CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
debate and free discussion in the press, find their remedies for
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom
of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
NEAR v. MINNESOTA
F: Near is the owner of The Saturday Press. The county
attorney of Hennepin brought this action to enjoin The
Saturday Press for publishing articles charged, in substance,
that a Jewish gangster was in control of gambling, bootlegging,
and racketeering in Minneapolis, and that law enforcing
officers and agencies were not energetically performing their
duties. Most of the charges were directed against the chief of
police; he was charged with gross neglect of duty, illicit
relations with gangsters, and with participation in graft. The
county attorney was charged with knowing the existing
conditions and with failure to take adequate measures to
remedy them. The mayor was accused of inefficiency and
dereliction. On member of the grand jury was stated to be in
sympathy with the gangsters. A special grand jury and a
special prosecutor were demanded to deal with the situation in
general, and, in particular, to investigate an attempt to
assassinate one Guilford, one of the original defendants, who,
it appears from the articles, was shot by gangsters after the first
issue of the periodical had been published. There is no
question but that the articles made serious accusations against
the public officers named and others in connection with the
prevalence of crimes and the failure to expose and punish
them.
Defendants claim that the facts arent sufficient to constitute a
cause of action and that the statute was in fact
unconstitutional.
Chapter 285 of the Session Laws of Minnesota for the year
1925 provides for the abatement, as a public nuisance, of a
malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine
or other periodical. It criminalizes any person who is a
member, employee, participant in a corporation or business
engaged in the circulation, production, and publication of
malicious, scandalous, and defamatory print materials.
The Court found the publication in violation of the provision.
An appeal was made with the Supreme Court:
I: W/N the Saturday Press and its freedom of speech are
protected by the 14th Amendment
H: Clause (b) of section one is unconstitutional.
-The law is aimed at the distribution of scandalous material.
Not the truth or falsity behind them. It requires the proof by
the state of malice.
-The object of the statute is not punishment, in the ordinary
sense, but suppression of the offending newspaper or
periodical. The reason for the enactment, as the state court has
said, is that prosecutions to enforce penal statutes for libel do
not result in 'efficient repression or suppression of the evils of
scandal.'
-that it is better to leave a few of its noxious branches to
their luxuriant growth, than, by pruning them away, to injure
the vigour of those yielding the proper fruits.
-Public officers, whose character and conduct remain open to
false accusations in actions under libel laws providing for
redress and punishment, and not in proceedings to restrain the
publication of newspapers and periodicals.
-The preliminary freedom, by virtue of the very reason for its
existence, does not depend, as this court has said, on proof of
truth.
-Judgment reversed. We should add that this decision rests
upon the operation and effect of the statute, without regard to
the question of the truth of the charges contained in the
particular periodical.
-In the first place, the main purpose of such constitutional
provisions is 'to prevent all such previous restraints upon
publications as had been practiced by other
governments,' and they do not prevent the subsequent
punishment of such as may be deemed contrary to the public
welfare.
-The preliminary freedom extends as well to the false as to the
true; the subsequent punishment may extend as well to the
true as to the false. This was the law of criminal libel apart
from statute in most cases, if not in all.
-The exceptional nature of its limitations places in a strong
light the general conception that liberty of the press,
historically considered and taken up by the Federal
Constitution, has meant, principally although not exclusively,
immunity from previous restraints or censorship.
-"the protection even as to previous restraint is not
absolutely unlimited."
FREEDMAN v. MARYLAND
F: Freedman is the owner of a Baltimore theatre who showed
Revenge at Daybreak in said theatre. Maryland State Board
of Sensors requires that every movie to be shown within their
jurisdiction be screened for any obscenity, and because of his
violation, Freedman was CONVICTED. The State admits
that the unlicensed movie does not violate any of the
standards, only that it was not subject to scrutiny and given the
approval for screening. The issue isnt about the prevention of
the first showing of a film (whether or not obscene), it is that
the law presents PRIOR RESTRAINT because it presents A
DANGER of unduly suppressing protected expression:
particularly on the procedure for an initial decision by the
board which effectively, without judicial participation BARS
the exhibition of the film, and even, in this case convicts the
exhibitor.
I: W/N Maryland motion picture censorship stature is
constitutional
H: NO. The court reversed the decision of the Court of
Appeals of Maryland due to the fact that the statute
presents prior restraints.
-In the area of freedom of expression it is well established
that one has standing to challenge a statute on the
ground that it delegates overly broad licensing discretion
to an administrative office, whether or not his conduct
could be proscribed by a properly drawn statute, and
whether or not he applied for a license.
-In substance his argument is that, because the apparatus
operates in a statutory context in which judicial review
may be too little and too late, the Maryland statute lacks
sufficient safeguards for confining the censor's action to
judicially determined constitutional limits, and therefore
contains the same vice as a statute delegating excessive
administrative discretion.
-The ability of the Censor Board to convict goes well
beyond their jurisdiction that it steps on the right to
freedom of expression.
-Applying the settled rule of our cases, we hold that a
noncriminal process which requires the prior submission
of a film to a censor avoids constitutional infirmity only if
it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to
obviate the dangers of a censorship system.
-First, the burden of proving that the film is unprotected
expression must rest on the censor. As we said in Speiser
v. Randall, "Where the transcendent value of speech is
involved, due process certainly requires . . . that the State
bear the burden of persuasion to show that the
appellants engaged in criminal speech." Second, while
the State may require advance submission of all films, in
order to proceed effectively to bar all showings of
unprotected films, the requirement cannot be
administered in a manner which would lend an effect of
finality to the censor's determination whether a film
constitutes protected expression. The teaching of our
cases is that, because only a judicial determination in an
adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to
freedom of expression, only a procedure requiring a
judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final
restraint.
-Therefore, the procedure must also assure a prompt
final judicial decision, to minimize the deterrent effect of
an interim and possibly erroneous denial of a license.
-It is readily apparent that the Maryland procedural
scheme does not satisfy these criteria. First, once the
censor disapproves the film, the exhibitor must assume
the burden of instituting judicial proceedings and of
persuading the courts that the film is protected
expression. Second, once the Board has acted against a
film, exhibition is prohibited pending judicial review,
however protracted. Under the statute, appellant could
have been convicted if he had shown the film after
unsuccessfully
seeking a license, even though no court had ever ruled
on the obscenity of the film. Third, it is abundantly clear
that the Maryland statute provides no assurance of
prompt judicial determination. We hold, therefore, that
appellant's conviction must be reversed. The Maryland
scheme fails to provide adequate safeguards against
undue inhibition of protected expression, and this
renders the 2 requirement of prior submission of films to
the Board an invalid previous restraint.
NEW YORK TIMES CO v. US
F: The New York Times and Washington Post were enjoined
from publishing contents of a highly-classified study entitled
"History of U.S. Decision- Making Process on Viet Nam
Policy." The lower courts who adjudged the cases for New
York and The Washington Post share the sentiments laid
down in Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe that: The
Government "thus carries a heavy burden of showing
justification for the imposition of such a restraint." Supreme
Court agrees.
Background story: The Nixon administration tried to repress
the leakage of pentagon papers as it criminalized and besmirch
the name and cause of Ellsberg.
I: W/N the prevention of the publication was legal
H: NO. The burden that the state bears to show justification
for the imposition of such restraint was not proved.
PEOPLE v. PEREZ
F: Perez was a municipal secretary of polar, Sorsogon. On
April 1 1922, he was engaged in a discussion with several
persons about the then administration where he said "we must
get bolos and cut off Wood's head for having recommended a
bad thing for the Philippines." He was charged in the Court of
First Instance of Sorsogon with a violation of article 256 of the
Penal Code having to do with contempt of ministers of the
Crown or other persons in authority. 2 witnesses were
presented for prosecution and 3 for defense. The two witnesses
reiterated that he did in fact say things in violation of Art. 256.
The witnesses to the defense said that prior to that there was
an altercation with a severo Madrid. The latter saying the lack
of independence and the situation of the Philippines is due to
the Nacionalista Party, while Perez retorted that it was
Governor-General Wood as the one in charge, who brought
the Philippines to its state.
I: W/N Perez should be convicted for the violation of Art 256
H: No. He should be convicted for violating Art 292,
committing acts of sedition. His words were not merely in
contempt of the crown and it's ministers. It was seditious (and
treasonous) in that it was inciting public disturbance.
-It is of course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act
No. 292 must not be interpreted so as to abridge the freedom
of speech and the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the Government for redress of grievances.
Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of
Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the
Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the
range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be
seditious. But when the intention and effect of the act is
seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech
and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive
measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted
authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and
the existence of the State.
DENNIS v. US
F: In1948, petitioners were indicted for the violation of the
conspiracy provisions of the Smith Act. The motion to quash
that consequently assails the constitutionality of the provisions
was dismissed both by lower court and the CA.
Section 2 makes unlawful the following acts: advocating,
teaching the duty or necessity to overthrow the government,
prining such materials for the advocacy, and to organize a
group or society that advocate the same.
Section 3 makes it unlawful to attempt to, conspire to, or
actually do acts prohibited in the provisions.
Petitioners were found conspiring to organize a Communist
Party, and teaching and advocating the teachings that tend
toward the overthrow of the government. The evidence
gathered amounted to 16,000 pages in record.
I: W/N the means employed, by Congress in enacting such
laws, were in conflict with the First Amendment
H: NO. We hold that 2 (a) (1), 2 (a) (3) and 3 of the Smith Act
do not inherently, or as construed or applied in the instant
case, violate the First Amendment and other provisions of the
Bill of Rights, or the First and Fifth Amendments because of
indefiniteness. Petitioners intended to overthrow the
Government of the United States as speedily as the
circumstances would permit. Their conspiracy to organize the
Communist Party and to teach and advocate the overthrow of
the Government of the United States by force and violence
created a "clear and present danger" of an attempt to
overthrow the Government by force and violence. They were
properly and constitutionally convicted for violation of the
Smith Act. The judgments of conviction are affirmed.
The law gives way to discussion, as what petitioners claim to
have been doing. The law only punishes the advocacy of
overthrowing the government. The basis of the First
Amendment is the hypothesis that speech can rebut speech,
propaganda will answer propaganda, free debate of ideas will
result in the wisest government policies.
-Justice Holmes: The question in every case is whether the
words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has the
right to prevent.
-The clear and present danger standard is not neat nor
mathematical, but like all verbalizations it is subject to
criticism on the score of indefiniteness.
-Success or the probability of success in overthrowing the
government should not be the criterion.
GONZALES v. COMELEC
F: An action for declaratory relief with preliminary injunction
was instigated by petitioners wherein the latter assails the
constitutionality of 2 new provisions in the Revised Election
code under RA 4880. The assailed provisions were described
to be limiting of the campaign period as well as allowing of
early nomination of candidates. Petitioner Gonzales came as a
Filipino citizen, taxpayer, and voter, where hi co-petitioner
Cabigao was running for Vice Mayor of Manila.
-In the answer of the respondent as well as its memorandum,
stress was laid on Republic Act No. 4880 as an exercise of the
police power of the state, designed to insure a free, orderly and
honest election by regulating "conduct which Congress has
determined harmful because if unrestrained and carried for a
long period before elections it necessarily entails huge
expenditures of funds on the part of the candidates,
precipitates violence and even deaths, results in the corruption
of the electorate, and inflicts direful consequences upon public
interest as the vital affairs of the country are sacrificed to
purely partisan pursuits." Evidently for respondent that would
suffice to meet the constitutional questions raised as to the
alleged infringement of free speech, free press, freedom of
assembly and freedom of association.
- Freedom of speech and of the press thus means something
more than the right to approve existing political beliefs or
economic arrangements, to lend support to official measures,
to take refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any matter
of public consequence. So atrophied, the right becomes
meaningless. The right belongs as well, if not more, for those
who question, who do not conform, who differ. To paraphrase
Justice Holmes, it is freedom for the thought that we hate, no
less than for the thought that agrees with us.
- Thus: "These are the 'clear and present danger' rule
and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, as interpreted in a
number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the
comment or utterance must be 'extremely serious
and the degree of imminence extremely high' before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be
guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be
prevented." It has the advantage of establishing according to
the above decision "a definite rule in constitutional law. It
provides the criterion as to what words may be published."
-The Cabansag case likewise referred to the other test, the
"dangerous tendency" rule and explained it thus: "If the
words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the
state has a right to prevent, then such words are
punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or
immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be
advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in
general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be
reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force,
violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency
and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the
substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent."
- ". . . the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall
before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time
to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to
avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be
applied is more speech, not enforced silence."
- The Bill of Rights as thus noted prohibits abridgment by law
of freedom of speech or of the press. It likewise extends the
same protection to the right of the people peaceably to
assemble. As was pointed out by Justice Malcolm in the case of
United States v. Bustos, 30 this right is a necessary
consequence of our republican institution and complements
the right of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of
citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public
affairs. From the same Bustos opinion: "Public policy, the
welfare of society, and the orderly administration of
government have demanded protection for public opinion."
I: W/N the provisions of RA 4880 are violative of the freedom
of speech and freedom to assemble
H: PARTLY YES. (But the provisions were not struck down)
Freedom to assemble VALID: the political parties are given
less freedom as to the time in choosing their representatives or
candidates because of the time limit imposed by the law. BUT
it does not curtail their other rights to assemble.
Freedom of speech VOID for VAGUENESS: to engage in an
election campaign or partisan political activity except during
the period of one hundred twenty days immediately preceding
an election involving a public office voted for at large and
ninety days immediately preceding an election for any other
elective public office. The term 'candidate' refers to any person
aspiring for or seeking an elective public office regardless of
whether or not said person has already filed his certificate of
candidacy or has been nominated by any political party as its
candidate. The term 'election campaign' of 'partisan political
activity' refers to acts designed to have a candidate elected or
not or promote the candidacy of a person or persons to a
public office . . ."
-More specifically, in terms of the permissible scope of
legislation that otherwise could be justified under the clear and
present danger doctrine, it is the considered opinion of the
majority, though lacking the necessary vote for an adjudication
of invalidity, that the challenged statute could have been more
narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more precisely
delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a
valid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine.
-It is undeniable, therefore, that even though the governmental
purposes be legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursued
by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties
when the end can be more narrowly achieved. For precision of
regulation is the touchstone in an area so closely related to our
most precious freedoms.
Under the circumstances then, a majority of the Court feels
compelled to view the statutory provisions in question as
unconstitutional on their face inasmuch as they appear to
range too widely and indiscriminately across the fundamental
liberties associated with freedom of the mind.
-that such provisions were deemed by the legislative body to
be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate response
not merely to a clear and present danger but to the actual
existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive
partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that
of late has invariably marred election campaigns and partisan
political activities in this country. He did invite our attention
likewise to the well-settled doctrine that in the choice of
remedies for an admitted malady requiring governmental
action, on the legislature primarily rests the responsibility. Nor
should the cure prescribed by it, unless clearly repugnant to
fundamental rights, be ignored or disregarded.
- We recognize the wide discretion accorded Congress to
protect vital interests. Considering the responsibility
incumbent on the judiciary, it is not always possible, even with
the utmost sympathy shown for the legislative choice of means
to cure an admitted evil, that the legislative judgment arrived
at, with its possible curtailment of the preferred freedoms, be
accepted uncritically. There may be times, and this is one of
them, with the majority, with all the respect to a coordinate
branch, unable to extend their approval to the aforesaid
specific provisions of one of the sections of the challenged
statute. The necessary two-third vote, however, not being
obtained, there is no occasion for the power to annul statutes
to come into play.
AYER PROD PYT LTD. V. JUDGE CAPULONG
F: Australian film maker and owner of Ayer Productions, Hal
McElroy, envisioned, sometime in 1987, the filming for
commercial viewing and for Philippine and international
release, the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA.
-The proposed motion picture would be essentially a
reenactment of the events that made possible the EDSA
revolution; it is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series
television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating
four (4) fictional characters interwoven with real events, and
utilizing actual documentary footage as background.
On 21 December 1987, private respondent Enrile replied that
"[he] would not and will not approve of the use,
appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or
picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or
television production, film or other medium for advertising or
commercial exploitation" and further advised petitioners that
"in the production, airing, showing, distribution or exhibition
of said or similar film, no reference whatsoever (whether
written, verbal or visual) should be made to [him] or any
member of his family, much less to any matter purely personal
to them." The petitioners obliged.
-However, Enrile had the crew and the production subject to a
preliminary injunction for his unwarranted involvement in the
film. Ayer answered that Enrile was not in fact included. The
court still issued a TRO partially enjoining the
implementation of the respondent Judge's Order of 16 March
1988 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued therein,
and allowing the petitioners to resume producing and filming
those portions of the projected mini-series which do not make
any reference to private respondent or his family or to any
fictitious character based on or bearing substantial
resemblance or similarity to or identifiable as private
respondent.
I: W/N petitioners right to freedom of speech is being
infringed
H:
-Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the
communication of ideas and the expression of the artistic
impulse.
-Succinctly put, the right of privacy cannot be invoked to resist
publication and dissemination of matters of public interest. 8
The interest sought to be protected by the right of privacy is
the right to be free from "unwarranted publicity, from the
wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an
individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public
concern."
- Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of
speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles of the
mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the
'balancing-of-interests test' (Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando on the Bill of Rights, 1970 ed., p. 79). The
principle 'requires a court to take conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests
observable in a given situation or type of situation.'
- Because of the preferred character of the constitutional rights
of freedom of speech and of expression, a weighty presumption
of invalidity vitiates measures of prior restraint upon the
exercise of such freedoms. 14 The invalidity of a measure of
prior restraint does not, of course, mean that no subsequent
liability may lawfully be imposed upon a person claiming to
exercise such constitutional freedoms.
- The subject matter of "The Four Day Revolution" relates to
the non-bloody change of government that took place at
Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in February 1986, and the train
of events, which led up to that denouement. Clearly, such
subject matter is one of public interest and concern.
-The extent of the intrusion upon the life of private respondent
Juan Ponce Enrile that would be entailed by the production
and exhibition of "The Four Day Revolution" would,
therefore, be limited in character. The extent of that intrusion,
as this Court understands the synopsis of the proposed film,
may be generally described as such intrusion as is reasonably
necessary to keep that film a truthful historical account.
Private respondent does not claim that petitioners threatened
to depict in "The Four Day Revolution" any part of the
private life of private respondent or that of any member of his
family.
- A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his
accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a
profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate
interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become
a 'public personage.'
Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at
least, their right of privacy.
- Private respondent is a "public figure" precisely because,
inter alia, of his participation as a principal actor in the
culminating events of the change of government in February
1986. Because his participation therein was major in
character, a film reenactment of the peaceful revolution that
fails to make reference to the role played by private respondent
would be grossly unhistorical.
- The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant
case between the constitutional freedom of speech and of
expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in
terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must
be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events.
There must, in other words, be no knowing or reckless
disregard of truth in depicting the participation of private
respondent in the EDSA Revolution. 16 There must, further,
be no presentation of the private life of the unwilling private
respondent and certainly no revelation of intimate or
embarrassing personal facts. 17 The proposed motion picture
should not enter into what Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera in
Lagunzad referred to as "matters of essentially private
concern." 18 To the extent that "The Four Day Revolution"
limits itself in portraying the participation of private
respondent in the EDSA Revolution to those events, which are
directly and reasonably related to the public facts of the EDSA
Revolution, the intrusion into private respondent's privacy
cannot be regarded as unreasonable and actionable. Such
portrayal may be carried out even without a license from
private respondent.
-Lawyers of Honasan and Enrile not charged of forum
shopping.
ADIONG v. COMELEC
F: 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347.
The provisions provide: It is unlawful to post in any place,
whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the
COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards, at the
campaign headquarters of the candidate or political party,
organization or coalition, or at the candidate's own residential
house or one of his residential houses, if he has more than one:
Provided, that such posters or election propaganda shall not
exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in size."
-Petitioner, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992
elections now assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it
prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places
like cars and other moving vehicles.
I: W/N COMELEC can prohibit the posting of decals and
stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit their
location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it
fixes.
H: NO.
-The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental
right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4,
Article III) There is no public interest substantial enough to
warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case.
- It is difficult to imagine how the other provisions of the Bill of
Rights and the right to free elections may be guaranteed if the
freedom to speak and to convince or persuade is denied and
taken away.
-The so-called balancing of interests individual freedom on
one hand and substantial public interests on the other is
made even more difficult in election campaign cases because
the Constitution also gives specific authority to the
Commission on Elections to supervise the conduct of free,
honest, and orderly elections.
-When faced with border line situations where freedom to
speak by a candidate or party and freedom to know on the
part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for
maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials
and COMELEC should lean in favor of freedom. For in the
ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the State's
power to regulate are not antagonistic. There can be no free
and honest elections if in the efforts to maintain them, the
freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly curtailed.
-The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars
and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial
government interest. There is no clear public interest
threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of
the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression.
Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the
danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil
sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a
clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled.
-For these reasons any attempt to restrict those liberties must
be justified by clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully
or remotely, but by clear and present danger. The rational
connection between the remedy provided and the evil to be
curbed, which in other context might support legislation
against attack on due process grounds, will not suffice. These
rights rest on firmer foundation. Accordingly, whatever
occasion would restrain orderly discussion and persuasion, at
appropriate time and place, must have clear support in public
danger, actual or impending. Only the greatest abuses,
endangering permanent interests, give occasion for permissible
limitation.
-Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the
question prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or
the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an
individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his
car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be
furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to
have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a
statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody
else.
-A statute is considered void for overbreadth when "it offends
the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to
control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms."
-The resolution prohibits the posting of decals and stickers not
more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and
fourteen (14) inches in length in any place, including mobile
places whether public or private except in areas designated by
the COMELEC. Verily, the restriction as to where the decals
and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses
even citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-
owned vehicle.
-The provisions allowing regulations are so loosely worded that
they include the posting of decals or stickers in the privacy of
one's living room or bedroom.
-In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on
"mobile" places whether public or private except in the
authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes
censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution.
SWS v. COMELEC
F: RA 9006 is being assailed by petitioners for section 5.4
which PROHIBITED the publication of surveys affecting
national candidates fifteen days before an election, and surveys
affecting local candidates seven days before an election, was a
prior restraint on the exercise of the freedom of speech without
any clear and present danger to justify such restraint.
Petitioner is a private non-stock, non-profit social research
institution conducting surveys in various fields, including
economics, politics, demography, and social development, and
thereafter processing, analyzing, and publicly reporting the
results thereof.
-Election surveys refer to the measurement of opinions and
perceptions of the voters as regards a candidate's popularity,
qualifications, platforms or a matter of public discussion in
relation to the election, including voters' preference for
candidates or publicly discussed issues during the campaign
period (hereafter referred to as "Survey").
I: W/N section 5.4 is unconstitutionally violating freedom of
speech.
H: YES. 5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint
on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total
suppression of a category of expression even though such
suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved
by means other than the suppression of freedom of expression.
-It lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression, and
the press by prohibiting the publication of election survey
results affecting candidates within the prescribed periods of
fifteen (15) days immediately preceding a national election and
seven (7) days before a local election. Because of the preferred
status of the constitutional rights of speech, expression, and the
press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of
invalidity. Indeed, "any system of prior restraints of expression
comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity. . . . The Government 'thus carries a
heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of
such restraint.'" 3 There is thus a reversal of the normal
presumption of validity that inheres in every legislation.
-OBRIEN TEST- A government regulation is sufficiently
justified:
[1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government;
[2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest;
[3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression; and
[4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms [of speech, expression and press] is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest, it should be invalidated if
such governmental interest is "not unrelated to the suppression
of free expression."
-5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while
allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same
subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV
commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion makers.
In effect, 5.4 shows a bias for a particular subject matter, if
not viewpoint, by preferring personal opinion to statistical
results.
-The prohibition may be for a limited time, but the
curtailment of the right of expression is direct, absolute, and
substantial. It constitutes a total suppression of a category of
speech and is not made less so because it is only for a period of
fifteen (15) days immediately before a national election and
seven (7) days immediately before a local election.
DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v. COMELEC
F: 2013, posted two tarpaulins within their property but was
within public view. One said ibasura ang RH Law, and the
other presented a classification, coined Conscience Vote, of
the candidates who were either TEAM BUHAY and
TEAM PATAY. The size of the tarps were 6x10 ft.
The tarps werent sponsored by any candidate.
- Majarucon, in her capacity as Election Officer of Bacolod
City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials for
being oversized (requirements for campaign materials were
2x3), within 3 days. Petitioners asked to be given a specific
provision from COMELEC law and that while pending, they
be given the freedom to continue displaying. Court issued a
TRO.
-In fear of being subject to prosecution, petitioners submitted a
writ of certiorari and prohibition.
I: 1. W/N the letters sent to petitioners were final and
executory, determining the jurisdiction of the court to try
2. W/N the hierarchy of courts was violated
3. W/N the COMELEC had any jurisdiction at all with its
acts threatening imminent criminal action effectively abridging
meaningful political speech
H: 1. The letters were enforcing a law, which is the subject
matter of the case. The court can determine whether those
laws are impeding the exercise of fundamental rights.
Political Question: to be sure, the force to impugn the
jurisdiction of this Court becomes more feeble in light of the
new Constitution which expanded the definition of judicial
power as including "the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."
2. NO. The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad
rule. A direct resort to this court is allowed when there are
genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at
the most immediate time.
3.NO. Respondents considered the tarpaulin as a campaign
material in their issuances. The above provisions regulating
the posting of campaign materials only apply to candidates
and political parties, and petitioners are neither of the two.
-These provisions show that election propaganda refers to
matter done by or on behalf of and in coordination with
candidates and political parties. The tarps werent paid for by
any candidate.
-In the case at bar, petitioners lost their ability to give a
commentary on the candidates for the 2013 national elections
because of the COMELEC notice and letter. It was not merely
a regulation on the campaigns of candidates vying for public
office.
-Communication exists when "(1) a speaker, seeking to signal
others, uses conventional actions because he or she reasonably
believes that such actions will be taken by the audience in the
manner intended; and (2) the audience so takes the actions."
"[I]n communicative action[,] the hearer may respond to the
claims by . . . either accepting the speech act's claims or
opposing them with criticism or requests for justification."
Speech is not limited to vocal communication. "[C]onduct is
treated as a form of speech sometimes referred to as 'symbolic
speech[,]'" such that "'when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements
are combined in the same course of conduct,' the
'communicative element' of the conduct may be 'sufficient to
bring into play the [right to freedom of expression].'"
-We distinguish between political and commercial speech.
Political speech refers to speech "both intended and received
as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue," 200
"foster[ing] informed and civic-minded deliberation." 201 On
the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech
that does "no more than propose a commercial transaction."
The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is,
however, definitely political speech.
-While the tarpaulin may influence the success or
failure of the named candidates and political parties,
this does not necessarily mean it is election
propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or
posted "in return for consideration" by any
candidate, political party, or party-list group.
-"speech serves one of its greatest public purposes in the
context of elections when the free exercise thereof informs the
people what the issues are, and who are supporting what
issues."
-The right to freedom of expression is indeed not absolute.
Even some forms of protected speech are still subject to some
restrictions. The degree of restriction may depend on whether
the regulation is content-based or content-neutral. 223
Content-based regulations can either be based on the
viewpoint of the speaker or the subject of the expression.
-Size limitations during elections hit at a core part of
expression. The content of the tarpaulin is not easily divorced
from the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of
invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present danger
rule as measure. 228 Thus, in Chavez v. Gonzales:
A content-based regulation, however, bears a heavy
presumption of invalidity and is measured against the clear
and present danger rule. The latter will pass constitutional
muster only if justified by a compelling reason, and the
restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor vague. 229
(Citations omitted)
-Large tarpaulins, therefore, are not analogous to time and
place. They are fundamentally part of expression protected
under Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution.
-Because of that, the size regulation is not unrelated to the
suppression of speech. Limiting the maximum size of the
tarpaulin would render ineffective petitioners' message and
violate their right to exercise freedom of expression. (in
violation of the OBrien test)
xxx
-In an equality-based approach, "politically disadvantaged
speech prevails over regulation[,] but regulation promoting
political equality prevails over speech."
-Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be
constitutionally valid if it reaches into speech of persons who
are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a
political party if they are not candidates, only if what is
regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for
its principal object the endorsement of a candidate only. The
regulation
(a) should be provided by law,
(b) reasonable,
(c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the
opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the
primacy of the guarantee of free expression, and
(d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that
object.
The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place,
and manner of the rendition of the message. In no situation
may the speech be prohibited or censored on the basis of its
content. For this purpose, it will not matter whether the speech
is made with or on private property.
-Even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the
tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their
right to use their property is likewise protected by the
Constitution.
-Freedom of expression can be intimately related
with the right to property. There may be no
expression when there is no place where the
expression may be made. COMELEC's infringement
upon petitioners' property rights as in the present
case also reaches out to infringement on their
fundamental right to speech.
-With all due respect to the Catholic faithful, the church
doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this
court.
-Embedded in the tarpaulin, however, are opinions expressed
by petitioners. It is a species of expression protected by our
fundamental law. It is an expression designed to invite
attention, cause debate, and hopefully, persuade. It may be
motivated by the interpretation of petitioners of their
ecclesiastical duty, but their parishioner's actions will have very
real secular consequences.
1-UNITED v. COMELEC
SWS v. COMELEC
F: In Feb 2013, SWS and Pulse Asia conducted a survey,
asking voters which senators they would vote for if on the day
of the survey, it was the day of casting votes.
-Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) Resolution No. 9674
directed Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) and Pulse Asia,
Inc. (Pulse Asia), as well as "other survey firms of similar
circumstance" 4 to submit to COMELEC the names of all
commissioners and payors of all surveys published from
February 12, 2013 to April 23, 2013, including those of their
"subscribers." -theory of a free-will effect where "voters cast their ballots to
-Tiangco recounted that on February 28, 2013, he wrote to
SWS requesting, among others, that he "be furnished the
identity of persons who paid for the [pre-election survey
conducted from February 15 to February 17, 2013] as well as
those who subscribed to it." 12 Sometime in March 2013,
SWS supposedly replied to Tiangco, "furnishing [him] with
some particulars about the survey but [without] disclos[ing]
the identity of the persons who commissioned or subscribed to
the survey."
-COMELEC issued the resolution ordering the survey firms to
release the names of all commissioners and payors of the
surveys.
-In the letter 24 dated April 30, 2013, SWS and Pulse Asia
informed COMELEC Chairman Brillantes that they had not
received a copy of Resolution No. 9674. They also articulated
their view that Resolution No. 9674 was tainted with
irregularities, having been issued ultra vires (i.e., in excess of
what the Fair Election Act allows) and in violation of the non-
impairment of contracts clause of the Constitution. They also
expressed their intention to bring the matter before this court
on account of these supposed irregularities. Thus, they
requested that COMELEC defer or hold in abeyance
Resolution No. 9674's enforcement.
-COMELEC issued a notice enforcing the resolution, and a
subsequent subpoena for a criminal case.
-The survey firms uphold that they never received any of the
documents pertaining to the decision of the COMELEC and
the subsequent criminal action filed against them.
-Petitioners file for a TRO, and they were given the chance to
file their own Memoranda.
I: 1./W/N the Petitioners rights to due process were violated.
2. W/N it was beyond the jurisdiction of COMELEC to ask
for the names of the commissioners and payors of the surveys
H: 1. YES. The petitioners were not given any copies of the
Resolution and criminal complaint.
2.___. Congress . . . give[s] highest priority to the enactment of
measures that . . . reduce . . . political inequalities . . . by
equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common
good."
-The inclusion of election surveys in the list of items regulated
by the Fair Election Act is a recognition that election surveys
are not a mere descriptive aggregation of data. Publishing
surveys are a means to shape the preference of voters, inform
the strategy of campaign machineries, and ultimately, affect
the outcome of elections. Election surveys have a similar
nature as election propaganda. They are expensive, normally
paid for by those interested in the outcome of elections, and
have tremendous consequences on election results.
-bandwagon effect "electors rally to support the
candidate leading in the polls."
-underdog effect where "electors rally to support the candidate
trailing in the polls."
-motivating effect where "individuals who had not intended to
vote are persuaded to do so,"
-demotivating effect where "voters abstain from voting out of
certainty that their candidate or party will win.
-behavior known as strategic voting where "voting is
influenced by the chances of winning[.]"
prove the polls wrong[.]"
-There is a self-aggrandizement scheme in politics that gives
the elite the upper hand.
-It is necessary that the Fair Election Act be
appreciated for what it is: a mechanism for ensuring
equality.
-IN AN EQUALITY-BASED APPROACH,
"POLITICALLY DISADVANTAGED SPEECH
PREVAILS OVER REGULATION[,] BUT
REGULATION PROMOTING POLITICAL EQUALITY
PREVAILS OVER SPEECH."
-Concededly, what is involved here is not election propaganda
per se. Election surveys, on their face, do not state or allude to
preferred candidates. As a means, election surveys are
ambivalent. To an academician, they are an aggrupation of
data. To a journalist, they are matters for reportage. To a
historian, they form part of a chronicle. Election surveys thus
become unambiguous only when viewed in relation to the end
for which they are employed. To those whose end is to get a
candidate elected, election surveys, when limited to their own
private consumption, are a means to formulate strategy. When
published, however, the tendency to shape voter preferences
comes into play. In this respect, published election surveys
partake of the nature of election propaganda. It is then
declarative speech in the context of an electoral
campaign properly subject to regulation.
-WHILE IT DOES REGULATE EXPRESSION (I.E.,
PETITIONERS' PUBLICATION OF ELECTION
SURVEYS), IT DOES NOT GO SO FAR AS TO
SUPPRESS DESIRED EXPRESSION. THERE IS
NEITHER PROHIBITION NOR CENSORSHIP
SPECIFICALLY AIMED AT ELECTION SURVEYS. THE
FREEDOM TO PUBLISH ELECTION SURVEYS
REMAINS. ALL RESOLUTION NO. 9674 DOES IS
ARTICULATE A REGULATION AS REGARDS THE
MANNER OF PUBLICATION, THAT IS, THAT THE
DISCLOSURE OF THOSE WHO COMMISSIONED
AND/OR PAID FOR, INCLUDING THOSE
SUBSCRIBED TO, PUBLISHED ELECTION SURVEYS
MUST BE MADE.
-Petitioners' free speech rights must be weighed in relation to
the Fair Election Act's purpose of ensuring political equality
and, therefore, the speech of others who want to participate
unencumbered in our political spaces. On one hand, there are
petitioners' right to publish and publications which are
attended by the interests of those who can employ published
data to their partisan ends.
-This case does not involve a "capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable" 140 regulation. We have demonstrated that not
only an important or substantial state interest, but even a
compelling one anchors Resolution No. 9674's requirement of
disclosing subscribers to election surveys. It effects the
constitutional policy of "guarantee[ing] equal access to
opportunities for public service" 141 and is impelled by the
imperative of "fair" elections.
DAVAO CITY v. ARANJUEZ
F: Petitioner Davao City Water District (DCWD) is a
government-owned and controlled corporation in Davao City
represented by its General Manager Engr. Rodora N.
Gamboa (GM Gamboa). Petitioners are officers and members
of Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Davao City Water District
(NAMADACWAD). They were charged with several
administrative cases due to acts committed during the
anniversary celebration of DCWD such as wearing of t-shirts
with inscriptions "CNA Incentive Ihatag Na, Dir. Braganza
Pahawa Na!" and posting of bond papers outside the
designated places. The inscriptions and postings bore
employees' grievances. Said officers have been found prior to
said stunt to have staged pickets, airing their grievances about
the non-payment of their Collective Negotiation Payment.
-As a consequence of their actions, GM Gamboa sent a
Memorandum dated 14 November 2007 addressed to the
officers and members of NAMADACWAD, requiring them to
explain the reasons for the attire they wore during the
anniversary celebration. Through a collective letter dated 19
November 2007, the officers and members explained that the
Memorandum only required the employees to wear any sports
attire, though theirs were with additional inscriptions
containing grievances. They countered that the inscriptions
were but manifestations of their constitutional rights of free
speech and freedom of expression. Administrative cases were
filed against them for the violation of civil service laws.
Respondent filed an MR. He then filed for the violation of
fundamental and constitutional rights with the CSC.
CSC said the act of wearing the t-shirts werent punishable
since it doesnt fall within the ambit of prohibited mass action
for there was no stoppage of work. However, posting papers of
their grievances were in violation of the office rules. . On the
other hand, and contrary to the assertions of DCWD, the
violations committed by the private respondents are not
serious in nature due to the lack of any abusive, vulgar,
defamatory or libelous language. CA affirmed and said: The
appellate court was likewise in agreement with the CSC which
considered as simple violation of office rules the posting of
banners outside the designated posting areas by Cagula. Also
like the CSC, it ruled that such offense is not punishable with
the penalty of dismissal. DCWD now files this petition with the
SC.
I: W/N CA erred in determining the officers to be at fault and
in violation of Resolution No. 021316
H: NO. Resolution 021316 provides a specific guideline as to
what constitutes a prohibited concerted activity. A prohibited
concerted activity must be one undertaken by government
employees, by themselves or through their association, with
the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption, in
order to realize their demands or force concessions.
-Though the appeal before the CSC lacked a notice of appeal
as required by CSC Resolution No. 991936 or the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(URACCS), 27 the Consolidated Memorandum filed by the
private respondents was enough to be considered as a
sufficient compliance with the rules.
-When substantial justice dictates it, procedural rules may be
relaxed in order to arrive at a just disposition of a case.
-The operative phrases are "any collective activity" and "work
stoppage or service disruption." Without the intent at work
stoppage or service disruption, the concerted activity is not
prohibited.
-It is clear that the collective activity of joining the fun run in t-
shirts with inscriptions on CNA incentives was not to effect
work stoppage or disrupt the service. As pointed out by the
respondents, they followed the advice of GM Gamboa "to be
there" at the fun run. Respondents joined, and did not disrupt
the fun run. They were in sports attire that they were allowed,
nay required, to wear. Else, government employees would be
deprived of their constitutional right to freedom of expression.
-Pursuant to this mandate, the former General Manager of
DCWD issued an office memorandum designating the bulletin
board at the motorpool area below the Office of the
Purchasing Division and the side of the office building beside
the guard house where the bundy clock is located as the
designated areas for posting of grievances. 45 Clearly, the
DCWD Office Memorandum hews close and faithfully to MC
No. 33. It is a reasonable rule issued by the heads of the
agencies in order to regulate posting of grievances of the
employees.
-It is correct to conclude that those who enter government
service are subjected to a different degree of limitation on their
freedom to speak their mind; however, it is not tantamount to
the relinquishment of their constitutional right of expression
otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of their
employment. 45 Unarguably, a citizen who accepts public
employment "must accept certain limitations on his or her
freedom." But there are some rights and freedoms so
fundamental to liberty that they cannot be bargained away in
a contract for public employment. It is the Court's
responsibility to ensure that citizens are not deprived of these
fundamental rights by virtue of working for the government.
-Thus, in line with the civil service rules and jurisprudence, we
conclude that a violation of an office memorandum, which was
issued as an internal rule to regulate the area for posting of
grievances inside the office premise, is only a light offense
punishable by reprimand.
RUBIN v. COORS BREWING
F: Because 5(e)(2) of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act
(FAAA or Act) prohibits beer labels from displaying alcohol
content, the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
(BATF) rejected respondent brewer's application for approval
of proposed labels that disclosed such content. Respondent
filed suit for relief on the ground that the relevant provisions of
the Act violated the First Amendment's protection of
commercial speech. The Government argued that the labeling
ban was necessary to suppress the threat of "strength wars"
among brewers, who, without the regulation, would seek to
compete in the marketplace based on the potency of their
beer. The District Court invalidated the labeling ban, and the
Court of Appeals affirmed. Although the latter court found
that the Government's interest in suppressing "strength wars"
was "substantial," the court held that the ban violates the First
Amendment because it fails to advance that interest in a direct
and material way.
I: W/N the FAAA was in violation of commercial speech
H: YES. We conclude that the ban infringes respondent's
freedom of speech, and we therefore affirm.
-For commercial speech to come within [the First
Amendment], it at least must concern lawful activity and not
be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted
governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield
positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation
directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest."
-The Government identifies two interests it considers
sufficiently "substantial" to justify 205(e)(2)'s labeling ban. First,
the Government contends that 205(e)(2) advances Congress'
goal of curbing "strength wars" by beer brewers who might
seek to compete for customers on the basis of alcohol content.
-THE GENERAL THRUST OF FEDERAL ALCOHOL
POLICY APPEARS TO FAVOR GREATER
DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION, RATHER THAN
LESS.
-The Government here has a significant interest in protecting
the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens by preventing
brewers from competing on the basis of alcohol strength,
which could lead to greater alcoholism and its attendant social
costs. Both panels of the Court of Appeals that heard this case
concluded that the goal of suppressing strength wars
constituted a substantial interest, and we cannot say that their
conclusion is erroneous. We have no reason to think that
strength wars, if they were to occur, would not produce the
type of social harm that the Government hopes to prevent.
-One State's decision to permit brewers to disclose alcohol
content on beer labels will not preclude neighboring States
from effectively banning such disclosure of that information
within their borders.
- IT DID NOT PASS THE TEST OF THE
GOVERNMENT INTERESTS FURTHERED WITH
REASONABLE MEANS EMPLOYED.
-As only 18 States at best prohibit disclosure of content in
advertisements, App. to Brief for Respondent 1a-12a, brewers
remain free to disclose alcohol content in advertisements, but
not on labels, in much of the country. The failure to prohibit
the disclosure of alcohol content in advertising, which would
seem to constitute a more influential weapon in any strength
war than labels, makes no rational sense if the government's
true aim is to suppress strength wars.
-Other provisions of the FAAA and its regulations similarly
undermine 205(e)(2)'s efforts to prevent strength wars. While
205(e)(2) bans the disclosure of alcohol content on beer labels,
it allows the exact opposite in the case of wines and spirits.
Thus, distilled spirits may contain statements of alcohol
content, 27 CFR 5.37 (1994), and such disclosures are
required for wines with more than 14 percent alcohol, 27 CFR
4.36 (1994). If combatting strength wars were the goal, we
would assume that Congress would regulate disclosure of
alcohol content for the strongest beverages as well as for the
weakest ones.
-Even if 205(e)(2) did meet the Edenfield standard, it would
still not survive First Amendment scrutiny because the
Government's regulation of speech is not sufficiently tailored to
its goal. The Government argues that a sufficient "fit" exists
here because the labeling ban applies to only one product
characteristic and because the ban does not prohibit all
disclosures of alcohol content - it applies only to those
involving labeling and advertising.
POLICARPIO v. MANILA TIMES
F: Policarpio, a member of the Philippine Bar and was also
executive secretary of the local UNESCO National
Commission., seeks to recover moral, exemplary and
correctional damages for the publication in the Saturday
Mirror of August 11, 1956, and in The Daily Mirror of August
13, 1956, of two (2) articles or news items which are claimed to
be per se defamatory, libelous and false, and to have exposed
her to ridicule, jeopardized her integrity, good name and
business and official transactions, and caused her grave
embarrassment, untold and extreme moral, mental and
physical anguish and incalculable material, moral, professional
and business damages.
The subject of grievance comes from a strained relationship
with a subordinate, Reyes who is a confidential assistant. She
filed charges against Reyes that caused the latters separation
from UNESCO. Ryes filed counter-charges for alleged
malversation of public funds and another complaint for alleged
estafa thru falsification of public documents. It was scheduled
for investigation. Saturday Mirror and The Daily Mirror
published the same articles with her picture.
Plaintiff alleges that the portions "WOMAN OFFICIAL
SUED" and "PCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO ON FRAUD"
are not true. Similarly, the statement in the first paragraph of
the article, to the effect that plaintiff "was charged with
malversation and estafa in complaints filed with the city fiscal's
office by the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission"
otherwise known as PCAC is untrue, the complaints for
said offenses having been filed by Miss Reyes. Neither is it true
that said "criminal action was initiated as a result of current
administrative investigation" as stated in the second paragraph
of the same article. Plaintiff maintains that the effect of these
false statements was to give the general impression that said
investigation by Col. Alba had shown that plaintiff was guilty,
or, at least, probably guilty of the crimes aforementioned, and
that, as a consequence, the PCAC had filed the corresponding
complaints with the city fiscal's office.
I: W/N The defendants published in bad faith
H: YES.
-Again, it is obvious that the filing of criminal complaints with
the city fiscal's office by another agency of the Government,
like the PCAC, particularly after an investigation conducted
by the same, imparts the idea that the probability of guilt on
the part of the accused is greater than when the complaints are
filed by a private individual, specially when the latter is a
former subordinate of the alleged offender, who was
responsible for the dismissal of the complainant from her
employment. It is only too apparent that the article published
on August 11, 1956, presented the plaintiff in a more
unfavorable light than she actually was.
It goes without saying that newspapers must enjoy a certain
degree of discretion in determining the manner in which a
given event should be presented to the public, and the
importance to be attached thereto as a news item, and that its
presentation in a sensational manner is not per se illegal.
NEWSPAPER MAY PUBLISH NEWS ITEMS RELATIVE
TO JUDICIAL, LEGISLATIVE OR OTHER OFFICIAL
PROCEEDINGS, WHICH ARE NOT OF
CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, BECAUSE THE PUBLIC IS
ENTITLED TO KNOW THE TRUTH WITH RESPECT
TO SUCH PROCEEDINGS, WHICH, BEING OFFICIAL
AND NON-CONFIDENTIAL, ARE OPEN TO PUBLIC
CONSUMPTION. BUT, TO ENJOY IMMUNITY, A
PUBLICATION CONTAINING DEROGATORY
INFORMATION MUST BE NOT ONLY TRUE, BUT,
ALSO, FAIR, AND IT MUST BE MADE IN GOOD
FAITH AND WITHOUT ANY COMMENTS OR
REMARKS.
-In the case at bar, aside from containing information
derogatory to the plaintiff, the article published on August 11,
1956, presented her in a worse predicament than that in which
she, in fact, was. In other words, said article was not a fair and
true report of the proceedings therein alluded to.
-Defendants maintain that their alleged malice in publishing
the news items in question has not been established by the
plaintiff. However, Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code,
provides:
"Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious,
even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for
making it is shown, except in the following cases:
"1. A private communication made by any person to
another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty;
and
"2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without
any comments or remarks of any judicial, legislative or other
official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of
any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings,
or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise
of other functions."
LOPEZ v. CA
F: Petitioner Lopez is the owner of The Manila Chronicle. On
January 1956, an article was published front page about a a
sanitary inspector assigned to the Babuyan Islands, Fidel Cruz
sending a distress signal to a passing United States Airforce
plane which in turn relayed the message to Manila. He was
not ignored, an American Army plane dropping on the beach
of an island an emergency-sustenance kit containing, among
other things, a two-way radio set. He utilized it to inform
authorities in Manila that the people in the place were living in
terror, due to a series of killings committed since Christmas of
1995. Losing no time, the Philippines defense establishment
rushed to the island a platoon of scout rangers led by Major
Wilfredo Encarnacion. Upon arriving at the reported killer-
menaced Babuyan Claro, however, Major Encarnacion and
his men found, instead of the alleged killers, a man, the same
Fidel Cruz, who merely wanted transportation home to
Manila. In view of this finding, Major Wilfredo Encarnacion
branded as a "hoax," to use his own descriptive word, the
report of Fidel Cruz. That was the term employed by the other
newspapers when referring to the above-mentioned incident
-The newspaper then edited by petitioner Juan T. Gatbonton,
devoted a pictorial article to it in its issue of January 15, 1956.
Mention was made that while Fidel Cruz story turned out to
be false, if brought to light the misery of the people living in
that place, with almost everybody sick, only two individuals
able to read and write, food and clothing being scarce. Then
in the January 29, 1956 issue of This Week Magazine, the
"January News Quiz" included an item on the central figure in
what was known as the Calayan Hoax, who nevertheless did
the country a good turn by calling the government's attention
to that forsaken and desolate corner of the Republic.
-The magazine on both occasions carried photographs of the
person purporting to be Fidel Cruz. Unfortunately, the
pictures that were published on both occasions were that of
private respondent Fidel G. Cruz, a businessman-contractor
from Santa Maria, Bulacan.
- The newspaper sent out a correction, however.
I: W/N the petitioners are liable for libel
H:YES
-It is on the freedom of the press that petitioners would stake
their case to demonstrate that no action for libel would lie
arising from the publication of the picture of respondent Cruz
identified as responsible for the hoax of the year, when such
was not the case at all. It is easily understandable why. No
liability would be incurred if it could be demonstrated that it
comes within the wellnigh all-embracing scope of freedom of
the press. Included therein is the widest latitude of choice as to
what items should see the light of day so long as they are
relevant to a Matter of public interest, the insistence on the
requirement as to its truth yielding at times to unavoidable
inaccuracies attendant on newspapers and other publications
being subject to the tyranny of deadlines.
-"Publication of a person's photograph in connection with an
article libelous of a third person, is a libel on the person whose
picture is published, where the acts set out in the article are
imputed to such person." 8 In support of the above statement,
he made reference to several cases. 9 Other decisions to the
same effect have been promulgated since the fourth edition of
Newell published in 1924. 10 Why libel law has both a
criminal and a civil aspect is explained by Hale in his Law of
the Press thus: "On the one hand, libeling a person results in
depriving him of his good reputation. Since reputation is a
thing; of value, truly rather to be chosen than great riches, an
impairment of it is a personal wrong.
-"The interest of society and the maintenance of good
government demand a full discussion of public affairs.
Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is
a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its
probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life
may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation: the
wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A
public officer must not to be too thin-skinned with reference to
comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence
and dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism
does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as an individual
is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for
the common good."
-"SO LONG AS IT IS DONE IN GOOD FAITH,
NEWSPAPERS HAVE THE LEGAL RIGHT TO HAVE
AND EXPRESS OPINIONS ON LEGAL QUESTIONS.
TO DENY THEM THAT RIGHT WOULD INFRINGE
UPON THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS."
-A newspaper, it is stressed, "should not be held to account to
a point of suppression for honest mis takes or imperfection in
the choice of words."
BUT
-there is the added requirement of reasonable care imposed by
such decision which from the facts here found, appeared not to
be satisfied. It cannot be concluded then that the plea of
petitioners is sufficiently persuasive. The mandate of press
freedom is not ignored, but here it does not speak
unequivocally. It is not decisive of the basic issue. By itself, it
does not have a controlling significance.

MILLER v. CALIFORNIA
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GONZALES v/ KALAW-KATIGBAK
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PITA v. CA
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I:
H:

BAYAN v. ERMITA
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H: