Nigeria Conference University of Keele September 1980 "the Federal Character of Nigeria’: Boon of Contentment or Bone of Contention? by AAW.M. KIRK-GREENE, Senior Research Fellow in Afvican Studies St. Antony's College OXFORD June 1980 : Not to be referred to or quoted from without the author's permis:By definition, and by ample declaration, the military government of Nigeria was dedicated to removing the blemishes in the civilian government which Drought about the decline and fall of the First Republic. By extension, and by implication, the Second Republic must be equally committed to preventing the recurrence of the conditions which led to the collapse of its predecessor political regime. Such alone can be the justification of a period of corrective military rule and such is the rationale of the prolonged consultative process which culminated in- the writing and adoption of a new constitution for Nigeria. ‘he constitutional weaknesses of the First Republie [by which shorthand the whole period from independence in 1960 until the coup d'état of 1966 is to be understood, not just the Literal years from 1963 onwards] have been widely identified and condenned. Three vere of particular significance and profound influence. One was ‘Regionalism’, the blatant (alb it quite lawful) ability and the unhesitating readiness of one part of the Federation to dominate (this often less legally) the other constituent parts. ‘The evidence is copious, cumulative, and convincing. Suffice it to quote how General Obasanjo summed it up in his New Year message to the nation for 1979, the year of Nigeria's return to civilian rule: "One major cause of failure of civilian administration in this country was that our leaders then concentrated on the part and ignored the whole: hence regionalism, tribalisw, sectionalism and ethnicity becane the order of the dey" .) A second vulnerability came about as the result of this constitutional imbalance, which (again quite constitutionally) frequently reduced the central government to a non possumus position in face of the overwhelming but legitimate authority of the Regional governments. These two flaws in the constitution ~ blunt negation of classic Whearism - were further exacerbated by the Northern Region alone retaining the services of the original leader of its principal political party in the Regional capital and not, in contrast to the AG/Western Region and NCNC/ Eastern Region experience, finally despatching him to participate in national life in the Federal capital. ‘thirdly, still linked with the fundamental constitutional skewing, was what Richard Sklar acutely identified as the fatal contradiction between the locus of political power (NPG/NN) and that of socio-cconomic pover (aG/Nenc/sy) . (2)-2- In the near-fourteen years between the death of the First Republic and the birch of the Second, two polarised remediew were applied to the solution of Nigeria's dire attack o£ ultra-regionalism. One vas the reconstruction of Nigeria as a unitary state, publicly advanced by Tronsi in Yay 1966: "rigid adherencé to repionalisa was the bane of the last regime and one of’ the main factors which contributed to ee ss structure, but this Hime within a better balanced constitutional setting. (Neither of the other Proposals put forvard at the Ad Hoe Constitutional Conference of September 1966, for @ confederation or for a uniquely Nigerian political system, got off the grouna) .(4) The latter atrategy, of reformed federalion, was initiated in May 1967 by Covon's fragmentation of the four Regions into twelve States: “the main obstacle to future Stability in this country 4s the present structural imbalance dn the Nigerian Federation". >) rt was furcher implemented at. the beginning of 1976 by Murtala Mohammed's re-draving of the twelve State boundaries so as to accommodate nineteen States. land in hand within the fundamental framevork of these constitutiona? reforms decreed between 1967 and 1977 went other me, sures, especially fiscal ones, which gradually enabled the Federal Military Government to extend its centralized authority over the actions of the nation's constituent parts. With the promilgation of the new Constitution in Septenber 1978, the de facto strong centre which had Progressively evolved since 1966 emerged as a a¢ jure one. The new Nigeria could now be seen as determined to legislate out once and for all the constitutional Provisions which had at least set the enabling scone for the demise of the Old Nigeria, Never again would the Regional or State tail be allowed to wag the Federal dog. One further prime contributory cause of the collapse of the First Republic seened fo, the ‘new Nigerians' harder to outlaw by constitutional means. ‘This was the country's prominent, positive, pernicious ethnic imperative ~ the human or group expression, if you Like, of the constitutional imbalance and consequent cut-throat competition. Once more, there is no lack of evidence, from actors and audience alike, of the destabilizing character of the primacy of ethnicity im the politics of the First Republic, Seldom has it been more graphically expressed than in one of the-~3- delegations’ addresses to the abortive constitutional conference held in Lagos in September 1966, when the theory of Auget was advanced as the cxplanatioa of ethnic conflict in Nigeri We all have our fears of one another. Some fear that opportunities in their own areas are Limited and they would, therefore wish to expand and venture unhampered in other parts.. Some fear the sheer weight of numbers of other parts which they feel could be used to the detriment of their own interests. Some fear the sheer weight of skills and the aggressive drive of other groups which they feel has to be regulated, if they are not to be left as the economic, social, and possibly political under-dogs in their ovn areas of origin in the very near future. These fears may be real or imagined; they may.be reasonable or petty. Whether they are genuine or not, they have to be taken account of because they influence to a considerable degree the actions of the groups towards one another and, nore important perhaps, the daily actions Qf) the individual in each group tovards individuals from other groups. In most of the instances of a post~military Second Republic striving to improve on the performance of its predecessor civilian regime, explicit attention to the suppression of destructive ethnicity has not been looked on as a matter for con~ stitutional regulation, Thus in Ghana 1969 and 1979, Upper Volta 1978 and Mali, 1979, the hope has simply been that ethnic rivalry vould automatically be reduced as a result of other constitutional social and economic reforms. The short~Lived Dahoney trofka constitutional device of 1970, whercby regionaliom was recognised to the extent of allowing a rotating leadership based on the three main ethnic areas of the country, can scarcely be looked to as a model for the constitutional control of the ethnic factor in politics: inevitably two ganged up against the third, thereby reformulating the proverb into one's company, two's a crowd and three's a calamity. Nigeria, however, has taken a very different view of the art of ethnic engineering and the anenability of ethnicity to constitutional constraints. Here, right from the early deliberations of the Constitution Drafting Committee in 1975, attention vas focussed on the devastating record of ethnicity in the undoing of the First Republic. A special section was included in the Drafting Committee's ants report, headed "Promotion of National Loyalty in a Mule{-Ethnie Society". disclosed sharp differences in the proposed solution. Nevertheless, the eventual Constitution of the Second Republic is characterised by a vigorous determination to curb and control the potential of ethnicity as a force for national disintegration. Furthermore, this re: s actually translated into the text of the Constitution.Se ‘The key phrase lies in the concept of 'the Federal Character of Nigerta'. tt was a phrase which found wide accepfability as a compromise among the differences of opinion expressed in the Constitution Drafting Committee when they were discussing the composition of bodies or appointing functionaries for the dixeetion of the affairs of the Federal government, It is one which occurs at least a dozen times in the Constitution, the concept of Nigeria's new-found 'federat character! was Probably not far below the surface in the vigorous opposition, during the examining sessions of the Constituent Assembly, to the notion of a separate Shari'a Court Of Appeal: once accept the plea of a special case, it was felt, and every case can be argued as a special one (echoes of Government attitudes towards pay claims for police, nurses, teachers, ete., in this country) and, in the Nigerian instance, bang would go the whole basis for an inviolable ‘federal character! - a state of grace ac fragile and irrevocable as lost virginity. It is interesting to note that the Constitution Drafting Committee, determined to learn from the mistakes of the First Republic, decided to place all its constitutional eggs, as it were, in the ethnic basket of the ‘federal character’, believing that here and not in any socio-economic conflict between the haves and the have-nots (what some would interpret as the incipient class struggle) lay the most dangerous seeds of disaster for the Second Republic. ‘Time alone will tell whether the right insurance policy was taken out. The ‘federal character* was included in the list of definitions attached as Chapter X of the Draft Constitution of 1976, A different definition is included in Section 277 of the 1979 Constitution. The original definition, with the 1979 omission in square brackets, reads thus: : In this Constitution, unless it is otherwise expressly provided or required by the context ~ "federal character of Nigeria" refers to the distinctive desire of the peoples of Nigeria to promote national unity, foster national loyalty and give every citizen of Nigeria a sense of belonging to the nation [notwithstanding the diversities of ethnic origin, culture, language or religion which may exist and which it is their desire to nourish and harness to the enrichment of the Federal Republic of Nigeria]. The 1979 Constitution amends the 1976 definition by dropping the passage in brackets and substituting a reference to"... a sense of belonging to the nation as expressed in Section 14(3) and (4) of this Constitution". ‘this Section 14(3), a revised versionce of the clauses in the draft Constitution, Lays down that: ‘The composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few States or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that goverament or any of its agencies. Section 14(4) refers, » to the composition of state and local fovernnent bodies, culminating in the provision that the conduct of the affairs of any such agency shall be carried out “in such manner as to recognise the diversity of the peoples ‘within its area of authority and the need to promote a sense of belonging and loyalty among all peoples of the Federation". Although this definition is rather wil hy-washy without its amplification in Section 14 (it implies far more than it makes explicit and rests on @ possibly optimistic assumption by the Constitution Drafting Committee ~ viz., the passage in brackets above, not found in the text of the final Constitution), its intent is unaubiguous and to the point: in the interest of nation-butlding, no Nigerian must feel he is excluded fron any aspect of national life simply because of his ethnic provenance. In the words of Section 15, "National integration shall be actively encouraged, whilst discrimination on the grounds of place of origin, sex, religion, status, ethnic or linguistic association or ties shall be prohibited", The concept of the "federal character’ has all the hallmark of being a fundamental principle of the new Constitution for a new Nigeria, Certainly it is entrenched as the decisive factor in the operation of a number of major institutions These include im the Nigerian political and governmental scene (a) the election of the President (b) the formation of political parties (ec) the composition of the Cabinet (4) the recruitment of the armed forces (e) the establishment of Federal Commissions and Councils. For instance, under (a) ~ to take the most widely publicised reference to the Constitution in its first year of operation ~ Section 126 encapsulates the pan- national character of the President's election to office: he requires not only aec majority of the votes cast but also, to emphasise the national and non-sectionat nature of his popularity, he shalt require not less than one-quarter of the votes cast in the election in each of at least two-thirds of all the States. At once the ghost of regionalism inherent in the £irst-past-the-post kind of election has been exorcised by the medium of the 'fedeval character’ hich inspires the Presidential electoral arithnetic, Taking the underlying principle of the ‘federal character! with regard to the topmost elective office one stage further, it was interesting to notice how each of the five political parties recognised by FEDECO as qualified fo participate in the general elections of 1979 took care to nominate the prestdential candidate's running mate from a State (indeed, a 'region', if not a ‘Region') other than the one from which the presidential candidate came. The NPN went a step further still, by “oning' (a perhaps Second Republic euphemism for the First Republic's discredited 'regionalising') the allocation of all the top parliamentary offices, e.g. President of the Senate, Speaker, ete, As for (b), the formation and conduct of political parties ~ among the nost sensitive and the most conspicuous of the ains of the reformist Second Republic ~, it reveals in unmistakable terms the overriding imperative of the 'federal character’ as the criterion for acceptability. Indeed, Section 202 may be looked on ap the layman's interpretation of the basic intent of the ‘federal character! somevhat loosely defined in Section 277, In plain speaking, it withholds the grant of recognition ae a political party from aay association unless (1) neaberahip is open to every citizen of Nigeria, “irrespective of his place of origin, sex, religion or ethnic grouping",and provided (ii) "the name of the association, its emblem or motto does not contain any ethnic or religious connotation or give the appearance that the activities of the association are confined to a part only of the geographical area of Nigeria". ‘this is ona of the clearest statements in the whole Constitution of what the ‘federal character! is getting at. And in the regulations governing the Constitution and rules of political parties, the concept is introduced quite Heerally when Section 203 requires that the members of every political party's exccutive committee shall "reflect the federal choractex of Nigerta", thie to amplified by a clause laying down that the requirement. of reflecting the “federal~ 7. character’ shall be deemed to be met only if the menbers of the executive comaittee belong to different States, "not being less in mumber than two-thirds of the States comprising the Federation". While the application of the constitutional notion of the ‘federal, character! of Nigeria is well-known in respect of examples (a) and (b), the sane cannot yet be caid of items (c) and (a). Maybe they have not had ~ or have not needed to have « the same publicity. Yet both are key areas for the operation of the concept, and both these critical aspects of public 1ife are guaranteed by the Constitution, While, sin the Second Republic, the President is alloved more leeway over the appointment of Federal Ministers insofar a hie choice is no Longer restricted to elected Meubers of Parliament (the National Assenbly), Section 135 imposes on him one restraint which was not constitutionally binding on the Prime Minister of the First Republic. It lays down that in nominating the wenbers of the Federal Cabinet, the President “shall appoint at least one Minister from each State, who shall be an indigene [the term occurs nowhere else in the Constitution and does not appear in the inter pretation Section] of such State". Once again, the federal character* imperative underlies the provision. Even less attention has been patd to the unequivocal extension of this imperative - again, in stark contrast to the situation under the First Republic ~ to the establishment of the Nigerian military. Section 197(2) is precise, concise and telling enough to cite in full: “the composition of the officer corps and other ranks of the armed forces shall reflect the federal character of Nigeria". This attempt to adjust recruitment to the ethnic realities of the country in place of the topsy-turvy imbalance which had characterised the composition of the military up to at least 1967 is something far more fundamental than a replay of the ethnic juggling of the officer corps initiated by the NPC government of the First Republic. In the event, depending on how literally the provision ts interpreted, this may prove a difficult requirement to implement on anything Like terms of state equality. The last example, (e) the establishment of certain Federal Executive Bodics as set out in Section 140, is governed by the provisions of Part 1 of the Third Schedule to the Constitution, Central to the arguments of this paper is the bindingzane application of the ‘federal character" of Nigeria as exemplified in its care to include representation from every gingle State so that none shall have cause to feel that the institutions are confined to a part only of the geographical entity ef Nigeria. Thus the Council of State includes not’ only the Governor of each State but also one other person from each State. ° Similarly, every State is represented on the National Economie Council by its Governor, The Federal Electoral Commiesion As required to have in its composition one menber from every State of the Federation, as also is the National Population Commission, the statutory body charged with the formidable task of carrying out what has relentlessy proved one of Nigeria's most consistently intractable and traumatic problems, a national census. the Cex Panel set up in May this year is to include no less than four men [sic) from cach of the 19 States, selected for their “undoubtful integrity, loyalty and character" [seilicet "federal character'?] What we have, therefore, as an underlying principle of the new Constitution is an explicit recognition of the essentially composite nature of the Federation and ano less unabiguous recipe for its welding into one, This takes the form of the new constitutional concept of 'the federal character of Nigeria’. However, it is arguable that the concept is only half translated by its application to the individual: "giving every Nigerian a sense of belonging to the nation" - “irrespective of his place of origin or ethnic grouping" ~ not giving the appearance that the activities are "confined to a part only of the geographical area of Nigeria", etc, For complete understanding, another half Lies in the emphasis given to the principle of equitability by guaranteeing representation of every State in almost every major national institution — explicitly in the Federal Cabinet, Federal Commission and Councils, and by implication in the comp. tion of the Federal Civil Service and the armed forces - s0 as, to quote the wording of Section 199, "to ensure that [the composition of these institutions] shall reflect the federal character of Nigeria", We may call these two dimensions to the concept of the ‘federal character’ the 'irrespective' and the "irreducible or compositional’ imperatives; or, if you like, the twin principles of ‘equality! and "equation".~9- So far, so good ... at least, on paper. But suppose that the ubiquitous principle of the "federal character', now entrenched as a dominant notif of Nigerian national Life, should becoue extended, logically and with some apparent justification, to other national institutions and aspects of the Federal Government? Would this ipsc cto lead to the same anticipated benefit of the cooling of the Influence of the ethnic factor? Might not the full extension of the fundanental principle of the ‘federal character! to all major national institutions generate a greater threat to the efficacy, even the stability, of the Federation? Let us consider for a moment the Likely result of the application of the twin principles underlying the concept of the ‘federal character’, ethnic equality and stitutions of the Federal State equation, as a possible determinant in three major government where it has not yet been invoked but where, if we read the signs aright, we may soon expect calls for its implementation. These three major, sensitive national institutions where the adoption of the ‘federal character! might have deleterious results are A. The Foreign Service B. The Federal Civil Service C, The Universities (A) and (B) may be taken together. At present, the President is empovered under Section 157 to appoint ambassadors, high commissioners, permanent secretaries of Federal ministries s or their departmental equivalent, the head of the Federal Civil Service and(should this not be @ dual post) the Secretary to the Government of the Federation. However, in making such appointments he "shall have regard to the federal character of Nigeria and the need to prowote national unity". Now this could mean that, interpreted within the spirit of the ‘irreducible’ principle of the ‘federal character", each State will demand ei ther an equal share of the ambassadorshipa and permanent secretaryships or the allocation of at least one State indigene each anong these officcholders. With 19 States already in existence, and with the NPN conmitted in its manifesto to on open-minded policy over the creation of more States (currently the figure of anything from two or three more to another dozen is being talked of), a total of 22 States might well, granted the adoption of- lo - : the ‘conpositional' principle of the 'federal character", mean that every State wot have one Federal permanent secretasy and two or three ambassadors. At once the federal bureaucracy would be exposed to the danger of dilution and veakened by the ejection of the merit principle, For, with say 19 federal permanent s¢eretary- ships allocated at one per State indigene, it could well be that the second most qualified civil servant would be pushed down to No. 20 in the queue and hence not be appointed to the post, just because he came from the same State as the No. 1 candidate, Conversely, it could be that the second appointment went to the 50th or 100th most deserving ~ in absolute terms — candidate simply because he was the sole indigenz from that particular State. While the larger number of aubassadorsh ips reduces the pressure of this argument within the Yoreign Service, the principle of the ‘federal character’ could be pushed to the possibly undesirable, or even discriminatory, demand that when the Aubassador in a major diplomatic mission comes from State A, then the Minister must be a State B indigene and the Counsellor be appointed from state c. gtready confusing enough, imagine the gane of musical chairs involved ~ ox the Limitation on the openness of the next appointment ~ when any one of these diplomats is reassigned 8, retired, or returned to Lagos! There are alxeady signs that the opportunities for State egalitarianism inherent in the ‘federal. character ' - always, of course, in the name of national unity ~ will not be long overlooked. During the recent press criticism over what was seen as the inept handling by Ishaya Audu of his disposition of senior diplomatic staff in Nigeria's key missions abroad, such as London, Washington, New York and Moscow, the Daily Times revealed the State provenance of 69 sexving ambassadors and labelled the imbalance a "mockery of the federal character". jecording to this source, 15 ambassadors came fom Bendel, 7 from Ogun, 6 from Oyo, 5 each from Ondo, Kano and Bauchi, 4 each from Gongola and Kad a, 3 cach from Imo, Lagos, Plateau and Sokoto, and 2 from Cross Kiver. One is from Rivers State, while Borno, Anambra and Niger have no ambassadorial representation (Bemi2 was not Listed). - (12) Another List, drawn up by Mr. 7,0. ob-Manuel of the NPN, purports to show that the five UPN-controlled States of Oyo, Ogua, Onde, Lagos and Bendel have their- ue indigenes in two-thirds of the Federal Government posts above Grade 14 (jt15~16,000), against the 33% of such posts shared between the remaining fourteen States. In the Ministry of External Affairs, Mr. Bob-Manuel alleged, of the Grade 14 posts (that immediately below ambassadorial rank), the distribution ranged from 23 held by Bendel indigenes and 16 from.Ogun through 8 from Kwara and 7 from Kaduna to 1 each from Bene and Boxno, In no way could such a lop-sided distribution be said to fulfil the ‘federal character' of the country imposed upon the President by the Constitution for filling the posts of ambassador and for ensuring that the 'federal character’ is reflected in all federal institutions What is more - perhaps dangerously more - is that the application of this dilutory or egalitarian principle of State representation so as to reflect the "federal character of Nigeria’ may next be sought, after its acceptance at the top levels, in the composition of the whole Federal Civil and Foreign Services. After all, is not the precedent there in the composition of the officer corps and the other ranks of the armed forces (Section 197)? The meritocratic mind boggles at the possible outcone of statism run wild. Turning to the Universities, the existence of a separate and specific paper at this conference means that only two points germane to the context of the "federal character’ need to be made here. ‘The first is that the anticipated demolition of JAMB (Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board), s t up by the Federal Military Government in order to ensure an element of equitable distribution and real mixture among admissions in both the short-term and the long-term national interest, can be construed as a wove against the 'national unity’ dimension of the ‘federal character’ and also an exercise of ite "State representation! dimension. There 4s a certain irony in the fact that, while the new Constitution labours the issue of uational unity and the primacy of the need to reflect the ‘federal character! in the national institutions, even to the extent of converting all the approved universities into federal ones, the intake of students and gradually the appointment of teaching staff are beginning to make some of the universities less national and wore particularistie than they were during the First Republ when twor thirds of them werestatutorily non-federal institutions. Furthermore, there is- 2 - the danger of having thir lass as well as first-class universities within Nigeria Af every State decides to open its own University, without Federal support. Secondly, adnissions policies apart, will the insistence on the ‘federal character! policies be applied, as it was under the Military Government, at the level of rin the interests Vice-Chancellors and Chancellors, where it'was alnost de rigueu of national unity for these appointments to be held by a no “State indigenc? or shall ve see a reversion to local interests?) rhe new government's concessions fon the method of nominating future Vice-Chancéllors, and the reported reluctance of Sone States to send their personnel to the Federal Staff College because of both its location and its teaching statf distribution (or Jack of it), indicate that here, too, we may expect the Universities to favour the "State primsey’ over the ‘ethnic {rvespectivity' interpretation of the "federal chacacter', Nor is it imposible that we shall hear demands for equal State representation in the componition of the Federal Civil Service Commiusion (at present restricted to @ chairman and nine menbers), the Federal Judicial Service Commission, or the Police Service Comission. And the Boards of national parastatals need not expect to remain immune from such equalizing demands, as recent debates in the House of Representatives have begun to make clear, Already the House of Representatives has passed a motion calling for a quota system of adinission into all Federal inotituttons throughout the country. Again, a case has already been nade for the estublishnent of State police forces (Canada and the USA do provide @ precedent), perhaps as a way to get round the present composition of the Nigeria Police which, in curious contrast to the armed forces, has buon excluded fron the constitutional requiresent to reflect the "federal character" of Nigeria.* And vhat de to prevent arguments for equal representation by the conponent areas within certain State civil services, say Katsina versus Zaria in Kaduna State or Kanuri~emirate versus non-Kanuri- emirate areas in Borno State or northern versus southern Zaria in a putative Zaria State ~ always, bien entendu, in the name of the ‘federal chavacter!? If we accept that the explicit principle of the need to reflect the ‘federal character! of Nigeria in all Federal institutions under the Second Republic is preferable tothe implicit ethnic arithmetic to uhich che First Republic frequently resorted, what is the answer to the dangers of dilution or divisiveness (the-B- negation of the very rationale of its conceptyalization) which its extension into other walks of Nigerian public Life could bring about? Pour possible solutions are put forvard for disc sion. First, if the State quota imperative for the composition of the Federal Civil and Foreign Services becones irresistible,’ the Federal Goverament still has several options, There are three distinet levels on which it might be operated, Should the State quota be at initial entry? At every promotion grade? Or at the top post(s) only? Or wonld it be better to operate a dual system, whereby at each Level say X% of the posts would be filled on the basis of minimal State representation and the balance on ‘indigene~irrespective' mei it? Secondly, with regard to the Universities, might a sinilar ‘hal’, ad-half' approach to admissions furnish an acceptable compromise, with perhaps 50% of the places going to the State in which the university is located and the other 50% being allocated to the other States on some agreed formula of distribution? The alternative of inward-Looking, autarkic and progressively inferior colleges fs surely a non-starter. Ethnic and national quotas have long been a fact of life in Malaya and were so in the former East African Community, and more recently in some American universities (Sri Lankan universities are also discussing this approach), while in Fiji race has become a legal category in the recruitment of its public service. Thirdly, if the 19 States increase their number substantially, vould there be a case for 'pairing' or ‘alternates’ in the composition of such institutions as at present require total State representation? Section 14(3) might be construed as allowing this strategy, for it refers to “a few States" rather than “a single State", Too many menbers can ruin a committee just as surely as too many cooks can spoil the broth. Finally, there is the crucial interpretation of the ‘federal character'. Almost forty years ago, in 1943, Six Arthur Richards sought the New Jerusalem in his objective of promoting the unity of Nigeria within the framework of recognising the diverse elements which made up Nigeria, Tt cannot be claimed that he totally succeeded, In 1979, the Nigerian leaders have placed their hopes for national unity dn the principle of the ‘federal character', It, too, carries an inherent tug-of-war between the clains of belonging to the nation and the claims of localue . recognised diversity, How far can one go in insisting on equal representation and on State and individual rights, without rocking the national boat? If ve are to accept the Intent of the concept, nawely that i¢ carries an unambiguous and vachallengable nation-building mandate, then the present definition is too susceptible to extreme interpretations, Part of the fault Lies in the equal weight attaching to the two potentially opposite principles underlying the notion of the ‘federal character", whut I have called the concept of 'irrespectivity' or ‘equality’ (that no Nigerian shall have cause to feel aggrieved or excluded on the grounds of his place of origin, sex, religion or ethase grouping, a principle enshrined in Section 202(b) and (c)) and that of Nirreduesbility! or the: 'eompo~ sitional' concept, that of equation (whereby the couposition of certain key tust tutions shall include representation by at Least one member fron each State, who shall be an indigene therefrom, a principle enshrined in Section 135(3)). These two constitutional imperatives, the 'irrespective’ and the irreducible’, are, if you Like, two sides of a single coin, that of the "federal character’ of Nigeria. It therefore follows that, in the face of calls for its extension to more Federal institutions where its application might do as much harmas good, the ‘federal character! may need to be redefined so ae to reflect the final, supreme and overriding welfare of the nation above that of its component parts, instituttonal (States) or human (citizens). The ‘federal character" needs to emphasise the two-way nature of its purpose: it is to promote nation-building as well as to protect the individual and prevent discriminative dominance, areal or ethnic, The Constitution Drafting Committee got it right when St agreed that loyalty to 1a one's own community cannot be allowed to inhibit or detract: from national loyalty, 4) A rider to the present definition of the ‘federal character! along the Lines of + provided that the application of this prine: ple shall not militate against the fundamental objective of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as a State based on the principles of democracy and social justice and dedicated to the national cthic of discipline, self-reliance and patriotism as laid down in Sectiom 14 and 22 of the Constitution might meet the case, In the final analysis, a sense of patriotisw must take precedence over any feeling of particulartsm or parochialism. ‘the whole- 15 - must remain gre ter then the part; to reverse the priority was the shortcoming of the First Republic. ; The new Constitution may vell have got the ‘irrespective’ principle of the ‘federal character’ right. But pushed too far, its ‘irreducible! or ‘representational' principle could undo the vhole concept. Paradoxically, an all-out application of the pri neiple of ‘irreducibility’ or ‘equation! undexlying the '£ederal character’ could come into head-on conflict with the co-principle of ‘irrespectivity' or ‘equality': in the effort to avoid negative personal, discrimination the clains of positive State discrimination are furthered. One party's poison is another party's meat, If Nigerians can expect to be no Longer discriminated agyalust "on the grounds of origin, sex, ¥ eligion, status, ethnic or linguistic association (Section 15(2)), or by “ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few States or from a fey ethnic or other sectional groups sm the [Federal] Government or in any of its agencics" (Section 14(3)), they may yet find themselves discriminated for (and hence, by reverse-discrimination, against) by virtue of the need to recognise the diversity of the country and by the pressure of 'one-from-each-State' demands. To appoint as Federal permanent secretary or ambassador A in the interests of State equation because he comes from Y State at the same time constitutes reverse-discrimination against Bon the ‘irrespective’ principle because he comes from State Z. In the final analysis, there cannot be a multiplicity of equal loyalti "Loyalty to the nation", Section 15(4) already makes clear, "shall override sectional loyalties". Otherwise, as Gowon once said, if he were to Listen to the voice of every Nigerian, with their national-capacity for infinite regression, the country would end up with 250 States.a. 12. 135 uM, Footnotes, Broadcast Lo the nation, Lagos, 1 January 1979. oklar, "Contradiction in the Nigerian Political systes" + 1965, 201-213. 8 press conference, 21 February 1966, quoted ian AHA. Rix Nigeria, 1970, Vol. 1, 45. Gowon's opening address to the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference, 12 Septenber 1966, veproduced in full in Kirk-Greonc, op.cit., 216-219. Broadcast, Lagos, 27 May 1967, quoted in Kirk-Greeng op.cit., 444. Quoted in -A.H.M. Kirk-Greeng, " Scandinavian Institute of Af st and the Genesis of the Nigerian Civil W can Studies Kesearch Report No. 27, 1975, 20. Report of the Constituet (hagov), Vol. I, 1976, viitnx. A possible parallel was the mathematic Uganda in 1969. In the event, 29 election y al requirements for the election of MPs in held miler these provisions, The notion of zoning and of rotation smong the zones insofax as it reloted to che organisation of the presidential election was firet introduced in the delibexations of the Constituent Assembly and subsequently included in the report of the Constitution Drafting Committee, This Line of argument was advanced by the Bagtern Regional delegation to the vesumed At Mec Constitutional Conference in September 1966. See Kirk-Greene, Grisis and Conflict, 238-239. A comparable convention existed wrong the of the Elite top posts in the Bast African Commnicy Ministries. Sce West Africa, 7 lanvary 1980, 18. t Afvica, 28 January 1980, 140. in 1962~63, there was an ethnic ery of 'Buggins! turn’ when appointments felL due to the Vice-Chancellorships of Lagos and Ubadan Universities. mittee, vili.