CBEA v.

BSP
G.R. No. 148208 | 15 December 2004

Special Civil Action in the SC. Prohibition

J. Puno
FACTS: 3 Jul. 1993: RA 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect and abolished the old
Central Bank of the Phils., creating a new BSP.

8 Jun. 2001: Almost 8 years after effectivity of RA 7653, petitioner Central Bank
Employees Association, Inc. (CBEA) filed a petition for prohibition against the
respondents BSP & Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain the
latter from further implementing the last proviso in Sec. 15-c, Art. II of said rule.
o Petitioner alleged that the aforementioned proviso makes an unconstitutional
cut between 2 classes of employees in the BSP, i.e., a classic case of class
legislation based solely on the SG & not on substantial distinctions.
(1) officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization
Law (SSL); and
(2) rank-and-file (SG 19), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL.

BSP contended that said provision does not violate the equal protection clause,
provided it be construed with other provisions of the said law. The SolGen also argued
that the classification adheres to the policy of the said law to establish professionalism
and excellence within the BSP.

ISSUE: Whether Sec. 15-c, Art. II of RA 7653 is a violation of the equal protection clause, and is thus
unconstitutional.
HELD: Yes.

RATIO: Under present standards of Equal Protection, it is valid.

o It is settled in constitutional law that the equal protection clause does not
prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects
upon which different rules shall operateso long as the classification is not
unreasonable.
o In the present case, the exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) was
intended to address the lack of competitiveness of employees, and was not
intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file.

But the Court held that the enactment of subsequent laws which exempted all other
rank-and-file employees of Govt. Financial Institutions (GFI), rendered the continued
application of the provision a violation of the equal protection clause, i.e., such
circumstances considerably altered the reasonability of the continued operation of the
proviso in question.
o Concept of Relative Constitutionality A statute valid at one time may
become void at another time because of altered circumstances.

The principle of equality has long been recognized under International Law (Art. 1 of
UDHR). Non-discrimination, together with equality before the law and equal protection
of the law without any discrimination, constitutes basic principles in the protection of
human rights.

In the present case, the conclusion of unconstitutionality of the proviso in question are
in cadence and in consonance with the progressive trend of other jurisdictions and in
international law. There should be no hesitation in using the equal protection clause as
a major cutting edge to eliminate every conceivable irrational discrimination in our
society. Indeed, the social justice imperatives in the Constitution, coupled with the
special status and protection afforded to labor, compel this approach.

Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the
interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with less privilege
in life should have more in law. And the obligation to afford protection to labor is
incumbent not only on the legislative and executive branches but also on the judiciary
to translate this pledge into a living reality. Social justice calls for the humanization of
laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in
its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated