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IS LIFE A GAME WE ARE PLAYING?

BERNARD SUITS

I define life. Taken together they amount


IF LIFE is a game we are playing, it must
to the contention that life may be a game.
be a game which most of us, at any II
rate, do not know we are playing. One
might, therefore, wonder whether it is at I define game-playingas follows. To play
all possible for life to be a game, since it a game is to engage in activity directed
may be thought strange, if not absurd, to toward bringing about a certain state of
suppose that anyone could play a game affairs, using only means permitted by
and not know it. Indeed, one might choose certain rules, where the means permitted
to define "playing a game" in such a way by the rules are more limited in scope than
that whatever other things it might be pos- they would be in the absence of the rules
sible to do unknowingly, game-playing is and where the sole reason for accepting
necessarily not among them. Such a defi- such limitation of means is to make pos-
nition, however, seems unduly arbitrary sible such activity. Thus, in the game of
and is evidently no more true than the high jumping, the players strive to be on
belief from which it admittedly follows: the other side of a barrier. But certain
that no intentional actions can be per- means for achieving this end are ruled
formed unconsciously-a belief not true out, for example, walking around the bar-
at all. In any case, I propose to give an rier, ducking under it, or using a ladder
account of game-playing which is, I would to climb over it. The end of the players is
like to submit, both useful and fitting and not to be on the other side of the barrier
which does not preclude the possibility per se, since aside from the game they are
that games can be played unknowingly. playing they may have no reason whatever
That the account will be useful is mani- for being on the other side. Their end is
fest; it will permit me to entertain the not simply to get to the other side but to
possibility that life is an unconsciousgame. do this by using only means permitted by
That the account is fitting, however, will be rules, namely, running from a certain dis-
manifest only if it is a fitting account, and tance and then jumping. The players ac-
that must wait upon the event. Anyone, cept the rules, furthermore, just because
therefore, who finds that the account does they want to act within the limitations the
not satisfactorily define games is invited rules impose; that is, they accept rules
to substitute X for the word "game" wher- so that they can play a game, and they
ever the latter occurs in these remarks. accept these rules so that they can play
Such a procedure will not (at least of it- this game.
self) render my argument pointless. For According to this account, then, if a
my purpose is not only to provide a satis- person is playing a game, four things are
factory account of games but also, quite involved in what he is doing. (1) He is
aside from that question, to show that life seeking to achieve an end, describable as
may be the kind of thing, whatever that a certain state of affairs. (2) He rules out
thing may be, which my account describes. certain means for achieving this end. (3)
There are thus two contentions at issue, He intends to rule out these means. (4) He
either of which may be judged independ- intends to rule out these means solely in
ently of the other. One is that my account order to make possible the activity in
defines games, and the other is that it may question, and not for an "external" rea-
209

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210 ETHICS
son. A person could fail to know that he lieve that life is more serious than the
was playing a game, therefore, if he were games we occasionally fit into its inter-
doing all of these things but did not know stices. If life really is a game, therefore,
that he was doing one or more of them. our failure to know it should not be sur-
(In the same way, a person might not know prising; it is just what one would expect.
that X was a bachelor because he did not Intentional unconsciousness of one's in-
know either that X was an adult, or unmar- tentions, I suggest, is the link which con-
ried, or a male.) Thus, an unconsciousplayer nects the possibility of unconscious game-
might know that he had intentionally ruled playing with the possibility that life is a
out certain means for achieving an end, game.
but he might mistakenly believe that he III
had done this, not in order to play a game,
On the basis of the foregoing consider-
but for some other reason. Or, knowing ations, I would like to set out two samples
he had made such a ruling, he might not
of the kind of game life might be. The first
know he had intended it. Or, having made
may be stated briefly and is an adaptation
such a ruling, he might not know he had from Freud. In this game death is the end
made it. Finally, he might not know he was the players are seeking, and the employ-
seeking the end in question. In terms of ment of certain means for achieving this
this account, therefore, to suppose that end are forbidden by the rules; most im-
life is one game which all of us are play-
portant, suicide is ruled out. We do not,
ing is to suppose that there are certain
as Freud suggests, refrain from suicide
universal intentions among men and that
because we want to live but because we
men are universally ignorant of at least
want to choose the manner of our death.
some of them. The way in which we choose to die, ac-
At this point the objection might be cordingly, becomes the way in which we
raised that, even if it is possible to play live. But to limit the means to a sought
a game without knowing it, it seems unlike-
goal, not for an "external" reason, but
ly that all of life could be such a game.
solely in order to be able to engage in the
Surely somebody would have noticed it. activity made possible by the limitation,
If life is a game why do we not know we is to play a game. We do not know we are
are playing it? I suggest that the answer playing this game, perhaps, because we
is that we do not want to know it. It is
do not want to know that we are seeking
not necessary, though it would not be in-
death or because we prefer to think that
appropriate, to enter into a psychological the stricture on suicide is a moral com-
(or psychiatric) account of why we do not mand.
want to know that life is a game we are
IV
playing. It will suffice to notice that such is
the case. Practically nobody wants to be- The second game, which I shall consider
lieve that life is "merely" a game. We be- at greater length, assumes that each play-
lieve that life is serious, or hard, or ca- er is out to maximize his own pleasure.
pable of nobility, or demandingof sacrifice. It also assumes that the rule that limits
We believe it is significant. But we believe the means permitted in the pursuit of this
that there is something essentially trifling end is the following: in seeking to increase
and insignificant about games. "To exert your pleasure, do not decrease the pleasure
oneself and work for the sake of amuse- of any other player. Now if the sole reason
ment seems silly and utterly childish. But for accepting such a rule is for the sake of
to amuse oneself in order that one may participating in the activity such accept-
exert oneself . . . seems right." This obser- ance makes possible, I would want to say
vation of Aristotle no doubt still commands that such activity is game-playing. Let us
nearly universal assent. We prefer to be- now suppose that the players are ignorant

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DISCUSSION 211
of their motive in accepting the rule which for their justification makes questionable
forbids them to increase their pleasure at their ultimacy. But another view is possi-
the expense of another's.Now I would want ble. The difficulty in justifying ultimate
to say that they are playing a game without moral principles may lie, not in the logical
knowing they are playing it. Why do they wrong-headedness of the attempt (where
not know they are playing it? A likely pos- the difficulty is interpreted as a disguised
sibility is that they do not think that the impossibility), but in the fact that moral
rule in question is a rule in a game because rules are rules in a game. If that is the
they think it is some other kind of rule. case, the attempt to justify them may not
They may, for example, think it is a moral be logically impossible, only psychologi-
rule, that is, not a rule whose acceptance is cally improbable. The moral philosopher,
requiredin order to play the game in which on this view is unwilling, and perhaps psy-
it is a rule but a rule whose acceptanceis re- chologically incapable, of admitting that
quired, perhaps, categorically. Or they may moral rules are game rules. He thus per-
think that the rule is itself a utilitarian rule, sists in advancing other reasons for them
that is, not a rule which sets limits upon in piecemeal efforts to sustain his self-de-
means for increasingpleasure (which is what ception, or, like Pritchard, he seeks to
the moralrule does) but a rule that, in effect, achieve the same purpose wholesale by
sets a strategy for increasing pleasure. The denying the possibility of giving any rea-
rule would perform the latter function if sons whatever.
it were the case that one could not increase Consider the concept of fairness as this
one's pleasure at the expense of another's, has sometimes figured in ethical discussion.
for example, either because one is pained Sidgwick takes this to be an irreducible
to make others unhappy or because those precept or command, and hence discover-
whose pleasure one decreases are likely to able only by intuition. No arguments can,
retaliate by decreasing one's own pleasure. or should be, advanced in support of the
But the reasons why the rule in question principle. The principle is knowable but in-
might be thought of as a moral principle explicable. But if life is a game the prin-
or as a strategic maxim, rather than as a ciple is not inexplicable. Furthermore, its
rule in a game, are less important than explication can be given in terms not al-
the fact that such reasons can be given. ready rejected by the intuitionist. The ex-
The point is, if the activity we have imag- plication thus agrees with the intuitionist
ined to characterize life is a game, such view that fairness is not a strategic (pru-
strategic or moralistic reasons for refrain- dential) decision, since it precedes and
ing from increasing one's pleasure at the conditions strategic decisions. Fairness in
expense of another's are really a mask to games means obedience to the rules of the
prevent the player from knowing that he is game, and strategies in games are plans
playing a game. for playing obediently. Fairness, therefore,
One can, on the basis of the foregoing does not constitute a particular strategy
considerations, develop the thesis that all but preconditionsevery strategy. In games,
moral rules are game rules in disguise. however, the priority of the principle does
Such a thesis might find support in the not preclude its explicability. The explica-
fact that it is so notoriously difficult to tion is teleological. We exact fairness from
give reasons for accepting moral rules ourselves and others so that we can play the
which purport to be ultimate. Thus Pritch- game. In terms of the present sample of life-
ard attempts to make a virtue of what as-game, fairness is not the best way (either
would otherwise be a deficiency in moral prudentially or moralistically) to maximize
philosophy by concluding that it is a mis- one's pleasure; fairness is a requirementfor
take to ask for reasons which will justify making the maximization of pleasure the
ultimate moral principles, since a demand end in a game.

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212 ETHICS
From this perspective, the contention be true, many of these beliefs cannot, by
that moral principles are not susceptible their nature, be shown to be true, for ex-
of justification may be seen as part of the ample, the belief that life is a game in
psychopathology of moral philosophy; the which we are pieces moved by God. But,
moral philosopher is putting up a last- just as I have argued (by arguing that one
ditch defense against the realization that can play a game without knowing it) that
life is a game. Having failed to produce my thesis about life is not obviously false,
convincing reasons for accepting a certain I also maintain that it is not obviously un-
rule, but refusing to grant the possibility verifiable. I take it that the possibility
that the rule is accepted because one wishes that life is a game in which we are pieces
to play the game in which it is a rule, the moved by God is unverifiable because
moral philosopher insists that the quest verification that something is a game re-
for such reasons is insane. On this view, quires information about the intentions of
the assertion that moral rules cannot be the participants, and we are not privy to
justified means that the person making God's intentions. The intentions of men,
the assertion cannot bring himself to do however, are available for investigation,
so. This is not only to play a game without and, although their discovery is no doubt
knowing it, it is also to develop a theory very difficult and present methods for con-
about the rules of the game one is uncon- ducting the search still fairly rudimentary,
sciously playing such that it is forbidden it would seem at least prematureto declare
to entertain the possibility that they are such efforts to be clearly futile.
rules in a game. Thus, life's being a game that all of us
are playing implies the existence of cer-
V tain universal intentions among men, for
In speculating upon the kind of game example, the intentions to seek death and
that life might be, I have confined myself avoid suicide. If investigation, therefore,
to cases in which all of us are participat- were to reveal that there are no such uni-
ing in the same game. But of course the versals, this might show that we are not
possibility that life is one game which we all playing the same game. Instead, inves-
are all playing does not rule out the possi- tigation might reveal that life is made up
bility that it may be, alternatively, several of a number of different games, possibly
games or, if the latter, the possibility that depending upon differences between cul-
their number is as great as the number of tures, nations, classes, vocations, or per-
players, so that each player's game would sons. Or, of course, it might turn out that
be like a game of solitaire. The possibility the lives of men are not games at all. But
that life is a game does not rule out these it is not my purpose to decide these ques-
possibilities any more than it rules out tions or, certainly, to claim that their de-
the possibility that life is not a game at all. cision is easy), only to submit that they
In view of these admissions one might are not, in principle, undecidable.
be led to question the value of the present
undertaking. If life, for all we know, could VI
be anything, then an extended effort to It should be clear from these consider-
show that it could be a game might ap- ations that I am not arguing for the possi-
pear to be, at best, gratuitous. But, in the bility of viewing life as though it were a
first place, no one believes that life can be game. My purpose has been, rather, to set
anything, for example, a pound of brass out the conditions for life's really being
or the square root of two. Some things a game. Recommendations that things be
seem obviously false to say of life. And, viewed as though they were other things
in the second place, while people believe are usually made in the interest of some
certain other things about life which could kind of utility. Thus Kant points out that

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DISCUSSION 213
it is scientifically useful to view nature might disclose unimagined sources of hu-
as though it were governed by ends. And man action and stimulate unexpected feats
we are sometimes exhorted to live each day of human invention. For the newly con-
as though it were our last. Viewing life scious players might be expected to ap-
as though it were a game, accordingly, ply themselves with incalculably greater
might be a beneficial philosophy of life zest and ingenuity to a game whose rules
to adopt, but neither that philosophy nor they for the first time clearly understood
its possible benefits are concerns of the and whose very existence they for the first
present discussion. However, a practical time permitted themselves to cherish. True,
philosophy can be based upon a literal, as the discovery that life is a game might al-
well as upon a metaphorical, reading of so evoke the response that it is therefore
life. Such a philosophy, that is, might not worth the candle, and far from being
arise, not from the recommendationto live a consolation or an inspiration, the philo-
life as though it were a game, but from a sophic vision of life sub specie ludi might
statement of fact followed by a recommen- be a radical-and radically irremediable-
dation: "Life is a game. Live accordingly." disappointment. But even this response
And such a philosophy might claim to pro- would have the merit of being based upon
vide benefits of its own. fact instead of illusion and could, there-
If life is a game, a philosophy based fore, issue in rational conduct. A man who
upon that discovery might provide for discovered that to live is to play a game
mankind consolation equal to that pro- might choose to terminate his participation
vided by an Epicurus or an Epictetus; or, in life. On the other hand, a melancholy
more sanguinely, it might accomplish a man might find consolation in the fact
renascence of man's reflection upon him- that life, although gloomy, is at least a
self comparable to that accomplished by gloomy game. And Homo ludens, who if
a Socrates or a Freud. Thus, one of the life were a game would be the only verus
games that life might be draws the sting homo, would find in that fact his supreme
of death; for death would there be seen, justification. These are visions, to be sure.
not as the most dreaded interrupter of
But they are not, if life is possibly a game,
life, but as life's primary requirement. Or
a less somber possibility can be enter- demonstrably false visions.
tained. The discovery that life is a game UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO

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