality are dependent on
remain. To see this one need only recog? our pasts and do not always require
nize that the traits that could survive a total memory for their continuation. This can be
loss of memory would probably be compat? true even of features which are quite spe?
ible with the Young Russian beginning life cific. A person may not, for instance, re?
again as a Missionary, Police Officer, or member the details of his early courtship
crusader for Liberal Democracy. Certainly or the events which influenced him in his
decision to get married; or a person may without some recognition of a history and
forget the particular readings, seminars, shared projects and plans. And while
and discussions that led her to the project Parfit's young Russian might be relieved
with which she is now engaged. Nonethe? to know that his money would go where
less, the emotions, desires, and intentions he intended it to go, the post-amnesia
themselves may well continue unabated person's inexplicable desire to give money
after the details of their origins have been to the peasants is certainly not the same
forgotten. Indeed, this is probably more the intention as the pre-amnesia Russian's con?
rule than the exception. sidered commitment to their betterment.
It is crucial to recognize, however, that Unless we insist on the implausible view
this very common phenomenon differs that emotions, desires, and intentions have
drastically from the amnesia case that has no content beyond the proposition by
been under consideration. In the ordinary which they can be expressed, the phenom
case, although the particular details of an enological and behavioral difference en?
affection or intention's origins may be lost gendered by lack of context will make it
there remains a broader context and sense impossible for specific personality features
of biography in which it makes perfect to survive amnesia in any strong sense.
sense. The man who cannot remember the This analysis reveals an important di?
time when he first fell in love with his wife
mension of personal survival that is often
at least knows who she is, that they have a overlooked. Defenders of psychological
history together, and many of the things accounts of personal identity tend to con?
that he admires about her. The woman who centrate almost exclusively on the internal
cannot recall just how she got started on aspects of psychological life?what these
her current project at least knows what her states are like for the person. People are
job is, and what kinds of things interest her, not, however, people in their minds alone,
and the basic activities she was involved but also in the world. It is not just their
in around the time the ideas for her project inner lives which are important to them,
came together. In these cases the person? but also their relationships with other
ality features are at least harmonious and people, their jobs, and their hobbies.16 Spe?
comprehensible within the context of an cific psychological features persisting
extended and highly specific biography. In without a context are deficient not only in
the amnesia case, on the other hand, sur? their phenomenological character, but also
viving personality traits are entirely with? in their behavioral implications. Isolated
out context. If they are specific, then they as they are from the biographies that give
must come totally out of the blue, with no them substance, they can lead only to very
explanation or justification. limited and inflexible behaviors. They thus
This difference has far-reaching conse? contribute very little to a person's capac?
quences. Without context, specific person? ity to continue living the life she had been
ality features can be reproduced only living, and this severely limits the contri?
partially. This is because the circumstances bution they can make to personal survival.
which give rise to these features also sup? Our young Russian, for instance, does not
port them and provide some of their con? only want to give his money to the peas?
tent. A person's love for his spouse is, ants, he wants to continue his life project
presumably, more than just a feeling; it is of addressing economic inequities. Even if
a complex set of attitudes, emotions, and an impulse to follow through on his inten?
dispositions that could not be what it is tion concerning his inheritance were some
how to survive amnesia, it would be able to typically interact and support one anoth
go no further than that in perpetuating his There are important types of mem
life project. In trying to imagine the impact which are not possible without some c
of specific traits that persist without the tinuity of personality, and the most
context of memory, it seems clear that the cific continuities of personality req
more a trait allows a person to pick up the some continuity of memory. Amnesia
thread of her old life the more it contrib? radical personality change are thus b
utes to her survival. Once this is understood, cases of partial survival, not only bec
however, it becomes clear once again how they contain fewer connections than
important continuity of consciousness re? usually present, but also because the c
ally is. However much continuity of life nections that are present are thinner. T
plans or projects can be generated through two types of partial survival will, m
traits that persist stripped of their context, over, be quite different from one anoth
it is hard to imagine radical amnesia caus? This is undoubtedly a broader phen
ing anything short of a catastrophic break enon. Other types of changes will
in life continuity. If it did not, then so many yield partial survival of a different sort
specific traits would have to continue that a other kinds of continuities will also b
person should have no trouble reconstruct? volved in relations of mutual support
ing her history from them, and a clear bio? continuity of memory and personality.
graphical sense?if not memory itself? bility of environment has already
would develop. mentioned as one such factor, and there
The dependence of continuity of person? certainly others (e.g., the continuit
ality on continuity of consciousness thus has other cognitive and affective capacit
at least two aspects. First, there is an im? The lesson learned from Shoemaker's
portant sense in which the highly specific nesia case can thus be put more gene
personality traits which are so crucial to by saying that it reveals that personal s
personal survival depend upon autobio? vival is (1) multi-dimensional (ther
graphical memory. Second, "personality" is many types of continuities involved, int
not just the way a person thinks or feels, ference with any of which can yield a d
but the way he acts and lives as well. The ferent kind of partial survival) an
continuation of life plans and projects can, dynamic (the various types of contin
however, only take place in the context of a interact and mutually support one anot
well-defined autobiographical sense. The Psychological continuity theories, as
thickest sort of continuity of personality stand, are unable to capture either of t
thus relies on some degree of continuity of facts. Clearly it would be desirable to
consciousness just as the thickest sort of an account of survival that could.
continuity of consciousness relies on con?
Such an account can be found by bec
tinuity of personality. ing somewhat more open-minded about
form it is expected to take. Although m
V
theorists have accepted the fact that an
The discussion of amnesia and countradical
of personal survival might not
personality change has shown that conti?
the form of an identity criterion, it is
nuity of memory and continuitygenerally
of person?assumed, that to give such an
count
ality both contribute to personal we must define a relation w
survival,
holds
but they do so in different ways. between
It has also a present person and on
shown that these two types ofmore continuity
person in the future. This assum
is at least in part a result of the way in future person to whom he is identical. This
which the idea that survival and identity explains the longstanding emphasis on
should not be equated is introduced by identity. Parfit's argument, however, chal?
Parfit. His argument involves a case of fis? lenges this assumption by suggesting that
sion in which a single person is psycho? it is not obviously incoherent to suppose
logically connected in exactly the same that a person might continue into the fu?
way and to the same degree, to two future ture as someone else. The question of
people. In such a case, Parfit says, there is whether this is really possible remains con?
no legitimate basis for identifying only one troversial. There is, however, an important
of the successors as the original person, insight that can be gleaned from this move
yet since they are clearly not identical to without having to resolve the controversy.
one another, transitivity implies that these At the very least there is fairly widespread
successors cannot both be identical to the agreement about the general claim that
original person either. It seems, then, that what people care about, or what matters to
neither successor can be said to be identi? them, is not identity per se, but rather what?
cal to the original person, but each bears a ever is required for them to continue into
relation to that person which, considered the future. The question of metaphysical
in other contexts, seemed sufficient for identity, then, is one question; the ques?
survival. It is therefore awkward, Parfit tion of what kind of continuation consti?
argues, to claim that the original person tutes the survival people typically crave is
fails to survive splitting. The best descrip? another; and the question of how these two
tion of this case, he thus concludes, is that are related yet a third.
the original person has survived even Once these questions are distinguished
though there is no one in the future to there is reason to consider directly the
whom he is identical. question of what matters in survival. In
In Parfit's argument the relation which doing so this question need not be con?
is supposed to define survival is already in strued as necessarily about a relation be?
place before survival and identity are tween a present and future person. A
decoupled, and so there is no immediate different approach has already been seen
reason to ask what form an account of sur? at the end of section four. There it was sug?
vival should take. One can, however, take gested that what people want in wanting
a more general moral from Parfit's account, survival is to be able to continue living
one which does not depend on accepting their lives. It is not only internal psycho?
the particular definition of survival he logical states, but the life they allow a per?
employs or the specific argument he of? son to live which matters to him. This is a
fers for distinguishing between identity very natural construal of what is involved
and survival. More broadly, his discussion in survival. If one is able to continue liv?
is a reminder that what is of concern in ing one's life one has survived; if one's life
reflection on issues of survival and mor? ends one has not?this seems indisputable.
tality is not whether there is a person in Thinking about survival in this way allows
the future to whom one bears the identity an understanding of the question of per?
relation?at least not under that descrip? sonal survival as the question of what is
tion. What is of concern is whether one will required for a person's life to continue
continue into the future. It is, of course, rather than as the question of what rela?
natural to suppose that what it means for tion she must bear to a future person to
someone to continue is for there to be a survive as that person.
At first, this rephrasing may not seem to bodiment are also likely to be included and,
buy much. A person's life must, after all, more controversially, some degree of au?
be lived by a person, and so it seems that tonomy may also be part of the mix. The
the continuation of a life must depend upon basic idea behind this proposal is that the
the continuation of the person living it. continuation of a person's life will be de?
This would lead back to the search for a fined in terms of these features and capaci?
relation between temporally separated in? ties (which can be called life-elements).
dividuals. This is not the only way to look The diminishment or interruption of one
at things, however. There is no obvious of these life-elements will impact a
reason that the continuity of the person person's ability to continue living her
must be taken as most fundamental. It is life?and hence her personal survival?in
just as easy to take the question of what some more-or-less predictable way. An
gives continuity to a person's life as more account of personal survival would de?
primary, and draw conclusions about the scribe these effects.
continuation of the person from this in? Because a number of different elements
quiry. This reversal of priorities suggests and capacities contribute to the life of a
a way of developing an account of survival person, each in a different way, this kind
that can capture its multidimensional and of account can capture the multi-dimen?
dynamic nature. Lives, after all, are clearly sional nature of survival. For instance, a
both multi-dimensional and dynamic, and brain lesion that undermines a person's
so an account of their continuation should capacity to form complicated plans or un?
include all of the complexities of survival dertake projects will interfere with her life
revealed by the amnesia case. In order to in one way, while an injury which leaves
show in detail how this would work it this capacity intact but interferes with af?
would be necessary to have an account of fect in a way which undermines the capac?
the continuity of a life?something which ity to form evaluations or to develop lasting
obviously cannot be provided here. It is, relationships with other people will inter?
however, possible to get an idea of the gen? fere with it in another. By developing an
eral contours of such a view which can account of the roles different features play
show its promise as an account of personal in leading the life of a person, it will be
survival. possible to express the difference between
The life of a person, to count as such, these two assaults to survival.
will need to include certain capacities and Indeed all of the different kinds of
features. There is no inconsiderable litera? changes which impact the conduct of a
ture, and also no clear consensus, on what person's life can be expressed through their
these are. Still, there is bound to be a fi? effects on one or more of these central fea?
nite?even fairly limited?list of features tures. Changes like memory loss or radi?
which contribute, each in its own way, to cal personality change will affect survival
creating what we recognize as the life of a insofar as they modify or diminish one or
person. Some reasonably uncontroversial more of the life-elements. Changes like
candidates might be the capacity for self losing a job or getting a divorce may or
refection and for valuation, the ability to may not have an impact, depending on how
form and carry out plans and projects, and a person reacts to them. Typically such
the capacity to form relationships of cer? changes will be absorbed into an ongoing
tain sorts with other people. Some other life, but this will not always be the case.
cognitive capacities and some sort of em Such a change might, for instance, cause a
severe depression which interferes with a right, however, these interactions also al?
person's ability to make new plans, dis? low features which are not immediately
courages him from undertaking new impacted to compensate for deficits so that
projects, and destroys his relationships their impact is not as great as one might
with others in a way from which he does fear. Some examples will help illustrate
not soon recover. If this happens survival this point. Let's return to our earlier cases
will be affected. Since these events will un? of amnesia and character change. Amne?
doubtedly impact different combinations sia, conceived as the loss of all autobio?
of life-elements in different ways, however, graphical memory, obviously deals a
their varied impact on survival can be eas? serious blow to the capacity to continue
ily represented by my view. living one's life. With no memory of one's
This view can also express the dynamic history both projects and personal relation?
interactions between the various elements ships will be horribly disrupted. If, how?
of survival. These interactions can be found ever, a great many other features of the
on two different levels. First, there are in? amnesiac's life stay in place, if, e.g., the
terconnections among the life-elements environment is constant, and generic per?
themselves. A person's life does not con? sonality features and cognitive capacities
sist simply of a collection of capacities or remain more or less intact, the impact on
components laying side-by-side; the dif? the amnesiac's life may be mitigated. Be?
ferent aspects of our lives support one an? cause personal relationships are not uni?
other. Our relationships contribute to the directional, for instance, those with whom
stability of our personalities and projects, the amnesia victim had close relationships
and our projects and relationships can be will probably strive to maintain those re?
as they are only because of our ability to lationships, picking up the slack caused by
evaluate and reflect upon ourselves. This the lost memories as much as they can. The
kind of interaction also shows up at the amnesia victim will likely continue to live
level of the psychological features and ca? (at least to begin with) in the same place
pacities which underlie these broader ca? that she did before her memory loss; her
pacities. This is the level of interaction parents, friends, spouse, and children will
uncovered in our earlier discussion. For probably rally around her. Not only will
instance, memory is crucial not only to the these continuities help to continue many
capacity for a certain kind of self-reflec? aspects of her life despite her loss of
tion, but also to interpersonal relationships memory, they might also allow her to re?
and agency. Continuity of personality also gain some of the psychological features
contributes, in its way, to each of these fea? that were lost to one degree or another. A
tures of a person's life. Many of these life devoted family might pore over photo al?
elements are possible only through a bums, show home videos, and tell stories
combination of more specific cognitive to fill in the person's biography for her,
psychological capacities. helping her to develop a sort of ersatz
It is worth noting that the interactions memory; a loyal boss may retain a posi?
among the various elements of a person's tion for her and try to reintegrate her into
life can impact survival in one of two ba? her work, helping her to regain enthusiasm
sic ways. The way in which a deficit in one for her earlier projects.
capacity can lead to a deficit in others, thus If many generic psychological features
magnifying what is lost has been discussed remain in place the amnesiac may respond
already in some detail. If circumstances are well to these attempts and if she does she
will be able to pick up much (but undoubt? their pressures, he may be able to under?
edly not all) of the thread of her life. On stand his change of plans and projects in a
way that does not make it seem so much
the other hand, the effort to re-establish her
previous life may fail. Either because there like a loss of his previous life. If this does
are too many collateral changes, or because not happen, however, his loss of values
of the specific way in which her memory may well lead to the break-up of his mar?
was integrated into her life, or for some riage and severing of all old relationships.
other reasons. If this happens, the initial Again, the change of a major element of
changes caused by the loss of memory will his life will multiply itself over time, mak?
be magnified over time. If her close per? ing the discontinuity even more complete.
sonal relationships and past projects can? These interactions thus sometimes lead
not be made vivid or compelling to her to the magnification of deficits, and some?
again she will likely change her family times to their limitation. Indeed, some?
situation, choose new projects, find new times a deficit in one area can be so well
work and so on, and this will lead to an compensated by developments in others
even more profound disruption of her life that life becomes enriched rather than di?
than the memory loss alone. In such a case minished because of it. There are many
there will almost certainly still be some con? well-known examples in which a reversal
tinuities with her old life, but survival will of fortune or debilitating accident leads a
be far less complete and the thread of life person to a new life path that includes more
will unravel even further as time goes on. satisfying interpersonal relationships or
A very similar situation is found in the meaningful projects. Producing an account
case of Parfit's young Russian. From his of the dynamics of life-elements will thus
viewpoint as a young socialist, his loss of be a tricky task, not least because these
socialist ideals would cause his demise by interactions are enormously complex and
undercutting the projects and commitments specific to the circumstances of an indi?
which seem so central to the conduct of vidual life. All this means, however, is that
his life. His most central aim is working this account should not be expected to di?
for equality and fairness, and he views a rectly say what impact a particular change
shift away from this project as a fundamen? will have on someone's survival. It is more
tal rupture in his life. Should he come to promising to look for a more general ac?
lose his ideals and rethink this project af? count of the ways in which the features that
ter he gets his inheritance, one of two make up a person's life interact and mutu?
things might happen. The other continu? ally support and depend upon one another.
ities which remain in place may allow him To present an account of personal sur?
to pick up the thread of his life; or the in? vival of the sort proposed here it would be
ability of other continuities to compensate necessary to develop three major compo?
will result in threats to these continuities nents: First, a list of the features which
as well. Initially the Russian will remain make up the life of a person. Second, a
married to the same woman, a woman he description of the contribution each fea?
obviously trusts, and who shares his so? ture makes to living the life of a person.
cialist sensibilities. He will live in the same And third, a general account of the dy?
village and be forced to face his former namic interactions between these features.
comrades. These continuities may temper There are many existing resources for each
his change so that he does not become as of these, including extensive work in value
corrupt as he fears; or, by responding to theory and empirical psychology.
According to the view proposed here a Conclusion

person would survive if her life continued;
The distinction between identity and sur?
fail to survive completely when her life
vival is an important development in the
ended definitively (when, i.e., all of the
discussion of personal continuation. If taken
features which go into making up the life
seriously it points to two separate paths of
of a person were completely eliminated);
inquiry: one into the metaphysical identity
and survive partially if her capacity to live
question and the other into the question of
her life is compromised or diminished. what kind of continuation we care about.
Admittedly this view would not be able to
Following out the second path reveals im?
answer some of the questions that psycho?
portant phenomena that psychological con?
logical continuity theories have tried to. It
tinuity theories cannot capture. The kind of
would not, for instance, be able to give a
survival people care about can be partial in
straightforward reply to the question of
ways more complicated than the degrees of
whether a person would survive total am?
survival offered by psychological continu?
nesia, or splitting in two, or having his psy?
ity theorists are able to express. By taking
chological make-up transplanted to a new
more seriously the disconnect between sur?
body. Instead it would have to allow that
vival and identity an alternative approach
the answers to these questions will depend is uncovered. Survival can be conceived in
upon the effect these changes have on the
terms of the continuation of a person's life,
person's life, and this, in turn, will depend
and partial survival described in terms of
upon the individual details ofthat life. This
the ways in which a person's life does or
is not a difficulty for the view, however,
does not continue after some change. There
since these questions are raised only in the
is much work to be done to develop this
interest of getting clearer on what is re?
account, and it will be fairly messy when it
quired for the survival which matters to us,
is done. This is, however, to be expected
and this view speaks to that question di?
when what is at issue is nothing less than
rectly. This account of personal survival what matters.17
will not take the form such an account was
initially expected to have, but can address University of Illinois at Chicago
our concerns all the better for it.
ENDNOTES
1. "Personality" is used very broadly here. Personality features include beliefs, values, desires,
goals, traits, intentions, and temperament. Section four will address the obvious fact that this is
actually a very heterogeneous group of features.
2. Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 206.
3. Sydney Shoemaker, Personal Identity (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1984), p. 87.
4. Ibid., pp. 87-88.
5. Or might not. Shoemaker allows that there may be an inherent link between continuity of
some memories and continuity of personality, and so that amnesia with character continuity of
the sort he is imagining may not be possible. This will be an important theme later, but for now it
will be useful to proceed on the hypothesis that this is a possibility. Doing so will ultimately
make it clearer why, in the end, it is not.
6. Shoemaker, Personal Identity, p. 88.
7. Martin believes that this assessment of the conditions of survival is ultimately a mistake since
the perceiver-self never actually persists (and people do sometimes survive). An alternative way
of reading these facts would be to say that in order to capture what is accurate in this intuitive
sense of survival it is essential to think of the continuation of the perceiver-self as a phenomeno
logical rather than metaphysical fact. That is, if a person can experience the perceiver-self as
continuous and persistent she will have the kind of psychological continuation that, in at least
some moods, is taken to constitute personal survival. Resolving these issues is, of course, a mat?
ter for a different series of papers.
8. Michael Frayn, Headlong (New York: Picador, 1999), pp. 126-127.

9. Parfit, op. cit., p. 327.
10. David Lewis, "Survival and Identity," in Philosophical Papers, Volume I (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1983), p. 66.
11. See, for instance, Harry Frankfurt, "Some Mysteries of Love," from the 2000 Lindley Lec?
ture, University of Kansas; Christine Korsgaard, Sources ofNormativity (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996). For a critical discussion of this strand see David Velleman, "Identifica?
tion and Identity," in Contours of Agency, ed. Sarah Buss and Lee Overton (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 2002), pp. 91-123.
12. For a wonderful discussion of the importance of empathie access see Richard Wollheim, The
Thread of Life Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), chapter 4.
13. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966).
14. Shoemaker, op. cit., p. 88.
15.Ibid.
16. This analysis also implies that survival depends to a certain extent on a stability of environ?
ment, since this, too, is important to continuing a life. While I do not have time to discuss this
point here, I embrace this implication. It can be made plausible by recognizing that times of civil
war, famine, revolution and other dramatic social upheavals are frequently cited as times of wide?
spread identity crisis. On a fully developed picture, stability of environment would be seen as a
third factor in personal survival, one in dynamic interaction with the two outlined in this paper,
as these two are with each other. I will discuss this further in section V.
17. This paper has benefited from the input of a great many colleagues. In particular, discussions
with David Zimmerman and Sam Black, and feedback from colloquia at the philosophy depart?
ments at Simon Fraser University and Arizona State University were immensely beneficial.

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Personality and Persistence: The Many Faces of Personal Survival

North American Philosophical Publications, University of Illinois Press are collaborating

PERSONALITY AND PERSISTENCE:

continuity of consciousness, memory con? sciences contain a wealth of information

The richer sense of continuity of con? IV

the means of production, and his interest if post-amnesia he developed a commitment

According to the view proposed here a Conclusion

8. Michael Frayn, Headlong (New York: Picador, 1999), pp. 126-127.

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