G.R. No.
L-1716 June 28, 1949
MATERIAL DISTRIBUTORS (PHIL.), INC., and
HARRY LYONS, petitioner,
vs.
FELIPE NATIVIDAD, Judge of First Instance of
Manila, and LOPE SARREAL, respondents.
Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha for petitioner.
Claro M. Recto for respondent Lope Sarreal.
No appearance for respondent Judge.
PERFECTO, J.:
On March 24, 1947, Lope Sarreal filed a complaint
(amended on April 10, 1947, to include Harry Lyons)
seeking a money judgment against petitioners on
three causes of action in the total of P1,256,229.30.
On May 27, 1947, Sarreal filed a motion for the
production and inspection of the following documents:
I. Books or Papers of Material Distributors (Phil.)
Inc.:
1. Cash Receipts Journal
2. Cash Payments Journal
3. All Individual Ledgers, specially of the
following persons or entities
(a) British-American Engineering
Corporation
(b) Philippine Refinery
(c) Felipe Buencamino
(d) Luzon Stevedoring
(e) Standard Oil Company of New
York
(f) Philippine Exchange Co., Inc.
(g) Manila Laundry Company
(h) Filipino Businessmen's
Syndicate
(i) Material Distributors Inc.,
Wichita, Kansas
(j) Harry Lyons
4. All letters exchanged between Material
Distributors (Phil.) Inc., Material
Distributors, Inc. of Wichita, Kansas and
Harry Lyons, between October 9, 1946
and March 31, 1947.
5. All cablegrams exchanged between
Material Distributors (Phil.), Inc., and
Material Distributors, Inc., Wichita,
Kansas, between October 9, 1946 to
March 31, 1947.
II. Books and Papers of the defendant Harry
Lyons.
1. Letters exchanged between Harry
Lyons and Material Distributors, Inc.,
Wichita, Kansas between September 14,
1946 and March 24, 1947.
2. Cablegrams exchanged between Harry
Lyons and Material Distributors, Inc.,
Wichita, Kansas, between September 14,
1946 and March 24, 1947.
 3. Cash Receipts Journal.
4. Cash Payments Journal.
On June 4, 1947, Sarreal filed a supplemental motion
for the production and inspection of the originals of
Annexes A and B of the complaint.
On June 12, 1947, petitioner filed a memorandum and
opposition to Sarreal's above mentioned original and
supplemental motion on the ground that he failed to
show good cause and that the motion were evidently
filed for the purpose of fishing evidence.
On July 16, 1947, respondent judge, granting both
motions, required petitioners to produce the
documents and annexes in question on July 24, 1947.
On account of the absence in the Philippines of Harry
Lyons, petitioner moved, reserving whatever rights
they have under the Rules of Court, to postpone the
inspection of the documents and annexes in question
and accordingly respondent judge postponed it to
August 15, 1947.
On August 13, 1947, petitioners moved for the
reconsideration of the order of July 16, on the following
grounds:
"(a) Article 46 of the Code of Commerce which
prohibits the delivery, communication and
general examination of the correspondence of
merchants, a substantial right, as well as the
petitioners' right to the inviolability of their
correspondence as guaranteed by the
Constitution would be violated by the order
requiring the production of the following
documents:
BOOKS AND PAPERS OF DEFENDANT HARRY
LYONS
(1) Letters exchange between Harry Lyons and
Material Distributors, Inc., of Wichita, Kansas,
between Sept. 14, 1946 and March 24,1947;
(2) Cablegrams exchanged between Harry Lyons
and Material Distributors, Inc., of Wichita,
Kansas, between September 14, 1946 and
March 24, 1947.
BOOKS AND PAPERS OF MATERIAL DISTRIBUTORS
(PHIL.) INC.
(4-5) All letters and cablegrams exchanged
between Material Distributors (Phil.), Inc.,
Material Distributors, Inc., of Wichita, Kansas,
and Harry Lyons between October 9, 1946 and
March 31, 1947.
"(b) That the production for the plaintiff's
inspection of all the foregoing documents above
enumerated, as well as of the following
documents, would constitute a "fishing
expedition," not allowed by Rule 21 of the Rules
of Court, since their materiality or probable
materiality is not shown by the pleadings of the
parties except by movant's bare allegation
which are disputed by your petitioners:
BOOKS AND PAPERS OF MATERIAL
DISTRIBUTORS (PHIL.) INC.
1-2. Cash Receipts Journal and Cash Payments
Journal.
3. All individual Ledgers, specially of the
following persons or entities.
(b) Philippine Refinery.
(c) Felipe Buencamino.
(d) Luzon Stevedoring.
(e) Standard Oil Company of New York.
(f) Philippine Exchange Co., Inc.
(g) Manila Laundry Company.
"(c) That plaintiff is not entitled to the
production and inspection of the originals of
Annexes A and B because his only purpose, as
stated in his supplemental motion, Exhibit D,
was to find out if a case of falsification has been
made; that the issue between the parties in this
regard is material only to your petitioners'
affirmative defense, and if the plaintiff's purpose
was as stated in said supplemental motion, then
your petitioners claimed their privilege against
self-incrimination. That this letter privilege was
also claimed insofar as the production and
inspection of the other documents were
concerned by your petitioners in view of counsel
for respondent Lope Sarreal's charge to the
Honorable City Fiscal for the City of Manila that
your petitioners were violating our Corporation
Law."
On September 27, 1947, respondent judge denied the
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners impugn the validity of the orders of July 16
and September 27, 1947, as were issued by the
respondent judge in excess of his jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of his discretion, and prayed for the
annulment or modification of the order of July 16,
1947.a
Respondent Sarreal advanced the following reasons to
show that the orders complained of were not issued in
excess of the trial court's jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion:
(a) The motions of the respondent Lope Sarreal
of May 27, 1947 and June 4, 1947 contain
allegations of the ultimate fact that the books
and papers mentioned in said motions
constitute or contain evidence material to the
matters involved in the case and are in the
possession, custody or control of the petitioners
herein, and allegation to this effect is adequate
showing of good cause for the production and
inspection of the documents mentioned therein,
being an allegation in the very words used in
Form 11 of the Appendix Forms of our Rules of
Court, and therefore a sufficient compliance with
said Rule (Go Tianco vs. Judge Diaz, G. R. L-7,
January 22, 1946, reported in the June 1946
issue of the official Gazette).
(b) Article 46 of the Code of Commerce invoked
by the petitioners does not apply to cases of
production and inspection of books and papers
belonging to a party to the action in which such
production and inspection are sought(Decision
of Supreme Court of Spain of March 30, 1894).
At any rate, said Article of the Code of
Commerce has been impliedly repealed by Act
No. 190, pertinent portions of which are now
embodied in our Rules of Court (3 Op. of Atty.
Gen., 380).
(c) Neither would the inspection of books and
papers of the petitioners amount to a violation
of the inviolability of the correspondence under
Sec. 1, No. 5, Article III of the Constitution of the
Philippines, considering that the inspection of
said books and papers are sought through
proper order of the trial court, and the
Constitutional provision invoked by the
petitioners precisely allows inspection of
communication and correspondence upon lawful
order of the court. Moreover, this provision of
our Constitution creates no new right, being
merely a re-enforcement of the Constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures (Sinco, Philippine Government and
Political Law, 4th Edition, p. 632), and when the
inspection of such books and papers was
allowed "upon lawful order of the court" made
through the respondent Judge, such inspection
cannot be considered as unreasonable although
such books and papers are private in character
(First National Bank vs. Hughes, 6 Fed., C 737,
741, appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction in
106 U.S., 523, 27 Law ed., 268, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep.
489; Johnson Steel Street-Rail Co. vs. North
Branch Steel Co., 48 Fed., 191; Victor G. Beede
Co. vs. Joseph Bancroft and Sons Co., 98 Fed.,
175, affirmed in 52 L. R. A., 734, 45 C. C. A.,
354, 106 Fed., 396, where this question was not
involved; Burnham vs. Morrissey, 14 Gray, 226,
74 A. Dec., 676; United States vs. Terminal R.
Assoc., 148 Fed., 486; Re Dunn, 9 Mo. App., 225;
Elder and Bogardus, 1 Edm. Sel Cas., 110;
Boston and M. R. Co. vs. States [N. H.], 77 Atl.,
996; Hopkinson vs. Burghley, L. R. 2ch., 447;
Groker-Wheeler Co. vs. Bullock [C. C.], 134 Fed.,
241; Re Bolster, 110 Pac., 547.).
(d) The inspection of the said documents is not
for the purpose of "fishing evidence" but with a
view to enabling the respondent Lope Sarreal to
designate with the particularity of the subpoena
duces tecum to be obtained in connection with
trial of the case on its merits the specific books
and papers containing the entry of receipts and
payments made by the petitioners, such books
and papers being material to the case in view,
among others, of the allegation in the amended
complaint that the defendants, the petitioners
herein, had been remitting all or the greater
volume of the proceeds from the sales of
equipment and materials of the defendants in
Civil Case No. 2059 outside the jurisdiction of
the trial court and had been disposing of their
properties with the intention of defrauding their
creditors. At any rate, "fishing expedition" is
allowed and is precisely contemplated in Rule 21
of our Rules of Court as a weapon of discovery
(XXVI Am. Bar. Ass. Jur. No. 1, Jan. 1940, 48;
Golden vs. Arcadia Mutual Casualty Company,
D. C. III., 1942, 3 F. R. D., 26; Leach vs. Griff
Bros. Coop. Corp., D. C. Miss, 1942 2 F. R. D.,
444; Civil Aeronautics Board of Aeronautics
Authority vs. Canadian Colonial Airways, D. C.,
1941, 41 F. S., 1006; Quemus Theatre Co. vs.
Warner Bros. Pictures, D. C. N. J., 1940, 35 F. S.,
949; United Mercantile Agency vs. Silver Fleet
Motor Express, D. C. Ky., 1941, F. R. D., 709;
Walling vs. Richmon Screw Anchor Company, D.
C. N. Y., 1943,4 F. R. D., 265; Monarch Liquor
Corp. vs. Schenley Distillers Corp., D. C. N.Y.,
1941, 2 F. R. D., 51; Walsh vs. Comm. Mutual
Life Insurance Company of Hartford, Conn.
[1939], 26 F. Supp., 556; Olson Transportation
Company vs. Socony Vacuum Oil Company, 7 F.
R. D., 234).
(e) The originals of Annexes A and B are
relevant not only to the case of the defendants
but also to that of the plaintiff in Civil Case No.
2059 here involved, in view of the issue of fact
raised by the pleadings of the parties as to
whether the originals of Annexes A and B have
been falsified by the insertion therein of the
names of Gil J. Puyat and Raymond
Lehmann after said Annexes were signed by
respondent Lope Sarreal and delivered to the
petitioner Harry Lysons, in view of which
respondent Lope Sarreal is entitled to the
production and inspection thereof under the
provisions of Rule 21 of our Rules of Court.
(f) Even if ocular inspection of said Annexes A
and B may reveal falsification thereof by the
petitioners amounting to a violation of the
applicable provisions of our Revised Penal Code,
the petitioners cannot exempt themselves from
the production of said exhibits for mere
inspection and copying, inasmuch as the
Constitutional prohibition against self-
incrimination has been extended in specific case
only to the production of documents as
evidence, and only when the person producing
them is made to take the witness stand and
identify them under oath, and not to the
production of such documents for mere
inspection (Comm. vs. Southern Express Co.,
1914, 160 Ky., 1, 169 SW., 517, annotated cases
1916A, 373, L. R. A., 1915B, 913; U. S. vs.
Hughes, 12 Blatchff, 553); the reason being that
the Constitutional prohibition is one against
compelling a person to be a "witness against
himself", and this has been held to
mean testimonial compulsion or extraction of
admission form the person's own lips (4
Wigmore, 865, 2263; Wilson vs. U. S., 55 Law,
ed., 776, citing cases).
(g) Moreover, the corporate records sought to
be inspected are not covered by the
Constitutional prohibition against self-
 incrimination, even though such documents
may contain evidence tending to subject any or
all of the officers of a corporation to a criminal
indictment (Wilson vs. U. S., 221 U. S., 361, 51
Law. ed., 771; Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. vs.
Walling, 327 U. S.,186, 90 Law. ed., 614, 627-
629; U. S. vs. Baunch & Lamp Optical Co., 321U.
S., 707, 88 Law. ed., 1024, 1037 [1944]; U.
S. vs. White, 88 Law. ed., 1547).
(h) Production and inspection of documents
have been allowed and sustained in decided
cases, under Orders which were broader than
those here assailed, for the production and
inspection of all books of
accounts, all memoranda and records, stocks
book, ledger, journal, cash book, bank book,
bank deposit slip, check book, voucher,
contract, income tax return, booking record and
correspondence (U. S. vs. Duoder, 1 F. R. S., 466,
U. S. D. C. June 16, 1939; Orange Country
Theater Corp. vs. League, 1 F. R. S., 448).
(i) The respondent Judge, before issuing the
Orders complained of, gave the parties full
opportunity, not only to discuss the question
involved by repeated oral arguments but also by
written memoranda, and in the exercise of his
discretion issued the Orders complained of only
after full consideration of all the questions of
fact and law involved.
The production and inspection of documents and
books here in question call for the interpretation and
application of section 1 of Rule 21, which reads as
follows:
SECTION 1. Motion for production or inspection;
order. Upon motion of any party showing
good cause therefor and upon notice to all other
parties, the court in which an action is pending
may (a) order any party to produce and permit
the inspection and copying or photographing, by
or on behalf of the moving party, of any
designated documents, papers, books,
accounts, letters, photographs, objects or
tangible things, not privileged, which constitute
or contain evidence material to any matter
involved in the action and which are in his
possession, custody or control; or (b) order any
party to permit entry upon designated land or
other property in his possession or control for
the purpose of inspecting, measuring,
surveying, or photographing the property or any
designated relevant object or operation thereon.
The order shall specify the time, place and
manner of making the inspection and taking
copies and photographs, and may prescribe
such terms and conditions as are just.
Petitioners contend that in filling his original and
supplemental motions, Sarreal has failed to show good
cause for the issuance of the requested order. It
appears, however, in the original motion of May 27,
1947, that the books and papers therein mentioned
"constitute or contain the evidence material to the
matters involved in the above entitled case."
In the supplemental motion of June 4, 1947, it is
alleged that there is direct conflict between the
allegations of the complaint and amended complaint
and those of the answer and amended answer as to
whether or not the names of Gil J. Puyat and Raymond
W. Lehmann appear in any part of the originals of
Annexes A and B of the complaint, and plaintiff Sarreal
wanted the production and inspection of said originals
to show that they did not contain the names of Gil J.
Puyat and Raymond W. Lehmann, and that if said
names should appear now typed in said Annexes A and
B, said additional names must have been typed by
direction of Harry Lysons without the knowledge or
consent of Sarreal and after said originals were
delivered by Harry Lysons and filed by the latter and
that the changes so introduced are a forgery.
With these allegations in the original and supplemental
motions Sarreal has fulfilled the requirements of
showing good cause for the production and inspection
of the books and documents in question under Rule 21.
Petitioners contained that the order of the trial judge
violated petitioner's constitutional rights against self-
incrimination.
We have considered carefully persons advanced by
petitioners and memoranda in support of this
allegation and we found nothing in them to show how,
without the inspection of Annexes A and B of the
complaint, petitioners may incriminate themselves. We
have, therefore, to dismiss such contention.
(3) The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizure shall not be
violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." (Sec. 1. Art. III, Constitution of the
Philippines.)
(5) The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court or when public safety
and order require otherwise. (Sec. 1. Art. III,
Constitution of the Philippines.)
The orders in question, issued in virtue of the
provisions of Rule 21, pertain to a civil procedure that
cannot be identified or confused with the unreasonable
searches prohibited by the Constitution. But in the
erroneous hypothesis that the production and
inspection of books and documents in question is
tantamount to a search warrant, the procedure
outlined by Rule 21 and followed by respondent judge
place them outside the realm of the prohibited
unreasonable searches. There is no question that,
upon the pleadings in the case, Sarreal has an interest
in the books and documents in question, that they are
material and important to the issues between him and
petitioners, that justice will be better served if all the
facts pertinent to the controversy are placed before
the trial court.
The constitutional guarantee of privacy of
communication and correspondence will not be
violated, because the trial court has power and
jurisdiction to issue the order for the production and
inspection of the books and documents in question in
virtue of the constitutional guarantee making an
express exception in favor of the disclosure of
communication and correspondence upon lawful order
of a court of justice.
After a careful consideration of the legal question
raised by petitioners, this Court has arrived at the
conclusion that the trial judge, in issuing the order of
July 16, 1947, has not exceed his jurisdiction or acted
with grave abuse of discretion.
Petition denied with costs against petitioner.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Tuason, Montemayor, and
Reyes, JJ., concur.
MORAN, C.J.: Mr. Justice Pablo voted for this decision.
[G.R. No. 86218. September 18, 1992.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. ELSIE BAGISTA y BANGCO, Accused-
Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT
AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE;
RULE. The general rule regarding searches and
seizures can be stated in this manner: no person shall
be subjected to a search of his person, personal effects
or belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a
search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest.
The basis for the rule can be found in Article III,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Art. III, Section 3
(2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in
violation of the aforementioned right shall, among
others, "be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SEARCH OF A MOVING VEHICLE, AN
EXCEPTION. The constitutional proscription against
warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain
exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful
arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases
of a moving vehicle, and the seizure of evidence in
plain view. With regard to the search of moving
vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the
mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the
vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITE. This in no way,
however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion
to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the
absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped
and subjected to an extensive search, such a
warrantless search has been held to be valid only as
long as the officers conducting the search have
reasonable or probable cause to believe before the
search that they will find the instrumentality or
evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be
searched.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICATION IN CASE AT
BAR. The NARCOM officers in the case at bar had
probable cause to stop and search all vehicles coming
from the north at Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the
confidential information they received from their
regular informant that a woman having the same
appearance as that of accused-appellant would be
bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise have
probable cause to search accused-appellants
belongings since she fits the description given by the
NARCOM informant. Since there was a valid
warrantless search by the NARCOM agents, any
evidence obtained during the course of said search is
admissible against Accused-Appellant.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF
WITNESS; FINDINGS OF TRIAL JUDGE; RULE AND
EXCEPTION; CASE AT BAR. The prosecution had
shown, primarily through the positive testimony of Sgt.
Parajas, that the bag containing the dried marijuana
leaves was taken from accused-appellants possession.
She denies this fact and contends that the bag in
question was actually taken from the luggage carrier
above the passenger seats and not from her.
Indisputably, We have two opposing versions of what
actually happened at the checkpoint in Km. 16, Acop,
Tublay, Benguet, resulting in the accused-appellants
apprehension, that of the prosecution and that of the
defense. In situations like this, the matter of assigning
values to the testimony of witnesses is best performed
by the trial courts because, unlike appellate courts,
they can weigh such testimony in the light of the
demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses at
the trial. The exception is when the trial court has
overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if
considered, might affect the result, which We do not
find in the instant case.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY MINOR
DISCREPANCIES; CASE AT BAR. As to the alleged
discrepancies in the prosecutions case, such as the
color of the stripes of the bag which contained the
marijuana and whether the items seized from accused-
appellant were marijuana leaves or marijuana fruit
tops, these are minor in character and do not detract
from the prosecutions case since it was shown by the
Receipt of Property Seized, which was signed by
accused-appellant, that these were the very items
taken from her at the time of her arrest.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT
AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE;
RULE; SEARCH OF MOVING VEHICLE AS AN EXCEPTION;
REQUIRES PROBABLE CAUSE; NOT PRESENT IN CASE
AT BAR. In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents
searched the bag of the accused on the basis alone of
an information they received that a woman, 23 years
of age with naturally curly hair, and 52" or 53" in
height would be transporting marijuana. The extensive
search was indiscriminately made on all the baggages
of all passengers of the bus where the accused was
riding, whether male or female, and whether or not
their physical appearance answered the description of
the suspect as described in the alleged information. If
there really was such an information, as claimed by
the NARCOM agents, it is a perplexing thought why
they had to search the baggages of ALL passengers,
not only the bags of those who appeared to answer the
description of the woman suspected of carrying
marijuana. Moreover, the accused was not at all acting
suspiciously when the NARCOM agents searched her
bag, where they allegedly found the marijuana. From
the circumstances of the case at bar, it would seem
that the NARCOM agents were only fishing for
evidence when they searched the baggages of all the
passengers, including that of the accused. They had no
probable cause to reasonably believe that the accused
was the woman carrying marijuana alluded to in the
information they allegedly received. Thus, the
warrantless search made on the personal effects of
herein accused on the basis of mere information,
without more, is to my mind bereft of probable cause
and therefore, null and void. It follows that the
marijuana seized in the course of such warrantless
search was inadmissible in evidence.
DECISION
NOCON, J.:
Appeal by accused-appellant Elsie Bagista from the
decision dated September 26, 1988 of the Regional
Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, finding
her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, and
sentencing her to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs.
The facts of the case are as follows: On July 4, 1988, at
around 8:00 oclock in the morning, the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) Detachment Office located at the
Arix Building, Bokawkan Road, Baguio City, received
information from one of its regular informants that a
certain woman, 23 years of age, with naturally curly
hair, and with a height of 52" or 53", would be
transporting marijuana from up north. 1 Acting upon
this piece of information, Sgt. Oscar Parajas testified
that he, Sgt. Godofredo Fider and a civilian NARCOM
agent proceeded to Km. 16, Acop, Tublay, Benguet.
Upon arriving at said location at around 11:00 oclock
that same morning, they established a checkpoint and
flagged down all vehicles, both private and public,
coming from the north to check if any of these vehicles
were carrying marijuana leaves on board. 2
After about 4 1/2 hours, the NARCOM agents stopped a
Dangwa Tranco bus with Plate No. AVD 938 and body
number 428, which came from Lepanto, Benguet. Sgts.
Parajas and Fider boarded the bus and thereupon Sgt.
Parajas announced to the passengers that they were
NARCOM agents and that they were going to search
their baggages. Sgt. Parajas then proceeded to the
rear of the bus while Sgt. Fider began inspecting the
bags in the front. 3
While at the back, Sgt. Parajas noticed a woman with
curly hair seated at the right side (as one is facing the
driver) of the last seat of the bus, with a travelling bag
with black and orange stripes 4 on her lap. Sgt. Parajas
inspected the bag and discovered three (3) bundles of
marijuana leaves covered by assorted clothing. The
bag and the contents thereof were confiscated and the
woman arrested; she was later brought to the NARCOM
office in Baguio City where she was booked and
investigated. The woman was then identified
as Accused-Appellant. 5 The confiscated bundles were
subjected to laboratory examination, and found
positive for marijuana. 6
->Accused-appellants defense rests solely on denial.
She claimed that she was engaged in the buying and
selling of vegetables, particularly cabbages. On the
day in question, she boarded the Dangwa Tranco bus
at Abatan, Benguet, bringing with her ten (10) sacks of
cabbages which she intended to sell to a certain Maria
Opino in Baguio City. While inside the bus, she
approached the conductor for her ticket to cover the
fare for her sacks of cabbages, but was told by the
latter that he would attend to her later.
When the bus reached Tublay, Benguet, it was stopped
by the NARCOM agents who boarded the same and
began inspecting the baggages of the passengers.
Accused-appellant claimed that the bag containing the
marijuana was taken from the luggage carrier above
the passenger seats. When nobody admitted owning
the bag, the NARCOM agent approached her, took the
shoulder bag on her lap, and asked her to come with
them for investigation as she fits the description of the
would-be transporter of the marijuana given by the
NARCOM informer. She denied having anything to do
with the marijuana found on the
bus.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
To corroborate her story, Accused-appellant presented
the conductor of the Dangwa Tranco bus, Nestor
Yangkin. He testified that when the NARCOM agents
boarded the bus at Tublay, Benguet, one of them got a
bag from the luggage carrier, opened it, and smelled
the contents. The agent then asked the passengers
who among them owned the bag; when nobody
answered, he walked to the back of the bus, all the
time looking at the faces of the passengers. When the
agent approached accused-appellant, who was seated
at the rear of the bus, the former talked to her, then
escorted her out of the bus. 7
During Yangkins cross-examination, it came out that
the 10 sacks of vegetables that were loaded at Abatan
were brought by a man who told him that the fare for
the sacks will be paid upon arrival at the Dangwa
Station in Baguio City but that the owner of the sacks
would be riding in the bus. And yet, Yangkin did not
seek out the alleged owner of the sacks. The witness
also testified that none of the passengers approached
him and offered to pay for the fare of the sacks, 8
contrary to accused-appellants testimony.
In convicting accused-appellant, the trial court found
the testimony of Sgt. Parajas credible. Said the court a
quo:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
". . . The testimony of Sgt. Oscar Parajas was direct
and straightforward as he gave all the requisite details
of the entrapment operation they conducted based on
an information provided by a coordinating individual.
His testimony reveals that the bag containing the
marijuana leaves was found on the lap of the accused.
There is nothing in the record to suggest that Sgt.
Parajas was moved by any motive than simply the
carrying out of his official mission or duty. Where there
is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the
principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by
improper motives, the presumption is that he was not
so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith
and credit (People v. Francia, L-69253, September 30,
1987, 154 SCRA 495)." 9

The trial court brushed aside the defenses observation
that there were discrepancies between the testimony
of Sgt. Parajas and the evidence presented, such as
the color of the bag allegedly taken from accused-
appellant and the kind of marijuana taken from the
bag, as immaterial. Similarly brushed aside was the
defenses contention that the evidence against
accused-appellant, such as the Receipt of Property
Seized 10 and her signature thereon, 11 and the
Booking Sheet and Arrest Report 12 and her signature
thereon, 13 were inadmissible due to the absence of
counsel, since these were not confessions or extra-
judicial statements.
Finally, the trial court did not give credence to the
testimonies of accused-appellant and her witness
Nestor Yangkin, in view of the testimony of Sgt. Parajas
that he took the bag containing the marijuana from
accused-appellants lap. Moreover, the court a quo
observed that there was a discrepancy between the
testimonies of accused-appellant and Yangkin on the
matter of the 10 sacks of cabbage, which led the court
to conclude that the former was in the act of
transporting marijuana at the time of her arrest.
Accused-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration,
alleging that the marijuana leaves found in the bag
taken from her was inadmissible in evidence as it was
the product of a warrantless search, which motion was
denied by the trial court for lack of merit on November
22, 1988.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Aggrieved, Accused-appellant filed the instant appeal,
alleging that the court a quo erred (1) in not finding
the warrantless search conducted by the NARCOM
agents as illegal and unconstitutional, and (2) in
admitting the illegally obtained evidences and
convicting her on the basis of said evidences.
Accused-appellant is in error.
The general rule regarding searches and seizures can
be stated in this manner: no person shall be subjected
to a search of his person, personal effects or
belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a
search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. 14
The basis for the rule can be found in Article III,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which
states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any
evidence obtained in violation of the aforementioned
right shall, among others, "be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding."cralaw virtua1aw library
The constitutional proscription against warrantless
searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions.
Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a
warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a
moving vehicle, 15 and the seizure of evidence in plain
view. 16
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had
been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor
vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be
searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought. 17
This in no way, however, gives the police officers
unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of
automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a
vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive
search, such a warrantless search has been held to be
valid only as long as the officers conducting the search
have reasonable or probable cause to believe before
the search that they will find the instrumentality or
evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be
searched. 18
The NARCOM officers in the case at bar had probable
cause to stop and search all vehicles coming from the
north at Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the
confidential information they received from their
regular informant that a woman having the same
appearance as that of accused-appellant would be
bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise have
probable cause to search accused-appellants
belongings since she fits the description given by the
NARCOM informant.
Since there was a valid warrantless search by the
NARCOM agents, any evidence obtained during the
course of said search is admissible against Accused-
Appellant.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
At any rate, no objection was raised by the accused-
appellant in the court below on the inadmissibility of
the evidence against her on the ground that the same
was obtained in a warrantless search. This amounts to
a waiver of the objection on the legality of the search
and the admissibility of the evidence obtained
therefrom. 19 Amid a waiver, the court is duty bound
to admit the evidence. 20
Reviewing the evidence, We find the same sufficient to
prove accused-appellants guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
The prosecution had shown, primarily through the
positive testimony of Sgt. Parajas, that the bag
containing the dried marijuana leaves was taken from
accused-appellants possession.
She denies this fact and contends that the bag in
question was actually taken from the luggage carrier
above the passenger seats and not from her.
Indisputably, We have two opposing versions of what
actually happened at the checkpoint in Km. 16, Acop,
Tublay, Benguet, resulting in the accused-appellants
apprehension, that of the prosecution and that of the
defense. In situations like this, the matter of assigning
values to the testimony of witnesses is best performed
by the trial courts because, unlike appellate courts,
they can weigh such testimony in the light of the
demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses at
the trial. 21 The exception is when the trial court has
overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if
considered, might affect the result, 22 which We do
not find in the instant case.
Moreover, Accused-appellants defense was weakened
by the fact that her witness Nestor Yangkin
contradicted her on the matter of the 10 sacks of
vegetables appellant claims to have brought with her
at the time of her arrest. Appellant claims she loaded
the sacks of vegetables on the bus and tried to pay for
its fare, but that conductor Yangkin, put her off.
Yangkin claims otherwise: the sacks of vegetables
were loaded by a man who told him that the fare for
the sacks will be paid upon arrival in Baguio City, and
that no one on the bus offered to pay for the
same.cralawnad
In weighing contrary declarations and statements,
greater weight must generally be given to the positive
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses than the
denials of the Accused-Appellant. 23
Given the discrepancy on this point, the trial court
correctly disregarded the corroborative testimony of
Nestor Yangkin. The matter of the ownership of the 10
sacks of vegetables is material since appellants
reason for being on the bus was to deliver these sacks
to Baguio City. If the sacks of vegetables are not hers,
then the only conclusion that can be drawn is that she
was on her way to Baguio City to sell the marijuana
found in her possession.
As to the alleged discrepancies in the prosecutions
case, such as the color of the stripes of the bag which
contained the marijuana and whether the items seized
from accused-appellant were marijuana leaves or
marijuana fruit tops, these are minor in character and
do not detract from the prosecutions case since it was
shown by the Receipt of Property Seized, 24 which was
signed by accused-appellant, that these were the very
items taken from her at the time of her arrest.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision appealed
from, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs
against Accused-Appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado and Melo, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Although there is a similarity in the factual
circumstances of the case at bar with those of the
Malmstedt case (GR No. 91107, 19 June 1991, 198
SCRA 101) where the Court upheld the validity of the
warrantless search, however, in the present case, I am
of the view that the information alone received by the
NARCOM agents, without other suspicious
circumstances surrounding the accused, did not give
rise to a probable cause justifying the warrantless
search made on the bag of the accused.
In the Malmstedt case, it will be recalled that no
extensive search was immediately made of the
Personal effects of the accused. It was only after the
NARCOM agents noticed a bulge on the waist of the
accused (causing them to suspect that he was carrying
a gun) and only after he failed or refused to present his
passport when required to do so, that a warrantless
search was made of the personal effects of the
accused. In other words, the information received by
the NARCOM agents that a certain Caucasian travelling
from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying prohibited
drugs together with the suspicious failure or refusal of
the accused to present his passport, supplied the
probable cause that reasonably led the NARCOM
agents to believe that the said accused was then and
there committing a crime. Thus
"Warrantless search of the personal effects of an
accused has been declared by this Court as valid,
because of existence of probable cause, where the
smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned
by the accused, or where the accused was acting
suspiciously, and attempted to flee."cralaw virtua1aw
library
x x x whether male or female, and whether or not their
"The receipt of information by NARCOM that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs
in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the
accused to produce his passport, taken together as a
whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe
that the accused was trying to hide something illegal
from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a
probable cause which justified the warrantless search
that was made on the personal effects of the accused.
In other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in
requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in
opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said
bag (which was discovered to contain hashish) as well
as the two (2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy
bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted
by accuseds own attempt to hide his identity by
refusing to present his passport, and by the
information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian
coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his
possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the
ability and facility to act accordingly, including, to
search even without warrant, in the light of such
circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and
ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of
society." (198 SCRA 401).
In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the
bag of the accused on the basis alone of an
information they received that a woman, 23 years of
age with naturally curly hair, and 52" or 53" in height
would be transporting marijuana. The extensive search
was indiscriminately made on all the baggages of all
passengers of the bus where the accused was riding,
physical appearance answered the description of the
suspect as described in the alleged information. If
there really was such an information, as claimed by
the NARCOM agents, it is a perplexing thought why
they had to search the baggages of ALL passengers,
not only the bags of those who appeared to answer the
description of the woman suspected of carrying
marijuana.
Moreover, the accused was not at all acting
suspiciously when the NARCOM agents searched her
bag, where they allegedly found the marijuana.
From the circumstances of the case at bar, it would
seem that the NARCOM agents were only fishing for
evidence when they searched the baggages of all the
passengers, including that of the accused. They had no
probable cause to reasonably believe that the accused
was the woman carrying marijuana alluded to in the
information they allegedly received. Thus, the
warrantless search made on the personal effects of
herein accused on the basis of mere information,
without more, is to my mind bereft of probable cause
and therefore, null and void. It follows that the
marijuana seized in the course of such warrantless
search was inadmissible in evidence.

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