Anonuevo vs jalandoni
As mentioned earlier, it contains the
MAY D. AONUEVO, ALEXANDER BLEE DESANTIS AND JOHN
DESANTIS NERI, PETITIONERS VS. INTESTATE ESTATE OF
RODOLFO G. JALANDONI, REPRESENTED BY BERNARDINO G.
JALANDONI AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, RESPONDENT (FIRS
DIVISION, G.R. NO. 178221, O1 DECEMBER 2010)
THIS CASE IS ABOUT LEGAL PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE. BIRTH
CERTIFICATE STATING THAT ONES PARENTS WERE MARRIED
ESTABLISHES THE PRESUMPTION THAT INDEED THEY WERE
MARRIED.
DIGEST:
FACTS:
RODOLFO DIED. HIS BROTHER FILED AT RTC PETITION FOR
ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION. ANONUEVO ET AL
INTERVENED. THEY SAID THEIR MOTHER SYLVIA WAS DAUGHTER
OF ISABEL AND JOHN. BUT AT THE TIME OF RODOLFOS DEATH,
THEIR GRANDMOTHER ISABEL WAS THE LAWFUL WIFE OF
RODOLFO BASED ON A MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE. RODOLFOS
BROTHER OPPOSED THEIR INTERVENTION BECAUSE THE BIRTH
CERTIFICATE OF SYLVIA STATES THAT ISABEL AND JOHN WERE
MARRIED. THEREFORE ISABELS MARRIAGE TO RODOLFO WAS
NULL AND VOID. ANONUEVO ET AL HOWEVER ARGUED THAT THE
ENTRIES IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF SYLVIA COULD NOT BE
USED AS PROOF THAT ISABEL AND JOHN WERE INDEED
MARRIED. FURTHER, SUCH STATEMENT OF MARRIAGE IN THE
BIRTH CERTIFICATE IS JUST TO SAVE FACE AND IS CUSTOMARY.
ISSUE:
CAN ANONUEVO ET AL INTERVENE?
RULING:
NO. THEY HAVE NO PERSONAL STANDING TO INTERVENE. THE
BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF SYLVIA WHICH SHOWS THAT ISABEL AND
JOHN WERE MARRIED IS SUFFICIENT PROOF THAT INDEED THEY
WERE MARRIED. THEREFORE ISABELS MARRIAGE TO RODOLFO
IS VOID SINCE AT THAT TIME ISABEL WAS STILL MARRIED TO
JOHN. BEING NOT MARRIED TO RODOLFO, ISABEL AND HER
DESCENDANTS HAVE NO SHARE IN THE ESTATE OF RODOLFO.
WHILE A MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE IS CONSIDERED THE PRIMARY
EVIDENCE OF A MARITAL UNION, IT IS NOT REGARDED AS THE
SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF MARRIAGE. [1][47]
JURISPRUDENCE TEACHES THAT THE FACT OF MARRIAGE MAY BE
PROVEN BY RELEVANT EVIDENCE OTHER THAN THE MARRIAGE
CERTIFICATE.[2][48] HENCE, EVEN A PERSONS BIRTH CERTIFICATE
MAY BE RECOGNIZED AS COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN HIS PARENTS. THE REASON FACE SAVING/
CUSTOMARY IS WITHOUT MERIT. THE COURT CANNOT TAKE
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF A FOLKWAY.
The ruling of the Court:
PEREZ, J.:
XXXXXX
The second argument of the petitioners is also without merit.
We agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the
petitioners and their siblings failed to offer sufficient evidence to
establish that Isabel was the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The very
evidence of the petitioners and their siblings negates their claim
that Isabel has interest in Rodolfos estate.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence
of a previous marriage between Isabel and John Desantis was
adequately established. This holds true notwithstanding the fact
that no marriage certificate between Isabel and John Desantis
exists on record.
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence
of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive
evidence of marriage.[3][47] Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the
marriage certificate.[4][48] Hence, even a persons birth certificate
may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage
between his parents.[5][49]
In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia precisely
serves as the competent evidence of marriage between Isabel
and John Desantis.
following notable entries: (a) that Isabel and John Desantis were
married and (b) that Sylvia is their legitimate child.[6][50] In
clear and categorical language, Sylvias birth certificate speaks
of a subsisting marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.
Pursuant to existing laws, [7][51] the foregoing entries are accorded
prima facie weight. They are presumed to be true. Hence,
unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, they can, and
will, stand as proof of the facts attested. [8][52] In the case at
bench, the petitioners and their siblings offered no such rebuttal.
The petitioners did no better than to explain away the entries in
Sylvias birth certificate as untruthful statements made only in
order to save face.[9][53] They urge this Court to take note of a
typical practice among unwed Filipino couples to concoct the
illusion of marriage and make it appear that a child begot by
them is legitimate. That, the Court cannot countenance.
The allegations of the petitioners, by themselves and
unsupported by any other evidence, do not diminish the
probative value of the entries. This Court cannot, as the
petitioners would like Us to do, simply take judicial notice of a
supposed folkway and conclude therefrom that the usage was in
fact followed. It certainly is odd that the petitioners would
themselves argue that the document on which they based their
interest in intervention contains untruthful statements in its vital
entries.
Ironically, it is the evidence presented by the petitioners and
their siblings themselves which, properly appreciated, supports
the finding that Isabel was, indeed, previously married to John
Desantis. Consequently, in the absence of any proof that such
marriage had been dissolved by the time Isabel was married to
Rodolfo, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is
bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.
The inability of the petitioners and their siblings to present
evidence to prove that Isabels prior marriage was dissolved
results in a failure to establish that she has interest in the estate
of Rodolfo. Clearly, an intervention by the petitioners and their
siblings in the settlement proceedings cannot be justified. We
affirm the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the
decision dated 31 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 00576 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PER
Garcia-Recio vs. Recio
TITLE: Grace J. Garcia-Recio v Rederick A. Recio
CITATION: GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA
437
FACTS:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an
Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They
lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian
family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving
the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.
On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it
was solemnized at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church,
Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived
separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As
a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal
assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their
Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.
Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on
the ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she
learned only in November 1997, Redericks marriage with Editha
Samson.
ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick
Recio is admissible as evidence to prove his legal capacity to
marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.
HELD:

The nullity of Redericks marriage with Editha as shown by the
divorce decree issued was valid and recognized in the Philippines
since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However, there
is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity
to marry petitioner though the former presented a divorce
decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was
inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not
authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will
be used.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country
by either:
(1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of
the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such
copy must be:
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial
Court of Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that will
conclusively prove respondents legal capacity to marry
petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.
Cosca vs. Palaypayon237 SCRA 249
Facts:
Ramon C. Sambo and other complainants filed an administrative
co mplaint to the Offi ce of the C our t Ad ministra to r
ag ain st Jud ge Lucio Palaypayon and Nelia Baroy,
respondents, for the following offenses:
1.Illegal solemnizatio n o f m arriag e
2.Falsifi cation o f th e mo nthly rep orts of c as es3 .B riber y
in consideratio n of an ap po in tm en t in c our t4 .N on -
iss uan ce of receipt for cash bond received 5.In fi delity
in the cu stod y of d etained pr is oners , and 6.Requ ir in g
paymen t o f fi ling fees from exemp ted en tities
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized
marriages even without the requisite of marriage license. Thus,
several couples were able to get married by the simple
expedient of paying the marriage fees to r e s p o n d e n t
Baroy, despite the absence of marriage license.
A s a consequence, their marriage contracts did not reflect any
marriage license numb er. In add itio n, the resp ond ent
jud ge d id no t sign th eir ma rr iag e contracts and did not
indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he
allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by
the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony.
Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the local
civil registrar.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge is liable of illegal solemnization
of marriage.
Ruling:
On the charge regarding illegal marriages, the
Fa m i l y C o d e pertinently provides that the formal requisite of
marriage, inter alia, a valid m a r r i a g e license
except in the cases provided for
therein. C omp lementar ily, it declares tha t the
abs en ce of any o f the ess en tia l or forma l requ is ites
shall g enerally rend er th e ma rr ia ge void a b in itio and
th at, wh ile an irreg ular ity in the fo rm a l req uisites shall
not aff ect th e validity of the marriage, the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity sh all b e c ivilly, cr im in ally
and ad ministratively lia ble. Thus , res pond en t judge is
liable for illegal solemnization of marriage.
Navarro vs. Judge Domagtoy A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088
July 19, 1996
Facts:
M a y o r R o d o l f o N a v a r r o fi l e d a n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
c a s e a g a i n s t Mun ic ip al Circu it Tr ia l Co ur t Judg e
Hernando Domagto y. Com plaina nt c o n t e n d e d t h a t
Domagtoy displayed gross misconduct as well
a s ineffi cien cy in o ffi c e and igno ran ce of the law wh en
he solemnized the weddings of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn
Borga, despite the knowledge that the groo m is merely
sep ar ated from h is fi rs t wife, an d Flor ia no Dad or
Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario, which
w a s s o l e m n i z e d a t t h e respondents residence which
does not fall within his jurisdictional area. R e s p o n d e n t
judge seeks exculpation from his act of having
solemnized the marriage between Gaspar
Ta g a d a n , a m a r r i e d m a n separated from his wife, and
Arlyn Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affi davit
issu ed b y the Mun ic ip al Trial Judg e of Bas ey,
S ama r,confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife
have not seen each o th er for a lm ost seven year s. With
res pect to the s ec ond ch arge, he main tain s th at in
so lemn iz in g th e ma rr iag e between Sumaylo and
D elRosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the
Family Code and that article 8 thereof applies to the case in
question.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge may be
h e l d l i a b l e f o r solemnizing marriages which did not comply
with the requisites in the FC?
Ruling:
The Court held that even if the spouse present has a well-
founded belief that the present spouse was already dead, a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is
necessary in order to contract a sub sequent marriag e. In
this cas e, Ta ga da n wa s not a ble to present a summar y
p ro ceed ing fo r the declar ation of th e fi r st wifes
p resump tive e death thus, he is still considered married to his
first wife.A marriage can only be considered beyond the
boundaries of the jurisdiction of the judge in the following
instances: (1) at the point of death;(2 ) in remote p laces; o r
(3) upon requ es t of b oth par ties in wr itin g in a sworn
statement to this effect. None of these were complied with
therefore there is an irregularity
Nial vs. Bayadog328 SCRA 122
Facts:
Pep ito Ni al was m arr ied to Teodu lfa B ello nes on
S ep temb er 2 6, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein
petitioners. Pepito resulting to her d ea th on Ap ril 2 4, 19 85
sh ot Teod ulfa . One yea r and 8 mon ths t h e r e a f t e r o r
on D ecemb er 24, 1986, Pep ito and res p on d en t
N o r m a Bayadog got married without any marriage license. In
lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated
December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least 5 years and were thus exempt from
securing a marriage license. After Pep ito s d eath on
Febru ar y 19, 1 997 , petitio ners fi led ap etitio n for
d ec la ra tio n o f nu llity o f the ma rr ia ge o f Pep ito an d
N orma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a
marriage license.
Issue:
Wha t na tu re o f c oha bita tio n is co ntemplated und er
Ar tic le 7 6 o f the Civil Code (now Article 34 of the Family Code)
to warrant the counting of the 5-year period in order to exempt
the future spouses from securing amarriage license.
Ruling:
The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted
back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period
of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage.
This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the
day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party was involved
at any time within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken. An y
m arriag e subs equ en tly co ntra cted dur in g th e lifetime
o f the first spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to the
exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled. In th is c ase , a t th e time Pep ito and
res pond e nts ma rr ia ge, it cannot be said that they have
lived with each other as husband and wife for at least 5 years
prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage
was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only
about 20 months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage
at the time when h e s tar ted coh ab itin g with respo ndent.
I t is im ma ter ia l tha t when they lived with each other, Pepito
had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. Th e
sub sis ten ce of th e marr ia ge even where th ere is was
a ctua l severance of the filial companionship between the
spouses cannot make an y coh ab itation by either sp ouse
with a ny third par ty as b ein g one as husband and
wife .Having determined that the second marriage involve in
this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a
marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of
such element
Manzano vs. SanchezA.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March
8, 2001
Facts:
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David
an za no , h avin g been ma rr ied to him in San Gabr iel
A rch ang el Pa rish , A r a n e t a A v e n u e , C a l o o c a n C i t y.
F o u r c h i l d r e n w e r e b o r n o u t o f t h a t m arriag e.
Ho wever, her husba nd con tr ac ted an other ma rr iag e
with one Luzvimin da Pa ya o b efore resp ond en t Judg e.
Wh en res pond en t Judge so lemn iz ed sa id m arr ia ge, he
kn ew o r oug ht to know tha t th e sa me wa s void and
bigamous , as the marriag e c ontra ct clea r ly stated th at
both contracting parties were "separated."
Resp o n d en t Ju d g e, o n th e o th er h an d , c la im s
t h a t w h e n h e officiated the marriage between Manzano and
Payao he did not know that Man za no wa s lega lly ma rr ied .
Wh at he kn ew was th at th e two had been living
to geth er as husband and wife fo r seven year s alread y
witho ut the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint
affidavit. According to him, had he known that the late Manzano
was married, he would have advised he latter not to marry
again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy.
He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit
and for being designed merely to harass him. After an evaluation
of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Adm in is tr ator
reco mmen ded th at resp ond en t Jud ge be fo und gu ilty
of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of
P2,000, with a warn in g tha t a rep etitio n of the sa me or
similar act wou ld be dealt with more severely.
Issues:
1) Whether or not convalidation of the second
u n i o n o f t h e respondent falls under the purview of Article 34
of the Family Code?
2) Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance
of the law?
Ruling:
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to
apply, the following requisites must concur:
1. The man and wo ma n mus t have been livin g tog ether
as hus ban d and wife for at least five years before the
marriage;
2. The parties must haveno leg al im pediment to m arry
each other;
3. The fact o f absenc e o f leg al impediment between the
parties must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have
lived together for at least five years and are without legal
impediment to marry each other; and
5. Th e so lemn izin g o ffi c er mus t execu te a sworn
statement th at h e had asc er ta ined the qua lifi c a tion s o f
th e parties and that h e h ad fo und no lega l impediment
to their marriage.
Not all of these requirements are present in the
c a s e a t b a r. I t i s significant to note that in their separate
affidavits executed on 22 March 1993and sworn to before
respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda
Payao exp ress ly stated the fa ct o f th eir pr io r exis tin g
marr iage. A lso , in their m arriag e con tr ac t, it was
ind icated that both were "s ep ar ated ." Resp ond ent Judge
knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a
diri ment impediment, which would make the subsequent
marriage null and void.N eith er can res pond en t Judg e ta ke
refu ge on the Jo int A ffi d avit o f David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as
husb and and wife for seven yea rs . Just like sepa ra tion ,
free and volun tary cohabitation with another person for at
least five years does not severe the tieof a subs is ting
previo us marriag e. C lear ly, respo ndent Jud ge
demons tr ated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized
a void and bigamous marriage
Leouel Santos vs. CAG.R. No. 112019 January 4,
1995
Facts:
Leouel first met Julia in Iloilo City. The meeting later proved to be
an even tful day fo r bo th of th em fo r they got m arried
on September 20 , 1 9 8 6 . L e o u e l a n d J u l i a l i v e d w i t h
the latters parents. The ecstasy, however, did
not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel
a v e r r e d , b ecaus e of the frequ en t in ter feren ce by
Julias parents into the yo ung s p o u s e s f a m i l y
a ff a i r s . O c c a s i o n a l l y , t h e c o u p l e w o u l d a l s o
s t a r t a quarrel over a number of things like when and where
the couple should tar t living independently fro m Julia s
parents or wh en ever Ju lia wo uld express resentment on
Leouels spending a few days with his own parents. On M ay 18 ,
19 88, Julia fi n ally left for the U .S . to wo rk as a nurs e
des pite his hus ban ds plea s to so d issu ade her. Seven
mon ths after her d ep arture, Ju lia ca lled Leou el fo r th e
fi rs t time. Sh e pro mised to retu rn home upon the
expiration of her contract but she never did. When Leouel go t a
chance to visit the U .S ., wh ere h e underwent a tr aining
progr am under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines he desperately tried to loc ate, o r to so meho w
get in tou ch with Julia , bu t a ll h is eff or ts were of no
avail Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at
the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years
are circumstances th at clea rly sh ow her b ein g
ps yc ho lo gica lly in ca pa cita ted to enter in to married life.
Issue:
Whether or not Julia is psychologically incapacitated under
Article36 of the FC?
Ruling:
The use of the phrase psychological incapacity under Article
36of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such
possible cases of psyc hos es a s, likewis e men tion ed by
so me ecc les ia stic a l au th o r ities , extremely low intelligence,
immaturity and like circumstances. Article 36 of the Family Code
cannot be construed independently of but must stand in
conjunction with existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus,
correlated, p s y c h o l o g i c a l i n c a p a c i t y s h o u l d r e f e r
t o n o l e s s t h a n a m e n t a l ( n o t physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly in cognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the p ar ties to the m arriag e which , as so expressed
b y Article 6 8 of the Fam il y Cod e, in clu de their mutual
ob liga tio ns to live to geth e r, obs er ve love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated
Choa vs. ChoaG.R. No. 143376 November 26, 2002
Facts:
Leni Choa, petitioner, and Alfonso Choa, respondent, were
marriedon March 15, 1981. Out of this union, two children were
born. On October27, 1993, respondent filed a complaint for the
annulment of his marriage to petitioner. Also filed an amended
complaint for the declaration of nullityof his marriage based on
her alleged psychological incapacity. The case went on tr ial
with th e respon dent pres enting h is evid en ce. Ho wever ,
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the evidence. RTC denied
petitioners demurrer to evidence on the ground that petitioner
must controvert the established quantum evidence of
respondent. Petitioner elevated the case to CA after the motion
of reconsideration was denied. CA held that denial o f th e
d emu rrer was m erely interloc utor y an d petitio ner in
h er defense must present evidence.
Issue:
Wheth er or not petition er s ob liga ted to present h er
evid en ce d e s p i t e t h e i n a d e q u a t e e v i d e n c e o f
r e s p o n d e n t i n t h e a n n u l m e n t o f marriage case
grounded on psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious. However, the
e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t p etition er is gross ly insu ffi cien t to
sup por t an y fi nd in g of ps ych olog ic al i n c a p a c i t y t h a t
would warrant a declaration of nullity of the
p a r t i e s marriage. R e s p o n d e n t c l a i m s t h a t t h e
fi l i n g b y p e t i t i o n e r o f a s e r i e s o f charg es ag ainst
h im a re p roo f o f th e la tter s ps yc ho lo gical in capacity
to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. These
charges included Complaints for perjury, false testimony,
concubinage and deportation. The documents presented by
respondent during the trial do not in any way sh ow th e
a lleged ps yc ho log ic al inc ap ac ity of his wife. It is the
height of absurdity and inequity to condemn
h e r a s p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y inc apa citated to fulfi ll her
m ar ital ob liga tion s, s im ply b ec ause she fi led c a s e s
against him. The evidence presented merely
e s t a b l i s h e s t h e prosecution of the cases against him. To
rule that the filings are sufficient to establish her psychological
incapacity is not only totally erroneous, but also grave abuse of
discretion bordering on absurdity. Cou rt clear ly explain ed
tha t "ps yc ho lo gica l in ca pa city mus t b e characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The
evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his
wife could not get along with each other. There was absolutely
no showing of t h e g r a v i t y o r j u r i d i c a l a n t e c e d e n c e
or incurability of the problems
Be setting their marital union
Antonio vs. ReyesG.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
Facts:
Leonilo Antonio, petitioner, filed a petition to have his marriage
to Marie Reyes, respondent, declared null and void. He anchored
his petition fo r nullity on A rtic le 36 o f th e Family Cod e
a lleging tha t respon dent wa s psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential
m a r i t a l obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondents
incapacity existed a t the tim e their marr iage was
celeb rated and s till subs is ts up to th e present. As
manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity,
petitio ner claimed tha t respo ndent pers istently lied
abo ut h ers elf, the people around her, her occupation,
income, educational attainment and other events or things. I n
s u p p o r t o f h i s p e t i t i o n , p e t i t i o n e r p r e s e n t e d D r.
A b c e d e , a psychiatrist, and Dr. Lopez, a clinical psychologist,
who stated, based on t h e t e s t s t h e y c o n d u c t e d , t h a t
petitioner was essentially a normal,
Intro spective, shy and c ons er va tive typ e of perso n. On
th e o th er han d, they observed that respondents persistent
and constant lying to petitioner wa s abn orma l or
patho lo gical. It underm ined the bas ic rela tionsh ip th at
shou ld be based on lo ve, tru st and respect. Th ey
fu rther ass er ted th at respondents extreme jealousy was
also pathological. It reached the point o f p a r a n o i a s i n c e
there was no actual basis for her to suspect
t h a t petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They
concluded based on th e foreg oing th at resp ondent was
psych olog ically incap ac ita ted to perform her essential
marital obligations.
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence
and held that respondents propensity to lying about almost
anythingher occup atio n, s ta te o f h ea lth, s inging
ab ilities an d her incom e, a mong
Othershad been duly established.
A c c o r d i n g t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t , respondents
fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories
a n d personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-
believe. This made her p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y i n c a p a c i t a t e d
a s i t r e n d e r e d h e r i n c a p a b l e o f g i v i n g meaning
and significance to her marriage. The trial court thus declared
the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.
Issue: Whether or not there is sufficient basis/showing of
psychological incapacity as to render the marriage null and void.
Ruling:
It shou ld b e no ted th at th e lies attribu ted to
respo ndent were no t a dop ted a s false preten ses in
order to ind uce p etition er in to m arriag e. More
dis tu rb ing ly, they ind ic ate a fa ilure on the par t of
respo ndent to d istin gu ish ruth from fiction, or at least abide
by the truth. Petitioners witnesses and the tr ia l co urt were
emphatic on res pond en ts invetera te p roc livity to
tellin g lies an d th e pa tho lo gic na tu re o f her mistruths ,
wh ich acco rd in g to them, were revela tor y of
respo ndents in ability to und er stand a nd perform the
ess en tial obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to
distinguish between fantasy an d rea lity wou ld s im ilar ly be
unab le to compreh end th e leg al na tu re o f the marital
bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding
obligations attach ed to m arriag e, in clu ding p aren ting .
One unable to adh ere to reality cannot be expected to
adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments. Clearly in
this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert
witnesses that respondents psychological incapacity was
curable or incurable. From the totality of the evidence, however,
the court is sufficiently convinced th a t t h e i n c u r a b i l i t y o f
respondents psychological incapacity has been
established by the petitioner.
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CAG.R. No. 119190 January 16,
1997
Facts:
Ch i M in g Tso i a nd G in a La o were ma rr ied on May 22 ,
1 988 . Un til their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no
sexual contact between th em . Henc e, G in a (wife) fi led a
p etition for the declar atio n of nu llity of their marriage.
Medical examinations showed that the wife was healthy, no rmal
an d still a virg in , while the husb and was found to b e
c ap able of having sexual intercourse since he was not
impotent. The wife claimed that her husband was impotent, and
was a closet ho mos exua l a s he did no t sh ow his penis
an d sin ce h e wa s usin g his mothers eyebrow pencil and
cleansing cream. She also claimed that her husband married her,
a Filipino citizen, in order to acquire or maintain his r e s i d e n c y
status here in the country and to publicly
m a i n t a i n t h e appearance of a normal man. On the other
hand, the husband claimed that it was his wife wh o was
ps yc ho lo gica lly in ca pa cita ted to p er fo rm bas ic marital
ob liga tio ns . He ass er ts th at his wife avoided him
whenever he wants to have sexual intercourse with her. He
further claimed that his wife filed the case because she was
afraid that she would be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of
his mother, and that he might consummate their marriage. He
also insisted that their marriage would remain valid because
they a re still ver y you ng and there is still a chan ce to
o verc om e their differences. T h e t r i a l c o u r t d e c l a r e d
t h e i r m a r r i a g e v o i d o n a c c o u n t o f psychological
incapacity of the husband. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Wheth er or not th e pro lo nged refus al of th e husban d to
ha ve s e x u a l c o o p e r a t i o n f o r t h e p r o c r e a t i o n o f
c h i l d r e n w i t h h i s w i f e i s equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
Ruling:
Ye s . T h e p r o l o n g e d r e f u s a l o f t h e h u s b a n d t o
h a v e s e x u a l c oop er ation for the p rocreation o f
ch ildren with his wife is equ iva lent to psychological
incapacity. I f a sp ous e, a lthou gh ph ys ic ally cap ab le bu t
s imp ly refus es to p e r f o r m h i s o r h e r e s s e n t i a l
marriage obligations, and the refusal is
s ens eles s and con stan t, the Ca th olic marriag e
tribun als a ttr ibu te the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal. The husbands s e n s e l e s s a n d
protracted refusal to f u l fi l l his marital
o b l i g a t i o n s i s equivalent to psychological incapacity. One of
the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to
proc rea te child ren ba sed o n the univers al princip le
tha t pro crea tio n o f children through sexual cooperation is the
basic end of marriage. Constant n o n - f u l fi l l m e n t o f t h i s
o b l i g a t i o n w i l l fi n a l l y d e s t r o y t h e i n t e g r i t y o r
wholeness of the marriage. Decision affirmed and petition denied
for lack of merit.