Qualitative Hazard Analysis

26.1 INTRODUCTION

Hazard analysis identifies possible hazard scenarios for a process or facility (CCPS,
1992). Qualitative risk estimates are often included in hazard analysis. OSHAs
Process Safety Management (PSM) standard, 29 CFR 1910.119 and EPAs Risk
Management Program (RMP) rule, 40 CFR Part 68, require that a process hazard
analysis (PHA) be performed for processes covered by the regulations and that,
among other things, the PHA shall address human factors.
Hazard analysis must address human failures together with equipment fail-
ures and external events as possible causes of hazard scenarios (see Figure 26:l).
Note that equipment failures may be attributed ultimately to human failures on the
part of process designers, specification engineers, fabricators, maintenance per-
sonnel, etc. and some external events are also human induced. Human failures
may be initiating events, intermediate events, or enabling events for hazard sce-
narios. Closing the wrong valve may be an initiating event, failure to respond to
an alarm may be an intermediate event, and bypassing a trip may be an enabling
event.
Hazard analysis should also address the human factors that influence the likeli-
hood of human failures occurring. For example, an operator may fail to close a
manual valve in a line when required to do so. This could be the initiating event for
a hazard scenario. The human factors that influence the likelihood of this failure
must be identified in order to 1) assess the likelihood of the failure, 2) identify ex-
isting safeguards that may protect against it, and 3) decide what recommendations
may be needed to reduce the risk to a tolerable level. For example, the valve may
not be labeled, it may be located close to another similar valve in an adjacent line,
operator training or procedures may be inadequate, etc.
Treatment of human factors in hazard analysis requires:

Identification of human failures as causes of or contributors to hazard scenar-

ios.
Identification of human factors that influence the likelihood of human fail-
ures.
Optionally, qualitative assessment of the likelihood of human failures.

Human Factors Methods for Improving Performance in the Process Industries 175
02007 American Institute of Chemical Engineers
176 QUALITATIVE HAZARD ANALYSIS

Initiation Propagation Termination

Process responses
Operator responses

lnterrnediate
initiating event -+ -+Consequences
Events
~

Equipment failure
Human failure
External events
1 Enabling events 1
I I
Pe*pe
Properiy
Process
Make possible another En vironrne17 i
event EfG

Figure 26-1: Elements of a hazard scenario. Copyright C 2004, Primatech Inc. All rights
Reserved.

26.2 TOOLS-HUMAN FAILURES

Human failures are usually identified in hazard analysis by brainstorming causes of

scenarios along with equipment failures and external events. Knowledge of human
involvement in a process and the types of failures people may make is used to iden-
tify human failures. Structured brainstorming uses lists of the people involved in the
process, the actions they perform, and the types of failures that may occur (acts of
omission and commission, extraneous acts, and violations or deliberate acts) and
combines entries from the three lists to identify possible human failures. A key to
success in identifying human failures is insuring that all people involved in the
process are considered, including operators, mechanics, contractors, and others.
Human failures identified by hazard analysis can be seen in Figure 26-2 in the
Cause column of the worksheet.
In hazard analysis, the likelihood of human failure is usually assessed qualita-
tively along with the likelihood of equipment failures and external events to provide
an estimate of the overall scenario likelihood. Estimates are made using engineering
judgement.
Also important in hazard analysis are human factors issues that affect the perfor-
mance of studies. These include the willingness and ability of the analysts to con-
sider human failures and human factors, the teams ability to work together effec-
tively, and time pressures to complete the study.
Tools are also available to analyze the work performed by people to identify the
failures that may occur. Task analysis is one such method (Kinvan and Ainsworth,
1992).
 26.3 TOOLS-HUMAN FACTORS 177

Figure 26-2: Example of PHA with human failures and human factors identified.

~~

A company performed a PHA on a process and completed a PHA report that was
provided to management. However, the report was simply filed and no action
was taken on the recommendations it contained until nearly five years later when
a PHA revalidation was performed. The company took immediate steps to cor-
rect the problems identified and also changed the management system to prevent
this from occurring in the future. The company considered itself fortunate that an
accident did not occur as a result of the neglected recommendations.

26.3 TOOLS-HUMAN FACTORS

Human factors can be considered during hazard analysis (Bridges, et al., 1994).
Simple checklists can be used to identify human factors issues that may impact hu-
man failures identified in the hazard analysis. Recommendations to deal with the
human failures address the underlying human factors issues that make them likely.
178 QUALITATIVE HAZARD ANALYSIS

An example of a checklist is provided in Figure 26-3. The use of checklists to

screen for human factors during Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) studies has been
described (Attwood, et al., 2004). The American Petroleum Institute (API) has de-
veloped human factors checklists for PHAs of new plant designs (API, 2003). The
report states that the checklists are not intended to be applied retroactively. The
questions include example situations and potential solutions to increase their utility.
Human factors can also be treated as adjunct studies to PHAs using checklists of
typical issues for processes. An example checklist is provided in CCPS (2001).
Checklists contain questions such as Are valves labeled? and Are manual valves
readily accessible to operators? An example of part of a completed checklist is
provided in Figure 26-3.
Approaches have also been developed to address human factors using specific
hazard analysis methods. For example, some users of the HAZOP method include a
human factors parameter and use it to identify and analyze human factors issues. An
example is provided in Figure 26-4. Hazard analysis methods can also be applied
directly to procedures to identify human failures and the factors influencing them
(Bridges, et al., 1996). A modified Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) can be

Figure 26-3: Example of a human factors checklist study.

 26.4 REFERENCES 179

Figure 26-4: Example of human factors treated using deviations in a HAZOP study.

used to identify the human factors involved for critical scenarios involving human
failures (Baybutt, 2002).
A key to success is identifying human factors issues both locally within a process
and also globally for the entire process. For example, readability of a particular gauge
is a local issue while the quality of written operating procedures is a global issue.

26.4 REFERENCES

API (2003), Tool for Incorporating Human Factors During Process Hazard Analysis Re-
views of Plant Designs (Washington, DC: American Petroleum Institute).
Attwood, D. A,. Deeb, J. M., and Danz-Reece, M. E. (2004), Ergonomic Solutions for the
Process Industries (Amsterdam: Elsevier), p. 407.
Baybutt, P. (2002), Layers of Protection Analysis for Human Factors (LOPA-HF). Process
Safety Progress, Vol. 21, No. 2. pp. 119-129.
Bridges, W. G.. Kirkman. J. Q., and Lorenzo, D. K. (1994), Include Human Errors in
Process Hazard Analyses, Chem. Eng. Prog., March, Vol. 90: No. 5 , pp. 74-82.
180 QUALITATIVE HAZARD ANALYSIS

CCPS (1992), Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures (NY: AICHE Center for
Chemical Process Safety).
CCPS (200 l), Revalidating Process Hazard Analyses (NY: AICHE Center for Chemical
Process Safety), Appendix G.
Kirwan, B. and Ainsworth, L. K. (1992), A Guide to Task Analysis (Taylor and Francis,
London).

26.5 ADDITIONAL REFERENCES

API 770 (2001), A Managers Guide to Reducing Human Errors; Improving Human Perfor-
mance in the Process Industries (Washington, DC: American Petroleum Institute). Note:
This was previously published as CMA (1990), A Managers Guide to Reducing Human
Errors (Washington, DC: Chemical Manufacturers Association).
CCPS (1994), Guidelines for Preventing Human Error in Process Safety (NY: Center for
Chemical Process Safety).