Beastly Notes
Nuguid v. Nuguid
Facts: Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate.
Surviving her were her legitimate parents Felix and Paz, and 6
brothers and sisters.
Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly
executed by Rosario instituting the former as the sole, universal heir
of all her properties. She prayed that said will be admitted to probate
and that letter of administration be issued to her.
Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that
by the institution of Remedios as universal heir of the deceased,
oppositors who are compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line
were illegally preterited and that in consequence, the institution is
void.
Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir.
Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective
disinheritance rather than one of preterition drawing the conclusion
that Article 854 does not apply in the case at bar.
Issue: WON the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as
the sole, universal heir preterited the compulsory heirs.
Held: Yes. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or
illegitimate, but she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her
parents, and her holographic will does not explicitly disinherit them
but simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of preterition
of the parents, not a case of ineffective disinheritance.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced
heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned
therein, or, through mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor
are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance, in turn, is a testamentary
disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime
1
for a cause authorized by law.
Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole,
universal heir and preterits the parents of the testatrix, and it contains
no specific legacies or bequests, such universal institution of
petitioner, by itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.
ORIGINAL:
Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on Dec 30, 1962,
single, without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her
were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid,
and 6 brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios,
Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the CFI of
Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on
Nov 17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed
that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of administration
with the will annexed be issued to her.
On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid,
concededly the legitimate father and mother of the deceased Rosario
Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground
therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of petitioner Remedios
Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors who are
compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line
were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is
void.
On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for
probate and objection thereto, oppositors moved to dismiss on the
ground of absolute preterition.
On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the
motion to dismiss.
The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question
is a complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of
Beastly Notes
the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition without
costs.
A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came
to this Court on appeal.
1. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our
attention. The case is for the probate of a will. The court's area of
inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the
extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's
testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be
presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said court at this
stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic
validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any
devise or legacy therein.1
A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside
the question of whether or not the will should be allowed probate. For
them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the will.
Normally, this comes only after the court has declared that the will
has been duly authenticated.2 But petitioner and oppositors, in the
court below and here on appeal, travelled on the issue of law, to wit:
Is the will intrinsically a nullity?
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of
the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be
protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of
probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case
will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic
validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense,
plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that
induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of
the validity of the provisions of the will in question. 3
After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.
2. Petitioner's sole assignment of error challenges the correctness of
the conclusion below that the will is a complete nullity. This exacts
from us a study of the disputed will and the applicable statute.
Reproduced hereunder is the will:
2
Nov. 17, 1951
I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and
memory, having amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby
give, devise, and bequeath all of the property which I may have when
I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with
me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name
this seventh day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.
(Sgd.) Illegible
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID
The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil
Code which, in part, provides:
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious. ...
Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is a
reproduction of Article 814 of the Civil Code of Spain of 1889, which
is similarly herein copied, thus
Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct
line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born
after the death of the testator, shall void the institution of heir; but the
legacies and betterments4 shall be valid, in so far as they are not
inofficious. ...
A comprehensive understanding of the term preterition employed in
the law becomes a necessity. On this point Manresa comments:
La pretericion consiste en omitar al heredero en el testamento. O no se le
nombra siquiera o aun nombrandole como padre, hijo, etc., no se le instituya
heredero ni se le deshereda expresamente ni se le asigna parte alguna de
los bienes, resultando privado de un modo tacito de su derecho a legitima.
Para que exista pretericion, con arreglo al articulo 814, basta que en el
testamento omita el testador a uno cualquiera de aquellos a quienes por su
muerte corresponda la herencia forzosa.
Se necesita, pues, a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso. b)
Beastly Notes
Que la omision sea completa; que el heredero forzoso nada reciba en el
testamento.
It may now appear trite bat nonetheless helpful in giving us a clear
perspective of the problem before us, to have on hand a clear-cut
definition of the word annul:
To "annul" means to abrogate, to make void ... In re Morrow's Estate,
54 A. 342, 343, 204 Pa. 484.6
The word "annul" as used in statute requiring court to annul alimony
provisions of divorce decree upon wife's remarriage means to reduce
to nothing; to annihilate; obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no
effect; to nullify; to abolish. N.J.S.A. 2:50 38 (now N.J.S. 2A:34-
35). Madden vs. Madden, 40 A. 2d 611, 614, 136 N..J Eq. 132. 7
ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or
of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with. Ex parte Mitchell,
123 W. Va. 283, 14 S.E. 2d. 771, 774.8
And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario
Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left
forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors
Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely omits
both of them: They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly,
they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly
disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. Such preterition in the
words of Manresa "anulara siempre la institucion de heredero, dando
caracter absoluto a este ordenamiento referring to the mandate of
Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code.9 The one-sentence will here
institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir nothing more. No
specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this
posture that we say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario
Nuguid died intestate. Says Manresa:
En cuanto a la institucion de heredero, se anula. Lo que se anula deja de
existir, en todo o en parte? No se aade limitacion alguna, como en el
articulo 851, en el que se expresa que se anulara la institucion de heredero
en cuanto prejudique a la legitima del deseheredado Debe, pues,
entenderse que la anulacion es completa o total, y que este articulo como
especial en el caso que le motiva rige con preferencia al 817. 10
3
The same view is expressed by Sanchez Roman:
La consecuencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institucion de heredero por
pretericion de uno, varios o todos los forzosos en linea recta, es la apertura
de la sucesion intestada total o parcial. Sera total, cuando el testador que
comete la pretericion, hubiese dispuesto de todos los bienes por titulo
universal de herencia en favor de los herederos instituidos, cuya institucion
se anula, porque asi lo exige la generalidad del precepto legal del art. 814,
al determinar, como efecto de la pretericion, el de que "anulara la institucion
de heredero." ... 11
Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there
is no escaping the conclusion that the universal institution of
petitioner to the entire inheritance results in totally abrogating the will.
Because, the nullification of such institution of universal heir
without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a
declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in
clear terms, Article 854 offers no leeway for inferential interpretation.
Giving it an expansive meaning will tear up by the roots the fabric of
the statute. On this point, Sanchez Roman cites the "Memoria annual
del Tribunal Supreme, correspondiente a 1908", which in our opinion
expresses the rule of interpretation, viz:
... El art. 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la
institucion de heredero, no consiente interpretacion alguna favorable a la
persona instituida en el sentido antes expuesto aun cuando parezca, y en
algun caso pudiera ser, mas o menos equitativa, porque una nulidad no
significa en Derecho sino la suposicion de que el hecho o el acto no se ha
realizado, debiendo por lo tanto procederse sobre tal base o supuesto, y
consiguientemente, en un testamento donde falte la institucion, es obligado
llamar a los herederos forzosos en todo caso, como habria que llamar a los
de otra clase, cuando el testador no hubiese distribudo todos sus bienes en
legados, siendo tanto mas obligada esta consecuencia legal cuanto que, en
materia de testamentos, sabido es, segun tiene declarado la jurisprudencia,
con repeticion, que no basta que sea conocida la voluntad de quien testa si
esta voluntad no aparece en la forma y en las condiciones que la ley ha
exigido para que sea valido y eficaz, por lo que constituiria una
interpretacion arbitraria, dentro del derecho positivo, reputar como legatario
a un heredero cuya institucion fuese anulada con pretexto de que esto se
acomodaba mejor a la voluntad del testador, pues aun cuando asi fuese,
sera esto razon para modificar la ley, pero no autoriza a una interpretacion
contraria a sus terminos y a los principios que informan la testamentifaccion,
pues no porque parezca mejor una cosa en el terreno del Derecho
constituyente, hay razon para convereste juicio en regla de interpretacion,
Beastly Notes
desvirtuando y anulando por este procedimiento lo que el legislador quiere
establecer. 12
3. We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that,
annullment notwithstanding, "the devises and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious". Legacies and devises merit
consideration only when they are so expressly given as such in a
will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests that the mere institution of a
universal heir in a will void because of preterition would give
the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is
inexistent.
There must be, in addition to such institution, a testamentary
disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart and separate
from the nullified institution of heir. Sanchez Roman, speaking of the
two component parts of Article 814, now 854, states that preterition
annuls the institution of the heir "totalmente por la pretericion"; but
added (in reference to legacies and bequests) "pero subsistiendo ...
todas aquellas otras disposiciones que no se refieren a la institucion
de heredero ... . 13 As Manresa puts it, annulment throws open to
intestate succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre
(que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtud de legado, mejora o donacion.
14
As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except
the institution of petitioner as universal heir. That institution, by itself,
is null and void. And, intestate succession ensues.
4. Petitioner's mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective
disinheritance rather than one of preterition". 15 From this, petitioner
draws the conclusion that Article 854 "does not apply to the case at
bar". This argument fails to appreciate the distinction between
pretention and disinheritance.
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced
heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned
therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor
are expressly disinherited." 16 Disinheritance, in turn, "is a
testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share
in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. " 17 In Manresa's own
4
words: "La privacion expresa de la legitima constituye la desheredacion. La
privacion tacita de la misma se denomina pretericion." 18 Sanchez Roman
emphasizes the distinction by stating that disinheritance "es siempre
voluntaria"; preterition, upon the other hand, is presumed to be
"involuntaria". 19
Express as disinheritance should be, the same must be supported by
a legal cause specified in the will itself. 20
The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the
forced heirs. It simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather
than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the
said forced heirs suffer from preterition.
On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are
totally different from those of disinheritance. Preterition under Article
854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, "shall annul the institution of heir".
This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition,
testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In
ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such
disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", put only
"insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited", which last
phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. 21 Better stated yet, in
disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of
which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. Manresa's
expressive language, in commenting on the rights of the preterited
heirs in the case of preterition on the one hand and legal
disinheritance on the other, runs thus: "Preteridos, adquiren el
derecho a todo; desheredados, solo les corresponde un tercio o dos
tercios, 22 el caso. 23
5. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively
disinherited are entitled to receive their legitimes, but that the
institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of the
heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes. 24
This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr. Chief
Justice Moran in the Neri case heretofore cited, viz:
But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in
favor of the children by the second marriage should be treated as
legado and mejora and, accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled
Beastly Notes
but merely reduced.
This theory, if adopted, will result in a complete abrogation of Articles
814 and 851 of the Civil Code. If every case of institution of heirs
may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and betterments
reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of Articles 814
and 851 regarding total or partial nullity of the institution, would. be
absolutely meaningless and will never have any application at all.
And the remaining provisions contained in said article concerning the
reduction of inofficious legacies or betterments would be a
surplusage because they would be absorbed by Article 817. Thus,
instead of construing, we would be destroying integral provisions of
the Civil Code.
The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a
failure to distinguish institution of heirs from legacies and
betterments, and a general from a special provision. With reference
to article 814, which is the only provision material to the disposition of
this case, it must be observed that the institution of heirs is therein
dealt with as a thing separate and distinct from legacies or
betterments. And they are separate and distinct not only because
they are distinctly and separately treated in said article but because
they are in themselves different. Institution of heirs is a bequest by
universal title of property that is undetermined. Legacy refers to
specific property bequeathed by a particular or special title. ... But
again an institution of heirs cannot be taken as a legacy. 25
The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a
complete nullity". Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies
"the institution of heir". Considering, however, that the will before us
solely provides for the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and
nothing more, the result is the same.
The entire will is null. Upon the view we take of this case, the order of
November 8, 1963 under review is hereby affirmed. No costs
allowed. So ordered.
5
EN BANC [G.R. No. 45449. April 22, 1939.]
In the matter of the estate of Jose de Aguilar y Aules, deceased.
TOMAS OCEJO Y SAMPERIO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. CONSUL
GENERAL OF SPAIN, movant-appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; APPOINTMENT OF
CONSUL GENERAL, OF SPAIN AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR OF
A DECEASED SPANISH SUBJECT.
It is admitted that the deceased was a Spanish subject before
coming to the Philippines. The consul general in his motion stated,
under oath, that the deceased was a Spanish subject at the time of
his death. Appellant himself, having reported his death to the
Spanish Consul General, impliedly recognized his Spanish
nationality. These circumstances. taken in conjunction with the fact
that the deceased was registered as a Spanish subject in the
Spanish Consulate General in the Philippines more than sufficiently
warrant the conclusion that said deceased was a Spaniard when he
died. Even admitting that the deceased had been residing in the
Philippines up to the time of his death his having inscribed himself in
the Spanish Consulate General as a Spanish subject is a sufficient
declaration of his intention to preserve his allegiance to the Crown of
Spain. (Yaez de Barnuevo v. Fuster, 29 Phil, 606.)
2. ID.; ID.; TREATIES, APPLICATION TO THE PHILIPPINES. The
word "dominios" appearing in article 26 of the Treaty of Friendship
and General Relations of 1902 between Spain and the United States,
includes the Philippines. Pending withdrawal of the sovereignty of the
United States, the Philippines, even in its present self-governing
status, continues to be subject to the sovereignty of the United
States and is in this sense a part of the United States. The rule
invoked by the appellant to the effect that the constitution and acts of
Congress of the United States do not, ex propio vigore, have force in
Beastly Notes
the Philippines, does not apply to a treaty which by the very nature of
its provisions, is intended to apply thereto.
3. ID.; ID.; ID. The provisions of article 27 of the treaty, which
confers upon the consul general the right to represent the unknown
and absent relatives of the deceased must be construed as
according him the right to be situated within the first place in said
order of preference. At all events the court was not bound, in the
appointment of special administrator, to follow said order of
preference. According to the treaty, the consul general has the right
to take possession and make settlement of the estate of the
deceased in so far as it was compatible with the laws of the
Philippines; and to make that right conformable to local laws
governing administration of the estate of deceased persons, there
was no other means but the appointment of the consul general as
special administrator subject to the orders of the court. Accordingly,
the appointment of the consul general was proper.
MORAN, J.:
On October 19, 1936, appellant, Tomas Oceio v Samperio, claiming
to be one of the principal creditors of the deceased Jose de Aguilar v
Aules, filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila, seeking
to be appointed administrator of the estate of said deceased. The
petition alleges that, on petitioners best information and belief, the
deceased died intestate; and that the deceased was since and his
heirs, if he had any, were unknown. The petition was granted.
Thereafter, the Consul General for Spain moved to vacate the order
of appellants appointment as administrator, alleging that the
deceased was a Spanish subject at the time of his death, and prayed
that he instead, be appointed special administrator pursuant to the
Treaty of Friendship and General Relations entered into between
Spain and the United States in 1902. He also prayed that the estate
of the deceased not exceeding P6,000, be summarily distributed in
accordance with law. J. Perez Cardenas. claiming likewise the a
creditor of the deceased, intervened and indicated acquiescence in
the appointment of the consul general as special administrator. The
lower court granted the motion of the consul general and, vacating
appellants appointment, ordered that the estate be summarily settled
6
under section 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended and
appointed said consul general special administrator. From this order,
petitioner appealed.
Three important questions are raised in this appeal.
(1) Was the deceased a Spanish subject at the time of his death? It
is admitted that the deceased was a Spanish subject before coming
to the Philippines. The consul general in his motion stated, under
oath, that the deceased was a Spanish subject at the time of his
death, appellant himself, having reported his death to the Spanish
Consul General, impliedly recognized his Spanish nationality. These
circumstances, taken in conjunction with the fact that the deceased
was registered as a Spanish subject in the Spanish Consulate
General in the Philippines, more than sufficiently warrant the
conclusion that said deceased was a Spaniard when he died.
Appellant, in his objection to the motion of the consul general, stated
that the deceased had come to the Philippines fifty years ago, where
he had been residing continually until his death, and having failed to
make a declaration before a court of record of his desire to preserve
his allegiance to the Crown of Spain, he had become a Filipino
citizen, under the provisions of the Treaty of Paris of December
10,.1898. These pretensions are not, however, supported by any
proof. Appellants claim that he has not been accorded an
opportunity to offer such proof finds no support in the record:
wherefore, the regularity of the proceedings must be presumed.
Besides, even admitting that the deceased had been residing in the
Philippines up to the time of his death, his having inscribed himself in
the Spanish Consulate General as a Spanish subject is a sufficient
declaration of his intention to preserve his allegiance to the Crown of
Spain. (Yaez de Barnuevo v. Fuster, 29 Phil., 606.)
(2) Is the Treaty of Friendship and General Relations of 1902
between Spain and the United States applicable to the Philippines?
Articles 26 and 27 of the Treaty read:
"Articulo XXVI. En caso de fallecimiento de un subdito o ciudadano de
una de las partes en los territorios o dominios de la otra, las Autoridades
locales competentes deberan dar aviso del hecho al Consul o Agente
Consular de la Nacion a que el difunto pertenecla, a fin de que se pueda
informar inmediatamente a las partes interesadas.
Beastly Notes
"Articulo XXVII Los Consules generales, Consules, Viceconsules y
Agentes consulares de las respectivas Altas Partes contratantes, tendran
conforme a las leyes de su pais y a las instrucciones y reclamentos de su
pronio Gobierno, en cuanto sean compatibles con las leyes locales, el
derecho de representar a los herederos ausentes, desconocidos o menores
de edad, narientes inmediatos o representantes legales de los subditos o
ciudadanos de su Pais que mueran dentro de su jurisdiccion consular, asi
como de aquellos de sus compatriotas que mueran en el mar, cuyos bienes
sean llevados a su demarcacion consular, y.de comnarecer personalmente o
por medio de delegado que los represente en todos los procedimientos
relativos al arreglo de sus bienes, hasta que los herederos o representantes
legales comparezcan por si mismos.
"Hasta que tenga lugar esta comparecencia podran dichos funcionarios
consulares, en cuanto sea comnatible con las leyes locales, cumnlir todos
los deberes prescritos por las leyes de su pais y las instrucciones y
reglamentos de su propio Gobierno para la custodia de la propiedad y
arreglo de los bienes de su difunto compatriota.
"En todo caso los efectos y bienes de los subditos o ciudadanos difuntos
seran retenidos dentro del Distrito consular durante doce meses naturales
por dichos Consules generales, Consules, Viceconsules o Agentes
consusulares, o por los representantes legales o herederos del difunto,
durante cuyo tiempo los acreedores de aquel, si los habiere, tendran
derecho nara presentar sus reclamaciones y demandas contra dichos
efectos v bienes; y todas las cuestiones que se suscitan con motivo de estas
reclamaciones o demandas, se decidirAn por las autoridades judiciales
locales con arreglo a las leyes del pais en que dichos funcionarios estan
nombrados."cirtua1aw library
The word "dominios" appearing in article 26 of the treaty includes the
Philippines. Pending withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United
States, the Philippines, even in its present self-governing status,
continues to be subject to the sovereignty of the United States and
is, in this sense, a part of the United States. The rule invoked by the
appellant to the effect that the constitution and acts of Congress of
the United States do not, ex propio vigore, have force in the
Philippines, does not apply to a treaty which, by the very nature of its
provisions, is intended to apply thereto.
(3) Has the Spanish Consul General a better right than the appellant
to be appointed as special administrator? Appellant contends that he
7
comes second, and the consul general third, in the order of
preference established in section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The provisions of article 27 of the treaty, which confers upon the
consul general the right to represent the unknown and absent
relatives of the deceased, must be construed as according him the
right to be situated within the first place in said order of preference.
At all events, the court was not bound, in the appointment of special
administrator, to follow said order of preference. According to the
treaty, the consul general has the right to take possession and make
settlement of the estate of the deceased in so far as it was
compatible with the laws of the Philippines; and to make that right
conformable to local laws governing administration of the estate of
deceased persons, there was no other means but the appointment of
the consul general as special administrator subject to the orders of
the court. Accordingly, the appointment of the consul general was
proper. Finally, it appearing that the estate of the deceased does not
exceed P6,000, the order for the summary settlement thereof was
equally proper.
Judgment is affirmed, with costs against Appellant.
G.R. No. L-30289 March 26, 1929
SERAPIA DE GALA, petitioner-appellant,
v. APOLINARIO GONZALES and SINFOROSO ONA, opponents-
appellants.
OSTRAND, J.:
On Nov 23, 1920, Severina Gonzales executed a will in which
Serapia de Gala, a niece of Severina, was designated executrix.
The testatrix died in November, 1926, leaving no heirs by force of
law, and on Dec 2, 1926, Serapia, through her counsel, presented
the will for probate. Apolinario Gonzales, a nephew of the deceased,
filed an opposition to the will on the ground that it had not been
executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code
of Civil Procedure.
On April 2, 1927, Serapia de Gala was appointed special
Beastly Notes
administratrix of the estate of the deceased. She returned an
inventory of the estate on March 31, 1927, and made several
demands upon Sinforoso Ona, the surviving husband of the
deceased, for the delivery to her of the property inventoried and of
which he was in possession.
On Sept 20, 1928, the CFI ordered Sinforoso Ona to deliver to
Serapia de Gala all the property left by the deceased. Instead of
delivering the property as ordered, Sinforoso filed a motion asking
the appointment of Serapia de Gala as special administratrix be
cancelled and that he, Sinforoso, be appointed in her stead. The
motion was opposed by both Apolinario Gonzales and by Serapia de
Gala, but on March 3, 1928, it was nevertheless granted, Serapia
was removed, and Sinforoso was appointed special administrator in
her place, principally on the ground that he had possession of the
property in question and that his appointment would simplify the
proceedings.
In the meantime and after various continuances and delays, the court
below in an order dated January 20, 1928, declared the will valid and
admitted it to probate. All of the parties appealed, Serapia de Gala
from the order removing her from the office of special administratrix,
and Apolinario Gonzales and Sinforoso Ona from the order probating
the will.
Serapia's appeal requires but little discussion. The burden of the
argument of her counsel is that a special administrator cannot be
removed except for one or more of the causes stated in section 653
of the Code of Civil Procedure. But that section can only apply to
executors and regular administrators, and the office of a special
administrator is quite different from that of regular administrator. The
appointment of a special administrator lies entirely in the sound
discretion of the court; the function of such an administrator is only to
collect and preserve the property of the deceased and to return an
inventory thereof; he cannot be sued by a creditor and cannot pay
any debts of the deceased. The fact that no appeal can be taken
from the appointment of a special administrator indicates that both
his appointment and his removal are purely discretionary, and we
cannot find that the court below abused its discretion in the present
8
case. In removing Serapia de Gala and appointing the present
possessor of the property pending the final determination of the
validity of the will, the court probably prevented useless litigation.
The appellants Sinforoso Ona and Apolinario Gonzales argue that
the will in question was not executed in the form prescribed by
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No.
2645. That section reads as follows:
No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to
pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same,
unless it be written in the language or dialect known by the testator
and signed by him, or by the testator's name written by some other
person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested
and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence
of the testator and of each other.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and
the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid,
each and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages
shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of
each sheet. The attestation shall state the number of sheets or
pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the
testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some
other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the
presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the
will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each
other.
The principal points raised by the appeal are (1) that the person
requested to sign the name of the testatrix signed only the latter's
name and not her own; (2) that the attestation clause does not
mention the placing of the thumb-mark of the testatrix in the will; and
(3) that the fact that the will had been signed in the presence of the
witnesses was not stated in the attestation clause but only in the last
paragraph of the body of the will.
The first point can best be answered by quoting the language of this
court in the case of the Estate of Maria Salva, G. R. No. 26881: 1
An examination of the will in question disclosed that it contains five
Beastly Notes
pages. The name of the old woman, Maria Salva, was written on the
left hand margin of the first four pages and at the end of the will.
About in the center of her name she placed her thumb-mark. About in
the center of her name she placed her thumb-mark. The three
witnesses likewise signed on the left-hand margin and at the end of
the will.
On these facts, the theory of the trial judge was that under the
provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as
amended by Act No. 2645, it was essential to the validity of the will
that the person writing the name of the maker of the will also sign.
Under the law prior to the amendment, it had been held by this court
that where a testator is unable to write and his name is signed by
another at his request, in his presence and in that of the subscribing
witnesses thereto, it is unimportant, so far as the validity of the will is
concerned, whether the person who writes the name of the testator
signs his own or not. (Barut vs. Cabacungan (1912), 21 Phil., 461).
But his Honor, the trial judge emphasizes that the amendment
introduced into the law the following sentence: 'The testator or the
person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every
page thereof, on the left margin . . ..' This requirement, it is said, was
not lived up to in this instance.
There is, however, an entirely different view which can be taken of
the situation. This is that the testatrix placed her thumb-mark on the
will in the proper places. When, therefore, the law says that the will
shall be 'signed' by the testator or testatrix, the law is fulfilled not only
by the customary written signature but by the testator or testatrix'
thumb-mark. The construction put upon the word 'signed' by most
courts is the original meaning of a signum or sign, rather than the
derivative meaning of a sign manual or handwriting. A statute
requiring a will to be 'signed' is satisfied if the signature is made by
the testator's mark. (28 R. C. L., pp. 116-117).
The opinion quoted is exactly in point. The testatrix thumb-mark
9
appears in the center of her name as written by Serapia de Gala on
all of the pages of the will.
The second and third points raised by Sinforoso Ona and Apolinario
Gonzales are sufficiently refuted by quoting the last clause of the
body of the will together with the attestation clause, both of which are
written in the Tagalog dialect. These clauses read as follows:
Sa katunayang ang kasulatang ito, na may anim na dahon, ay siyang
naglalaman ng aking huling tagubilin, at sa hindi ko kaalamang lumagda ng
aking pangalan, ipinamanhik ko sa aking pamankin na si Serapia de Gala na
isulat ang aking pangalan at apellido, at sa tapat ay inilagda ko ang titik ng
kanang daliri kong hinlalaki, sa walkas at sa bawat isa sa anim (6) na dahon
ng kasulatang ito, at ito's ginawa niya sa kautusan at sa harap ko at ng
tatlong saksing nagpapatutuo sa huli ngayon ika dalawang po't tatlo ng
Nobiembre ng 1920.
(Sgd.) SEVERINA GONZALES
Pinatutunayan namin na ang kasulatang ito na binubuo ng anim (6) na
dahon na pinirmahan sa harap namin ni Serapia de Gala sa kahilingan ni
Severina Gonzales sa wakas at sa mga gilid ng bawa't isa sa anim (6) na
dahon at isinaysay na ang kasulatang ito ay siyang huling habilin o
testamento ni Severina Gonzales, ay pinirmahan namin, bilang mga saksi sa
wakas at sa gilid ng bawa't dahon sa harap at sa kahilingan ng tinurang
testadora, at ang bawat isa sa amin ay pumirma sa harap ng lahat at bawat
isa sa amin, ngayon ika dalawang po't tatlo ng noviembre ng taong 1920 ng
taong 1920.
(Sgd.) ELEUTERIO NATIVIDAD
JUAN SUMULONG
FRANCISCO NATIVIDAD
The translation in English of the clauses quoted reads as follows:
In virtue of this will, consisting of six pages, that contains my last
wish, and because of the fact that I cannot sign my name, I request
my niece Serapia de Gala to write my name, and above this I placed
my right thumb-mark at the end of this will and to each of the six
pages of this document, and this was done at my direction and in the
presence of three attesting witnesses, this 23rd of November, 1920.
(Sgd.) SEVERINA GONZALES
We certify that this document, which is composed of 6 sheets and
Beastly Notes
was signed in our presence by Serapia de Gala at the request of
Severina Gonzales at the end and on the margins of each of the 6
sheets and was declared to contain the last will and testament of
Severina Gonzales, was signed by us as witnesses at the end and
on the margins of each sheet in the presence and at the request of
said testatrix, and each of us signed in the presence of all and each
of us, this 23rd day of November of the year 1920.
(Sgd.) ELEUTERIO NATIVIDAD
JUAN SUMULONG
FRANCISCO NATIVIDAD
As will be seen, it is not mentioned in the attestation clause that the
testatrix signed by thumb-mark, but it does there appear that the
signature was affixed in the presence of the witnesses, and the form
of the signature is sufficiently described and explained in the last
clause of the body of the will. It maybe conceded that the attestation
clause is not artistically drawn and that, standing alone, it does not
quite meet the requirements of the statute, but taken in connection
with the last clause of the body of the will, it is fairly clear and
sufficiently carries out the legislative intent; it leaves no possible
doubt as to the authenticity of the document.
The contention of the appellants Sinforoso Ona and Apolinario
Gonzales that the fact that the will had been signed in the presence
of the witnesses was not stated in the attestation clause is without
merit; the fact is expressly stated in that clause.
In our opinion, the will is valid, and the orders appealed from are
hereby affirmed without costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-2211 Dec 20, 1948
NATIVIDAD I. VDA. DE ROXAS, petitioner,
v. POTENCIANO PECSON, Judge of First Instance of Bulacan,
MARIA ROXAS and PEDRO ROXAS, respondents.
FERIA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari filed against the respondent judge of
the CFI of Bulacan.
10
The facts in this case may be summarily stated as follows: Pablo M.
Roxas died leaving properties in Bulacan. The other respondents
Maria and Pedro Roxas, sister and brother respectively of the
deceased, filed on August 3, 1946, a petition for the administration of
the latter's estate, in special intestate proceeding No. 1707 of the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, and Maria Roxas was appointed
special administratrix upon an ex-parte petition.
On August 10, 1946, the petitioner Natividad Vda. de Roxas, widow
of Pablo M. Roxas, filed a petition for the probate of an alleged will of
her deceased husband, and for her appointment as executrix of his
estate designated is said will, and the petition was docketed as
special proceeding No. 172 of the same court. In said will the
deceased bequeathed one-half of his estate to his widow, the herein
petitioner, and the other half to Reynaldo Roxas, an adulterous child
9 years old of the decedent.
Upon agreement of both parties, the intestate proceeding No. 170
was dismissed and ordered closed by the court.
In view of the opposition to the probate of the will by the respondents
Maria and Pedro Roxas, the petitioner was appointed on September
10, 1946, special administratrix and qualified as such over the
objection of the respondents Maria and Pedro Roxas, who sought
the appointment of Maria as such.
The said respondents filed on October 21, 1946, a motion for
reconsideration of the order of the court appointing the petitioner as
special administratrix, with an alternative prayer that Maria Roxas be
appointed as special co-administratrix, which motion was not acted
upon.
After hearing on Dec 15, 1947, the respondent judge rendered a
decision denying the probate of the will presented by the petitioner
on the ground that the attesting witnesses did not sign their
respective names in the presence of the testator, from which the
petitioner has appealed, and the appeal is now pending.
Beastly Notes
On Dec 29, 1947, the respondents Maria and Pedro Roxas renewed
their petition for the appointment of Maria Roxas as special
administratrix or special co-administratrix, and on May 5, 1948, the
respondent judge rendered his resolution appointing the petitioner
Natividad I. Vda. de Roxas as special administratrix only of all the
conjugal properties of the deceased, and Maria Roxas as special
administratrix of all capital or properties belonging exclusively to the
deceased Pablo M. Roxas.
The present petition for certiorari has been filed with this Court
against the last order or resolution of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan based on the ground that the respondent judge acted in
excess of the court's jurisdiction in appointing two special co-
administratices of the estate of the deceased Pablo Roxas, one of
the capital or properties belonging exclusively to the deceased, and
another of his conjugal properties with his wife (now widow), the
petitioner.
It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or
preferred right of certain persons to the appointment of administrator
under section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory provisions as to
causes for removal of an executor or administrator under section 653
of Act No. 190, now section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection
or removal of special administrator. (21 Am. Jur., 833; De Gala vs.
Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 104, 106.)
As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special
administrator and the qualifications the appointee must have, the
judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be
appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or
contrary to reason, justice or equity.
There is nothing wrong in that the respondent judge, in exercising his
discretion and appointing the petitioner as special administratrix, had
taken into consideration the beneficial interest of the petitioner in the
estate of the decedent and her being designated in the will as
executrix thereof. But the respondent's subsequent act of appointing
her as special administratrix only of the conjugal or community
11
property, and Maria Roxas as special administratrix of the capital or
exclusive property of the decedent, does not seem to be in
conformity with logic or reason.
The petitioner has or claims to have the same beneficial interest after
the decision of the court disapproving the will, which is now pending
on appeal, as she had prior to it, because the decision is not yet final
and may be reversed by the appellate court.
Besides, even if the will is not probated, the widow in the present
case would have, under the law, the right of usufruct over one-half of
the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the
conjugal partnership.
The beneficial interest required as a qualification for appointment as
administrator of the estate of a decedent is the interest in the whole
estate and not only in some part thereof. The petitioner being entitled
to one-half in usufruct of all the exclusive properties of the decedent,
she would have as much if not more interest in administering the
entire estate correctly, in order to reap the benefit of a wise, speedy,
economical administration of the state, and not suffer the
consequences of the waste, improvidence or mismanagement
thereof. The good or bad administration of the property may affect
rather the fruits than the naked ownership of a property.
However, for the decision of the question involved in this proceeding
it is not necessary for us to determine whether or not the respondent
judge has acted with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the
resolution complained of for the reasons just stated, in view of our
conclusion that the respondent judge acted in excess of the court's
jurisdiction in appointing two separate special administratices of the
estate of the decedent: one of the conjugal or community property
and another of the capital or exclusive property of the deceased
Pablo M. Roxas.
According to section 2, Rule 75, taken from section 685 of the former
Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, as amended, "when the
Beastly Notes
marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the
community property shall be inventoried, administered, and
liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse." That is the reason why,
according to section 4, Rule 78, the "letters testamentary, or letters of
administration with the will annexed, shall extend to all the estate of
the testator in the Philippines," and section 6, Rule 79, provides for
appointment of one administrator in case of intestacy, except in
certain cases in which two or more joint, but not separate and
independent, administrators may be appointed under section 3, Rule
82. Therefore the administrator appointed to administer and liquidate
the exclusive property of a deceased spouse shall also administer,
liquidate and distribute the community property, because the estate
of a deceased spouse which is to be settled, that is, administered,
liquidated and distributed, consists not only of the exclusive
properties of the decedent, but also of one-half of the assets of the
conjugal partnership, if any, which may pertain to the deceased, as
determined after the liquidation thereof in accordance with the
provisions of articles 1421 to 1424 of the Civil Code.
There is absolutely no reason for appointing two separate
administrators, specially if the estate to be settled is that of a
deceased husband as in the present case, for according to articles
1422 and 1423 of the Civil Code, only after the dowry and
parapherna of the wife and the debts, charges, and obligations of the
conjugal partnership have been paid, the capital or exclusive
property of the husband may be liquidated and paid in so far as the
inventoried estate may reach; and if the estate inventoried should not
be sufficient to pay the dowry and the parapherna of the wife and the
debts, charges and obligations of the partnership, the provision of
Title XVII of the Civil Code relating to concurrence and preference of
credits shall be observed. If two separate administrators are
appointed as done in the present case, in every action which one of
them may institute to recover properties or credit of the deceased,
the defendant may raise the question or set up the defense that the
plaintiff has no cause of action, because the property or credit in
issue belongs to the class which is being administered by the other
administrator, which can not be done if the administrator of the entire
estate is only one.
As under the law only one general administrator may be appointed to
12
administer, liquidate and distribute the estate of a deceased spouse,
it clearly follows that only one special administrator may be
appointed to administer temporarily said estate, because a special
administrator is but a temporary administrator who is appointed to act
in lieu of the general administrator.
"When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration occasioned by an appeal from the allowance or
disallowance of will, or from any other cause, the court may appoint a
special administrator to collect and take charge of the estate of the
deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and
executors or administrators thereupon appointed," (sec. 1, Rule 81).
Although his powers and duties are limited to "collect and take
charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the
deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator
afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and
maintain suits as administrator, and may sell such perishable and
other property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall
not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased." (Section 2, Rule 81.)
In view of all the foregoing, we hold that the court below has no
power to appoint two special administratices of the estate of a
deceased husband or wife, one of the community property and
another of the exclusive property of the decedent, and therefore the
respondent judge acted in excess of the court's jurisdiction in
rendering or issuing the order complained of, and therefore said
order is hereby set aside, with costs against the respondents. So
ordered.
THE HEIRS OF PEDRO ESCANLAR ET AL V. CA 281 SCRA 176
(1997)
FACTS: Spouses Guillermo Nombre and Victoriana Cari-an died
without issue in 1924 and 1938, respectively. Nombres heirs include
his nephews and grandnephews. Victoriana was succeeded by her
late brothers son, Gregorio Cari-an.
1. After Gregorios death in 1971, his wife, Generosa Martinez and
children (Rodolfo, Carmen, Leonardo and Fredisminda) were
adjudged as heirs by representation to Victorianas estate. Leonardo
Beastly Notes
passed away, leaving his widow, Nelly Chua vda. de Cari-an and
minor Leonell as his heirs
2. 2 parcels of land, denominated by Lot 1616 and 1617, formed
part of the estate of Guillermo Nombre and Victoriana Cari-an.
3. In 1978, Gregorios heirs executed a deed of sale of rights,
interests and participation in favor of Pedro Escanlar and Francisco
Holgado over the undivided share of Victoriana for P275,000 to
be paid to the heirs, except the share of the minor Leonell Cari-an
which shall be deposited to the Municipal Treasurer. Said contract
of sale will be effective only upon approval of CFI
4. Escanlar and Holgado, the vendees, were concurrently the
lessees of the subject property. In a deed of agreement executed by
both parties confirming and affirming the contract of sale, they
stipulated the following:
a. That the balance of the purchase price (P225,000) shall
be paid on or before May 1979
b. Pending complete payment thereof, the vendees shall
not assign, sell, lease or mortgage the rights, interests and
participation thereof
c. In the event of nonpayment of the balance of said
purchase price, the sum of P50,000 (down payment) shall be
deemed as damages
5. Escanlar and Holgado were unable to pay the individual shares
of the Cari-an heirs, amounting to P55,000 each, on the due date.
However, said heirs received at least 12 installment payments from
Escanlar and Holgado after May 1979. Rodolfo was fully paid by
June 1979, Generosa Martinez, Carmen and Fredisminda were
likewise fully compensated for their individual shares. The minors
share was deposited with the RTC in September 1982.
6. Being former lessees, Escanlar and Holgado continued in
possession of Lots 1616 and Lots 1617. Interestingly, they continued
13
to pay rent based on their lease contract.
7. Subsequently, Escanlar and Holgado sought to intervene in the
probate proceedings of Guillermo and Victoriana as buyers of
Victorianas share. In 1982, the probate court approved the motion
filed by the heirs of Guillermo and Victoriana to sell their respective
shares in the estate. Thereafter, the Cari-ans, sold their shares in 8
parcels of land including lots 1616 and 1617 to spouses Chua for
P1.85 million.
8. The Cari-ans instituted a case for cancellation of sale against
Escanlar and Holgado alleging the latters failure to pay the balance
of the purchase price on the stipulated date and that they only
received a total of P132,551 in cash and goods.
9. Escanlar and Holgado averred that the Cari-ans, having been
paid, had no right to resell the subject lots and that the spouses
Chua were purchasers in bad faith.
10. The trial court held in favor of the heirs of Cari-an citing that
the sale between the Cari-ans and Escanlar is void as it was not
approved by the probate court which was required in the deed
of sale.
11. CA affirmed the same and cited that the questioned deed of sale
of rights is a contract to sell because it shall become effective only
upon approval by the probate court and upon full payment of the
purchase price.
ISSUE: WON the non-happening of a condition affects the validity of
the contract itself
HELD: No, the non-happening of a condition only affects the
effectivity and not the validity of the contract.
Under Art 1318 Civil Code, the essential requisites of a contract
are: consent of the contracting parties; object certain which is
the subject matter of the contract and cause of the obligation
which is established. Absent one of the above, no contract can
arise. Conversely, where all are present, the result is a valid
contract. However, some parties introduce various kinds of
Beastly Notes
restrictions or modalities, the lack of which will not, however,
affect the validity of the contract.
In the instant case, the Deed of Sale, complying as it does with
the essential requisites, is a valid one. However, it did not bear
the stamp of approval of the court. The contracts validity was not
affected for in the words of the stipulation, this Contract of Sale of
rights, interests and participations shall become effective only upon
the approval by the Honorable Court In other words, only the
effectivity and not the validity of the contract is affected.
CONTRACT TO SELL VS. CONTRACT TO SALE
In contracts to sell, ownership is retained by the seller and is not to
pass until the full payment of the price. Such payment is a positive
suspensive condition, the failure of which is not a breach of contract
but simply an event that prevented the obligation of the vendor to
convey title from acquiring binding force. To illustrate, although a
deed of conditional sale is denominated as such, absent a proviso
that title to the property sold is reserved in the vendor until full
payment of the purchase price nor a stipulation giving the vendor the
right to unilaterally rescind the contract the moment the vendee fails
to pay within a fixed period, by its nature, it shall be declared a deed
of absolute sale.
In a contract of sale, the non-payment of the price is a resolutory
condition which extinguishes the transaction that, for a time, existed
and discharges the obligations created thereunder. The remedy of an
unpaid seller in a contract of sale is to seek either specific
performance or rescission.
In the case at bar, the sale of rights, interests and participation
as to portion pro indiviso of the 2 subject lots is a contract of
sale for the reasons that (1) the sellers did not reserve unto
themselves the ownership of the property until full payment of
the unpaid balance of P225,000.00; (2) there is no stipulation
giving the sellers the right to unilaterally rescind the contract
the moment the buyer fails to pay within the fixed period.
NEED OF PROBATE COURTS APPROVAL EXISTS WHERE
SPECIFIC PROPERTIES OF THE ESTATE ARE SOLD AND NOT
WHEN IDEAL AND INDIVISIBLE SHARES OF AN HEIR ARE
14
DISPOSED OF
The need for approval by the probate court exists only where specific
properties of the estate are sold and not when only ideal and
indivisible shares of an heir are disposed of. In Dillena v. Court of
Appeals, the Court declared that it is within the jurisdiction of the
probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person
by his prospective heirs before final adjudication. The probate courts
approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the
decedents estate. However, reference to judicial approval cannot
adversely affect the substantive rights of the heirs to dispose of their
ideal share in the co-heirship and/or co-ownership among the heirs.
It must be recalled that during the period of indivision of a decedents
estate, each heir, being a co-owner, has full ownership of his part
and may therefore alienate it. But the effect of the alienation with
respect to the co-owners shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
CONTRACTUAL STIPULATIONS CONSIDERED LAW BETWEEN
PARTIES; EXCEPTION: CONTEMPORANEOUS ACTS OF
PARTIES
As a general rule, the pertinent contractual stipulation (requiring court
approval) should be considered as the law between the parties.
However, the presence of two factors militates against this
conclusion: (1) the evident intention of the parties appears to be
contrary to the mandatory character of said stipulation.
Whoever crafted the document of conveyance, must have been
of the belief that the controversial stipulation was a legal
requirement for the validity of the sale. But the contemporaneous
and subsequent acts of the parties reveal that the original objective
of the parties was to give effect to the deed of sale even without
court approval.
Receipt and acceptance of the numerous installments on the balance
of the purchase price by the Cari-ans, although the period to pay the
balance of the purchase price expired in May 1979, and leaving
Escanlar and Holgado in possession of Lots 1616 and 1617 reveal
their intention to effect the mutual transmission of rights and
obligations. The Cari-ans did not seek judicial relief until late 1982 or
three years later; (2) the requisite approval was virtually rendered
Beastly Notes
impossible by the Cari-ans because they opposed the motion
for approval of the sale filed by Escanlar and Holgado, and sued
the latter for the cancellation of that sale. Having provided the
obstacle and the justification for the stipulated approval not to be
granted, the Cari-ans should not be allowed to cancel their first
transaction with Escanlar and Holgado because of lack of approval
by the probate court, the lack of which is of their own making.
Teotico vs Del Val
GR No. L18753, March 26, 1965
FACTS:
Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving properties
worth P600,000. She executed a will written in
Spanish, affixed her signature and acknowledged
before Notary Public by her and the witnesses.
Among the legacies made in the will was the
P20,000 for Rene Teotico who was married to the
testatrixs niece, Josefina Mortera. The usufruct of
Marias interest in the Calvo Building were left to
the said spouses and the ownership thereof was
left in equal parts to her grandchildren, the
legitimate children of said spouses. Josefina was
likewise instituted, as sole and universal heir to all
the remainder of her properties not otherwise
disposed by will. Vicente Teotico filed a petition
15
for the probate of the will but was opposed by Ana
del Val Chan, claiming that she was an adopted
child of Francisca (deceased sister of Maria) and
an acknowledged natural child of Jose (deceased
brother of Maria), that said will was not executed
as required by law and that Maria as physically
and mentally incapable to execute the will at the
time of its execution and was executed under
duress, threat, or influence of fear.
ISSUE: WON defendant has right to intervene in
this proceeding.
HELD:
It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person
may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding is that he must have an interest in the
estate, will or in the property to be affected by
either as executor or as a claimant of the estate
and be benefited by such as an heir or one who
has a claim against it as creditor. Under the terms
of the will, defendant has no right to intervene
because she has no such interest in the estate
either as heir, executor or administrator because
it did not appear therein any provision designating
her as heir/ legatee in any portion of the estate.
She could have acquired such right if she was a
legal heir of the deceased but she is not under the
CIVIL CODE. Even if her allegations were true, the
law does not give her any right to succeed the
estate of the deceased sister of both Jose and
Francisca because being an illegitimate child she
is prohibited by law from succeeding to the
Beastly Notes
legitimate relatives of her natural father and that
relationship established by adoption is limited
solely to the adopter and adopted and does not
extend to the relatives of the adopting parents
except only as expressly provided by law. As a
consequence, she is an heir of the adopter but not
16
of the relatives of the adopter.
Hence, defendant has no right to intervene either
as testamentary or as legal heir in the probate
proceeding.