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1. Liban v. Gordon - ABUZO

FACTS:
Petitioners, officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, alleged that by accepting the
chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate
pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that [n]o Senator . . . may hold any other office
or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Petitioners cited
the case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, decided August 6, 1999, which held that the PNRC is a
GOCC, in supporting their argument that respondent Gordon automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate when
he accepted and held the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.
Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5, held that the office of the PNRC Chairman is
NOT a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the
President or by any subordinate government official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a GOCC because it is a
privately-owned, privately-funded, and privately-run charitable organization and because it is controlled by a
Board of Governors four-fifths of which are private sector individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit
his legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.
The Court, however, held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD 1264 and 1643, is void
insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation since Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution states
that [t]he Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of
private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof. The Court thus directed the PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and
register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.
Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of the Decision claiming that it was
improper for the court to decide on the constitutionality of the PNRC Chapter since such was not the lis mota of
the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not it was proper for the court to decide on the constitutionality of the PNRC chapter.

HELD:
No. The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not among the issues
defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case. In the case of Alvarez v. PICOP
Resources, Inc., this Court stated that it will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota.
It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record
also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the
constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question will be unavoidable.

Furthermore, although the respondent, under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman
thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a
private corporation within the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, which must be organized under
the Corporation Code. By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like any other private
corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRCs sui generis character and special status under
international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State, designated to assist it in discharging its obligations
under the Geneva Conventions.

The PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the government in the humanitarian field in
accordance with its commitments under international law. This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize
its existence, especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised by the
parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to almost all national disasters since 1947, and is
widely known to provide a substantial portion of the countrys blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is
unparalleled. The Court should not shake its existence to the core in an untimely and drastic manner that would
not only have negative consequences to those who depend on it in times of disaster and armed hostilities but also
have adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in the international community. The sections of the PNRC
Charter that were declared void must therefore stay.

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2. Boy Scouts of the Phil. v. COA - BELTEJAR

FACTS: The BSP is a public corporation created under Commonwealth Act No. 111 dated October 31, 1936,and
whose functions relate to the fostering of public virtues of citizenship and patriotism and the general improvement
of the moral spirit and fiber of the youth.-On Aug 19, 1999, COA issued Resolution No. 99-011"Defining the
Commission's policy with respect to the audit of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines" which provides for the
conduction of an annual financial audit of the Boy Scouts of the Phil. and the expression of an opinion on the
fairness of their financial statements. The BSP shall also be classified among the government corporations
belonging to the Educational, Social,Scientific, Civic and Research Sector.- The COA resolution stated that the
BSP was created as a public corporation under Commonwealth Act No.111 and is a government-controlled
corporation. The COA Resolution also cited its constitutional mandate under Section 2 (1), Article IX (D).-On Nov.
26, 1999, the BSP National President Jejomar Binay sought reconsideration of the resolution stating that the BSP
is not subject to the Commission's jurisdiction because it is not a unit of the government.Moreover, RA 7278
virtually eliminated the "substantial government participation" in the National Executive Board and that the BSP is
not as a government instrumentality under the 1987 Administrative Code which provides that instrumentality refers
to "any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special
functions or jurisdiction by law.-On July 3, 2000, Director Sunico, Corporate Audit Officer of the COA, furnished
the BSP with a copy of the
Memorandum that opined that the substantial government participation is only one (1) of the three (3)grounds
relied upon by the Court in the resolution of the case. Other considerations include the character of the BSP's
purposes and functions which has a public aspect and the statutory designation of the BSP as a "public
corporation". On the argument that BSP is not "a government instrumentality" and "agency" of the government,
the Supreme Court has elucidated this matter in the BSP vs NLRC case when it declared that BSP is both a
"government-controlled corporation with an original charter" and as an "instrumentality" of the Government.-Upon
the BSP's request, the audit was deferred for thirty (30) days. The BSP then filed a Petition for Prohibition with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order before the COA.

ISSUE: W/N the BSP is a public corporation and is subject to COAs audit jurisdiction.

HELD: Yes. BSP is a public corporation and its funds are subject to the COA's audit jurisdiction.The BSP is a
public corporation whose functions relate to the fostering of public virtues of citizenship and patriotism and the
general improvement of the moral spirit and fiber of the youth. The functions of the BSP include, among others,
the teaching to the youth of patriotism, courage, self-reliance, and kindred virtues,are undeniably sovereign
functions enshrined under the Constitution. Any attempt to classify the BSP as a private corporation would be
incomprehensible since noless than the law which created it had designated it as a public corporation and its
statutory mandate embraces performance of sovereign functions. The manner of creation and the purpose for
which the BSP was created indubitably prove that it is a government agency.Moreover, there are three classes of
juridical persons under Article 44 of the Civil Code and the BSP, as presently constituted under Republic Act No.
7278, falls under the second classification.The purpose of the BSP as stated in its amended charter shows that it
was created in order to implement a State policy declared in Article II, Section 13 of the Constitution.Evidently, the
BSP, which was created by a special law to serve a public purpose in pursuit of a constitutional mandate, comes
within the class of "public corporations"defined by paragraph 2, Article 44 of the Civil Code and governed by the
law which creates it.

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3. Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Commission on Audit, et al. - BONIFACIO
FACTS: Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (PSPCA), herein petitioner, is a juridical entity
which was incorporatd by virtue of Act No. 1285 by the Philippine Commission in 1905. Primarily composed of
animal aficionados, the objective of the group was to enforce laws for the protection of animals in the country and
for the promotion of their welfare, as stated in their charter. Act No. 1285 was enacted ahead of both the
Corporation Law and the constitution of the Securities and Exchange Commission. In line with their objectives, the
petitioner was granted by its charter to apprehend violators of animal welfare laws and to share one-half () of the
fines imposed and collected through its efforts for violations of laws related thereto. But this power of the petitioner
was recalled by virtue of the enactment of C.A. 148.

An audit team of the COA, herein respondents, visited the petitioners office to conduct an audit survey.
The petitioner contested that being a private entity, it was beyond the general jurisdiction of COA as provided for
by Sec .2(1), Art. IX of the Constitution. They argue that PSPCA was created by special legislation when there
was no other general law under which it may be organized and incorporated, nor SEC which would have passed
upon the same. Also, they aver that Executive Order No. 63, which enacted C.A. 148, underscore the fact that
PSPCA exercises no governmental function. Thus, the government by itself and its overt acts confirmed
petitioners status as a private entity.

COA asserted that PSPA was subject to its authority to which petitioner responded by filing a request for
re-evaluation on COAs finding of their jurisdiction over PSPA and insisting that it was a private domestic
corportaion. Acting on the said request, the General Councel of COA affirmed its earlier findings and informed
PSPCA the results of the re-evaluation which was similar to the initial evaluation. Thereafter, it was forwarded to
COA Assistant Commissioner that the audit survey was not conducted because the petitioner refused to submit to
the same, insisting that it was a private entity.

PSPCA received the questioned correspondence which ordered that the COA audit team shall conduct the
necessary audit survey on the petitioner which prompted them to file a special civil action for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 2 of Rule 64.

ISSUE: Whether or not PSPCA is within the general jurisdiction of COA

HELD: NO. The charter test cannot be applied in the case at bar. It is predicated on the legal regime established
by the 1935 Constitution, Sec.7, Art. XIII. Since the underpinnings of the charter test had been introduced by the
1935 Constitution and not earlier, the test cannot be applied to PSPCA which was incorporated on January 19,
1905. Laws, generally, have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. There are a few exceptions: (1)
when expressly provided; (2) remedial statutes; (3) curative statutes; and (4) laws interpreting others. None of the
exceptions apply in the instant case.

The mere fact that a corporation has been created by a special law doesnt necessarily qualify it as a public
corporation. At the time PSPCA was formed, the Philippine Bill of 1902 was the applicable law and no proscription
similar to the charter test can be found therein. There was no restriction on the legislature to create private
corporations in 1903. The amendments introduced by CA 148 made it clear that PSPCA was a private
corporation, not a government agency.

PSPCAs charter shows that it is not subject to control or supervision by any agency of the State. Like all private
corporations, the successors of its members are determined voluntarily and solely by the petitioner, and may
exercise powers generally accorded to private corporations.

PSPCAs employees are registered and covered by the SSS at the latters initiative and not through the GSIS.

The fact that a private corporation is impressed with public interest does not make the entity a public corporation.
They may be considered quasi-public corporations which are private corporations that render public service,
supply public wants and pursue other exemplary objectives. The true criterion to determine whether a corporation
is public or private is found in the totality of the relation of the corporate to the State. It is public if it is created by
the latters own agency or instrumentality, otherwise, it is private.

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4. The Province of North Cotabato v. the Gov. of the Republic of the Phils. Peace Panel - BRINAS
FACTS: On Aug. 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through
the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels (Rodolfo Garcia and Mohagher Iqbal), were
scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF
Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The MOA-AD contained, among others, the
commitment of the parties to pursue peace negotiations, protect and respect human rights, negotiate with sincerity
in the resolution and pacific settlement of the conflict, and refrain from the use of threat or force to attain undue
advantage while the peace negotiations on the substantive agenda are on-going.

On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Pinol filed a petition for
mandamus and prohibition with prayer for the insurance of writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents to
disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing,
pending the disclosure of the contents and the holding of a public consultation. They also pray that the MOA-AD
be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not the MOA-AD is constitutional?

DOCTRINE: The Constitution does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State,
much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for
independence.

HELD: NO, the MOA-AD is not constitutional, because it contains numerous provisions that cannot be
reconciled with the Constitution and other pertinent laws. No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is
recognized under our laws as having an associative relationship with the national government. This concept
implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It
also presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implied that the same is on its way to independence.

Features/Stipulations of the MOA-AD

Grounds the right to self-governance of the Bangsamoro people on the past suzerain authority of the
sultanates. The territory defined as the Bangsamoro homeland was ruled by several sultanates and, specifically in
the case of the Maranao, by the Pat a Pangampongku Ranaw, a confederation of independent principalities
(pangampong) each ruled by datus and sultans, none of whom was supreme over the others.
Mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the authority and
jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro.
The core of the BJE is defined as the present geographic area of the ARMM - thus constituting the following
areas: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City. Significantly, this core also
includes certain municipalities of Lanao del Norte that voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite.
Outside of this core, the BJE is to cover other provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which are
grouped into two categories, Category A and Category B. Each of these areas is to be subjected to a plebiscite to
be held on different dates, years apart from each other. Thus, Category A areas are to be subjected to a plebiscite
not later than twelve (12) months following the signing of the MOA-AD. Category B areas, also called "Special
Intervention Areas," on the other hand, are to be subjected to a plebiscite twenty-five (25) years from the signing
of a separate agreement - the Comprehensive Compact.
BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural resources within its "internal waters," defined as extending fifteen
(15) kilometers from the coastline of the BJE area.
BJE shall also have "territorial waters," which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the
baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within
these territorial waters, the BJE and the "Central Government" (used interchangeably with RP) shall exercise joint
jurisdiction, authority and management over all natural resources.
Describes the relationship of the Central Government and the BJE as "associative," characterized by
shared authority and responsibility. And it states that the structure of governance is to be based on executive,
legislative, judicial, and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the Comprehensive
Compact.
Provides that its provisions requiring "amendments to the existing legal framework" shall take effect upon
signing of the Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the aforesaid amendments, with due regard to the
non-derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive
Compact.
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5. Basco v. PAGCOR - CABANGBANG

FACTS: Petitioners filed the instant petition seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and
because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because it constitutes: (a) A waiver of a
right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the Manila City governments right to
impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law; and (b) For the same reason stated in the immediately
preceding paragraph, the law has intruded into the local governments right to impose local taxes and license
fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy.

ISSUE: Whether PD 1869 is valid?

1. Whether the exemption clause in PD 1869 is violative of the principle of local autonomy.
2. Whether the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violative by PD 1869.

HELD: The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

1. The Court held that the contention of the petitioner is without merit. The City of Manila, being a mere
Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. The Charter of Manila is subject to control by
Congress. It should be stressed that municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress which has the
power to create and abolish municipal corporations due to its general legislative powers. The City of Manilas
power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. Therefore, only the National Government has
the power to issue licenses or permits for the operation of gambling.

Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a GOCC with
an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. Being an
instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its
operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government.

2. NO. The power of local government to impose taxes and fees is always subject to limitations which
Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an operative law until amended, repealed or revoked, its
exemption clause remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and
fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy. Besides, the
principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means decentralization. It does not make local
governments sovereign within the state or an imperium in imperio.

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6. Lina v. Pano - DEIPARINE

FACTS: On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz,
Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayors permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in
a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 which was issued on September 18, 1995. The
ordinance prohibits any form of gambling in Laguna. Respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief
with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, asking for the enjoining therein defendants
from enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg 508. RTC ruled in favor of Calvento hence this present petition.

ISSUE: Whether Kapasiyahan Blg 508 is Valid

DOCTRINE: Freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually
enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress.

HELD: NO. The ordinance, however, merely states the objection of the council to the said game. It is but a mere
policy statement on the part of the local council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a valid ground to
prohibit the operation of the lotto system in the province of Laguna. Even petitioners admit as much. As a policy
statement expressing the local governments objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the local
governments autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national governments. However, this
freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go
against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and
should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.
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7. Limbona v. Mangelin - DESUASIDO

FACTS: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or
Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam,
Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as
Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government officials. Petitioner
accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be
no session in November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of Congress. However, on
November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was unseated
from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that
he was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution
from the Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had
"filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which should have
been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the petition had
become "moot and academic" because its resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or regions. What is
the extent of self-government given to the autonomous governments of Region XII?

HELD: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization

of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and
accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and
enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only
to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that
he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from
central authorities.

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is
subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of
"autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the
supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). If
the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond
the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines
are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our
jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao
persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power).
PD No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and
control over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of
the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.

This case involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy.
We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy.

Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacaang and the other
beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.

Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under
Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by
direction of the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still
invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled
matter whether or not he could do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim
Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Also, assuming
that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake.
What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny.
Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground
of good faith.

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8. Disomangcop v. Datumanong - DIMACULANGAN

FACTS: For the first time in its history after three Constitutions, the Philippines ordained the establishment of
regional autonomy with the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. Sections 1 and 15, Article X mandate the creation of
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Republic
Act No. 6734 was enacted and the same contains elaborate provisions on the powers of the Regional
Government and the areas of jurisdiction which are reserved for the National Government and also, it called for
the holding of a plebiscite in various provinces. In accordance with R.A. 6734, President Aquino issued E.O. 426,
which placed the control and supervision of the Offices of the Department of Public Works and Highways within
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao under the Autonomous Regional Government. Eventually, the
ARMM was formally organized on November 06, 1990. At the time of the inauguration, the powers of seven
cabinet departments were already devolved to ARMM.
Nine years later, then DPWH Secretary issued D.O. 119, which created the Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office that had jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projects and facilities under the DPWH
within Marawi City and the province of Lanao del Sur. Two years later, R.A. 8999 was enacted which created an
engineering district in Marawi, and an office therefor. Further, Congress enacted R.A. 9054 which was an act to
strengthen and expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. In pursuant to the latter
law, a plebiscite was again held and the results saw both the cities of Marawi and Basilan join the ARMM. R.A.
6734 and R.A. 9054 are collectively referred to as the ARMM Organic Acts.
In light of the results of the plebiscite, petitioners now sought for the revocation of D.O. 119 and the non-
implementation of R.A. 8999. No action was taken, thus this petition. Petitioners contend that D.O. 119 violates
the constitutional autonomy of the ARMM and that tasked the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office with
functions that have already been devolved to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur.
However, in its response, the Solicitor General contends that the powers of the autonomous regions did not
diminish the legislative power of Congress

ISSUE: 1. Is D.O. 119 valid?

2. Is. R.A. 8999 valid?

HELD: NO. The office created under D.O. 119, having essentially the same powers, is a duplication of the DPWH-
ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur formed under the aegis of E.O. 426. The department order, in
effect, takes back powers which have been previously devolved under the said executive order. D.O. 119 runs
counter to the provisions of E.O. 426. The DPWH's order, like spring water, cannot rise higher than its source of
powerthe Executive.

NO. The Supreme Court held that R.A. 8999 is patently inconsistent with R.A. 9054 which is a later law.
The latter law advances the constitutional grant of autonomy by detailing the powers of the ARMM which covers
among others Lanao del Sur. However, R.A. 8999 ventures to reestablish the National Government's jurisdiction
over the infrastructure programs in Lanao del Sur. It is therefore inconsistent with R.A. 9054, and it destroys the
latter law's objective of devolution of the functions of DPWH in line with the policy of the Constitution to grant
LGUs meaningful and authentic regional autonomy. R.A. 8999 contravenes true decentralization which is the
essence of regional autonomy.

The idea behind the Constitutional provisions for autonomous regions is to allow the separate
development of peoples with distinctive cultures and traditions. A necessary prerequisite of autonomy is
decentralization. To this end, Section 16, Article X limits the power of the President over autonomous regions. In
essence, the provision also curtails the power of Congress over autonomous regions. Consequently, Congress
will have to re-examine national laws and make sure that they reflect the Constitution's adherence to local
autonomy. And in case of conflicts, the underlying spirit which should guide its resolution is the Constitution's
desire for genuine local autonomy.

However, the creation of autonomous regions does not signify the establishment of a sovereignty distinct
from that of the Republic, as it can be installed only "within the framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines."
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9. Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals - GAMO

FACTS:

On July 28, 1986, the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210 which granted Batangas CATV a
permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolution provides that
petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified therein, "provided, however, that
any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.

In November 1993, Batangas CATV increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to 180.00 per month. The
Batangas Mayor wrote to Batangas CATV a letter threatening to cancel the permit unless it secures the approval
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Batangas CATV filed with the Batangas City RTC a petition for injuction alleging
that the Sangguniang Panlungsod had no authority to regulate the subscriber rates because under Executive
Order No. 205, the National Telecommunications Commission has the sole authority to regulate CATVs. The RTC
decided in favor of Batangas CATV as (1) Resolution No. 210 violates the deregulation policy passed by the NTC
in August 25, 1989 and that (2) LGUs cannot exercise regulatory power over CATV operations without appropriate
legislation.

The trial court held that the enactment of Resolution No. 210 by respondent violates the States deregulation
policy as set forth by then NTC Commissioner Jose Luis A. Alcuaz in his Memorandum dated August 25, 1989.
Also, it pointed out that the sole agency of the government which can regulate CATV operation is the NTC, and
that the LGUs cannot exercise regulatory power over it without appropriate legislation. The respondents elevated
the case to the CA. The CA reversed and set aside the decision. The CA held that while the NTC is grants the
Certificate of Authority, this does not preclude the Sangguniang Panlungsod from regulating CATVs under the
general welfare clause of the local Government Code.

Hence, Batangas CATV filed an instant petition for review on certiorari contending that while the Local
Government Code of 1991 extends to the LGUs the general power to perform any act that will benefit their
constituents, nonetheless, it does not authorize them to regulate the CATV operation. Pursuant to E.O. No. 205,
only the NTC has the authority to regulate the CATV operation, including the fixing of subscriber rates.

Respondents counter that Resolution No. 210 was enacted pursuant to Section 177(c) and (d) of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 337, the Local Government Code of 1983, which authorizes LGUs to regulate businesses. The
term "businesses" necessarily includes the CATV industry. And second, Resolution No. 210 is in the nature of a
contract between petitioner and respondents, it being a grant to the former of a franchise to operate a CATV
system. To hold that E.O. No. 205 amended its terms would violate the constitutional prohibition against
impairment of contracts.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators within its
territorial jurisdiction?

Doctrine: It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws
of the state. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide application is universally
held to be invalid. The principle is frequently expressed in the declaration that municipal authorities, under a
general grant of power, cannot adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit of a state law or repugnant to the general
policy of the state. In every power to pass ordinances given to a municipality, there is an implied restriction that
the ordinances shall be consistent with the general law.
HELD:
No. President Marcos and President Aquino, in the exercise of their legislative power, issued P.D. No. 1512, E.O.
No. 546 and E.O. No. 205. Hence, they have the force and effect of statutes or laws passed by Congress. 24 That
the regulatory power stays with the NTC is also clear from President Ramos E.O. No. 436 mandating that the
regulation and supervision of the CATV industry shall remain vested "solely" in the NTC.

It must be emphasized that when E.O. No. 436 decrees that the "regulatory power" shall be vested "solely" in the
NTC, it pertains to the "regulatory power" over those matters which are peculiarly within the NTCs competence,
eg. (1) determination of rates, (2) issuance of "certificates of authority. Within these areas, the NTC reigns
supreme as it possesses the exclusive power to regulate -- a power comprising varied acts, such as "to fix,
establish, or control; to adjust by rule, method or established mode; to direct by rule or restriction; or to subject to
governing principles or laws."

There is no dispute that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, like other local legislative bodies, has been
empowered to enact ordinances and approve resolutions under the general welfare clause of R.A. No. 7160 (the
Local Government Code of 1991). Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the
general welfare clause. This is primarily because the CATV system crosses public properties to reach its
subscribers.

However, Resolution No. 210 violates the mandate existing laws and the States deregulation policy. Resolution
No. 210 is an enactment of an LGU acting only as agent of the national legislature. Necessarily, its act must
reflect and conform to the will of its principal. The apparent defect in Resolution No. 210 is that it contravenes E.O.
No. 205 and E.O. No. 436 insofar as it permits respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod to usurp a power exclusively
vested in the NTC. Since E.O. No. 205, a general law, mandates that the regulation of CATV operations shall be
exercised by the NTC, an LGU cannot enact an ordinance or approve a resolution in violation of the said law.

To say that LGUs exercise the same regulatory power over matters which are peculiarly within the NTCs
competence is to promote a scenario of LGUs and the NTC locked in constant clash over the appropriate
regulatory measure on the same subject matter. LGUs must recognize that technical matters concerning CATV
operation are within the exclusive regulatory power of the NTC. Resolution No. 210 also violated the States
deregulation policy. When the State declared a policy of deregulation, the LGUs are bound to follow.

Municipal corporations are bodies politic and corporate, created not only as local units of local self-government,
but as governmental agencies of the state. The legislature, by establishing a municipal corporation, does not
divest the State of any of its sovereignty; absolve itself from its right and duty to administer the public affairs of the
entire state; or divest itself of any power over the inhabitants of the district which it possesses before the charter
was granted. When the Drafters of the 1987 Constitution enunciated the policy of ensuring the autonomy
of local governments, it was never their intention to create an imperium in imperio and install an intra-
sovereign political subdivision independent of a single sovereign state.

The RTC Decision is affirmed.

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10. Judge Dadole v. Commission on Audit - LIM

FACTS: In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving monthly allowances through the
yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the said city. In 1991,Mandaue City
increased the amount to P1,500 for each judge. On March 15, 1994, the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) issued the disputed Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which provided that such additional allowances
in the form of honorarium at rates shall be granted but it shall not exceed P1,000.00 in provinces and cities and
P700.00 in municipalities subject to the following conditions: a) That the grant is not mandatory on the part of the
LGUs; b) That all contractual and statutory obligations of the LGU including the implementation of R.A. 6758 shall
have been fully provided in the budget; c) That the budgetary requirements/limitations under Section 324 and 325
of R.A. 7160 should be satisfied and/or complied with; and d) That the LGU has fully implemented the devolution
of functions/personnel in accordance with R.A.7160.
Acting on the DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowance to petitioners.Beginning
October, 1994, the additional monthly allowances of the petitioner judges were reduced to P1,000 each. They
were also asked to reimburse the amount they received in excess of P1,000 from April to September, 1994. The
petitioner judges filed with the Office of the City Auditor a protest against the notices of disallowance. But the City
Auditor treated the protest as a motion for reconsideration and indorsed the same to the COA Regional Office No.
7. In turn, the COA Regional Office referred the motion to the head office with a recommendation that the same be
denied. On November 27, 1995, Executive Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, for and in behalf of the petitioner
judges, filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the COA. In a resolution dated May 28,1996, the COA
denied the motion. Hence, this petition. Petitioner judges argue that LBC 55 is void for infringing on the local
autonomy of Mandaue City. They also maintain that said circular is not supported by any law and therefore goes
beyond the supervisory powers of the President. Respondent COA, on the other hand, insists that the
constitutional and statutory authority of a city government to provide allowances to judges stationed therein is not
absolute. Congress may set limitations on the exercise of autonomy. It is for the President, through the DBM, to
check whether these legislative limitations are being followed by the local government units.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) is void for going beyond the supervisory
powers of the president.

HELD: Yes. Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of local
autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the President.
Sec 4 Art X of 1987 Constitution: "The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. x x x" The said provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control.

The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos of the President. As such, they are
subject to the power of control of the President; he will see to it that the local governments or their officials were
performing their duties as provided by the Constitution and by statutes, at whose will and behest they can be
removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. They are subject to the
President's supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate
powers. The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a LGU if he or she finds that the latter has
acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the President's supervisory powers over LGUs.

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11. Pimentel v. Aguirre, et al. - MANGILA

FACTS: The President issued AO 327 Sec 1 wherein it requires local government units to reduce their
expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services. Sec. 4 AO 327 also
withheld internal revenue allotment (IRA) to local government units to amount equivalent to 10%.

Petitioner contends that the President, in issuing AO 372 was exercising power of control over LGUs. Petitioner
further argues that by withholding the 10% of their IRA is in contravention of the provisions of the Local
Government Code and of the Constitution which provides for the automatic release to each of these units its share
in the national internal revenue.

The respondents on the other hand claims that AO 372 was issued to alleviate the economic difficulties and
constituted merely an exercise of the Presidents power of supervision over LGUs. Respondents also claim that is
does not violate local fiscal autonomy as it merely directs local governments to identify measures that will reduce
their total expenditures. Lastly, respondents claim that the provision withholding the 10% of LGUs IRA does not
violate the statutory prohibition on the imposition of any lien on their revenue shares because such withholding is
temporary in nature pending the assessment by the Development Coordination Committee of the emerging fiscal
situation.
ISSUE: WON the provisions Sec. 1 of AO 372 that directs LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25% and
Sec 4 of the same which withholds 10% of their IRA are valid exercises of the Presidents power of general
supervision over local governments.

DOCTRINE: The Constitution vests the President with the power of supervision, not control, over local
government units (LGUs). While he may issue advisories and seek their cooperation in solving economic
difficulties, he cannot prevent them from performing their tasks and using available resources to achieve their
goals. He may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the law. Thus, the withholding of a
portion of internal revenue allotments legally due them cannot be directed by administrative fiat.

HELD: The Supreme Court upheld the validity of Sec. 1 of AO 327 as the order is merely advisory in
character, and does not constitute mandatory or binding order that interferes with local autonomy. However, the
Court ruled that Sec 4 of AO 327 is not a valid exercise of Presidents power of general supervision over local
governments. As mandated by the Constitution, the basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release
of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. Sec. 4, however, orders withholding 10% of the LGUs IRA;
such withholding contravenes the Constitution. Although temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback. The provision
encroaches the fiscal autonomy of local governments.
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12. Province of Batangas v. Romulo - MARCILLA

FACTS: On December 7, 1998, then President Joseph Estrada issued EO No. 48 entitled Establishing a
Program for Devolution Adjustment and Equalization to enhance the capacities of local government units in the
discharge of the functions and services devolved to them by the National Government Agencies concerned
pursuant to the Local Government Code.
The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora passed Resolutions No. OCD-99-
005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003 which were approved by Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The guidelines
formulated by the Oversight Committee required the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for funding under the
portion of LGSEF and submit the project proposals and other requirements to the DILG for appraisal before the
Committee serves notice to the DBM for the subsequent release of the corresponding funds.

The petitioner, represented by Governor Mandanas, petitioned to declare unconstitutional and void certain
provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as they uniformly
earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of P5billion for the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the
Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) & imposed conditions for the release thereof.

ISSUE:
Procedural Issues
1) Whether or not petitioner has locus standi to file the suit
2) Whether or not the issue had been rendered moot and academic
Substantive Issue
1) Whether or not the assailed provisos are unconstitutional

HELD:
Procedural Issues
1) YES. The Supreme Court held that petitioner possesses the requisite standing to maintain the present suit.
The petitioner, a local government unit, seeks relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and of
the other LGUs. This interest pertains to the LGUs share in the national taxes or the IRA. The petitioners
constitutional claim is, in substance, that the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD
resolutions contravene Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, mandating the automatic release to the LGUs of
their share in the national taxes.

2) NO. The Supreme Court held that there is compelling reason for this Court to resolve the substantive issue
raised by the instant petition. Supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from
rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. Another reason justifying the resolution by this
Court of the substantive issue now before it is the rule that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and
academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.
Substantive Issue
YES. The Supreme Court held that the provisos assailed in the General Appropriations Acts of 1999, 2000
and 2001, and the assailed OCD resolutions are unconstitutional. According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the Constitution,
the State shall ensure the local autonomy of local governments. Consistent with the principle of local autonomy,
the Constitution confines the Presidents power over the LGUs to one of general supervision, which has been
interpreted to exclude the power of control. Drilon v. Lim distinguishes supervision from control: control lays down
the rules in the doing of an act the officer has the discretion to order his subordinate to do or redo the act, or
decide to do it himself; supervision merely sees to it that the rules are followed but has no authority to set down
the rules or the discretion to modify/replace them.

The entire process involving the distribution & release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. The
LGSEF is part of the IRA or just share of the LGUs in the national taxes. Sec.6, Art.X of the Constitution
mandates that the just share shall be automatically released to the LGUs. Since the release is automatic, the
LGUs arent required to perform any act to receive the just share it shall be released to them without need of
further action. To subject its distribution & release to the vagaries of the implementing rules & regulations as
sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999-2001 and the OCD Resolutions would violate this
constitutional mandate.

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13. ACORD v. Zamora - MUNGCAL

FACTS:
Pres. Estrada submitted the National Expenditures program for fiscal year 2000. He proposed an IRA of
P121,778,000,000 and became the General Appropriations Act (GAA) for 2000. Under such law, the allocations
for the Local Government Units shall amount to P111,778,000,000. The controversy lies in the Unprogrammed
Fund part of the GAA which states that 10 Billion Pesos, in addition to the aforesaid amount, shall be used to fund
the IRA, which amount shall be released only when the original revenue targets submitted by the President to
Congress can be realized based on a quarterly assessment to be conducted by certain committees. The release
of the 10 Billion Pesos for the IRA is conditional, and based upon the accomplishment of the abovementioned
task.

Petitioners then assail the constitutionality of these provisions of the 2000 GAA, namely, Section 1, XXXVII (A),
and LIV (UNPROGRAMMED FUND) Special Provisions 1 and 4.
They contend that the said provisions violate the LGUs fiscal autonomy because it reduced the IRA and placed it
under Unprogrammed Fund, when it should be released immediately and automatically by the Executive as
mandated by Art. X, Sec 6.

ISSUE: WoN XXXVII (A), Section 1, and LIV Special Provisions 1 and 4 violated the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs
stated under Article X.

DOCTRINE: (Power of the President over LGUs)

The automatic release of the IRA (Internal Revenue Allotment) is mandated by the 1987 Constitution in Article X,
Section 6:
Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them.
The Constitution mandates the Executive branch to automatically release the just share of the taxes to the local
governments, and as such, it RESTRICTS the Legislature to create/pass laws that will prevent the executive
branch from performing its duty of automatic release of funds. Doing so will make the Executive disregard this
constitutional provision because of a subsequent legislative enactment, virtually making Art. X, Sec 6 amendable
by a statute, which is patently absurd.

Since only the just share is qualified by as determined by law, and not its automatic release, the implication is that
the Congress is not authorized by the Constitution to bar or impede the automatic release of the IRA.

HELD:
The petition is GRANTED, and XXXVII and LIV Special Provisions 1 and 4 are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
for setting apart a portion (10 Billion Pesos) of the IRA as Unprogrammed Fund. This decision mentions The
Province of Batangas v. Romulo:
It would be readily seen that the provision mandates that:
1. the LGUs shall have a just share in the national taxes
2. the just share shall be determined by law
3. the just share shall be automatically released to the LGUs
A basic feature of the local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal
revenue. By withholding the release of funds in the 2000 GAA upon the fulfillment of a condition would render the
automatic release and the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs nugatory.

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14. Kida v. Senate of the Philippines - NOBLE
FACTS: On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the
Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for
Other Purposes was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of August 2011, to the second
Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, to coincide with the countrys regular national and local
elections. The law as well granted the President the power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of the
Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who
shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections
shall have qualified and assumed office.

Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153 already spawned petitions against their
validity; House Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill No. 2756 were challenged in petitions filed with this Court. These
petitions multiplied after RA No. 10153 was passed.

The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws amend RA No.
9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections
1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become effective.

The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the
three-reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Also cited as grounds are the alleged
violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere to the elective and
representative character of the executive and legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners
challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective
ARMM officials until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed office.
Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of appointment also gave the President the power of control over the
ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates the Constitution

HELD: NO. The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the
exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in
order to be recognized. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which
classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint:

First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments
are vested in the President in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.[74]
Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of
officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed
law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.

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15. Gov. Villafuerte, Jr. and Prov. Of Camsur v. Robredo, - RUBIO

Doctrine: To safeguard the state policy on local autonomy, the Constitution confines the power of the President
over LGUs to mere supervision. The President exercises general supervision over them, but only to ensure that
local affairs are administered according to law. He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can
substitute their judgments with his own.

FACTS: In 1995, the Commission on Audit conducted an examination and audit on the manner the local
government units utilized their Internal Revenue Allotment for the calendar years 1993-1994.
The examination yielded an official report, showing that a substantial portion of the 20% development fund of
some LGUs was not actually utilized for development projects but was diverted to expenses properly chargeable
against the Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses, in violation of Section 287 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991.

Thus, on December 14, 1995, the DILG issued MC No. 95-216, enumerating the policies and guidelines on the
utilization of the development fund component of the IRA. It likewise carried a reminder to LGUs of the strict
mandate to ensure that public funds, like the 20% development fund, shall be spent judiciously and only for the
very purpose or purposes for which such funds are intended.

On September 20, 2005, then DILG Secretary Angelo T. Reyes and Department of Budget and Management
Secretary Romulo L. Neri issued Joint MC No. 1, series of 2005, pertaining to the guidelines on the appropriation
and utilization of the 20% of the IRA for development projects.

On August 31, 2010, the respondent, in his capacity as DILG Secretary, issued the assailed MC No. 2010-83,
entitled Full Disclosure of Local Budget and Finances, and Bids and Public Offerings, which aims to promote
good governance through enhanced transparency and accountability of LGUs.
On December 2, 2010, the respondent issued MC No. 2010-138,11 reiterating that 20% component of the IRA shall
be utilized for desirable social, economic and environmental outcomes essential to the attainment of the
constitutional objective of a quality of life for all.

On February 21, 2011, Villafuerte, then Governor of Camarines Sur, joined by the Provincial Government of
Camarines Sur, filed the instant petition for certiorari, seeking to nullify the assailed issuances of the respondent
for being unconstitutional and having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

Petitioners filed their Reply (With Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order). Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed memorandum circulars violate the principles of local and fiscal autonomy
enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC.

HELD: NO.
The Constitution has expressly adopted the policy of ensuring the autonomy of LGUs. It is also pursuant to the
mandate of the Constitution of enhancing local autonomy that the LGC was enacted.

To safeguard the state policy on local autonomy, the Constitution confines the power of the President over LGUs
to mere supervision. The President exercises general supervision over them, but only to ensure that local affairs
are administered according to law. He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their
judgments with his own.

A reading of MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a mere reiteration of an existing provision in the LGC. It was plainly
intended to remind LGUs to faithfully observe the directive stated in Section 287 of the LGC to utilize the 20%
portion of the IRA for development projects. It was, at best, an advisory to LGUs to examine themselves if they
have been complying with the law.

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16. Sema v. Comelec - SALONGA

FACTS: Maguindanao has 2 legislative districts. It forms part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) which was created under its Organic Act, (RA 6734), as amended by (RA 9054). Notwithstanding that
Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII,
having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held in November 1989.

On 28 August 2006 - the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create
provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao.

Later, three new municipalities were added to the original 8 municipalities constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing
its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its
second legislative district. As stated earlier, Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanaos first legislative district,
is not part of the Province of Maguindanao.

ISSUE: (1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
create provinces, is constitutional; and

(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for
such new province.

HELD: (1) and (2) No. No. There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional
legislative bodies the power to create municipalities and barangays, PROVIDED Sec 10, Art X of the Constitution
is followed. HOWEVER, creation of PROVINCES AND CITIES is another matter. According to Sec 5, par 3, Art VI
of the Constitution, each city with at least 250k, or each province, shall have at least 1 representative. Pursuant to
this provision, a province or a city with a population of 250k or more requires the power to create a legislative
district. THEREFORE, the delegation granted by the Congress through RA 9054 to the ARMM to create provinces
and cities is unconstitutional. Congress cannot validly delegate the power to create legislative districts for
the House of Reps, since the power to increase the allowable membership in the HOR and to reapportion
legislative districts, is VESTED EXCLUSIVELY IN CONGRESS.

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17. League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec - SANGALANG

FACTS: During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law RA 9009 amending Sec. 450 of the Local
Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from
P20M to P100M to restrain the mad rush of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in
the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.

Prior to its enactment, a total of 57 municipalities had Cityhood bills pending in Congress. Congress did not act on
24 cityhood bills during the 11th Congress. During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29. This Resolution reached the Senate. However, the 12th Congress adjourned without the Senate
approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the
unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed between November and December of 2006, through their respective
sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood bills containing a common provision that exempts them from the income
requirement.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause

ISSUE: Whether or not the Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional for it violates Sec. 10, Art X of the Constitution

DOCTRINE: The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government
Code and not in any other law.

HELD: *PLEASE TAKE NOTE OF THIS, IBA RULING NA SINASABI NI NACHURA,CHECK PAGE 706 OF HIS
BOOK :)*

Yes, the Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional for it violates Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. The
Constitution is clear that the creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law. It is important to remember that there is only one Local Government
Code.

In this case, the Cityhood Laws, which are unmistakably laws other than the Local Government Code, provided for
an exemption from the increased income requirement for the creation of cities under Sec.450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws contravene the letter intent of Sec.10, Art. X of
the Constitution for providing an exemption to the income requirement laid down by the Local Government Code.

Congress is not prohibited from amending the Local Government Code itself, as what Congress did by enacting
RA 9009 (which was actually prior to the Cityhood Laws). Indisputably, the act of amending laws comprises an
integral part of the Legislatures law-making power. The unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact
that the Congress provided an exemption contrary to the express provision of the Constitution that no city shall
be created except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code. In other words, the
Congress exceeded and abused its law-making power, rendering the challenged Cityhood Laws void for being
violative of the Constitution.

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18. Navarro v. Ermita - SIMEON

FACTS: Republic Act No. 9355 created the province of Dinagat Islands, formerly part of Surigao Del Norte. It was
questioned for constitutionality for not being in compliance with the population or the land area requirements of the
Local Government Code under Sec. 461. Petitioner contends that when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land
area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population of only 106,951, failing to comply with Section 10, Article
X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC which provides that a province may be created if it has 1.) a
continuous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management
Bureau; or 2.) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office:

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9355 is constitutional?

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that RA 9355 is constitutional. Article 9(2) of the Local Government Code -
Implementing Rules and Regulations, which substantiate the real intent of the lawmakers of the Local
Government Code for its efficient and effective implementation, thereby ensuring compliance with the principles of
local autonomy as defined under the Constitution., provides that The land area requirement shall not apply where
the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands. Such provision is to promote development in the
previously underdeveloped and uninhabited land areas such as Dinagat.

The Supreme Court also added that what is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of
viability of a local government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking
into account its average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of
Local Government Finance, which is four times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the
creation of a province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and
sustainable.Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait
accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagats existence as a province, they must be seen
from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province.
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19. Miranda v. Aguirre - SY

FACTS: Petitioner assails the constitutionality of R.A. 8528 that will convert the city of Santiago, Isabela from an
independent city to a component city of the Province of Isabela. Petitioner argues that the lack of provision to
submit the law for ratification by the residents in a proper plebiscite is a violation of the requirements of Sec. 10,
Art. 10 of the Constitution and Sec. 10, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code. Respondents on the other hand
argue that the petition raises a political issue and that the reclassification of Santiago did not involve any creation,
division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries that would require a plebiscite.

ISSUE: Does R.A. 8528 violate the Constitution and the Local Government Code by not requiring a plebiscite?

HELD: Sec. 10, Art. 10 of the Constitution and Sec. 10, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code intended for a
plebiscite to be held because of the material change in the political and economic rights of the local government
unit and its people. The downgrading of Santiago from an independent city to a component city of the Province of
Isabela diminishes the independence of the city as a political unit because its reclassification would introduce
substantial changes in the political culture and administrative responsibilities of Santiago. A plebiscite therefore is
needed to validly reclassify the city of Santiago from an independent city to a component city. Furthermore, the
Constitution imposes 2 conditions for a city to be altered substantially: it must meet the criteria fixed by the Local
Government Code and it must be approved by the people. Secs. 7, 8, and 9 of the Local Government Code
involve requirements on income, population, and land area, which are designed to achieve an economic purpose;
while a plebiscite is required to achieve a political purpose. R.A. 8528 is unconstitutional for substantially altering
the city of Santiago without requiring a plebiscite.
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20. Samson v. Aguirre - SY

FACTS: Petitioner assails the constitutionality of R.A. 8535 creating the city of Novaliches out of 15 barangays of
Quezon City.Petitioner argues that R.A. 8535 failed to conform to the requirements of Secs. 7, 11(a), and 450(a)
of the Local Government Code because of the absence of certifications concerning income, population and land
area, and the adverse effect by the creation of Novaliches to Quezon City. Respondent argues that petitioner
failed to substantiate the allegations with convincing proof.

ISSUE: Does R.A. 8535 fail to conform to Secs. 7, 11(a), and 450(a) of the Local Government Code?

HELD: During the hearings held by the Senate Committee on Local Government, resource persons from different
government offices like the National Statistics Office, Bureau of Local Government Finance, Land Management
Bureau, and Department of Budget Management provided information that the average annual income of the
barangays for the years 1995 and 1996 was around Php 26.9 Million, over the minimum requirement of Php 20
Million; and the population of the barangays were around 347,310, more than the minimum requirement of
150,000. The official statements by the officers can serve the same purpose contemplated by law requiring
certificates. With regard to Sec. 11(a), Sec. 12 of the Local Government Code, which serves as a complement to
Sec. 11(a), states that existing government facilities may serve as the seat of government. Finally, with regard to
the adverse effect of the creation of Novaliches will have on Quezon City, the mayor of Quezon City as its chief
executive would be the first to protest any development that might prove detrimental to Quezon City. The fact he
did not raise any adverse issues during the public hearings is indicative of the non-existence of any detriment to
the land area, population, and income of Quezon City. R.A. 8535, therefore, is constitutional.
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21. Alvarez v. Guingona - SIMEON

FACTS: HB No. 8817, entitled An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component
City to be known as the City of Santiago, was filed in the House of Representatives. It was subsequently referred
to the House Committee on Local Government and the House Committee on Appropriations and passed the three
readings required for legislation before it was transmitted to the Senate. However, a counterpart of HB No. 8817,
Senate Bill No. 1243, entitled, An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City
to be Known as the City of Santiago, was filed in the Senate by Senator Sotto.The House of Representatives,
upon being apprised of the action of the Senate, approved the amendments proposed by the Senate. The SB No.
1234 was then transmitted to the President and was subsequently signed into a law and was known as RA 7720.
When a plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the registered voters of Santiago voted
in favor of the conversion of Santiago into a city.

Petitioners Alvarez et al question the constitutionality of Republic Act 7720 mainly because the Act allegedly did
not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. Also, petitioners claims that Santiago could not qualify into a component city because its average
annual income for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices is only P13,109,560.47.
Hence, Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average annual income which is P20,000,000 required
under Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in order to be converted into a component city. That the
certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance, which indicates
Santiagos average annual income to be P20,974,581.97, is not accurate as the Internal Revenue Allotments were
not excluded from the computation. Petitioners asseverate that the IRAs are not actually income but transfers and
or budgetary aid from the national government and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on factors
like population, land and equal sharing.

ISSUE: (I) Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the computation of the
average annual income of a municipality for purposes of its conversion into an independent component city

(II) Whether or not, considering that the Senate passed SB No. 1243, its own version of HB No. 8817,
Republic Act No. 7720 can be said to have originated in the House of Representatives.

HELD: (I) Yes. Section 450 (c) of the Local Government Code provides that the average annual income shall
include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the same as a special
fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government
Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of
funding support from the national government, its instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled
corporations. Thus, Department of Finance Order No. 3593 correctly encapsulizes the full import of the above
disquisition when it defined ANNUAL INCOME to be revenues and receipts realized by provinces, cities and
municipalities from regular sources of the Local General Fund including the internal revenue allotment and other
shares provided for in Sections 284, 290 and 291 of the Code, but exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as
other national aids, grants, financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets, and similar others (Italics
ours). Such order, constituting executive or contemporaneous construction of a statute by an administrative
agency charged with the task of interpreting and applying the same, is entitled to full respect and should be
accorded great weight by the courts, unless such construction is clearly shown to be in sharp conflict with the
Constitution, the governing statute, or other laws.

(II) Yes. Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that All appropriation, revenue or tariff
bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments simply
means that such bills shall come from the initiative of the House of Representatives and does not prohibit the filing
in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the
Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

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22. Mariano v. COMELEC - SANGALANG

FACTS: 2 petitions assailing cerain provisions of R.A. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A No.7854 is entitled An
Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati. One
petition was filed by Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as taxpayers and
the other petition filed by John H. Osmena as senator, taxpayer, and concerned citizen.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Sec. 2 of R.A No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial
jurisdiction of Makati specifying the metes and bounds with technical description in relation with Sec. 7 and Sec.
450 of the Local Government Code
(2) Whether or not Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the 3 consecutive term limit of local
elective officials, in violation of Sec.8, Art. X and Sec. 7, Art. VI of the Constitution
(3) Whether the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional as the reapportionment
cannot be made by a special law
HELD:
(1) NO because Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 properly identified the land area, the provision states that:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city
to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the
present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has
jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the
Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by
the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.

The Court ruled that so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably ascertained, i.e, by
referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be concluded that the
legislative intent behind the law has been sufficiently served. Certainly, the Congress did not intend the laws
creating new cities must contain therein technical descriptions similar to those appearing in Torrens titles, as
petitioners seem to imply. The manifest intent of the Code is to empower local government units and to give them
their rightful due; thus, invalidating R.A. No. 7854 on the ground of lack of technical description would defeat the
spirit of the Code.

(2) Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that:

Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of the Municipality of
Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions
until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and
assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive
officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their functions and duties and
they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati.

Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution provide the following:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which
shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election.

No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained by the Court as the premise on the issue is on the
occurrence of many contingent events. Petitioners argue that under these provisions, incumbent Makati Mayor
Jejomar Binay who has already served 2 consecutive terms may decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in
the coming elections, he can still run for the same position and seek another 3 consecutive term since his 3 year
consecutive term as municipal mayor would not be counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that Sec. 52 of R.A.7854
has been crafted to suit the political ambitions of Binay. Considering that these events may or may not happen,
petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Moreover,
only Mariano among the petitioners is a resident of Taguig and are not the proper parties to raise this abstract
issue.

(3) NO, reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as the charter of a new
city. Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides that the Congress may be comprised of not more
than two hundred fifty members, unless otherwise provided by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not
preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the
law. This is exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in
Makatis legislative district

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23. Cawaling Jr. v. COMELEC - SALONGA

FACTS: On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an Act Creating
The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And
Appropriating Funds Therefor.

Pursuant to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, COMELEC conducted a plebiscite in the Municipalities of
Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification.

Thereafter, the Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers (PCBC) proclaimed the creation of the City of Sorsogon as
having been ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite.

Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer of the former Municipality of Sorsorgon, Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr.
filed a petition to enjoin the further implementation of R.A. No. 8806 for being unconstitutional, contending, in
essence, that:

The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450(a) of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires that only a municipality or a
cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city.

Section 10, Art X - No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected.

Section 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into
a component city xxx

The petitioner assails the RA 8806 because according to him, Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code
(LGC) states that, a component city may be created only by converting a municipality or a cluster of barangays,
not by merging two municipalities, as what R.A. No. 8806 has done.

ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is correct?

DOCTRINE: The phrase A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city is not
a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may be created.

HELD: No. The petitioners constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the LGC is wrong. The phrase A municipality
or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city is not a criterion but simply one of the modes
by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, quoted earlier and which petitioner cited
in support of his argument, allows the merger of local government units to create a province, city, municipality or
barangay in accordance with the criteria established by the LGC. Thus, Section 8 of the LGC distinctly provides:

Section 8. Division and Merger - Division and merger of existing local government units shall comply
with the same requirements herein prescribed for their creation: Provided, however, That such division
shall not reduce the income, population, or land area of the local government unit or units concerned to
less than the minimum requirements prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That the income
classification of the original local government unit or units shall not fall below its current income
classification prior to such division. x x x.

Verily, the creation of an entirely new local government unit through a division or a merger of existing local
government units is recognized under the Constitution, provided that such merger or division shall comply with the
requirements prescribed by the Code.

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24. Aquino v. Comelec - RUBIO

FACTS:
In this original action, petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public
officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716.

On 12 October 2009 Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and
Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative
District From Such Reapportionment."was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo

I n substance, the said law created an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by
reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.
Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were
reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district
municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second
district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit
constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the
creation of a legislative district.The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first
and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a
population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum
population standard.The provision reads:

Article VI

Section 5.(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least
one representative.

On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, seek the dismissal of the present
petition.
The respondents call attention to an apparent distinction between cities and provinces drawn by Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

The respondents concede the existence of a 250,000 population condition, but argue that a plain and simple
reading of the questioned provision will show that the same has no application with respect to the creation of
legislative districts in provinces.Rather, the 250,000 minimum population is only a requirement for the creation of a
legislative district in a city.

ISSUE: whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a
new legislative district in a province.

HELD: Yes.
We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption of
constitutionality.Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a clear showing that a
specific provision of the fundamental law has been violated or transgressed. When there is neither a violation of a
specific provision of the Constitution nor any proof showing that there is such a violation, the presumption of
constitutionality will prevail and the law must be upheld. To doubt is to sustain.

There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a
legislative district.

As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a
minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district.

The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and
the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative,
with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be
similarly entitled.

The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities was, in turn, the subject of
interpretation by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC.The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000
minimum population requirement for cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3),
Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a
representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional
district.

Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province which, by
virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government
Code states:

Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices
and either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management
Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National
Statistics Office.

Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to
the indispensable income requirement.

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25. Tan v. Comelec - NOBLE

FACTS: This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New Province
in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay,
Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R.
Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto proposed to belong to the new province).
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3, 1986.
Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in
complete accord with the Local Government Code because:

The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of the new
province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite.
The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km.,
which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the Constitution,
which states that Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished,
or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government
Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected?

HELD: NO. Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the
boundaries, the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected must first be obtained.
The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration
of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent province).

Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent
province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity
would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province
of Negros del Norte.

Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, the
dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is applicable, to wit:
when the Constitution speaks of the unit or units affected it means all of the people of the municipality if the
municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a
merger.

The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the
boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue
the points raised by the petitioners.
SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.
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26. Dela Cruz v. Paras - MUNGCAL

FACTS:
The Municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan issued a Prohibition and Closure ordinance (Ordinance no. 84) to prohibit the
issuance and renewal of licenses for night clubs, cabarets and dance halls, and the revocation of existing
licenses. The prohibition is because it is alleged in the ordinance that such establishments are the principal cause
in the decadence of morality and because of their other adverse effects on the community. Petitioners allege that
such ordinance is null and void because municipalities have no authority to prohibit a lawful business, occupation
or calling.

ISSUE: Can a LGU absolutely prohibit the operation of night clubs and the employment of hostesses with
Ordinance no. 84?

DOCTRINE: (Police Power of LGUs under General Welfare Clause)

It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare clause must
be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the
laws or policy of the State. The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not
repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it
by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof,
and for the protection of property therein.

The general welfare clause has two branches: One branch attaches itself to the main trunk of municipal authority,
and relates to such ordinances and regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the
powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law. With this class we are not here directly
concerned. The second branch of the clause is much more independent of the specific functions of the council
which are enumerated by law. It authorizes such ordinances as shall seem necessary and proper to provide
for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and
convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.

HELD:
NO. The petition is GRANTED, and Ordinance no. 84 is declared NULL AND VOID. Municipal corporations
cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs, but they can, however, regulate them. The Local Government Code
only grants municipalities the power of regulation and not total prohibition of the exercise of a legitimate trade.
Should the municipality strive to accomplish the end of fostering good public morals, then regulation and not
absolute prohibition is sufficient to serve such end.

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27. Binay v. Domingo - MARCILLA

FACTS: Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which extends
P500 burial assistance to bereaved families whose gross family income does not exceed P2,000.00 a month. The
funds are to be taken out of the unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila
Commission approved the resolution. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000.00
for the implementation of the program. Resolution No. 60 was referred to COA and the same was disapproved
and disallowed the disbursements because there was no connection or relation between the objective sought to
be attained under Resolution No. 60 and the alleged public safety, general welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of
Makati.

ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a
valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause.

HELD: YES. The Supreme Court held that there was a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare
clause. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with
civilized government. Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant
thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary
to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and
proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public
morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the
protection of property therein." Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience
of the people. Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers.
In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. It is elastic and must be responsive to
various social conditions. The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor
has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.

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28. Tano v. Socrates - MANGILA

FACTS: The Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an Ordinance banning the shipment of
all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City. To implement said city ordinance the Mayor issued Office
Order which authorize to conduct necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped
out in order to ascertain whether the shipper possessed the required Mayors Permit. Futher,
SangguniangPanlalawigan issued a resolution which prohibits gathering and selling of live marine coral aquatic
organisms. Both ordinances have two principal objectives: 1. To establish a closed season for species of fish or
aquatic animals for period of 5 yrs and 2. To protect the corals of marine waters of Puerto Princesa from further
destruction.

The Petitioners contend that 1. the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, 2. the Mayor had the
absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue permit because the Office Order issued contained no
regulation nor condition under which Mayors permit could be granted.

The Respondents on the other hand defended the validity of the Ordinance as a valid exercise of the Provincial
Governments power under the general welfare clause and its specific power to protect the environment.Further,
respondents maintained that there was no violation of due process because public hearings were conducted
before the enactment of the Ordinance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinances issued were valid

DOCTRINE: Under the general welfare clause of the LGC, local government units have the power, inter alia, to
enact ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. It likewise specifically vests
municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters, and impose rentals, fees or charges
therefor

HELD: Yes. The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters.
Devolution refers to the act by which the National Government confers power and authority upon the various local
government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities.One of the devolved powers enumerated in the
section of the LGC on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation
of mangroves.This necessarily includes enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within
the municipal waters. The realization of the objectives of the ordinances falls within both the general welfare
clause of the LGC and the express mandate thereunder to cities and provinces to protect the environment and
impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment.

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29. White Light Corp. v. City of Manila - LIM

FACTS: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled
An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in
Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila (the
Ordinance). The ordinance sanctions any person or corporation who will allow the admission and charging of
room rates for less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a day.

The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and
Development Corp. (STDC), who own and operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion to
intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the ordinance will affect their
business interests as operators. The respondents, on the other hand, contended that the ordinance is a legitimate
exercise of police power.
The RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed and jealousy guarded by the Constitution. Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution
encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well as, the right to operate economic
enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could
nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay,

When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to
Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities the power to regulate the establishment,
operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging
houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. Also, they contended that under
Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they have the power to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and
proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace,
good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to fix penalties for the
violation of ordinances.

Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and freedom
of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive interference in their
business.

The CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance. First, it held that
the ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or
operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of
police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective
of the ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the
establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect of the establishments is justified by the well-
being of its constituents in general.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power.

HELD: No. Ordinance No. 7774 is an invalid exercise of police power.

The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila v Laguio Jr ruling, but the 1967 decision
in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. The common thread
that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered under
the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals including
particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments.

The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for
an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be
partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with
public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.

The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions
and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as
conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code.

Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and
its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and various actions of the State.

The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit
sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the
ambit of the States police power. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their
achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution.
SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its
effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law that they were
capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners. Yet, they also recognized the capacity
of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons those persons who would be deprived
of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question. The rights at stake herein
fell within the same fundamental rights to liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice
Malcolm to include the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot
be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the
right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint
as are necessary for the common welfare.

An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of
lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the ordinance as a police power
measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation
must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under
the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be
permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into
private rights.

The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished
simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug
dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement
of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal
intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the
ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those
engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect wash rates from their
clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.

SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from
needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-intentioned the ordinance may be, it is in effect an
arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The ordinance
needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their
patrons without sufficient justification. The ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than
twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.

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30. Social Justice Society v. Atienza - GAMO

FACTS:

On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027. Mayor Atienza
approved the ordinance on November 28, 2001 and it it became effective on December 28, 2001, after its
publication. Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to local government units, a
principle described as the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote
the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of the society.

Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners
and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses
within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the
so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies Caltex, Petron and Pilipinas Shell.
However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum
of understanding with the oil companies in which they agreed that "the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals
[was] the most viable and practicable option." Under the MOU, the oil companies agreed to perform the following:
(1) program to scale down the Pandacan Terminals which shall include, among others, the immediate
removal/decommissioning process 28 tanks starting with the LPG spheres and the commencing of works for the
creation of safety buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals; (2) to do so by establishing a
separate agreement on joint operations and management; (3) the development and maintenance of the safety
and green buffer zones mentioned therein, which shall be taken from the properties of the OIL COMPANIES and
not from the surrounding communities.

The City of Manila and the DOE, on the other hand, committed to do the following: (1) The City Mayor shall
endorse to the City Council the MOU (2) The City Mayor and the DOE shall allow the OIL COMPANIES to
continuously operate in compliance with legal requirements; (3) The DOE and the City Mayor shall monitor the
OIL COMPANIES compliance; (4) - The CITY OF MANILA and the national government shall protect the safety
buffer and green zones and shall exert all efforts at preventing future occupation or encroachment into these
areas by illegal settlers and other unauthorized parties.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97., with the MOU effective only for a period of
six months starting July 25, 2002. On January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13 extending the
validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits to
the oil companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the ordinance.

The petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on December 4, 2002 praying that Mayor Atienza be
compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.
Petitioners contend that respondent has the mandatory legal duty, under Section 455 (b) (2) of the Local
Government Code (RA 7160), to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals of
the oil companies. Instead, he has allowed them to stay. Respondents defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has
been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the City Mayor can be compelled to enforce Ordinance 8027?

HELD:
Yes, the City Mayor may be compelled to enforce Ordinance 8027. The Local Government Code imposes upon
respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city." One
of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his
ministerial duty to do so.

In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., we stated the reason for this: These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the
ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously
hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the
constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been
declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and
are bound to obey it.

Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it
and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. Thus, at
present, there is nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.

The petition is granted and and Mayor Atienza is directed to enforce the said Ordinance.

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SJS Officers v Lim/Atienza (2014)

Brief: Consolidated petitions questioning the validity of Ordinance No. 8187. Ordinance 8187 led to the creation of
a medium industrial zone (1-2) and heavy industrial zone (1-3) and effectively lifted the prohibition against owners
and operators of businesses, including Chevron, Shell, and Petron, from operating in the designated commercial
zone an industrial zone prior to the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027.

Highlighting that the Court has so ruled that the Pandacan oil depots should leave, herein petitioners now seek
the nullification of Ordinance No. 8187, which contains provisions contrary to those embodied in Ordinance No.
8027. Allegations of violation of the right to health and the right to a healthful and balanced environment are also
included.

Issue: Whether or not Ordinance 8027 is unconstitutional.

Held:

No, the said Ordinance is valid and constitutional. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the LGU to enact and be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2)
must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate
trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy and (6) must not be unreasonable. There is no
showing that the Ordinance is unconstitutional.

As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their police power only if
the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and
a lawful method.

Ordinance No. 8027 is a valid police power measure because there is a concurrence of lawful subject and lawful
method. It was enacted for the purpose of promoting sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety and
general welfare of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to protect the
residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards
this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in the ordinance from industrial to commercial.

The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and
not just of a particular class. The depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a representation of western interests
which means that it is a terrorist target. As long as it there is such a target in their midst, the residents of Manila
are not safe. It therefore became necessary to remove these terminals to dissipate the threat. Wide discretion is
vested on the legislative authority to determine not only what the interests of the public require but also what
measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. Clearly, the Sanggunian was in the best position to
determine the needs of its constituents.

In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order
to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare.
However, the interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or
means used to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare must have a reasonable relation to the end in view.

The means adopted by the Sanggunian was the enactment of a zoning ordinance which reclassified the area
where the depot is situated from industrial to commercial. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or
municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political subdivision into
specific land uses as present and future projection of needs. As a result of the zoning, the continued operation of
the businesses of the oil companies in their present location will no longer be permitted. The power to establish
zones for industrial, commercial and residential uses is derived from the police power itself and is exercised for
the protection and benefit of the residents of a locality. Consequently, the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is
within the power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Manila and any resulting burden on those affected
cannot be said to be unjust.

Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. They allege that they stand to lose billions of
pesos if forced to relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, the right to life
enjoys precedence over the right to property. The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not. When the
state or LGUs exercise of police power clashes with a few individuals right to property, the former should prevail.