Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
STANDING COMMITTEE ON
PETROLEUM & NATURAL GAS
(2011-12)
TWELFTH REPORT
CP&NG No. 12
STANDING COMMITTEE ON
(2011-12)
NEW DELHI
CONTENTS
COMPOSITION OF THE COMMITTEE ... (iv)
INTRODUCTION (vi)
REPORT
PART-I
Chapter-I Introductory
Legislative Framework
Chapter-II
Safety Mechanism in oil and gas installations
Oil Industry Safety Directorate
Jurisdiction of OISD
Safety measures in private sector
Safety factors in new installations
Safety audits
Stoppage due to safety consideration
Accident/incident investigations
Training
Oil spill
Chapter-III M.B.Lal Committee recommendations
Issues raised by industry on amended standard
Chapter-IV Procurement related issues
HVLR monitor
Rim Seal fire protection system
Hydrocarbon detector
Double fire contingency
Replacement of Hammer blinds
Provision of MEFG
PART II
Observations/Recommendations of the Committee
ANNEXURES
I Implementation Status of Major items of M. B. Lal- Committee
recommendations
II List of OISD Standards
III Minutes of the Thirteenth sitting of the Committee (2010-11) held on
26.07.2011
IV Minutes of the Second sitting of the Committee (2011-12) held on
31.10.2011
V Minutes of the Seventh sitting of the Committee held on 29.3.2012
VI Minutes of the Ninth sitting of the Committee held on 16.4.2012
VII Minutes of the Eleventh sitting of the Committee held on 21.5.2012
4
(iii)
20 Shri C. Sivasami
Rajya Sabha
SECRETARIAT
________________________________________________________________
#Nominated to the Committee w.e.f. 4.5.2012
$ Re-nominated to the Committee w.e.f. 4.5.2012
*Shri Kalraj Mishra ceased to be Member of the Committee consequent upon his resignation from
Rajya Sabha w.e.f. 21.3.2012
@ Shri Vijay Kumar Rupani ceased to be Member of the Committee consequent upon his
retirement from Rajya Sabha w.e.f. 2.4.2012
and Shri Silvius Condpan ceased to be Member of the Committee consequent upon his demise w.e.f. 10.10.2011
6
(v)
INTRODUCTION
I, the Chairman, Standing Committee on Petroleum & Natural Gas having been
authorised by the Committee to submit the Report on their behalf present this Twelfth
Report on Safety of Oil Installations.
3. The Committee considered and adopted the Report at their sitting held on
21.5.2012.
4. The Committee wish to express their thanks to the representatives of the Ministry
of Petroleum and Natural Gas and the Public Sector Undertakings/Organisations
concerned for placing their views before them and furnishing the information desired in
connection with examination of the subject.
5. The Committee also place on record their appreciation for the invaluable
assistance rendered to them by the officers of the Lok Sabha Secretariat attached to the
Committee.
REPORT
CHAPTER - 1
Introductory
Oil and gas sector comprising of crude oil, petroleum products and refinery is a
core sector of the economy and therefore, has a significant role in the nations
economic development. This sector is of strategic importance and play a pivotal role in
addressing countrys energy concerns thereby influencing decisions on all other
spheres of economy. The sector has been witnessing steady growth as more blocks
have been awarded in recent years under the New Exploration Licensing policy for
intensifying exploration and production activities. The number of oil and gas
discoveries and production fields have also seen an increase in recent times as also
the number of companies operating in the sector. The refining activities have also been
growing at a steady pace and our nation is becoming a refinery hub in this part of the
world. Also increasing urbanization of many parts of the country, increase in
automobile usage, high growth in commercial vehicles have increased fuel outlets and
the transportation of the oil and gas has increased the total length of pipelines. In view
of the increased activities in exploration, refining, transportation of oil and gas, the
safety concerns has become a major and critical factor in the oil and gas industry.
Since oil and gas are highly inflammable, the impact of any accident can be very high
as such incidents will be felt not only on the accident site but also on the surroundings.
These accidents can cause loss of material, loss of lives and also damage to the
environment. Hence it is imperative that the oil and gas industry need to be very
vigilant and should not be lax to adopt stringent safety measures in handling these
products.
1.2 On October 29, 2009, a fire accident occurred in Indian Oil Corporation's
terminal at Sanganer in Jaipur during the transfer of kerosene and motor spirit to
another terminal. There was a blast which completely destroyed the facilities and
resulted in 9 tanks catching fire in immediate succession. Though fire tenders were
rushed but no action was initiated as a considered decision was taken by IOC,
management to allow fire to burn till such time the products get completely burnt out.
8
The last tank fire extinguished itself after 11 days on 10.11.2009. The incident caused
death of 11 people, out of which 6 were company persons.
1.3 This Committee were concerned about the safety related aspects in the oil and
gas installations in the country as more safety related incidents continued even though
an inquiry committee headed by Shri M.B.Lal had given its report on the Jaipur
accident and recommended safety measures to be implemented in these oil
installations. Hence the Committee decided to examine the subject "Safety of Oil
Installations" in greater detail.
Legislative Framework
1.4 As per the Annual Report of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, the work
allocated to Ministry are as under:
12. The Petroleum & Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User Inland)
Act , 1962 (50 of 1962).
16. The Caltex (Acquisition of Shares of Caltex Oil Refining (India) Limited
and of the Undertakings in India of Caltex (India) Limited Act, 1977.
17. Administration of the Petroleum Act, 1934 (30 of 1934) and the rules made
thereunder.
18. Administration of Balmer Lawrie Investments Limited and Balmer Lawrie
and Company Limited.
1.6 There are several agencies which are concerned with enforcement of the above
legislations for the oil and gas industry. On being asked about the details regarding the
agencies, the Ministry in a written note furnished the following reply:-
DG, Factory Advice Service & Labour Institute / Chief Inspector of Factories
of respective State
Factories Rule under Factories Act, 1948 of Ministry of
Labour
Manufacture Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemical Rules, 1989
under Environment ( Protection) Act, 1986.
1.7 On being pointed out that many of the legislations were very old and whether the
Ministry has proposal to revisit these legislations for its proper updating, the Ministry in
its written reply stated the following:
Amendments are done from time to time depending upon the need. For
example, amendment in respective Rules under Petroleum Act,1934 and ORDA
Act,1948 were notified in 2011 and 2008 respectively.
1.8 Commenting on the issue during the oral-evidence Secretary, MoPNG inter-alia
made the following comments:-
"We will definitely take your point into consideration. In fact, these rules and
legislations are periodically visited. That is why, as you would have noticed, the
OISD standards have been revised on the basis of a particular incidence. This is
a continuous process and I agree with you. They should be done from time to
time".
12
CHAPTER 2
2.1 There are 21 refineries, 11 Gas processing plants, 660 oil and LPG installations
and more than 30,000 km cross-country pipelines spread across the length and breadth
of the country. In Offshore Exploration & Production, there are 16 production
complexes, 180 well platforms and 35 rigs. On-land, there are 323 production
installations and 223 rigs. The installed refining capacity of the country is around 194
MMTPA; indigenous crude oil production is around 38 MMTPA while gas production is
around 48 Billion m3 per annum. The marketing points including retail outlets, depots,
and terminals are spread throughout the country for maintaining steady supply of
petroleum products in the country. Hence, safety of oil & gas installations is of
paramount importance.
2.2 Asked about the present safety level in the oil industry, the Ministry submitted the
following:-
"Oil industry maintains the highest level of safety standards. The safety
measures include both proactive and secondary measures to combat any unsafe
situation and are systemic in nature. Some of the major safety measures include
incorporation of in-built safety aspects at the nascent stage, i.e., during the
design phase itself. These include process safety, instrumentation & safety
interlocks, safety while design of equipment, following the best international
standards. The Industry has systems and procedures in the form of work permit
system, operating manuals entailing start-up, shutdown, emergency handling
procedures, disaster management plan etc.
Besides, each installation has its dedicated fire-fighting facilities which are
equipped with modern equipment, trained crew to fight fire in case of any
eventuality. Safety measures in oil industry are looked after by a dedicated group
of personnel. Safety of vital plants, installations, employees and public at large is
required to be given the highest priority.
By adopting both proactive and reactive measures in fire and safety, Oil Industry
is equipped with measures to protect its vital installations. The industry also
carries out Internal Safety Audits and conducts periodic mock drills, both on-site
and off-site. It has also developed its own Disaster Management Plan and
organizes mock drills both offsite & onsite to ensure emergency preparedness.
13
2.3 When asked the safety mechanism for these installations, the Ministry stated as
under:-
The Government, vide Resolution dated 10th January, 1986, set up a Safety
Council to ensure proper implementation of the various aspects of safety in the
oil industry. The Safety Council, headed by Secretary of the Ministry of
Petroleum & Natural Gas includes all Joint Secretaries and Advisors in the
MOPNG, the Chief Executives Officers of all Public Sector Undertakings of the
oil industry, the Chief Controller of Explosives, Advisor, Fire to the Govt. of India
and the Director General of Factory Advice, Service and Labour Institutes as
members. The major objective of the Safety Council is to lay down the
procedures and guidelines in the matter of design, operations and maintenance
as well as creation of new assets with a view to achieving the highest safety
standards in a cost effective manner. The Safety Council is assisted by a
technical body viz the Oil Industry Safety Directorate (OISD), which has expertise
in the design of facilities, operations, maintenance, fire and safety aspects,
industrial hygiene, etc.
2.4 OISD a technical directorate under the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas
was formed in 1986 by a resolution of the Government with an objective to formulate
and standardize procedures and guidelines in the areas of design, operation and
maintenance as also the creation of new safety standards in a cost effective manner. It
also coordinated the implementation of a series of self regulatory measures aimed at
enhancing the safety in the oil and gas industry in India.
2.5 OISD is successfully looking after the safety in entire hydrocarbon chain in
upstream and downstream sector viz., Oil Exploration & production, Petroleum
Refining and Gas processing, Marketing & distribution and cross country pipelines.
14
2.7 To address the operational safety issues in Offshore Oil and Gas operations,
Petroleum and Natural Gas (Safety in Offshore operations) Rules, 2008 have been
formulated with emphasis on asset integrity and process safety. OISD is designated as
nodal agency for implementation of this Rules in Offshore operations with effect from
June2008.
Jurisdiction of OISD
2.8 The activities of Public Sector Undertakings, Private Companies, Joint Ventures
in the hydrocarbon industry covered by OISD as under:
2.9 OISD, over the years, has developed technical expertise in overseeing safety in
the entire oil and gas sector. The core competence of OISD includes:
2.10 Regarding safety standards developed by OISD, the Ministry informed the
committee as under:-
OISD has till date developed a total of 112 standards for implementation by oil
companies. These standards enable oil industry to meet the requisite safety
measures. Industry implements these safety standards on self-regulatory basis.
OISD through various safety inspections checks the implementations of these
safety standards and recommends measures for enhancing safety in the
installations.
2.11 When asked to furnish the sanctioned and actual manpower of OISD in each
category and the mode of recruitment of personnel for OISD, the Ministry gave the
following in written reply:-
The officers in OISD are positioned on deputation basis from PSU oil
companies and are selected through a process of short listing and interview."
2.12 Asked to explain as to why only six people out of 28 sanctioned strength are
there in the Explorations and Production area and whether this limited workforce will
16
affect the effective functioning of the OISD, the Secretary, MoPNG during the oral
evidence replied the following:
"We agree with you that they do not have the required strength. In case of the
Explorations and Production, the only place from where they can get the
manpower is either ONGC or Oil. These organisations have not been able to
spare more people relating to their own safety installations for deputation to
OISD. But as I had stated in the beginning, this is a cause for our concern also.
We really intend to strengthen the organization. That is why we want to really
create posts from where they can take people from outside or from the market.
Out of 66 sanctioned staff strength, only 29 staff members are there. It is less
than 50 per cent. So, this is an area of concern for us also".
2.13 Asked to elaborate further on the concerns about autonomous functioning of
OISD as it presently stands, the Secretary further added the following
"The degree of concern relates to two aspects. One is that they do not have the
legal authority and secondly they do not have a cadre of their own. They have
to draw from public sector undertakings because if we draw from the private
sector, it could cause graver problem. So, it is safer to have it from the public
sector on deputation. That is what, we are having. Once the Organization gets
the legal authority, it will have its own cadre, have its own strength of technical
people and then they would be even authorized to prosecute whosoever is not
following".
2.14 When asked to explain on building own cadre as OISD draws its personnel
from the PSU sector on deputation, the Secretary, MoPNG inter-alia stated the
following during the oral evidence:-
2.15 Asked to update on the strengthening and giving statutory powers to OISD, the
Ministry in its written reply stated the following:
2.16 It has been noted that the Petroleum and Explosive Safety Organisation (PESO)
is under the administrative control of Department of Industry Policy and Production
(DIPP) which comes under the Ministry of Commerce. However, the role of PESO
includes administrating of 6 OISD Standards over the oil and gas industries. When
asked as to what is the role of PESO in implementation of safety aspects in the
petroleum sector, the Ministry stated the following:-
2.17 On the query that since PESO does not report to MoPNG, how does MoPNG
penalize the companies for violation of safety standards, the Ministry informed that
PESO takes punitive action on its own, if required based on OISD standards. On being
asked whether there is any move by MoP&NG to seek the activities of PESO
connected with safety of petroleum sector under OISD, the Ministry is its reply stated
the following:-
PESO, under the Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion (DIPP) of the
Ministry of Commerce & Industry at present is the statutory authority for
implementation of Petroleum Act 1934 and the Rules thereof as well as
Explosives Act 1884. DIPP hasproposed to transfer the PESOs work relating to
Petroleum Rules 2002 to a new statutory body/OISD under MOP&NG.
18
2.18 When enquired as to whether OISD can enforce safety measures over private
Oil and gas installation, the Ministry stated the following in written reply:-
OISD does not have statutory power to enforce safety measures over
downstream private Oil and gas installations. Petroleum & Explosive Safety
Organization (PESO) has such legal authority.
OISD has the statutory power & authority for enacting safety in upstream
offshore Oil & Gas installations.
In case of upstream onshore Oil & Gas installations, Director General of Mines
Safety(DGMS) is entrusted with the legal authority.
"OISD carries out safety audits for the private companies as well. The gaps in
the system, if any, based on various OISD standards are identified by the audit
team which are, in turn, discussed with the top management and a time bound
plan for liquidation is emphasized. The companies prepare ATR and submit to
OISD, which in turn, monitors the implementation process."
The factors that are considered from the safety point of view, when oil and gas
companies set up their installations are as under:
19
Risk analysis and risk assessment study of the proposed installations to be set
up.
Environment impact assessment of the proposed location to be set up.
Conformity to the lay out design of the facilities that are being set up in the oil
and gas installations in accordance with OISD standards.
During the nascent state of design of the oil installations/plants, various inbuilt
safety systems viz., process safety, instrumentation safety including instrument
inter-locks, rigorous review of piping and instrumentation diagram, 3D model
review of the plant/installation etc. are carried out.
Further, during the design stage itself for improved reliability of the various
equipment besides the process safety aspects, international engineering
standard like API, ASME codes are followed to enhance safety of the
installations to be set up.
Guidelines towards in-built safety in design & other important aspects are also
covered in various OISD standards viz. process design & operating philosophy;
pressure relief & disposal system; design & safety recommendation for LPG
mounded storage; hazardous area classification for electrical equipment; safety
instrumentation for process systemetc.
The proposed firefighting facilities and infrastructure that are required to be
installed are in accordance with the various OISD guidelines/Standards (OISD
116 & 117).
2.21 Asked as to what studies/impact assessments does a company need to carry out
before the units/installations are set up ,the Ministry stated in their written reply as
under:-
"The impact assessment study needs to be carried out before the
units/installations are set up in line with Environment (Protection) Rules notified
by Ministry of Environment and Forests (MOE&F) and to be submitted to MOE&F
for obtaining environmental clearance. The impact assessments includes
information like use of natural resources, release of pollutants, risk analysis,
environmental sensitivity and anticipated impacts and mitigation measures
according to MOE&Fs guidelines.
Safety Audits
2.22 Regarding the safety systems and guidelines that are in place in the oil and gas
installation and the nature of supervision of agencies who enforce these guidelines.
The Committee enquired as to what measures do the agencies take to ensure that the
safety systems and guidelines have been adhered to by the oil industry. To this the
Ministry furnished the following in a written reply:
To achieve safety in vital oil & gas installations, regular audits are conducted to
ensure that safety systems are in place and are in accordance with the
guidelines. These audits are very effective tool to identify the areas of strengths
& weaknesses and action plan to overcome the gaps.
Oil companies at regular intervals carry out internal audit of its respective
installations to identify the gaps in the safety system and action plan to liquidate
such gaps. Audits are conducted in a planned manner based on check lists, field
visits and in accordance with OISD guidelines and standards. These internal
audits are carried out by multi-disciplinary cross functional team.
OISD periodically alsoconducts External Safety Audit and Surprise Safety Audit
of oil installations with a purpose to check whether in-built design safety systems,
operational safety, instrumentation safety, plant health & integrity and fire-fighting
facilities etc. are in accordance with the OISD guidelines. During the course of
such audits, OISD team through site visits, interaction with operating personnel
and checking of various documents highlights the areas of improvement.
During the Surprise Audit, OISD carries out similar exercise without informing the
installation which is audited to check its preparedness and whether various
safety systems are in accordance with the guidelines.
Further during the audits, OISD team also carries out mock drills to see the
readiness of the plant personnel in mitigating any emergency situations that may
take place in the installations due to fire or accidents.
21
Pre- commissioning Safety Audit is carried out by OISD for all new installations
and for additional facilities at the existing location in downstream Oil and Gas
Installation of Oil PSUs for checking compliance of the norms prescribed by
OISD and other statutory requirements.
Safety Council
The major objective of the Safety Council is to lay down the procedures and
guidelines in the matter of design, operations and maintenance as well as
creation of new assets with a view to achieving the highest safety standard in a
cost effective manner.
Safety Council is assisted by Executive Director, OISD who is also the member
secretary of Safety council.
2.23 When asked the frequency of safety audits and how does it conduct them, the
Ministry provided the following in its written reply:-
External safety Audit
These audits are conducted by OISD with members from other Oil companies
other than the audited company. The period of audit varies from 3 to 5 days
and the frequency of audits is:
i. For Refineries & Gas Processing Plants: Once in 3 years
ii. For Marketing installations: Two audits at a gap of 5 years initially and
thereafter either a request audit or surprise inspection.
External safety audit is carried out as per check list developed by OISD which
broadly includes the following checks:
i. Functioning of Safety Management, Safety Committee & Safety trainings
ii. Emergency Management system
iii. Internal Safety audit findings & its liquidation status
iv. Layout & facilities of the installation
v. Operational activities
22
During the audit, mock drills are also carried out to check the healthiness and
preparedness of fire-fighting infrastructure including the knowledge of employees
on handling such emergency scenarios.
The surprise safety audits of Refineries and major gas processing units are
carried out by technical experts not below the rank of General Managers deputed
from Industry.
In case of Marketing installations, the surprise audits are carried out by Officers
from OISD based on site visit and review of implementation of earlier external
safety audits/internal audits recommendations.
Compliance report
The oil companies are required to submit the compliance reports on the
recommendations made in the above audits/inspections on quarterly basis to
OISD. The compliance status is reviewed by the respective companies at senior
management level. The pending issues of ESA/SSA are also reviewed at the
Board level and by the Safety Council.
Pre-Commissioning Audit:
Since 1994 all the Oil and Gas Installation of Oil PSUs are required to offer their
facilities for checking the compliance of the norms prescribed by OISD and
other statutory requirements. Pre-commissioning audit is carried by OISD
based on request from OMCs which broadly includes the following checks:
i. Layout & safe distances in conformity with OISD STD-118 & other statutory
requirements.
ii. Firefighting facilities in conformity with OISD STD-117 including fire alarm and
communication facilities.
iii. Compliance to various statutory approvals.
iv. Risk analysis and implementations of corrective measures.
23
During the last 5 years, OISD has carried out the following number of audits:
During the last 5 year, 30 POL and 02 LPG installations of OMCs have been
closed due to factors mentioned above. The details are as under:
"Specific study towards this has not been conducted to review safety aspects in
the existing oil and gas installations due to revision of seismic zones in the
country. However, at the design stage itself, if the installation lies on the earths
25
fault zone then appropriate safety factors are considered to take care of any
future eventuality."
2.27 Regarding the coastal oil and gas installations in the country subjected to
review of safety measures and to give details of measures to be taken, to which the
Ministry replied the following in a written note:-
"Review of safety measures of all the oil installations in the country including the
installations in coastal area is carried out regularly by OISD. All the
recommendations of such reviews are monitored on quarterly basis."
Safety review
Year Recommendations (nos.) Year Recommendations (nos.) Year Recommendations (nos.)
Coastal
Refineries Total Implemented In Total Implemented In Total Implemented In
progress progress progress
HPCL-MR April, 86 85 01 Feb, 72 60 12 - - -
2006 2010
HPCL-VR Dec, 2005 62 60 2 May, 64 57 7 - - -
2009
BPCL-MR Feb, 2005 38 36 2 April 35 33 2 Feb - -
2008 2012
BPCL KR April , 50 50 - March, 74 72 2 Jan 170 111 59
2002 2006 2010
CPCL Manali Oct, 2002 85 85 - April 65 60 5 June 78 64 14
2007 2010
CPCL CBR 2000 - - - Aug, 70 70 0 Oct, 62 62 -
2004 2007
Hadia Feb, 2003 34 34 - Feb 43 42 1 March 74 64 10
Refinery 2007 2010
MRPL June 97 91 6 Feb 129 116 13 - - -
2005(1st 2009
ESA) (2nd
ESA)
7) ONGC-Uran: Internal inspection of two crude oil tanks planned & action
taken for modification of Effluent treatment plant.
8) MRPL: Job for connecting the Horton sphere safety valve discharge is
taken up along with New Unit under capacity augmentation this year.
2.28 Asked as to whether there is any laid down disaster management plan to
minimize losses in case of natural disasters/accidents at the installation. The Ministry
in their reply stated that the disaster management plans for natural disasters/accidents
at the installations are already included in the Disaster Preparedness Manual of the
concerned units.
2.29 When asked about the organisational set up of Safety, Health and
Environment (HSE) in oil and gas companies, the Ministry stated as follows in their
written reply:-
"All Oil & Gas Companies have their own Safety, Health and Environment
policy. Corporate Safety Departments functions include policy formulation,
monitoring of safety management system, auditing, accident investigation,
review and reporting to top management, OISD, MoP&NG and various statutory
authorities."
28
2.30 Regarding the details of accidents at installation during the last 5 years, the
Ministry informed as under:-
62 80 85 97 84
Total
Table 2 : Group wise total fire Incident
Marketing 4 5 5 11 6
Terminals/ LPG
Plants/ Depots
Cross Country 8 3 5 6 10
Pipelines
TOTAL 42 61 68 74 70
(at Installations)
2.31 On being asked as to how are accidents defined in the oil and gas industry
and details regarding the accidents occurred in the oil and gas installations during the
last 5 years,the Ministry stated the following:-
"OISD Manual use the term incidents to describe various fire and accidents
that occur in the oil installations. Incidents defined in oil and gas industry are as
follows:
Major Incident
i. Fatality
ii. Permanent Loss of Body Part
iii. Permanent Disability
iv. Loss of Property >Rs. 5 lacs
v. Shut down of Plant / Facility
vi. Blow out / Explosion
vii. Loss of more than 500 man-hours
viii. Fire of more than 15 minutes duration
ix. Failure of Rig Critical Equipment like draw works, casing line etc.
Minor Incident
Any incident not falling under any of the categories of major incident.
Near miss Incident
i. An incident which does not result in any injury or damage to property but
has the potential to result in injury and / or property damage.
ii. An undesirable event, if not timely controlled, would have led to a major /
minor incident.
The following events are to be categorized under major or minor incident,
as applicable:
Hydrocarbon leakage from pipeline, resulting in stoppage of operations
Collision between vessel and offshore installation/ rig.
Release of toxic gases."
30
2.32 When asked as to when are accidents declared as major, the OISD, ED during
the oral evidence stated as under:-
"Sir, the OISD standard says that the major fire is where there is a loss of more
than Rs.5 lakh or if the unit is shut down. So, mostly if the unit is shut down, we
declare it as major fire even if there is some fire in the supply line without which
you cannot run the unit".
2.33 When asked whether the companies are obliged to report such
accidents/incidents to statutory authorities, it was stated that Companies are obliged to
report major incidents to PESO and Chief Inspector of Factories as per the MSIHC
Rule and all the major accidents / incidents are also reported to OISD.
2.34 On being asked about the causes for these fire accidents , the Ministry replied
that most of the accidents took place due to human error, like violation of work permit
system as laid down in OISD standard-105and non-adherence to the Standard
Operating Procedures.
2.35 On the financial impact of such fires and incidents in various oil installations.
The ministry furnished the following information :-
TRAINING
2.37 In handling safety related incidents, training of people plays an important role.
When the Committee asked the Ministry to furnish a note on the training given to the
operating personnel/supervisors of the oil and gas installations, the Ministry give the
following in their written reply:-
2.38 Each of the oil company has its own training calendar. The training needs of the
employees are identified and based on the need requisite in-house and off the
company trainings are imparted. Training to the employees consists of both class room
inputs as well as on the job training. In other words, through faculty interaction requisite
theoretical inputs are provided and at site on-the-hand training is provided to gain
practical approach.
The training programs basically cover the following:
2.39 Besides, regular training inputs are also provided to various contract labour
employees working in the installation so as to equip them with adequate knowledge
and skill not only to fight emergency situations like fires but also various dos and
donts of fire and safety. The Safety training to contract workers, TT crew, security
personnel are given in line with OISD-standard-154.
2.40 Induction level trainings are provided to all the contract workers prior to
providing them gate pass for working in the installation.
2.41 Asked whether Safety Drills are conducted by companies at their installations
and to give details of the frequency of such drills conducted, the Ministry stated the
following:-
"Safety drills are regularly conducted by companies at their installations. The
Onsite emergency drills are conducted at the interval of 6 months and offsite
emergency drill is conducted once in a calendar year in line with provisions of
Manufacturing, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals (Amendment)
Rules, 2000."
OIL SPILL
2.42 When a question was posed by the Committee on offshore oil spill and its
consequences the CMD, ONGC, replied as under during the oral evidence:-
"Sir, as regards the offshore, I can tell you that we have a dispersion model
based on a Norwegian software company. It can indicate at any time in the year
depending upon which installation oil spill is taking place, how much time it will
take for us to tackle it and which place it will land in. So, it is very much
available. I am not aware whether it is prescribed there or not but this is very
much prevalent not only with ONGC but even with joint ventures which are
operating in the western offshore. It is very much available".
2.43 When asked as to whether such software are available in the private sector
also as they are now given oil blocks ,the Secretary, MoPNG stated that it is mandated
by law and this requires a clearance from the Ministry of Environment and Forest. This
impact assessment has to be submitted to them.
"Sir, I am not sure if it is mandated by law. But what we are trying to say is that
any software which is making this prediction will look into all these, the weather,
the current, the waves and the tide and will come to conclusions whether it is
internal or external, irrespective of that fact, the model will always predict where
these spills are going to take place and in how much time. Mostly what happens
in case of oil spills is that oil gets evaporated before it reaches the shore. If the
time is there it can always be collected, dispersed and disintegrated. So, there is
hardly any chance of this going and creating a catastrophe in case it is of a
smaller volume".
2.46 Elaborating further on the subject, the CMD, ONGC stated the following:-
'The entire oil spill has been broken into three tiers. If it is up to 700 tonnes, it
called tier I, and all the operators, like the ONGC or the other operators in the
offshore have been given the responsibility of having the facilities. So, we have
for both the Eastern and the Western off shores to contain if the oil spill is about
700 tonnes. If it is more than 700 tonnes, then it called the tier II and the Indian
Coast Guard has been mandated to have this responsibility of containing this.
Beyond that it is called tier III and there are world renowned companies, they
are invariably called. Nobody maintains it. No country probably maintains this
kind of tier III facilities. These are specialised companies who have got the total
wherewithal. They have got their own aircraft etc. and all that we need to have is
a membership of that. They can mobilise within hours and then we have to pay
for the oil spill control".
2.47 When asked as to explain the domain expertise of the Coast Guard in oil spill,
the ED, OISD replied the following during the oral evidence:-
"There is a common pool and in the common pool the fund is given and Coast
Guard takes the necessary equipment whatever is required and it is the Coast
Guard who does it".
2.48 In a Note on the preparedness of oil PSUs to deal with oil industry problem like
oil spill in offshore locations and other contaminations in onshore installation. The
Ministry furnished the following:
34
"OFFSHORE Installations:
The offshore oil installations have implemented the Oil Spill Response Plan to
deal with Tier-I level oil spill (up to 700 MT of oil spill). Regular mock drills are
carried out to check the efficacy of the Oil Spill Response system.
Indian Coast Guard has the facility to deal with oil spill more than 700 MT and
up to 10000 MT (Tier-II level). Tier-III relates to spill over 10000 MT and would
involve national and international support.
National Oil Spill Disaster Contingency Plan (NOS-DCP) exists in the country to
preserve and protect the marine environment and prevent & control marine
pollution. The functional responsibilities of various Ministries and Departments
for oil spill response in maritime zones have been defined in the NOS-DCP. DG
(Coast Guard) is designated as the Central Coordinating Agency (CCA) to
implement the plan and coordinate resource pool up in the event of an oil spill.
Individual oil companies are also the stakeholders in the plan, which will provide
assistance to the Coast Guard.
Indian Coast Guard has four regional oil spill response centers at Port Blair,
Mumbai, Chennai & Gulf of Kutch (Gujarat).
Indian Coast Guard periodically reviews the NOS-DCP provisions with the
industry, Port authorities, central and state pollution control boards, National
Institute of Oceanography etc.
The Contingency Plan prepared by the operator for handling oil spill
emergencies is vetted by Coast Guard.
In order to further enhance the capabilities for oil spill response it has been
discussed and decided to pool the resources available with the companies.
Accordingly, mutual aid arrangement for Pooling of Resources amongst all the
companies located in near vicinity has been prepared as given below:
a) Western Coast-
1. Vadinar IOCL, RIL, Essar and BORL
2. Hazira Cairn India &Niko
3. Mumbai High ONGC & BG
4. Kochi BPCL & Kochi Port
b) Eastern Coast
5. Puducherry Hardy & HOEC
6. KG Basin/ Yanam Cairn, RIL, GSPC & ONGC
7. Vizag HPCL &Vizag Port
8. Paradip IOCL &Paradip Port
MOU for Pooling of Resources is finalized except at Mumbai High area, where
ONGC & BG are in the process of finalizing the same and at Puducherry area,
where the MOU would be finalized as soon as production at Hardy platform is
resumed.
35
Major oil companies like ONGC have taken membership with M/s OSRL,
Singapore to deal with any major oil spill.
ON SHORE Installation:
For Onshore installations where storage facilities are there have been provided
with containment system in the form of tank dyke. The volume of tank dyke is
designed in such a way that it can contain 110% of the tank volume. Floor of the
dyke are preferable made with cement concrete to prevent ingress of oil to the
soil. Dyke valves are always kept in close position to prevent oil spill from the
dyke to the other areas. Thus, oil spill at onshore installation are remote
possibility. "
36
CHAPTER 3
The M.B.Lal Committee had also observed that due to non-availability of self
contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) at the accident site and absence of any training
to deal with such emergency ,the personal could do little and had to withdraw.
Hon. Chairman, since the time this issue was raised by the hon.
Committee, we had convened certain meetings with all the concerned and have
taken decisions. Those decisions will stand. We are committed to implement
the M.B. Lal Committee recommendations. We are moving ahead in that
direction. In fact, I had read out in one of the meetings that we have given them
a timeline, a chart. By that time, they will have to comply; they will have to put
whatever is required in place to make the installation safe. And there is no
rethinking at our level. We are, in fact, pressing them continuously to move
ahead and finalise the tenders, invite bids open bids, compare, place orders,
and move ahead in the given time frame. There is no rethinking and no review
in our minds at our level. It has to be done and that too, within a time frame.
We have laid down a mechanism at the Ministry level. Additional Secretary
himself convenes the meetings periodically to monitor the progress. The last
meeting was convened in August. I believe that the next meeting is again going
to be convened and we are really going to see that each and every milestone is
achieved. I can only express my concern because hon. Committee Members
have raised certain issues which may not have come to our notice. Definitely,
we would ourselves like to confront this to the Oil Marketing Companies. This is
the position. Some slippages might be taking place. They have to bring it to our
notice. Otherwise, they would not be able to adhere to the timeline. I can from
my side say and say with confidence that they have to comply with it. They
have to put all the safety equipments etc. in position as per the timelines given
to them. They keep assuring us that all the actions required for the safety
equipments to be brought in are in line and somehow they are also feeling
confident that it will all be done within the given time frame. But, definitely
looking to the concern which hon. Members have expressed, we would like to
take it from them also so that there is no slippage, there is no carelessness at
any level. This much assurance I can give to the Committee
from some members, CVC and Shri M.B. Lal himself which were placed before
the steering committee and thereafter to chairmen committee. On being asked
that since the Ministry is moving in direction of implementation of M.B. Lal
Committee report, the reasons for appointing another Committee the Secretary
stated that it is a continuous process which keeps happening.
When asked on the action taken on OMCs which are delaying the
process the Secretary stated that with the time schedule given by M.B. Lal
Committee report, in some cases it can happen that work is not completed in
stipulated time as it can take more time. However there is no dilution in
implementing OISD standards.
3.4 OISD had revised two Standards namely OISD-STD-116 and OISD-STD-117 in
November, 2010. These Standards basically relate to fire protection Standards as per
the details given below.
OISD-STD-116 Fire protection facilities for petroleum refinery & oil/gas processing
plants)
OISD STD-117 - Fire protection facilities for petroleum depots, terminals, pipelines
installations and lube oil installations
3.5 When asked by the Committee how the OISD Standards are developed, the
Ministry stated the following:
OISD Std.-116 (Fire protection facilities for petroleum refinery & oil/gas
processing plants) & OISD Std.-117 (Fire protection facilities for petroleum
depots, terminals, pipelines installations and lube oil installations) are statutory
standards. These two standards were developed through a consultative process
viz. wide consultation with industry members, incorporating recommendations of
MB Lal committee and recommendations by the Chairman Committee
constituted by the Safety Council. These standards, upon approval by the
Safety Council, were notified for implementation in Nov, 2010.
3.6 It is seen that M.B. Lal Committee set up after Jaipur Fire Accident in 2009
made 113 recommendations which the Ministry has accepted. When the Committee
enquired as to whether it does not indicate that there were gaps in the safety
preparedness need for improvement of safety systems, revision of standards etc. of
the oil and gas Installations, the Ministry in its reply furnished the following:-
Fire at IOCLs Jaipur terminal occurred primarily due to human error. The
operation involving reversal of the hammer blind with MOV kept in open position
resulted in huge spillage of POL. This led to formation of vapour cloud and
subsequently fire of such a magnitude. It may be mentioned that although fire-
fighting equipment were in place but were of little help once hydrocarbon fire of
such magnitude engulfed the area. Routine operations involving transferring of
POL had been carried out by the plant personnel umpteen numbers of times in
the past without any accident. To this extent, there were gaps in safety
preparedness. Knowledge gap is an issue and the OMCs have accorded extra
thrust to equip their employees, including contract labourers with adequate skill
& knowledge.
It is submitted that OISD standard 116 & 117 were in the process of revision as
per normal practice prior to the Jaipur incident. The Jaipur fire incident led to the
constitution of the MB Lal committee. The MB Lal Committee recommended
certain safety measures. Recommendations were also made by a Committee of
Chairmen of PSU oil companies. Since OISD standards were in the process of
revision, the recommendations of both the committees were included in the
revised standard.
3.7 The Committee wanted to know as to how the decisions related to safety are
decided in the Ministry and related agencies. So the Committee sought from the
Ministry as to which is the highest forum to decide on safety issues for oil and gas
installations. The Ministry in its written replies furnished the following:-
Safety aspects technically and operationally are looked after by concerned
Unit head and Oil Companies CEOs. Besides, there is a Safety Council which
is headed by Secretary, Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas as Chairman and
41
3.8 When asked by the Committee, about the estimated expenditure to be incurred
to implement the MB Lal Committee recommendations by oil PSUs and private
companies, the Ministry furnished the following in its written reply:-
3.9 Asked subsequently by the Committee to spell out the time frame by which the
Ministry and PSUs will implement the recommendations of M.B.Lal Committee, the
Ministry gave the following information:-
As per the information received from OISD, there are 113 recommendations
given by M.B. Lal Committee post Jaipur fire in 2010 that are to be implemented
by the oil industry. Out of this, 66 recommendations have since been
implemented and 47 recommendations are at various stages of implementation.
As per inputs provided by the oil companies and OISD based on the progress
achieved so far, the time frame for major engineering & procurement related
recommendations are as follows:
Sl. Items Tentative Time Schedule
No.
1 High Volume Long Range Foam cum water Partly Implemented.
monitors. Balance : December,2014
3.10 When the Committee sought to know regarding any assessment has been done
on the safety measures installed by private companies in pursuance of MB Lal
Committee Recommendations, the Ministry gave the following details in its written
reply:-
Assessment has been done on safety measures installed by private
companies in line with OISD-116 &117 and as per the MB Lal Committee
recommendations for following installations:
3.12 The Committee sought from the Ministry as to what were the main issues raised
by private companies in respect of OISD 116/117, the Ministry in their written reply
furnished the following:-
43
Subsequent to the notification of revised OISD standards 116 and 117, BORL,
EOL and RIL raised the following issues:
i.Fire water requirement for Terminals with storage capacity exceeding 30,000
KL- Double fire contingency.
ii.Automatic actuated Rim seal fire detection (based on linear heat hollow metallic
tube) and single shot foam protection system in Class A tanks.
iii. Installation of Remote Operated Long Range variable flow monitors.
3.13 Asked by the Committee as to whether some of the M.B. Lal committee
recommendations were changed due to representations made by oil and gas
companies, the Ministry gave the following in its written reply :-
"No representation has been received from oil and gas companies for changing
the recommendations of the MB Lal committee. All the recommendations of M B
Lal committee were accepted by the Government and these are being
implemented by the industry".
3.14 When the Committee wanted to know whether there is any move to review the
MB Lal committee recommendations, the Ministry gave the following in a written reply:-
There is no move to review the recommendations of M B Lal Committee
recommendations except for the fire water requirement as per double fire
contingency scenario. It has been proposed by Chairmen Committee that the
design water requirement for double fire contingency should be considered for
large oil installations with total storage capacity of more than 30,000 KL.
3.15 The Committee wanted to know the steps taken by the Ministry in the issue of
equivalency retroactivity and common fire-fighting facilities. The Ministry had furnished
the following in its written note to the Committee which details out the sequence of
activities carried out regarding the OISD standards 116 & 117:-
Meeting Convened by MoP&NG
Addl. Secretary, MoP&NG convened a meeting on 21st April2011 to address the
issues that had been raised. During the meeting, it was agreed that OISD could
consider inclusion of clauses on equivalency, retroactivity and common fire-
fighting facilities. However, it was also mentioned that any consideration of this
should not be an impediment in implementation of the fire safety measures as
mentioned in the OISD standards 116 and 117. Any change in the standards
would require approval of the Safety Council.
44
10.2 During this meeting, some other issues, viz., necessity of rim seal
protection system in all Class-A tanks irrespective of their size and diameter,
requirement of remote HVLR facility etc. were also raised by the principal
panelists. No consensus could be reached on these divergent views.
Since there were enough divergent views and consensus could not be arrived
at, OISD considered it prudent to refer the matter to the Committee of Chairmen
for advice. The referral to Chairmen Committee was aimed at getting a broader
perspective and requisite advice from the team whose earlier recommendations
had been incorporated in the Standards.
The Technical Expert Committee (TEC) consisting of Director (R) - IOCL &
Convener, Director(R)- BPCL and Executive Director (O&D)- HPCL deliberated
the issues at length and met four times at New Delhi. To arrive at a scientific
solution, the expert committee with due approval of Chairmen Committee co-
opted two experts from EIL.
Automatic rim seal fire detection & suppression system for all Class A
tanks (as already provided in the amended OISD STDs 116,117)
TEC also suggested operating philosophy for HVLRs must be developed by oil
companies for effective firefighting. Provision of manual operated HVLR in OISD
STD 117, wherever sufficient distance is available within the installation from the
point of hazards, and in-company fire-fighting infrastructure with respect to the
location is available.
CHAPTER 4
4.1 The Committee had wanted to know the progress of implementation of MB Lal
Committee recommendations in the oil marketing companies. All the
recommendations were to be implemented by 24 months i.e. by April, 2012. The
Committee wanted to examine the issues that have resulted in delay of implementation
of MB Lal Committee recommendations in the oil marketing companies.
4.2 The Major Engineering & Procurement related items that need to be installed as
part of MB Lal Committee recommendations are as under:
Provision of HVLRs.
Provision of MEFG/ROSOV/CCTV/MFM.
4.3 The Committee were informed that the oil companies faced certain difficulties in
procurement of some items/equipments which were part of MB Lal Committee
recommendations/provisions of OISD std 116 and 117. When asked by the Committee
to elaborate, the Ministry stated the following in its written reply:
It may be mentioned that oil companies have been implementing the various
MB Lal Committee recommendations/ provisions of OISD-STD-116 and 117. As
informed by OISD, basing on inputs received from PSU Oil Companies, about
58% of MB Lal Committee recommendations have been implemented. The
balance are also under various stages of execution. The difficulties that were
faced by oil companies in the areas of procurement of some of the equipment,
as intimated by the oil companies to OISD are as under
Various equipment like hollow metallic Rim Seal fire protection, HVLR, Double
Block Bleeder valve, remote operated shut down valves, Mass Flow Meters etc.
in large quantities have been recommended for procurement and installation to
enhance safety of the oil installations. The oil companies faced problems with
47
limited number of vendors for procurement of such high value, high volume
equipment. The limited number of vendors also resulted in non-competitive
bidding process. As there were not many qualified vendors to supply such
equipment and coupled with abnormally high quotes, oil companies faced with
the problem of justifying the reasonability of the price quoted.
It has been observed that in some cases the rates quoted by the vendors were
as high as 400% above the estimate which left oil companies with no other
alternative but to stop the tendering process and float fresh tender. In the
process, the procurement process got delayed.
As large quantities of equipment were being procured for the first time, it was
decided that procurement should be done by one nominated company on behalf
of the industry to get the best price. However, at the time of procurement, it was
found that the vendors did not qualify the laid down PQ criteria of the company.
Even after relaxing the PQ criteria, it was found that vendors did not even meet
the relaxed criteria. Under such circumstances oil companies had to essentially
cancel the tender.
It has now been decided that instead of joint tender individual oil companies
must procure the equipment for their respective companies. Not qualifying the
PQ criteria and the decision to go for joint procurement resulted in delay in
procurement and implementation thereof.
It has been observed that vendors were quoting high rates for the same item as
compared to the past supply taking advantage of Mandatory/Statutory provision
in OISD Standard. For example, the quoted price Hollow Metallic Rim Seal
system prior to the amendment of the OISD-STD-116 and 117 and thereafter
had been quoted at around 2.5 times more even after adjusting the inflation
factor. The high quote of the equipment apropos amendment of the standard
posed problem in the oil industry in justifying the reasonability of rate.
The complaints of the vendors and subsequent reference from CVC had to be
settled before the normal procurement process could be followed. The
48
Although oil companies in their right earnest intended to go ahead with the
procurement process but due to the above constraints viz., limited vendors, not
meeting the PQ criteria, quoting abnormal high rates, complaints from various
quarters and its settlement delayed the implementation process particularly in
respect of procurement of some of the items
4.4 When IOC was enquired as to how decisions to retenders are taken, the IOC,
Chairman in the oral evidence stated as follows:
"The decision is taken on the merit and the circumstances of the case. There
are instances where we have gone for re-tendering and there are instances
where we have also accepted. So, there is a mix of both the acceptance and
rejection. We normally do not calculate it in this manner. If it is required we will
do it. I should also clarify that if it is a single tender case and it is more than the
accepted rate then it is obviously re-tendered but wherever it is within the
estimate but it is a single tender there could be both the situations".
Giving his views on delay in implementation the Secretary stated that major
delays have been due to clubbing when the vendors were disqualified. Later it
was declubbed.
4.5 The Committee have been informed by the Ministry that the procurement of
certain engineering items are causing delays due to which the implementation
schedule has been postponed. The Committee were concerned with the PSUs and
Oil Companies for such serious delays done by them in providing safety at oil
installations despite repeated commitments by the Ministry/PSU officials regarding the
implementation of safety at all oil installations. The Committee called for information
from the Ministry regarding the reasons for such delays in procurement of the key
equipments required for implementation of the revised OISD Standards. The Ministrys
reply on each of the item is given below:
The Ministry had informed the Committee that the OISD Standards 117 have
provided for the following:
Provision of manual HVLRs is only for locations where all of the following are
available:
4.6 When the committee sought to know the reasons for delay in procurement of
HVLR, the Ministry informed the following:
Price bid opening planned in May, 2011 but could be done only in Jan, 2012.
One of the Vendor informed on 12/03/12 that for similar monitor, they have
supplied to HMEL at ~50% lower than the price quoted by L-1 vendor.
Evaluation committee took final decision on 2nd April 2012 and Emergency
procurement put up for management approval.
50
4.7 When asked whether the oil companies had negotiated with the suppliers of
monitors on prices, during the oral evidence stated the following reply was given:-
"Sir, when the Tender Evaluation Committee were negotiating with the L1
bidder, we have received some work orders from Hindustan Mittal Refineries
that they have supplied such monitors at 50 per cent lower cost. Hindustan
Mittal has supplied the monitors at 50 per cent lower cost. The monitor which
was supplied was 2000 gpm, and the tender was for 5750 gpm max. So, he has
supplied a higher volume monitor at a lower cost. That information came to TEC
and then TEC wanted to examine the offer which we have received from HEML
at 50 per cent lower cost".
4.8 Asked to explain the delay in procurement of HVLR due to complaints, the
Ministry in its written reply stated the following:-
CVC received a complaint regarding the HVLR tender which was forwarded by
IOCLs vigilance department to IOCLs purchase department for review. As per
CVC guidelines, the issues raised in the complaint were presented to
Independent External Monitors four times. As per the advice of IEMs, following
actions were taken:
a) The issues of the complaint were shared with other OMCs(HPCL &
BPCL) for examination at their end.
HPCL received a complaint that the three vendors participating in the tender
are related to each other. HPCL referred the issue to their legal department.
Various documents were asked from the vendor & scrutinized by HPCLs legal
department.
The process of scrutinizing the issues of the complaints delayed the
procurement process by approximately 9-10 months.
The complaints have been handled as per CVC guidelines and purchase
procedures.
51
On the query of the Committee the reasons for not opening the bids for which
tenders were floated and were promised to be done in two months the CMD ,
IOCL stated:-
What I want to submit and what I did say is that we will make efforts.
But, if you might recall, I had also said that since many companies are involved,
IOCL on its own cannot go ahead and place the order. We have to have an
evaluation process. All the companies have to accept it. Then only, we can do
it. We are just the nodal agency to do work on behalf of everybody. So, this is
one of the aspects which we had anticipated. It is not that we have stopped
working. We are still working. We hope that we have given the status that
some of them will be completed by 30th November and some other will be
completed by 31st December. Even that status has been given in the
presentation. We are not stopped. But, it might take two months. It might take
a little more time. We have good reasons as to why it took more time. We are
not trying to delay them. The Secretary has already clarified that we have not
put a stop to it. We are going ahead. So, the status is this. We are able to
present it. If you ask and give us an opportunity, we will given in writing as to
what has happened from the last date and why there is a delay of one, two or
three months. We will give that in writing. We have cogent reasons to submit
before you.
The matter was again raised during evidence on 29.8.2011. The work regarding
tendering of HVLRs was to be completed in two months but even after a lapse of 8
months the process has not completed. When enquired the reasons for negotiating
when as per CVC guidelines if the bid is within 5% of estimated amount there would
be no negotiations. CMD, IOC stated that in the tender committee the CMD or officer
immediate below are not involved. They can only ask the committee to expedite. They
generally do not involve in the process as it will tantamount to vitiating their negotiating
process.
4.9 Asked by the Committee regarding the current status on 29.3.12 in ordering of
HVLRs, the Secretary, MoPNG, during the oral evidence informed that:-
"Some orders have been placed and for the remaining, orders will be placed in
April, 2012".
52
4.10 The Committee have been given to understand that there was an unsolicited
offer from a company named ACRON for supply of HVLR monitors to OMCs. The
Committee sought the factual position on this issue from the oil companies. Regarding
ACRON email, the representative of BPCL are made the following comments during
oral evidence:
"Sir, when the tender was floated, the material of construction which was given
in the tender was stainless steel and it was UL approved whereas this party,
Akram Brass, has supplied with the material of construction as brass and also
had UL approval at that particular point of time. When the technical bids were
received and were getting evaluated, at that point of time the Technical
Committee, which was there for evaluating the technical offers, rejected this
officer saying that it is brass and it is not stainless steel. That is why, he was
rejected on technical grounds. After that the price bid was opened. On 4th of
January the price bid was opened and the Negotiation Committee started.
During the month of February, the e-mails came to all the Chairmen and also all
the TEC Members. All nine TEC Members got the e-mail from some source
where he had given the ACRON offer at Rs. 19 lakh or something and he had
also given the technical offer. Initially also he was saying: Instead of brass I
can give steel. Give me some time; I will get approval for steel. It was not
approved by the Technical Committee at that point of time. When this offer
came, as it was addressed to Technical Committee Members, everybody
thought that let us look at that particular cost, what is the exact cost and all that.
After that initially the vender has given only two per discount and after the he
has started increasing the discount up to 10 per cent. That is one point".
4.11 Elaborating further on the issue, the CMD, BPCL made the following
observation:-
The fact is that the Technical Negotiating Committee took note of it and they
use this as a negotiating point.
RIM SEAL FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM
4.12 When asked by the Committee as to what is the cost of the rim seal fire
protection system, the Ministry replied the following:
"As far as the rim seal fire protection for Refinery Division Rs. 987 crore for IOC
and Rs. 350 crore for BPCL & HPCL".
53
4.13 When the Committee wanted to know the progress made by the companies in
procurement of RIM SEAL system, the Ministry furnished the following reply:
IOCL
Since the value of job & volume of work was enormous and installation specific,
decided to go for individual tender basis on 8th Dec, 2011.
HPCL
"That this has to be done on tanks which are having hydrocarbons. We are
discussing here about the safety. One tank will have 65,000 crude oil. On the
top of it, the job has to be done. The job has to be done by people who have no
knowledge of refining. Our submission is that we should go slowly and we
should not rush and do this job. This is our submission to you. Initially, for the
IOC Refinery Division, we have issued a tender for 236 tanks. When we issued
the tender, there were so many complaints and counter complaints. Then, we
went to IEM also. They also suggested that this is a safety items.
4.15 Adding further, the CMD, IOC stated:-
"It will be done in such a mega scale. It has never been done in any country in
the world. For the first time, in such a mega scale it will be done. We were
advised: Do not do it in one go. Do it in phases. So, we have gone to our
Board. We have taken permission for going into phases. We have tenders,
document, file but there is a vigilance guideline that we cannot reduced the
number once we have already tendered out. If we go in two phases,
automatically we have to retain that. I am talking of the refinery division".
4.16 Elaborating further about the steps, he further added:-
"Similarly, for the marketing division, we are doing it. Even if we purchase all
these materials, these are to be put on the tank. We can hand over maximum
three tanks at a time because there is crude, naphtha etc. At the same time, the
refinery also has to run to supply products to the marketing division. These
refineries are running for 50 years without any major fire incidence. There have
been only seven fires in previous years. Out of that, five happened in the crude
tank. I had explained last time that all these tanks are even double-sealed.
Earlier one single seal was there. There will be vapor generation. So, we have
gone for double sealing. We have a procedure".
It is seen in case of procurement of Rim Seal system by IOCL the technical bid
was opened on 20.3.2013 and only one offer was received which is under
evaluation.
When asked about the CVC guidelines on single tender, the
representative informed that work can be awarded on single tender basis
however, it requires boards approval.
Giving the activity chart for procurement of Rim Seal Fire Protection system
the Ministry in a post evidence reply informed that on 20.3.12 technical bids
were opened & only one offer received. Bid was also not meeting the tender
criteria. Hence it was proposed to cancel the tender. On 4.4.12 industry
55
working group met on 4.4.12 and decided to revisit the rimseal specification in
light of the clarification sought by various bidders in the tenders floated by
OMCs. It was also decided to take up the matter with OISD.
Hydrocarbon Detector
4.17 The Committee sought to know the progress made and reasons for delay in
installations of hydrocarbon detectors by the Oil Marketing Companies (OMCs) In
regard to delay in procurement of hydrocarbon detector, the Ministry in a presentation
given the following reasons:
4.18 In an information furnished to the Committee, the Ministry had made the
following regarding the status in procurement of double fire contingency.
4.19 The Committee note that this is one of the important recommendations of MB
Lal Committee. In order to know the progress made in implementing this
recommendations, the Committee sought the status and reasons for delay if any from
the Ministry. The following were the reasons given by the Ministry:
4.20 On being enquired to give an update regarding the procurement of MEFG by the
OMCs, the Ministry furnished the following to the Committee:
4.21 The Committee noted that for some items of procurement, only one bid has
been received. So the Committee wanted to know whether there are many suppliers of
these items. So the Committee enquired as to whether there are many manufacturers
of these items like MEFG and activated rim seal fire detection suppression system.
The Ministry in its reply furnished the following:-
57
PART-II
Recommendation No.1
The Committee note that safety is a major and critical concern for oil and
gas industry. Any laxity in upkeep/handling of highly inflammable oil and gas
products can be a high risk to life, property and environment. In view of
increasing activity in the sector and large number of oil and gas installations i.e.
exploration sites, refineries, pipelines etc. in the country, it is imperative for the
oil and gas companies to have well developed safety systems and practices in
place and strict compliance of safety norms by personnel working in the
installations. The safety mechanisms of the companies are also required to be
regularly monitored by the Ministry.
The Committee are, however, constrained to note that despite the safety
being of paramount concern, the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas does not
have implementation of safety measures as part of their mandate. To give due
importance to the safety aspects, the Committee recommend that monitoring of
safety measures in both public and private companies should be included in the
mandate of the Ministry. They further desire that the Ministry should place safety
in both upstream and downstream companies as a thrust area of 12th Plan.
59
Recommendation No.2
The Committee opine that multiplicity of legislations to deal with the safety
of oil and gas installations has made the enforcement process difficult. The
Committee recommend the Government to bring out an umbrella legislation for
the oil and gas sector with the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural gas as nodal
Ministry incorporating all safety related provisions contained in different Acts.
60
Recommendation No 3
The Committee note that OISD has been functioning as the technical
directorate of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas and has formulated 112
safety standards. OISD checks the implementation of these standards through
various safety inspections but has statutory powers to enforce these standards
only for upstream offshore installations. The Committee further note that PESO
which is under the administrative control of Ministry of Commerce and Industry is
the competent authority to administer Petroleum Rules under Petroleum Act,
1934 which inter alia refers to 6 crucial OISD standards pertaining to fire
protection facilities for downstream oil and gas installations. The Committee
further note that Director General of Mines Safety (DGMS) under the
administrative control of Ministry of Labour and Employment has been vested
with powers for enforcing safety rules for onshore oil and gas installations.
The Committee have been informed that there is a proposal to transfer the
PESOs job relating to Petroleum Rules to OISD. The Committee are in agreement
with this move and desire that the process of transfer should be completed at the
earliest. The Committee further recommend that the Ministry should take up the
matter with appropriate authorities for the transfer of DGMS responsibilities
under the Petroleum Rules to OISD as well.
The Committee would like to point out that multiple agencies enforcing
different set of safety laws will lead oil industry to comply with number of
authorities for safety related laws and regulations. The Committee view that there
will be no clear accountability on the part of agencies as they may blame other
agencies for any lapses which lead to incidents. The Committee, therefore,
recommend that OISD should be made the nodal agency to formulate, monitor
and enforce the OISD standards and other applicable laws for the entire oil and
gas sector.
61
Recommendation No 4
The Committee note that OISD carries out safety audits/inspection and
conducts pre commissioning safety audits of PSUs. The Committee note that
these standards are implemented on self regulatory basis by the industry.
The Committee note that OISD has not been vested with statutory authority
to penalize the violators of safety standards. The Committee feel that this has
rendered OISD a mere recommendatory body with no powers to enforce the
stipulated standards. The Committee are of the opinion that in the oil industry, it
is essential to adhere to safety standards and implement safe working practices.
The Committee, therefore, recommend that the Ministry should confer statutory
status on OISD to enable it to enforce the safety standards with legal authority
and also to take penal action against the non-compliance thereof.
62
Recommendation No 5
The Committee note that the total sanctioned manpower in OISD is 66 but
the actual manpower is only 29. A large number of posts are vacant in
Exploration & Production (E&P) side as only 6 posts are filled against the actual
strength of 28 posts. The Committee also note that OISD draws its personnel only
on deputation from public sector oil companies and there are no permanent staff
or its own cadre. The Committee understand that this is due to fact that the oil
companies are not able to spare their officials which the Ministry has also
admitted as an area of concern.
The Committee are of the view that since OISD has no permanent cadre
with less than half of the sanctioned manpower in place, the efficacy of the
enforcement of safety standards is compromised. The Committee, therefore,
recommend that the Ministry should urgently look into the matter and take steps
to fill up the vacant posts by exploring the options other than deputation. The
Committee further desire that the Ministry should consider manning OISD with a
permanent cadre of officers in a time bound manner.
63
Recommendation No 6
The Committee note that MB Lal Committee which was constituted in the
aftermath of the Jaipur fire accident in October, 2009, came out with a Report
containing 113 recommendations. The Ministry while accepting the Report
specified a time line of 24 months i.e. by end of April 2012 in consultation with
OMCs for the implementation of these recommendations. The Committee are
constrained to note that by April, 2012, only 66 recommendations out of 113 have
been implemented. The Committee further note that the timeline has been shifted
to December, 2014 for implementation of some of the recommendations.
The Committee are unhappy that though the initial timeline has expired,
the recommendations especially pertaining to procurement and installation of
important safety equipments are still pending. This reflects poorly on the
managements of OMCs and their planning and implementation abilities. The
Committee strongly deprecate the dilatory tactics of the OMCs and inefficient
supervision of the Ministry resulting in inexplicable delays in the implementation
of safety standards.
Recommendation No 7
The Committee note that OISD has prescribed standards for training of
personnel and provision of personal protective equipments and life saving
appliances at the installations. They are however, surprised to note that as
pointed out by MB Lal Committee, the personnel deployed at Jaipur IOC terminal
at the time of the accident had no safety training and also Self Contained
Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) which is an important safety equipment was not
available. The Committee wonders whether these issues were pointed out by
OISD when it conducted the safety audits at this installation. The Committee
observe that this clearly indicates gaps in the safety preparedness to handle the
accidents in oil and gas sector. The Committee are constrained to note that
M.B.Lal Committee recommendations for hands on training in fire fighting has not
been implemented even one year after the expiry of the time line set for the
purpose.
The Committee are of the opinion that training related to safety should be
an integral part of work in the oil industry. The Committee, therefore recommend
that safety training to all employees should be made mandatory and at the same
time ensuring the availability of personnel with protective equipments and life
saving appliances at all oil and gas installations. The Committee also desire the
Ministry to ensure comprehensive safety audits in oil installations by
incorporating the aspects not already covered. The Committee recommend that
all oil and gas installations should run mandatory disaster response simulations
to ensure that adequate response mechanisms are in place for any eventuality.
65
Recommendation No.8
The Committee note that there has been increase in the number of
incidents in oil and gas installations during the last few years. During 2010-11
there were a total of 84 incidents consisting of 70 accidents and 14 relating to fire
leading to a loss of Rs.34.15 crore. The Committee find that such high number of
incidents in a year unacceptable and feel that the oil companies should have
zero tolerance for accidents. The Committee desire that all incidents including
minor ones and near miss should be thoroughly investigated and accountability
should be fixed. The Committee suggest that oil and gas companies should
designate the senior most official of the unit as the nodal officer for safety related
matters to ensure closer supervision and effective monitoring of safety
standards.
66
Recommendation No 9
Recommendation No 10
The Committee note that the Safety Council includes Members comprising
of all Joint Secretaries and Advisors of the Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas,
Chief Executive Officers of all of PSUs of the oil industry, Chief controller of
Explosives, Advisor, Fire to the Govt of India and the DG of Factory Advice,
Service and Labour Institutes.The Committee also note that the Secretary,
MOPNG is Chairman of Safety Council.
Recommendation No 11
The Committee were informed that the OISD Standards 116 and 117 relating
to fire protection facilities in downstream companies were revised after inputs
from MB Lal Committee and Chairmen Committee. The Committee note that the
OISD and the Ministry received a number of representations from private
companies raising some issues pertaining to revised standards. The Committee
further note that after receipt of the representations the issues were referred first
to Steering Committee, then to Chairman Committee and thereafter to Technical
expert committee and finally certain clauses like Equivalency clause,
retroactivity clause and common firefighting clause in OISD STD-116 and 117
have been accepted for inclusion.
The Committee would like to point out that in the written replies of the
Ministry and also during oral submissions before the Committee, the Secretary
had maintained that there is no move to review or dilute the OISD standards
116/117 and the same are being implemented by the industry. The Committee feel
that this is an ambivalent stand of the Ministry since the inclusion of Equivalency
clause, retroactivity clause and common firefighting clauses in OISD STDs clearly
indicates dilution of the OISD standards apart from derailing the implementation
schedule. The Committee, therefore, strongly deprecate the Ministry and OMCs
for misleading them on this important issue and would expect more diligent and
responsible approach of officials while making submissions before the
Committee. The Committee recommend that there should be no dilution in OISD
safety standards 116 & 117 till the implementation of M.B.Lal Committee Report.
69
Recommendation No 12
The Committee note that OISD Standard 117 have provided for installation of
High Volume Long Range Monitors (HVLRs) in the oil installations. The Committee
note that the Joint Industry tender for procurement was floated on 6th December,
2010 and the technical bids opened on 18th Jan, 2011 for evaluation. However, the
price bids which were to be opened in May, 2011 could be opened only in January,
2012. This delay has been attributed to obtaining stage wise clearance from
individual OMCs and handling of complaints from some quarters. The Committee are
not convinced by reasons given by the oil companies. They are unable to
understand the requirement of stage wise clearance from individual OMCs when the
Joint Industry tender has been floated. Though some of the delays were procedural
due to handling of complaints, the Committee could not but come to a conclusion
that the OMCs are not serious in early procurement of these items.
The Committee are further constrained to note that after more than 16 months
only a bare minimum quantity for emergency procurement has been put up for
approval. The Committee deplore the kind of insensitivity shown by the oil
companies in procurement of such a key safety equipment. The Committee would
like to know the reasons for making only an emergency procurement.
The Committee note that after the technical bids were opened there was an
unsolicited offer from Akron Bros whose tender was earlier rejected on technical
grounds and the price quoted by Akron Bros was used as negotiating point with
other vendors. The OMCs claim that it is in accordance with CVC guidelines and
purchase procedures. The Committee desire that the issue needs to be verified and
reported upon by the Ministry and recommend the matter be referred to CVC to see if
there is any violation of guidelines in taking Akron Bros offer as negotiating point
with other vendors.
70
Recommendation No 13
The Committee note that the Rim Seal Fire Detection System is an the
important safety equipment that needs to be installed in the tanks carrying hydro
carbons. The Committee note that the about 618 nos. of this system are required
involving an expenditure of Rs. 1125 crore for all the three oil marketing
companies. The Committee note it was decided on 8th October, 2010 that this
item was to be procured on Joint Industry basis. The Industry Working Group
finalized tender document on 11th September, 2011.
The Committee further note that as the volume of work was enormous and
installation specific, the OMCs decided to go for individual tender basis on 8th
December, 2011. The Committee express unhappiness at the time taken by the 3
OMCs for finalizing the tender document which almost took one year and then to
go for company-wise tender.
The Committee are further anguished that after all the exercise Ministry has
now informed that there is a proposal to cancel the tender since only one offer
was received and the bid was also not meeting the tender criteria. Industry
working group has now decided to revisit the Rim Seal specification. The
Committee are dismayed that an important recommendation of the MB Lal
Committee has not progressed even after two years and the process has to start
afresh. The Committee would urge the Ministry to relook at the decision of the
OMCs as there appears to be a deliberate attempt on the part of OMCs to delay in
implementing this safety recommendation.
71
Recommendation No 14
The Committee desire the Ministry and OMCs to submit the explanation of
the officials concerned on the inordinate delays in the matter and also take
required measures to prepone the timelines for early implementation of safety
standards.
72
Recommendation No 15
The Committee are dismayed at the considerable time lost in tendering and
retendering due to which procurement of important safety equipment has got
delayed. Though 400% price quoted by vendor is very much on higher side, the
decision to go for retendering was not a prudent one since the offers received
have been found not meeting the tender criteria. The Committee hope that
relaxed PQ criteria for the refloated tenders does not amount to dilution of safety
standards.
Recommendation No 16
The Committee note that the MB Lal Committee had made several
recommendations and OISD also had revised its standards because of which the
oil companies need to procure important safety equipments. The Ministry had
consulted the OMCs regarding implementation of these recommendations and
had agreed for 24 month timeline.
Now the Committee have been informed by the ministry that the OMC,s
have been facing the following important issues relating to procurement.
The Committee understand that the Oil Marketing Companies are bound by
their own procurement procedures and also CVC guidelines. The Committee are
of the view that the delay that has happened is inexplicable and would expect the
Ministry and OMCs should have shown more alertness and urgency in
procurement rather than hiding behind procedures. The Committee, therefore
recommend that the Ministry should order an enquiry into the entire process of
procurement and delay in procurement and also whether the procedure followed
were in conformity with the extant rules in place. The Committee may be apprised
of the outcome of the above enquiry within a period of one month.
10.2 Hydrocarbon (HC) 6 moths As per Sl. As per Sl. As per Sl. As per Sl. As per Sl. As per Sl. No-5
(xxix) detectors shall be No-5 of No-5 of No-5 of No-5 of No-5 of of Annexure-II
installed near all By Annexure-II Annexure-II Annexure-II Annexure-II Annexure-II
potential leak sources October2010
of class A and B
petroleum products
e.g. tank dykes, tank
manifolds, pump house
manifolds, etc. Further,
HC detectors of proper
type should be
selected and should be
proof tested and
maintained in good
condition
10.2 Protection for Dyke Progressively by As per Sl. As per Sl. As per Sl. As per Sl. As per Sl. As per Sl. No.
(xxx) Area/ Spill Fire (MEFG April 2012 No. 4 of No. 4 of No. 4 of No. 4 of No. 4 of 4 of Annexure-
provision) for Annexure-II Annexure-II Annexure-II Annexure-II Annexure-II II
Marketing/CTF/Pipeline
installations
10.3(a) Avoid hammer blind as 24 months Tendering Joint Tender Joint Tender Joint Tender No Hammer Under
an equipment in the Floated on Floated on Floated on blind valve in progress
plant design. Only a 09.12.2011 09.12.2011 09.12.2011 operation
closed system design Pre bid Pre bid Pre bid
should be adopted. It is Progressively by meeting held meeting held meeting held Therefore
understood that other May 2012 on on on Not
OMCs/MNCs are 21.12.2011 21.12.2011 21.12.2011 applicable
already using such
designs in their Tender Tender Tender
installations. Using a received on received on received on
75
10.3(b) The first body valve on 24 months TENDERING Joint Tender Joint Tender Joint Tender Completion Under
the tank should be Floated on Floated on Floated on by Nov2013 Progress:
Remote Operated Shut by May2012 18.01.2012 18.01.2012 18.01.2012
Off Valve (ROSOV) on Pre bid Pre bid Pre bid
the tank nozzle inside meeting held meeting held meeting held
the dyke with Remote on on on
Operation only from 03.02.2012 03.02.2012 03.02.2012
outside the dyke as
well as from the control Tender Tender Tender
room. ROSOV should opening on opening on opening on
be fail safe and fire 02.03.2012 02.03.2012 02.03.2012
safe. It should have
only close feature and
not open and stop
from control room.
However, it should
have close, open &
stop operation from
the panel located
outside the dyke.
10.6(c) Remote operated long 24 months TENDERING As per Sl.
range foam monitors by No.3 of
(1000 GPM and above) November2012 Annexure-II
to fight tank fires shall enclosed
be provided which
should be of variable
flow.
10.2 An emergency kit shall Progressively by As per Sl. As per Sl.
(xxxi) be provided consisting October 2012 No. 8 of No. 8 of
of safety items viz. fire Annexure-II Annexure-II
suites, various leak enclosed enclosed
plugging gadgets, oil
dispersants and oil
adsorbents, lifting jacks
(for rescue of trapped
workers), high intensity
intrinsically safe search
lights for hazardous
area, etc. and shall be
readily available at the
terminals.
10.3(q) A CCTV should be 12 moths Completed :
installed covering tank By May2011 121 locations
farm areas and other In progress :
critical areas. The 13 locations
CCTV can nowadays Target :
provided with an alarm 31.3.2012
to provide warning in
case of deviation from
any normal situation.
The CCTV monitoring
station should be
provided both in the
control room as well as
in the Security
cabin/office.
10.3(n) Wherever PLT 12 moths TENDERING Under
transfers take place, to By May2011 finalization
avoid pilferages, a
Mass Flow Meter with
Integrator shall be
provided on delivery
pipelines.
76
10.3(o) Tank Dyke Valves 9 moths Completed : Completed : In progress : In progress Under
should be provided 109 locations 36 locations 58 locations Target Implementation
with position indicator By Feb2011 In progress : In progress : Target : 30.11.2012
(open or close) in 29 locations 45 locations progressively
control room and Target : Target : by 31.3.2012
necessary hardware progressively progressively
and instrumentation by 28.2.2012 by 31.3.2012
should be provided for
this.
77
Annexure-II
ANNEXURE-III
MINUTES
THIRTEENTH SITTING
(26.7.2011)
The Committee sat on Tuesday, the 26th July, 2011 from 1400 hrs. to 1530 hrs. in
Committee Room B, Parliament House Annexe, New Delhi.
PRESENT
Shri Aruna Kumar Vundavalli - Chairman
MEMBERS
Lok Sabha
3. Thereafter, the representatives of the Ministry briefed the Committee on the status of
implementation of recommendations of M.B. Lal Committee constituted in the wake of security
concerns aggravated post Jaipur fire incident. The Committee then discussed various issues
related to the subject including delay in implementation of some of the recommendations of
M.B. Lal Committee which were required to be implemented immediately, delay in procurement
of items as recommended by the above Committee and functioning of the monitoring Committee
constituted for the purpose, safety measures taken by the Government at oil installations,
action taken against the officers who were charge-sheeted in the Jaipur fire accident and
compensation given to affected parties and fixing the responsibilities at high level in such cases.
4. The clarifications sought by the Members on various points related to the subject were
provided by the representatives of the Ministry. On some of the points to which the Ministrys
officials could not readily respond, the Chairman asked them to furnish written information within
a specific time period.
ANNEXURE-IV
MINUTES
SECOND SITTING
(31.10.2011)
The Committee sat on Monday, October 31, 2011 from 1500 hrs. to 1730 hrs. in
Committee Room 'C', Ground Floor, Parliament House Annexe, New Delhi.
PRESENT
MEMBERS
Lok Sabha
2. Shri Sudarshan Bhagat
3. Shri Dilipkumar Mansukhlal Gandhi
4. Dr. Thokchom Meina
5. Shri Mahabal Mishra
6. Shri M.B. Rajesh
7. Shri Brijbhushan Sharan Singh
8. Shri Dhananjay Singh
9. Shri Uday Pratap Singh
10. Shri C. Sivasami
11. Shri Thol Thirumaavalavan
Rajya Sabha
SECRETARIAT
1. Shri A.K. Singh - Joint Secretary
2. Smt. Anita Jain - Director
3. Shri Sanjeev Kumar Mishra - Deputy Secretary
87
2. At the outset, Hon'ble Chaiman paid tribute to Late Shrimati Indira Gandhi on her death
anniversary and late Shri Silvius Condpan, a member of this Commitee from Rajya Sabha, who
passed away on 10th October,2011. The Committee passed a Condolence Resolution in his
honour. Thereafter, Honble Chairman welcomed the Members, representatives of the Ministry
of Petroleum and Natural Gas and public Undertakings to the sitting.
88
3. The representatives of the Ministry briefed the Committee on the subject 'Safety of Oil
Installations' and also apprised them of the stage of implementation of recommendations of the
M.B. Lal Committee on Jaipur fire incident. The Committee discussed various issues pertaining
to the above subject and expressed unhappiness over the tardy progress made in implementing
the recommendations of M.B.Lal Committee. Other issues which came up for discussion
included putting on hold tendering process resulting in delay of procurement of safety items as
recommended by the said Committee, CVC guidelines and enquiry into single tender process
by IOC, review of OISD standards 116 and 117 particularly relating to equivalency, retroactivity
and common fire fighting facilities in a meeting despite the same notified by the OISD for
adoption and incorporation by the industry.
4. The Members registered their strong protest over circulation of unsigned note of Shri
M.B. Lal submitted to the Secretary, MOPNG, in his individual capacity despite the fact that the
recommendations of the M B Lal Committee have been accepted by the Government for
implementation. The note was in regard to expenditure on implementing Jaipur fire Committee
recommendations and the scope for optimizing costs and time.
5. The clarifications sought by the members on various points related to the subject were
provided by the representatives of the Ministry. On some of the points to which the Ministry's
officials could not readily respond, the Chairman asked them to furnish written information within
a specific time period.
ANNEXURE-V
MINUTES
SEVENTH SITTING
(29.3.2012)
The Committee sat on Thursday, March 29, 2012 from 1500 hrs. to 1730 hrs. in
Committee Room 'B', Parliament House Annexe, New Delhi.
PRESENT
Shri Aruna Kumar Vundavalli - Chairman
Lok Sabha
12 Shri C.L.Ruala
Rajya Sabha
Secretariat
1. Shri A.K.Singh - Joint Secretary
4. Other issues which came up for discussion included putting on hold tendering process
resulting in delay of procurement of safety items as recommended by the said Committee, CVC
guidelines and enquiry into single tender process by IOC, review of OISD standards.
5. The clarifications sought by the Members on various points related to the subject were
provided by the representatives of the Ministry. On some of the points to which the Ministry's
officials could not readily respond, the Chairman asked them to furnish written information within
a specific time period.
ANNEXURE-VI
MINUTES
NINTH SITTING
(16.4.2012)
The Committee sat on Monday, April 16, 2012 from 1100 hrs. to 1330 hrs. in Room
No. 62, Parliament House, New Delhi.
PRESENT
Shri Aruna Kumar Vundavalli - Chairman
Lok Sabha
14 Shri C. Sivasami
93
Rajya Sabha
ecretariat
1. Shri A.K.Singh - Joint Secretary
4. The clarifications sought by the Members on various points related to the subject were
provided by the representatives of the Ministry. On some of the points to which the Ministry's
officials could not readily respond, the Chairman asked them to furnish written information within
a specific time period.
ANNEXURE-VII
MINUTES
STANDING COMMITTEE ON PETROLEUM & NATURAL GAS
(2011-12)
ELEVENTH SITTING
(21.05.2012)
The Committee sat on Monday the 21st May, 2012 from 1015 hrs. to 1100 hrs. in
Room No 113, First Floor, Parliament House Annexe, New Delhi.
PRESENT
Shri Aruna Kumar Vundavalli - Chairman
MEMBERS
2 Shri Ramesh Bais
Rajya Sabha
Secretariat
1. Shri A.K.Singh - Joint Secretary
2. At the outset, Honble Chairman welcomed the Members to the sitting of the Committee.
3. Thereafter, the Committee took up for consideration the draft Report on the subject
Safety of Oil Installations and adopted the same with minor modifications.
4. The Committee authorised the Chairman to finalise the Report in the light of
consequential changes arising out of the suggestions made by the Committee Members in
Report and to present/lay the same in the both Houses of Parliament.