EVIDENCE

(Part VIII of IX)

I. Evidence (Rule 128-133)
A. General Provisions
1. Definitions
Rule 128, Sec. 1. Evidence defined. - Evidence is the means, sanctioned by
these rules, of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a ma
tter of fact. (1)
Evidence the means, sanctioned by these rules, of ascertaining in a judicial pro
ceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact.
Relevant evidence evidence which has a relation to the fact in issue as to induc
e belief in its existence or non-existence; evidence which tends in any reasonab
le degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue.
Material evidence evidence which is directed to prove a fact in issue as determi
ned by the rules of substantive law and pleadings; evidence of such quality of s
ubstantial importance to the particular issue, apart from its relevance
Escolin: The terms relevant and material are practically the same. They are used int
erchangeably by the SC.
Competent evidence evidence which is not excluded by the law or by the Rules of
Court
Direct evidence evidence which proves a fact in dispute without the aid of any i
nference or presumption
Circumstantial evidence proof of facts from which, taken collectively, the exist
ence of the particular fact in dispute may be inferred as a necessary or probabl
e consequence
Expert evidence testimony of a witness regarding a question of science, art or t
rade, when he is skilled therein
Prima facie evidence evidence which suffices for the proof of a particular fact
until contradicted and overcome by other evidence
Conclusive evidence evidence which is incontrovertible and which the law does no
t allow to be contradicted
Cumulative evidence evidence of the same kind and character as that already give
n and tends to prove the same proposition
Corroborative evidence evidence of a different kind and character tending to pro
ve the same point
Best evidence evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the fact in quest
ion
Secondary evidence evidence which is necessarily inferior to primary/best eviden
ce and shows on its fact that better evidence exists
Factum probans the evidentiary fact by which the factum probandum is to be estab
lished; material evidencing the proposition, existent, and offered for the consi
deration of the tribunal
Factum probandum the ultimate fact sought to be established; proposition to be e
stablished, hypothetical, and that which one party affirms and the other denies
Factum Probans
Proposition
Material
Conceived
probandum
evidencing
oftofor
asbehypothetical;
practical
established
the proposition
purposes
that which
as existent,
one partyandaffirms
is offered
and the
as such
otherfor
denies
the
consideration
Collateral facts
of thematters
court other than facts in issue and which are offered as a ba
sis merely for inference as to the existence or non-existence of the facts in is
sue
Real evidence evidence furnished by the things themselves, or view or inspection
as distinguished from a description by them of a witness; that which is address
ed directly to the senses of the court without the intervention of a witness
Rebuttal evidence evidence which is given to explain, repel, counteract or dispr
ove facts given in evidence by the adverse party
Positive evidence when a witness affirms that a fact did or did not occur
Negative evidence when a witness states that he did not see or know the occurren
ce of a fact
2. Distinguish
Admissibility
Weight
Pertains
oftoevidence
theofability
evidenceof the evidence to be allowed and accepted subject to it
s relevancy
Pertains
Substantive
to essence
and effect
the competence
or characteristic
of evidence admitted
feature of evidence as would make it worth
yTheofprobative
consideration
valuebyofthe
evidence
court which
beforethe
itscourt
admission
may give to admit after complyin
g with the rules of relevancy and competency
Effect
Evidence
Proof
Medium
End
MeansResult
toof
andthe
proof
result
end of evidence
3. Scope
a. Rule 128 2
Sec. 2. Scope. - The rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts a
nd in all trials and hearings, except as otherwise provided by law or these rule
s. (2a)
b. Cases
Reyes v. CA, 216 SCRA 25 (1992) The Rules of Court, and its rules on Evidence, a
re not even suppletorily applicable to agrarian cases. Special law allows affida
vits to be admitted in evidence in agrarian courts, even without the witness tes
tifying nor subject to cross-examination.
Escolin: Note that in Reyes, what was presented were affidavits. Ordinarily, aff
idavits are not admissible before the regular courts because there is no opportu
nity for the other party to cross-examine. Depositions are admissible because th
ere was an opportunity for the adverse party to cross-examine.
Imperial Textile Mills, Inc. v. NLRC, 217 SCRA 237 (1993) The unverified positio
n paper is a mere procedural infirmity which does not affect the merits of the c
ase. Procedural technicalities do not strictly apply to proceedings before the L
A.
The rules of evidence does not apply to
1. probation board
2. CTA
3. SEC
4. Immigration cases
5. LA/NLRC
6. CAR
B. Admissibility of Evidence
Sec. 3. Admissibility of evidence. - Evidence is admissible when it is r
elevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. (3a)
Requisites for admissibility
1. relevant
2. competent
1. Relevancy
a. Rule 128 4
Sec. 4. Relevancy; collateral matters. Evidence must have such a relatio
n to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Ev
idence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any r
easonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in is
sue. (4a)
Relevance relation to the facts in issue as to induce belief in its existence or
non-existence
Evidence on collateral matters allowed only when it tends in any reasonable degr
ee to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue.
b. Cases
Bautista v. Aparece, 51 OG 805 (1995)
Lopez v. Heesen, 365 P.2d 448 (1961)
State of Missouri v. Ball, 339 S.W2d 783 (1960)
2. Competence
a. Rule 128 3
Sec. 3. Admissibility of evidence. - Evidence is admissible when it is r
elevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. (3a)
Competence not excluded by the law or the RoC
b. Constitutional rules of exclusion
1) Art. III, Secs. 2 and 3
 Art. III, Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatev
er nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warr
ant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searc
hed and the persons or things to be seized.
Art. III, Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence sha
ll be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or
order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shal
l be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
2) Art. III, Sec. 12
Art. III, Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If t
he person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. T
hese rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means wh
ich vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, so
litary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
Xxx

3) Art. III, Sec. 17

Art. III, Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against h
imself.
Absolutely inadmissible evidence obtained
1. from unreasonable searches and seizures, or
2. in violation of the right of privacy of communication and correspondence
Relatively inadmissible (inadmissible only against the person whose rights are
violated, admissible for other purposes) evidence obtained
1. in violation of the right be informed of the right to remain silent and to ha
ve competent and independent counsel
2. from means which vitiate the free will
3. in violation of the right against self-incrimination
c. Statutory rules of exclusion
1) NIRC, 201, as amended by RA 8424
Sec. 201. Effect of Failure to Stamp Taxable Document. An instrument, docume
nt or paper which is required by law to be stamped and which has been signed, is
sued, accepted or transferred without being duly stamped, shall not be recorded,
nor shall it or any copy thereof or any record of transfer of the same be admit
ted or used in evidence in any court until the requisite stamp or stamps shall h
ave been affixed thereto and cancelled.
No notary public or other officer authorized to administer oaths shall add h
is jurat or acknowledgment to any document subject to documentary stamp tax unle
ss the proper documentary stamps are affixed thereto and cancelled.
Failure to stamp a document required by law to be stamped shall render the docum
ent inadmissible in any court until the requisite stamp or stamps shall have bee
n affixed thereto and cancelled (201 NIRC). This is an absolute inadmissibility.
2) General Banking Act of 2000, RA 8791, 55.1 (b)
Sec. 55. Prohibited Transactions. -
55.1. No director, officer, employee, or agent of any bank shall
(b) Without order of a court of competent jurisdiction, disclose to any unau
thorized person any information relative to the funds or properties in the custo
dy of the bank belonging to private individuals, corporations, or any other enti
ty: Provided, That with respect to bank deposits, the provisions of existing law
s shall prevail;
 Elements of the exclusion
1. director, officer, employee, or agent of any bank
2. disclosure to unauthorized person
3. information relative to the funds or properties in the custody of the bank be
longing to private individuals, corporations, or any other entity
4. without a court order
de Leon: Note that this provision covers only property in the custody of the ban
k other than bank deposits. For bank deposits, RA 1405 governs. Note also that t
he provision does not state the nature of the inadmissibility. I submit that it
is a rule of absolute inadmissibility.

3) RA 1405: Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits

Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions i
n the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the
Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby c
onsidered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inqui
red or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except
upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon or
der of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public of
ficials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter
of the litigation.
GR: All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Ph
ilippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philipp
ines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considere
d as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or l
ooked into by any person, government official, bureau or office.
Exceptions
1. written permission of the depositor
2. impeachment, or
3. order of a competent court in cases of
a. bribery or
b. dereliction of duty of public officials, or
4. where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation
.
de Leon: I submit that this is a rule of absolute inadmissibility.

4) RA 4200: Wire-tapping
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all
the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cab
le, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept
, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known a
s a dictaphone or dictagraph or dectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the
act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any t
ape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereo
f, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effect
ive date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same
for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either
verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete
or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any co
pies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offens
es mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
Unlawful acts
1. any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communicat
ion or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or ar
rangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spok
en word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or dectap
hone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described:
2. any person to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or
any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word s
ecured in the manner prohibited by this law; or
3. any person to replay the same for any other person or persons
4. any person to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing
, or
5. any person to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to
any other person:
The use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be c
overed by this prohibition.
Sec. 2. Any person who wilfully or knowingly does or who shall aid, perm
it, or cause to be done any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the preceding
section or who violates the provisions of the following section or of any order
issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes such violation shall, upon convi
ction thereof, be punished xxx.
Sec. 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it unlawful or
punishable for any peace officer, who is authorized by a written order of the Co
urt, to execute any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the two preceding sec
tions in cases involving the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war and dis
loyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy a
nd proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to
commit sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping as defined by the Revised Pena
l Code, and violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing espionage and othe
r offenses against national security: Provided, That such written order shall on
ly be issued or granted upon written application and the examination under oath
or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and a showing:
(1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerat
ed hereinabove has been committed or is being committed or is about to be commit
ted: Provided, however, That in cases involving the offenses of rebellion, consp
iracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspir
acy to commit sedition, and inciting to sedition, such authority shall be grante
d only upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case may be
, have actually been or are being committed; (2) that there are reasonable groun
ds to believe that evidence will be obtained essential to the conviction of any
person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any of such crimes;
and (3) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such evide
nce.
xxx
Conditions for valid wiretapping
1. any peace officer
2. authorized by a written order of the Court
3. in cases involving the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war and disloy
alty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and
proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to com
mit sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping, espionage and other offenses aga
inst national security:
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substa
nce, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any informa
tion therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the pre
ceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial,
quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Information obtained in violation of the anti-wiretapping act is absolutely inad
missible.
Ramirez v. CA, 248 SCRA 590 (1995) Even a person privy to a communication who re
cords his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter
violates the anti-wiretapping act. The recording is inadmissible in evidence.
Gaanan v. IAC, 145 SCRA 112 (1986)
Salcedo Ortaez v. CA, 235 SCRA 111 (1994)
C. What Need Not be Proved
3 things that need not be proved
1. matters of mandatory judicial notice
2. matters of discretionary judicial notice
3. judicial admissions
1. Judicial notice
a. Mandatory (Rule 129 1)
Sec. 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial n
otice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial ex
tent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nati
onality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and
their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the offi
cial acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippi
nes, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (1
a)

Mandatory Judicial Notice

1. existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of
government and symbols of nationality
2. the law of nations
3. the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals
4. the political constitution and history of the Philippines
5. the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of t
he Philippines
6. the laws of nature
7. the measure of time, and
8. the geographical divisions
Sermonia v. CA, 233 SCRA 155 (1994) In determining prescription in a prosecution
for bigamy, the reckoning point is actual discovery of the subsequent marriage
by the offended party, not from the registration of the marriage contract. The d
octrine of constructive knowledge does not apply, even if it is more favorable t
o the accused.
b. Discretionary (Rule 129 2)
Sec. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. - A court may take judicial
notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionab
le demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial funct
ions. (1a)
Discretionary Judicial Notice matters which are
1. of public knowledge, or
2. are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or
3. ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions
c. When hearing required (Rule 129 3)
Sec. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. - During the trial, the
court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intent
ion to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard ther
eon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its
own initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter
and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a materi
al issue in the case.(n)
When court takes judicial notice
1. During trial, on any matter allow the parties to be heard thereon
2. After trial, and before judgment or on appeal any matter and allow the partie
s to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case
 Hearing is necessary when
1. During the trial, the court
a. motu propio, on request of a party
b. announces its intention to take judicial notice of any matter
2. After trial
a. before judgment or on appeal
b. motu propio, on request of a party
c. takes judicial notice of any matter, and
d. if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case
Hence, the court can take judicial notice of any matter during the trial as long
as there is a hearing. If trial is already over, the court can take judicial no
tice only of matters decisive of a material issue in the case as long as there i
s a hearing (p. 88, Francisco).
de Leon: Why on earth would a court take judicial notice of a matter which is no
t decisive of a material issue in a case?
City of Manila v. Garcia, 19 SCRA 413 (1967)
Baguio v. Vda. de Jalagat, 42 SCRA 337 (1971)
Prieto v. Arroyo, 14 SCRA 549 (1965)
Ozaeta Romulo etc. , 92 SCRA 1 (1979)
Yao-Kee v. Sy-Gonzales, 167 SCRA 736 (1988)
Tabuena v. CA, 196 SCRA 650 (1991) As a general rule courts are not authorized t
o take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the
contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or
are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may
have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge. However, an exce
ption is when in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all
parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a
case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it,
when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it for tha
t purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficientl
y designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it,
is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction, at the request
or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the
case then pending.
People v. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676 (1995)

2. Judicial admissions
a. Rule 129 4
Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by
a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proo
f. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through pa
lpable mistake or that no such admission was made. (2a)
Requisites for judicial admission
1. made by a party
2. in the course of the proceedings
3. in the same case
de Leon: If the admission was made in outside the proceedings or in another case
, it is also admissible under admissions of a party (Rule 130, Sec. 26).
The admission may be contradicted only by showing that
1. it was made through palpable mistake or
2. no such admission was made
b. Instances of Judicial admissions
 Instances of Judicial admissions
1. the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document copied or attache
d to a pleading, when the other party fails to specifically deny under oath (Rul
e 8 8)
2. material allegations in the complaint, when the other party fails to specific
ally deny it (Rule 8 11)
3. admissions in superseded pleadings, when offered in evidence (Rule 10 8)
4. act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact (Rule 130 26)
5. implied admission of guilt in an offer of compromise by the accused in crimin
al cases, except quasi-offenses and those allowed by law to be compromised (Rule
130 27)
6. admission by silence (Rule 130 32)
c. Cases
Lucido v. Calupitan, 27 Phil. 48 (1914)
Torres v. CA, 131 SCRA 24 (1984)
D. Object and Documentary Evidence
1. Rule 130 1-2
Sec. 1. Object as evidence. Objects as evidence are those addressed to the s
enses of the court. When an object is relevant to the fact in issue, it may be e
xhibited to, examined or viewed by the court. (1a)
Object Evidence evidence addressed to the senses of the court
Ocular inspection qualifies as object evidence.
Sec. 2. Documentary evidence. Documents as evidence consist of writings
or any material containing letters, words, numbers, figures, symbols or other mo
des of written expressions offered as proof of their contents. (n)
Documentary evidence any material containing modes of written expressions offere
d as proof of their contents
2. Cases
People v. Bardaje, 99 SCRA 388 (1980)
Sison v. People, 250 SCRA 58 (1995)
Adamczuk v. Holloway, 13 A.2d 2 (1940)
State v. Tatum, 360 P. 2d 754 (1961)
E. Best Evidence Rule
1. Rule 130 3-4
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced, exceptions. When the subject
of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other
than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in c
ourt, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party ag
ainst whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after rea
sonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to b
e established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer
or is recorded in a public office. (2a)
Best Evidence Rule When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself
Exceptions: When the original
1. has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith
on the part of the offeror;
2. is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence
is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
3. consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them
is only the general result of the whole; and
4. the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is reco
rded in a public office
2. Cases
People v. Tandoy, 192 SCRA 28 (1990) The best evidence rule does not apply to th
e marked money in a buy bust operation because the inquiry is not on the content
s of the marked bill, but merely its existence.
Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 (1966)
Meyers v. US, 171 F.2d 800 (1948) BER only applies if the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document; such an inquiry need not be the main issue
People v. Tan, 105 Phil. 1242 (1959)
Seiler v. Lucasfilm, 797 F.2d 1504 (1986) US BER or their equivalents vs. Philippi
ne BER other modes of written expression; is a disputed work in an infringement ca
se object or documentary?
US v. Gregorio, 17 Phil. 522 (1910)
Fiscal v. Reyes, 55 Phil 905 (1931)
Sec. 4. Original of document.
(a) The original of a document is one the contents of which are the subject
of inquiry.
(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same t
ime, with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.
(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being c
opied from another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are l
ikewise equally regarded as originals. (3a)
Original documents
1. one the contents of which are the subject of inquiry.
2. When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time,
with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.
3. When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied
from another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewi
se equally regarded as originals
F. Secondary Evidence
1. Rule 130 5-8
Sec. 5. When original document is unavailable. When the original document ha
s been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proo
f of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad
faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its cont
ents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order s
tated. (4a)
Sec. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control.
If the document is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party, he
must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satis
factory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evid
ence may be presented as in the case of its loss. (5a)
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. W
hen the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recor
ded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by
the public officer in custody thereof. (2a)
cf Rule 132 25-27
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. - Whenever a copy of a document or
record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part t
hereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of t
he attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a
seal, under the seal of such court. (26 a)
Sec. 26. Irremovability of public record. - Any public record, an official copy
of which is admissible in evidence, must not be removed from the office in which
it is kept, except upon order of a court where the inspection of the record is
essential to the just determination of a pending case. (27 a)
Sec. 27. Public record of a private document. - An authorized public record of a
private document may be proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof, at
tested by the legal custodian of the record, with an appropriate certificate tha
t such officer has the custody. (28a)
To prove loss, get affidavits of loss from all the people who possibly has a co
py of the original, e.g. Notarized Deed of Sale
1. Vendor
2. vendee
3. notary public
4. clerk of the court which gave the notary public commission
5. Bureau of Archives
Requisites for admission of secondary evidence, according to grounds
1. the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court
a. prove execution or existence
b. prove cause of unavailability without bad faith of the offeror
c. proof of contents in the following order
1) copy
2) recital of its contents in
a) some authentic document, or
b) testimony of witnesses
2. the original is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party
a. adverse party had reasonable notice to produce the original (Subpoena duces t
ecum)
b. proof of the original s existence
c. adverse party fails to produce the original
d. proof of contents in the following order
1) copy
2) recital of its contents in
a) some authentic document, or
b) testimony of witnesses
3. the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be establis
hed from them is only the general result of the whole; and
4. the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is reco
rded in a public office contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the
public officer in custody thereof
a. Rule 132 25: What attestation of copy must state
1) the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof
2) under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he b
e the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court
b. Rule 132 27: Public record of a private document - may be proved by
1) the original record, or
2) by a copy thereof
a) attested by the legal custodian of the record
b) with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody
2. Cases
Municipality of Victorias v. CA, 149 SCRA 32 (1987)
Facts: In action to recover land, a party failed to produce the deed of sale, bu
t presented only a Certificate from the Archives Division of the Bureau of Recor
ds Management of an entry in a notarial register.
Held: Certificate is admissible. Where the original has been lost or destroyed,
the offeror may prove its contents by a recital of its contents in some authenti
c document or by testimony of witnesses. The Certificate is one such authentic d
ocument.
de Vera v Aguilar, 218 SCRA 602 (1983) In case of loss of the original of a docu
ment, the order of proof is as follows; 1) existence of the original, 2) its due
execution, 3) loss, and 4) its contents. Failure to prove loss of all the origi
nals without fault of the offeror renders secondary evidence inadmissible.
Vda. de Corpus v. Brabangco, (C.A.) 59 O.G. 8262 (1963) when the existence of a d
ocument is proven, the court should allow the lost document to be proven by paro
le; testimony of a witness need not be verbatim
Compaia Maritima v. Allied Free Workers Union, 77 SCRA 24 (1977) voluminous chara
cter of accounts must be established, and it must be made available to the adver
se party before parole; audit made by or testimony of private auditor is inadmis
sible as proof of original record or books of accounts; auditor s opinion not admi
ssible; best evidence on cost of equipment are sales invoices not testimony of a
n auditor
Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Ferrer, 25 SCRA 845 (1968) it is not necessary for a
party seeking to introduce copy to prove that original is in actual possession o
f adverse party as long as it is under his control; adverse party need not admit
that it is in his possession before a copy may be introduced
Michael & Co., Inc. v. Enriquez, 33 Phil. 87 (1915) To prove a lost document, mu
st prove due execution, delivery (if required), and the fact of lost or destruct
ion; it is important to have qualified witnesses
Sec. 8. Party who calls for document not, bound to offer it. - A party w
ho calls for the production of a document and inspects the same is not obliged t
o offer it as evidence. (6a)
G. Parol Evidence Rule
1. Rule 130 9
Sec. 9. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an, agreement have
been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed up
on and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no ev
idence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms
of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement
;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agre
ement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successor
s in interest after the execution of the written agreement.
The terms "agreement" includes wills. (7a)
Parol Evidence Rule: When the terms of an, agreement have been reduced to writin
g, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, be
tween the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms ot
her than the contents of the written agreement.
Exceptions: a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms
of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading
1. An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement
2. failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of
the parties
3. validity of the written agreement; or
4. The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in
interest after the execution of the written agreement
If the ground is subsequently-agreed terms, the subsequently-agreed terms must a
lso be put in issue in the pleadings.
The rule applies only to the terms of an agreement. If the evidence sought to be
admitted refers to matters other than the terms of the agreement (e.g. statemen
t of facts), then the PER does not apply, such evidence is admissible.
PER applies only to the parties to the agreement. It does not apply where PER is
invoked against a litigant who is a stranger to the agreement.
Requisites for mistake as exception to PER
1. mutual between the parties
2. of fact, not of law
3. alleged and put in issue in the pleadings
4. proved by clear and convincing, not merely preponderance of, evidence
Escolin: Note that the rule on self-defense also requires that the circumstances
of self-defense be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
2. Art. 1403 and 1405 Civil Code
Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratifi
ed:
xxx
(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this
number. In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceab
le by action, unless the same, or some note or memorandum, thereof, be in writin
g, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of
the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence o
f its contents:
(a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from
the making thereof;
(b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of ano
ther;
(c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual prom
ise to marry;
(d) An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at a p
rice not less than five hundred pesos, unless the buyer accept and receive part
of such goods and chattels, or the evidences, or some of them, of such things in
action or pay at the time some part of the purchase money; but when a sale is m
ade by auction and entry is made by the auctioneer in his sales book, at the tim
e of the sale, of the amount and kind of property sold, terms of sale, price, na
mes of the purchasers and person on whose account the sale is made, it is a suff
icient memorandum;
(e) An agreement of the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for th
e sale of real property or of an interest therein;
(f) A representation as to the credit of a third person.
Art. 1405. Contracts infringing the Statute of Frauds, referred to in No. 2
of article 1403, are ratified by the failure to object to the presentation of or
al evidence to prove the same, or by the acceptance of benefit under them.
Statute of Frauds: If the following agreements are not in writing and subscribe
d, it is unenforceable and evidence thereof is inadmissible
1. not to be performed within a year from the making thereof
2. special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;
3. agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to m
arry;
4. agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at a price not
less than P500, unless the buyer accept and receive part of such goods and chat
tels, or the evidences, or some of them, of such things in action or pay at the
time some part of the purchase money;
5. lease for more than 1 year, or sale of real property or of an interest therei
n;
6. representation as to the credit of a 3rd person.
Exceptions
1. failure to object to the presentation of oral evidence, or
2. acceptance of benefit under the agreement

3. Distinguish parole evidence rule from best evidence rule

Parole
Best
No
Issue
Parol
Secondary
Presupposes
Effect
Invoked
Applies
issue
Evidence
isis
evidence
Evidence
when
by
only
toascan
contents
evidence
anybody,
all
toto
that
the
if
Rule
not
the
is
kinds
Rule
the
agreements
original
ofis
offered
add,
present
contents
controversy
whether
aoffered
of writing
subtract,
writing
isand
anyaofnot
inparty
evidence
ais
wills
court
writing
available
or between
explain
to on the
the parties
instrument
thecontents
contents
to or
the
other
not
agreement
than the original
4. Cases
Cruz v CA, 192 SCRA 209 (1990) PER does not apply to receipts because it is not
an agreement. It is proof only of delivery of money. Furthermore, the parole evi
dence bars only evidence as to the terms, it does not bar evidence as to stateme
nt of facts. The receipt of money is merely a statement of fact. Lastly, failure
of the adverse party to object renders parole evidence admissible.
Pioneer Savings & Loan Bank v. CA, 226 SCRA 740 (1993)
Facts: Pioneer execute an DoAS of a car in favor of Michael Santos. Pioneer clai
ms that the car was merely a security for the time deposit placements of Santos r
elatives. Since Santos relatives have recovered their placements, Pioneer sued fo
r recovery of the car.
Held: Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not a
dmissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid instrument. Whi
le parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of w
ritten contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract
additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the wri
ting, unless there has been fraud or mistake. Pioneer failed to produce any inst
rument or written document which would prove that the deed of sale in question w
as only a security for the time deposit placements of Santos' relatives in Pione
er. The 2 main witnesses for Pioneer, were not mere employees of the bank. They
were bank officers; one being a lawyer and supposed to be steeped in legal and
banking knowledge and practices. They were expected to know the consequences of
their act of signing a document which outrightly transferred ownership over the
subject vehicle in favor of Santos. They could have incorporated in the deed of
sale (if such was the intention or agreement of the parties) a stipulation that
transfer of ownership and registration of the vehicle in Santos' name were condi
tioned on the failure of his relatives to recover their time deposit placements
in petitioner bank. No such stipulation was incorporated in the deed of sale whi
ch was an outright and unconditional transfer of ownership of the motor vehicle
to respondent Santos.
de Leon: Note that the PER exceptions of other term agreed by the parties refer
to those agreed after, not before, the execution of the agreement. Pioneer shoul
d have invoked the exception that the agreement did not express their true inten
t and agreement.

Enriquez v. Ramos, 6 SCRA 219 (1962)

Facts: In a foreclosure of REM case, plaintiff invokes the registered mortgage a
greement. Defendant answers that the contract did not express the true agreement
of the parties because it did not include the undertaking of plaintiff to const
ruct roads on the land. Furthermore, defendant argues that the ordinance that re
quires the construction of such roads in the subdivision before the lots could b
e sold is deemed included in the contract.
Held: Since the answer alleged that the contract did not express the true intent
ion of the parties, it has therefore been put in issue in the pleadings. The sam
e may therefore be subject of parole evidence.
Canuto v. Mariano, 37 Phil. 840 (1918) parol may be introduced to prove subseque
nt agreement regardless of how soon such agreement was made
Yu Tek & Co. v. Gonzales, 29 Phil. 384 (1915) Parol evidence inadmissible to inc
orporate additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in
the writing, unless there is fraud or mistake
Land Settlement & Development Corp. v. Garcia Plantation, 7 SCRA 750 (1963) exce
ption to PER may be put in issue in answer to counterclaim; when operation of co
ntract made to depend upon occurrence of an event, which for that reason is a co
ndition precedent, such may be established by parol evidence, since if it is pro
ven, there will be no contract
Maulini v. Serrano, 28 Phil. 640 (1914) PER does not apply where the purpose of
parol evidence is to show that no written contract ever existed
PNB v. Seeto, 91 Phil. 756 (1952) assurances made by an indorser that the drawer
has funds, which assurances induced bank to cash the check, are admissible in e
vidence
Woodhouse v. Halili, 93 Phil. 526 (1953) Inducement by fraud may be proved by pa
rol because it goes into the validity of the agreement
Robles v. Lizarraga, 50 Phil. 387 (1927) parol may be received regardless of whe
ther the written agreement contains any reference to the collateral agreement an
d whether the action is at law or in equity even if it deals with related matter
s
Lechugas v. CA, 143 SCRA 335 (1986) PER not applicable where suit is between one
of the parties to the document and 3rd persons; PER does not apply and may not
be invoked by either party to the litigation against the other, where at least o
ne of the parties to the suit is not party or privy to the written agreement and
does not base a claim on the instrument; both parties to the agreement must be
parties to the suit
Inciong v. CA, 257 SCRA 578 (1996) PER does not specify that the agreement be a
public document; need not be in any particular form or signed by the parties; fr
aud must be corroborated
Ortaez v. CA contemporaneous conditions not referred to in the contract can not b
e proven by parol; merely alleging that the contract is subject to conditions do
es not put the exception in issue in the pleadings
H. Interpretation of Documents
1. Rule 130 10-19
Sec. 10. Interpretation of a writing according to its legal meaning. The lan
guage of a writing is to be interpreted according to the legal meaning it bears
in the place of its execution, unless the parties intended otherwise. (8)
Sec. 11. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. In the
construction of an instrument where there are several provisions or particulars
. such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.
(9)
Sec. 12. Interpretation according to intention; general and particular provi
sions. In the construction of an instrument, the intention of the parties is to
be pursued; and when a general and a particular provision are inconsistent, the
latter is paramount to the former. So a particular intent will control a general
one that is inconsistent with it. (10)
Sec. 13. Interpretation according to circumstances. For the proper construct
ion of an instrument, the circumstances under which it was made, including the s
ituation of the subject thereof and of the parties to it, may be shown, so that
the judge may be placed in the position of those whose language he is to interpr
et. (11)
Sec. 14. Peculiar signification of terms. The terms of a writing are presume
d to have been used in their primary and general acceptation, but evidence is ad
missible to show that they have a local, technical, or otherwise peculiar signif
ication, and were so used and understood in the particular instance, in which ca
se the agreement must be construed accordingly.(12)
Sec. 15. Written words control printed. When an instrument consists partly o
f written words and partly of a printed form, and the two are inconsistent, the
former controls the latter. (13)
Sec. 16. Experts and interpreters to be used in explaining certain writings.
When the characters in which an instrument is written are difficult to be decip
hered, or the language is not understood by the court, the evidence of persons s
killed in deciphering the characters, or who understand the language, is admissi
ble to declare the characters or the meaning of the language. (14)
Sec. 17. Of two constructions, which preferred. When the terms of an agreeme
nt have been intended in a different sense by the different parties to it, that
sense is to prevail against either party in which he supposed the other understo
od it, and when different constructions of a provision are otherwise equally pro
per, that is to be taken which is the most favorable to the party in whose favor
the provision was made. (15)
Sec. 18. Construction in favor of natural right. When an instrument is equal
ly susceptible of two interpretations, one is favor of natural right and the oth
er against it, the former is to be adopted. (16)
Sec. 19. Interpretation according to usage. An instrument may be construed a
ccording to usage, in order to determine its true character. (17)
Rules of interpretation of documents
1. Interpretation of a writing according to its legal meaning in the place of ex
ecution
2. Instrument construed so as to give effect to more provisions
3. Interpretation according to intention of the parties
4. particular over general
5. Interpretation according to circumstances of the parties and the subject
6. Terms presumed to be used in primary and general acceptation, evidence of loc
al, technical, or peculiar signification use admissible
7. Written words control printed
8. When the characters are difficult to decipher, or the language is foreign, th
e evidence of experts and interpreters is admissible
9. When the terms of an agreement have been intended in a different sense by the
different parties to it, that sense is to prevail against either party in which
he supposed the other understood it
10. When different constructions of a provision are otherwise equally proper, th
at is to be taken which is the most favorable to the party in whose favor the pr
ovision was made
11. preference for natural right
12. usage may be considered
2. Arts. 1370-1379 Civil Code
Art. 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations sh
all control.
If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties,
the latter shall prevail over the former.
Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.
Art. 1372. However general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not be
understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are different
from those upon which the parties intended to agree.
Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several meani
ngs, it shall be understood as bearing that import which is most adequate to ren
der it effectual.
Art. 1374. The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted toget
her, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of th
em taken jointly.
Art. 1375. Words which may have different significations shall be understood
in that which is most in keeping with the nature and object of the contract.
Art. 1376. The usage or custom of the place shall be borne in mind in the in
terpretation of the ambiguities of a contract, and shall fill the omission of st
ipulations which are ordinarily established.
Art. 1377. The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract
shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity.
Art. 1378. When it is absolutely impossible to settle doubts by the rules es
tablished in the preceding articles, and the doubts refer to incidental circumst
ances of a gratuitous contract, the least transmission of rights and interests s
hall prevail. If the contract is onerous, the doubt shall be settled in favor of
the greatest reciprocity of interests.
If the doubts are cast upon the principal object of the contract in such a w
ay that it cannot be known what may have been the intention or will of the parti
es, the contract shall be null and void.
Art. 1379. The principles of interpretation stated in Rule 123 of the Rules
of Court shall likewise be observed in the construction of contracts.
Statutory rules of interpretation
1. If the terms are clear, the literal meaning shall control.
2. If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, t
he intention shall prevail
3. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporan
eous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.
4. terms of a contract shall not be understood to comprehend things that are dis
tinct and cases that are different from those upon which the parties intended to
 agree
5. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several meanings, it shal
l be understood as bearing that import which is most adequate to render it effec
tual.
6. The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attribu
ting to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken joi
ntly.
7. Words which may have different significations shall be understood in that whi
ch is most in keeping with the nature and object of the contract.
8. The usage or custom of the place shall be borne in mind in the interpretation
of the ambiguities of a contract, and shall fill the omission of stipulations w
hich are ordinarily established.
9. The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not f
avor the party who caused the obscurity.
10. When it is absolutely impossible to settle doubts by the rules established i
n the preceding articles
a. the doubts refer to incidental circumstances of
1) a gratuitous contract, the least transmission of rights and interests shall p
revail
2) an onerous contract, the doubt shall be settled in favor of the greatest reci
procity of interests
b. If the doubts are cast upon the principal object of the contract in such a wa
y that it cannot be known what may have been the intention or will of the partie
s, the contract shall be null and void.
11. The principles of interpretation stated in the Rules of Court shall likewise
be observed
3. Cases
Lambert v. Fox, 26 Phil. 588 (1914) If from the words the meaning is plain, cont
ract should be enforced according to the words
Capital Insurance v. Sadang, 21 SCRA 1183 (1967) doubt resolved against one who
prepared the document
I. Rule 130 20: Qualifications of Witnesses
Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in the next suc
ceeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known th
eir perception to others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or convi
ction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for dis
qualification. (18 a)
Qualifications of witnesses
1. can perceive
2. perceiving
3. can make known their perception to others
NOT ground for disqualification
1. Religious belief
2. political belief
3. interest in the outcome of the case, or
4. conviction of a crime, unless otherwise provided by law, e.g.
a. A state witness must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral tur
pitude [Rule 119, Sec. 17 (e)]
b. A person who has been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or fa
lse testimony is disqualified from being a witness to a will (Art. 821 NCC)
1. Mental Incapacity or Immaturity
a. Rule 130 21
Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. The
following persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examin
ation, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perce
ption to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of pe
rceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truth
fully. (19a)
For a mentally defective person to be a witness, he must be mentally capable at
the time of production, even if he was not so at the time of perception. A child
must be mentally mature both at the time of perception and at the time of produ
ction.
With regards to the subject matter of the testimony, we must make a distinction
between absolute disqualifications and relative disqualifications. Objections ba
sed on absolute disqualifications may be raised upon the calling of the disquali
fied witness. Objections based on relative disqualifications may be raised when
it becomes apparent that the subject matter of the testimony covers inadmissible
matters.
Absolutely disqualified witnesses
1. can t perceive
2. not perceiving
3. can t make known their perception to others
4. whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, rend
er them incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others
5. whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the f
acts respecting which they are examined and relating them truthfully
6. marital disqualification
7. parental and filial privilege
Relative disqualifications
1. dead man s statute
2. marital communication privilege
3. attorney-client privilege
4. an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk concerning any fact the knowl
edge of which has been acquired in such capacity
5. Physician-Patient Privilege
6. Priest-Penitent Privilege
7. State Secrets
b. Cases
People v. de Jesus, 129 SCRA 4 (1984) even though feeble minded, there is no sho
wing that she could not convey her ideas by words or signs ___ competent; even i
f she had difficulty comprehending the questions
People v. Salomon, 229 SCRA 402 (1993) being mental retardate is not per se a di
squalification; although speech was slurred, testimony was positive, clear, plai
n and unambiguous
People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 113791, Feb. 2, 1996 any child, regardless of age, c
an be a witness as long as he meets the qualifications for competency: observati
on, recollection, and communication

2. Marriage
a. Rule 130 22: Marital Disqualification Rule
Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their marriage, neit
her the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the co
nsent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, o
r in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latte
r's direct descendants or ascendants. (20a)
Requisites for marital disqualification rule
1. marriage subsists
2. a spouse is a litigant
3. no consent from the spouse-litigant
4. not a civil case by one against the other, or a criminal case for a crime com
mitted by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants
.
GR: During their marriage, spouses may not testify for or against the other with
out the consent of the affected spouse
Exceptions:
1. in a civil case by one against the other, or
2. in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against
a. the other or
b. the other s direct descendants or ascendants
The marital disqualification rule refers to all matters, whether or communicated
by one spouse to the other. It applies only during the existence of the marriag
e. It can be invoked only if one spouse is a party to the action. It is an absol
ute disqualification and can be invoked the moment that one spouse is called to
testify.
This is a testimonial disqualification, as opposed to the testimonial privilege
of ascendants and descendants (Rule 130 25). Hence, the witness has no say whethe
r the objection is to be raised or not. The holder of the privilege is the spous
e-litigant. When the spouse-litigant consents to the testimony, the spouse-witne
ss must testify whether he wants to or not.
cf Rule 130 24 (a), Marital Communications
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following p
ersons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases
:
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined wi
thout the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by
one from the other during the marriage except in a civil case by one against th
e other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or
the latter's direct descendants or ascendants;
Marital
Covers
AApplies
Invoked
spouseonly
all
Disqualification
Communications
during
when
must
need
matters
those
anot
the
bespouse
thetestimony
andabe
communicated
regardless
marriage
after
litigant
aislitigant
theappears
called
marriage
ofbytosource
one
testify
to spouseprivileged
cover to anothermatters
Note that the exceptions under the marital disqualification and marital communic
ations rule are the same.
b. Cases
Ordoo v. Daquigan, 62 SCRA 270 (1975) The wife can therefore testify against her
husband in such a case for rape against her daughter because it is considered a
crime against the wife. When an offense directly attacks, or directly impairs th
e conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the marital disqualificati
on rule.
de Leon: Note that when this case was decided, a crime by a spouse against the o
ther s descendant was not yet an express exception to the marital disqualification
rule.
People v. Castaeda, 88 SCRA 562 (1979) The wife can testify against the husband i
n a case for falsification of the wife s signature in public documents to sell sha
re of wife in conjugal property because it is a crime committed by the husband a
gainst the wife.
Lezama v Rodriguez, 23 SCRA 1166 (1968) Wife who is a co-defendant of her husban
d in a case of collusive fraud, where their interests are not separate, can not
be examined as a hostile witness by the adverse party
People v. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694 (1947) when the husband imputes crime against
wife, he waives the marital disqualification rule
3. Dead Man s Statute
a. Rule 130 23
Sec. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. P
arties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is p
rosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a dec
eased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand agains
t the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, can
not testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased
person or before such person became of unsound mind. (20a)
Requisites for dead man s statute
1. the witness sought to be disqualified is the plaintiff
2. Executor, administrator or representative of a deceased person, or the person
of unsound mind is the defendant
3. upon claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against su
ch person of unsound mind
4. as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person o
r before such person became of unsound mind.
5. [no counterclaim is filed]
b. Cases
Razon v. IAC, 207 SCRA 234 (1992) The dead man s statute does not apply where the
case is filed by the estate. Besides, cross-examination of the witness is a waiv
er of the privilege.
Reyes v. Wells, 54 Phil 102 (1929) If the witness sought to be disqualified is n
ot the plaintiff (e.g. disinterested 3rd party), the dead man s statute is not app
licable.
Guerrero v. St. Clare s Realty, 124 SCRA 553 (1983) Mere witnesses not parties to
the case are not disqualified by the dead man s statute. Furthermore, the rule req
uires that the defendant must be the estate. It does not apply where the heirs a
re being sued in their individual capacities. Representatives are only those who,
like the executor, one sued in their representative, not personal, capacity
Abraham v. Recto-Kasten, 4 SCRA 298 (1962) A cross-examination of the disqualifi
ed witness is a waiver of the dead man s privilege, even if there was a continuing
objection.
Lichauco v. Atlantic Gulf, 84 Phil. 330 (1949) This in effect ruled that the Dea
d Man s statute can not be invoked against a plaintiff-corporation. Interest no lo
nger disqualifies a witness. Officers/stockholder of corporation may testify in
a case filed against the estate of a deceased by the corporation
Escolin: In an action where the administrator is the plaintiff, the defendant ma
y testify on facts occurring prior to the death of the decedent.
Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil 698 (1927) action must be brought against the estate,
not by the estate, to be covered under the dead man s statute
Escolin: The dead man s rule does not apply in cadastral cases.
Escolin: If there is no instrument evidencing the claim, it would be difficult t
o prove the claim in the estate proceeding because of the dead man s statute. Howe
ver, if there is such an instrument, it is not barred by the dead man s statute (N
eibert v. Neibert)
Goi v. CA, 144 SCRA 222 (1986) heirs of a deceased are representatives within the a
mbit of the dead man s statute; waived by defendant if he files counterclaim again
st plaintiff; adverse party may testify to transactions or communications with d
eceased which were made with an agent of such person if the agents is still aliv
e and can testify as long as it is confined to the transactions
J. Privileged Communications
Privileged Communications
1. marital
2. attorney-client
3. physician-patient
4. priest-penitent
5. state secrets
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The followi
ng persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following c
ases:
This is a rule of relative disqualification. Each of those enumerated is disqual
ified to testify as to specific matters only. It does not disqualify them from t
estifying on matters not privileged. Hence, it is improper to object to their te
stimony upon mere subpoena. One must wait until it becomes apparent that their t
estimony covers matters that are privileged (e.g. upon asking of a question that
covers privileged matters; when the purpose of their testimony as admitted by t
he offeror covers privileged matters) before one may properly object.
Though a relative disqualification, it is nevertheless a testimonial disqualific
ation, as opposed to the testimonial privilege of ascendants and descendants (Ru
le 130 25). [careful not to be confused in the multiple meanings of the word privi
lege ] Hence, the witness has no say whether the objection is to be raised or not.
When the holder of the privilege (not necessarily the opposing party) consents
to the testimony, the witness must testify.
Note that the wording of the law is to the effect that (someone) may not be exami
ned without the consent of (another). The law does not say that one can not testi
fy or be examined over the objection of another. The wording of the law is to th
e effect that an objection of the other party in the privileged communication is
not necessary for the privilege to hold. Consent of the other party in the priv
ileged communication is an act that needs to be proved for the testimony to be a
dmitted. This is not to say that failure of a such a party to object will never
render such testimony admissible. This is to say that where the other party to t
he privileged communication is not a litigant in the case, and privileged commun
ication is offered in evidence without the consent of such party, the litigant a
gainst whom the testimony is offered may object to its admission on the ground o
f privileged communication. Where the other party in the privileged communicatio
n is a litigant, then his failure to object will be taken as a consent to the te
stimony or a waiver of a privilege.
The communication that is privileged need not be in any form. It can be oral or
written.
The communication ceases to be privileged if knowingly communicated in the prese
nce of 3rd persons. In such a case, the privilege may not be invoked at all. How
ever, if the privileged communication was within the surreptitious observation o
f a 3rd person, then the communication can be invoked if either the communicator
or communicatee called to testify. However, the privilege can not be invoked if
the 3rd person is called to testify.
1. Marital Communications
a. Rule 130 24 (a)
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examine
d without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidenc
e by one from the other during the marriage except in a civil case by one agains
t the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the othe
r or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants;
Requisites for Marital Communications Rule
1. communication received
a. from the spouse
b. in confidence
c. during the marriage
2. without the consent of the spouse
Note that the marital communication rule applies even after the marriage. It app
lies only to matters communicated by one spouse to another in confidence. It doe
s not cover knowledge of matters that a spouse obtains from a source other than
other spouse. It can be invoked even if neither spouse is a party to the action.
It is a relative disqualification and can be invoked only when it is apparent t
hat the testimony would cover privileged matters.
The exceptions to the rule are
1. in a civil case by one against the other, or
2. in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latt
er's direct descendants or ascendants
cf Rule 130 22: Marital Disqualification Rule
Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their marriage, neither
the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consen
t of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in
a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's
direct descendants or ascendants. (20a)
The marital disqualification rule refers to all matters, whether or communicated
by one spouse to the other. It applies only during the existence of the marriag
e. It can be invoked only if one spouse is a party to the action. It is an absol
ute disqualification and can be invoked the moment that one spouse is called to
testify.
Marital
Covers
AApplies
Invoked
MEMORIZE!
spouseonly
all
Disqualification
Communications
during
when
must
need
matters
matters
anot
the
bespouse
thetestimony
andabelitigant
regardless
marriage
after
communicated
aislitigant
(Rule
(Rule
the
called
appears
130,
marriage
of130,
toby
source
Sec.
testify
to
Sec.
one
cover
24spouse
22)
[a])
privileged
to another,
matters
during the marriage
b. Cases
People v. Carlos, 47 Phil. 626 (1925) where the privilege communication from one
spouse to the other comes into the hands of a 3rd party, without collusion or v
oluntary disclosure on the part of either spouse, not privilege; illegality of s
eizure must be raised by motion before trial for return of letter; unanswered le
tter inadmissible

2. Attorney-Client Privilege
a. Rule 130 24 (b)
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to
any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the
course of, or with a view to, professional employment, nor can an attorney's se
cretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client a
nd his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in
such capacity;
Requisites for attorney-client privilege
1. existence of an attorney-client relationship
2. witness is an attorney
3. as to communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon
4. the communication was made in confidence
5. communication was made in the course of, or with a view to professional emplo
yment
The privilege extends to the attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk concer
ning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity. The dif
ference being consent of only the client is needed for the attorney to testify.
However, the consent of both the attorney and the client is necessary for the at
torney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk to testify.
The attorney-client privilege does not apply if the attorney was sued by his cli
ent.
b. Cases
Uy Chico v. Union Life, 29 Phil. 163 (1915) communication made by client to atto
rney for purpose of being communicated to others not privileged, e.g. compromise
agreement
Regala v. Sandiganbayan, 262 SCRA 124 (1996) prosecution can not use attorneys a
s leverage to compel them to name their clients; client s identity is protected wh
en there is a strong probability exists that revealing client s name would implica
te him in the very activity for which he sought advice
Barton v. Leyte Asphalt and Mineral Oil Co., 46 Phil. 938 (1924) letter from cli
ent to attorney obtained by adverse party, admitted authentic in court, not priv
ileged regardless whether legally or illegally obtained (what about constitution
al rule of exclusion on evidence obtained in violation of the right to privacy o
f communication and correspondence?); one who overhears the communication with o
r without client s knowledge is not privileged
Orient Insurance v. Revilla, 54 Phil. 919 (1930) introduction in evidence of a p
art of a paper by one party waives privilege as to other parts of the same writi
ng; when a party invokes BER, it is the party who produces original who is deeme
d to have introduced it in evidence; contract for attorney s fees is not privilege
d; there is no partial waiver of privilege
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) privilege does not extend to information
gathered by an attorney from witnesses; WP can not be secured without sufficient
justification
Upjohn Company v. US, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) Privilege extends to information given
by employees to corporate not to facts.
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 732 F.2d 447 (1983) The general rule is the iden
tity of a client is not protected; legal advice exception may be defeated throug
h prima facie showing that the legal representation was secured in furtherance o
f present or intended continuing illegality, as where the representation itself
is part of a larger conspiracy; it is the link between the client and the commun
ication, not the link between client and possibility of potential criminal prose
cution which is protected; last link exception is abandoned; disclosure might po
ssibly implicate client in criminal activity not an exception
US v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1979) statement made by co-defendant to
an investigator acting for defendant s counsel protected; communication by client
to attorney remain privileged when attorney shares them with co-defendant for a
common defense
US v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1975) protection does not extend to
the communication regarding an intended crime; communication divulged to strange
rs not protected
US v. Nobles, 422 US 225 (1975) WPD waived when client presents investigator as
witness
People v. Sandiganbayan, 275 SCRA 505 (1997)
3. Physician-Patient Privilege
a. Rule 130 24 (c)
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot i
n a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice
or treatment given by him or any information which he may have acquired in atte
nding such patient in a professional capacity, which information was necessary t
o enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of
the patient;
Waivers of the physician-patient privilege, cf Rule 28, Sec. 3 and 4
Sec. 3. Report of findings. If requested by the party examined, the party causin
g the examination to be made shall deliver to him a copy of a detailed written r
eport of the examining physician setting out his findings and conclusions. After
such request and delivery, the party causing the examination to be made shall b
e entitled upon request to receive from the party examined a like report of any
examination, previously or thereafter made, of the same mental or physical condi
tion. If the party examined refuses to deliver such report, the court on motion
and notice may make an order requiring delivery on such terms as are just, and i
f a physician fails or refuses to make such a report the court may exclude his t
estimony if offered at the trial. (3a)
Sec. 4. Waiver of privilege. By requesting and obtaining a report of the examina
tion so ordered or by taking the deposition of the examiner, the party examined
waives any privilege he may have in that action or any other involving the same
controversy, regarding the testimony of every other person who has examined or m
ay thereafter examine him in respect of the same mental or physical examination.
(4)
Requisites for physician-client privilege
1. civil case
2. witness is a person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics
3. as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may ha
ve acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity
4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity
5. the information would blacken the reputation of the patient
Escolin: The old rule used the word character (what the person actually is). The n
ew rules use the word reputation (what people think of the person).
Note that the patient need not be the source of the information.
Only persons authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics are covered
by the privilege. Hence, nurses, midwives and other people who attend to the ill
can be called to testify as to any matter.
The privilege does not cover expert opinion as long as the witness does not test
ify to matters specifically referring to the patient.
There is no physician-patient privilege in criminal cases.
de Leon: What about civil cases impliedly instituted with criminal cases?
1) Cases
Lim v. CA, 214 SCRA 273 (1992) The physician-patient privilege is not violated b
y permitting physician to give expert testimony regarding hypothetical facts.
Krohn v. CA, 233 SCRA 146 (1994) Non-physician testimony on a medical psychologi
st s report is not covered by the physician patient privilege. This is hearsay but
there was no objection.
4. Rule 130 24(d): Priest-Penitent Privilege
 (d) A minister or priest cannot, without the consent of the person making th
e confession, be examined as to any confession made to or any advice given by hi
m in his professional character in the course of discipline enjoined by the chur
ch to which the minister or priest belongs;
Requisites for Priest-Penitent Privilege
1. witness is a minister or priest
2. as to any confession made to or any advice given by him in his professional c
haracter
3. in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which the minister or p
riest belongs
5. State Secrets
a. Rule 130 24(e)
(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwa
rds, as to communications made to him in official confidence, when the court fin
ds that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure. (21a)
Requisites for the State Secrets rule
1. witness is a public officer
2. as to communications made to him in official confidence
3. the court finds that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure
b. Cases
US v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) absent a claim of need to protect military, dip
lomatic or sensitive national security secrets, executive privilege can not prev
ail over due process
Banco Filipino v. Monetary Board, 142 SCRA 523 (1986) confidential information i
s not necessarily privileged; no public interest is prejudiced by disclosure, th
us not protected; is there a need for a law to declare it confidential?
6. Newsman s Privilege
a. RA 53 as amended by RA 1477
Sec. 1. Without prejudice to his liability under the civil and criminal
laws, the publisher, editor, columnist or duly accredited reporter of any newspa
per, magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal
the source of any news-report or information appearing in said publication whic
h was related in confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter unless the cou
rt or a House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by
the security of the State.
Requisites of newsman s privilege
1. publisher, editor, columnist or duly accredited reporter
2. of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation
3. cannot be compelled to reveal
4. as to the source of any news report or information appearing in said publicat
ion
5. related in confidence
Exception: Court, a House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is
demanded by the security of the State.
b. Cases
Matter of Farber (A.B.), 394 A. 2d 330 (1978) Constitution prevails over shield
law, but entitled to hearing to prove relevance.
7. Bank Deposits (RA 1405)
Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions i
n the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the
Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby c
onsidered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inqui
red or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except
upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon or
der of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public of
ficials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter
of the litigation.
Note that the privilege applies only to bank deposits. As to other property bein
g held by a bank, bank personnel may be examined upon order of a court (Sec. 55.
1 [d], RA 8791, General Banking Act of 2000).
K. Parental and Filial Privilege
1. Rule 130 25
Sec. 25. Parental and filial privilege. No person may be compelled to testif
y against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descend
ants. (20a)
There is no distinction between legitimate or illegitimate relations.
Note that this is a testimonial privilege, not a testimonial disqualification, f
ound in 22-24 of Rule 130 [careful not to be confused in the multiple use of the
word privilege ]. Here, the witness is the holder of the privilege and has the powe
r to invoke or waive the privilege. The relative against whom he is testifying c
an not invoke nor waive the privilege. However this must be construed in the lig
ht of Art. 215 of the Family Code
Art. 215. No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify again
st his parents and grandparents, except when such testimony is indispensable in
a crime against the descendant or by one parent against the other. (315a)
Hence, a descendant may be compelled to testify in a criminal case where
1. the descendant-witness himself is the victim, or
2. the descendant-witness s parent commits a crime against the descendant-witness s
other parent.
Note that an ascendant may not be compelled to testify even if it is a crime by
the descendant against the ascendant-witness. The ascendant-witness may testify
voluntarily though.
2. Case
People v. Publico, 7 CAR (2s) 703 (1972) information given by child to 3rd perso
n is protected
L. Admissions
Admissions that are admissible against a party
1. Admissions against interest
2. Compromises
3. Exceptions to Res Inter Alios Acta
a. Partner s/Agent s admissions
b. Co-conspirator s statements
c. Admission by Privies
4. Admissions by silence

1. Admissions against interest

a. Rule 130, 26
Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a party
as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. (22)
The general rule is evidence as to extra-judicial acts, omissions, and declarati
ons (AODs) of a party is admissible. These evidences can either be favorable or
unfavorable to a party. Rule 130, 26 expressly allows evidence of AODs prejudicia
l to the AODer. However, an objection may be raised as to the admissibility of A
ODs favorable to the AODer on the grounds of that these are self-serving AODs. T
he argument is Rule 130 26 only allows evidence of AODs prejudicial to the AODer. H
owever, 26 is only a rule of admissibility. It allows evidence of AODs prejudicia
l to the AODer, but does not prohibit evidence on AODs favorable to AODer. There
being no express prohibition, any evidence on AODs favorable to the AODer falls
under the general rule that evidence not excluded by law or the Rules is admiss
ible (Rule 128 3). Any doubt as to such evidence refers to its weight or probati
ve value and not to its admissibility.
Self-serving statements = hearsay? Declaration against interest is an exception
to the hearsay rule only applies if the declarant is deceased or unable to testi
fy. Self-defeating statements can not be excluded by the hearsay rule because it
is expressly admissible by the rules.
Is personal knowledge on the part of the AODer required?
b. Cases
Keller & Co. v. COB president s admission binds corporation

2. Compromises
a. Rule 130, 27
Sec. 27. Offer of compromise not admissible. In civil cases, an offer of com
promise is not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence
against the offeror. In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (c
riminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compr
omise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guil
t.
A plea of guilty later withdrawn, or an unaccepted offer of a plea of guilty
to a lesser offense, is not admissible in evidence against the accused who made
the plea or offer.
An offer to pay or the payment of medical, hospital or other expenses occasi
oned by an injury is not admissible in evidence as proof of civil or criminal li
ability for the injury. (24a)
Note that the offer of compromise in civil cases is not admissible only as evide
nce of liability. If the offer of compromise is offered as evidence on other mat
ters (e.g. amount of liability), then the evidence is admissible.
In civil cases, an offer of compromise is inadmissible regardless of the cause
of action. In criminal cases, the general rule is an offer of compromise is admi
ssible. However, it is inadmissible under the following cases:
1. quasi-offenses (criminal negligence)
2. cases allowed by law to be compromised (e.g. BIR can compromise tax cases)
3. plea of guilty later withdrawn
4. unaccepted offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense
5. offer to pay or payment of expenses occasioned by an injury
6. [the offer is made only to avoid the consequences of litigation]
Note that the inadmissible offer to pay refers only to expenses occasioned by an
injury. It does not include offers to pay other expenses. Ergo, an offer to pay
for damages to property is admissible in criminal cases.
Further note that an offer to pay for expenses other than those occasioned by an
injury is inadmissible in civil cases. Though the 3rd paragraph of 27 excludes i
n civil cases offers to pay only for expenses occasioned by an injury, offers to
pay for other expenses fall under the general rule that an offer to compromise
in civil cases is not admissible. The exclusion in civil cases of offers to pay
for expenses occasioned by an injury is merely a superfluity. Even if the exclus
ion was expressly applied to only criminal cases, an offer to pay for expenses o
ccasioned by an injury is in the nature of an offer to compromise which is undou
btedly admissible in civil cases. The bottomline is: an offer to pay for any exp
ense in civil cases is inadmissible.
b. Cases
Veradero v. Insular Lumber, 46 Phil. 176 (1924) evidence on an offer to compromi
se is admissible even in civil cases if it is to prove amount of a liability and
not the liability itself.
US v. Torres, 34 Phil. 994 (1916) offer of compromise in criminal cases inadmiss
ible when accused shows that it was made not under a consciousness of guilt, but
merely to avoid inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason; in this
case, the law allowed compromise, thus the offer to compromise is not admitted
People v. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676 (1995) offer to compromise made by a person other
than the accused is inadmissible if the accused repudiated the actions of such p
erson by raising the trial court s admission of evidence of such offer as an error
.
People v. de Guzman, 265 SCRA 228 (1996) the offer to compromise made by a perso
n other than the accused was admitted in evidence because the accused failed to
repudiate such acts by raising the trial court s admission of evidence on such off
er as an error.
People v. Yparriguirre, 268 SCRA 35 (1997) whether a complaint has been filed or
 not is irrelevant as to the admissibility of an offer to compromise.
People v. Maqui, 27 Phil. 97 (1914)
3. Res Inter Alios Acta
a. Rule 130, 28
Sec. 28. Admission by third party. The rights of a party cannot be prejudice
d by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided
. (25a)
The general rule is extra-judicial acts of a person other than a party are inad
missible against such party. However, the rules also provide for exceptions
1. Partner s admissions
2. agent s admissions
3. admissions by a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested
with the party.
4. Co-conspirator s statements
5. Admission by privies
Is personal knowledge required for these exceptions to apply?
b. Cases
People v. Tena, 215 SCRA 43 (1992)
Facts: Accused was convicted of robbery with homicide on the basis of an extra-j
udicial confession of another admitting his participation in the offense.
Held: This is not a co-conspirator s statement because there was no evidence of co
nspiracy independent of the extra-judicial confession. Furthermore, the confessi
on was executed long after the supposed conspiracy had ended.
Escolin: Had the co-conspirator taken the witness stand and pointed to his co-ac
cused, the testimony would have been admissible. In this case, what was presente
d was a merely his affidavit.
People v. Alegre, 94 SCRA 109 (1979) absent independent evidence of conspiracy,
extra-judicial confession of the accused is not admissible against others
People v. Raquel, 265 SCRA 248 (1996) extra-judicial confession of accused can n
ot be used to implicate co-accused unless repeated in open court.
c. Exceptions
Note that all the exceptions to res inter alios acta require that the relationsh
ip be proven by evidence independent of the act or declaration sought to be admi
tted.
1) Partner s/Agent s admissions
a) Rule 130, 29
Sec. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. The act or declaration of a partn
er or agent of the party within the scope of his authority and during the existe
nce of the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such party af
ter the partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act or declar
ation. The same rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint d
ebtor, or other person jointly interested with the party. (26a)
Requisites for admission by co-partner or agent
1. act or declaration of a partner, agent, or person jointly interested with the
party
2. within the scope of authority
3. made during the existence of the partnership, agency or joint interest
4. the partnership, agency, or joint interest is shown by evidence other than su
ch act or declaration
b) Cases
Ormachea v. Trillana, 13 Phil 194 (1909) Discharge of a debt given by a managing
partner, 2 years after the partnership had been dissolved does not qualify as a
partner s admission and can not prejudice or bind the other partners.
Kiel v. Estate of Sabert, 46 Phil 193 (1924)
Facts: After a partner died, the remaining partner sought to recover his share i
n the partnership.
Held: The declarations of one partner, not made in the presence of his co-partne
r, are not competent to prove the existence of a partnership, between them as ag
ainst such other partner. The existence of a partnership cannot be established b
y general reputation, rumor, or hearsay.
Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival, 588 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 198) the jurisdiction in
which this case is decided has a law which explicitly declared that an act of a
party or his agent is not hearsay; agent need not have personal knowledge of hi
s statement as long as it is within the scope of his authority, may be used agai
nst him and his principal
2) Co-conspirator s statements
a) Rule 130, 30
Sec. 30. Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator r
elating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence aga
inst the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than suc
h act of declaration. (27)
Requisites for co-conspirator s statements
1. act or declaration of a conspirator
2. relating to the conspiracy
3. made during its existence
4. the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of declaration.
b) Cases
People v. Cabrera, 57 SCRA 715 (1974)
Facts: Accused was convicted based on the extra-judicial confession of his co-ac
cused.
Held: The statement was made after, not during, the conspiracy, hence it was ina
dmissible.
People v. Yatco, 97 Phil. 941 (1955) confession regarding conspiracy may be used
against confessor (multiple admissibility); confession regarding conspiracy sho
uld be conditionally admitted until conspiracy is proved; statements must be mad
e during the conpiracy and in furtherance of its object to be admissible
People v. Chaw Yaw Shun, 23 SCRA 127 (1968) conspiracy must be proved by indepen
dent evidence other than the confession; reiterated in furtherance
People v. Serrano, 105 Phil. 531 (1959) requirement that conspiracy must be show
n 1st other than confession applies only to extra-judicial confessions not to te
stimony in open court
3) Admission by Privies
a) Rule 130, 31
Sec. 31. Admission by privies. Where one derives title to property from anot
her, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title,
in relation to the property, is evidence against the former. (211)

Requisites for admission by privies

1. a party derives title to property from another
2. act, declaration, or omission of the transferor
3. made while holding the title
4. in relation to the property
Tequillo: Does this not violate the Property Registration Decree, that says 3rd
parties are not bound unless the encumbrance is registered?
b) Cases
Alpuerto v. Pastor, 38 Phil. 785 (1918) privies denotes any act whereby the succes
sor is substituted in the place of the predecessor in interest; purchaser at exe
cution sale is a privy of the execution debtor; 3rd parties are persons who have n
ot intervened in the execution of the instrument either as principals or witness
es
City of Manila v. Del Rosario, 5 Phil. 227 (1905) admission must be made while o
ne holds title
4. Admissions by silence
a. Rule 130 32
Sec. 32. Admission by silence. An act or declaration made in the presence an
d within the hearing or observation of a party who does or says nothing when the
act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not tr
ue, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence agai
nst him. (23a)
Requisites for admission by silence
1. The act or declaration is made in the presence and within the hearing or obse
rvation of a party
2. The party does or says nothing
3. The act or declaration naturally calls for action or comment if not true
4. Such action or comment is proper and possible on the part of the party.
b. Cases
People v. Paragsa, 84 SCRA 105 (1978) Failure by a supposed rape victim to rebut
sweetheart defense based on testimonial evidence may be taken against her. Requ
irements for admission by silence: 1) heard and understood, 2) at liberty to den
y, 3) affects his rights, 4) within his knowledge, and 5) material to the issue
People v. Alegre, 94 SCRA 109 (1979) silence of accused in custody during invest
igation can not be used as evidence against him
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 853 (1965) court may not comment on accused s fail
ure to testify regarding facts within his knowledge
M. Confessions
1. Rule 130, 33
Sec. 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt o
f the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be gi
ven in evidence against him. (29a)
This rule is applicable only in criminal cases.
A confession need not be in writing in order to be admissible in evidence.
If it is in writing, it is NOT required to be under oath.
Escolin: However, if it is not in writing, the prosecution may find difficulty i
n proving it.
2. Art. III, 12 and 17, 1987 Constitution
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the per
son cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These r
ights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means wh
ich vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, so
litary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
3. Rule 115 (e)
Sec. 1. Rights of accused at trial. xxx
(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself.
4. Cases
People v. Sarmiento, 147 SCRA 252 (1987) A confession, to be admissible, must ha
ve been executed in the presence of counsel. Waiver of right to counsel must be
with the assistance of counsel.
People v. Marra, 236 SCRA 565 (1994) Where the confession was made even before t
he accused was under custodial investigation, it is admissible even if he was no
t assisted by counsel. Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiate
d by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or othe
rwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Only after the i
nvestigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to
focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the polic
e carries out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incrimi
nating statements that the accused is said to be under custodial investigation.
People v. Sumayo, 70 SCRA 488 (1976) Where the extra-judicial confessions of the
accused are consistent in many material details and manifest amazing consistenc
y and accuracy in the narration of events and of facts which could not have been
known to the police investigators if the same were not voluntarily given by the
accused, such statements are admissible against the accused on the doctrine of
interlocking confessions.
de Leon: The value of the doctrine of interlocking confessions is when a confess
ion is inadmissible against one accused (e.g. obtained without counsel), but it
is nevertheless admissible against the other co-accused. The confession of one m
ay be used against another to produce evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
People v. Compil, 244 SCRA 135 (1995)
People v. Wong Chuen Ming, 256 SCRA 182 (1996)
People v. Alegre, 94 SCRA 109 (1979)
People v. Yip Wai Ming, 264 SCRA 224 (1996)
People v. Maqueda, 242 SCRA 565 (1995)
Bruton v. US,
Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979)
People v. Encipido, G.R. No. 7009l, Dec. 29, 1986
N. Previous Conduct as Evidence
1. Rule 130, 34-35
Sec. 34. Similar acts as evidence. Evidence that one did or did not do a cer
tain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the
same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a speci
fic intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage,
and the like. (48 a)
GR: Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admis
sible to prove that he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another
time
Exceptions: It may be received to prove a specific
1. intent
2. knowledge
3. identity
4. plan
5. system
6. scheme
7. habit
8. custom or
9. usage, and
10. the like.
Sec. 35. Unaccepted offer. An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of mo
ney or to deliver a written instrument or specific personal property is, if reje
cted without valid cause, equivalent to the actual production and tender of the
money instrument, or property. (49 a)
2. Cases
US v. Evangelista, 24 Phil 453 (1913) In a trial for arson, the prosecution may
prove that the accused had attempted to set fire to the house on the day previou
s to the burning alleged in the information, for the purpose of showing the inte
nt of the accused in subsequently setting fire to the house. Where a person is c
harged wit the commission of a specific crime, testimony may be received of the
other similar acts committed about the same time, only for the purpose of estab
lishing the criminal intent of the accused.
US v. Pineda, 37 Phil 457 (1918)
Facts: A druggist filled a prescription for protassium chlorate with barium chlo
rate, a poison, causing the death of two horses. After analyzing the packages, t
wo chemists went to the drug store of the defendant and bought potassium chlorat
e, which when analyzed was found to be barium chlorate.
Held: The testimony of the chemist was admissible in order to demonstrate defend
ant's motive and negligence. It is permissible to ascertain defendant's knowledg
e and intent and to fix his negligence. If the defendant has on more than one oc
casion performed similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly excluded, negl
igence is intensified, and fraudulent intent may even be established. There is n
o better evidence of negligence than the frequency of accidents. Evidence is adm
issible in a criminal action which tends to show motive, although it tends to pr
ove the commission of another offense by the defendant.
People v. Irang, 64 Phil 285 (1937)
Facts:
After barging into her home, a man ordered Maximiniana Vicente to bring out her
money and jewelry. As she turned over the items, she looked at the man's face an
d saw that he had pockmarks and a scar on his left eyelid. Irang was identified
by Maximiana from a police line-up and was charged. During the trial, Maximiana s
neighbor, Juana de la Cruz, testified that on the night in question, her house w
as assaulted by malefactors. de la Cruz noticed that one of them had pockmarks a
nd a scar on the left eyelid. She identified that man to be Irang.
Held: The testimony of Juana de la Cruz indirectly corroborates Maximiniana s test
imony that the man of the same description was the one who went to her house and
demanded delivery of her money and jewelry. While evidence of another crime is,
as a rule, not admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when i
t is otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify defendant as the perpetra
tor of the robbery charged, or tends to show his presence at the scene or in the
vicinity of the crime at the time charged, or when it is evidence of a circumst
ance connected with the crime.
People v. Soliman, 53 O.G. 8083 (1957)
People v. Babiera, 52 Phil. 97 (1928)
US v. Mercado, 26 Phil. 127 (1913)
O. Hearsay Rule
1. Testimonial Knowledge
a. Rule 130, 36
Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay exclude
d. A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal know
ledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise p
rovided in these rules. (30 a)
b. Cases
People v. Damaso, 212 SCRA 547 (1992) Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or n
ot, cannot be given credence. The lack of objection may make any incompetent evi
dence admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weigh
t of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no probative valu
e.
People v. Brioso, 37 SCRA 336 (1971)
People v. Cusi, 14 SCRA 944 (1965)
People v. Gaddi, 170 SCRA 649 (1989)
Leake v. Hagert, 175 N.W.2d 675 (1970)
U.S. v. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. 464 (1980)
2. Exceptions
Exceptions to the hearsay rule
1. waiver
2. independently relevant evidence
3. dying declaration
4. Declaration against interest
5. Act or declaration about pedigree
6. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree
7. Common reputation
8. Part of the res gestae
9. Verbal acts
10. Entries in the course of business
11. Entries in official records
12. Commercial lists and the like
13. Learned treatises
14. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding
a. Dying Declaration
1) Rule 130, 37
Sec. 37. Dying declaration. The declaration of a dying person, made under th
e consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his d
eath is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circums
tances of such death. (31 a)
 Requisites for admissibility of a dying declaration
1. declaration of a dying person
2. made under the consciousness of an impending death
3. his death is the subject of inquiry
4. as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death
2) Cases
People v. Devaras, 37 SCRA 697 (1971)
Facts: The next morning after being stabbed or 11 hours later, as the victim was
about to be taken to the hospital, a patrolman was able to get his statement as
to the identity of the perpetrators. The victim was unable to sign the statemen
t and he died the next day.
Held: The statement was not part of the res gestae because of the lapse of consi
derable time between the commission of the offense and the taking of the stateme
nt. However, the statement amounts to a dying declaration, as it is a statement
coming from a seriously wounded person even if death occurs hours or days after
it was inflicted if there be showing that it was due to the wound whose gravity
did not diminish from the time he made his declaration until the end came. There
is no need for proof that the declarant state "that he has given up the hope of
life. It is enough if. from the circumstances, it can be inferred with certainty
that such must have been his state of mind. It is sufficient that the circumsta
nces are such as to lead inevitably to the conclusion that the time [of such sta
tement] the declarant did not expect to survive the injury from which he actuall
y died. Its admissibility is not affected by death occurring hours or days after
wards.
People v. Laquinon, 135 SCRA 91 (1985)
Facts: Pablo Remonde was shot. The barrio captain found him lying on the sand at
the bank of a river. Pablo s hands were tied on his back and he was lying face do
wn. The barrio captain took Pablo s ante-mortem statement and learned that he was
Pablo Remonde, he was shot by Gregorio Laquinon, and that Pablo was not sure if
he would survive the gunshot wounds he suffered. Pablo died in the hospital 3 da
ys later. Laquinon was charged and convicted of Murder. Laquinon argues that the
statement is not a dying declaration because it was not made under the consciou
sness of an impending death.
Held: The statement of the deceased Pablo Remonde is not admissible as a dying d
eclaration since the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not. Th
e declaration fails to show that the deceased believed himself in extremis, at t
he point of death when every hope of recovery is extinct, which is the sole basi
s for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule. I
t may be admitted, however, as part of the res gestae since the statement was ma
de immediately after the incident and the deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficie
nt time to concoct a charge against the accused.
de Leon: In Devaras, consciousness of impending death was inferred from the exte
nt of the injuries. In Laquinon, the declarant expressly said that he was not su
re that we was going to die. The moral of the story is, in taking a dying declar
ation, don t ask if the declarant thinks he will die. :)
People v. Sabio, 102 SCRA 218 (1981)
Facts: Catralino Espina was found by his grandnephew in his house lying and woun
ded. Espina asked for the police. When police officers arrived, they asked Espin
a who slashed and robbed him. Espina answered that it was Sabio. His declaration w
as taken down and thumbmarked by him. Sabio was charged and convicted of robbery
with homicide. Sabio questions the admissibility of the declaration on the grou
nd that it was not made under the consciousness of an impending death because th
e victim had hopes of recovery for his first word to his grandnephew was for the
latter to fetch the police.
Held: Statement is admissible. The seriousness of the injury on the victim's for
ehead which had affected the brain and was profusely bleeding; the victim's inab
ility to speak unless his head was raised; the spontaneous answer of the victim
that "only Papu Sabio is responsible for my death"; and his subsequent demise fr
om the direct effects of the wound on his forehead, strengthen the conclusion th
at the victim must have known that his end was inevitable. That death did not en
sue till 3 days after the declaration was made will not alter its probative forc
e since it is not indispensable that a declarant expires immediately thereafter.
It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death, that
renders the dying declaration admissible. The fact that the victim told his gra
ndnephew to fetch the police, does not negative the victim's feeling of hopeless
ness of recovery but rather emphasizes the realization that he had so little tim
e to disclose his assailant to the authorities.
However, only homicide was proved. The evidence supportive of the charge of robb
ery is at best circumstantial and does not establish beyond reasonable doubt tha
t the accused had carried away personality belonging to the offended party. Ther
e was no eyewitness to the alleged robbery, nor was any part of the alleged miss
ing objects recovered. The consummation of the robbery cannot he inferred nor pr
esumed from the circumstance that the accused was seen running "with his hands i
nside his shirt", or that the "barro", alleged to have contained cash amounting
to about P8, was seen on the floor, open and empty, or that the things and merch
andise inside the house were in disarray. Nor can the dying declaration of the v
ictim be admitted to establish the fact of robbery. The admission of dying decla
rations has always been strictly limited to criminal prosecutions for homicide o
r murder as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of death.
de Leon: Could not have the statement been admissible as proof of Sabio s guilt of
robbery as a part of the res gestae?
People v. de Joya, 203 SCRA 343 (1991)
Facts: Eulalia Deamse was fatally wounded. Her grandson, Alvin Valencia, came ho
me and found her wounded. He asked his grandmother "Apo, Apo, what happened?" Th
e deceased victim said: "Si Paqui". After uttering those two words, she expired.
It is not disputed that "Paqui" is the nickname of Pioquinto de Joya. De Joya w
as charged and convicted of robbery with homicide.
Held: A dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself. To be com
plete in itself does not mean that the declarant must recite everything that con
stituted the res gestae of the subject of his statement, but that his statement
of any given fact should be a full expression of all that he intended to say as
conveying his meaning in respect of such fact. The statement as offered must not
be merely a part of the whole as it was expressed by the declarant; it must be
complete as far it goes. It is immaterial how much of the whole affair of the de
ath is related, provided the statement includes all that the declarant wished or
intended to include in it. Thus, if an interruption cuts short a statement whic
h thus remains clearly less than that which the dying person wished to make, the
fragmentary statement is not receivable, because the intended whole is not ther
e, and the whole might be of a very different effect from that of the fragment;
yet if the dying person finishes the statement he wishes to make, it is no objec
tion that he has told only a portion of what he might have been able to tell. Si
nce the declarant was prevented from saying all that he wished to say, what he d
id say might have been qualified by the statements which he was prevented from m
aking. That incomplete declaration is not therefore entitled to the presumption
of truthfulness which constitutes the basis upon which dying declarations are re
ceived.
In this case, the dying declaration of the deceased victim here was incomplete.
The words "Si Paqui" do not constitute by themselves a sensible sentence. The ph
rase "Si Paqui" must, moreover, be related to the question asked by Alvin: "Apo,
Apo, what happened?" Alvin's question was not: "Apo, Apo, who did this to you?"
The deceased was cut off by death before she could convey a complete or sensibl
e communication to Alvin. The trial court simply assumed that by uttering the wo
rds "Si Paqui", the deceased had intended to name her killer. But Eulalia hersel
f did not say so and we cannot speculate what the rest of her communication migh
t have been had death not interrupted her. We are unable to regard the dying sta
tement as a dying declaration naming the appellant as the doer of the bloody dee
d.
Escolin: Justices Relova and Francisco and I disagree with this decision. Under
the context, what else could have Si Paqui meant other than that he was responsibl
e for the crime?
People v. Salison, G.R. No. L-115690, Feb. 20, 1996
b. Declaration Against Interest
1) Rule 130, 38
Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. The declaration made by a person dece
ased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact a
sserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declar
ant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made th
e declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence agai
nst himself or his successors in interest and against third persons. (32 a)
Requirements for hearsay testimony on declaration against interest
1. declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify
2. against the interest of the declarant
3. the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contr
ary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not
have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true
4. as evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third p
ersons
cf Rule 130 Sec. 31
Sec. 31. Admission by privies. Where one derives title to property from another,
the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in re
lation to the property, is evidence against the former. (211)
Admission
Declaration
One
Exception
Evidence
Admitter
Declarant
Relates
of 3toneed
exceptions
against
byany
to
is
need
title
against
must
privies
hearsay
dead
not
interest
notthe
even
to
be
bebeproperty
or interest
to
against
successor
dead
unable
the
against
resor
declarant,
inter
to
the
unable
the
ininterest
testify
alios
interest
admitter
tohistestify
acta
successor
ofof
sthe
interest
thedeclarant
admitter
in interest, or 3rd persons
2) Cases
Viacrusis v. CA, 44 SCRA 176 (1972) Previous recognition of ownership in another
by a party in possession of property in dispute is admission against interest w
hich may be received even against 3rd persons.
People v. Toledo, 51 Phil. 825 (1928) Declaration against interest, as an except
ion to the hearsay rule, covers not only pecuniary interest, but also penal inte
rest.
People v. Majuri, 96 SCRA 472 (1980)
Fuentes v. CA, 253 SCRA 430 (1996)
c. Pedigree
1) Rule 130, 39
Sec. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a pers
on deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person
related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurr
ed before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes re
lationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the pla
ces where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also
facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree. (33 a)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to pedigree
1. act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify
2. in respect to the pedigree of another person
3. related to him by birth or marriage
4. where it occurred before the controversy
5. the relationship between the 2 persons is shown by evidence other than such a
ct or declaration.
"Pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the
dates when and the places where these facts occurred, the names of the relatives
, and facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.
2) Cases
Gravador v. Mamigo, 20 SCRA 742 (1967)
Tison v. CA, 276 SCRA 582 (1997)
d. Family Tradition
1) Rule 130, 40
Sec. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. The reputation o
r tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the
pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness t
estifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or aff
inity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on r
ings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree. (3
4 a)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to family reputation or tra
dition regarding pedigree
1. reputation or tradition existing in a family
2. previous to the controversy
3. in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members
4. the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by cons
anguinity or affinity
Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, f
amily portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
de Leon: note that in family tradition, the declarant must be dead or unable to
testify. In family reputation or tradition, there is not even a declarant to spe
ak of; just a witness who was aware of an exiting family reputation or tradition
.
2) Case
People v. Alegado, 201 SCRA 37 (1991) Testimony of a witness and the witness gran
dfather as to the date of birth and age of the witness is evidence on family tra
dition which is admissible as an exception to hearsay.
Ferrer v. de Inchausti, 38 Phil 905 (1918) Entries in family bibles or other fam
ily books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, to be a
dmissible as an evidence of pedigree, need NOT be proven to have been made at th
e same time as the occurrence of the events documented.
e. Common Reputation
1) Rule 130, 41
Sec. 41. Common reputation. Common reputation existing previous to the contr
oversy, respecting facts of public or general interest more than thirty years ol
d, or respecting marriage or moral character, may be given in evidence. Monument
s and inscriptions in public places may be received as evidence of common reputa
tion. (35)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to Common reputation
1. Common reputation
2. existing previous to the controversy
3. respecting either
a. facts of public or general interest more than 30 years old, or
b. marriage or
c. moral character
Monuments and inscriptions in public places may be received as evidence of commo
n reputation.
2) Cases
City of Manila v. Del Rosario, 5 Phil 227 (1905)
f. Res Gestae
1) Rule 130, 42
Sec. 42. Part of the res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startli
ng occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with re
spect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res
gestae. xxx
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to res gestae
1. Statements made by a person either
a. while a startling occurrence is taking place or
b. immediately prior or
c. immediately subsequent thereto
2. with respect to the circumstances thereof
2) Cases
People v. Putian, 74 SCRA 133 (1976) A declaration made by a person immediately
after being wounded, pointing out or naming his assailant, may be considered as
part of the res gestae and is admissible in evidence. A statement was given some
time after the stabbing while the declarant was undergoing treatment at a medica
l clinic, where he had no time to concoct a falsehood or to fabricate a maliciou
s charge against the accused and no motive has been shown as to why he would fra
me-up the accused would render the statement admissible as a part of the res ges
tae.
People v. Peralta, 237 SCRA 218 (1994)
Facts: Atanacia Ramos had a daughter Rosita. Rosita married Domiciano Peralta. T
hey had a daughter Siony. On morning, Siony came to Atanacia at her house franti
cally told her that Domiciano was strangling Rosita. They went to the Peralta ho
me and found Rosita dead. Domiciano was not there. They immediately reported the
matter to the police, who eventually arrested the Domiciano. At the preliminary
investigation, Siony executed a sworn statement implicating her father. Domicia
no was charged with Parricide. At the trial Atanacia testified as to Siony s decla
ration. However, Siony testified for her father and said that though she saw som
eone strangling her mother, she did not see who it was. After the defense rested
, the prosecution presented the investigating judge who testified as to the regu
larity of the conduct of the preliminary investigation. TC convicts.
Held: The statement Siony made to her grandmother when she rushed to inform her
of her father's attack on her mother was part of the res gestae. Res gestae mean
s the "thing done." It refers to those exclamations and statements made by eithe
r the participants, victims or spectators to a crime immediately before, during
or immediately after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are suc
h that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired
by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant
to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. Siony rushed to Atanacia imme
diately upon seeing her father strangling her mother to death. Her spontaneous d
eclaration to Atanacia was part of the res gestae and is assumed to preclude the
probability of premeditation of fabrication. Since the utterance was made under
the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses rather than reason and
reflection, and during the brief period when consideration of self-interest coul
d not have been fully brought to bear, the utterance may be taken as expressing
Siony's real belief as to the facts just observed by her.
Besides, where a witness executes a statement for the prosecution and retracts h
is testimony and subsequently testified for the defense, the test to decide whic
h testimony to believe is one of comparison coupled with the application of the
general rules of evidence. Retractions are generally unreliable and are looked u
pon with considerable disfavor by the courts. Siony testified during the prelimi
nary examination conducted by Judge Paano that the appellant choked her mother t
o death. Her subsequent retraction was an afterthought and has no probative valu
e at all.
Furthermore, there are certain circumstances that may have persuaded the daughte
r to change her former declaration and testify in favor of her father. First, th
e accused was her father after all, and she probably felt that she should not be
responsible for his incarceration for the rest of his life. Second, her testimo
ny was given 7 years after the incident and therefore could not be expected to b
e as accurate as the statement she made in the preliminary investigation only ho
urs after the killing. Third, during all this time, her father had been under de
tention and she must have believed that this was punishment enough for him. Last
ly, she was, at the time she testified in court, living with her father's sister
, who may have greatly influenced her testimony and caused her to recant her ear
lier statement.
g. Verbal acts
1) Rule 130, 42
Sec. 42. Part of the res gestae. xxx So, also, statements accompanying an eq
uivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be re
ceived as part of the res gestae (36 a)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to verbal acts
1. statements accompanying an equivocal act
2. material to the issue
3. giving it a legal significance
2) Case
Dusepec v. Torres, 39 Phil 760 (1919)
Facts: Tan Po Pik died in the Philippines intestate. After he died, Marta Torres
, claiming to be his widow, took possession of his estate and partitioned it bet
ween herself and her children by the deceased. Plaintiffs claim to be the legal
wife and children of the deceased from China. They now sue to recover their supp
osed share of the estate. The SC found numerous inconsistencies as to the testim
onial and documentary evidence of the plaintiffs as to lead to the conclusion th
at the plaintiffs are not who they claim to be. However, the plaintiff offered i
n evidence a sworn declaration of the deceased that the plaintiffs were his chil
dren. Defendants offered letters between the deceased and his brother showing th
at deceased s sworn declaration was to deceive the customs authorities to allow pl
aintiffs to enter the country. Plaintiffs object to the admissibility of such le
tters.
Held: The declaration was made in proceedings before customs authorities upon ar
rival of the plaintiffs from China. The arrival and admission of these plaintiff
s and the declaration of Tan Po Pik are isolated parts of an event which is the
voyage from China to the Philippines of these supposed children of the deceased.
Their preparations for the voyage and the plans conceived by them to obtain the
ir sure entrance into this country are also part of the voyage. In order to cons
ider the declaration made by Tan Po Pik before the customs authorities, the othe
r acts, declarations, and events occurring before the said entrance into the cou
ntry, which may have an essential bearing or which have led to the realization o
f their entrance into the country are admissible in evidence in this case on the
ground that they constitute parts of the same transaction, or of the res gestae
. A word, an expression, or an act of a person, considered apart from the circum
stances surrounding them, does not signify anything, and in many cases it signif
ies the opposite of the true sense of the said word, expression, or act. It is i
mprudent and illegal to consider the declaration made by Tan Po Pik before the c
ustoms authorities separately from the circumstances which prompted him to make
such a declaration. We must therefore inquire into circumstances which surrounde
d the entrance of the plaintiffs and the declaration made by Tan Po Pik on that
occasion.
In this case, letters between Tan Po Pik and his brother in China contained an a
greement that for plaintiffs to enter the Philippines, Tan Po Pik was to declare
before the customs authorities that plaintiffs were his children. The names of
the children whom Tan were supposed to declare as his children were the same as
the names of the plaintiffs, except that they now bear the surname Tan. The lett
ers even refer to one of the plaintiffs as the deceased s nephew. If these plainti
ffs were really children of Tan Po Pik, there would have been no necessity for t
he above letters. Thus, Tan Po Pik s declaration before the customs authorities is
for the sole purpose of allowing the children to enter the Philippines, and suc
h a declaration is entirely false. All these letters formed an essential part of
the fact of the coming of these plaintiffs to Manila, because if these letters
had not been transmitted and received the plaintiffs could not have succeeded in
entering the Philippines. Therefore, all the statements and declarations-of Tan
Po Ho in these documents relative to the prosecution of the object of the consp
iracy are admissible in evidence.
People v. Lungayan, 162 SCRA 100 (1988)
People v. Tolentino, 218 SCRA 337 (1993)
h. Entries in the Course of Business
1) Rule 130, 43
Sec. 43. Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the tim
e of the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to te
stify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received a
s prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capa
city or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of busi
ness or duty. (37 a)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to Entries in the course of
business
1. Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer
2. by a person deceased, or unable to testify
3. who was in a position to know the facts therein stated
4. if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the perfor
mance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
Note that in business records, the person making the entry must be deceased or u
nable to testify. In official records, the person making the entry need not be d
eceased or unable to testify (Rule 130, Sec. 44). Both official and business rec
ords are only prima facie evidence.
If the person making the entry is still alive, use the record to refresh his mem
ory. (Rule 132, Sec. 16)
2) Cases
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943)
Philamlife v. Capital Assurance Corp., (CA) 72 O.G. 3941
i. Official Records
1) Rule 130, 44
Sec. 44. Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in th
e performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidenc
e of the facts therein stated. (38)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to Entries in official reco
rds
1. made in the performance of his duty
2. by either
a. a public officer of the Philippines, or
b. by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law
Note that in official records, the person making the entry need not be deceased
or unable to testify, but he must be a public officer or a person in the perform
ance of a duty specially enjoined by law. In business records, the person making
the entry must be deceased or unable to testify. Both official and business rec
ords are only prima facie evidence.
2) Cases
Fortus v. Novero, 23 SCRA 1330 (1968)
Facts: Ciriaca Angelo was the owner of the parcel of land. She had only one chil
d, Crisanta Ilagan. Crisanta predeceased her mother. Crisanta was married to Fer
min Fortus. They had an only son, the Victorino Fortus. Ciriaca died intestate.
The property therefore passed on to Victorino Fortus. However, Victorino never c
aused the OCT to be cancelled and to have another issued in his name. Ciriaca s es
tate was therefore not yet closed.
Victorino Fortus and Julia Fortus were husband and wife but were childless. Upon
Victorino's death, Julia executed an affidavit of extra-judicial summary settle
ment of Ciriaca s estate and had it registered. Rosario Novero, claiming to be an
illegitimate child of Victorino with Patricia Novero, initiated proceedings for
summary settlement of Ciriaca s estate. Julia opposed, along with the Fortuses, wh
o claim to be Victorino s half-brother and sisters. They claim to be the legitimat
e children of Fermin Fortus with Jacoba Aguil.
The Fortuses did not present the marriage contract or certificate of their alleg
ed parents, but sought to present secondary evidence. The SC found the testimoni
al evidence the Fortuses presented to lay the basis for introduction of secondar
y evidence were inconsistent, incredible and insufficient to establish than an
original marriage contract was indeed executed. However, the Fortuses presented
baptismal certificates of some of them to prove the marriage of their parents. N
ote that they must prove marriage because otherwise, they would be illegitimate
relatives of Victorino which would disqualify them from inheriting from him.
Held: The record of baptism attests to the fact of the administration of the sac
rament on the date stated therein, but not the truth of the statements therein m
ade as to the parentage of the child baptized. Neither are the baptismal certifi
cates public documents or public writings, because the parochial records of bapt
isms are not public or official records, as they are not kept by public officers
, and are not proof of relationship or filiation of the child baptized.
Furthermore, though the Fortuses invoke that since for the past 30 years their p
arents had deported themselves in public as husband and wife and had been living
under the same roof, the legal presumption is that they had entered into a lawf
ul marriage. This presumption, however, is only applicable where there is no cle
ar and concrete evidence showing otherwise. In this case, however, there is a ce
rtificate from the Division of Archives to the effect that 'no copy of the marri
age record of spouses Fermin Fortus and Jacoba Aguil supposed to have been solem
nized in the year 1902 and 1905 in the Municipality of Rosario, Batangas had bee
n received by said office for file', and this certification is further strengthe
ned by the affirmation of Clemente Barbosa, a clerk in the office of the municip
al treasurer of Rosario, Batangas, that there was no record of such marriage sup
posedly contracted between the spouses Fermin Fortus and Jacoba Aguil from 1902
and 1922 of the Municipality of Rosario, Batangas. At most, the baptismal certif
icates were only a prima facie proof which oppositor Julia Fortus had overcome b
y satisfactory evidence to the effect that Fermin Fortus and Jacoba Aguil were n
ever married and hence all of their children are not legitimate brothers or half
brothers and therefore have no right to inherit from Victorino Fortus.
Escolin: Before, baptismal certificates were competent evidence to establish the
parentage of the child. After Act 3753, baptismal certificates were no longer c
ompetent.
Johnson v. Lutz, ()
Africa v. Caltex, 16 SCRA 448 (1966)
People v. Leones, 117 SCRA 382 (1982)
Manalo v. Robles Trans. Co., Inc., 99 Phil. 729 (1956)
People v. Cabuang, 217 SCRA 675 (1993)
People v. Gabriel, G.R. No. L-107735, Feb. 1, 1996
j. Commercial Lists
1) Rule 130, 45
Sec. 45. Commercial lists and the like. Evidence of statements of matters of
interest, to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, pe
riodical, or other published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the t
ruth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for use b
y persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by th
em therein. (39)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to Commercial lists
1. statements of matters of interest
2. to persons engaged in an occupation
3. contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation
4. as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated
5. the compilation is
a. published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and
b. generally used and relied upon by them therein.
e.g. NEDA reports, part of the newspaper which reports the prices of shares
2) Cases
State v. Lungsford, 400 A.2d 843 (1979)
Estrada vs. Noble, [C.A,] 49 O.G. 139
k. Learned Treatises
1) Rule 130, 46
Sec. 46. Learned treatises. A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on
a subject of history, law, science or art is admissible as tending to prove the
truth of a matter stated therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a witnes
s expert in the subject testifies that the writer of the statement in the treati
se, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling as expert
in the subject. (40 a)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to Learned treatises (used
to prove unwritten foreign law)
1. published treatise, periodical or pamphlet
2. on a subject of history, law, science or art
3. Either
a. the court takes judicial notice, or
b. a witness expert in the subject testifies
4. that the writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is r
ecognized in his profession or calling as expert in the subject
2) Cases
Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales, 167 SCRA 736 (1988) Philippine courts can not take judic
ial notice of foreign law. Failure to prove foreign law whether unwritten under
Rule 130, Sec. 46 or written under Rule 132, Sec. 24, raises the presumption tha
t the law is the same as ours.
Escolin: This provision is useful to prove an unwritten law. E.g. learned treati
ses on unwritten law which the court has taken judicial notice: Manresa, Sanchez
-Roman. E.g. of writers of treatises acknowledged as experts: Corpus juris, Corp
us juris secundum, LRA
If it is a written law that is sought to be proven, cf Rule 132, Sec. 19
Sec. 19. Classes of documents. For the purpose of their presentation in evidence
, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Ph
ilippines, or of a foreign country;
xxx
E.g. of written official acts: Judicial decisions, executive orders. Our courts
take judicial notice of local laws. However, there are certain instances when an
official copy of the written official act is required to be presented. cf Rule
132, Sec. 24
Sec. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced
by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having t
he legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record
is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the cu
stody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the ce
rtificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service
of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept
, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (25 a)
Ways to prove written foreign official acts
1. official publication, or
2. copy
a. attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his dep
uty, and
b. if the record is not kept in the Philippines
1) accompanied with a certificate that such officer has the custody made by
a) a secretary of the embassy or legation
b) consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or
c) by any Philippine officer in the foreign service stationed in the foreign cou
ntry in which the record is kept
2) and, authenticated by the seal of his office.
l. Prior Testimony
1) Rule 130, 47
Sec. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. The testimony or de
position of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or p
roceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject ma
tter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity
to cross-examine him. (41 a)
cf with the rules on admissions (Rule 130 Secs. 26-33, RoC) and interrogatories
(Rule 24, RoC)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to prior testimony
1. testimony or deposition
2. of a witness deceased or unable to testify
3. given in a former case or proceeding
4. involving the same parties and subject matter
5. as evidence against the adverse party
6. adverse party had the opportunity to cross-examine him
2) Cases
Tan v. CA, 20 SCRA 54 (1967) Absent a showing that the witness is dead, outside
the Philippines, or unable to testify, their prior testimony is inadmissible. Me
re refusal to testify is does not amount to inability to testify. The party coul
d have urged to court to have these witnesses summoned, arrested, and punished f
or contempt in case of refusal to obey the summons.
People v. Liwanag, 73 SCRA 473 (1976)
Facts: The prosecution moved that the testimony of the witnesses presented durin
g the preliminary investigation of this case be adopted as part of the evidence
in chief of the prosecution. The trial court granted the motion subject to the c
ondition that the witnesses be further cross-examined by counsel for the accused
. At the trial, the witnesses for the prosecution who testified at the prelimina
ry investigation were recalled and were again cross-examined by counsel for the
appellant.
Held: The testimony sought to be made part of the evidence in chief are not ex-p
arte affidavits, but testimony of witnesses taken down by question and answer du
ring the preliminary investigation in the presence of the accused and his counse
l who subjected the said witnesses to a rigid and close cross-examination. The i
nclusion of said testimony was made subject to the right of the defendant to fur
ther cross-examine the witnesses whose testimony are sought to be reproduced and
, pursuant to said order, the witnesses were recalled to the stand during the tr
ial and again examined in the presence of the appellant. Upon the facts, there w
as no curtailment of the constitutional right of the accused to meet the witness
es face to face.
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)
P. Opinion Rule
1. Rule 130, 48-50
Sec. 48. General rule. The opinion of a witness is not admissible, except as
indicated in the following sections. (42)
Sec. 49. Opinion of expert witness. The opinion of a witness on a matter req
uiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to pos
sess, may be received in evidence. (43 a)
Sec. 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. The opinion of a witness for which p
roper basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding -
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, co
ndition or appearance of a person. (44 a)
GR: The opinion of a witness is not admissible.
Exceptions: Admissible opinion evidence
1. a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he
is shown to possess, may be received in evidence.
2. the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
3. a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity
4. the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
5. his impressions of the
a. emotion
b. behavior
c. condition or
d. appearance of a person
2. Cases
Dilag & Co. v. Merced, 45 O.G. 5536 (1949)
U.S. v. Trono, 3 Phil. 213 (1904)
State v. Garver, 225 P.2d 771 (1950)
U.S. v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970)
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993)
United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540 (1993)

Q. Rule 130, 51: Character Evidence

Sec. 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions.
(a) In Criminal Cases:
(1) The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the
moral trait involved in the offense charged.
(2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral characte
r which is pertinent it to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
Note that in criminal cases, the prosecution goes first. Hence, it can not prese
nt evidence on the bad moral character of the accused on its evidence in chief.
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if i
t tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability o
f the offense charged.
(b) In Civil Cases:
Evidence of the moral character of a party in a civil case is admissible onl
y when pertinent to the issue of character involved in the case.
This covers either party to the case.
(c) In the case provided for in Rule 132, Section 14. (46 a, 47 a)
cf Rule 132, Sec. 14
Sec. 14. Evidence of good character of witness. Evidence of the good character o
f a witness is not admissible until such character has been impeached. (17)
GR: Character evidence not generally admissible
Exceptions
1. In Criminal Cases:
a. accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral tr
ait involved in the offense charged.
b. In rebuttal, the prosecution may prove the bad moral character of the accused
which is pertinent it to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
c. moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish
in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged
.
2. In Civil Cases only when pertinent to the issue of character involved in the
case.
3. good character of an impeached witness
R. Rule 131, 1: Burden of Proof
Sec. 1. Burden of proof. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present e
vidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the
amount of evidence required by law. (1 a, 2 a)
Burden of proof the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue ne
cessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by
law
1. Civil Cases
a. Rule 133, Sec. 1
Rule 133, Sec. 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases,
the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance
of evidence.
In determining whether a contract is a sale or equitable mortgage, the evidence
presented must be clear and convincing, not merely a preponderance of evidence.
b. Cases
Pornellosa v. LTA, L-14040, 31 January 1986
IFC v. Tobias, 78 SCRA 28 (1977)
2. Criminal Cases
a. Rule 133, Sec. 2
Rule 133, Sec. 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. In a criminal case, the acc
used is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable do
ubt.
For self-defense, the accused must show clear and convincing evidence.
b. Cases
People v. Pajenado, 31 SCRA 812 (1970) The prosecution has the burden of proving
even the negative elements of a crime (e.g. lack of license to possess a firear
m).
Escolin: The remedy is to present the certification of the officer, who is in ch
arge of issuing the licenses, that the accused was not issued a license.
People v. Verzola, 80 SCRA 600 (1977) The elements of self-defense must be prove
n by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence.
U.S. v. Dube, 520 F.2d 250 (1st Cir. 1975)
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 19 (1977)
3. Administrative Cases
a. Rule 133, Sec. 5
Rule 133, Sec. 5. Substantial evidence. In cases filed before administrative
or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported b
y substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable m
ind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. (n)
substantial evidence that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind mi
ght accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
b. Cases

S. Presumptions
1. Conclusive presumptions
a. Rule 131, 2
Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. The following are instances of conclusive p
resumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentio
nally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to ac
t upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration
, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it:
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the tim
e of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. (3 a)
Instances of conclusive presumptions
1. a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deli
berately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such be
lief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omiss
ion, be permitted to falsify it:
2. The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of
the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.
b. Arts. 1431-1439 NCC: Estoppel
Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered concl
usive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against th
e person relying thereon.
Art. 1432. The principles of estoppel are hereby adopted insofar as they are
not in conflict with the provisions of this Code, the Code of Commerce, the Rul
es of Court and special laws.
Art. 1433. Estoppel may in pais or by deed.
Art. 1439. Estoppel is effective only as between the parties thereto or thei
r successors in interest.
Art. 1434. When a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates
and delivers it, and later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such ti
tle passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee.
Art. 1435. If a person in representation of another sells or alienates a thi
ng, the former cannot subsequently set up his own title as against the buyer or
grantee.
 Art. 1436. A lessee or a bailee is estopped from asserting title to the thin
g leased or received, as against the lessor or bailor.
Art. 1437. When in a contract between third persons concerning immovable pro
perty, one of them is misled by a person with respect to the ownership or real r
ight over the real estate, the latter is precluded from asserting his legal titl
e or interest therein, provided all these requisites are present:
(1) There must be fraudulent representation or wrongful concealment of facts
known to the party estopped;
(2) The party precluded must intend that the other should act upon the facts
as misrepresented;
(3) The party misled must have been unaware of the true facts; and
(4) The party defrauded must have acted in accordance with the misrepresenta
tion.
Art. 1438. One who has allowed another to assume apparent ownership of perso
nal property for the purpose of making any transfer of it, cannot, if he receive
d the sum for which a pledge has been constituted, set up his own title to defea
t the pledge of the property, made by the other to a pledgee who received the sa
me in good faith and for value.
Statutory instances of estoppel
1. non-owner transferor who later acquires title passes ownership to the transfe
ree by operation of law (Art. 1434 NCC)
2. agent who alienates can not claim title against the transferee (Art. 1435 NCC
)
3. a lessee or a bailee is estopped from asserting title to the thing leased or
received, as against the lessor or bailor. (Art. 1436 NCC)
4. in a contract between 3rd persons concerning immovable property, one of them
is misled by a person with respect to the ownership or real right over the real
estate, the latter is precluded from asserting his legal title or interest there
in, provided all these requisites are present:
a. fraudulent representation or wrongful concealment of facts known to the party
estopped;
b. party precluded must intend that the other should act upon the facts as misre
presented;
c. party misled must have been unaware of the true facts; and
d. party defrauded must have acted in accordance with the misrepresentation. (Ar
t. 1437 NCC)
5. One who has allowed another to assume apparent ownership of personal property
for the purpose of making any transfer of it, cannot, if he received the sum fo
r which a pledge has been constituted, set up his own title to defeat the pledge
of the property, made by the other to a pledgee who received the same in good f
aith and for value. (Art. 1438 NCC)

c. Cases
Molina v. CA, 109 Phil 769 (1960)
Facts: Felix Molina then overseer of Basilisa Manjon, informed her that some gue
rilla soldiers would arrest her for investigation, because one Conchita Cuba com
plained to them against her for having illegally encroached on her property. Afr
aid to be taken to the guerilla camp Manjon asked the Molina what was best for h
er to do. He suggested that she execute a fictitious deed of sale in his favor f
or the portion in question which was the one claimed by Conchita Cuba, in order
that he could defend her rights in his name against the claim of Conchita Cuba.
Manjon accepted the suggestion and asked Molina to have the corresponding deed o
f sale prepared which Manjon signed. However, Manjon made the Molina sign a stat
ement in, which he expressly admitted that the transaction was only a simulated
sale. The Molina denied the whole story and asserted that the statement was a fo
rgery. Manjon sues Molina for recovery of possession of land.
TC ruled for the Manjon on the ground that she could not have disposed the land
because it was part of the public domain, sales patent having been issued to pla
intiff by the government only on 1948. CA affirms.
Held: Under the doctrine of estoppel by deed, when a person who is not the owner
of a thing sells or alienates and delivers it and later the seller or grantor a
cquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or gra
ntee. Case remanded to determine whether the sale was indeed fictitious.
Fige v. CA, 233 SCRA 586 (1994) The juridical relation between petitioners and p
rivate respondents is that of lessee and lessor. Considering this jural relation
ship, petitioners cannot claim that they purchased the questioned lot from someb
ody else. A tenant cannot, in an action involving the possession of the leased p
remises, controvert the title of his landlord. Nor can a tenant set up any incon
sistent right to change the relation existing between himself and his landlord,
without first delivering up to the landlord the premises acquired by virtue of t
he agreement between themselves.
2. Disputable presumptions
a. Rule 131, 4
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory
if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong;
(b) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent;
(c) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act;
(d) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns;
(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced;
(f) That money paid by one to another was due to the latter;
(g) That a thing delivered by one to another belonged to the latter;
(h) That an obligation delivered up to the debtor has been paid;
(i) That prior rents or installments had been paid when a receipt for the la
ter ones is produced;
(j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a rec
ent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that thi
ngs which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by
him;
(k) That a person in possession of an order on himself for the payment of th
e money, or the delivery of anything, has paid the money or delivered the thing
accordingly;
(1) That a person acting in a public office was regularly appointed or elect
ed to it;
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or els
ewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction;
(o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before t
he court and passed upon by it; and in like manner that all matters within an is
sue raised in a dispute submitted for arbitration were laid before the arbitrato
rs and passed upon by them;
(p) That private transactions have been fair and regular;
(q) That the ordinary course of business has been followed;
(r) That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract;
(s) That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for a sufficient cons
ideration;
(t) That an indorsement of a negotiable instrument was made before the instr
ument was overdue and at the place where the instrument is dated;
(u) That a writing is truly dated;
(v) That a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular cours
e of the mail;
(w) That after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not th
e absentee still lives, he is considered dead for all purposes, except for those
of succession.
The absentee shall not be considered dead for the purpose of opening his suc
cession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of s
eventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that hi
s succession may be opened.
The following shall be considered dead for all purposes including the divisi
on of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aircraft whic
h is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the ves
sel or aircraft;
(2) A member of the armed forces who has taken part in armed hostilities, an
d has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and w
hose existence has not been known for four years;
(4) If a married person has been absent for four consecutive years, the spou
se present may contract a subsequent marriage if he or she has a well-founded be
lief that the absent spouse is already dead. In case of disappearance, where the
re is danger of death under the circumstances hereinabove provided, an absence o
f only two years shall be sufficient for the purpose of contracting a subsequent
marriage. However, in any case, before marrying again, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in the Family Code and in the rules f
or a declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
(x) That acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in wa
s conformable to the law or fact;
(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and
the ordinary habits of life;
(z) That persons acting as copartners have entered into a contract of copart
nership;
(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have ente
red into a lawful contract of marriage;
(bb) That property acquired by a man and a woman who are capacitated to marr
y each other and who live exclusively with each other as husband and wife withou
t the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, has been obtained by their j
oint efforts, work or industry.
(cc) That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who are not capacita
ted to marry each other and who have acquired property through their actual join
t contribution of money, property or industry, such contributions and their corr
esponding shares including joint deposits of money and evidences of credit are e
qual.
(dd) That if the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another ma
rriage within three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage,
these rides shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary:
(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of t
he subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during the former ma
rriage, provided it be born within three hundred days after the termination of t
he former marriage;
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of
the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriag
e, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of
the former marriage.
(ee) That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with th
ings of that nature;
(ff) That the law has been obeyed;
(gg) That a printed or published book, purporting to be printed or published
by public authority, was so printed or published;
(hh) That a printed or published book, purporting to contain reports of case
s adjudged in tribunals of the country where the book is published, contains cor
rect reports of such cases;
(ii) That a trustee or other person whose duty it was to convey real propert
y to a particular person has actually conveyed it to him when such presumption i
s necessary to perfect the title of such person or his successor in interest;
(jj) That except for purposes of succession, when two persons perish in the
same calamity, such as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who
died first, and there are no particular circumstances from which it can be infer
red, the survivorship is determined from the probabilities resulting from the st
rength and age of the sexes, according to the following rules:
1. If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is deemed to have
survived;
2. If both were above the age of sixty, the younger is deemed to have surviv
ed;
3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is deemed t
o have survived;
4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be different, the ma
le is deemed to have survived; if the sex be the same, the older;
5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between those ages,
the latter is deemed to have survived.
(kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called
to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the deat
h of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, they
shall be considered to have died at the same time. (5 a)
b. Cases
People v. Padiernos, 69 SCRA 484 (1976) Mere non-presentation of a written state
ment of a witness to the police which she allegedly did not sign, does not give
rise to the presumption that it "contained declarations disastrous to the prosec
ution case". The presumption that suppressed evidence is unfavorable does not ap
ply where the evidence was at the disposal of both the defense and the prosecuti
on through use of compulsory processes, e.g. subpoena duces tecum.
People v. Pablo, 213 SCRA 1 (1992) The presumption that evidence willfully suppr
essed would be adverse if produced does not apply when the testimony of the witn
ess is merely corroborative. Neither does it apply in cases where the witness, a
s in this case, is available to the accused because then, the evidence would hav
e the same weight against one party as against the other. Mere failure to presen
t the poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation is not suppression of evidence.
Pascual v. Angeles, 4 Phil. 604 (1905)
Ormachea v. Trillana, 13 Phil. 194 (1909)
Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925)
County Court of Ulster City v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979)

3. Rule 131, 4: Legitimacy or Illegitimacy

Sec. 4. No presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy. There is no presumptio
n of legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred days followi
ng the dissolution of the marriage or the separation of the spouses. Whoever all
eges the legitimacy or illegitimacy of such child must prove his allegation. (6)
T. Examination of Witnesses
1. Rule 132 1-18
Sec. 1. Examination to be done in open court. The examination of witnesses p
resented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or af
firmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls f
or a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally.
(1 a)
Examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing
1. done in open court
2. under oath or affirmation
3. answers of the witness shall be given orally, unless
a. the witness is incapacitated to speak, or
b. the question calls for a different mode of answer
Sec. 2. Proceedings to be recorded. The entire proceedings of a trial or hea
ring, including the questions propounded to a witness and his answers thereto, t
he statements made by the judge or any of the parties, counsel, or witnesses wit
h reference to the case, shall be recorded by means of shorthand or stenotype or
by other means of recording found suitable by the court.
A transcript of the record of the proceedings made by the official stenograp
her, stenotypist or recorder and certified as correct by him shall be deemed pri
ma facie a correct statement of such proceedings. (2 a)
The rules now require even the statements of the judge be recorded.
Requisites for transcript to be deemed prima facie a correct statement of the p
roceedings
1. made by the official stenographer, stenotypist or recorder and
2. certified as correct by him
Sec. 3. Rights and obligations of a witness. A witness must answer questions
, although his answer may tend to establish a claim against him. However, it is
the right of a witness:
(1) To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or insulting questions, and f
rom harsh or insulting demeanor;
(2) Not to be detained longer than the interests of justice require;
(3) Not to be examined except only as to matters pertinent to the issue;
(4) Not to give an answer which will tend to subject him to a penalty for an
offense unless otherwise provided by law; or
(5) Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade his reputation, unless
it be to the very fact at issue or to a fact from which the fact in issue would
be presumed. But a witness must answer to the fact of his previous final convict
ion for an offense. (3 a, l9 a)
Obligation of a witness answer questions, although his answer may tend to establ
ish a claim against him

Rights of a witness
1. To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or insulting questions, and from h
arsh or insulting demeanor;
2. Not to be detained longer than the interests of justice require;
3. Not to be examined except only as to matters pertinent to the issue;
4. Not to give an answer which will tend to subject him to a penalty for an offe
nse, unless otherwise provided by law; or
5. Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade his reputation, unless it be
to the fact
a. at issue or
b. from which the fact in issue would be presumed
c. of his previous final conviction for an offense.
Sec. 4. Order in the examination of an individual witness. The order in whic
h an individual witness may be examined is as follows:
(a) Direct examination by the proponent;
(b) Cross-examination by the opponent;
(c) Re-direct examination by the proponent;
(d) Re-cross-examination by the opponent. (4)
Sec. 5. Direct examination. Direct examination is the examination-in-chief o
f a witness by the party presenting him on the facts relevant to the issue. (3 a
)
Direct examination the examination-in-chief of a witness by the party presenting
him on the facts relevant to the issue.

Sec. 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. Upon the termination of t

he direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as
to any matters stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with s
ufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom
from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearin
g upon the issue. (8a)
Witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party
1. as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith
2. with sufficient fullness and freedom
a. to test his
1) accuracy and
2) truthfulness and
3) freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse
b. to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue
Sec. 7. Re-direct examination; its purpose and extent. After the cross-exami
nation of the witness has been concluded, he may be re-examined by the party cal
ling him, to explain or supplement his answers given during the cross-examinatio
n. On re-direct examination, questions on matters not dealt with during the cros
s-examination, may be allowed by the court in its discretion. (12)
Re-direct examination
1. to explain or supplement his answers given during the cross-examination
2. with leave of court, on matters not dealt with during the cross-examination
Sec. 8. Re-cross-examination. Upon the conclusion of the re-direct examinati
on, the adverse party may re-cross-examine the witness on matters stated in his
re-direct examination, and also on such other matters as may be allowed by the c
ourt in its discretion. (13)
Re-cross-examination
1. on matters stated in his re-direct examination, and
2. with leave of court, other matters
Sec. 9. Recalling witness. After the examination of a witness by both si
des has been concluded, the witness cannot be recalled without leave of the cour
t. The court will grant or withhold leave in its discretion, as the interests of
justice may require. (14)
A witness can be recalled only with leave of the court.
Sec. 10. Leading and misleading questions. A question which suggests to the
witness the answer which the examining party desires is a leading question. It i
s not allowed, except:
(a) On cross examination;
(b) On Preliminary matters;
(c) When there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from
a witness who is ignorant, or a child of tender years, or is of feeble mind, or
a deaf-mute;
(d) Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or
(e) Of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managin
g agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or association wh
ich is an adverse party.
A misleading question is one which assumes as true a fact not yet testified
to by the witness, or contrary to that which he has previously stated. It is not
allowed. (5 a, 6 a, and 8 a)
Leading questions a question which suggests to the witness the answer which the
examining party desires
GR: Leading questions not allowed.
Exceptions
1. cross examination;
2. Preliminary matters;
3. difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is
a. ignorant, or
b. a child of tender years, or
c. feeble mind, or
d. a deaf-mute;
4. unwilling or hostile witness (cf Rule 132, Sec. 12); or
Sec. 12. Party may not impeach his own witness. xxx
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the c
ourt upon adequate showing of his adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to te
stify, or his having misled the party into calling him to the witness stand.
5. witness is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a p
ublic or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adve
rse party.
Misleading question one which assumes as true a fact not yet testified to by the
witness, or contrary to that which he has previously stated.
Misleading questions are never allowed. No exceptions.
Sec. 11. Impeachment of adverse party's witness. A witness may be impeached
by the party against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence
that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evide
nce that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present tes
timony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be s
hown by the examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he h
as been convicted of an offense. (15)
Impeachment of adverse party's witness
1. contradictory evidence
2. evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad
3. evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his pre
sent testimony
4. evidence of conviction of an offense
Sec. 12. Party may not impeach his own witness. Except with respect to witne
sses referred to in paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 10, the party producing a
witness is not allowed to impeach his credibility.
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by t
he court upon adequate showing of his adverse interest, unjustified reluctance t
o testify, or his having misled the party into calling him to the witness stand.
The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an adver
se party, may be impeached by the party presenting him in all respects as if he
had been called by the adverse party, except by evidence of his bad character. H
e may also be impeached and cross-examined by the adverse party, but such cross
examination must only be on the subject matter of his examination-in-chief. (6 a
, 7 a)
GR: The party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his credibility.
Exceptions: When party may impeach his own witness (except evidence of bad char
acter)
1. an unwilling or hostile witness; or
2. a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent
of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is a
n adverse party.
Grounds for declaring a witness unwilling or hostile
1. adverse interest
2. unjustified reluctance to testify, or
3. misled the party into calling him to the witness stand.
Consequences of being an unwilling, hostile, or adverse witness
1. may be impeached by the proponent, except by evidence of bad character
2. may also be impeached by the opponent
3. may be cross-examined by the opponent, only on the subject matter of his dire
ct examination
4. proponent may ask leading questions
Sec. 13. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements. Befor
e a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times stateme
nts inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be related to h
im, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and
he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain
them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before a
ny question is put to him concerning them. (16)
Requisites for impeaching a witness by prior inconsistent statements
1. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any
question is put to him concerning them.
2. the statements must be
a. related to him
b. with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present
3. he must be asked whether he made such statements
4. if so, allowed to explain them
Escolin: if the witness refuses to acknowledge the prior inconsistent statement,
present someone who can testify that the recording of the prior statement was a
ccurate (e.g. stenographer, in which case, the statement is prima facie evidence
of the fact stated therein).
 Sec. 14. Evidence of good character of witness. Evidence of the good charact
er of a witness is not admissible until such character has been impeached. (17)
cf Rule 130, Sec. 51
Sec. 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions.
xxx
(c) In the case provided for in Rule 132, Sec(ion 14. (46 a, 47 a)
Evidence of the good character of a witness is not admissible until such charact
er has been impeached.
Sec. 15. Exclusion and separation of witnesses. On any trial or hearing, the
judge may exclude from the court any witness not at the time under examination,
so that he may not hear the testimony of other witnesses. The judge may also ca
use witnesses to be kept separate and to be prevented from conversing with one a
nother until all shall have been examined. (18)
Sec. 16. When witness may refer to memorandum. A witness may be allowed to r
efresh his memory respecting a fact, by anything written or recorded by himself
or under his direction at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately therea
fter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew tha
t the same was correctly written or recorded; but in such case the writing or re
cord must be produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he
chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it, and may read it in evidence. So, als
o, a witness may testify from such a writing or record, though he retain no reco
llection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing or rec
ord correctly stated the transaction when made; but such evidence must be receiv
ed with caution. (10 a)
Requisites for a witness to refer to a memorandum
1. the memorandum must have been written or recorded by himself or under his dir
ection
2. either
a. at the time when the fact occurred, or
b. immediately thereafter, or
c. at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory
3. he knew that the same was correctly written or recorded
4. the memorandum must be produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, wh
o may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it, and may read it in evid
ence.
5. if the witness retains no recollection of the particular facts, he must swear
that the writing or record correctly stated the transaction when made
Sec. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence, the
remainder admissible. When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or
record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be
inquired into by the other, and when a detached act, declaration, conversation,
writing or record is given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation
, writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence
. (11 a)
When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in ev
idence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the o
ther.
When a detached act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in ev
idence, any other act, declaration, conversation, writing or record necessary to
its understanding may also be given in evidence.
cf Dusepec v. Torres, 39 Phil 760 (1919) under Rule 130 Sec. 42
Sec. 18. Right to inspect writing shown to witness. Whenever a writing is sh
own to a witness, it may be inspected by the adverse party. (9 a)
2. Cases
a. Examination in Open Court
People v. Estenzo, 72 SCRA 428 (1976)
b. Cross-Examination
de la Paz, Jr. v. IAC, 154 S 65 (1987)Where a party has had the opportunity to c
ross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeit
s the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of th
e witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record. Implied waiver of
the right of cross-examine may take various forms, as long as the party was giv
en the opportunity to confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed
to take advantage of it reasons attributable to himself alone. Repeated absences
, and/or unjustified motions for postponement of the hearing in which the witnes
s is scheduled to be cross-examined until the witness passed away is a waiver of
the right to cross-examine.
Fulgado v. CA, 182 S 81 (1990) The right of a party to confront and cross-examin
e opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal, civil, or adminis
trative, is a fundamental right which is part of due process. The right is not t
o an actual, but a mere opportunity to cross-examine. Failure of the adverse par
ty to move to schedule the hearing for the cross-examination of a witness before
he died or migrated abroad (the imminence of which the adverse party was aware)
is a waiver of such right. The burden is on the party wishing to exercise the r
ight to cross-examination, not necessarily the plaintiff, to schedule the hearin
g.
Capital Subdivision v. Negros Occidental, 52 O.G. 4672 (1956)
U.S. v. Mercado, 26 Phil. 127 (1913)
U.S. v. Marshall, 762 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1985)
c. Recalling Witnesses
People v. Rivera, 200 S 786 (1991) The discretion to recall a witness is not pro
perly invoked or exercisable by an applicant's mere general statement that there
is a need to recall a witness "in the interest of justice," or "in order to aff
ord a party full opportunity to present his case," or that, as here, "there seem
s to be many points and questions that should have been asked" in the earlier in
terrogation. To regard expressed generalities such as these as sufficient ground
for recall of witnesses would make the recall of witness no longer discretionar
y but ministerial. Something more than the bare assertion of the need to propoun
d additional questions is essential before the Court's discretion may rightfully
be exercised to grant or deny recall. There must be a satisfactory showing of s
ome concrete, substantial ground for the recall. There must be a satisfactory sh
owing on the movant's part, for instance, that particularly identified material
points were not covered in the cross-examination, or that particularly described
vital documents were not presented to the witness whose recall is prayed for, o
r that the cross-examination was conducted in so inept a manner as to result in
a virtual absence thereof. Absent such particulars, there would be no foundation
for a trial court to authorize the recall of any witness.
Furthermore, failure of the recalled witness to be appear is not ground to strik
e out his testimony. There should have been a showing of the indispensability of
his further examination, what it was that would have been elicited, and that su
ch additional testimony would cause the evidence to become inadmissible. Lastly,
striking out of testimony must be upon motion. It can not be ordered motu propi
o.
People v. Del Castillo, 25 SCRA 716 (1968)
Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Ong Su, 79 SCRA 207 (1977)
d. Leading Questions
People v. Salomon, 229 SCRA 403 (1994) A mental retardate is not for this reason
alone disqualified from being a witness. As in the case of other witnesses, acc
eptance of his testimony depends on its nature and credibility or, otherwise put
, the quality of his perceptions and the manner he can make them known to the co
urt. In the case before us, the trial court noted that although Sylvia's speech
was slurred and it was necessary at times to ask her leading questions, "her tes
timony was positive, clear, plain, coherent and credible." Her mental condition
did not vitiate her credibility.
State v. Scott, 149 P2d 152 (1944)
e. Impeaching One's Own Witness
Becker v. Eisenstodt, 158 A.2d 706 (1960)
f. Impeachment By Bias
U.S. v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984)
U.S. v. Harvey, 547 F.2d 720 (2d Cir.1976)
g. Impeachment By Prior Inconsistent Statement
Villalon, Jr. v. IAC, 144 S 443 (1986) A party may impeach a witness by introduc
ing into evidence their previous testimony in his disbarment proceedings which a
re inconsistent with their current testimony. An attorney may waive the confiden
tial nature of his own disbarment proceedings.
People v. Resabal, 50 Phil 780 (1927) To impeach a witness by prior inconsistent
statements, he must be given ample opportunity to explain the discrepancies by
a reading to him of such prior statement. Mere presentation of the statement, wi
thout said declaration having been read to the witness while he testified, is no
ground for impeaching his testimony.
Escolin: Note that the accused now does not have the right to cross-examine the
witness during the preliminary investigation. He can only give questions to the
investigating officer to be propounded to the witness.
U.S. v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1984)
h. Impeachment By Other Means
U.S. v. Mercado, 20 Phil. 127 (1913)
Mosley v. Commonwealth, 420 SW2d 679 (1967)
Coles v. Harsh, 276 P. 248 (1929)
U.S. v. Medical Therapy Services, 583 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1978)
Newton v. State, 127 A. 123 (Md. 1924)
State v. Oswalt, 381 P. 2d 617 (1963)
i. Exclusion of Witnesses
People v. Sandal, 54 Phil. 883 (1930)
State v. Bishop, 492 P2d 509 (1972)
j. Refreshing Recollection
State v. Peoples, 319 S.E. 2d 177 (1984)
U. Authentication and Proof of Documents
1. Rule 132 19-33
Sec. 19. Classes of documents. For the purpose of their presentation in evid
ence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovere
ign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of th
e Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and test
aments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required b
y law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private. (20a)
Public documents
1. written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign autho
rity, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philipp
ines, or of a foreign country;
2. notarized documents, except last wills and testaments; and
3. public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law
to be entered therein.
Publicprove
Private
Genuineness
Must
Binding
Binds
Certainonly
documents
documents
against
transactions
genuineness
parties
and the
authenticity
toparties
are
the
andrequired
document
due
and
presumed
execution
3rdtopersons
be in a public document (e.g. donation of r
eal property)
Sec. 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as a
uthentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be pro
ved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the ma
ker. (cf with Rule 132, Sec. 22)
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claim
ed to be. (21 a)
Sec. 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. The handwriting of a person
may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such perso
n because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his
upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowled
ge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may al
so be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings adm
itted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, o
r proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. (23 a)
Sec. 21. When evidence of authenticity of private document not necessary. Wh
ere a private document is more than thirty years old, is produced from a custody
in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alte
rations or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its authenticity nee
d be given. (22 a)
Requisites for admissibility of private document
1. offered as authentic due execution and authenticity must be proved
a. either by
1) anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
2) evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
a) any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because
i. he has seen the person write, or
ii. has seen writing purporting to be his
i) upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and
ii) has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person
b) a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings
i. admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offe
red, or
ii. proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge
b. Unless it is an ancient document; requisites
1) more than 30 years old
2) produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and
3) unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion
2. not offered as authentic identified as that which it is claimed to be
Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in pu
blic records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima fac
ie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public documents are evidence
, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution an
d of the date of the latter. (24 a)
Documents consisting of
1. entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public offic
er prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
2. all other public documents evidence, even against a 3rd person, of the fact w
hich gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.
Sec. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred t
o in paragraph (a) of Section 19 (official acts), when admissible for any purpos
e, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by
the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accomp
anied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that suc
h officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a for
eign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legat
ion, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in
the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in whic
h the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (25 a)
The record of public documents of official acts may be evidenced by
1. an official publication thereof or
2. a copy
a. attested by
1) the officer having the legal custody of the record, or
2) his deputy, and
b. if the record is not kept in the Philippines
1) accompanied by a certificate that such officer has the custody made by
a) secretary of the embassy or legation
b) consul general
c) consul
d) vice consul, or
e) consular agent or
f) any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreig
n country in which the record is kept
2) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Procedure in obtaining copy of foreign official acts
1. get a copy from the legal custodian
2. have the legal custodian attest that the copy is correct
3. have the Philippine consul certify that the person in #2 is the legal custodi
an of a copy of official act
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document
or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, i
n substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of
the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having
a seal, under the seal of such court. (26 a)
Attestation of copy must
1. state the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof,
as the case may be
2. be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if h
e be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court
Sec. 26. Irremovability of public record. Any public record, an official cop
y of which is admissible in evidence, must not be removed from the office in whi
ch it is kept, except upon order of a court where the inspection of the record i
s essential to the just determination of a pending case. (27 a)
GR: Any public record, an official copy of which is admissible in evidence, must
not be removed from the office in which it is kept
Exception: upon order of a court where the inspection of the record is essential
to the just determination of a pending case
Sec. 27. Public record of a private document. An authorized public record of
a private document may be proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof,
attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an appropriate certificate t
hat such officer has the custody. (28a)
Public record of a private document may be proved by
1. the original record, or
2. a copy thereof
a. attested by the legal custodian of the record
b. with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody
Sec. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer h
aving the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent sea
rch no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of
his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evi
dence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry. (29)
Proof of lack of record
1. A written statement
a. signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by his deput
y
b. that after diligent search no record or entry of a specified tenor is found t
o exist in the records of his office,
2. accompanied by a certificate that such officer is supposed to have custody
If a notarized document is lost, get certifications of loss from
1. notary public
2. bureau of archives
3. clerk of court who commissioned the notary public
Sec. 29. How judicial record impeached. Any judicial record may be impeached
by evidence of: (a) want of jurisdiction in the court or judicial officer, (b)
collusion between the parties, or (c) fraud in the party offering the record, in
respect to the proceedings. (30 a)
Any judicial record may be impeached by evidence of
1. want of jurisdiction in the court or judicial officer
2. collusion between the parties, or
3. fraud in the party offering the record, in respect to the proceedings
Sec. 30. Proof of notarial documents. Every instrument duly acknowledged or
proved and certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence without fu
rther proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the
execution of the instrument or document involved. (31 a)
Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law
1. may be presented in evidence without further proof
2. the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution
of the instrument or document involved
Sec. 31. Alterations in document, how to explain. The party producing a docu
ment as genuine which has been altered and appears to have been altered after it
s execution, in a part material to the question in dispute, must account for the
alteration. He may show that the alteration was made by another, without his co
ncurrence, or was made with the consent of the parties affected by it, or was ot
herwise properly or innocently made, or that the alteration did not change the m
eaning or language of the instrument. If he fails to do that the document shall
not be admissible in evidence. (32 a)
The party producing a document as genuine which has been altered and appears to
have been altered after its execution, in a part material to the question in di
spute
1. must account for the alteration, either as
a. made by another, without his concurrence, or
b. made with the consent of the parties affected by it, or
c. otherwise properly or innocently made, or
d. the alteration did not change the meaning or language of the instrument
2. If he fails to do that the document shall not be admissible in evidence
Sec. 32. Seal. There shall be no difference between sealed and unsealed priv
ate documents insofar as their admissibility as evidence is concerned. (33 a)
Sec. 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial language. Documents written i
n an unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied w
ith a translation into English or Filipino. To avoid interruption of proceedings
, parties or their attorneys are directed to have such translation prepared befo
re trial. (34 a)
Documents written in an unofficial language
1. shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into
English or Filipino
2. parties or their attorneys are directed to have such translation prepared bef
ore trial.
2. Cases
a. Proof of private documents
Buag v. CA, 158 SCRA 299 (1988) The authenticity and due execution of a private d
ocument is not proven by testimony that the party thumbmarked it. The circumstan
ces of the presence of the witness during the execution must be related. There m
ust be proof that the party understood it, considering he was illiterate (implie
d from the thumbmarking). There must be showing that the document was duly read,
explained and translated to the illiterate party.
b. Ancient documents
Bartolome v. IAC, 183 SCRA 102 (1990) Where the offeror s witness testified that t
he document had a missing 4th page, the document can not qualify as an ancient d
ocument because it is blemished by alteration or circmstance of suspicion. An in
complete document is akin to an altered document, more so if the missing page co
ntains the signature of the parties to the document. Proof of the document s authe
nticity and due execution is therefore necessary.
Heirs of Lacsa v. CA, 197 SCRA 234 (1991) Lack of signatures on the first pages
of a document alone is not a blemish that would disqualify a document from being
an ancient document. Allegations that the pages had been substituted should be
proven in order to disqualify the document from being an ancient document, more
so if the documents were shown to be exact copies of the original on file with t
he Register of Deeds. Proof of their due execution and authenticity is no longer
required.
de Leon: Note that the document was actually a public record because it had been
registered with the Registry of Deeds. Therefore, the court did not have to det
ermine whether the document was in fact an ancient document because it was in th
e first place a public document whose authenticity and due execution need not be
proven. The problem with this case is it is now authority to say that private d
ocuments whose first pages are not signed by the parties can qualify as ancient
documents. Keep in mind that crucial to the ruling in Lacsa was the fact that th
e document presented matches the one on file in the Registry of Deeds. Had there
been no matching copy in the Registry of Deeds, I submit that the document can
not qualify as an ancient document.
c. Proof of foreign judgments
Pacific Asia Overseas v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 122 (1988) To be enforceable, the foreig
n judgment must be proven as a public document of a written official act or reco
rd of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country. The offeror m
ust submit an attestation issued by the proper foreign official having legal cus
tody of the original judgment that the copy is a faithful reproduction of the or
iginal, which attestation must be authenticated by a Philippine Consular officer
having jurisdiction in that country.
Zalamea v. CA, 228 SCRA 23 (1993) Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can t
he courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be allege
d and proved. Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by
his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. T
he certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul gene
ral, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign ser
vice of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. Mere testimony of a witness i
s not sufficient to prove foreign law.
d. Documents in unofficial language
Pacific Asia Overseas v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 122 (1988) A document written in an unof
ficial language should be translated into either English or Filipino. The transl
ator should be identified either as an official interpreter of the court, or as
a competent translator of both languages. The translation should be either sworn
to as an accurate translation of the original, or agreed upon by the parties.
People v. Monleon, 74 SCRA 263 (1976) Affidavits written in an unofficial langua
ge and not accompanied with a translation are inadmissible in evidence.
Escolin: The NIRC provides that all notarial documents which don t have the requir
ed documentary stamp tax will not be admitted in evidence.
Salison v. People, 253 SCRA 758 (1996)
IBM Phils., Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117221, April 13, 1999
V. Offer and Objection
1. Rule 132 34-40
Sec. 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has n
ot been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be
specified. (35)
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
Sec. 35. When to make offer. As regards the testimony of a witness, the offe
r must be made at the time the witness is called to testify.
Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the presentation of a
party's testimonial evidence. Such offer shall be done orally unless allowed by
the court to be done in writing.(n)
When to make offer
1. testimony the time the witness is called to testify
2. documentary and object after the presentation of a party's testimonial eviden
ce
Offer of evidence shall be done orally unless allowed by the court to be done in
writing.
Offer of evidence
Identification of evidence
 Sec. 36. Objection. Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immedi
ately after the offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of
a witness shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably
apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days a
fter notice of the offer unless a different period is allowed by the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.(36 a)
When objection to evidence offered must be made
1. orally immediately after the offer is made.
2. in writing within 3 days after notice of the offer, unless a different period
is allowed by the court.
3. a question propounded in the course of the oral examination as soon as the gr
ounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
The grounds for the objections should always be specified.
Grounds for objection
1. Hearsay
2. argumentative
3. leading
4. misleading
5. incompetent
6. irrelevant
7. best evidence rule
8. parole evidence rule
9. question has no basis
10.
Sec. 37. When repetition of objection unnecessary. When it becomes reasonabl
y apparent in the course of the examination of a witness that the questions bein
g propounded are of the same class as those to which objection has been made, wh
ether such objection was sustained or overruled, it shall not be necessary to re
peat the objection, it being sufficient for the adverse party to record his cont
inuing objection to such class of questions. (37 a)
Requisites for a proper continuing objection
1. in the course of the examination of a witness
2. objection has been made
3. reasonably apparent that the questions being propounded are of the same class
as those to which objection has been made
4. adverse party records his continuing objection to such class of questions
Sec. 38. Ruling. The ruling of the court must be given immediately after the
objection is made, unless the court desires to take a reasonable time to inform
itself on the question presented; but the ruling shall always be made during th
e trial and at such time as will give the party against whom it is made an oppor
tunity to meet the situation presented by the ruling.
The reason for sustaining or overruling an objection need not be stated. How
ever, if the objection is based on two or more grounds, a ruling sustaining the
objection on one or some of them must specify the ground or grounds relied upon.
(38 a)
The ruling of the court on an objection
1. must be given immediately after the objection is made
2. unless the court desires to take a reasonable time to inform itself on the qu
estion presented; but the ruling shall always be made
a. during the trial and
b. at such time as will give the party against whom it is made an opportunity to
meet the situation presented by the ruling.
GR: The reason for sustaining or overruling an objection need not be stated.
Exception: If the objection is based on two or more grounds, a ruling sustaining
 the objection on one or some of them must specify the ground or grounds relied
upon.
Escolin: The parties may ask for the ground for the ruling, even if the rules do
es not require the judge to so state.
Sec. 39. Striking out answer. Should a witness answer the question before th
e adverse party had the opportunity to voice fully its objection to the same, an
d such objection is found to be meritorious, the court shall sustain the objecti
on and order the answer given to be stricken off the record.
On proper motion, the court may also order the striking out of answers which
are incompetent, irrelevant, or otherwise improper. (n)
Requisites for Striking out an answer
1. witness answers the question before the adverse party had the opportunity to
voice fully its objection
2. objection is found to be meritorious
3. court order that the answer given to be stricken off the record.
On proper motion, the court may also order the striking out of answers which are
incompetent, irrelevant, or otherwise improper.
Sec. 40. Tender of excluded evidence. If documents or things offered in evid
ence are excluded by the court, the offeror may have the same attached to or mad
e part of the record. If the evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may state fo
r the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and the su
bstance of the proposed testimony. (n)
If documents or things offered in evidence are excluded by the court, the offer
or may
1. have the same attached to or made part of the record, if the evidence is obje
ct or documentary
2. If the evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record
a. the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and
b. the substance of the proposed testimony.
2. Cases
a. When evidence considered offered
People v. Franco, 269 SCRA 211 (1997) The court shall consider no evidence, even
an extra-judicial confession, which has not been formally offered. Mere fact th
at evidence has been identified and marked in the course of the examination of a
witness, without the contents being recited in his testimony, does not mean tha
t it has been formally offered as evidence. Identification of documentary eviden
ce is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the e
vidence as an exhibit, while the formal offer of documentary evidence is done on
ly when the party rests its case.
Philippine Bank of Commerce v. CA, 195 SCRA 567 (1991) Where the genuineness and
due execution of documents of an instrument attached to a complaint are deemed
admitted by failure to specifically deny it under oath, such instruments are con
sidered as evidence although they were not formally offered.
Escolin: cf Rule 8, Sec. 8
Sec. 8. How to contest such documents. When an action or defense is founded upon
a written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as pr
ovided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the instru
ment shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically
denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but the requirement
of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party
to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the orig
inal instrument is refused. (8a)
Tabuena v. CA, 196 SCRA 650 (1991) Mere fact that a document is marked as an exh
ibit does not mean it has been offered as evidence. Marking at the pre-trial was
only for the purpose of identifying them at that time. However, if an exhibit h
as been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and has itself been incorpora
ted into the records (i.e. recital of the contents of the exhibit).
b. When objection make
People v. Java, 227 SCRA 668 (1993) Objection to testimony on the ground of lack
of a formal offer of the testimony should be done when the witness was called t
o testify.
Catuira v. CA, 236 SCRA 398 (1994) Failure to object upon the time a witness is
called to testify on the ground that there was no formal offer of the testimony
is a waiver of the objection. Objection on such ground after the witness has tes
tified is too late.
Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, 186 SCRA 385 (1990) Objection to documenta
ry evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered (i.e. when the party
rests its case) as an exhibit and not before. Objection prior to that time (e.g
. identification of the evidence) is premature. Mere identification and marking
is not equivalent to a formal offer of the evidence. A party may decide to not o
ffer evidence already identified and marked.
de Leon: Note that the court also said that there was no continuing objection be
cause continuing objections are applicable when there is a single objection to a
class of evidence. This ruling is no longer applicable because the new rules on
evidence is now clear that continuing objections are applicable only to testimo
nial evidence.
de Leon: Does this mean that party may remain silent when inadmissible evidence
is being identified and marked, and then object when it is formally offered? In
terpacific Transit was explicit when it said What really matters is the objection
to the document at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit.
de Leon: What if after an exhibit has been identified, marked, and its contents
recited, the offeror decides not to formally offer it into evidence. Is the cour
t authorized to consider such exhibit on the strength of the ruling in Tabuena?
I would say yes because the recital of the contents of the exhibit is now part of
the testimony of the witness which has been formally offered.
People v. Cario, 165 SCRA 664 (1988)
De los Reyes v. IAC, 176 SCRA 394 (1989)
People v. Yatco, 97 Phil. 940 (1955)
PHILAMGEN v. Sweet Lines, Inc., 212 SCRA 194 (1992)
Sheraton Palace v. Quijano, (C.A.) 64 O.G. 9116
Vda. de Oate v. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 283 (1995)
W. Weight & Sufficiency of Evidence
1. Rule 133
Sec. 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the party
having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of eviden
ce. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the
issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of
the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means
and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of
the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their test
imony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility s
o far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also con
sider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with
the greater number. (1 a)
MEMORIZE!
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by
a preponderance of evidence.
In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the is
sues involved lies, the court may consider
1. all the facts and circumstances of the case
2. the witnesses' manner of testifying
3. their intelligence
4. their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying
5. the nature of the facts to which they testify
6. the probability or improbability of their testimony
7. their interest or want of interest
8. their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon th
e trial.
9. number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the gre
ater number.
An cause of action on the ground of reformation of instrument must be proven by
clear and convincing evidence.
Sec. 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. In a criminal case, the accused is en
titled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding poss
ibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required,
or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. (2 a
)
MEMORIZE!
In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is
shown beyond reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt
1. does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, prod
uces absolute certainty.
2. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conv
iction in an unprejudiced mind.
A defense of self-defense must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Sec. 3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction. An e
xtrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for c
onviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. (3)
An extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground f
or conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if;
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a convict
ion beyond reasonable doubt. (5)
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if
1. There is more than one circumstance
2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and
3. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction b
eyond reasonable doubt.
Sec. 5. Substantial evidence. In cases filed before administrative or quasi-
judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substant
ial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. (n)
MEMORIZE!
In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be de
emed established if it is supported by substantial evidence
Substantial evidence that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind mi
ght accept as adequate to justify a conclusion
Sec. 6. Power of the court to stop further evidence. The court may stop the
introduction of further testimony upon any particular point when the evidence up
on it is already so full that more witnesses to the same point cannot be reasona
bly expected to be additionally persuasive. But this power should be exercised w
ith caution. (6)
Sec. 7. Evidence on motion. When a motion is based on facts not appearing of
record the court may hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by
the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly
or partly on oral testimony or depositions. (7)
When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record
1. the court may hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the r
espective parties
2. but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral te
stimony or depositions.
2. Cases
People v. Cruz, 134 SCRA 512 (1985)
Facts: In a prosecution for arson committed in Davao City, there were no eyewitn
esses. However, there was evidence as to the presence of the accused at the scen
e of the crime before and at the time the fire started, that he moved out hurrie
dly and running away from the burning premises, that he had previously manifeste
d resentment against the owner of the premises and even hinted that he would bur
n the owner s house, that he abandoned his job, left Davao City without leaving a
word to anyone, and went into hiding in Manila, that he concealed his identity b
y disguising himself with long hair, long moustache, and colored eyeglasses, tha
t he exhibited indifference and unperturbed attitude towards the fate suffered b
y the victims, that he did not even condole with the bereaved family and relativ
es or pay them a visit, that he did not attend the wake or the funeral, and that
he had a serious misunderstanding and strained relationship with the owner of t
he burned premises.
Held: There are enough circumstantial evidence to produce a conviction beyond re
asonable doubt.
U.S. v. Lasada, 18 Phil. 90 (1910)
People. v. Abendan, 82 Phil. 711 (1948)
People v. Solayao, 262 SCRA 255 (1996)
People v. Lorenzo, 240 SCRA 624 (1995)
??
??
??
??

411

411
Remedial Law Reviewer