Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Table of Contents
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2394 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3847-RTJ), September 01,
2014
EN BANC
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Complainant Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court has had enough of
the respondent, a law practitioner, who had engaged in the unethical
practice of filing frivolous administrative cases against judges and personnel
of the courts because the latter filed a motion to inhibit the complainant from
hearing a pending case. Hence, the complainant has initiated this complaint
for the disbarment of respondent on the ground of gross misconduct and
gross violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Antecedents
xxxx
This Court will not allow that a case be removed from it just because of the
personal sentiments of counsel who was not even the original counsel of the
litigant.
SEPTEMBER 2014
This was so because Atty. Dealca had filed Administrative as well as criminal
cases against this Presiding Judge which were all dismissed by the Hon.
Supreme Court for utter lack of merit. This is why he should not have
accepted this particular case so as not to derail the smooth proceedings in
this Court with his baseless motions for inhibition. It is the lawyers duty to
appear on behalf of a client in a case but not to appear for a client to remove
a case from the Court. This is unethical practice in the first order.
Relative to the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for the Accused filed by Atty.
Vicente C. Judar dated January 29, 2007, the same is hereby DENIED for
being violative of the provisions of Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.
So also, the Appearance of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as new counsel for accused
Philip William Arsenault is likewise DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Consequently, Judge Madrid filed a letter complaint 4 in the Office of the Bar
Confidant citing Atty. Dealcas unethical practice of entering his appearance
and then moving for the inhibition of the presiding judge on the pretext of
previous adverse incidents between them.
On July 17, 2007, the Court referred the matter to the IBP for appropriate
investigation, report and recommendation.7 Several months thereafter, the
Court also indorsed pertinent documents in connection with A.M. OCA IPI No.
05-2385-RTJ, entitled Joseph Yap III v. Judge Jose L. Madrid and Court
SEPTEMBER 2014
On June 6, 2007, the Court in Yap v. Judge Madrid dismissed for its lack of
merit the administrative complaint against Judge Madrid for allegedly
falsifying the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing on March 4,
2005 in Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled Joseph D. Yap V, et al. v. Joseph H.
Yap III, but referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation the propensity of Atty. Dealca to
file administrative or criminal complaints against judges and court personnel
whenever decisions, orders or processes were issued adversely to him and
his clients.9cralawre
xxx
It will be noted that in Bar Matter No. 1197, the respondents were judges
(Judge Jose L. Madrid & Judge Honesto A. Villamor) and lawyers in IBP
Sorsogon Chapters, who are no doubt officers of the court, and the case
aroused (sic) out of the unfavorable consensus of the IBP chapter members
that was adverse to the position of the respondent. The other four (4) cases
aroused [sic] out of the cases handled by respondent for the complainants
who failed to secure a favorable action from the court.
Specifically, Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ was a result of the case
before the sala of Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51) entitled Alita P. Gomez vs.
Rodrigo Jarabo, et al., for: Accion Publiciana and Damages,that was handled
by respondent for the complainant Alita Gomez.
III, entered his appearance and pleaded for the latter. As a result of an
adverse order, this ombudsman case arose.
Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ was also a result of the Civil
Case No. 5403 entitled Salve Dealca Latosa vs. Atty. Henry Amado Roxas,
with Our Ladys Village Foundation and Most Reverend Arnulfo Arcilla, DD as
third party defendant that was heard, tried, decided and pending execution
before the sala of Judge Honesto A. Villamor (RTC 52).
All these four (4) cases are precipitated by the adverse ruling rendered by
the court against the clients of the respondent that instead of resorting to
the remedies available under the Rules of Procedure, respondent assisted his
clients in filing administrative and criminal case against the judges and
personnel of the court.
xxxx
Judge Madrid filed a petition,13 which the IBP Board of Governors treated as a
motion for reconsideration, and soon denied through its Resolution No. XX-
2012-545.14cralawred
Issues
(1) Did Atty. Dealca file frivolous administrative and criminal complaints
against judges and court personnel in violation of the Lawyers Oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility?
(2) Was Atty. Dealca guilty of unethical practice in seeking the inhibition of
Judge Madrid in Criminal Case No. 2006-6795?
SEPTEMBER 2014
I
Atty. Dealca must guard against his own impulse of initiating
unfounded suits
Atty. Dealca insists on the propriety of the administrative and criminal cases
he filed against judges and court personnel, including Judge Madrid. He
argues that as a vigilant lawyer, he was duty bound to bring and prosecute
cases against unscrupulous and corrupt judges and court
15
personnel. cralawred
Although the Court always admires members of the Bar who are imbued with
a high sense of vigilance to weed out from the Judiciary the undesirable
judges and inefficient or undeserving court personnel, any acts taken in that
direction should be unsullied by any taint of insincerity or self-interest. The
noble cause of cleansing the ranks of the Judiciary is not advanced
otherwise. It is for that reason that Atty. Dealcas complaint against Judge
Madrid has failed our judicious scrutiny, for the Court cannot find any trace of
idealism or altruism in the motivations for initiating it. Instead, Atty. Dealca
exhibited his proclivity for vindictiveness and penchant for harassment,
considering that, as IBP Commissioner Hababag pointed out, 16 his bringing of
charges against judges, court personnel and even his colleagues in the Law
Profession had all stemmed from decisions or rulings being adverse to his
clients or his side. He well knew, therefore, that he was thereby crossing the
line of propriety, because neither vindictiveness nor harassment could be a
substitute for resorting to the appropriate legal remedies. He should now be
reminded that the aim of every lawsuit should be to render justice to the
parties according to law, not to harass them.17cralawred
The Lawyers Oath is a source of obligations and duties for every lawyer, and
any violation thereof by an attorney constitutes a ground for disbarment,
suspension, or other disciplinary action. 18 The oath exhorts upon the
members of the Bar not to wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit. These are not mere facile words, drift and
hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep
inviolable.19cralawred
As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of his duty under his Lawyers
Oath not to initiate groundless, false or unlawful suits. The duty has also
been expressly embodied in Rule 1.03, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
SEPTEMBER 2014
Responsibility thuswise:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule 1.03 A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage
any suit or proceeding or delay any mans cause.
His being an officer of the court should have impelled him to see to it that
the orderly administration of justice must not be unduly impeded. Indeed, as
he must resist the whims and caprices of his clients and temper his clients
propensities to litigate,20 so must he equally guard himself against his own
impulses of initiating unfounded suits. While it is the Courts duty to
investigate and uncover the truth behind charges against judges and
lawyers, it is equally its duty to shield them from unfounded suits that are
intended to vex and harass them, among other things. 21cralawred
Moreover, Atty. Dealca must be mindful of his mission to assist the courts in
the proper administration of justice. He disregarded his mission because his
filing of the unfounded complaints, including this one against Judge Madrid,
increased the workload of the Judiciary. Although no person should be
penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate, the right must nonetheless
be exercised in good faith.22 Atty. Dealcas bringing of the numerous
administrative and criminal complaints against judges, court personnel and
his fellow lawyers did not evince any good faith on his part, considering that
he made allegations against them therein that he could not substantially
prove, and are rightfully deemed frivolous and unworthy of the Courts
precious time and serious consideration.
With due respect, what could be WRONG was the summary dismissal of
cases filed against erring judges and court personnel for lack of merit, i.e.
without even discussing the facts and the law of the case.23
Atty. Dealca was apparently referring to the minute resolutions the Court
could have promulgated in frequently dismissing his unmeritorious petitions.
His arrogant posturing would not advance his cause now. He thereby
demonstrated his plain ignorance of the rules of procedure applicable to the
Court. The minute resolutions have been issued for the prompt dispatch of
the actions by the Court.24Whenever the Court then dismisses a petition for
review for its lack of merit through a minute resolution, it is understood that
the challenged decision or order, together with all its findings of fact and law,
is deemed sustained or upheld,25 and the minute resolution then constitutes
the actual adjudication on the merits of the case. The dismissal of the
petition, or its denial of due course indicates the Courts agreement with and
its adoption of the findings and conclusions of the court a quo.26cralawred
SEPTEMBER 2014
The requirement for stating the facts and the law does not apply to the
minute resolutions that the Court issues in disposing of a case. The Court
explained why in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals: 27cralawred
xxxx
The Court is not duty bound to render signed Decisions all the time. It has
ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions, provided
a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case.
II
Atty. Dealca violated Canon 11 and Rule 11.04of the Code of
Professional Responsibility
Atty. Dealca maintains that Judge Madrid should have in good grace
inhibited himself upon his motion to inhibit in order to preserve confidence
SEPTEMBER 2014
Canon 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.
xxxx
Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported
by the record or have no materiality to the case.
In light of the foregoing canons, all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity
and authority of the courts, and to promote confidence in the fair
administration of justice. It is the respect for the courts that guarantees the
stability of the judicial institution; elsewise, the institution would be resting
on a very shaky foundation. 34cralawred
The motion to inhibit filed by Atty. Dealca contained the following averment,
to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Atty. Dealcas averment that Judge Madrid did not hear cases being handled
by him directly insinuated that judges could choose the cases they heard,
and could refuse to hear the cases in which hostility existed between the
judges and the litigants or their counsel. Such averment, if true at all, should
have been assiduously substantiated by him because it put in bad light not
only Judge Madrid but all judges in general. Yet, he did not even include any
particulars that could have validated the averment. Nor did he attach any
document to support it.
SEPTEMBER 2014
Worth stressing, too, is that the right of a party to seek the inhibition or
disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free,
disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case must be
balanced with the latters sacred duty to decide cases without fear of
repression. Thus, it was incumbent upon Atty. Dealca to establish by clear
and convincing evidence the ground of bias and prejudice in order to
disqualify Judge Madrid from participating in a particular trial in which Atty.
Dealca was participating as a counsel. 36 The latters bare allegations of Judge
Madrids partiality or hostility did not suffice, 37 because the presumption that
Judge Madrid would undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to
law and the evidence and without fear or favor should only be overcome by
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 38 As such, Atty. Dealca clearly
contravened his duties as a lawyer as expressly stated in Canon 11 and Rule
11.04, supra.
On a final note, it cannot escape our attention that this is not the first
administrative complaint to be ever brought against Atty. Dealca. In Montano
v. Integrated Bar of the Philippines,39 we reprimanded him for violating Canon
22 and Rule 20.4, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
warned him that a repetition of the same offense would be dealt with more
severely. Accordingly, based on the penalties the Court imposed on erring
lawyers found violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03, 40 and Canon 11, Rule 11.0441 of
the Code, we deem appropriate to suspend Atty. Dealca from the practice of
law for a period one year.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to
be appended to Atty. Dealcas personal record as an attorney; to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
SEPTEMBER 2014
SEPTEMBER 2014
EN BANC
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Case
Antecedents
xxxx
On the same date, Mayor Biron also issued Office Order No. 13 detailing
Catalina V. Belonio (Belonio), another municipal employee, to the office of
the Local Civil Registrar of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo to assume the functions and
duties as Local Civil Registrar-designate effective upon receipt of the order.
Office Order No. 13 reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As such, you are hereby authorized to sign and issue documents relative
thereto including the claim for travel allowance and seminar expenses.
x x x x3
On June 1, 2010, Mayor Biron issued to Causing Memorandum No. 17, Series
of 2010, and Memorandum No. 17-A, Series of 2010, respectively reading as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Memorandum No. 17
You are hereby directed to report to the Office of the Mayor effective
immediately upon receipt of this Order and signing of MCR documents shall
likewise be done at my office where you will be provided with a table for this
particular function.
Office Order No. 12 issued on May 28, 2010 is hereby repealed accordingly.
You are hereby directed to report to the Office of the Mayor effective
immediately upon receipt of this Order. You have to take action on R.A. 9048
and sign MCR documents at my office where you will be provided with a
table for this particular function.
Office Order No. 12 issued on May 28, 2010 is hereby repealed accordingly.
xxxx
5. The issuance of Office Order No. 12 dated May 28, 2010 by the municipal
mayor ordering my detail at the Office of the Municipal Mayor, made within
the election period and without prior written authority from the COMELEC is
illegal and violative of Section 1, Paragraph A, No 1 in connection with
Section 6 (B) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 (Series of 2009) otherwise
known as In the Matter of Enforcing the Prohibition against appointment or
hiring of new employees, creating or filing of new positions, giving any salary
increase or transferring or detailing any officer or employee in the civil
service and suspension of local elective officials in connection with the May
10, 2010 national and local elections;
xxxx
SEPTEMBER 2014
8. Further, said transfer of detail does not fall under any of the exceptions to
the requirement of prior authority from the COMELEC, as provided under
Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737.
x x x x6
Issues
Causing submits that Office Order 12 and Office Order 13 were gross
violations of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737, Series of 2009, that
implemented Section 261 (g), (h), and (x) of the Omnibus Election Code; that
the prohibition contained in said provisions covered any movement during
the election period, whether it was by reassignment, appointment,
promotion, or demotion, regardless of rank, level or salary of the affected
personnel; that her detail to the Office of the Mayor was a clear case of
personnel movement prohibited by law;12 and that Mayor Biron violated the
provisions because he did not secure from the COMELEC the prior authority
to transfer or detail her during the election period. 13cralawred
abuse of discretion in affirming the findings of PES Doronilla to the effect that
there was no probable cause to hold Mayor Biron liable for violating
the Omnibus Election Code; and that the COMELEC En Banc totally
disregarded a crucial piece of evidence the existence of Office Order No.
13 that had ordered the detail of Belonio as the Local Civil Registrar-
designate.14cralawred
In his comment,15 Mayor Biron insists that the petition for certiorari should be
dismissed because of the petitioners failure to file a motion for
reconsideration in the COMELEC, and because of her failure to attach copies
of equally important documents pertinent to the case. 16 He emphasizes that
Office Order No. 12 was issued by his office for the purpose of closely
supervising her in performing her functions after complaints about her
behavior in dealing with her co-workers and with the public transacting
business in her office had been received by his office. 17 He accuses her of
willfully suppressing evidence, specifically the two office orders that clarified
that she would still be performing the functions of her office, albeit in the
Office of the Mayor.18cralawred
Mayor Biron reiterates his counter-affidavit, namely: (a) that there was no
transfer or detail involved, and any movement of Causing, if at all, was a
purely physical transfer, that is, only a few steps from her office to the Office
of the Mayor, without any change in the present work, agency, position, rank
and compensation;19 and (b) that granting without admitting that the
movement constituted reassignment, the same was not covered by the
provisions of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737, which expressly limited the
prohibition to either transfer or detail only.20cralawred
Mayor Biron posits that Office Order No. 13 purportedly ordering the detail of
Belonio as Local Civil Registrar-designate was a mere piece of paper, which
Belonio never received.21 He points out that his actions were upheld by the
decision dated August 13, 2010 of the Regional Office of the Civil Service
Commission dismissing the appeal by Causing of the assailed office
orders.22cralawred
Finally, Mayor Biron asserts that Causing did not demonstrate that the
COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
findings that there was no probable cause to hold him liable for violation of
the Omnibus Election Code.23cralawred
On its part, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG),24 defends its questioned resolution, stating that the
words transfer and detail, having already acquired legislative and
jurisprudential meanings, should not be understood in their literal sense; that
Causing was neither transferred nor detailed; that she was not moved to a
SEPTEMBER 2014
different office with the same rank, level and salary, or to another
agency;25 and that Mayor Birons act of transferring the office space of
Causing was intra vires, and found legal support in the power of supervision
and control accorded to local chief executives under the Local Government
Code.26cralawred
Ruling
1. Procedural Issue:
Causing did not file a motion for reconsideration
before filing the petition for certiorari
Mayor Biron indicates that Causing did not file a motion for reconsideration
before coming to the Court. Causing submits, however, that she was not
required to file the motion for reconsideration because the only recourse of
an aggrieved party from the decision of the COMELEC was the filing of the
petition for certiorari under either Rule 64 or Rule 65.30cralawred
The rule is not absolute, however, considering that jurisprudence has laid
down exceptions to the requirement for the filing of a petition
for certiorari without first filing a motion for reconsideration, namely: (a)
where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have
been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as
SEPTEMBER 2014
those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent
necessity for the resolution of the question, and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government, or of the petitioner, or the subject
matter of the petition is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a
motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where the petitioner was
deprived of due process, and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in
a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent, and the granting of
such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the
lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding
was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i)
where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.
A perusal of the circumstances of the case shows that none of the foregoing
exceptions was applicable herein. Hence, Causing should have filed the
motion for reconsideration, especially because there was nothing in the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure that precluded the filing of the motion for
reconsideration in election offense cases. 32cralawred
2. Substantive Issues:
Mayor Birons acts did not violate the Omnibus Election Code
and the COMELEC Resolution
E.O. Case No. 10-131 was founded on Mayor Birons alleged violation of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8737, Series of 2009, in relation to Section 261(g),
(h) and (x) of the Omnibus Election Code, which respectively
provide:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A. During the election period from January 10, 2010 to June 09, 2010, no
public official shall, except upon prior authority of the Commission:
xxxx
xxxx
(2) Any government official who promotes, or gives any increase of salary or
remuneration or privilege to any government official or employee, including
those in government-owned or controlled corporations.
(h) Transfer of officers and employees in the civil service. - Any public official
who makes or causes any transfer or detail whatever of any officer or
employee in the civil service including public school teachers, within the
election period except upon prior approval of the Commission.
xxxx
Equally material is that Mayor Birons act of transferring the office space of
Causing was rooted in his power of supervision and control over the officials
and employees serving in his local government unit, in order to ensure the
faithful discharge of their duties and functions. 38 His explanation that he
transferred Causings work station from her original office to his office in
order to closely supervise her after his office received complaints against her
could not be justly ignored. Verily, she thereafter continued to perform her
tasks, and uninterruptedly received her salaries as the Municipal Civil
Registrar even after the transfer to the Office of the Mayor.
The issuance of Office Order No. 13 by Mayor Biron detailing Belonio to the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar was not proof of Mayor Birons crystal clear
intention to replace and transfer her during the election period. 39 As the
COMELEC En Banc found, Belonio did not receive the order, and Causing
SEPTEMBER 2014
It is interesting to note that aside from the present election offense case,
Causing initiated an administrative case in the Civil Service Commission to
challenge her reassignment pursuant to the same office orders. In that
administrative case, she referred to the personnel movement not as
a transfer or detail, but as a reassignment that constituted her constructive
dismissal.40 On August 13, 2010, the CSC Regional Office No. 6 in Mandurriao,
Iloilo City ruled that although Mayor Biron used the word detail in referring to
the personnel movement effected, the personnel action that actually took
place, albeit a reassignment, was a valid
reassignment, viz:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the instant case, Causing is not stripped of her functions as Municipal Civil
Registrar (MCR). She was merely required to physically report to the Mayors
Office and perform her functions as Municipal Civil Registrar therein.
Definitely, she is still the MCR, albeit doing her work physically outside of her
usual work station. She is also not deprived of her supervisory function over
the staff as she continues to review their work and signs documents they
prepared. While she may encounter difficulty in performing her duties as a
supervisor as she is not physically near her staff, that by itself, however,
does not mean that she has lost supervision over them. That difficulty,
nonetheless, is not tantamount to constructive dismissal. That Mayor Biron
prefers to ensure that Causing faithfully discharging her duties as MCR is
principally an exercise of his sound judgment and discretion. He alone has
the discretion to decide when to resort to the necessity of implementing
changes in the workplace as he occupies the ideal vantage point and is in
the best position to determine the needs of his agency and how to satisfy
those needs. Besides, contrary to the allegations of Causing, none of the
elements of constructive dismissal is present.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari ; AFFIRMS the
Resolution of the Commission on Elections promulgated on September 9,
SEPTEMBER 2014
2011 dismissing E.O. Case No. 10-131 entitled Elsie S. Causing v. Hernan D.
Biron, Sr.; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.cralawlaw library
SEPTEMBER 2014
EN BANC
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Antecedents
In her memorandum dated September 30, 2010, 4 Lopez neither denied nor
admitted the allegations against her. She dared the OAS instead to allow her
to confront the complainant head on and to openly address each issue, and,
SEPTEMBER 2014
in turn, she would waive the filing of the comment because the comment
would be unnecessary due to anonymous complaints being a dime a
dozen.5 She insinuated that despite anonymous complaints of more serious
nature against employees, officials, and even the Justices of the Court having
abounded, the OAS did not pay attention to, and did not dignify such
complaints by requiring the individuals complained against to
comment.6cralawred
Lopez and Montalvo appeared before the CID on December 1, 2010 and
December 8, 2010 for the clarificatory hearing.9cralawred
During the hearing, Lopez requested the CID to identify the anonymous
complainant and to allow her to confront the latter.10 However, the CID
denied her request, explaining that there was no need to identify the
complainant because she herself could either confirm or repudiate the
allegations of the letter-complaint against her. 11 Being thereafter reminded of
her oath to tell the truth, she relented and revised her earlier statements by
clarifying that she was not denying all the allegations against her.
Specifically, Lopez denied the allegation that she had lent money to around
300 court employees, and that she had held their ATM cards in her custody
as collateral;12 but admitted having lent money to only about 20 personnel of
the janitorial agency and to some low-ranking employees of the Court, like
the utility workers and messengers for a period of two years, 13 with the
amounts lent ranging from P500.00 to P2,000.0014 depending upon the
amounts needed and the availability of money. She said that she would
receive only P10.00 for every P100.00 borrowed that she did not consider as
interest.15 She insisted that she did not require her borrowers to pay her the
P10.00 for every P100.00 borrowed because they voluntarily gave her the
amount; and that she did not engage in money lending because she did not
offer to lend money to anyone.
Lopez acknowledged that she was the only person in the Checks
Disbursement Division of FMBO who had lent money, absolving Montalvo and
the other members of the staff of that office by saying that they had nothing
to do with her transactions.16 She stressed that her transactions did not
result in any conflict of interest, and did not compromise the integrity of her
office because her transactions had been done during break times or outside
of office hours.17cralawred
SEPTEMBER 2014
On his part, Montalvo denied the charges against him, maintaining that the
anonymous letter-complaint was a malicious attempt to damage his
reputation and the reputation of his office. 18 He declared that he lent money
only to closest acquaintances as was customary among friends.19cralawred
After completing its investigation, the CID received a second undated but still
anonymous letter-complaint,20 which alleged that Lopez had continued her
lending activities at usurious rates of interest despite the pendency of the
first complaint.
In her memorandum dated June 6, 2011, 21 Atty. Eden Candelaria, the Chief
Administrative Officer of the OAS, directed Lopez to comment on the second
complaint within five days from receipt.22cralawred
Here, therefore, the anonymous complaint has to be dealt with, and its
veracity tested with utmost care, for it points the finger of accusation at two
employees of the Court for engaging in money-lending activities at
unconscionable rates of interest, with low-ranking employees of the Court as
their targets. That such a complaint, albeit anonymous, has been made
impacts on their reputations as individuals as well as on their integrity as
personnel of the Court itself. We cannot ignore the complaint, hoping that it
will be forgotten, but must inquire into it and decide it despite the anonymity
of the complainant. Any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those
involved in the administration of justice that violates the norms of public
accountability and diminishes or even just tends to diminish the faith of the
people in the Judiciary cannot be countenanced. 31 It is for this reason that all
anonymous but apparently valid complaints are not quickly dismissed but are
justly heard and fairly investigated and determined by this Court.
The respondents are both responsible fiduciary officers in the FMBO, the
office that is in charge of all the financial transactions of the Court, including
the preparation and processing of vouchers to cover the payment of salaries,
allowances, office supplies, equipment and other sundry expenses, utilities,
janitorial, and security services, and maintenance and other operating
expenses, and the issuance of corresponding checks therefor. Indeed, the
respondents discharge the delicate task of handling the payment of
employees salaries and allowances.
1. Re: Montalvo
The Court concurs with the findings of the OAS that the complaint against
Montalvo had no factual basis. His involvement in money lending was not
shown to be habitual, going on only as far as accommodating his friends
during their personal emergencies without imposing any interests. The
statement in the letter-complaint to the effect that both respondents have
been in the forefront of syndicated lending activities was not supported by
any proof. It is notable that Montalvo firmly denied the allegations against
him, and that Lopez corroborated his denial. 32 Accordingly, the complaint
against Montalvo should be dismissed.
2. Re: Lopez
10% interest on the money borrowed (i.e., P10 for every P100
borrowed);35 (c) the money lent had ranged from P500.00 to P5,000.00; 36 (d)
her regular borrowers had included the utility workers,37 and the low-salaried
court employees,38 like court messengers;39 (e) she had engaged in such
activity for more than two years already; 40 (f) she had attended to the
transactions around 3:30 oclock in the afternoon and at times during break
time;41 (g) she had taken hold of at least 10 but not more than 20 ATM cards
of her borrowers as collateral;42 (h) the money she had lent to the borrowers
had been proceeds from her Coop or SCSLA personal loans; 43 and (i) she had
also accommodated her office staff whenever they did not have money in
going to and from the office.44cralawred
From the foregoing, this Office has established that Ms. Lopez is guilty of
lending money with interest which at most would reach up to 10% of the
total amount borrowed. While she denied that the loan is somewhat like the
famously known 5-6 loan, as she denied charging the employees with
usurious interest because she is just accommodating them to lessen their
financial burdens and it is the employees themselves who would insist on
paying interest voluntarily, this Office nonetheless finds the act improper.
Even if she was motivated solely by her earnest desire to help employees in
dire need of money, the fact remains that she lends money for a
consideration. It would have been different perhaps if she lends money
without any voluntary interest as she claimed.
In fact, she is not even obliged to lend money to them. It is beyond her duty
to answer every financial difficulties of the employees. While there is no law
or rules and regulations which prohibits charity or generosity among court
employees, what is unacceptable is her act of lending money for a
consideration and within the premises of the Court on official time.
Worse, she is the Chief of the Checks Disbursement Division that handles the
preparation and issuance of checks to court employees. It is beyond
question that her official functions consist of, among others, the supervision
of office staff. This gives us the impression that she took advantage of her
position and abused the confidence reposed in her office, thus, placing at risk
the integrity of the division and the whole Fiscal Management and Budget
Office (FMBO). As an officer of the FMBO she can be privy of the benefits
which may be given. From there, employees can borrow and/or advance
money from her and where she may easily accede knowing that after all
there will be benefits forthcoming.
Thus, this Office concludes that her actuation although not related to her
official functions as division chief, has undeniably fell short of the high
SEPTEMBER 2014
Moreover, she has demeaned the image of the office which she represents,
by the fact that she utilized her office in the conduct of her lending business.
Courts are considered temples of justice and should never be utilized for any
other purpose. Her claim that she conducts her business during lunch breaks
and/or after office hours is of no moment. The fact remains that it is done
within the premises of the Court and presumably inside their office where
official resources are utilized. This alone is highly reprehensible. By allowing
anybody to enter their office solely for the purpose of borrowing money, she
has compromised the safety of the Checks Disbursement Division. The Code
of Conduct for Court Employees specifically Canon I, Section 5 provides that
Court personnel shall use the resources, property and funds under their
official custody in judicious manner and solely in accordance with the
prescribed statutory and regulatory guidelines or procedures.
Worthy to note is the observance made and reports received by this Office,
that a good number of Court employees are heavily indebted to various
entities because of lack proper financial planning. This leads them to obtain
excessive debt and be financially dependent on others. It is for this reason
that the Honorable Chief Justice directed the conduct of the seminar on
financial and debt management for Court employees entitled. Towards
Financial Independent. This is aimed, among others, to help employees
manage their finances. With the presence, however of employees such as
SEPTEMBER 2014
The Court agrees with the observations and findings of the OAS about Lopez
having engaged in money-lending activities. Her various admissions entirely
belied her insistence that her activities did not constitute money lending. Her
claim that the amounts voluntarily given to her by the recipients had not
been interests on the loans extended to them was plainly insincere. The fact
of her parting with her money in favor of another upon the condition that the
same amount would be paid back was exactly what constituted a loan under
the law. In a contract of loan, according to Article 1933 of the Civil Code,
one of the parties delivers to another, either something not consumable so
that the latter may use the same for a certain time and return it, in which
case the contract is called a commodatum; or money or other consumable
thing, upon the condition that the same amount of the same kind and quality
shall be paid, in which case the contract is simply called a loan or mutuum.
Administrative Circular No. 5 (Re: Prohibition for All Officials and Employees
of the Judiciary to Work as Insurance Agents), dated October 4, 1988, has
prohibited all officials and employees of the Judiciary from engaging directly
in any private business, vocation or profession, even outside their office
hours. The prohibition has been at ensuring that full-time officers and
employees of the courts render full-time service, for only thereby could any
undue delays in the administration of justice and in the disposition of court
cases be avoided.46 The nature of the work of court employees and officials
demanded their highest degree of efficiency and responsibility, but they
would not ably meet the demand except by devoting their undivided time to
the government service.47 This explains why court employees have been
enjoined to strictly observe official time and to devote every second or
moment of such time to serving the public. 48cralawred
Considering that the official and personal conduct and deportment of all the
people who work for the Judiciary mirrored the image of the Court
itself,50 they should strive to comport themselves with propriety and decorum
at all times, and to be above suspicion of any misdeed and
misconduct.51 Only thereby would they earn and keep the publics respect for
and confidence in the Judiciary. As a public servant, therefore, Lopez knew
only too well that she was expected at all times to exhibit the highest sense
of honesty and integrity. No less that the Constitution itself impresses this
expectation in Section 1 of its Article XI, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all
times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives.
Lopez was quite aware that the foregoing declarative language of the
Constitution on the nature of her public office and her responsibilities as a
public officer was not mere rhetoric expressing idealistic sentiments, but a
definite working standard and a statement of attainable goals that the actual
deeds of the public officers and employees should match. She plainly
disregarded the Constitution.
pay was meted on a Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities for
engaging in the lending business;58 and dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of all the benefits due became the condign punishment for a clerk
who had worked as part-time sales agent of an appliance center, and who
had committed other offenses, specifically, the falsification of her daily time
records and the infliction of physical injuries on the complainant in a public
place under scandalous circumstances.59cralawred
Before closing, we note that the respondents made the following statements
in their respective memorandums,60 to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Montalvo
Lopez
The respondents thereby flagrantly accused the Court, acting through the
OAS, of being unfairly selective in causing their investigation upon the
anonymous complaint but ignoring the far more serious accusations
SEPTEMBER 2014
against employees, officials and justices even. Their accusation has tended
to diminish the publics faith and confidence in the Court itself.
SO ORDERED.cralawlaw library
SEPTEMBER 2014
EN BANC
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Before us is the administrative matter inquiring into the loss of 140 reams of
long copy paper, and 40 reams of short copy paper, valued at P27,000.00,
delivered to the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA). The loss was criminal
theft by all means.
Also for our consideration now is the application for the release of his
retirement benefits due to his intervening compulsory retirement from the
service on his 65th birthday on August 17, 2012 of one of the employees
under investigation.
Antecedents
On October 23, 2008, Bocs Trading Co., Inc. delivered 1,300 reams of short
copy paper and 1,100 reams of long copy paper to the Supreme Court
intended for the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA). As instructed by
Administrative Officer Ma. Christina M. Recio, the delivery was initially
accepted by Ryan Orcullo, the Property Custodian of the PHILJA, because
Supply Officer II Isidro Austria and Store Keeper IV Lenin Mario Ordoez, both
of the Property and Supply Section, PHILJA Administrative Office, were then
not around. The first batch of copy paper, consisting of 300 reams long copy
paper and 800 reams of short copy paper, were unloaded under the
supervision of Orcullo and brought directly to the stock rooms and available
spaces at the premises of the PHILJA. When Orcullo left for his lunch break,
Ordoez took over. The rest of the delivery were unloaded from the delivery
truck at the Centennial Building of the Court upon the instruction of Ordoez.
SEPTEMBER 2014
With the help of Judicial Staff Employee II Elizalde S. Carmona, Ordoez then
initiated the transfer of the copy paper to the stockroom and the
Reproduction Room (Repro Room) of the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) in the Supreme Court Multipurpose Building located in the SC New
Building. In the afternoon of October 23, 2008, Orcullo informed
Administrative Officer Recio that 400 reams of short copy paper and 40
reams of long copy paper were missing.
In his letter dated October 27, 2008, Atty. Rodel O. Hernandez formally
reported the missing boxes of copy paper belonging to the PHILJA to PHILJA
Vice Chancellor Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr., disclosing that the preliminary
investigation conducted by Administrative Officer Recio and HR Officer III Ma.
Lourdes Pelaus revealed that: (a) Austria had admitted having used the SCs
Lite Ace van with Plate No. SEF 868 to unload 50 reams of short bond paper
contained in five boxes in Intramuros to pay his outstanding personal debt of
P5,000.00; but had denied any involvement in the loss of the other boxes of
copy paper; (b) Ordoez had claimed that he supervised and made the
transfer of 300 reams in 30 boxes of long bond paper to the OCA stock room,
but the verification had shown only 270 reams in 27 boxes; he had admitted
riding the PHILJA van with Plate No. SFV 785 to deliver the reams of copy
paper to the Repro Room without the proper trip ticket, leaving the boxes of
copy paper there without padlocking the stockrooms; (c) driver Eusebio M.
Glor of the Administrative Division had admitted driving the Lite Ace van with
Plate No. SEF 868 to Intramuros with Austria on board, and had
acknowledged facilitating the unlawful transfer of 50 reams of copy paper in
50 boxes; but had denied knowledge of the remaining missing boxes of copy
paper; and (d) Carmona had driven the PHILJA van with Plate No. SFV 785
upon the request of Ordoez without the corresponding trip ticket, and had
assisted Ordoez only in the transfer of the boxes from the OCA stockroom to
the Repro Room.1cralawred
In his comment,2 Ordoez reiterated his denial of any knowledge of the loss
of the 30 boxes of long copy paper from the OCA stockroom, but admitted
that he had initiated the transfer upon the instructions of Administrative
Officer Recio. He claimed that he had merely endorsed the copy paper to
Orcullo as the PHILJA Property Custodian tasked with overseeing the supplies
in the stockroom; that it was already the practice in the PHILJA to bring to or
take supplies from the Repro Room with the help of any available PHILJA
drivers even without any corresponding trip tickets although the drivers
SEPTEMBER 2014
might have other driving assignments; and that even the guards were aware
of the practice.
On his part, Austria conceded that he had used the 50 reams of papers to
pay for the copy paper he had borrowed from one Mr. Roy of the Jimmy Roy
Trading, a supplier of toners, inks, and sometimes copy paper. He denied that
the copy paper was payment for his personal loan, maintaining that he had
only borrowed the copy paper in order to avoid delays for an upcoming
PHILJA training. Recalled by the OAS, however, Austria retracted, and pointed
to Glor as having taken the copy paper. According to him, Glor even planned
their purported escape.
Glor declared that Austria had instructed him to load five boxes of short copy
paper in the van, and directed him to proceed to a place in Intramuros,
where someone else unloaded the copy paper. Recalled by the OAS, Glor
likewise recanted, averring instead that the paper had been unloaded by
Austria on Orosa St. near the Philam Insurance Company; and that he had
been coached by Austria on what their version would be. 3cralawred
After conducting the investigation, the OAS concluded that Ordoez had
failed to exercise the required diligence in the performance of his task in
overseeing the delivery of the copy paper by not seeing to the safe storage
of the copy paper, and by not properly endorsing the copy paper to his office
or to the security guard assigned in the area where he had left the reams of
copy paper. The OAS pointed out that the loss of the copy paper from the
OCA stockroom had been Ordoezs fault, because he was the person in
charge of the stockroom; that Ordoezs negligence had facilitated the theft
of the 50 reams by Austria and Glor; and that the theft had resulted in the
loss of approximately P27,000.00 by the Court.4cralawred
The OAS found that Austria and Glor had committed perjury by giving false
statements, as borne out by the incongruence of their initial narration of
facts and their subsequent statements blaming each other as the perpetrator
of the theft of the copy paper; that it was clear that their act of taking the
copy paper without authority constituted theft; that they were liable for
serious dishonesty considering that their acts were attended by certain
circumstances that rendered their offense serious, namely: (a) damage and
prejudice to the Government; (b) moral depravity; and (c) employment of
fraud or falsification of official documents in committing the dishonest
acts.5cralawred
As to Carmona, the OAS observed that he was still responsible for securing
the trip ticket as a driver even if he had been requested to help
Ordoez,.6cralawred
SEPTEMBER 2014
A. x x x
II. For having been found guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty, Mr. Lenin
Mario M. Ordoez, be meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from
the service with forfeiture of benefits except accrued leave
credits;
C. This Office submits for the Courts information, the Memorandum with
supporting documents dated February 20, 2009 of Justice Justo P.
Torres, Jr., Vice Chancellor, PHILJA, providing (a) their stock position as
of December 2008; (b) documents showing distribution of supplies and
materials to the various PHILJA offices/divisions; (c) information that
the PHILJA has implemented stricter rules in order to resolve any form
or (sic) waste or pilferage at PHILJA.
Meanwhile, on May 4, 2009, Ordoez resigned from the PHILJA, citing the
approval of his familys visa application for immigrant status in Canada as
the reason for his resignation.8 On June 23, 2009, the Court En
SEPTEMBER 2014
Subsequently, the parties manifested that they were submitting the case for
resolution upon the pleadings filed.10cralawred
On August 20, 2014, the Third Division directed the consolidation of A.M. No.
2014-025-Ret. with A.M. No. 2008-23-SC.11 The Banc accepted the
consolidation on September 9, 2014.
Ruling
After reviewing the records, we are satisfied with and adopt the findings of
the OAS.
It can never be said often enough that the conduct of judges and court
personnel must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum at all
times but must also be above suspicion. In this regard, respondent Sevillo
SEPTEMBER 2014
For making false statements, committing perjury and stealing the copy
paper, Austria and Glor are guilty of grave misconduct, 19 gross dishonesty,
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Their dismissal
from the service is the proper penalty, with forfeiture of retirement benefits,
except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from re-
employment in the Government. In addition, the records of the case should
be referred to the Department of Justice for investigation with a view to the
filing, if warranted, of the appropriate criminal proceedings.
On August 17, 2012 and during the pendency of A.M. No. 2008-23-SC,
Austria turned 65 years old and was deemed compulsorily retired from the
service. He applied for retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 8291 (The
Government Service Insurance Act of 1997), and his application was
docketed as A.M. No. 2014-025-Ret. The OAS recommended on July 30, 2104
that the benefits of Austria under Republic Act No. 8291 could be paid to him
by the Government Service Insurance System subject to the usual clearance
requirements. As stated, the Third Division of the Court directed the
consolidation of A.M. No. 2014-025-Ret. with A.M. No. 2008-23-SC, and the
Banc accepted the consolidation on September 9, 2014.
The fact that Austria meanwhile reached the compulsory retirement age did
not render A.M. No. 2008-23-SC moot, let alone release him from whatever
liability he had incurred while in the active service. The jurisdiction acquired
by the Court continues despite his compulsory retirement. Indeed, the Court
retains its jurisdiction to declare a respondent either innocent or guilty of the
charge even in the extreme case of the respondents supervening death. If
innocent, the respondent receives the vindication of his name and integrity
by declaring his service in the Government to be well and faithful; if guilty in
SEPTEMBER 2014
anyway, he deserves the sanction just and appropriate for his administrative
sin.20cralawred
Austria is now being held guilty of the grave offenses of gross dishonesty and
grave misconduct, (either of which is punishable by dismissal for the first
offense), as well as of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
but since the penalty of dismissal could no longer be imposed on him, the
Court forfeits all benefits to which he could be entitled, except accrued leave
credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of
the Government, including Government-owned and Government-controlled
corporations, and fines him in the amount equivalent to his salary for his last
six (6) months in the service to be deducted from whatever accrued leave
benefits remained for him. Hence, his request in A.M. No. 2014-025-Ret. for
the release of his compulsory retirement benefits under R.A. No. 8291 is
denied.
Ordoez is guilty of gross neglect of duty. Even if he did not have a direct
hand in the theft of the copy paper, his negligence facilitated the theft. As
correctly found by the OAS, he failed to safely store and to endorse the copy
paper to the assigned security personnel; and that he did not also conduct
an actual count and make a record of all the reams of copy paper delivered
to his safekeeping. Had he been diligent in performing his tasks and
responsibilities as a Storekeeper IV, 23 Austria and Glor would not have
managed to take out the reams of copy paper out of the stockroom, of which
he was then in charge. Indeed, he so admitted this during the
investigation.24cralawred
omission cannot escape the disciplinary power of this Court. 26 The imposable
penalty for gross neglect of duty is dismissal from the service.
The Court DENIES the application of ISIDRO T. AUSTRIA in A.M. No. 2014-
025-Ret. for the release of his compulsory retirement benefits under Republic
Act No. 8291.
The Office of the Court Administrator is instructed to refer the records of this
administrative case to the Department of Justice for investigation and filing,
if warranted, of the appropriate criminal proceedings against ISIDRO T.
AUSTRIA, EUSEBIO M. GLOR and LENIN MARIO M. ORDOEZ.
SO ORDERED.cralawlaw library
SEPTEMBER 2014
SEPTEMBER 2014
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Antecedents
To answer the complaint for illegal dismissal, Del Rosario laid out the reason
for the termination of the petitioner in her position paper, as follows:
In his decision dated August 23, 1999, Labor Arbiter Cresencio G. Ramos, Jr.
dismissed the petitioners complaint for lack of merit.3cralawlawlibrar
The petitioner sought reconsideration, but the NLRC denied her motion to
that effect.5cralawlawlibrary
On July 23, 2001, the petitioner commenced her special civil action
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA), alleging in her petition that the
NLRC had committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that there had been
just cause for her dismissal, and that Del Rosario had complied with the
requirements of procedural due process.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
Hence, the petitioner appeals, asserting that the CA erred in finding her
dismissal from employment to have been upon just cause; that there was no
substantial evidence showing the existence of just cause for her dismissal;
and that because the CA held that she had been deprived of her right to due
process, its finding of the existence of just cause for her dismissal was not
based on facts but on speculation and assumption.8cralawlawlibrary
Ruling
The just and valid causes for the dismissal of an employee, as enumerated in
Article 282 of the Labor Code, include: (a) serious misconduct or willful
disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
SEPTEMBER 2014
representative in connection with her work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by
the employee of her duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee
of the trust reposed in her by her employer or duly authorized
representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee
against the person of her employer or any immediate member of her family
or her duly authorized representative; and (e) other causes analogous to the
foregoing.
In his decision, which the NLRC affirmed for being correct, the Labor Arbiter
relevantly concluded as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
After going over the evidence adduced by the respondent in support of its
averments and principal defense, this Office finds the same to be reasonably
sufficient to arrive at the conclusion that complainant was indeed guilty of
the act(s) of dishonesty imputed upon her. Certainly, the aforesaid
dishonest act(s) committed by the complainant logically triggered
an erosion of the trust reposed upon him [sic] by his [sic] employer
and jurisprudence is explicit on the point that when an employee has been
guilty of breach of trust or his employer has ample reason to distrust him, a
labor tribunal cannot deny the employer the authority to dismiss
him.9 (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioner casts doubt on the affidavit of Caranay, Jr. by stating that he
was only forced to execute the affidavit in view of his being under the control
and moral domination of the respondent. 10The Court cannot sustain her,
however, considering that she did not present evidence either to discredit his
execution of the affidavit or to show his ill will or malice towards her.
The petitioner argues that she did not need to dispute the charge of
dishonesty or theft of her employers funds because she had the
presumption of innocence in her favor.11cralawlawlibrary
Records reveal that private respondent gave the petitioner 72 hours from
receipt of the letter dated March 25, 1998 within which to give her
explanation why she should not be dismissed from service because of the
earlier discussed acts alluded against her. Yet, private respondent did not
present in evidence such letter which petitioner allegedly refused to
acknowledge receipt. It is well to note that even before the Labor Arbiter,
petitioner had already been complaining of the denial of this required first
notice to explain her side of the charge against her. Under our Labor laws,
two (2) written notices are required before termination of employment can
be legally effected which are: (1) notice which apprises the employee of the
particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and, (2) the
subsequent notice to which informs the employee of the employer's decision
to dismiss him; not to mention the opportunity to answer and rebut the
charges against him, in between such notices (Legahi vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, 318 SCRA 446 [1999]; Masagana Concrete Products
vs. NLRC, 313 SCRA 576 [1999]).
xxxx
In our view, the CA thereby erred. It overlooked the fact that the respondent
had presented to the Labor Arbiter as Annex 2 of her position paper the
respondents letter dated March 25, 1998 requiring the petitioner to submit
her explanation.15 The letter, which was self-explanatory, was actually quoted
verbatim in the August 31, 2000 resolution of the NLRC, 16 as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Lastly, the petitioner posits that the CA should have applied the
pronouncement in Serrano v. National Labor Relations Commission 19 instead
of that in Wenphil Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission. 20 To
recall, the Court held in Wenphil Corporation that the employer should still
be sanctioned with an order to indemnify the dismissed employee despite
the termination being for cause provided the employer did not observe due
process. This holding was modified in Serrano, with the Court ruling that
where due process (i.e., the two-notice rule) was not observed, the employer
should award the dismissed employee full backwages as the penalty for the
violation of due process. Essentially, Serrano tightened the penalty
in Wenphil Corporation from mere indemnity to full backwages.
The position of the petitioner is untenable for two reasons. Firstly, Serrano
has been abandoned in Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission ,21 in
which the Court ruled that if the termination was valid but due process was
not followed, the employee remains dismissed but the employer must pay an
indemnity heavier than that imposed in Wenphil Corporation but lighter than
full backwages. In effect, Agabon partly restored the doctrine in Wenphil
Corporation. And, secondly, both Wenphil Corporation and Serrano should
apply only when there is a finding that the termination was valid but the
requirement of due process was not followed. Obviously, neither would be
applicable to the petitioner whose dismissal was valid and legal, and the
respondent as her employer complied with the demands of due process.
In view of the foregoing, the NLRC did not commit any abuse of discretion,
least of all a grave one, in upholding the decision of the Labor Arbiter
dismissing the petitioners complaint for illegal dismissal. Grave abuse of
discretion, according to De los Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Corporation,22must be grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi-
judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board
evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or
to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical
manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.cralawred
SEPTEMBER 2014
SEPTEMBER 2014
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Court affirms the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs over
seizure cases within the Subic Freeport Zone.
The Case
This appeal by petition for review on certiorari is brought by Agriex Co., Ltd.
to reverse the decision promulgated on November 18, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 67593,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed its petition
for certiorari and prohibition to nullify and set aside the Notice of Sale dated
October 18, 2001 issued by respondent Billy C. Bibit as the Collector of
Customs in the Port of Subic.
Antecedents
On July 19, 2001, the petitioner, a foreign corporation whose principal office
was in Bangkok, Thailand, entered into a contract of sale with PT. Gloria Mitra
Niagatama International of Surabaya, Indonesia (PT. Gloria Mitra) for 180,000
bags (or 9,000 metric tons) of Thai white rice. 2 Later on, it entered into
another contract of sale with R&C Agro Trade of Cebu City (R&C Agro Trade)
for 20,000 bags of Thai white rice. On July 27, 2001, it chartered the vessel
MV Hung Yen to transport the 200,000 bags of Thai white rice to the Subic
Free Port for transshipment to their designated consignees in the Fiji Islands
and Indonesia (for the 180,000 bags), and in Cebu City (for the 20,000
bags).3 The MV Hung Yen left Bangkok, Thailand on August 15, 2001 and
arrived at the Subic Free Port on August 20, 2001 with the inward foreign
manifest indicating the final destinations of the shipment. However, the Sea
Port Department of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) allowed the
vessel to berth only 22 days later, or on September 11, 2001. SBMA advised
the vessel agent to secure from the National Food Authority (NFA) an
amendment of the import permit issued in favor of R&C Agro Trade to change
the discharging port from the Port of Cebu to the Port of Subic.
SEPTEMBER 2014
Due to the delay in the berthing and unloading of the cargo from the vessel,
the petitioner, through its agent in Subic, applied for a vessel exit clearance
to allow the MV Hung Yen to sail for the Labuan Free Port in Malaysia. On
August 24, 2001, the Bureau of Customs issued a Clearance of Vessel to a
Foreign Port, granting the petitioners request to allow the MV Hung Yen and
cargo to exit for Malaysia.4 Despite the issuance of the clearance, the MV
Hung Yen did not set sail for the Labuan Free Port on August 26, 2001.
Accordingly, Collector Bibit issued WSD No. 2001-13 dated September 12,
2001 against the 20,000 bags of Thai white rice consigned to R&C Agro Trade
notwithstanding that no bag of rice had yet been unloaded from the
vessel.8cralawlawlibrary
After the unloading, transfer and storage of the rice shipment at SBMAs
warehouse, Collector Bibit issued amended WSDs on September 27, 2001 to
cover the MV Hung Yen and the remaining 180,000 bags of Thai white rice
intended for transshipment.9cralawlawlibrary
On October 4, 2001, the petitioner filed with the Bureau of Customs in the
Port of Subic an Urgent Motion to Quash Warrant of Seizure, inclusive of WSD
No. 2001-13 (20,000 bags consigned to R&C Agro Trade), WSD No. 2001-13A
(MV Hung Yen) and WSD No. 2001-13B (180,000 bags for
transshipment).10cralawlawlibrary
On October 26, 2001, Collector Bibit quashed WSD No. 2001-13A over the
MV Hung Yen on the ground that the vessel was not chartered or
leased.11cralawlawlibrary
motion.13cralawlawlibrary
The respondents did not file their Comment vis--vis the petition
for certiorari and prohibition. Instead, they filed a Manifestation and Motion
dated December 3, 2001, whereby they prayed for the dismissal of the
petition on the ground of mootness due to Commissioner Villanuevas
November 19, 2001 memorandum.17cralawlawlibrary
Meanwhile, on November 14, 2001, Collector Bibit denied the motion for the
quashal of the warrant of seizure issued against the rice shipments, and
ordered their forfeiture in favor of the Government.19cralawlawlibrary
The petitioner appealed the November 14, 2001 ruling by Collector Bibit to
Commissioner Villanueva,20 who resolved the appeal through the
Consolidated Order of February 4, 2002, disposing
thusly:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Let copies of this Order be furnished to all parties and offices concerned for
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.21
On February 20, 2002, the petitioner filed in the CA its Comment on the
respondents Manifestation and Motion dated December 3, 2001, arguing
that the issue concerning the October 18, 2001 Notice of Sale had not been
rendered moot and academic but merely suspended; that it would move for
the reconsideration of the February 4, 2002 Consolidated Order of
Commissioner Villanueva; and that should its motion for reconsideration be
denied, it would elevate the issues relative to the injunctive relief to the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) by petition for certiorari.22cralawlawlibrary
Judgment of the CA
Although it is true that the Port of Subic is a free zone, being a portion of the
Subic Special Economic Zone, and as such, it shall be operated and managed
as a separate customs territory ensuring free flow or movement of goods and
capital within, into and exported out of the Subic Special Economic Zone
under Republic Act No. 2779 (sic), particularly Section 12 thereof, yet, when
probable cause is shown that the foreign goods are considered as
contraband or smuggled goods, the Commissioner of Customs has the
primary jurisdiction to have the goods seized through the issuance of a
SEPTEMBER 2014
Moreover, contrary to the contention of the petitioner that it was denied due
process of law when the amended Warrant of Seizure and Detention Order
S.I. No. 2002-13B dated September 27, 2001 was issued, because it was
done without giving them an opportunity to be heard and explain their side,
suffice it to say that the essence of due process is simply to be heard or as
applied to administrative proceedings, to explain ones side or an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of an action or ruling complained of
(National Police Commission v. Bernabe, 332 SCRA 74) and due process
does not necessarily require conducting an actual hearing but simply giving
the party concerned due notice and affording an opportunity or right to be
heard (Ramoran v. Jardine CMG Life Insurance Company, Inc.) which
opportunity was given to the petitioner since it was able to file an Urgent
Motion to Quash Warrant of Seizure dated October 1, 2001 and Manifestation
and Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated October 19, 2001 which were
all denied in a decision dated November 14, 2001 by the Collector of
Customs and instead ordered the forfeiture of the subject bags of rice in
favor of the government.
SO ORDERED.27chanrobleslaw
The petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on
May 8, 2003.28cralawlawlibrary
Issues
As matters stand, WSD No. 2001-13A issued against the MV Hung Yen was
quashed by the October 26, 2001 order of Collector Bibit; while WSD No.
2001-13 issued against the 20,000 bags of rice consigned to R&C Agro Trade
had been effectively lifted by Commissioner Villanuevas Consolidated Order
dated February 4, 2002 following R&C Agro Trades payment of the
settlement value of P8,400,000.00.
The pending seizure proceedings under WSD No. 2001-13B of the 180,000
bags of rice remained, and became the basis for the issuance of the
subsequent notice of sale by Collector Bartolome. Consequently, the
controversy on the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs over the seizure and
forfeiture of goods and articles entering the free port area lingers and
requires the Courts intervention.
Ruling
The Subic Special Economic Zone, or the Subic Bay Freeport, was established
pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992), to be operated and managed as a special
customs territory. On the other hand, the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
(SBMA) was created under Section 13 of RA No. 7227 to serve as an
operating and implementing arm of the Conversion Authority within the SBF.
xxxx
We do not really care whether these goods are stored here. The only thing
that we care is for our people to have an employment because of the entry
of these goods that are being discharged, warehoused and reloaded into the
ships so that they can be exported. That will generate employment for us.
For as long as that is done, we are saying, in effect, that we have the least
contact with our tariff and customs laws and our tax laws. Therefore, we
consider these goods as outside of the customs jurisdiction of the Republic of
the Philippines as yet, until we draw them from this territory and bring them
inside our domestic commerce. In which case, they have to pass through our
customs gate. I thought we are carving out this entire area and convert it
into this kind of concept.31chanrobleslaw
On the basis of the concept, the petitioner claims that the Collector of
Customs had no jurisdiction to issue WSD No. 2001-13B and the October 18,
2001 Notice of Sale concerning the 180,000 bags of Thai white rice, which
had entered the SBF only for transshipment to other countries. 32 It insists
that the auction sale of the 180,000 bags was null and void for failing to
comply with Executive Order No. 272, which required presidential approval
when the amount to be generated from the sale was at least P50
Million;33 that the sale disregarded the memorandum of agreement between
the Bureau of Customs and the NFA; 34 that the rice was sold at P785.00 per
50-kilo bag instead of P1,100.00, the price established by the Bureau of
Agricultural Statistics;35 and that no notice of auction sale was sent to the
NFA or its accredited dealers. 36cralawlawlibrary
The Court declares that the Collector of Customs was authorized to institute
seizure proceedings and to issue WSDs in the Subic Bay Freeport, subject to
the review by the Commissioner of Customs. Accordingly, the proper remedy
to question the order or resolution of the Commissioner of Customs was an
appeal to the CTA, not to the CA.
Although RA No. 7227 is silent as to the person or entity vested with the
authority to seize and forfeit or detain goods and articles entering the Subic
Bay Freeport, the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of RA No. 7227
contained the following provisions, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEPTEMBER 2014
Sec. 11. Responsibilities of the SBMA. Other than the powers and
functions prescribed in Section 10 of these Rules, the SBMA shall have the
following responsibilities:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
f. Consistent with the Constitution, the SBMA shall have the following powers
to enforce the law and these Rules in the SBF:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
The SBMA may secure the assistance of and/or coordinate with Customs
officers to arrest persons in the SBF for violations of the customs laws for
which arrest is authorized concerning articles in the Customs Territory
destined to the SBF or articles which have been removed from the SBF to the
Customs Territory. (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
Customs Administrative Order No. 4-93 (CAO 4-93), also known as the Rules
and Regulations for Customs Operations in the Subic Special Economic and
Freeport Zone, similarly provides the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
xxxx
3. SEIZURE
Under these statutory provisions, both the SBMA and the Bureau of Customs
have the power to seize and forfeit goods or articles entering the Subic Bay
Freeport, except that SBMAs authority to seize and forfeit goods or articles
entering the Subic Bay Freeport has been limited only to cases involving
violations of RA No. 7227 or its IRR. There is no question therefore, that the
authority of the Bureau of Customs is larger in scope because it covers cases
concerning violations of the customs laws.
The authority of the Bureau of Customs to seize and forfeit goods and
articles entering the Subic Bay Freeport does not contravene the nature of
the Subic Bay Freeport as a separate customs authority. Indeed, the
investors can generally and freely engage in any kind of business as well as
import into and export out goods with minimum interference from the
Government.39 The Court has thus observed in Executive Secretary v.
Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc.40 :chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Freeport was designed to ensure free flow or movement of goods and
capital within a portion of the Philippine territory in order to attract investors
SEPTEMBER 2014
We would like to see Subic area converted into a little Hong Kong,
Mr. President, where there is a hub of free port and free entry, free
duties and activities to a maximum spur generation of investment
and jobs.
The initial outlay may not only come from the Government or the Authority
as envisioned here, but from them themselves, because they would be
encouraged to invest not only for the land but also for the buildings and
factories. As long as they are convinced that in such an area they can do
business and reap reasonable profits, then many from other parts, both local
and foreign, would invest, Mr. President.
Yet, the treatment of the Subic Bay Freeport as a separate customs territory
cannot completely divest the Government of its right to intervene in the
operations and management of the Subic Bay Freeport, especially when
patent violations of the customs and tax laws are discovered. After all,
Section 602 of the Tariff and Customs Code vests exclusive original
jurisdiction in the Bureau of Customs over seizure and forfeiture cases in the
enforcement of the tariff and customs laws.
the release of the 180,000 bags of rice. In their September 4, 2001 After
SEPTEMBER 2014
FINDINGS:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
RECOMMENDATION:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
Petitioner alleges that the RTC of Olongapo City has no jurisdiction over the
action for injunction and damages filed by respondents on 11 June 2002 as
said action is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the BOC pursuant to
Section 602 of Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise known as the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended. Section 602 provides,
thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sec. 602. Functions of the Bureau.- The general duties, powers and
jurisdiction of the bureau shall include:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
It is well settled that the Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over
SEPTEMBER 2014
seizure and forfeiture proceedings, and regular courts cannot interfere with
his exercise thereof or stifle or put it at naught. The Collector of Customs
sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings has exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and determine all questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable
goods. Regional trial courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the
validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the
BOC and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings. Regional
trial courts are precluded from assuming cognizance over such matters even
through petitions for certiorari , prohibition or mandamus.
Verily, the rule is that from the moment imported goods are actually in the
possession or control of the Customs authorities, even if no warrant for
seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs
in connection with the seizure and forfeiture proceedings, the BOC acquires
exclusive jurisdiction over such imported goods for the purpose of enforcing
the customs laws, subject to appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals whose
decisions are appealable to this Court. As we have clarified in Commissioner
of Customs v. Makasiar, the rule that RTCs have no review powers over such
proceedings is anchored upon the policy of placing no unnecessary
hindrance on the government's drive, not only to prevent smuggling and
other frauds upon Customs, but more importantly, to render effective and
efficient the collection of import and export duties due the State, which
enables the government to carry out the functions it has been instituted to
perform.46chanrobleslaw
The issuance of the October 18, 2001 Notice of Sale was merely an incident
of the seizure proceedings commenced by the Collector of Customs.
Consequently, the correctness of its issuance was necessarily subsumed to
the determination of the propriety of the seizure proceedings, a matter that
was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. In that
context, the proper recourse of the petitioner from the February 4, 2002
Consolidated Order of Commissioner Villanueva, which reviewed the
November 14, 2001 action of Collector Bibit, 47 was an appeal in due course
to the CTA, in accordance with Section 7(4) of RA No. 1125, as amended, 48 in
relation to Section 2402 of the Tariff and Customs Code, 49 within 30 days
after the receipt of the order. 50 Without the appeal having been timely filed
in the CTA, the February 4, 2002 Consolidated Order became final and
executory.
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Case
Accused Bobby Belgar appeals the decision promulgated on August 31, 2007
by the Court of Appeals (CA)1 affirming his conviction for rape by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30, in San Jose, Camarines Sur, and
imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Antecedents
Belgar pleaded not guilty to the charge.4 Testifying for the Prosecution were
AAA, BBB (AAAs mother), and Dr. Penafrancia N. Villanueva, while Belgar
was the lone witness for the Defense.
On January 20, 2000, at about 8:00 p.m., AAA and her two sisters were
sleeping in their house in Tigaon, Camarines Sur, when she was awakened
because someone was touching her feet. She saw that it was Belgar, who
SEPTEMBER 2014
was poking her neck with a knife. She resisted but he warned her not to
shout or he would stab her and her sisters. He dragged her outside the house
and brought her to a nearby tree, where he injected an unknown substance
into her stomach. She fell unconscious afterwards. Upon regaining
consciousness, she found herself naked, and her vagina was aching and
soaked with white and red substance. She put on her clothes and returned to
the house. She attended school the next morning. During her class, she
broke a mirror and slashed her left wrist. Her teacher came to her aid and
had her treated. While being treated she confided the rape to her
teacher.5 She was thus brought to the Municipal Health Office of Tigaon,
Camarines Sur, and was examined there by Dr. Villanueva, who issued her
medico-legal report containing the following
findings:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Extragenital Findings:
- Brownish discoloration of the skin at the anterior area of the distal portion
of the left lower arm.
Genital Examination:
Belgar denied raping AAA and interposed alibi, insisting that he was sleeping
in his house in San Miguel, Tigaon, Camarines Sur at midnight of January 20,
2000, having gone to bed there at 8:00 p.m. on the same date and waking
up at 5:00 a.m. of the next day; that he did not leave the house in that
period of time; and that it was his first time to see AAA when she identified
him inside the Municipal Jail of Tigaon as the one who had raped her at
midnight of January 20, 2000.7cralawlawlibrary
In its decision promulgated on June 17, 2003, the RTC found that all the
elements of rape under Article 266-A (1) (a) of Republic Act No. 8353 had
been duly established; that the State had shown that Belgar had committed
carnal knowledge of AAA by force, threat, and intimidation; that AAA was
candid and truthful as a witness; and that Belgars alibi could not prevail
because it was uncorroborated, and he did not show the physical
SEPTEMBER 2014
impossibility for him to be at the crime scene at the time of the commission
of the crime.8 It decreed thusly:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The accused Bobby Belgar shall be entitled to full credit of his preventive
imprisonment if he agreed to abide with the rules imposed upon convicted
person (sic) otherwise he shall be entitled to four-fifth (4/5) credit
thereof.9chanrobleslaw
Decision of the CA
On appeal, Belgar contended that the rape had not been proven because no
direct evidence of the sexual intercourse was presented due to AAA having
been unconscious during the rape; and that the non-submission for
laboratory examination of the red and white substance in AAAs vagina casts
doubt on the charge of rape.10cralawlawlibrary
On August 31, 2007, the CA affirmed the conviction, 11 holding that the
conviction for rape could be based on the circumstantial evidence adduced
through the testimony of AAA; that the absence of spermatozoa from the
vagina of the victim did not disprove rape because ejaculation was not an
element of the crime; and that the RTC properly rejected Belgars alibi upon
finding AAAs testimony credible.12cralawlawlibrary
Issues
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME
OF RAPE WHEN SAID VICTIM WAS UNCONSCIOUS WHEN THE INCIDENT
HAPPENED.13
Belgar argues that the perpetrator was already gone when AAA regained
consciousness; that she did not experience or feel the actual sexual
intercourse; that she only jumped to the conclusion that she had been raped,
and that it was the accused who had raped her; that there was no evidence
showing that he had been the perpetrator; 14 that the non-examination of the
white and red substance found in AAAs vagina removed the proof of the
possibility of the substance having come from a male organ; and that AAA
did not properly identify the culprit.15cralawlawlibrary
SEPTEMBER 2014
The information charged Belgar with rape committed through force, threat or
intimidation as defined under Article 266-A (1) (a), Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8353, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 266-A. Rape; Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed.
xxxx
The elements of the crime charged are that the offender had carnal
knowledge of a female, and that the same was committed by using force,
threat or intimidation.16 The elements were proved beyond reasonable doubt.
According to AAA, Belgar poked a knife at her neck, forced her to get up from
her sleep, and dragged her outside of the house. She resisted and would
have shouted but he warned her against shouting, and threatened to stab
her and her sleeping sisters. Once they were outside, he injected a
substance into her belly, thereby causing her to lose consciousness. Upon
regaining her consciousness, she was already naked and had blood in her
vagina.
completely naked?
A. I saw as (sic) if liquid, sir.
Q. Describe to us that liquid you observe[d]?
A. Reddish and whitish, sir.
Q. What did feel in your vagina when you woke up if any beside[s] that
red and white substance that you saw?
A. It was painful, sir.
Q. Because it was painful, what happened? What did you do if any?
A. I was still lying I felt pain and when I sitted as if I could not get up, sir.
Q. Because of that what happened next?
A. I stood up and proceeded inside our house, sir.
xxxx
Q. You did not report this matter to your parents and to your sisters?
A. No, sir.
Q. Tell us why?
A. Because of his threat to my family, sir.
Q. What is the threat all about?
A. That if I report he will kill all of us, sir.17
xxxx
Q. How were you able to know that the accused is responsible to the
crime being charged?
xxxx
A. I am sure that he was the one who rape[d] me because while I am
(sic) still sleeping he was the one who went inside and pulled my legs
toward the creek and there he injected.
FISCAL SOLANO: In other words, you are 100% sure because the accused is
the only one who get (sic) near you and nobody else?
A. Yes, sir.
COURT: Was the pulling of legs prior or after you become (sic) unconscious.
A. While I was still conscious.
Q. When you become (sic) conscious after you were unconscious who
were the very persons around by the way?
A. No more, sir.18
Like the RTC and the CA, we find AAAs narration of her ordeal as credible
and truthful. The assessment by the RTC on the credibility of AAA should be
respected because the trial court had personally observed her demeanor
while testifying. This appreciation held true because the CA affirmed the
factual findings of the RTC.19cralawlawlibrary
We likewise note that AAA did not hesitate or waver in her narration even
during her rigorous cross examination. As such, her sole but credible
testimony as the rape victim sufficed to convict the accused of his crime. 20 It
is remarkable, indeed, that there was neither allegation nor proof of any ill
motive on her part or on the part of her family in accusing him of raping her.
SEPTEMBER 2014
The commission of the rape was competently established although AAA had
been unconscious during the commission of the act. Proof of the commission
of the crime need not always be by direct evidence, for circumstantial
evidence could also sufficiently and competently establish the crime beyond
reasonable doubt. Indeed, the Court affirmed convictions for rape based on
circumstantial evidence.25 In this connection, circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if the conditions set forth in Section 4, Rule 133 of
the Rules of Court are shown to exist, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
In People v. Perez,26 we affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape based
on circumstantial evidence, there being no direct proof of the sexual
intercourse. The accused was charged with having carnal knowledge of the
16-year old victim through force, intimidation and against her will. The
Prosecution established that he had entered the victims room and had
covered her nose and mouth with a chemically-laced cloth, causing her to
lose consciousness. Upon waking up, she felt pain in her vagina, and she
then saw blood and a white substance in her vagina. Her clothes were in
disarray and her underwear was in the corner of the room. He was no longer
around. Nonetheless, the Court held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
one circumstance is duly proved and that the totality or the unbroken chain
of the circumstances proven lead to no other logical conclusion than the
appellants guilt of the crime charged. Cristinas positive identification of the
appellant as the person who came to the room where she slept one early
morning towards the end of May 1994, and that he covered her nose and
mouth with a foul smelling handkerchief until she lost consciousness, the
blood and white substance she found on her vagina which ached the
following morning, her torn shorts and her panty removed, all lead to one
inescapable conclusion that the appellant raped her while she was
unconscious.27cralawlawlibrary
This case has factual kinship with People v. Perez. The Prosecution proved
through AAAs testimony that: (1) Belgar had poked the knife at her neck; (2)
he had dragged her outside the house and had brought her to a nearby tree;
(3) he had injected an unknown substance into her belly that had then
rendered her unconscious; (4) upon waking up, she had found herself lying
naked on the ground; (5) she had felt pain in her vagina, which held a red
and white substance in it; and (6) he had been the only person last seen by
her before she had passed out. The lack of direct evidence against him
notwithstanding, these circumstances sufficed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt because they formed an unbroken chain that unerringly
showed Belgar, and no other, had committed the rape against her.
Both lower courts correctly concluded that the non-examination of the red
and white substance found in AAAs vagina did not negate the commission of
the rape. A finding of the presence of spermatozoa on the victim did not
define the commission of rape. Indeed, neither the medical examination of
the rape victim nor the laboratory test of anything related to the crime was
an element of the crime of rape. 28 As the Court aptly observed in People v.
Parcia:29cralawlawlibrary
The RTC and the CA were also correct in their uniform findings that AAAs
identification of Belgar as the rapist was reliable. AAAs view of the face of
the rapist was unquestionable because of the illumination from a lighted
kerosene lamp inside the room.31 She could not be mistaken about him
SEPTEMBER 2014
because she was familiar with his face from always seeing him whenever she
went to her school in Barangay San Miguel, Tigaon, Camarines Sur. 32 He was
also the man who had raped her before in November 1999 in San Jose,
Camarines Sur.33 It is noteworthy that she immediately identified him as the
rapist while he was under detention in the Municipal Jail of Tigaon, 34 and
repeated her identification of him in the course of her court testimony in this
case.35cralawlawlibrary
In addition, pursuant to Article 2229 and Article 2230 of the Civil Code,
exemplary damages are to be granted to the victim of a crime when at least
one aggravating circumstance was attendant. AAA was entitled to exemplary
damages of P30,000.0037 due to the attendance of the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and the use of the deadly weapon in the
commission of the rape. It was of no consequence that the information did
not allege the circumstances, for, as the Court observed in People v.
Catubig:38cralawlawlibrary
The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not
having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense.
The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as
it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it
causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the
prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of
additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a
graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance
of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its
commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern,
the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the
offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of
exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the
aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying.
Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a
distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to
the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the
case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should
entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the
unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
The Court imposes legal interest of 6% per annum on each of the civil
liabilities, reckoned from the finality of this judgment until full
payment.39cralawlawlibrary
SEPTEMBER 2014
SO ORDERED.cralawred
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Under review is the decision promulgated on June 21, 2002, 1 whereby the
Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by Northwest
Airlines, Inc. to assail on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction the adverse decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC).
Antecedents
The parties differed on what happened thereafter. Del Rosario claimed that
only an animated discussion had transpired between her and Gamboa, but
Morales insisted that it was more than an animated discussion, recalling that
Del Rosario had even challenged Gamboa to a brawl (sabunutan). Morales
asserted that she had tried to pacify Del Rosario and Gamboa, but the two
did not stop; that because the two were still arguing although the Business
Class passengers were already boarding, she ordered them out of the plane
and transfer to another nearby Northwest aircraft; that she inquired from
them about what had happened, and even asked if they were willing to fly on
the condition that they would have to stay away from each other during the
entire flight; that because Del Rosario was not willing to commit herself to do
so, she decided not to allow both of them on Flight NW 26, and furnished
them a Notice of Removal from Service (effectively informing Del Rosario of
her dismissal from the service pending an investigation of the fighting
incident between her and Gamboa).
On May 19, 1998, Morales sent a letter to Del Rosario telling her that
Northwest would conduct an investigation of the incident involving her and
Gamboa. The investigation was held on May 28, 1998 before Atty. Ceazar
Veneracion III, Northwests Legal Counsel and Head of its Human Resources
Department. All the parties attended the investigation
On June 19, 1998, Del Rosario was informed of her termination from the
service. Northwest stated that based on the results of the investigation, Del
Rosario and Gamboa had engaged in a fight on board the aircraft, even if
there had been no actual physical contact between them; and that because
fighting was strictly prohibited by Northwest to the point that fighting could
entail dismissal from the service even if committed for the first time,
Northwest considered her dismissal from the service justified and in
accordance with the Rules of Conduct for Employees, as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 1, General
SEPTEMBER 2014
xxxx
Del Rosario subsequently filed her complaint for illegal dismissal against
Northwest.2cralawlawlibrary
In her decision dated January 18, 1999, 3 Labor Arbiter Teresita D. Castillon-
Lora ruled in favor of Northwest, holding that the dismissal of Del Rosario had
been justified and valid upon taking into account that Northwest had been
engaged in the airline business in which a good public image had been
demanded, and in which flight attendants had been expected to maintain an
image of sweetness and amiability; that fighting among its employees even
in the form of heated arguments or discussions were very contradictory to
that expected image;4 and that it could validly dismiss its employees like the
respondent because it had been entitled to protect its business interests by
putting up an impeccable image to the public.
Upon appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, and ruled
in favor of Del Rosario, declaring that the incident between her and Gamboa
could not be considered as synonymous with fighting as the activity
prohibited by Northwests Rules of Conduct; that based on Blacks Law
Dictionary, fight referred to a hostile encounter, affray, or altercation; a
physical or verbal struggle for victory, pugilistic combat; that according to
Bouviers Law Dictionary, fighting did not necessarily imply that both parties
SEPTEMBER 2014
should exchange blows, for it was sufficient that they voluntarily put their
bodies in position with that intent;5 and that the incident between Del
Rosario and Gamboa could not be held similar to the fight that Northwest
penalized under its Rules of Conduct.
The NLRC ordered the reinstatement of Del Rosario to her former position
without loss of seniority rights and with payment of backwages, per diems,
other lost income and benefits from June 19, 1998; as well as the payment of
attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the monetary award.
Decision of the CA
NLRC had correctly held that Del Rosarios conduct did not constitute serious
misconduct, because the NLRC, in determining the usual, ordinary and
commonly understood meaning of the word fighting, had resorted to
authoritative lexicons that supported its conclusion that the exchange of
words between Del Rosario and Gamboa did not come within the definition of
the word fighting. 7cralawlawlibrary
Issues
The issues are the following, namely: (1) Was Del Rosarios dismissal from
the service valid?; and (2) Were the monetary awards appropriate?
Ruling
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer or duly authorized representative;
his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized
representative; and
Northwest argues that Del Rosario was dismissed on the grounds of serious
misconduct and willful disobedience. Misconduct refers to the improper or
wrong conduct that transgresses some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies
wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. But misconduct or improper
behavior, to be a just cause for termination of employment, must: (a) be
serious; (b) relate to the performance of the employees duties; and (c) show
that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the
employer.9cralawlawlibrary
There is no doubt that the last two elements of misconduct were present in
the case of Del Rosario. The cause of her dismissal related to the
performance of her duties as a flight attendant, and she became unfit to
continue working for Northwest. Remaining to be determined is, therefore,
whether the misconduct was serious as to merit Del Rosarios dismissal. In
that respect, the fight between her and Gamboa should be so serious that it
entailed the termination of her employment even if it was her first offense.
Northwest insists that what transpired on May 18, 1998 between her and
Gamboa was obviously a form of fight that it strictly prohibited, but Del
Rosario disputes this by contending that it was only an animated discussion
between her and Gamboa. She argues that as settled in American
jurisprudence fight pertained to combat or battle, like the hostile encounter
or engagement between opposing forces, suggesting primarily the notion of
a brawl or unpremeditated encounter, or of a pugilistic combat; 10 while
argument was a connected discourse based upon reason, or a course of
reasoning tending and intended to establish a position and to induce
belief.11cralawlawlibrary
In several rulings where the meaning of fight was decisive, the Court has
observed that the term fight was considered to be different from the term
argument. In People v. Asto,12 for instance, the Court characterized fight as
not just a merely verbal tussle but a physical combat between two opposing
parties, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Well into their second bottle of gin, at about eleven o'clock that morning,
Fernando Aquino and Peregrino had a verbal tussle. Fernando Aquino
declared that he was going to run for councilor of Alcala, Pangasinan.
Peregrino countered by saying: If you will run for that post, cousin, I
will fight you. After a brief exchange of words, Fernando Aquino, laughing,
went to sit beside Abagat. As Aquino continued with his mirth, Abagat stared
at Peregrino with contempt.
SEPTEMBER 2014
xxx. A few minutes later, he heard a commotion in the plantation some two
hundred meters away. He claims to have seen several people fighting each
other with pieces of wood but did not go to the field to check what was
happening.13 (Italics supplied.)
When the petitioner was about to hand over the bottles of beer to the private
complainant, the latter called him coward and dared him to get out for
a fight. Insulted, the petitioner went out of his store and chased the private
complainant. (Italics supplied.)
Based on the foregoing, the incident involving Del Rosario and Gamboa could
not be justly considered as akin to the fight contemplated by Northwest. In
the eyes of the NLRC, Del Rosario and Gamboa were arguing but not fighting.
The understanding of fight as one that required physical combat was absent
during the incident of May 18, 1998. Moreover, the claim of Morales that Del
Rosario challenged Gamboa to a brawl (sabunutan) could not be given
credence by virtue of its being self-serving in favor of Northwest, and of its
being an apparent afterthought on the part of Morales during the
investigation of the incident, without Del Rosario having the opportunity to
contest Morales statement. In that context, the investigation then served
only as Northwests means to establish that the grounds of a valid dismissal
based on serious misconduct really existed.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the incident was the kind
of fight prohibited by Northwests Rules of Conduct, the same could not be
considered as of such seriousness as to warrant Del Rosarios dismissal from
the service. The gravity of the fight, which was not more than a verbal
argument between them, was not enough to tarnish or diminish Northwests
public image.
Under the circumstances, therefore, the CA properly ruled that the NLRC did
not gravely abuse its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by
declaring Del Rosarios dismissal unjustified. Northwest as the petitioner
for certiorari must demonstrate grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC. Grave abuse of
discretion, according to De los Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company,15 must be grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi-
judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board
evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or
SEPTEMBER 2014
SO ORDERED.cralawred
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
SEPTEMBER 2014
BERSAMIN, J.:
Hence, Barut now seeks the review of his conviction by petition for review
on certiorari.
Antecedents
Upon seeing the exchange of gunshots, Vincent Ucag rushed towards his
father to go to his succor. Before Vincent could reach his father, however,
SEPTEMBER 2014
Barut fired at Vincent in the chest. Vincent, badly bleeding, tried to go back
to the owner-type jeep where his mother was, but fell to the ground before
reaching the jeep. Vincent was rushed to the Paraaque Medical Center,
where he expired while undergoing emergency surgery. His father was
brought to the Camp Panopio Hospital in Quezon City for treatment and
medical attendance.4cralawlawlibrary
Issues
(b) The finding on the supposed consistency of the testimonies of the States
witnesses constituted a sweeping conclusion.
Ruling
To start with, the CA held that it could not find from its review of the records
any compelling reason to set aside the factual findings of the trial court. It
ruled that Villas and Fabiano had clearly and consistently testified that Barut
had been the person who had shot Vincent; and that Baruts bare denial of
firing at Vincent did not prevail over their positive and categorical
identification of him as the perpetrator.
Although the record of the trial is laid bare and open during every appeal in a
criminal case, the credibility of witnesses is a factual issue that the Court
cannot disturb in this appeal.5 We reiterate that the findings of fact by the
trial court are accorded great respect especially when affirmed on appeal by
the CA.6 This great respect for such findings rests mainly on the trial judges
access to the witnesses while they testify in her presence, giving the trial
judge the personal and direct observation of their manner and decorum
during intensive grilling by the counsel for the accused, thereby enabling her
to see if the witnesses were fidgeting and prevaricating, or were sincere and
trustworthy.
Secondly, Barut adverts to the extra-judicial sworn statement that Villas gave
at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of September 25, 1995 barely a day
following the fatal shooting of Vincent in which he declared not having seen
Barut fire a gun. Barut contends that this declaration definitely contradicted
Villas court testimony on June 10, 1996, and manifested that he was not
clear and convincing because he never pointed out who [had] really shot
SEPTEMBER 2014
Vincent Ucag.7 Citing Villas answer of Maybe he was hit to the question
on direct examination: What was the reason if you know why he [referring
to Vincent Ucag] was weak?8 Barut insists that Villas was thereby
ambiguous and gave rise to the doubt as to who [had] really shot and killed
the victim, whether it was Ancheta (who had traded shots with the victims
father), or himself.9cralawlawlibrary
Noting that neither Ucag nor Ancheta had shot Vincent, the RTC explained
that the former could not anymore fire his gun at Vincent not only because
Vincent was his own son but also because he himself had already been lying
on the ground after being hit in his lower extremities; and that Ancheta
could not have fired at Vincent at all because he, too, had been already
wounded and lying on the ground and profusedly bleeding from his own
gunshot wounds. The RTC further noted that the slug extracted from the
body of Vincent had come from a .38 caliber revolver, not from Ucags .45
caliber firearm.
Baruts contention did not itself go unnoticed by the CA, which observed that
the RTC could not take the declaration of Villas into consideration because
Villas extra-judicial sworn statement containing the declaration had not been
offered and admitted as evidence by either side. The CA stressed that only
evidence that was formally offered and made part of the records could be
considered; and that in any event, the supposed contradiction between the
extra-judicial sworn statement and the court testimony should be resolved in
favor of the latter.
It is settled that courts will only consider as evidence that which has been
formally offered. x x x
A document, or any article for that matter, is not evidence when it is simply
marked for identification; it must be formally offered, and the opposing
counsel given an opportunity to object to it or cross-examine the witness
called upon to prove or identify it. A formal offer is necessary since judges
are required to base their findings of fact and judgment onlyand strictly
upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. To allow a party to
SEPTEMBER 2014
attach any document to his pleading and then expect the court to consider it
as evidence may draw unwarranted consequences. The opposing party will
be deprived of his chance to examine the document and object to its
admissibility. The appellate court will have difficulty reviewing documents
not previously scrutinized by the court below. The pertinent provisions of the
Revised Rules of Court on the inclusion on appeal of documentary evidence
or exhibits in the records cannot be stretched as to include such pleadings or
documents not offered at the hearing of the case.
The rule that only evidence formally offered before the trial court can be
considered is relaxed where two requisites concur, namely: one, the evidence
was duly identified by testimony duly recorded; and, two, the evidence was
incorporated in the records of the case. 12 Furthermore, the rule has no
application where the court takes judicial notice of adjudicative facts
pursuant to Section 2,13 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court; or where the court
relies on judicial admissions or draws inferences from such judicial
admissions within the context of Section 4,14 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court;
or where the trial court, in judging the demeanor of witnesses, determines
their credibility even without the offer of the demeanor as
evidence.15cralawlawlibrary
The Court also sees fit to correct the indeterminate sentence of 10 years and
one day of prision mayor, as the minimum, to 17 years and eight months
of reclusion temporal, as the maximum, fixed by the RTC and affirmed by the
CA. The maximum of 17 years and eight months comes from the maximum
period of reclusion temporal, but the maximum of the indeterminate
sentence should instead come from the medium period of reclusion
temporal, whose duration is from 14 years, eight months and one day to 17
years and four months, because neither the RTC nor the CA had found the
attendance of any aggravating circumstance. The minimum of the
indeterminate sentence is fixed at 10 years of prision mayor, and the
maximum of 17 years and eight months of reclusion temporal is modified to
17 years and four months of the medium period of reclusion temporal.
Anent the civil liability, the RTC granted P250,000.00 without specifying the
amounts corresponding to actual and moral damages, as well as to the civil
indemnity for the death of Vincent. The CA affirmed the grant. Both lower
courts thereby erred on a matter of law. Actual and moral damages are
different in nature and purpose. To start with, different laws govern their
grant, with the amounts allowed as actual damages being dependent on
proof of the loss to a degree of certainty, while the amounts allowed as moral
damages being discretionary on the part of the court. Secondly, actual
damages address the actual losses caused by the crime to the heirs of the
victim; moral damages assuage the spiritual and emotional sufferings of the
heirs of the victim of the crime. On the civil indemnity for death, law and
jurisprudence have fixed the value to compensate for the loss of human life.
SEPTEMBER 2014
Thirdly, actual damages may not be granted without evidence of actual loss;
moral damages and death indemnity are always granted in homicide, it
being assumed by the law that the loss of human life absolutely brings moral
and spiritual losses as well as a definite loss. Moral damages and death
indemnity require neither pleading nor evidence simply because death
through crime always occasions moral sufferings on the part of the victims
heirs.16 As the Court aptly said in one case,17cralawlawlibrary
The death indemnity and moral damages are fixed at P75,000.00 each in
view of homicide being a gross offense. Considering that the decisions of the
lower courts contained no treatment of the actual damages, the Court is now
not in any position to dwell on this. Nonetheless, the Court holds that despite
the lack of such treatment, temperate damages of P25,000.00 should be
allowed. Article 2224 of the Civil Code declares that temperate damages may
be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount
cannot be proved with certainty. There is no longer any doubt that when
actual damages for burial and related expenses are not substantiated with
receipts, temperate damages of at least P25,000.00 are warranted, for it is
certainly unfair to deny to the surviving heirs of the victim the compensation
for such expenses as actual damages.18 This is based on the sound reasoning
that it would be anomalous that the heirs of the victim who tried and
succeeded in proving actual damages of less than P25,000.00 would only be
put in a worse situation than others who might have presented no receipts at
all but would still be entitled to P25,000.00 as temperate
damages.19cralawlawlibrary
Also, in line with recent jurisprudence, 20 the interest fixed by the RTC is
reduced to six percent (6%) per annum on all the items of civil liability
computed from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
of damages hereby awarded from the date of finality of this judgment until
fully paid; and (c) he shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.cralawred
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A trial judge is not accountable for performing his judicial functions and office
because such performance is a matter of public duty and responsibility.
Indeed, the judges office and duty to render and administer justice, being
functions of sovereignty, should not be simply taken for granted. No
administrative charge for manifest partiality, gross misconduct, and gross
ignorance of the law should be brought against him for the orders issued in
the due course of judicial proceedings.chanrobleslaw
Antecedents
circumstances had gone beyond the contemplation of the parties at the time
they entered into the lease contract. 3chanrobleslaw
Summons and a copy of the complaint were served upon MBDC on March 23,
2011. On the last day for the filing of its responsive pleading, MBDC moved
for the dismissal of the complaint instead of filing its answer, claiming
prescription and failure to state a cause of action. 4 MBDC also stated in its
motion that the action for reformation was merely a ploy by Uniwide to
forestall the ejectment case against it.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss through its order dated August 1,
2011.5 MBDC received a copy of the order on September 26, 2011, and filed
its motion for reconsideration 11 days thereafter. Judge Madrona then
directed Uniwide and MBDC to file their comment and reply, respectively,
after which the motion for reconsideration would be deemed submitted for
resolution.
Before MBDC could file its reply, Uniwide filed a motion to declare MBDC in
default.
On December 23, 2011, Judge Madrona issued another order resolving the
two pending motions,6declaring MBDC in default, and declaring its motion for
reconsideration moot.
The Court referred the administrative case to the Court of Appeals (CA) for
investigation and recommendation.8 The CA raffled the administrative case
to Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam.9chanrobleslaw
The complainant asserted that the December 23, 2011 order declaring MBDC
in default, and rendering the motion for reconsideration moot showed Judge
Madronas manifest partiality in favor of Uniwide; that the motion for
reconsideration should have first been resolved; that the motion to declare
MBDC in default had not yet been deemed submitted for resolution, for, in
fact, Uniwide submitted its reply to MBDCs comment/opposition to the
motion only after the issuance of the December 23, 2011 order; that by
failing to resolve the substantial issues raised in the motion for
SEPTEMBER 2014
With regard to the allegation of gross ignorance of the law, the complainant
alleged that as a judge, Judge Madrona was expected to know the pertinent
law and procedural rules, and to apply them properly and in good faith; that
his stubborn refusal to reconsider the default declaration despite having
been fronted with jurisprudence, citing Diaz v. Diaz,13 that the reglementary
period within which to file an answer to a complaint should be counted from
a partys receipt of the order denying a motion for reconsideration; and that
MBDC should not have been declared in default without an earlier resolution
of the motion for reconsideration.14chanrobleslaw
As to the allegation that he had tampered with the minutes of the November
18, 2011 hearing, Judge Madrona pointed out that he had thereby merely
corrected the minutes; that he explained that the practice in his courtroom
had been to allow the court interpreter to prepare the minutes before
hearings started; that the interpreter then asked the parties if they had
reached any consensual agreements and noted the agreements down; that
the minutes were usually signed before the hearing, and the interpreter
relayed its contents to him (Judge Madrona) who then confirmed the contents
in his corresponding orders; that on November 18, 2011, the date of the
hearing of Uniwides motion to declare MBDC in default, the parties agreed
to file their comment and reply within 15 days respectively; that with regard
to the comment and reply, he usually granted the parties only 10 days to file
them; that unfortunately, the counsels for the parties had already left the
courtroom before being heard; that when he dictated his order for the
hearing, he changed the period to file the comment and reply from 15 days
to 10 days for both parties; and that he did so in the exercise of the courts
inherent power to amend and control its process and orders in order to make
them conformable to law and justice, pursuant to Section 5 (g), Rule 135 of
the Rules of Court.19chanrobleslaw
It is undisputed that MBDC received the summons on March 23, 2011, and
the latter was required to file an Answer until April 7, 2011. However,
instead of filing an Answer to the complaint, it filed a motion to dismiss on
April 7, 2011. In the RTCs Order, dated August 1, 2011, it denied MBDCs
motion to dismiss, which order was received by the latter on September 26,
2011. Instead of filing an answer, MBDC filed a motion for reconsideration of
the Order denying its motion to dismiss on October 7, 2011. Consequently,
Judge Madrona directed Uniwide to file a Comment thereto and thereafter,
MBDC filed its reply.
In view of the foregoing, it is the considered opinion of the Court that the
defendant failed to file the requisite responsive pleading, Answer,
within the reglementary period prescribed under Section 4, Rule 16
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Having thus
failed, the motion of plaintiff thus is with merit, the defendant is
therefore hereby declared in default.
Let then the Clerk of Court receive the evidence ex-parte for the plaintiff and
let the proper report/recommendation be submitted within 30 days after
completion of the reception of evidence aforesaid on the basis of which the
Court shall proceed to render judgment accordingly. The defendant in
default, though, shall still be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings
but not to take part in the trial.
With the motion of plaintiff being granted and the defendant declared in
default, action on the motion for reconsideration of defendant is thus
rendered mooted.
SO ORDERED.
SEC. 4. Time to plead. If the motion is denied, the movant shall file his
answer within the balance of the period prescribed by Rule 11 to which he
was entitled at the time of serving his motion, but not less than five (5) days
in any event, computed from his receipt of the notice of the denial. If the
pleading is ordered to be amended, he shall file his answer within the period
prescribed by Rule 11 counted from service of the amended pleading, unless
the court provides a longer period.
But apart from opposing defendants motion to dismiss, plaintiff Garcia asked
the trial court to declare Narciso in default for not filing an answer,
altogether disregarding the suspension of the running of the period for filing
such an answer during the pendency of the motion to dismiss that she filed
in the case. Consequently, when the trial court granted Garcias prayer and
simultaneously denied Narcisos motion to dismiss and declared her in
default, it committed serious error. Narciso was not yet in default when
the trial court denied her motion to dismiss. She still had at least
five days within which to file her answer to the complaint.
Judge Madrona cannot validly argue that the period of time for MBDC to file a
motion for reconsideration of the order denying a motion to dismiss must be
within the same period of time provided under Section 4 Rule 16 of the Rules
of Court. A careful review of the said provision reveals that the period
provided therein only applies to instances where a motion to dismiss is
denied, thus, the movant can still file his answer within the balance of the
period prescribed by law but no less than five days computed from the
receipt of the notice of denial. The said provision explicitly provides that the
same period of time shall apply to cases where a party intends to file a
motion for reconsideration of the denial of a motion to dismiss. We stress
that when the language of the law is clear, explicit and unequivocal, it
admits no room for interpretation but merely application.
In the case of AMA vs. Hon. Bueser, et. al. citing the case of Equitable PCI
Bank, Inc. v. Lavia, the Supreme Court ruled that resort to and exhaustion of
judicial remedies and a final ruling on the matter, are prerequisites for the
taking of appropriate measures against the judges concerned, whether of
criminal, civil or administrative nature. If the assailed act is subsequently
found and declared to be correct, there would be no occasion to proceed
against him at all.
Records show that during the preliminary conference of the case on February
12, 2014, MBDC thru counsel, admitted that there are two separate petitions
SEPTEMBER 2014
for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals involving the interlocutory orders
issued by Judge Madrona which are allegedly questionable. CA-G.R. SP No.
126858 assails Judge Madronas Orders, dated April 23, 2012 and July 18,
2012, which denied MBDCs Motion for Inhibition and to Suspend
Proceedings and granted Uniwides Motion to Set Case for Ex-parte Hearing
for Further Reception of Plaintiffs Evidence; and denied its motion for
reconsideration thereto, respectively. In CA-G.R. SP No. 126938, MBDC
assails Judge Madronas Order, dated August 13, 2012 denying its Motion to
Set Aside the Order of Default and to Admit Attached Answer. Since these
two petitions for certiorari are still pending and as there is no evidence on
record that the same have already been resolved by the Court of Appeals or
by the Supreme Court with finality, the instant administrative complaint is
deemed pre-mature.
In this case, other than the judicial error committed by Judge Madrona, MBDC
failed to adduce convincing evidence showing that Judge Madronas error
was so gross or patent, deliberate and malicious or incurred with evident bad
faith. Neither was bias nor partiality established. Acts or conduct of the
judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice must be clearly shown
before he can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. In the
same vein, bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the
judgment or order is adverse to a party.
As to the second issue, the Investigator agrees with Judge Madrona that
the changing of the period of time in the Minutes of November 18, 2011
hearing was authorized and made pursuant to the inherent powers of the
court to correct error in his Order.
This Investigator is convinced that Judge Madrona acted in good faith when
he corrected the Minutes of the November 18, 2011 hearing. We agree with
Judge Madrona that the changes made from 15 days to 10 days for the
parties to file their respective Comment and Reply were done to correct the
error and in order to conform with the usual court practice of allowing only
10 days to file a comment. It was inaccurate for MBDC to claim that the
correction was purposely intended to make it appear that MBDC untimely
filed its comment to the subject motion as Uniwide was also given the same
period of time to file its reply. More so, despite MBDCs late filing of its
comment beyond the 10 day period, the same was still considered in the
resolution of Uniwides motion, thus, showing that the correction was not
intended to solely prejudice MBDC but merely to conform with the courts
prevailing practice. Here, MBDCs accusation against Judge Madrona for
grave misconduct and manifest partiality is without basis.
Judge Madrona were appealed through petitions for certiorari and are still
pending with the Court of Appeals, hence, this Administrative case filed
against Judge Madrona constitutes an abuse of court processes that serves
to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice and
further clog the courts dockets.
RECOMMENDATION
Ruling
The records show that MBDC already availed of its rightful judicial remedies.
On January 24, 2012, MBDC moved to have the order of default set aside and
to have its answer admitted. On February 10, 2012, it filed a motion for the
inhibition of Judge Madrona and for the suspension of the proceedings. After
Judge Madrona adversely resolved each of the motions, it assailed the
adverse resolutions in the Court of Appeals through certiorari (i.e., CA-G.R.
SP No. 126858 and CA-G.R. SP No. 126938), the proceedings thereon being
still pending.
SEPTEMBER 2014
public; the individual advantage or loss results from the proper and
thorough or improper and imperfect performance of a duty for
which his controversy is only the occasion. The judge performs his
duty to the public by doing justice between individuals, or, if he fails
to do justice as between individuals, he may be called to account by
the State in such form and before such tribunal as the law may have
provided. But as the duty neglected is not a duty to the individual,
civil redress, as for an individual injury, is not admissible.
Justice Tijam found the allegation on the tampering of the minutes of the
November 18, 2011 hearing unlikely.
We concur with Justice Tijam. The correction of the minutes was done by
Judge Madrona under the inherent powers of his court to control its own
orders and processes before they became immutable. In changing in the
minutes the period stated for filing the comment and the reply from 15 days
to 10 days, Judge Madrona was merely correcting the period conformably
with the existing practice in his branch of granting only the shorter period of
10 days to make such filings. In that context, no bad faith should be inferred,
considering that both parties were subject to the same 10-day period.
Moreover, MBDC did not suffer actual prejudice from the change inasmuch as
Judge Madrona had actually noted MBDCs comment, and had considered
such comment in issuing his December 23, 2011 ruling.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary