Theory & Psychology

http://tap.sagepub.com/

Vygotsky through Wittgenstein : A New Perspective on Vygotsky's

Developmental Continuum
Domenic F. Berducci
Theory Psychology 2004 14: 329
DOI: 10.1177/0959354304043639

The online version of this article can be found at:

http://tap.sagepub.com/content/14/3/329

Published by:

http://www.sagepublications.com

Additional services and information for Theory & Psychology can be found at:

Email Alerts: http://tap.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts

Subscriptions: http://tap.sagepub.com/subscriptions

Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav

Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav

Citations: http://tap.sagepub.com/content/14/3/329.refs.html

>> Version of Record - Jun 1, 2004

What is This?

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on June 19, 2012

Vygotsky Through Wittgenstein
A New Perspective on Vygotskys Developmental
Continuum

Domenic F. Berducci
Toyama Prefectural University

Abstract. In this paper, I focus on aspects of Vygotsky and Wittgenstein

that relate to training and learning. Following the order of Vygotskys
developmental continuum, I demonstrate that the ideas of the two thinkers
virtually agree when their work deals with early forms of training that
precede operating on that continuum. However, when that initial training
develops into mature social interaction, the rules pertaining to Vygotskys
developmental continuum apply to the interaction at hand. I argue and
demonstrate that from that time on Vygotskys views and Wittgensteins
views become irreconcilable.
Key Words: conceptual confusions, developmental continuum, learning,
training, Vygotsky, Wittgenstein

I divide this paper into five sections (excluding the Discussion). In the first,
Background section, to orient the reader, I delineate relevant background
information about both Vygotsky and Wittgenstein. Next, in the Philoso-
phy section, I demonstrate how Vygotskys theory is modeled after portions
of Spinozas philosophy, and then relate that discussion to Wittgenstein.
Following, in the Earliest Training section, I outline Vygotskys and
Wittgensteins ideas on the earliest form of training, and show that they
strongly agree in that both declare this type of training to be necessarily
behavioristic. In the next section, Rules, I introduce Wittgensteins concept
of rules and relate it to its relationship with Vygotskian thought. In the
Conversing section, I demonstrate that Vygotskian and Wittgensteinian
ways of thinking diverge. Here, Vygotskian theory appears to constitute a
slight improvement over Cartesianism. However, I conclude that Wittgen-
steinian thought proves both Descartes and Vygotsky to be conceptually
confused.
To accomplish my goal of reexamining Vygotskys ideas concerning
training and his developmental continuum via Wittgenstein, I decided to
adhere, as much as possible, to original sources, especially Vygotsky (1987).

Theory & Psychology Copyright 2004 Sage Publications. Vol. 14(3): 329353
DOI: 10.1177/0959354304043639 www.sagepublications.com

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on June 19, 2012

330 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 14(3)

In particular, I focused on his explication and use of the developmental

continuum, and any work of Wittgensteins, or comments on Wittgenstein
and Vygotsky, that are directly related to my goal. Thus, my current
undertaking constrained me to infrequently, if at all, refer to some seminal
and seemingly related works (e.g. Lawrence & Valsiner, 2003; Van der Veer
& Valsiner, 1991, 1994).

Background

Vygotsky
During Vygotskys time, two schools of psychology dominated
mechanistic and idealist psychologiesand, according to him, the method-
ology of each contained fundamental errors. Vygotsky applied a corrective,
not by combining these two schools, but rather by neutralizing them via
creating a Marxist-compatible psychology under the direct influence of
Marxist writings, Spinozan philosophy and various literary figures.
More specifically, late 19th-century Russian academics divided the study
of humankind into two sections following traditional Cartesian divisions:
one side was devoted to the natural scientific study of the body, the other to
the philosophical/psychological study of the mind/soul (Cole & Maltzman,
1969, p. 4).
Contemporaneously, the works of three scholars, Darwin, Fechner, and
Sechenev, influenced the reconciliation of the above split. Though not
psychologists, their findings hinted at a Spinozan (monistic) outlook and
thus provided a model for Russian and, later, Soviet psychology by uniting
two heretofore separate worlds in each of their respective fields. Darwins
evolutionary theory demonstrated a plausible continuity between humans
and animals; Fechners study discovered a relationship between physical
events and psychic responses; and Sechenevs psychophysiological work
linked the natural scientific study of humans with the philosophical study of
animals (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 2).
In the early 1920s, after the Revolution, Soviets, though influenced by the
work of those scholars mentioned above, continued to be torn between
existent ideological traditions in psychology; between that ideology which
totally ignored consciousness (mechanistic psychology), and that which
totally ignored behavior (idealist psychology) (Vygotsky, 1978, pp. 45).
This indecision was marked by the larger debate between the mechanists
and the idealist dialecticians; the latter dominated Soviet philosophy for
several years in the form of Deborins school of Hegelian Marxism (Daniels,
1996, p. 205). The Soviets leaned toward the mechanists, yet continued to
debate what conception of materialism would be best suited for Marxism.
Those advocating the mechanistic ideology did not want to completely deny

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on June 19, 2012

BERDUCCI: VYGOTSKY THROUGH WITTGENSTEIN 331

idealist Hegelian dialectics; they did not do so, but required any academic
study to constrain itself to what was observable by the methods of natural
science. They needed somehow to include thought and consciousness in the
observable. Spinoza appeared to be the answer.
In relation to Spinozan thought, both the mechanists and Hegelian
dialecticians held different opinions. The former dismissed Spinoza as a
metaphysician, while the dialecticians held him to be both a materialist and
a dialectician. They settled the dispute politically. At a meeting of the
Second All-Union Conference of Marxist-Leninist Scientific Institutions,
attendees condemned mechanistic ideas as undermining dialectical materi-
alism (Proyect, 2002). This victory for the dialecticians was short-lived,
however, and again a political solution was needed and found in Stalin. He
concluded that dialecticians advanced the idealism of Hegel too far. The
newly ordained view constituted a compromise between the mechanists and
the dialecticians, and was ultimately decided by Stalins codifying dialec-
tical materialism.
Vygotsky, active at this time, was able to take advantage of this
uncertainty by aiming to synthesize contending views of psychology. He
achieved this through applying the unifying force of Spinozas monistic
philosophy. Vygotsky ultimately created a comprehensive approach that
both describes and explains the relation of thought to action, and the
development of higher psychological functions from lower. Following the
tenets of Spinozan materialist philosophy, his psychology stressed the social
origins of thinking.
Vygotskys psychology emerged as scientific, in line with Soviet im-
peratives, that is, it was objective, yet included the study of consciousness.
Spinozas attempt centuries earlier to bring human beings within the
framework of the natural sciences (Spinoza, 1677/2000, p. 50) was coming
to be realized via Vygotskys work. Spinozan monism, in tandem with the
official Soviet policy of dialectical materialism, allowed Vygotsky to study
all, physical as well as mental, phenomena as processes in change and
motion, processes on which his work is predicated (Valsiner, 1988,
p. 328).
Spinoza was a materialist; his ideas agreed with materialism and ulti-
mately assisted it to evolve into its highest form (Saifulin & Dixon, 1984).
For the Soviets, the objective, scientific study of thought was possible
because of Spinozan ideas. He posited thought to be an attribute of, not
separate from, nature. Spinoza argued that thought was a product of matter
rather than vice versa. This idea placed him above any representation of
mechanistic materialism for Engels (1968), who applied this Spinozan
argument in his Dialectics of Nature. There, Engels argued that it is in the
nature of matter (lower) to evolve into thinking (higher) beings. Addition-
ally, it is this relation of thought to matter that distinguishes dialectical

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on June 19, 2012

332 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 14(3)

materialism from crude mechanical materialism. Marxs teleological view

evidences that he also understood Spinoza in this way.
A profoundly scientific outlook constitutes the base of dialectical materi-
alism. Hegels idealist influence was of course basic, but, according to the
Soviets, without a materialist approach to society, it would have been
impossible to explain the laws of human cognition (Saifulin & Dixon,
1984).
For the Soviets, dialectical materialism comprised a philosophical synthe-
sis of the phenomena of human society, cognition, nature and the revolu-
tionary transformation of the world.
The core concept of Vygotskys work is transformation. Transformation
may be pictured as a continuous revolutionary and evolutionary line of
human development stretching to infinity. Vygotskys complete devel-
opmental continuum comprises four stages: phylogenetic (transformation
from ape to human), sociohistorical (primitive to modern), ontogenetic
(child to adult) and microgenetic (less to more capable individual). Between
each pair of stages, a qualitative jump is evident. I must note here that in the
following analysis of development and transformation, I will concentrate on
the final stage, microgenetic, though the analysis applies to the entire
continuum.
Vygotskys microgenetic continuum is comprised of six components:
Written Speech (WS), External Speech (ES), Private Speech (PS), Inner
Speech (IS), Thought (Th.), and Motivation (Mo.).
Since most readers are somewhat familiar with these components, I will
here only explicate their basic meanings as revealed in the latest translation
of Vygotskys original work Thought and Word (1987). Written Speech
consists of virtually any form of written communication: essays, letters,
dissertations, and so on. This form of speech (though written, Vygotsky
considers it speech) is monologic and constitutes the most mature and least
abbreviated and predicated component of Vygotskys developmental con-
tinuum. Through Written Speech, writers must make meaning explicit,
since, when writing, no interlocutors are co-present to negotiate, confirm or
clarify meaning. Next in line follows External Speech, the form Vygotsky
dubs as the source of all of the continuums components. ES consists of all
forms of social interaction: lectures, conversations, arguments, and so on. It
constitutes a more abbreviated and predicated speech form than WS since in
the former an interlocutor is necessarily co-present to negotiate, and so on.
The form subsequent to ES on the continuum, Private Speech, renamed from
Egocentric Speech to prevent confusion with Piagets concept, holds many
meanings (Diaz & Berk, 1992), but for our purposes it is speech to self, used
to control the self, while attempting to perform a task alone. PS originates in
ES as the voice of a teacher, caretaker, parent, and so on, during some type
of training. This speech form is more abbreviated than either WS or ES; a
speaker using PS usually drops the subject of an utterance, since, according

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on June 19, 2012

BERDUCCI: VYGOTSKY THROUGH WITTGENSTEIN 333

to Vygotsky, a speaker knows it is the self who is speaking. In place of

uttering to self, for instance, I should turn right while making a decision,
the abbreviated turn right would suffice. Though the form of these two
utterances differs, meaning remains equivalent. PS comprises both an
internal and external form. Inner Speech follows. It is comprised of spoken
thought and is more abbreviated and predicated than any of the preceding
forms. Abbreviation and predication both increase as we move down the
continuum towards the final components, Thought and Motivation. Thought
is said to be more abbreviated than IS, while to Motivation, the final
component, Vygotsky assigns the most abbreviated of all the speech forms
on the continuum.
In addition to conceiving the developmental continuum as being com-
posed of six components as listed here, we may also view it as being divided
into two larger groups of forms, inner and outer components. The outer
components consist of the Written and External Speech forms, and the
audible portions of Private Speech, while the remaining components form
the inner: Inner Speech, Thought and Motivation.
Figure 1 depicts a complete version of the microgenetic developmental
continuum, with components listed in proper relation. It is essential to keep
in mind while reading the subsequent discussion that meaning is conserved
along this continuum, while its vehicle, speech, appearing in any of the
forms of the continuum, is transformed.

Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein has been classified an anti-philosopher since he was, at
minimum, opposed to theory building (Grayling, 1988/1996; Hacker,
1993/1998), the defining activity of most philosophers. He opposes univer-
salistic philosophical and psychological explanations and concepts on logi-
cal, not empirical, grounds. It is in this sense that we would find his
wide-ranging opposition to the impetus behind large portions of Vygotskian
theory.
Wittgenstein was not a psychologist, and neither would, nor could,
contribute directly to Vygotskian psychology by either empirically support-
ing or disputing Vygotskys claims. Wittgenstein performed no empirical
research to test or refute his own or others claims; rather, simply stated, his
later work consisted of a logical or grammatical method used to examine
language use to reveal conceptual errors. Though Wittgensteins method
does not and cannot offer empirical solutions to any particular field, it
dissolves conceptual confusions; it can therefore offer clarity to any field.

WS ES PS IS Th. Mo.

Figure 1. Developmental continuum

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on June 19, 2012

334 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 14(3)

As a final point in this very brief exposition of Wittgensteins relevant

background, I would like to offer the following quote to readers. I find it to
be one of the most powerful and comprehensive explications of Wittgen-
steins later work; it fends off superficial criticism, and offers a compre-
hensive feel and justification for his method:
[Wittgensteins grammatical/conceptual method] seems to trivialize our
inquiry; we want to investigate the essence of thinking and Wittgenstein
tells us to examine the use of words. Surely words are arbitrary; and that
this word is used thus, that one thus is arbitrary too. Yet the nature of
thinking is anything but arbitrary! The [above] objection rests on in-
comprehension. It is grammar that determines the essence of something (cf.
Exg. para. 371f.). The rules for the use of the word think constitute what
is to be called thinking, and that is the essence or nature of thinking. Of
course, words are arbitrary; what is called thinking could have been
called something else. The use of the sign thinking could have been
different; but if it had been different, it would not have the meaning it has,
and so it would not have signified thinking. Investigating the grammar of
the word thinking and seeking to lay bare the essential nature of thought
are one and the same endeavor (cf. PI para 370). (Hacker, 1993/1998,
p. 147)

Philosophy

In this next section, I would like to expose Vygotskys philosophical

orientation, creating a foundation from which to appreciate the remaining
sections of this paper. Being aware of Vygotskys philosophical background
aids in understanding his notions of inner and outer. In addition, this
awareness helps one realize that portions of both his psychology and
Wittgensteins work are opposed in a way that is different, subtler than, and
yet related to, the way that Wittgensteins work opposes Cartesian thought.
At the outset, it is necessary to point out that Vygotsky was a monist,
which means that we must exercise special caution when discussing his
particular version of inner and outer. Because of his adherence to monist
tenets, these notions do not form two distinct entities, as in the received
wisdom of Descartes. Therefore, Wittgensteinian critiques of Cartesian-
psychologistic studies, though readily available, cannot directly apply.
In the following section I will detail portions of Spinozan philosophy
directly relevant to Vygotskian theory. Through that detailing, I will reveal
how Vygotsky used Spinozan monism to advance a distinctive picture of his
psychology.
Through Spinoza, Vygotsky sought an alternative to Cartesian dualism,
which . . . established for centuries to come the conflict between materialistic
scientific psychology and idealistic, philosophical psychology (Kozulin,

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on June 19, 2012

BERDUCCI: VYGOTSKY THROUGH WITTGENSTEIN 335

1986, p. xiv). From this impetus, Vygotsky originated his desire to dissolve
both behavioristic and idealistic psychologies.
Three fundamental concepts support Spinozas philosophy: Substance,
Attributes and Modes.
Scholars classify Spinoza as a substantial monist, meaning that every
existent thing forms part of one indivisible Substance, and that Substance is
God. Ironically, Spinoza originated this definition of Substance via Descartes
definition as that which requires nothing but itself in order to exist (Kenny,
1998, p. 221). Descartes not only counted God, but, as is familiar to most of
us, also mind and matter as distinct substances.1 This distinction creates
well-known, seemingly intractable questions, such as How can mind and
matter interact?, How does the mind cause the body to act?, and so on.
These questions, rather than difficult, are conceptually confused, according
to Wittgenstein.
Spinoza applied portions of the ontological argument to argue the proof of
existence of his one Substance. At the outset, he claims that it is necessary
for the one Substance to bring itself into existence because if any other entity
were necessary, then that one Substance could not fit the definition of
substance (Kenny, 1998, p. 221). Spinozan Substance equals a unified whole
containing within itself an explanation of itself. Though unified, Substance
consists of an infinite number of Attributes, though we can only comprehend
two of them, thought and extension. Thought constitutes the inner or mental
Substance, ideas and such, while extension constitutes the outer or material
Substance, objects, and so on.2
The next concept in Spinozas triumvirate is Attributes. Spinoza
(1677/2000) defined an Attribute as that which intellect perceives of
Substance, as constituting its essence (p. 17). By this definition, he means
that the relation between Substance and Attributes does not equal the
relation between separate entities. This is true first because Substance and
Attributes belong to logically different categories, and next because Attrib-
utes certainly do not equal entities. Simply stated, Spinoza means that the
one Substance can only be understood through its Attributes (p. 18).
Spinoza claimed that the two Attributes, mind and body, are inseparable
because, according to him, all ideas of a body and other extended things
constitute a mind, and, complementarily, a mind exists only insofar as a
body exists (Kenny, 1998). Mind and body in Spinozas system thus
mutually constitute each other.
The final concept in Spinozas tripartite system, Modes, exists as different
types of things within the one Substance. Spinoza (1677/2000) defines a
Mode as that which is in something else, through which it is conceived (p.
19). Each and every existent thing constitutes a Mode of the one Substance:
paintbrushes, bicycles, soymilk, and so on. Further, the variety and number
of these Modes extend to infinity.

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on June 19, 2012

336 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 14(3)

Additionally, in Spinozas monism, the tenet that mind is produced by the

development and subsequent transformation of matter is, as we will see,
consistent with the putative operation of Vygotskys developmental con-
tinuum. Further, directly related to an essential influence of Vygotskian
psychology, monism is viewed as being typical of dialectical materialism
(Saifulin & Dixon, 1984). In relation to this claim I must reiterate that
Spinoza and, of course, Marx were materialists. Therefore we may conclude
that the thinking of Marx, Spinoza and their student Vygotsky forms a
consistent and comprehensive theoretical package.
A demonstration follows that reveals an analogical relation that obtains
between Spinozas three concepts, Substance, Attributes and Modes, and
Vygotskys: developmental continuum, inner and outer distinctions, and the
components of his developmental continuum, respectively.
First, as stated, Vygotskys developmental continuum is analogous to
Spinozas Substance in that his continuum, as Spinozas Substance, is an all-
inclusive entity. The developmental continuum explains the origin of itself
through transformation of each one of its components into an adjacent
component, for example ES transforms into PS, and so on. This conception
can be expressed differently. Every component of Vygotskys developmen-
tal continuum generates, and is generated from, another component in that
same continuum. Just as Spinozas one Substance can transform itself into
existence, so does Vygotskys developmental continuum. Each component
of Vygotskys continuum originates in External Speech, and each of the
subsequently created components feeds back onto, transforms from and
develops into the remaining components.
Next, Spinozan Attributes, thought and extension, are directly analogous
to Vygotskys inner and outer. The conceptions inner and outer equal the
ways we conceive Vygotskys Substance, the developmental continuum, just
as thought and extension are ways we perceive Spinozas Substance.
Vygotskys Attributes, inner and outer, do just that, attribute meaning to the
developmental continuum, and aid in uniting that same continuum.
That Vygotskys continuum can be considered equivalent to Spinozas
Substance can also be inferred from terminology used in the application of
Vygotskian theory. Please examine, for example, the oft-used expressions
intermental and intramental. The grammar of these expressions indicates that
only mental components comprise the continuum. However, though true,
this indication does not follow for all of Vygotskys ideas concerning the
developmental continuum all of the time. Please recall that both inner and
outer attributes constitute the continuum in the following sense: Every
component exists as inner in that an individuals actions originate in, and are
transformed from, the inner. For example, social actions are transformed
from Motivation, Thoughts, Inner Speech, and so on. On the other hand,
every component simultaneously exists as outer, in that those Motivations,
Thoughts, and so on, were originally transformed from outer experience, that

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on June 19, 2012

BERDUCCI: VYGOTSKY THROUGH WITTGENSTEIN 337

is, transformed from ES. In the Vygotskian system, outer was previously
inner, and vice versa. Technically, in either Vygotskys or Spinozas system,
if everything is claimed to be mental, or if everything is claimed to be
material, both are true because these claims function merely as intellectual
designations, that is, as Attributes. Vygotsky and Spinoza do not claim to
posit an essential distinction between inner and outer, as does Descartes.
Rather, thought and extension, inner and outer, and similar expressions,
form a continuum and constitute transformations of one and the same
substance. These Attributes, inner and outer, simply comprise a heuristic
whereby humans can perceive Vygotskys Substance, the developmental
continuum.
Thus because in Spinoza and Vygotskys systems inner and outer are not
discrete entities, they are not as obvious targets as the Cartesian system for
Wittgensteins method, but they constitute targets nonetheless.
Finally, the arrival at the Vygotskian analogue for Spinozas modes is at
hand. Until this point I have continually used the phrase components of
Vygotskys developmental continuum. Each of these componentsWS,
ES, PS, IS, Th. and Mo.comprises an analogy to a Spinozan mode. To
help us understand this analogy, let us refer back to Spinozas obtuse
definition of Modes, that which is in something else, through which it is
conceived (Spinoza, 1677/2000, p. 19). The Vygotskian Modes exist within
the developmental continuum, and it is through these Modes that the
developmental continuum is constituted and conceived.
Now armed with Vygotskys philosophical orientation and its relation to
Wittgenstein, we can make sense of the next three sections: Earliest
Training, Rules and Conversing.

Earliest Training

In this section I will examine both Vygotsky and Wittgensteins thoughts on

the initial stages of any type of training. We will see, regarding these earliest
training forms involving either an infant or an absolute novice, that their
ideas strongly concur.

Vygotsky
For Vygotsky, a caretaker and an infant involved in the earliest training are
not yet working on his developmental continuum, but work together
inadvertently, via this training, in an attempt to move onto that continuum.
To accomplish this type of training, and to subsequently move onto the
Vygotskian continuum, Vygotsky notes that human infants possess a priori
biological abilities allowing them to at least physically discriminate among
objects in their environment, and to respond to a caretakers signals. These

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on June 19, 2012

338 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 14(3)

native abilities comprise the minimum necessary to initiate early training,

and, as we will see, this training is necessarily behavioral because of those
infants complete lack of linguistic and social skills. For an infant to know
that a caretaker is naming an object, for example, that infant would need to
possess an a priori ability to command some part of the caretakers language
(Grayling, 1988/1996, p. 73). Because this type of infant ability is logically,
as well as empirically, impossible, the pair must begin with behavioristic
training. Therefore behavioristic training, training that can proceed success-
fully without the necessity of an infant possessing the caretakers language
of instruction, solves the putative bootstrapping problem.
Further, in this earliest training, Vygtosky claims that human infants are
analogous to non-human animals, specifically apes, in that both infants and
apes can understand only context-specific stimuli. In this earliest training, a
caretakers words and gestures are context-specific and context-bound, and
serve merely to indicate. The indicative function of a caretakers actions
equals a purely referential signal, and is thus devoid of mature meaning
(Goudge, 1965, p. 65). A caretakers use of referential signals denotes a
stimulusresponse type of interaction. For this type of training to ensue,
nothing more than signals is either necessary or possible.
As training ensues, participants through social interaction come to under-
stand meaning in the training, and, if successful, initiate intersubjectivity,
resulting in an infant coming to understand, rather than react to, a care-
takers words and gestures. The infants understanding demonstrates that the
caretaker/infant pair has now moved out of the earliest stages of training and
onto Vygotskys developmental continuum, and thus can be said to be
participating in External Speech. Wertschs (1985) truck-puzzle experiments
constitute a lucid example of participants movement to External Speech. In
those experiments mothers were told to instruct their children to refer to a
completed truck-puzzle, to guide their completing a disassembled version of
1
that same puzzle. One mother and her 2 2-year-old child initially were not
able to communicate because this mother began by using a non-signal type
word, wheel, to refer to the wheel, while the child continued to perceive
those wheels as crackers. The childs perception indicated that he was
working in his intrasubjective world: a world preceding understanding, a
world preceding entry onto Vygotskys developmental continuum. Finally,
after several attempts at communication, the mother resorted to using a
signal-like form, a deictic, for example this, allowing the mother and child to
continue the training, and thus to continue moving towards working on the
developmental continuum.
According to Vygotsky, if any training continues successfully, with a
normal child, the participants necessarily would advance along the devel-
opmental continuum to a point where the child can ultimately operate
autonomously. If this truck-puzzle interaction had continued until its suc-
cessful conclusion, the child would have internalized the mothers inter-

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on June 19, 2012

BERDUCCI: VYGOTSKY THROUGH WITTGENSTEIN 339

action through transforming her External Speech, first into interaction with
self, Private Speech, and on to further components of the continuum.
Vygotskys theory explains learning just this way, by the transformation of
interaction into succeeding internal planes.

Wittgenstein
Wittgensteins conception of the earliest stages of training is strongly
consistent with, and yields further insight into, Vygotskys ideas on infant
training. In relation to his type of training, Wittgensteins comments concern
not only infants, but also any absolute novice trained in any domain. Even
though this is the case, the relation between Vygotskys ideas on training
infants, or Wittgensteins ideas on training absolute novices, remains the
same.
Wittgenstein, as Vygotsky, believes that the generation of meaning
through social interaction must occur in the earliest stages of training. For
Wittgenstein, since an infant possesses no cognitive skills at this time, the
caretaker serves as a proxy for its cognition. Training a novice how-to-do in
this way comprises an act of understanding only on the part of the caretaker;
the novice will later display understanding, if that training succeeds.
For Wittgenstein, as we saw for Vygotskys training at this earliest stage,
a human infants abilities equate to a non-human animals. Wittgenstein
offers a bee rather than an ape as an example (Williams, 1999, p. 195). Also
for Wittgenstein, infants possess an innate biological (non-cognitive) ability
to discriminate among objects. Thus, an absolute novice needs merely to
possess abilities suggested by behaviorists. For this type of training to ensue,
it is unnecessary for this type of novice to obey social rules. Novices here
need no special a priori cognitive ability; neither need any be posited on
their behalf. A novices ability to discriminate facilitates what Wittgenstein
calls ostensive training, requiring only the use of signals for its accomplish-
ment, because ostensive training is anchored in stimulusresponse inter-
action. Ostensive training does not require an absolute novice to possess
cognitive, semantic or epistemic competency to explain its ability to
successfully participate. Wittgensteins alternative [to a priori cognitive
ability] is that the child is trainable in a socially structured environment in
which the ability or competence to be taught is already mastered by the
teacher (Williams, 1999, p. 196). For Wittgenstein, an absolute novice
requires fewer abilities than those to be acquired in training.
Wittgensteins argument concerning training an absolute novice is in a
sense analogous to Augustines claims concerning language learning.
Augustine describes the learning of human language as if the child came
into a strange country and did not understand the language of the country
(Wittgenstein, 1958, 32). For Wittgenstein an absolute novice needs
neither to have nor to understand a caretakers language. Rather it is through

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on June 19, 2012

340 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 14(3)

the social interaction that constitutes training that a novice comes to think
and understand language. Vygotskian theory agrees.
In Wittgensteinian ostensive training, as in Vygotskys earliest training,
the wordobject relation is conditioned. Both of these types of training
constitute a causal process bringing about the association between an object
and a word, resulting in a novices ability to parrot, rather than to
understand. The parroting novice in a sense acts, but does so without
intention; he or she merely reacts, consistent with the fact that an absolute
novices abilities resemble a non-human animals. However, the ability to
parrot constitutes a necessary prerequisite to eventually advance to under-
standing, possibly later in the training.

Rules

At this point, advancing the discussion necessitates bringing in Wittgen-

steins complex thinking regarding rules. First we must be aware that
Wittgensteinian rules guide rather than coerce. Also, these rules do not
constitute a calculus that individuals must follow. Further, these rules do not
pre-exist a practice; they are what a practice makes of them, and are
expressed through that practice.
For Wittgenstein, rules form a significant and complex aspect of training.
For him, absolute novices first conform to a caretakers rules, and then
subsequently come to obey those same rules (Williams, 1999). Novices
involved in the earliest levels of training do not, because they cannot, obey
rules. These novices must first engage in ostensive/behavioristic training
where they mimic rule-obeying, and act, but without intention. The possibil-
ity of Action without intention exists (Rubinstein, 1981, p. 111), and it is
this type of acting that constitutes rule-conforming. It is training that
changes unintentional actions to intentional, and thus true rule-obeying,
actions. A novices acquiring an understanding of rules requires assimilation
into social practices through training (Williams, 1999, p. 203). As alluded to
above, a caretakers goal for the training, expressed through his or her
actions, serves as a novices vicarious intention, and re-creates rules for the
novice (Grayling, 1988/1996, pp. 8081).
As mentioned, an infant or an absolute novice, as a participant in
behavioristic interaction, merely conforms to rules; by the end of the training
an infant or novice obeys them. Conforming to rules in early training
seemingly concurs with Vygotskys ideas concerning earliest training.
However, for him, infants do not come to obey public rules, rather they (or
any learners) come to obey their own internal rules later in training; they
follow their own self-control through applying the internal modes of
Vygotskys continuum: PSISTh.Mo. In short, they obey the self-control
that originated with the caretakers public other-control. For Vygotsky, the

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on June 19, 2012

BERDUCCI: VYGOTSKY THROUGH WITTGENSTEIN 341

novice has internalized the interaction and obeys the caretaker through
obeying itself. Rules, if I can apply the concept in relation to Vygotskian
thought, become a component of the novices consciousness through train-
ing.
For Wittgenstein, obeying a rule is a public endeavor, and thus can be
seen directly. The relationship of Vygotsky and Wittgenstein in this arena
can easily be seen when we consider that for Wittgenstein (1958) following
a rule is analogous to obeying an order ( 206). For Vygotsky, following
orders is the essence of his training: one initially follows an order of an
other, and eventually an order of the self.
For both Vygotsky and Wittgenstein, the ability to obey rules increases as
novices come to act for themselves. As implied by the discussion until this
point, Vygotskys system explains ordering oneself, or coming-to-act-for-
oneself as a gradual transformation of and between the inner modes of his
continuum: PS, IS, Th. and Mo. On the other hand, a Wittgensteinian may
claim that the novice and caretaker, instead of transforming their interaction,
are moving from one language game to another; for example moving from
an earlier game, behavioristic training, to a later one, mature interaction.
However, Wittgenstein does not explain how movement from one language
game to another occurs. Because he is neither a developmental psychologist
nor involved in empirical analyses, he does not possess the means to
describe how this change can come about. However, for Wittgenstein, an
infant by the end of training embodies the rule of that training, and is thus
becoming a functioning and therefore understanding member of society.
This successful training results in a continuation of a system of belief, whose
certainty comes from the fact of belonging to a community.
Let us now analyze a single example of the initial stages of a training
session. In this instance we will see that training fosters Wittgensteinian
intention, or, in Vygotskian terms, volition. Specifically, we will see here a
caretaker inadvertently guiding an infant to becoming an agent. Obeying, as
opposed to conforming to, a rule may be viewed as agency, volition or
individualization. Please examine the following example adapted from
Vygotsky (Wertsch, 1985, p. 64):
infant: ((moves hand towards bottle, index finger extended))
caretaker: you want the bottle?
((picks up bottle and gives it to infant))

In the above example, for Vygotsky, the infants moving its hand with
extended index finger towards a baby bottle does not constitute pointing. It
must be emphasized that this is so, even though the infant displays the
correct form, that is, the extension of the index finger. Rather, the infants
hand movement constitutes a hunger reaction, a transformation of the
infants hunger into external behavior. Reacting, since it is not volitional,

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on June 19, 2012

342 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 14(3)

thus does not constitute any way in which a mature norm-using member of
society points.
In Wittgensteinian terms, the infant reaching for the bottle is analogous to
someone accidentally making a correct move in chess. This type of move
cannot comprise a move unless someone who knows chess rules performs
that action. Thus, following the same logic, the infant above is not pointing
to the bottle. Additionally, that infant has no intention to point, simply
because it is not possible for it to have intention at this time in its
development. However, the infant ultimately becomes intentional, becomes
volitional by virtue of the caretakers perceiving the hand-movement as
pointing. The caretaker perceiving it so, structures the situation by imputing
meaning to the infants moving its hand toward the bottle, which can be
viewed as the caretaker extending a courtesy (Williams, 1999, p. 204) to
the infant, which is necessary for the infant to eventually become an
intentional, volitional agent (Edwards, 1997, p. 308). The caretakers pre-
supposing that the infant is performing a mature pointing action also
structures the training in which the novice comes to, in Wittgensteinian
terms, obey a rule. Through continually following that rule, in a particular
context, in that language game, the infant becomes a more mature member
of society, and also ultimately becomes another potential caretaker. This
outcome is similar for Vygotsky. In his system, however, the infant
internalizes the interaction, and in that way becomes a mature member.
In both Vygotsky and Wittgensteins systems, to become an agent one
must be treated as if one can do something of ones own volition, as in the
above infantbottle example. One must be treated as if one can decide.
Initially, the infant reaching towards the bottle constitutes a reaction, a
transformation of hunger for Vygotsky, or an expression of hunger for
Wittgenstein.
Wittgenstein (1980) explains that the purpose of any training is to
straighten you up on the track if your coach is crooked on the rails. Driving
it afterwards is something we shall leave to you ( 39e).
Training creates agents and places them on rails. Rails or tracks comprise
a metaphor for a rule: a track that the caretaker has been following during
training, and a track that the novice will eventually follow autonomously.
Please note that the track metaphor represents the right way of doing things,
the way of the caretaker, the rule, the norm, the way to become a mature,
fully functioning member of society. It does not mean that a rule cannot be
broken or interpreted in any way by a listener. If a rule is broken or
misinterpreted in training, the action will be corrected, and it is this being-
corrected and subsequently acting-correctly that is analogous to interacting
on rails.
However, two discrete possibilities exist: one either interacts on the track
or off. No explanation from the Wittgensteinian literature exists as to how
one is initially put onto this developmental track. That is, no explanation

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on June 19, 2012

BERDUCCI: VYGOTSKY THROUGH WITTGENSTEIN 343

exists of how one moves to the next training interaction in the devel-
opmental line. One just finds oneself in that next training, in the next
language game. Vygotskys work with the developmental continuum, on the
other hand, demonstrates how interaction with more capable others trans-
forms infants into beings interacting on rails, following rules: that is,
Vygotskys work demonstrates how infants move onto his developmental
continuum.
Thus, interacting either on or off Wittgensteins track may each be viewed
as a discrete language game, consistent with his ahistorical, synchronic
method. Vygotskys method in this aspect is diametrically opposed. It is
historical and diachronic, and can and does demonstrate how development
ensues. Vygotskian theory allows for an historical link to bridge language
games. This opposition will be discussed below.
Table 1 summarizes the synoptic view of Vygotskian and Wittgensteinian
features of early training as presented in this section.

Conversing

It has been argued that substantial agreement obtains between Vygotskian

and Wittgensteinian ways of thinking concerning one type of language
game, initial training. In this section I will analyze interaction between more
mature members of society operating both on a Wittgensteinian track and on
the Vygotskian developmental continuum. In analyzing this type of inter-
action, insoluble differences between Vygotsky and Wittgenstein begin to
emerge.
Please recall that according to Wittgenstein, mature members of society
understand, intend and obey rules. Former novices, now mature, have
completed different types of training in the rules of language and society,
and are thus able to converse autonomously.

TABLE 1. Summary of Vygotskys and Wittgensteins ideas on

early training
Beginning of training Ending of training

Non-human human Mature member of society

Parroting Understanding
Rule-conforming Rule-obeying
Non-intentional Intentional
Non-volitional Volitional
Signal-using Symbol-using
Dependent Autonomous
Off track On track
Off developmental continuum On developmental continuum

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on June 19, 2012

344 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 14(3)

According to Vygotsky, on the other hand, mature members of society

autonomously operate on his developmental continuum, because their pre-
vious training has been transformed into internal structures: Inner Speech,
Thought, and so on. At the appropriate time, for example while conversing,
these putative internal structures re-transform into external structures, in a
word, conversation.
In light of the previous agreements of Vygotsky and Wittgenstein in
relation to the earliest type of training, let us now examine a fragment from
Vygotskys original work, where interactants have completed training, and
converse as mature members of society.
In the following analysis, Vygotskys literary influences can be easily
seen (adapted from Vygotsky, 1987, p. 282).
Conversation Hidden Motivations
Sophia: Oh Chatskii, ((wants to hide her confusion))
I am glad to see you.
Chatskii: Youre glad, thats good. ((wants to appeal to her conscience
Though, can one who becomes through mockery))
glad in this way be sincere? ((wants to elicit openness))
For Vygotsky, mental forces always lie transformed, hidden, behind dis-
course. This conception follows Dostoevsky, Stanislavsky and other literary
figures who teach that behind each of a characters lines there stands a
desire that is directed toward the realization of a definite volitional task
(Vygotsky, 1987, p. 282).
The above conversation fragment, including Vygotskys analysis of
participants motivations, demonstrates two modes from his developmental
continuum: External Speech, as the conversation between Sophia and
Chatskii; and their Hidden Motivations, as Vygotskys analysis of that same
conversation.
According to Vygotskian theory, Sophia and Chatskiis motivations
constitute the ultimate transformation, the final internal plane of the devel-
opmental continuum. Succumbing to the logic of Vygotskys theory, Sophia
and Chatskiis internal motivations precede, and subsequently transform into
(note, do not cause), their utterances. That is, the interlocutors motivations
are ultimately transformed into Thought, then into Inner Speech, culminat-
ing in Sophia and Chatskiis actual utterances, External Speech. It is
important to note that the meaning of these utterances resides ultimately in
that final plane, Motivation, rather than residing in the actual utterances.
The first question one may ask about Vygotskys ascription of motivations
in the above fragment is How does he or anyone arrive at those motiva-
tions? According to Vygotsky, he does not infer them from the interlocu-
tors actions, as would a Cartesian. Rather, he claims that he can observe
Sophia and Chatskiis motivations directly. His claim is consistent with his
theory, because, for example, Private Speech forms a process internal in
nature but external in manifestationis accessible to direct observation and

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on June 19, 2012

BERDUCCI: VYGOTSKY THROUGH WITTGENSTEIN 345

experimentation (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 258). Thus, because internal processes

transform into external processes, his claim is therefore warranted that
interlocutors can have direct access to their partners internal processes.
The meaning of direct here carries special import in this discussion, thus
it is necessary to spend some time divesting its meaning in both Vygotskys
and Wittgensteins works. I will argue that Vygotskys and Wittgensteins
definitions of direct differ.
According to Vygotsky, when anyone hears anyone else speaking, they
hear a transformation of that speakers motivations; they hear a transformed
version of what was once located within that speakers mind. What they hear
comprises part of one and the same Substance, only transformed into a
different vehicle. Though access is through transformed material, Vygotsky
maintains that access to the inner is direct. If the argument of his transforma-
tional system is logically extended, then he must also mean that one can
directly observe an ape by observing a human, directly observe a primitive
by observing a modern, directly observe a child by observing an adult, and
so on. This way of construing the meaning of direct is confused.
Vygotskys concept of directness, though confused, may be viewed as
more direct than a Cartesians, in that in Vygotskys system, inference is
unnecessary to access anothers inner world; rather, a transformed version
avails itself. However, the act of inferring implies a gap, implies a Cartesian
absolute distinction between inner and outer, between thought and speech,
and so on, requiring two discrete entities, making direct access, in any sense
of the term, logically impossible.
A Cartesian analyzing the interaction between Sophia and Chatskii would
need to infer or guess the participants motivations or meanings. Cartesian
analysis necessitates inference because of the absolute distinction between
action (body) and private motivations (mind) that lies at the base of the
Cartesian system, logically excluding any type of direct access to a listener.
Therefore, according to Descartes, it is impossible to perceive an others
mind or experience directly. We can, however, experience others bodies or
their behavior directly. Ones own mind can be directly perceived or directly
experienced only by the self. In relation to the above example, Sophias own
motivations, according to Cartesians, would be directly accessible only to
her. Further, for Descartes, motivations or any mental process would need to
be the cause of Sophia and Chatskiis actions, as software controls hardware.
This confused argument also applies to those more materialistic Cartesians
who substitute brain for mind. Thus, I could argue in this sense that
Vygotskys access to the inner is more direct than a Cartesians.
Continuing, lets now examine an important quote concerning Wittgen-
steinian thinking that will help clarify this hidden and direct discussion:
structuring [training] is never fully eliminated though it is rightfully
obscured from view in the behavior and judgments of those who have
mastered a practice (Williams, 1999, p. 213). The phrase obscured from

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on June 19, 2012

346 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 14(3)

view comprises the Wittgensteinian alternative to Vygotskys concepts:

hidden, internalization and transformation. Structuring in the above quote
equals training or Vygotskys External Speech. For Vygotsky, that structur-
ing is transformed into the behavior and judgments of less experienced
members of society. It is transformed into the inner, yet a putatively directly
accessible inner. For Wittgenstein, on the other hand, training discloses itself
directly in action, for example in a gesture, a gaze and a tone of voice. In
addition, for Wittgenstein, training reveals itself in our judgments, not
personal opinions, of an action; we judge a gesture to be aggressive, we
judge a gaze to be flirtatious, a tone of voice to be impudent, and so on.
Thus, for Wittgenstein, the contact between Sophia or Chatskiis minds,
or their understanding of each other, is direct and immediate in a sense
different than Vygotskys. Interlocutors such as Sophia and Chatskii cer-
tainly go beyond what people do and say, but not through inferring objects
or processes in the others mind, nor by observing a transformation of the
others mind. Rather, they, and we, can go beyond because we see
motivations on others faces, we hear motivations in the tone of others
voices, and so on.
The interlocutors motivations are, for Wittgenstein, what we, as mature
members of a particular society, know with certainty (Wittgenstein, 1969).
Some people are transparent to us; we can easily read them. We operate in
interaction based on that certainty. In the SophiaChatskii case we know
why they are doing what they are doing. This argument is analogous to
Wittgensteins well-known and oft-analyzed comments on pain (Grayling,
1988/1996; Hacker, 1993/1998; Wittgenstein, 1958). A natural expression of
the inner, for example pain or motivation, is revealed in outward criteria. In
the case of pain, an outward criterion may be the verbal expression ouch, or
a scream or some such. In the case of motivation, the outward expression
would be less obvious, but would show itself nonetheless in the behavior
. . . of those who have mastered a practice.
A complete analysis of Sophia and Chatskiis conversation is of course
not available in Vygotskys original work. However, we can be certain that
a certain look from Sophia, a particular movement of Chatskiis eye, a
special tone of Sophias voice, and so on, all of the micro-actions we were
trained to recognize as expressions of particular motivations, would reveal
themselves in that conversation. We were trained in recognizing and judging
these micro-actions relating to motivation just as we were trained to
recognize expressions of pain. Otherwise how would Vygotsky or anyone be
able to perceive the above motivations to the interlocutors behavior? The
answer from Wittgenstein is simple and direct. Sophia and Chatskii per-
ceived the motivations in each others actions. Now one may ask, What
about pretence? or What about the possibility of controlling ones pain, or
concealing ones motivations? Certainly pretence on the part of an actor is
possible, for example feigning or concealing a particular motivation or a

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on June 19, 2012

BERDUCCI: VYGOTSKY THROUGH WITTGENSTEIN 347

pain. But the ability to pretend or conceal does not disprove the fact that we
see motivations directly. The possibility of pretence or concealment only
demonstrates that the criteria for motivations, or other putatively inner
processes, are defeasible, and this defeasibility depends on the circum-
stances. That is, pretence may be functional in a different language game. In
this context we could ask Would there be a reason why someone would try
to pretend he or she was motivated in a certain way? An answer might be
for instance that a person may want to express to an employer his or her
desire to complete a certain job in order to get promoted, and so on. Or
another relevant question may be Why would someone try to control his or
her pain? A possible answer to this question may be that in a different
language game, one may want to control ones pain to prevent drawing
attention to oneself, for example during an important meeting. Because these
concepts controlling motivation or controlling pain exist, these language
games exist, are known directly without inference, and thus can be recog-
nized and utilized by mature members of society.
Inference as posited by a Cartesian as a procedure to contingently know
an others motivation is just nonsense, because inferring is logically un-
necessary to know that motivation; transformation of inner to outer as a
pathway to knowledge of other minds, as posited by Vygotsky is also
logically unnecessary. Vygotsky inherited the pictures of transformation,
and inner and outer, from Spinoza, and applied those pictures to create his
psychology. He did so rather than follow Wittgensteins dictum dont think,
but look! (Wittgenstein, 1958, 66). Vygotsky thought, applied the
received wisdom, and created unnecessary confusion. In Wittgensteinian
terms, Vygotsky, and Descartes as well, would be said to be conceptually
confused. Both Descartes and Vygotskys ways of conceptualizing inner
and outer are the result of their respective versions of conceptual confu-
sion.
Sophia and Chatskiis motivations, instead of being hidden in either
Cartesian or Vygotskian terms, are, as I have argued, for Wittgenstein,
explicitly open. Those motivations Vygotsky assigned to Sophia and Chat-
skii simply answer the question What are they doing? The answer
constitutes members knowledge of their language game. Therefore in
Sophia and Chatskiis conversation, we, as members of that community, and
because we have become members of that community, understand what
they are doing in that game because our understanding is based on social
competence (Ryle, 1949). Through that conversation Sophia directly demon-
strates her desire to hide her confusion, Chatskii directly demonstrates his
appeal to Sophias conscience, and so on.
Vygotskys suggested motivations from the above conversation can be
reformed into Wittgensteinian doings via Table 2. Through reformulating
these motivations, that is, reformulating Vygotskys wants to, into hiding,
appealing and eliciting, in short by reformulating Vygotskys wants to into

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on June 19, 2012

348 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 14(3)

TABLE 2. Vygotskian motivations and Wittgensteinian doings

Vygotskian Motivations Wittgensteinian Doings

Wants to hide her confusion Hiding her confusion

Wants to appeal to her conscience Appealing to Sophias conscience
through mockery through mockery
Wants to elicit openness Eliciting openness

actions visible to an other, Vygotskys most secret internal plane of verbal

thinking [motivation] (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 283) is thus directly exposed and
demystified. Logically extending this argument, the entire developmental
continuum can be demystified.
The last section regarding initial training ended with a statement that
Wittgensteins method is ahistorical and synchronic, while Vygotskys is
historical and diachronic. In the vernacular, the components of Vygotskys
developmental continuum can be described thus: Written Speech is writing,
External Speech is speaking, Private Speech is talking aloud to oneself,
Inner Speech is talking silently to oneself, and so on. For Wittgenstein, each
of these Vygotskian modes can comprise a discrete language game, but their
descriptions cannot be decontextualized as I have presented here. For
example, External Speech must be about something, must be part of a
language game. A possible game is speaking angrily at a professor, or
speaking intently to an eager student; Private Speech can be trying to
decide something for oneself as one speaks aloud to oneself; Inner Speech
functions the same as Private Speech yet silent. Gestures and facial
expressions may accompany any of Vygotskys components. The relation to
Vygotskys concepts of Thought and Motivation is similar. One can act
thoughtfully or act with Motivation, with or without speech. None of these
modes comprising Vygotskys developmental continuum need to be viewed
as transformed entities, but they may be seen as public actions.

Discussion

In this analysis, I have shown that political and intellectual influences

created a welcoming atmosphere and thus aided Vygotsky in his attempt to
neutralize two existent schools of psychology, the internal idealist school
and the external mechanistic school. These forces were instrumental in
creating/forming Vygotskian theory and thus in initiating his overall goal of
creating a new psychological theory that satisfied both him and the Soviets.
Further, I have also shown that Vygotsky applied various and different pre-
existing pictures from monism and literature. He attempted to accomplish
this neutralizing through creating the developmental continuum, essentially

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on June 19, 2012

BERDUCCI: VYGOTSKY THROUGH WITTGENSTEIN 349

an extension of monistic thinking, which allowed inner and outer to be

united in one Substance, and formed a consistent and logically integrated
picture of these constructs as being transformations of each other. In
Vygotskian theory, the developmental continuum operated as a tool for
transforming his different modes, External Speech, and so on, while main-
taining one Substance, the developmental continuum itself, and thus avoid-
ing the confusion of Cartesian dualism. However, though successful in his
avoiding confusion, largely through applying Spinozan concepts to create
his theory, he failed to solve it, thus creating other confusions.
Vygotskys developmental continuum certainly is elegant, logically con-
sistent, avoids dualism, satisfies our lust for generality, and so on; however,
as we have begun to see, this construct is not, and cannot serve as, an
adequate or exact theory with which to analyze learning-interaction, because
it is based on various confusions.
As mentioned, the raison detre of Wittgensteins later work functioned to
neutralize or dissolve philosophical problems. Wittgensteins neutralization
of philosophical problems was more successful than Vygotsky s neutral-
ization of psychological problems in the sense that the result of Wittgen-
steins dissolution was absolute, largely because he based his type of
dissolution on conceptual rather than empirical analyses. Wittgensteins
philosophy served as a palliative, dissolving errors in thinking, but did not
fabricate an additional explanatory system, as did Vygotskys psychology.
Vygotskys use of monism and Marxism, instead of neutralizing mechanistic
and idealistic psychologies, created a parallel psychology. In other words, he
created a new, additional type of psychology, while Wittgenstein obliterated
traditional philosophical thinking.
I stated that Cartesian thought constituted a relatively easy target for
Wittgensteinian philosophy, largely because in Cartesian thought two dis-
crete and incommensurable entities exist, inner and outer. Though relatively
unproblematic to attack philosophically, Cartesianism lies insidiously em-
bedded in our everyday way of thought. The Wittgensteinian problem then
became one of making us aware of the confusions inherent in our everyday
and analytical thought processes, rather than fabricating a new philosophical
system to replace Cartesianism.
As opposed to Cartesianism, in Vygotskys monistic psychology, inner
and outer do not and cannot constitute discrete entities, since they form a
continuum. A borderline between Vygotskys inner and outer Attributes
does not exist. In addition, monistic thought is not as deeply embedded in
our practices as is Cartesian dualism. Thus, a lighter Wittgensteinian attack
should be able to remove any existent confusions in this area.
I find it difficult yet essential to remember that Vygotsky and Wittgenstein
differ fundamentally in their methodologies: Wittgensteins method is con-
ceptual, while Vygotskys is empirical. As we have seen, for Wittgenstein,
grammar determines the essence of anything. To paraphrase Hacker, our use

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on June 19, 2012

350 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 14(3)

or concept of the word think in its different forms and multifarious contexts
determines what is thinking. For Vygotsky, on the other hand, thinking is an
empirical object, a singular unified socio-psychological process. For him,
thinking in the following utterances shares the same essence: I was thinking
about going to a movie and I was thinking intently to solve that math
problem. Following Spinozas thought, thinking in any context for Vy-
gotsky constitutes a transformation of an empirical object, that is, thinking
constitutes a transformation of External Speech. Monistic and Marxist
thinking influenced Vygotsky to discover this transformation; then he
justified his discovery, via experimentation, inference and possibly an
analogy from his own case.
For Wittgenstein, however, the word thinking can differ for each language
game it serves; and, further, for him, speaking and thinking can form two
distinct language games. For example, one can now either speak or think, or
one can speak thoughtfully, and so on. For Vygotsky, however, speaking in
any context necessitates thinking, since they comprise transformations of
each other.
As I also have established, Vygotsky and Wittgenstein do not always
disagree. In terms of the initial stages of any type of training, we did see a
strong concurrence between Vygotskian and Wittgensteinian thought. Both
agreed that initial training with an infant requires behavioristic or ostensive
training. Here both can agree, at least when discussing initial training,
because this level of training takes place before Vygotsky needs to invoke
his theoretical construct, the developmental continuum. One possible addi-
tional reason for their agreement here is that Vygotsky based his analysis of
the initial stages of training on observation. Following the Wittgensteinian
dictum dont think, but look!, he based this part of his analysis on looking
rather than thinking.
In the initial stages of training, for both Vygotsky and Wittgenstein,
infants possess the ability to respond to signals as non-human animals. Only
later in their development, in mature forms of interaction, do infants become
human and thus act autonomously, act as agents and as individuals, act with
intention and with volition. To sum up, in mature forms of interaction,
infants come to act, rather than react, as they do in initial stages of
training.
It is when analyzing mature interaction and applying Vygotskys devel-
opmental continuum and transformation (more thinking than looking) that
Vygotsky and Wittgenstein begin to differ. We saw this with their differing
meanings of the term direct. For Vygotsky, direct means that interlocutors
need not infer what is occurring inside of their partners heads. Rather, he
did this inferring for them. He originally inferred the existence of the inner
modes, Private Speech, Inner Speech, Thought and Motivation, in at least
two ways. First, he noticed that when children spoke to themselves while
completing a task, this Private Speech became abbreviated and predicated

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on June 19, 2012

BERDUCCI: VYGOTSKY THROUGH WITTGENSTEIN 351

relative to the External Speech that took place earlier with a caretaker. Next,
he observed that the amount of Private Speech decreased as these children
matured (Vygotsky, 1987, pp. 255262). From Private Speech, Vygotsky
then inferred its connection with Inner Speech. More specifically, he inferred
that since speech developing from ES to PS is abbreviated, the further we
move along the developmental continuum, the more abbreviated and predi-
cated speech must become. Thus, Inner Speech must be more abbreviated
than Private Speech; Thought must be more abbreviated than Inner Speech;
and, finally, Motivation must be more abbreviated than Thought. This
inferred, and thus putative, internalization for Vygotsky indicates trans-
formation.
My analysis has shown that using Wittgenstein, Vygotskian transforma-
tion need not be posited. As evidence of this non-need, as I presented earlier,
we can see our interlocutors motivations directly in action; one acts with
motivation; ones actions express ones motivation, and are a part of it. One
can observe a conversation partners actions and be certain of what is
happening in that interaction. It is this certainty that forms the ultimate basis
for knowing what is happening within an other. In sum, this certainty forms
the ultimate basis for meaning (Wittgenstein, 1969).
Following the implications of my initial analysis, I conclude that it is
incumbent upon present-day researchers to demonstrate how, without a need
to adhere to a theory and without applying psychologistic meta-concepts
such as transformation, developmental continuum, and so on, individuals in
interaction move from one language game to another. In short, I conclude
that it is possible, and less confusing, to demonstrate learning without
resorting to any type of traditional learning theory.
Finally, this paper has seemingly constituted an initial excursion into the
relationship of Vygotskian and Wittgensteinian ways of thought. However,
it is in a sense late in coming. Toulmin (1969) hinted at the relationship of
Vygotsky and Wittgenstein 35 years ago. In a note in his paper he wrote:
Vygotskys discussion of the relation between thought and inner speech
finds a close parallel in Wittgensteins remarks on the same topic in Zettel,
paras. 100ff. Some of Vygotskys aphorisms also have a strongly Wittgen-
steinian tone: e.g., A word is a microcosm of human consciousness, and
A thought may be compared to a cloud shedding a shower of words.
(p. 70)
Today we are armed with better translations, commentaries and applications
of Vygotskys work, as well as having available more complete translations
of Wittgensteins Nachlass. Lets get on with the task at hand!

Notes
1. For a fascinating (and brief) discussion of the contrast between Descartes and
Spinoza, please see Bennet (1965).

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on June 19, 2012

352 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 14(3)

2. I would like to diverge here slightly to present a quote from Wittgenstein

demonstrating his grammatical critique of monism:
353. But may it not be said: If there were only one substance, there
would be no use for the word substance? That however presumably
means: The concept substance presupposes the concept difference of
substance. (As that of the king in chess presupposes that of a move in
chess, or that of colour that of colours.) (Wittgenstein, 1967/1998,
p. 64)
Wittgensteins critique dissolves monism since there is no logical possibility to
discuss substance.

References
Bennet, J. (1965). A note on Descartes and Spinoza. Philosophical Review, 74(3),
379380.
Cole, M., & Maltzman, I. (Eds.). (1969). A handbook of contemporary Soviet
psychology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Daniels, H. (1996). An introduction to Vygotsky. London: Routledge.
Diaz, R.M., & Berk, L.E. (1992). Private speech: From social interaction to self-
regulation. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Edwards, D. (1997). Discourse and cognition. London: Sage.
Engels, F. (1968). Dialectics of nature. In K. Marx, & F. Engels, Collected works
(pp. 338353). London: Lawrence & Wishart.
Goudge, T.A. (1965). Peirces index. Transactions of the C.S. Peirce Society 2
(Fall).
Grayling, A.C. (1996). Wittgenstein. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Original
work published 1988.)
Hacker, P.M.S. (1998). Wittgenstein: Meaning and mind: Vol. 3 of an analytical
commentary on the Philosophical investigations, Part I: Essays. Oxford: Black-
well. (Original work published 1993.)
Kenny, A. (1998). A brief history of western philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell.
Kozulin, A. (1986). Vygotsky in context. In L.S. Vygotsky, Thought and language
(A. Kozulin, Ed.; pp. xilvi). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Lawrence, J.A., & Valsiner, J. (2003). Making personal sense: An account of basic
internalization and externalization processes. Theory & Psychology, 13,
723752.
Proyect, L. (2002). Marxism mailing list archive. Monday, September 23, 2002,
8:38AM. Retrieved February 24, 2003. http://www.marxmail.org/.
Rubinstein, D. (1981). Marx and Wittgenstein: Social praxis and social explanation.
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Saifulin, M., & Dixon, R.R. (Eds.). (1984). Dictionary of philosophy. New York:
International Publishers.
Spinoza, B. (2000). The ethics (G.H.R. Parkinson, Ed. and Trans.). Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Toulmin, S. (1969). Ludwig Wittgenstein. Encounter, 32, 5871.
Valsiner, J. (1988). Developmental psychology in the Soviet Union. Brighton:
Harvester.

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on June 19, 2012

BERDUCCI: VYGOTSKY THROUGH WITTGENSTEIN 353

Van der Veer, R., & Valsiner, J. (1991). Understanding Vygotsky. Oxford: Black-
well.
Van der Veer, R., & Valsiner, J. (Eds.). (1994). The Vygotsky reader. Oxford:
Blackwell.
Vygotsky, L.S. (1978). Mind in society: The development of higher psychological
processes (M. Cole, V. John-Steiner, S. Scribner, & E. Souberman, Eds.).
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Vygotsky, L.S. (1987). Thought and word. In R.W. Riebe, &, A.S. Carton (Eds.),
The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky, Vol. 1: Problems of general psychology (pp.
243288). New York: Plenum.
Wertsch, J.V. (1985). Vygotsky and the social formation of mind. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Williams, M. (1999). Wittgenstein, mind and meaning: Toward a social conception
of mind. London: Routledge.
Wittgenstein, L. (1958). Philosophical investigations (G.E.M. Anscombe, Trans.).
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Wittgenstein, L. (1969). On certainty (G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. von Wright,
Trans.). New York: Harper.
Wittgenstein, L. (1998). Zettel (G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. von Wright, Eds.; G.E.M.
Anscombe, Trans.). University of California Press. (Original work published
1967.)
Wittgenstein, L. (1980). Culture and value. Oxford: Blackwell.

Acknowledgements. This paper is a revised version of Vygotsky and

Wittgenstein: Contact and Conflict which appeared, in Japanese, in H.
Ishiguro (Ed.), Shakkai bunkateki apurochi (The Sociocultural Approach
Vol. 2), Kitaou Roshokyoku Publishers, Tokyo. Portions of an earlier
version of this paper were first presented at the Mind and Activity
Workshop, 2000, Meiji Gakuin University, Japan. I would like to thank
members of that workshop, especially Dr. Aug Nishizaka of Meiji Gakuin
University, for comments on that presentation. I would also like to thank
Dr. Brian McVeigh, of the University of Arizona, for comments on the
present version. Any errors are of course my own.

Domenic F. Berducci is Associate Professor in the Department of Liberal

Arts at Toyama Prefectural University in Japan. He is currently working on
demonstrating learning as co-participation in both formal and informal
learning contexts, rather than its being conceived as an individual cognitive
ability. In addition, he continues to work on critiquing Vygotskian theory
through a Wittgensteinian lens. Address: Department of Liberal Arts,
Toyama Prefectural University, Kosugi, Toyama 9390398, Japan. [email:
berducci@pu-toyama.ac.jp]

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on June 19, 2012