Individualism vs.

Collectivism: Our Future, Our Choice

The fundamental political conflict in America today is, as it has been for a century, individualism vs.
collectivism. Does the individuals life belong to himor does it belong to the group, the community,
society, or the state? With government expanding ever more rapidlyseizing and spending more and more
of our money on entitlement programs and corporate bailouts, and intruding on our businesses and lives in
increasingly onerous waysthe need for clarity on this issue has never been greater. Let us begin by
defining the terms at hand.

Individualism is the idea that the individuals life belongs to him and that he has an inalienable right to live it
as he sees fit, to act on his own judgment, to keep and use the product of his effort, and to pursue the values
of his choosing. Its the idea that the individual is sovereign, an end in himself, and the fundamental unit of
moral concern. This is the ideal that the American Founders set forth and sought to establish when they
drafted the Declaration and the Constitution and created a country in which the individuals rights to life,
liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness were to be recognized and protected.

Collectivism is the idea that the individuals life belongs not to him but to the group or society of which he is
merely a part, that he has no rights, and that he must sacrifice his values and goals for the groups greater
good. According to collectivism, the group or society is the basic unit of moral concern, and the individual
is of value only insofar as he serves the group. As one advocate of this idea puts it: Man has no rights
except those which society permits him to enjoy. From the day of his birth until the day of his death society
allows him to enjoy certain so-called rights and deprives him of others; not . . . because society desires
especially to favor or oppress the individual, but because its own preservation, welfare, and happiness are
the prime considerations.1

Individualism or collectivismwhich of these ideas is correct? Which has the facts on its side?

Individualism does, and we can see this at every level of philosophic inquiry: from metaphysics, the branch
of philosophy concerned with the fundamental nature of reality; to epistemology, the branch concerned with
the nature and means of knowledge; to ethics, the branch concerned with the nature of value and proper
human action; to politics, the branch concerned with a proper social system.

Well take them in turn.

Metaphysics, Individualism, and Collectivism

When we look out at the world and see people, we see separate, distinct individuals. The individuals may be
in groups (say, on a soccer team or in a business venture), but the indivisible beings we see are individual
people. Each has his own body, his own mind, his own life. Groups, insofar as they exist, are nothing more
than individuals who have come together to interact for some purpose. This is an observable fact about the
way the world is. It is not a matter of personal opinion or social convention, and it is not rationally
debatable. It is a perceptual-level, metaphysically given fact. Things are what they are; human beings are
individuals.

A beautiful statement of the metaphysical fact of individualism was provided by former slave Frederick
Douglass in a letter he wrote to his ex-master Thomas Auld after escaping bondage in Maryland and
fleeing to New York. I have often thought I should like to explain to you the grounds upon which I have
justified myself in running away from you, wrote Douglass. I am almost ashamed to do so now, for by this
time you may have discovered them yourself. I will, however, glance at them. You see, said Douglass,

I am myself; you are yourself; we are two distinct persons, equal persons. What you are, I am. You are a
man, and so am I. God created both, and made us separate beings. I am not by nature bound to you, or you to
me. Nature does not make your existence depend upon me, or mine to depend upon yours. I cannot walk
upon your legs, or you upon mine. I cannot breathe for you, or you for me; I must breathe for myself, and
you for yourself. We are distinct persons, and are each equally provided with faculties necessary to our
individual existence. In leaving you, I took nothing but what belonged to me, and in no way lessened your
means for obtaining an honest living. Your faculties remained yours, and mine became useful to their
rightful owner.2

Although one could quibble with the notion that God creates people, Douglasss basic metaphysical point
is clearly sound. Human beings are by nature distinct, separate beings, each with his own body and his own
faculties necessary to his own existence. Human beings are not in any way metaphysically attached or
dependent on one another; each must use his own mind and direct his own body; no one else can do either
for him. People are individuals. I am myself; you are yourself; we are two distinct persons.

The individual is metaphysically real; he exists in and of himself; he is the basic unit of human life. Groups
or collectives of peoplewhether families, partnerships, communities, or societiesare not metaphysically
real; they do not exist in and of themselves; they are not fundamental units of human life. Rather, they are
some number of individuals. This is perceptually self-evident. We can see that it is true.

Who says otherwise? Collectivists do. John Dewey, a father of pragmatism and modern liberalism,
explains the collectivist notion as follows:

Society in its unified and structural character is the fact of the case; the non-social individual is an
abstraction arrived at by imagining what man would be if all his human qualities were taken away. Society,
as a real whole, is the normal order, and the mass as an aggregate of isolated units is the fiction.3

According to collectivism, the group or society is metaphysically realand the individual is a mere
abstraction, a fiction.4

This, of course, is ridiculous, but there you have it. On the metaphysics of collectivism, you and I (and Mr.
Douglass) are fictional, and we become real only insofar as we somehow interrelate with society. As to
exactly how we must interrelate with the collective in order to become part of the real whole, well hear
about that shortly.

Let us turn now to the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature of knowledge.

Epistemology, Individualism, and Collectivism

What is knowledge? Where does it come from? How do we know whats true? Knowledge is a mental grasp
of a fact (or facts) of reality reached by perceptual observation or a process of reason based thereon.5 Who
looks at reality, hears reality, touches reality, reasons about realityand thereby gains knowledge of reality?
The individual does. The individual possesses eyes, ears, hands, and the like. The individual possesses a
mind and the capacity to use it. He perceives reality (e.g., dogs, cats, and birds, and death); he integrates his
perceptions into concepts (e.g., dog, animal, and mortal); he integrates his concepts into
generalizations (e.g., dogs can bite and animals are mortal); he forms principles (e.g., animals,
including man, must take certain actions in order to remain alive, and man requires freedom in order to
live and prosper). And so on. Knowledge is a product of the perceptual observations and mental
integrations of individuals.

Of course, individuals can learn from other people, they can teach others what they have learnedand they
can do so in groups. But in any such transmission of knowledge, the individuals senses must do the
perceiving, and his mind must do the integrating. Groups dont have sensory apparatuses or minds; only
individuals do. This, too, is simply unassailable.
But that doesnt stop collectivists from denying it.

The relevant epistemological principle, writes Helen Longino (chair of the philosophy department at
Stanford University) is that knowledge is produced by cognitive processes that are fundamentally social.
Granted, she says, without individuals there would be no knowledge because it is through their sensory
system that the natural world enters cognition. . . . The activities of knowledge construction, however, are
the activities of individuals in interaction; thus knowledge is constructed not by individuals, but by an
interactive dialogic community.6

You cant make this stuff up. But an interactive dialogic community can.

Although it is true (and should be unremarkable) that individuals in a society can exchange ideas and learn
from one another, the fact remains that the individual, not the community, has a mind; the individual, not the
group, does the thinking; the individual, not society, produces knowledge; and the individual, not society,
shares that knowledge with others who, in turn, must use their individual minds if they are to grasp it. Any
individual who chooses to observe the facts of reality can see that this is so. The fact that certain
philosophers (or dialogic communities) deny it has no bearing on the truth of the matter.

Correct epistemologythe truth about the nature and source of knowledgeis on the side of individualism,
not collectivism.

Next up are the respective views of morality that follow from these foundations.

Ethics, Individualism, and Collectivism

What is the nature of good and bad, right and wrong? How, in principle, should people act? Such are the
questions of ethics or morality (I use these terms interchangeably). Why do these questions arise? Why do
we need to answer them? Such questions arise and need to be answered only because individuals exist and
need principled guidance about how to live and prosper.

We are not born knowing how to survive and achieve happiness, nor do we gain such knowledge
automatically, nor, if we do gain it, do we act on such knowledge automatically. (As evidence, observe the
countless miserable people in the world.) If we want to live and prosper, we need principled guidance
toward that end. Ethics is the branch of philosophy dedicated to providing such guidance.

For instance, a proper morality says to the individual: Go by reason (as against faith or feelings)look at
reality, identify the nature of things, make causal connections, use logicbecause reason is your only means
of knowledge, and thus your only means of choosing and achieving life-serving goals and values. Morality
also says: Be honestdont pretend that facts are other than they are, dont make up alternate realities in
your mind and treat them as realbecause reality is absolute and cannot be faked out of existence, and
because you need to understand the real world in order to succeed in it. Morality further provides guidance
for dealing specifically with people. For instance, it says: Be justjudge people rationally, according to the
available and relevant facts, and treat them accordingly, as they deserve to be treatedbecause this policy is
crucial to establishing and maintaining good relationships and to avoiding, ending, or managing bad ones.
And morality says: Be independentthink and judge for yourself, dont turn to others for what to believe or
acceptbecause truth is not correspondence to the views of other people but correspondence to the facts of
reality. And so on.

By means of such guidance (and the foregoing is just a brief indication), morality enables the individual to
live and thrive. And that is precisely the purpose of moral guidance: to help the individual choose and
achieve life-serving goals and values, such as an education, a career, recreational activities, friendships, and
romance. The purpose of morality is, as the great individualist Ayn Rand put it, to teach you to enjoy
yourself and live.

Just as the individual, not the group, is metaphysically realand just as the individual, not the collective,
has a mind and thinksso too the individual, not the community or society, is the fundamental unit of moral
concern. The individual is morally an end in himself, not a means to the ends of others. Each individual
should pursue his life-serving values and respect the rights of others to do the same. This is the morality that
flows from the metaphysics and epistemology of individualism.

What morality flows from the metaphysics and epistemology of collectivism? Just what you would expect: a
morality in which the collective is the basic unit of moral concern.

On the collectivist view of morality, explains progressive intellectual A. Maurice Low, that which more
than anything marks the distinction between civilized and uncivilized society is that in the former the
individual is nothing and society is everything; in the latter society is nothing and the individual is
everything. Mr. Low assisted with the definition of collectivism at the outset of this article; here he
elaborates with emphasis on the alleged civility of collectivism:

In a civilized society man has no rights except those which society permits him to enjoy. From the day of his
birth until the day of his death society allows him to enjoy certain so-called rights and deprives him of
others; not . . . because society desires especially to favor or oppress the individual, but because its own
preservation, welfare, and happiness are the prime considerations. And so that society may not perish, so that
it may reach a still higher plane, so that men and women may become better citizens, society permits them
certain privileges and restricts them in the use of others. Sometimes in the exercise of this power the
individual is put to a great deal of inconvenience, even, at times, he suffers what appears to be injustice. This
is to be regretted, but it is inevitable. The aim of civilized society is to do the greatest good to the greatest
number, and because the largest number may derive benefit from the largest good the individual must
subordinate his own desires or inclinations for the benefit of all.7

Because Mr. Low wrote that in 1913before Stalin, Mao, Hitler, Mussolini, Pol Pot, and company tortured
and murdered hundreds of millions of people explicitly in the name of the greatest good for the greatest
numberhe may be granted some small degree of leniency. Todays collectivists, however, have no such
excuse.

As Ayn Rand wrote in 1946, and as every adult who chooses to think can now appreciate,

The greatest good for the greatest number is one of the most vicious slogans ever foisted on humanity.
This slogan has no concrete, specific meaning. There is no way to interpret it benevolently, but a great many
ways in which it can be used to justify the most vicious actions.

What is the definition of the good in this slogan? None, except: whatever is good for the greatest number.
Who, in any particular issue, decides what is good for the greatest number? Why, the greatest number.

If you consider this moral, you would have to approve of the following examples, which are exact
applications of this slogan in practice: fifty-one percent of humanity enslaving the other forty-nine; nine
hungry cannibals eating the tenth one; a lynching mob murdering a man whom they consider dangerous to
the community.

There were seventy million Germans in Germany and six hundred thousand Jews. The greatest number (the
Germans) supported the Nazi government which told them that their greatest good would be served by
exterminating the smaller number (the Jews) and grabbing their property. This was the horror achieved in
practice by a vicious slogan accepted in theory.
But, you might say, the majority in all these examples did not achieve any real good for itself either? No. It
didnt. Because the good is not determined by counting numbers and is not achieved by the sacrifice of
anyone to anyone.8

The collectivist notion of morality is patently evil and demonstrably false. The good of the community
logically cannot take priority over that of the individual because the only reason moral concepts such as
good and should are necessary in the first place is that individuals exist and need principled guidance in
order to sustain and further their lives. Any attempt to turn the purpose of morality against the individual
the fundamental unit of human reality and thus of moral concernis not merely a moral crime; it is an
attempt to annihilate morality as such.

To be sure, societiesconsisting as they do of individualsneed moral principles, too, but only for the
purpose of enabling individuals to act in ways necessary to sustain and further their own lives. Thus,
the one moral principle that a society must embrace if it is to be a civilized society is the principle of
individual rights: the recognition of the fact that each individual is morally an end in himself and has a moral
prerogative to act on his judgment for his own sake, free from coercion by others. On this principle, each
individual has a right to think and act as he sees fit; he has a right to produce and trade the products of his
efforts voluntarily, by mutual consent to mutual benefit; he has a right to disregard complaints that he is not
serving some so-called greater goodand no one, including groups and governments, has a moral right to
force him to act against his judgment. Ever.

This brings us to the realm of politics.

Politics, Individualism, and Collectivism

The politics of individualism is essentially what the American Founders had in mind when they created the
United States but were unable to implement perfectly: a land of liberty, a society in which the government
does only one thing and does it wellprotects the rights of all individuals equally by banning the use of
physical force from social relationships and by using force only in retaliation and only against those who
initiate its use. In such a society, government uses force as necessary against thieves, extortionists,
murderers, rapists, terrorists, and the likebut it leaves peaceful, rights-respecting citizens completely free
to live their lives and pursue their happiness in accordance with their own judgment.

Toward that end, a proper, rights-respecting government consists of legislatures, courts, police, a military,
and any other branches and departments necessary to the protection of individual rights. This is the essence
of the politics of individualism, which follows logically from the metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics of
individualism.

What politics follows from those of collectivism?

America works best when its citizens put aside individual self-interest to do great things togetherwhen
we elevate the common good, writes David Callahan of the collectivist think tank Demos.9Michael
Tomasky, editor of Democracy, elaborates, explaining that modern liberalism was built around the idea
the philosophical principlethat citizens should be called upon to look beyond their own self-interest and
work for a greater common interest.

This, historically, is the moral basis of liberal governancenot justice, not equality, not rights, not diversity,
not government, and not even prosperity or opportunity. Liberal governance is about demanding of citizens
that they balance self-interest with common interest. . . . This is the only justification leaders can make to
citizens for liberal governance, really: That all are being asked to contribute to a project larger than
themselves. . . . citizens sacrificing for and participating in the creation of a common good.10
This is the ideology of todays left in general, including, of course, President Barack Obama. As Obama puts
it, we must heed the call to sacrifice and uphold our core ethical and moral obligation to look out for
one another and to be unified in service to a greater good.11 Individual actions, individual dreams, are
not sufficient. We must unite in collective action, build collective institutions and organizations.12

But modern liberals and new progressives are not alone in their advocacy of the politics of collectivism.
Joining them are impostors of the right, such as Rick Santorum, who pose as advocates of liberty but, in
their perverted advocacy, annihilate the very concept of liberty.

Properly defined, writes Santorum, liberty is freedom coupled with responsibility to something bigger or
higher than the self. It is the pursuit of our dreams with an eye toward the common good. Liberty is the dual
activity of lifting our eyes to the heavens while at the same time extending our hands and hearts to our
neighbor.13 It is not the freedom to be as selfish as I want to be, or the freedom to be left alone, but the
freedom to attend to ones dutiesduties to God, to family, and to neighbors.14

HENRY ROSEMONT JR.

Against Individualism: A Confucian Rethinking of the Foundations of Morality, Politics, Family, and
Religion

Such is the state of politics in America today, and this is the choice we face: Americans can either continue
to ignore the fact that collectivism is utterly corrupt from the ground up, and thus continue down the road to
statism and tyrannyor we can look at reality, use our minds, acknowledge the absurdities of collectivism
and the atrocities that follow from it, and shout the truth from the rooftops and across the Internet.

What would happen if we did the latter? As Ayn Rand said, You would be surprised how quickly the
ideologists of collectivism retreat when they encounter a confident, intellectual adversary. Their case rests
on appealing to human confusion, ignorance, dishonesty, cowardice, despair. Take the side they dare not
approach; appeal toThis book has ten chapters and can be roughly divided into two parts: the
first five chapters focus on the discussion of many problematics of the Western notion of
individualism; and the second half is devoted to the Confucian role-based alternative. This
book can be seen as a culmination of Henry Rosemont Jr.'s decades of work in the field of
comparative philosophy. His critique of Western individualism along with his search for
Confucian spirituality as an alternative stretches back to his early works such as A Chinese
Mirror: Moral Reflections on Political Economy and Society (Open Court, 1991), "Human
Rights: A Bill of Worries" (in Confucianism and Human Rights, Columbia University Press,
1998) and Rationality and Religious Experience: The Continuing Relevance of the World's
Spiritual Traditions (Open Court 2001). Against Individualism is a natural progression of all
these early groundworks that Rosemont has laid along the way.

The Western notion of a free, autonomous, independent individual, an inner self untouched by sociality is, as
Rosemont argues, not only an ontological fiction, but more importantly ethically problematic, since to
champion one's freedom unencumbered by others as the utmost value for the libertarian and social
conservative alike comes at the expense of the advancement of socio-economic justice. (54) For the first
generation human rights (i.e. the Bill of Rights) are passive, focusing on freedom from constraints, and for
the second generation human rights (i.e. socio-economic rights) are positive rights, requiring assistance from
others to provide means to exercise those rights. These two rights stand in opposition if our conception of
the self is grounded in foundational individualism. As Rosemont writes precisely,

To whatever extent we may be seen to be morally and thus politically responsible for assisting others in the
creation and obtaining of those goods which accrue to them by virtue of having social and economic rights,
to just that extent we cannot be altogether autonomous individuals, enjoying full civil and political rights,
free to rationally decide upon and pursue our own projects rather than having to assist the less fortunate with
theirs. (66)

And if so, the notion of Western individualism not only does not help alleviate poverty and social inequality;
it in fact aggravates it, since the well-to-do and the needy alike are conceptualized as responsible only to
oneself and hence only for oneself as well. Each rises and falls on one's own, and to exercise the second
generation rights would be impossible within the framework of individualism. A conceptual alternative
obviously is sorely needed if we are to address the many socio-economic problems threatening the global
community today.

Despite all its problems, the lures of individualism, as Rosemont concedes in the "Epilogue," remain strong
in the West, since the myth of a free, autonomous and independent self is intertwined with our self-
representation and undergirds capitalism (177). It is a myth that is so ingrained in our psyche since the
Enlightenment that any proposed alternative immediately is characterized as its direct opposite, that is,
collectivism or totalitarianism. It is as if the choice is a Kierkegaardian either/or: either one champions
individualism all the way down or one is for the collectivism of a hive mind. Western individualism might
have worked in the past in helping establishing individual rights and limited state authority; the problems
that we face today demand a different kind of response, a response that is not modeled after the Us vs. Them
or absolute individual liberty vs. tyrannical government. The Confucian relational approach is a perfect
medium to rebuild the lost interpersonal relationships that are needed for a more cohesive and a more perfect
union in this global world. It is a vision of the co-emergence of the self and the other in relation, a kind of
self-identity that doesn't hedge on some sort of immutable inner self, but instead an existential self that
becomes increasing concrete with the ever expanding social roles that one lives throughout one's lifetime.

The most important role that is demanded of us in the Confucian tradition is the role of son and daughter
along with its corresponding excellence of xiao (filial reverence). But in this day and age, to revive the
concept of Confucian xiao might seem old fashion and, some might even argue, oppressive to those who
occupy the role of children. That familial constraint runs counter to the Western myth of a free, autonomous,
independent self who cares for no one and for whom no one cares. The Hobbesian adult male sprung out of
nowhere like a wild mushroom has been the standard, default vision of the self in the Western discourse on
ethics and politics. As Rosemont points out, most modern western philosophers are bachelors and have no
experience of family life beyond their childhood, philosophers such as Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, Locke,
Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Nietzsche, and Schopenhauer (119). It is no surprise to see not only a deficit on the
topic of family and parent-child relation in the West, but also a skeptical attitude toward the ethical valence
of Confucian xiao. In fact, Confucian xiao has been and is continued to be defined as ethically problematic
(cf. Bertrand Russell 1922; Walter Slote 1998; Donald Holzman 1998; Ranjoo Seodu Herr 2003; Liu
Qingping 2007). But the critique of Confucian xiao need not stand, since a careful reading of the Western
canonical writings on family and parent-child relation reveals a much more oppressive family structure and
relation that has been largely neglected by contemporary scholars.

For instance, in Jeffrey Blustein's (1982) comprehensive survey, the family structure and parent-child
relation in the Western canonical writings often times is modeled after the contractual master-servant
relationship where the head of the household has all the authority and the children all the obedience.
Although thinkers such as Seneca, Locke, and Kant have also pointed out some parental obligations such as
education, protection and financial support, the fundamental aspect of parent-child relation is one of
domination and submission. Nowhere in any of the writings discussed in Blustein's comprehensive survey
(1982) is it mentioned or even hinted that children have the right or obligation to remonstrate the parents.
The familial bond in the western canons is more of a contractual nature than a life-long affective bond that
generates the special familial obligation. Kant, in particular, notes that grown children owe their parents
nothing other than the general duty of gratitude, which is connected to the love for humanity, not a special
obligation that ties the child to the parent in this life and beyond (Metaphysics of Morals, "Doctrine of
Right" Ch. 28-30; "Doctrine of Virtue", Ch. 31-32; cf. Mary Gregor 1996). In comparison, the parent-child
relation in Confucianism is one of affection and mutual obligation. Familial bond is not something to be
discharged upon entering adulthood; in addition, Confucian emphasis on the obligation of remonstration to
the social superior including one's parents is quite refreshing, or one might even say it is a
step forward ethically.

In Confucianism, relationality is the basis of our ontological existence throughout our lifetime; there is no
sharp divide between the contractual dependency of childhood and the absolute freedom and equality of
adulthood. Unlike in the West, as Rosemont writes, "for the Confucians there are only interrelated persons,
no individual selves" (93). And if relationality is the ontological starting point of our existence, then to think
of a Confucian relational person as either being self-less or altruistic in living their social roles is to miss the
mark, since to live those roles is to bring forth their existential personhood that only exists in relations. In
short, to be for the Confucians is to be one-in-relation-with-the-other; one is only when the other is as well.
Or what is the same, as Confucius says, when seeking to establish oneself, one establishes others
(Analects 6.3; c.f. Ames and Rosemont 1998). When one's personhood is thus conceived, the natural
antagonism between self and other assumed by modern Western thinkers such as Hobbes and Kant--whose
writings are the basis for political rights of the individuals that has led to the excess of individualism at the
expense of the second generation rights in our time--is also overcome as well.

Confucian interpersonal personhood indeed provides a viable way forward to incorporate second generation
rights into our modern state and civic life. For in Confucianism, as Rosemont points out, freedom is seen "as
an achievement term, not a stative one, such that we can only begin to think of becoming truly free when
we want to meet our responsibilities, when we want to help others . . . , and enjoy being helped by others"
(106-7). This intentional cultivation to take joy in meeting one's inter-personal responsibilities, to have
others flourish, to Rosemont, is a "spiritual practice, Confucian style" (107). It is a spiritual practice that
takes the family as the starting point in preparation for full membership in our shared humanity (108).
Confucian xiaothat brings forth our respect for those who came before and from whom our being emerges
"can be seen most vividly, most religiously and most importantly, as a strategy for strengthening the roles of
and bonds between those still alive, adding significance to their lives" (132). In other words, through our
respect for our common root that the living are bound together and our lives made significant. This root of
commonality need not be limited to one's family, ethnicity or culture; rather it is the root of common
humanity, as Confucius puts it, within four seas all are one's brothers (Analects 12.5). It is a spiritual vision
of the world that is made ever more harmonious through the affirmation of the intertwining of oneself and
others in our shared humanity.

A religious impulse, as Rosemont terms it, is a "homoversal", a shared human attitude and behavior that
conveys a sense of "being in the presence of something larger than themselves, something that was present
before we came to be, something of which we can be a part now, and which will endure long after we are
gone" (137). In Confucianism, religious sensibility is expressed through the medium of ritual, which is
religious and secular at the same time, covering not only significant ceremonies but also all our social
interactions; or rather, it is the secular made sacred through one's embodiment of rituals (141-42). Rituals
with the obvious religious root, in Confucianism, also have an aesthetic as well as an ethical dimension. As
Xunzi explains perfectly, "Rites trim what is too long and stretch out what is too short, eliminate surplus and
repair deficiency, extend the forms of love and reverence, and step by step bring to fulfillment the beauties
of proper conduct" (Xunzi, Ch. 19; cf. Watson 1969, 100 and Rosemont 143). Taking rituals and traditions
seriously as important aspects of a flourishing life, as Rosemont concludes, would serve us well to go
beyond the narrowness of individualism as well as its temporality (146). For by embodying the rituals, one
comes to acknowledge the co-humanity of our fellows both living and dead, with sincerity and grace, and
with due measure and beauty. Indeed, rituals give Confucian personhood a sense of enduring continuity
connecting the present self to the ancestral past as well as to the future generation that is yet to come. And
that shared sense of common humanity in turn propels the Confucians to go beyond their immediate circles
of family and friends into the world at large.

A role-bearing Confucian, as Rosemont argues, is much more equipped to deal with the problem of socio-
economic injustice, since unlike other major religions, Confucian spiritual development is intrinsically
connected to one's moral life in the communal setting. Given the fact that there is no monastery in the
Confucian tradition, "without others, Confucian spiritual cultivation is not possible" (163). Interestingly,
George Rupp, a former dean of Harvard Divinity School, although not a sinologist, reaches the same
conclusion in his assessment of world religions: "For the Confucian, there is no access to the ultimate except
through social relationships" (2015, 77). In other words, a Confucian spiritual life is a social life made
sacred, and the wider the web of social relations one sustains, the more significant one's spiritual life has
become.

The Confucian spiritual drive to extend, sustain and repair relationships can also be applied to deal with the
trauma of criminal violations. For reconciliation is much more appealing to role-bearing Confucians than
vengeance, and in order to truly overcome trauma and heal severed relationships, we must go beyond the
current legal system of impersonal guilt and punishment that doesn't restore the victim or rehabilitate the
wrongdoer. Rosemont offers a Confucian inspired reading of the religious concepts of confession,
repentance, atonement, forgiveness and redemption as a better and more comprehensive way to deal with
social/political trauma. For, as Rosemont argues,

just as second generation human rights encompass first generation rights much more naturally than the other
way around, so too, I believe, is the restorative justice attendant on reconciliation broader than legal justice,
yet requires it, while legal justice is narrower than reconciliation, and does not require it (170).

In other words, in reconciliation, both the victim and wrongdoer are made better off, since their personhood
is each restored in their mutual acknowledgement through atonement and forgiveness. Although
reconciliation might not always be possible, it is a spiritual ideal we should all strive for and is in line with
the Confucian ideal of an inclusive, harmonious community of datong where all are cared for.

So if we are serious about going beyond the assumed natural antagonism between the self and other in order
to attend to the ever-widening problem of socio-economic injustice and to fashion a much more inclusive
global community that is not premised based on the ontologically and ethically problematic Western
individualism, we are better off taking the Confucian alterative where I and other are co-emergent relational
beings, where to extend, sustain and repair one's social life is a spiritual quest, and where our shared sense of
common humanity reaches out to all four seas. Or as Rosemont boldly declares, we must take a
stance Against Individualism and walk the path of a Confucian role-bearing person in her spiritual quest of
an ever more inclusive and just global community.

Anti-individualism

Anti-individualism (also known as content externalism) is an approach to various areas

of thought (both analytic and continental) including philosophy,[1] The Philosophy of Psychology,[2] French
Historical Studies,[3] Literature,[4] Phenomenology[5] and linguistics. The proponents arguing for anti-
individualism in these areas have in common the view that what seems to be internal to the individual is to
some degree dependent on the social environment. Thus, self-knowledge, intentions, reasoning and moral
value may variously be seen as being determined by factors outside the person.[6]
The position has been supported by Sanford Goldberg,[7] and by other thinkers such as Hegel, Hilary
Putnam and Tyler Burge.[5]

Early academic correspondence[edit]

Academic discussion negotiating anti-individualism as a reasonable stance started with Tyler Burge's
1988 Individuation and Self-Knowledge [8] being particularly influential. In it he set out to argue for a limited
agreement with the Cartesian model of self-cognition as being Authoritative, but also pointed out that
knowledge of self-cognition was not always absolute, allowing for the individuation of thought to originate
from both the external content of our environment, as well as from the internal landscape of our self-
knowledge as it is still being discovered: "One can know what one's mental events are and yet not know
relevant general facts about the conditions for individuating those events. It is simply not true that the cogito
gives us knowledge of the individuation conditions of our thoughts which enables us to "shut off" their
individuation conditions from the physical environment".[8]

9 Criticism Against Individualism Are as Follows

(1) State is not-a necessary evil:

The individualists view that state is a necessary evil, is not correct. The state is the result of social instinct
of man as Aristotle has said, State came into existence for the sake of mere life but it continues to exist for
the sake of good life.

The individualist view that the progress of civilization is possible in the freedom of the individual is also not
correct. The higher the state of civilization, observed Huxley, the more completely do the actions of one
member of the social body influence all the rest; and the less possible is it for any one man to do wrong
without interfering more or less with the freedom of all his fellow citizens, so that even upon the narrowest
view of the functions of the state, it must be admitted to have wider powers than the advocates of the laissez
faire theory are disposed to admit. Thus in a progressive civilization, more control of the state is needed.

Today the state has become a welfare institution. Burke has rightly said, State is a partnership in all
sciences, a partnership in all art, a partnership in all virtue and in all perfection. State is essential for the
development and progress of man. It is a historical fact that the state has done a lot for the welfare of man.
Thus it is improper to call it a necessary evil.

(2) Laws do not curtail liberty:

John Stuart Mill stated that with increase in the activities of the state, the laws will also increase and
consequently the liberty of the individual will be curtailed. Today, no wise man can agree with this view of
John Stuart Mill because the state enacts many such laws as help the people in their welfare. For instance, if
the state or government makes laws for the benefit of the workers, how is their liberty curtailed by such
laws?

(3) Man is not always the best judge of this interest:

The individualists were of the view that each individual is the best guardian of his own interests and,
therefore, he can think of them himself. But this is not a reality. Many people and classes are not so
intelligent as to know what is good for them.

Thus Dr. Gamer says, Not only is the individual not always a competent judge of his own interests as our
economic consumer, but in affairs of personal conduct, he is often not to be trusted, particularly in matters
relating to his health or safety or moral welfare.
The truth is, society may be better judge of a mans intellectual, moral, or physical needs, than he is himself
and it may rightfully protect him from disease and danger against his own wishes and compel him to educate
his children and to live a decent life. Sidwick, Laveleye and Jerons, etc., also hold identical views.

(4) Open competition is undesirable:

The individualists were the supporters of open competition but when this theory was given a practical shape,
many dangerous results accrued in Europe. How could the labourers compete with the capitalists? It
encouraged the exploitation of the labourers and their condition became miserable, which resulted in the rise
of socialism in Europe.

If even today, the government does not control of profits of the capitalists, and increase in the prices of the
commodities is not checked, not only the condition of the labourers would worsen but the consumers would
also face the same fate.

In India, before the declaration of Internal Emergency of June 25, 1975 the situation was the same. It is
essential that there should be the state regulation and control over industries and trade. Otherwise, many
undesirable results would accrue.

(5) The Doctrine of the survival of the fittest is most dangerous:

It will be a great foolishness to give recognition to Spencers theory of the survival of the fittest, because it
will result in creating the same situation as is seen in the jungle, where stronger animals consider the weaker
ones as their food.

With the acceptance of this theory, there will be the rule of thieves, dacoits, rogues and physically strong
people and, in place of justice and truth; the supremacy of brute physical power will prevail. The society will
have the same anarchy as was depicted by Hobbes in his state of nature. Thus the progress of human
civilization and culture will be retarded and there will be an end to social peace and order.

(6) Welfare of the individual lies in the welfare of the society:

Individualists say that the society came into being for the welfare of the individual and many functions of
the individual do not influence the society. But the reality is that the individual is an inseparable organ of the
society and he learns everything from the society.

Without society, the development of individual is not possible. An individuals welfare lies in the welfare of
the society. Due to individualistic concept, the individual thinks himself above the society, which is not a
correct approach.

(7) We cannot limit the functions of the state on the basis of past mistakes:

The individualists place the past mistakes of society before us in an exaggerated form and say that, on this
basis, the functions of the state should be limited. But this viewpoint is not correct. The reason for this is that
though the state did commit some mistakes in the past, yet this fact cannot become a guiding factor for
future, because as compared to state, private institutions have committed more mistakes, on which the
individualists depend very much.

In the past, the state has performed many such functions as proved beneficial to the individual and the
society. Functions like social security, labour welfare, abolition of zamindari, control on prices, education,
health and increase of productions, performed by the state, endorse this view.
It is also not necessary that the state would repeat its past mistakes in future also. The fact is that the state
would definitely learn something from its past mistakes and it would not repeat those mistakes in future.

(8) We need state for furthering human welfare:

If we accept the individualists view, the functions of the state would be limited. Now the question is who
should make arrangements for Railways, Posts and Telegraphs, education health, roads, hospitals, electricity,
dams, etc.?

Individualists want to transfer all these functions to private hands, but private institutions cannot perform
these functions properly. This has been proved in almost all the countries. Therefore, it is essential that the
functions of the state should be expanded.

(9) Individualists notions about the individual and society are wrong:

Individualists notion is that by nature man is selfish. Society for them is a collection of disintegrated
individuals, but both these notions are wrong. The fact is that though man is selfish to some extent, yet he is
social. Where he not a social animal, human civilization would not have progressed so much. Secondly,
human society is not an inanimate thing like a machine. It is an institution with organic unity in it.