ETHICS:

TOPIC:

LAWYER AND SOCIETY

A.C. No. 6057 June 27, 2006

PETER T. DONTON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco ("respondent") for serious misconduct and deliberate
violation of Canon 1,1 Rules 1.012 and 1.023 of the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code").

The Facts

In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant") stated that he filed a criminal complaint for estafa thru
falsification of a public document 4 against Duane O. Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay ("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary
public who notarized the Occupancy Agreement.

The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for perjury 5 against complainant. Respondent, in his affidavit-
complaint, stated that:

5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was prepared and notarized by me under the following
circumstances:

A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property located at No. 33 Don Jose Street, Bgy. San
Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.

B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier a U.S. citizen and thereby disqualified to own real property in his name
agreed that the property be transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a Filipino.

C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare several documents that would guarantee recognition of
him being the actual owner of the property despite the transfer of title in the name of Mr. Donton.

D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT, recognizing Mr. Stiers free and
undisturbed use of the property for his residence and business operations. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied up
with a loan which Mr. Stier had extended to Mr. Donton.6

Complainant averred that respondents act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite knowledge that Stier, being a foreign
national, is disqualified to own real property in his name, constitutes serious misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the Code.
Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do something in violation of law and assisting Stier in carrying
out a dishonest scheme.

In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that complainant filed the disbarment case against him upon the instigation
of complainants counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan, 7 because respondent refused to act as complainants witness in the criminal
case against Stier and Maggay. Respondent admitted that he "prepared and notarized" the Occupancy Agreement and asserted its
genuineness and due execution.
In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan ("Commissioner San Juan") of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for taking part in a "scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition
against foreign ownership of land in the Philippines." Commissioner San Juan recommended respondents suspension from the
practice of law for two years and the cancellation of his commission as Notary Public.

In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted, with modification, the Report and
recommended respondents suspension from the practice of law for six months.

On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B 8 of the
Rules of Court.

On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP. Respondent stated that he was already 76 years old and
would already retire by 2005 after the termination of his pending cases. He also said that his practice of law is his only means of
support for his family and his six minor children.

In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion for reconsideration because the IBP had no more jurisdiction on the
case as the matter had already been referred to the Court.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.

A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance of the laws which he is bound to
uphold and obey.9 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which
justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.10

By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from owning real property. 11 Yet, in his motion
for reconsideration,12 respondent admitted that he caused the transfer of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however,
aware of the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred the title in complainants name. But respondent provided "some
safeguards" by preparing several documents,13 including the Occupancy Agreement, that would guarantee Stiers recognition as the
actual owner of the property despite its transfer in complainants name. In effect, respondent advised and aided Stier in circumventing
the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of lands14 by preparing said documents.

Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when he prepared and notarized the
Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of lands. Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an
unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended. 15

In Balinon v. De Leon,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from the practice of law for three years for preparing an affidavit
that virtually permitted him to commit concubinage. In In re: Santiago,17 respondent Atty. Santiago was suspended from the practice
of law for one year for preparing a contract which declared the spouses to be single again after nine years of separation and allowed
them to contract separately subsequent marriages.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents personal record as an attorney,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

G R. No. L-35766 July 12, 1973

 LIBERATO V. CASALS, and JOSE T. SUMCAD, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, BR. 1, REBECCA T. PALANCA and
GRECAN CO., INC., respondents.

Ortile Law Office for petitioners.

Delante, Orellan and Associates for private respondents.

RESOLUTION

TEEHANKEE, J.:

The Court imposes a three-months suspension from the practice of law upon counsel of respondents for improper conduct and abuse
of the Court's good faith by his acts in the case at bar manifesting gross disrespect for the Court's processes and a willful disregard of
his solemn duty to conduct himself with all good fidelity to the Court and tending to embarrass gravely the administration of justice.

Upon the filing on November 2, 1972 of the petition at bar for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction, the Court as per its resolution of November 9, 1972 resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to require
respondents to comment thereon within ten days from notice and to issue a temporary restraining order restraining respondent court
inter alia from proceeding with the hearing of the case 1 pending before it below.

Under date of December 8, 1972, Atty. Leonido C. Delante as counsel for respondents, stating that while he had received on
November 15, 1972 notice of the Court's resolution of November 9, 1972, "no accompanying copy of the petition has been attached
thereto, hence the undersigned counsel would not be able to prepare the comments of the respondents as directed in said resolution
without said copy." filed his first motion for a ten-day extension of time from receipt of such petition within which to submit
respondents' comment. The Court granted such first extension per its resolution of December 15, 1972.

Under date of December 14, 1972, Atty. Primo O. Orellan on behalf of Delante, Orellan & Associates as counsel for respondents filed
a verified second motion for extension of ten days from December 15, 1972 within which to submit respondents' comment on the
ground "2. That Atty. L.C. Delante, counsel of record, got sick on December 6, 1972 and had not reported to work as yet" as per
verified medical certificate attached to the motion and "3. That Atty. Delante has just recovered from his ailment, and has requested
the undersigned to specially make this motion for another extension of TEN (10) days in order to enable him to finish the comments
for the respondents."

Under date of December 28, 1972, Atty. Leonido C. Delante filed a third motion for "a last extension of fifteen days from December
29, 1972 to submit the required comment, stating "That the undersigned counsel has already prepared the final draft of the desired
comments, but due to pressure of work in his office and matters occasioned by the Christmas season, the same has not been finalized
and typed out in a clean copy," for filing by the expiry date on December 28, 1972.

The Court per its resolution of January 15, 1973 granted the said extensions totalling twenty-five days. Having noted respondents'
failure to file their comment notwithstanding the numerous extensions sought by and granted to their counsel, which expired on
January 12, 1973, the Court as per its resolution of April 12, 1973 resolved to require Atty. Delante as counsel for respondents to
explain and show cause within ten days from notice why they failed to file the required comment.

Atty. Delante filed in due course his explanation dated May 7, 1973, wherein he claimed for the first time that "in view of (his)
pressing professional commitments," he requested his clients "to have the answer ... prepared by another lawyer for which reason
(respondents) took delivery of the records of the said case from his office and contracted the services of Atty. Antonio Fernandez."

Atty. Delante goes on to claim that it was only upon receipt of the Court's resolution of April 12, 1973 requiring his explanation that he
learned that Atty. Fernandez who had contracted "to prepare an answer, underwent a surgical operation," attaching a copy of Atty.
Fernandez' affidavit together with a medical certificate which certified however to the latter's confinement at the Davao Doctors'
Hospital only from "Dec. 23-26, 1972" and "(D)aily follow up: Dec. 26, 1972 Jan. 15, 1973." Atty. Fernandez in his affidavit however
stated that after his services had been retained by respondents "sometime on December 12, 1972" he "had been confined in the Davao
Doctors' Hospital and subsequently operated on for sinusitis" (on December 23-26, 1972) and that Gregorio Caeda, president of
respondent Grecan Co. Inc. "saw me in the hospital and asked from me the answer and I told him that I may not be able to proceed and
prepare the answer because of the operation that I just had, hence he got the records of the case G.R. No. L-35766 from me."

Atty. Delante further submitted the so-called "affidavit" dated May 5, 1973 of Gregorio Caeda, president and general manager of
respondent Grecan Co. Inc. supporting his belated claim now that their corporation contracted the services of Atty. Fernandez "to
prepare the answer to meet the deadline" and delivered the records of the case to the latter. The so-called "affidavit" is however not
sworn to before any official authorized to administer oaths but merely carries the statement "(T)hat the foregoing facts are true and
correct as what actually transpired" under the signature of one Rebecca T. Palanca (Secretary-Treasurer)."

Atty. Delante pleads that "it is far from (his) intention to cause any undue delay in the disposition of the above-entitled case," and
"(T)hat this is the first time it happened to him, and that if given an opportunity to prepare the answer, he will try his best to do it
within the period granted by this Honorable Tribunal, and that he assures this Honorable Tribunal that there would be no repetition of
this similar incident in the future." He prays that his explanation be accepted and without blinking an eye notwithstanding that the
required comment has long been overdue for almost four months at the time that he "be given an opportunity to prepare the
necessary answer for the respondents."

Counsel for petitioners promptly filed their comments dated May 11, 1973 citing the inconsistencies and contradictions in Atty.
Delante's explanation, opposing his plea to still be allowed to file respondents' comment after his "gross and inexcusable negligence"
and praying that the petition be considered submitted for resolution by the Court.

In an earlier resolution of July 9, 1973, the Court took action on the petition and dismissed the same for insufficient showing of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of respondent court in denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the case below and appeal in due course
from any adverse decision on the merits being the merits being the proper and adequate remedy.

The present resolution concerns Atty. Delante's explanation which the Court finds to be unsatisfactory.

Atty. Delante's present explanation that his failure to file respondents' comment is due to the failure of the other lawyer, Atty.
Fernandez, contracted by his clients at his instance because of his pressing professional commitments "to do so, because of a surgical
operation," is unworthy of credence because it is contrary to the facts of record:

In his previous motions for extension, he never mentioned his belated allegation now that another lawyer had been retained to file
the required comment, and no other lawyer, much less Atty. Fernandez, ever entered an appearance herein on behalf of respondents;

In his second motion for extension, supra, Atty. Delante's law office cited as reason the fact that he had gotten sick on December 6,
1972 and had just recovered and needed the additional 10-day extension "in order to enable him to finish the comments for the
respondents;"

In his third motion for a last 15-day extension, Delante assured the Court "that (he) has already prepared the final draft of the
desired comments" and cited "pressure of work in his office" and the Christmas Season for not having "finalized and typed out (the
comments) in a clean copy" which comments never came to be submitted to this Court;

His present explanation is not even borne out by Atty. Fernandez' medical certificate which shows that he was confined in the
hospital for sinusitis only from December 23-26, 1972 and therefore had sufficient time and opportunity to submit the comments by
the extended deadline on January 12, 1973;

Atty. Fernandez' own affidavit as submitted by Atty. Delante belies the latter's claim that the records of the case had been given to
the former, for Atty. Fernandez swore therein that when Gregorio Caeda of respondent corporation saw him at the hospital (sometime
between December 23-26, 1972) he advised Caeda of his inability to prepare the "answer" and Caeda got back the records of the
case from him;

He submits no explanation whatsoever, why if his "final draft of the desired comments" was "already prepared" since year-end of
1972 and only had to be "finalized and typed out" he utterly failed to submit the same notwithstanding the lapse of over six months
and worse, in his "explanation" of May 7, 1973 asked yet for "an opportunity to prepare the anser [which] he will try his best to do it
within the period granted by the Honorable Tribunal" when he had utterly ignored and disregarded the numerous extensions granted
him which lapsed on January 12, 1973; and

He likewise submits no explanation for his gross neglect in not seeing to it, assuming that Atty. Fernandez was to prepare the
required comment, that the required comment was filed within the last extension (that expired on January 12, 1973) secured by him
from the Court on his assurance that the final draft was ready and did nothing for three months until after he received the Court's
resolution of April 12, 1973 requiring his explanation.

The Court thus finds unsatisfactory Atty. Delante's explanation for his having allowed his extended period to lapse without submitting
the required comment nor extending to the Court the courtesy of any explanation or manifestation for his failure to do so. His inaction
unduly prevented and delayed for a considerable period the Court's prompt disposition of the petition. Worse, when this was noted and
the Court required his explanation, he gave an explanation that is devious and unworthy of belief since it is contradicted by his own
previous representations of record as well as by the "supporting" documents submitted by him therewith, as shown hereinabove.

Furthermore, notwithstanding the lapse of over six months which he let pass without submitting the required comment which
according to his motion of December 28, 1972 was "already prepared" by him and was only to be typed in clean, Atty. Delante in his
explanation still brazenly asked the Court for a further period to submit respondents' comment which supposedly had been readied by
him for submittal six months ago. His cavalier actions and attitude manifest gross disrespect for the Court's processes and tend to
embarrass gravely the administration of justice.

In Pajares vs. Abad Santos 2 the Court reminded attorneys that "There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the
Rules of Court which provides that "the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that
to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay" and
expressly admonishes that "for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action."

It should also not be necessary to remind attorneys of their solemn oath upon their admission to the Philippine Bar, that they will do no
falsehood and conduct themselves as lawyers according to the best of their knowledge and discretion good fidelity to the courts and
their clients.

The unsatisfactory explanation given by Atty. Delante as against the pleadings of record in the case at bar evinces a willful disregard
of his solemn duty as an attorney to employ in the conduct of a case "such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and
never seek to mislead" the courts "by an artifice or false statement of false statement of fact or law." 3

The Court has ever stressed that a lawyer must do his best to honor his oath, as there would be a great detriment to, if not a failure of
the administration of justice if courts could not rely on the submissions and representations made by lawyers in the conduct of a case.
As stated by the Court in one case, "Time and time again, lawyers have been admonished to remember that they are officers of the
court, and that while they owe their clients the duty of complete fidelity and the utmost diligence, they are likewise held to strict
accountability insofar as candor and honesty towards the court is concerned." 4

Hence, the Court has in several instances suspended lawyers from the practice of law for failure to file appellants' briefs in criminal
cases despite repeated extensions of time obtained by them, (except to file the missing briefs), with the reminder that "the trust
imposed on counsel in accordance not only with the canons of legal ethics but with the soundest traditions of the profession would
require fidelity on their part."

Considering, however, that counsel's record shows no previous infractions on his part since his admission to the Philippine Bar in
1959, the Court is inclined to act in a spirit of leniency.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby suspends Atty. Leonido C. Delante from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months
effective from his receipt of notice hereof, with the warning that repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely. The clerk of court is directed to circularize notice of such suspension to the Court of Appeals and all courts of first instance
and other courts of similar rank.

Let copies of this resolution be filed in his personal record and furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

[A.C. NO. 5542 : July 20, 2006]

DAYAN STA. ANA CHRISTIAN NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC. and/or its Officers, Members, namely: MINERVA
A. GENATO, JULIETA P. BENEDICTO, PRAXEDES A. MORENO, PATRICIA DE GUZMAN, PACITA G. MEQUERIO,
HELEN RESUELLO, RIC DE GUZMAN, and ERLINDA RAMIREZ, Complainants, v. ATTY. NAPOLEON A. ESPIRITU,
Respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

The instant disbarment case was filed by the officers/members of the Dayan Sta. Ana Christian Neighborhood Association Inc.,
charging Atty. Napoleon A. Espiritu with "deceitful conduct, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, and/or violation of oath of
office." The charges are contained in the Complaint-Affidavit1 dated May 17, 2001.

Complainants sought the services of respondent sometime in November 1997 regarding a consolidated ejectment case where they
were being sued in their respective capacities as officers and members of the association. The case, docketed as Civil Case Nos.
153905-90, was pending before the Municipal Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26. Complainants lost, however, and respondent advised
them to file a supersedeas bond to stay their eviction. 2 Complainants then entrusted the following amounts to respondent as payment
therefor:

A. ) On November 13, 1997 and November 28, 1997, he received the amount of P12,000.00 and P13,000.00 respectively from
Minerva Genato. (Annexes "B" and "B-1")

b.) On March 31, 1998, he received the amount of P41,257.00 from Rico Ramirez. (Annex "C")

c.) On March 23, 1998, he received from us the amount of P116,605.00, which are imparted under the following circumstances:

c.1.) Ric De Guzman - - - - - - - - - P14,010.00

-

c.2.) Patricia De Guzman - - - - - - - - - P15,784.00

-

c.3.) Ben/Lita Benedicto - - - - - - - - - P37,870.00

-

c.4.) Helena Resuello - - - - - - - - - P11,363.00

-

c.5.) Praxedes Moreno - - - - - - - - - P12,040.00

-

c.6.) Pacita Moquerio - - - - - - - - - P25,538.00

-

which he receipted erroneously in the amount of P86,666.72, but duly corrected by one of the members thereon. The aforesaid amount
was accepted by him in the name of Dayan as shown by the receipt he issued thereto marked as Annex "D."

d.) Again for the same reason, on July 28, 1998 he received the amount of P8,930.00 from us the following:
d.1.) Ric De Guzman - - - - - - - - - P1,250.00
-

d.2.) Patricia De Guzman - - - - - - - - - P1,125.00

-

d.3.) Ben/Lita Benedicto - - - - - - - - - P3,130.00

-

d.4.) Helena Resuello - - - - - - - - - P 625.00

-

d.5.) Praxedes Moreno - - - - - - - - - P 935.00

-

d.6.) Pacita Moquerio - - - - - - - - - P1,865.00

-

which he again receipted under Dayan as evidenced by hereto attached copy of the receipt marked as Annex "E."

e.) On July 28, 1998, he received again from Rico/Erlinda Ramirez the amount of P3,370.00. (Annex "F")

f.) Also on July 28, 1998, he received from Minerva Genato the amount of P4,000.00. (Annex "H")

g.) On August 7, 1998, he received from Manuel Rivera/Myrna Sayson the amount of P2,000.00 (Annex "H") and Prima Fidel the
amount of P4,000.00. (Annex "H-1")

h.) On August 27, 1998, he received from Minerva Genato the amount of P4,000.00. (Annex "I").3

According to complainants, respondent deposited only P48,000.00 before the Clerk of Court as evidenced by receipts furnished by
respondent himself.4 Association President Minerva Genato then made a verbal demand for respondent to return the remaining
balance, upon which respondent delivered a personal check for P141,904.00 in the name of Atty. Leonardo Ocampo. The check
bounced for insufficiency of funds. Consequently, Atty. Ocampo sent a demand letter 5 to Genato to make good the payment of the
check. Genato continued to make verbal demands and later sent a letter6 dated May 25, 2000 demanding the payment of the amount of
the check, to no avail. The Association was thus constrained to seek the help of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Through
Atty. Helengrace G. Cabasal, another demand letter 7 dated July 17, 2000 was sent for respondent to return the "remaining balance" of
P206,497.00. An Information8 charging respondent with estafa was likewise filed before the RTC of Manila.

In his Comment, 9 respondent admitted that he deposited to the clerk of court the amount of P48,481.00 as "partial supersedeas bond."
In his desire to help complainants, he talked to the counsel of plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 153905-90. Respondent likewise admitted
that he issued a postdated check to cover the balance (P141,904.00), and that he was unable to fund the same. He, however, made
arrangements with Atty. Ocampo and his clients for the payment of the subject check, and requested the latter for complainants to stay
in the subject property until December 1999, or even beyond. He pointed out that it was upon his representations that complainants
were allowed to stay in the subject premises up to the present, and that the said amount (P141,904.00 and not P206,497.00 as falsely
claimed by complainants), was meant as payment for supersedeas bond in Civil Case No. 153686-CV for the use and occupation of
the complainants of the subject property from January 1991 to December 1996. Respondent likewise disclosed that complainants had
lodged several complaints against him for estafa and/or theft in connection with the amount covered by the postdated check which he
issued in favor of Atty. Ocampo, which, however, are all baseless. He insisted that complainants have no cause of action against him,
and that the instant administrative complaint must be dismissed outright for the following reasons:
As stated earlier, the basis of this administrative case as well as the criminal complaints is the demand letter to Atty. Ocampo to make
good the check issued by respondent, and in case of failure, Atty. Ocampo will insist on the issuance of the execution. It bears
stressing, however, that because of the arrangement made by respondent with Atty. Ocampo, and as per their (Atty. Ocampo and the
respondent) agreement, Atty. Ocampo no longer pursued the eviction f the complainants. UP TO THE PRESENT, complainants are
still in the premises in question.

The complainants were never prejudiced by the bounced check and the demand letter sent by Atty. Ocampo to the complainants. On
the contrary, they have benefited by the representations made by respondent to Atty. Ocampo. Moreover, respondent had made
representations with the City Council of Manila for the expropriation of the premises in question, which is now under consideration by
the said City Council.

Hence, complainants have no cause to complain. In fact, they should be grateful to the respondent because without his representations
with Atty. Ocampo and the plaintiff in CIVIL CASE NO. 153686-CV, and with the City Council of Manila, complainants have long
been evicted from the said premises. To sanction complainants' administrative and criminal complaints against the respondent is a
mockery of justice; respondent will be placed in an unjust situation where he has to answer severally a single offense, if at all. He will
be made liable to Atty. Ocampo or to the plaintiff in CIVIL CASE NO. 153686-CV, to the herein complainants and to the Honorable
Court.

Parenthetically, complainants have absolutely no personality to file or institute this action against the respondent. As it now clearly
appears, the instant case is a persecution rather than a prosecution, where the aim or purpose of the complainants is to exact or extort
money from the respondent. Complainants are well aware that they are not entitled to the money they sought to collect from the
respondent which served as basis of their malicious and perjurious criminal and administrative complaints. The purpose of the money
received by the respondent had greatly been served through the issuance of the check by respondent to Atty. Ocampo and respondent's
representations with Atty. Ocampo and his client-plaintiff NOT TO EJECT complainants from the premises. Complainants have
benefited too much from the representations of respondent with Atty. Ocampo, UNTIL NOW.

To reiterate, it is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 153686-CV which has a cause of action against the respondent - and not or never the
herein complainants.10

Complainants refuted these allegations, insisting that the basis of the filing of the instant administrative case, as well as the criminal
charges for estafa against respondent, is the misappropriation or conversion of the amounts which should have been deposited with the
court or with the lessor in order to cover the required bond or arrears in rental over the property; the check was adduced in evidence to
prove the fact of misappropriation or conversion, as respondent issued the same after he failed to deposit the complete amount
entrusted to him by complainants; and due to respondent's unlawful acts, they were prejudiced and suffered damages, thus:

b. The continuing failure of the respondent to transmit the subsequent amounts he further collected and received, is not further
prejudicial to the enforcement and effective implementation of the rights of the complainants under the expropriation ordinance,
enacted by the local government, because of the nonpayment of the backrental constituting the supersedeas bond, which up to the
present, is being demanded by the lessor, as precondition for negotiating, for the expropriation compensation due to the lessor-owner.

c. It must be further noted and stressed, there was no representation at all made by respondent with the lessor through Atty. Ocampo;
nor, with the local government in the enactment and enforcement of said ordinance. Contrary then, to the respondent's contention, it
was through the coordinative efforts of the complainants through their President, which caused the passage of said expropriation law.
Further, the continuing stay of complainants in the premises is but the due consequence of such enactment and not through any
representation on the part of respondent, who failed to protect the interest of the complainant, as legal counsel of his clients, the herein
complainants, in gross dereliction of his duty as such.11

The case was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 12 Investigating
IBP Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan scheduled the case for hearing. Witnesses for complainants testified on November 6, 2003.
On the hearing set for June 13, 2004, however, respondent failed to appear. A representative informed the Commission that respondent
was suffering from "high sugar blood count." The hearing was reset to February 26, 2004, where respondent was ordered to present his
medical certificate. On the last scheduled hearing of the case on August 26, 2004, respondent failed to appear despite due notice,
hence, complainant's testimony was heard ex-parte. Complainant was then given 15 days to make a formal offer of evidence, after
which the case was submitted for resolution. The last notice sent to respondent was returned for being unclaimed.

In her Report and Recommendation dated May 26, 2005, Commissioner San Juan recommended that respondent be disbarred,
considering the following findings:

The claim of respondent that the complainants [have] no cause of action against him is without merit. He admitted receiving the funds
from complainants and that he deposited only P48,481.00 with the Clerk of Court as partial supersedeas bond. The fact that Atty.
Leonardo Ocampo counsel of the plaintiff in the ejectment case accommodated the respondent with his personal check does not
relieve respondent from liability. On the contrary it is evident that the arrangement was resorted to in order that respondent could
extricate himself from the situation he was in. By obtaining a loan from Atty. Ocampo in the form of a check is a clear admission that
the money entrusted to respondent by complainants was misappropriated. Noted is the failure of respondent to make an accounting of
the funds entrusted to him and the absence of an explanation why only a partial payment of the bond was made. The contention of
respondent that complainants were never prejudiced by the bouncing check likewise must fail. Neither will the payment of the check
and the funds entrusted to him "doubly prejudice" respondent.13

On January 28, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-05, modifying the penalty meted on respondent,
to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and
finding the recommendation duly supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for obtaining a loan from
Atty. Ocampo in the form of a check is a clear admission that the money entrusted to respondent by complainants was
misappropriated, Atty. Napoleon A. Espiritu is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for (1) year.

We agree with the foregoing recommendation. It is clear that respondent misappropriated the money which his clients, herein
complainants, had entrusted to him for a specific purpose, and such an act cannot be countenanced.

Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from his client. A lawyer should be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to him in his
professional capacity, because a high degree of fidelity and good faith on his part is exacted. 14 In Parias v. Paguinto,15 the Court had
the occasion to state that "money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but not used for failure to file the
case must immediately be returned to the client on demand." 16 Indeed, a lawyer has no right to unilaterally appropriate his or her
client's money.17

We note that respondent failed to appear before the IBP Investigating Commissioner to explain his actions, much less present his
defense. In Rangwani v. Dio,18 we ruled that it is not enough for a member of the bar to deny the charges:

Quite conspicuously, despite the opportunities accorded to respondent to refute the charges against him, he failed to do so or even
offer a valid explanation. The record is bereft of any evidence to show that respondent has presented any countervailing evidence to
meet the charges against him. His nonchalance does not speak well of him as it reflects his utter lack of respect towards the public
officers who were assigned to investigate the cases. On the contrary, respondent's comments only markedly admitted complainant's
accusations. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him. He must
meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity
which at all times is expected of him. These, respondent miserably failed to do.19

The fiduciary duty of a lawyer and advocate is what places the law profession in a unique position of trust and confidence, and
distinguishes it from any other calling. Once this trust and confidence is betrayed, the faith of the people not only in the individual
lawyer but also in the legal profession as a whole is eroded. To this end, all members of the bar are strictly required to at all times
maintain the highest degree of public confidence in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of their profession. 20 The nature of the office of a
lawyer requires that he shall be of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal
profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain one's good standing in the profession. 21 Law is a noble profession, and
the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically, and, equally important,
morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their
dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. 22

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefore. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he
is required to take before admission to the practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

However, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and character of a lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar. It should never be decreed where any lesser
penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired. 23 In this case, the Court finds that one-year suspension from
the practice of law will suffice as penalty against respondent.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Napoleon A. Espiritu is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
penalized with SUSPENSION from the practice of law for One (1) Year effective immediately. Respondent is DIRECTED to return
the funds entrusted to him by complainants, and to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent's personal records; the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6792 January 25, 2006

ROBERTO SORIANO, Complainant,

vs.
Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit1 for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by Roberto Soriano with the Commission on Bar
Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges that the conviction of respondent for a crime
involving moral turpitude, together with the circumstances surrounding the conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility;2 and constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.3

Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint, the CBD issued a Notice dated May 20, 2004, informing
him that he was in default, and that an ex-parte hearing had been scheduled for June 11, 2004. 4After that hearing, complainant
manifested that he was submitting the case on the basis of the Complaint and its attachments. 5 Accordingly, the CBD directed him to
file his Position Paper, which he did on July 27, 2004.6Afterwards, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.

On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report and Recommendation, which was later adopted and
approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12, 2005.

In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and that the conviction of the latter for frustrated homicide, 7 which involved moral turpitude, should result in his
disbarment.

The facts leading to respondents conviction were summarized by Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in this wise:
"x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his way home after gassing up in preparation for his trip to
Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the car driven by the accused not knowing that the
driver of the car he had overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyer and a prominent member of the Baguio community who was under
the influence of liquor. Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum and Carino
Streets. The accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi driver and held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver
forced open his door causing the accused to fall to the ground. The taxi driver knew that the accused had been drinking because he
smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused who looked elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car to help him get up. But the accused,
by now enraged, stood up immediately and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the latter boxed him on the chest instead.
The accused fell down a second time, got up again and was about to box the taxi driver but the latter caught his fist and turned his arm
around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until he could be pacified and then released him. The accused went back to his car and
got his revolver making sure that the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver was on his way back to his vehicle when
he noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He picked them up intending to return them to the accused. But as he was
handing the same to the accused, he was met by the barrel of the gun held by the accused who fired and shot him hitting him on the
neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused so the latter pushed him out and sped off. The incident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes
whose testimony corroborated that of the taxi driver, the complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano."8

It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of Soriano and brought the latter to the hospital. Because the
bullet had lacerated the carotid artery on the left side of his neck, 9 complainant would have surely died of hemorrhage if he had not
received timely medical assistance, according to the attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr. Soriano sustained a spinal cord
injury, which caused paralysis on the left part of his body and disabled him for his job as a taxi driver.

The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On January 18, 2002, respondent filed an application for
probation, which was granted by the court on several conditions. These included satisfaction of "the civil liabilities imposed by [the]
court in favor of the offended party, Roberto Soriano."10

According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to comply with this particular undertaking, even
appealed the civil liability to the Court of Appeals.11

In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law for
having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such crime, but that the latter also exhibited an obvious lack
of good moral character, based on the following facts:

"1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;

"2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because the latter, driving a taxi, had overtaken him;

"3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault, Respondent went back to his car, got a gun, wrapped the same
with a handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was unarmed;

"4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and fled;

"5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied that he had shot Complainant;

"6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was the one mauled by Complainant and two unidentified
persons; and,

"7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet satisfied his civil liabilities to Complainant." 12

On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP Resolution adopting the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.

We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, as approved and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.

Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or
suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer
possessed of good moral character.13 In the instant case, respondent has been found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final judgment,
of frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has already been established and is no longer open to question, the only issues that remain
to be determined are as follows: 1) whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt
warrants disbarment.

Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness,
vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals."14

The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has been discussed in International Rice Research Institute
(IRRI) v. NLRC,15 a labor case concerning an employee who was dismissed on the basis of his conviction for homicide. Considering
the particular circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, this Court rejected the employers contention and held that
homicide in that case did not involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime would have been violative of the IRRIs Employment Policy
Regulations and indeed a ground for dismissal.) The Court explained that, having disregarded the attendant circumstances, the
employer made a pronouncement that was precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for the latter to determine conclusively whether a crime
involved moral turpitude. That discretion belonged to the courts, as explained thus:

"x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in
every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction
involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. x x x. "16 (Emphasis
supplied)

In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude, the Court appreciated the presence of incomplete
self-defense and total absence of aggravating circumstances. For a better understanding of that Decision, the circumstances of the
crime are quoted as follows:

"x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then urinating and had his back turned when the victim drove
his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to
stop the attack but was ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of his
shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him several times. These
facts show that Micosa's intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the
mitigating circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance demonstrate
that Micosa's character and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust." 17

The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly evince the moral turpitude of respondent
and his unworthiness to practice law.

Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter least expected it. The act of aggression
shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and his arm twisted by complainant. Under the
circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyers assault.

We also consider the trial courts finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed morals of respondent. He shot the victim
when the latter was not in a position to defend himself. In fact, under the impression that the assault was already over, the unarmed
complainant was merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse,
respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly intention
to escape punishment for his crime.

The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct, respondent revealed his extreme
arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted like a god on the road, who deserved to be venerated and never to be
slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal
profession. His overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a
lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued complainant, we see not the persistence of a person who has been grievously wronged,
but the obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact revenge.

It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility through his illegal
possession of an unlicensed firearm 18 and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities. 19 He has thus brazenly violated the law and
disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts. We remind him that, both in his attorneys oath 20 and in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he bound himself to "obey the laws of the land."

All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in even a basic sense of justice. He obtained the benevolence
of the trial court when it suspended his sentence and granted him probation. And yet, it has been four years 21 since he was ordered to
settle his civil liabilities to complainant. To date, respondent remains adamant in refusing to fulfill that obligation. By his extreme
impetuosity and intolerance, as shown by his violent reaction to a simple traffic altercation, he has taken away the earning capacity,
good health, and youthful vigor of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges complainant the measly amount that could never even fully
restore what the latter has lost.

Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of the profession of lawyers, but certainly to their
good moral character.22 Where their misconduct outside of their professional dealings is so gross as to show them morally unfit for
their office and unworthy of the privileges conferred upon them by their license and the law, the court may be justified in suspending
or removing them from that office.23

We also adopt the IBPs finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which is an essential qualification for
the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.24

In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous behavior. As found by the trial court, he had sought,
with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel Farias, an out-of-court settlement with complainants family. 25 But when this effort failed,
respondent concocted a complete lie by making it appear that it was complainants family that had sought a conference with him to
obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon.26

The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely implausible story of having been mauled by complainant
and two other persons.27 The trial court had this to say:

"The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors who examined [Atty. Dizon] does not support his allegation that
three people including the complainant helped each other in kicking and boxing him. The injuries he sustained were so minor that it is
improbable[,] if not downright unbelievable[,] that three people who he said were bent on beating him to death could do so little
damage. On the contrary, his injuries sustain the complainants version of the incident particularly when he said that he boxed the
accused on the chest. x x x."28

Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness. 29 The rigorous
ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior. 30 Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court
or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.

The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the legal profession. They constitute moral turpitude for
which he should be disbarred. "Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are
competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system,
lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and
integrity in a manner beyond reproach."31

The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw. Considering the depravity of
the offense he committed, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP proper and commensurate.

The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this
important function be competent, honorable and reliable -- lawyers in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. 32 Thus,
whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid our
profession of odious members.

We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and that disbarment should never be decreed when any
lesser penalty would accomplish the end desired. In the instant case, however, the Court cannot extend that munificence to respondent.
His actions so despicably and wantonly disregarded his duties to society and his profession. We are convinced that meting out a lesser
penalty would be irreconcilable with our lofty aspiration for the legal profession -- that every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth
and justice.

We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high degree of good moral character, not only as a
condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short
of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.

In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances not the mere fact of their conviction
would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal profession. In the present case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and
brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll
of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING A.C. No. 5700

CORPORATION, represented by Atty. Carlos R.
Bautista, Jr.,

Complainant, Present:

Promulgated:

- versus -

January 30, 2006

ATTY. DANTE A. CARANDANG,

Respondent.

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is a verified complaint for disbarment filed by the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) against Atty.
Dante A. Carandang.

The complaint alleges that Atty. Carandang, respondent, is the president of Bingo Royale, Incorporated (Bingo Royale), a private
corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines.

On February 2, 1999, PAGCOR and Bingo Royale executed a Grant of Authority to Operate Bingo Games. Article V of this document
mandates Bingo Royale to remit 20% of its gross sales to PAGCOR. This 20% is divided into 15% to PAGCOR and 5% franchise tax
to the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

In the course of its operations, Bingo Royale incurred arrears amounting to P6,064,833.14 as of November 15, 2001. Instead of
demanding the payment therefor, PAGCOR allowed Bingo Royale and respondent Atty. Carandang to pay the said amount in monthly
installment of P300,000.00 from July 2001 to June 2003.

Bingo Royale then issued to PAGCOR twenty four (24) Bank of Commerce checks in the sum of P7,200,000.00 signed by respondent.

However, when the checks were deposited after the end of each month at the Land Bank, U.N. Avenue Branch, Manila, they were all
dishonored by reason of BingoRoyales Closed Account.

Despite PAGCORs demand letters dated November 12 and December 12, 2001, and February 12, 2002, respondent failed to pay the
amounts of the checks. Thus, PAGCOR filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila criminal complaints for violations of
Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 against respondent.

PAGCOR contends that in issuing those bouncing checks, respondent is liable for serious misconduct, violation of the Attorneys Oath
and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and prays that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

In his Opposition to the complaint, respondent averred that he is not liable for issuing bouncing checks because they were drawn by
Bingo Royale. His act of doing so is not related to the office of a lawyer.

Respondent explained that since the start of its operations, Bingo Royale has been experiencing financial difficulties due to meager
sales. Hence, it incurred arrearages in paying PAGCORs shares and failed to pay the amounts of the checks.

On November 20, 2001, PAGCOR closed the operations of Bingo Royale. This prompted the latter to file with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 59, Makati City, a complaint for damages against PAGCOR, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-1671.

Subsequently, Bingo Royale became bankrupt. Respondent now maintains that the dishonor of the checks was caused by
circumstances beyond his control and pleads that our power to disbar him must be exercised with great caution.

On February 24, 2003, we resolved to refer this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.[1]

In his Report and Recommendation, Atty. Doroteo B. Aguila, the Investigating IBP Commissioner, made the following findings and
observations:

Whether to issue or not checks in favor of a payee is a voluntary act. It is clearly a choice for an individual (especially one learned in
the law), whether in a personal capacity or officer of a corporation, to do so after assessing and weighing the consequences and risks
for doing so. As President of BRI, he cannot be said to be unaware of the probability that BRI, the company he runs, could not raise
funds, totally or partially, to cover the checks as they fell due. The desire to continue the operations of his company does not excuse
respondents act of violating the law by issuing worthless checks. Moreover, inability to pay is not a ground, under the Civil Code, to
suspend nor extinguish an obligation. Specifically, respondent contends that because of business reverses or inability to generate
funds, BRI should be excused from making good the payment of the checks. If this theory is sustained, debtors will merely state that
they no longer have the capacity to pay and, consequently, not obliged to pay on time, nor fully or partially, their debt to
creditors. Surely, undersigned cannot agree with this contention.

As correctly pointed out by complainant, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is an offense that involves public interest. In the leading case of
People v. Taada, the Honorable Supreme Court explained the nature of the offense, thus

xxx

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored
upon its presentation for payment xxx. The thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions the making of worthless
checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by law. The
law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public order.

xxx

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and
touches the interest of the community at large.The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to
the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well
pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The Code of Professional Responsibility requires a lawyer to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and the legal
processes. It also prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful conduct (Canon 1 & Rule 1.01). By issuing the bouncing checks in
blatant violation of B.P. Blg. 22, respondent clearly was irresponsible and displayed lack of concern for the rights of others nor for the
canons of professional responsibility (Castillo v. Taguines, 254 SCRA 554). Atty. Carandang deserves to be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one year. Consistent with the ruling in this Castillo case, suspension for one year is the deserved
minimum penalty for the outrageous conduct of a lawyer who has no concern for the property rights of others nor for the canons of
professional responsibility. Moreover, conviction for the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is not even essential for disbarment (De
Jesus v. Collado, 216 SCRA 619).

Commissioner Aguila then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year.

On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2003-177 adopting and approving
Commissioner Aguilas Report and Recommendation with modification in the sense that the recommended penalty is reduced to
suspension of six (6) months, thus:

RESOLVED TO ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of the Resolution/Decision as Annex A and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and considering that
the Code of Professional Responsibility requires a lawyer to obey the laws of the land and promote respect of law and the legal
processes, and also prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful conduct, Atty. Dante A. Carandang is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months.[2]

Section 1, B. P. Blg. 22 provides:

Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check on behalf of
such drawer shall be liable under this Act. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, even if the check was drawn by Bingo Royale, still respondent is liable.

In People v. Tuanda,[3] we explained the nature of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 as follows:

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored
upon its presentation for payment xxx. The thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless
checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the
law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public order.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and
touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to
the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well
pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest.

As a lawyer, respondent is deemed to know the law, especially B. P. Blg. 22. By issuing checks in violation of the provisions of this
law, respondent is guilty of serious misconduct. In Camus v. Civil Service Board of Appeals,[4] we defined misconduct as follows:

Misconduct has been defined as wrong or improper conduct; and gross has been held to mean flagrant; shameful (Webster). This Court
once held that the word misconduct implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment.

In Lizaso v. Amante,[5] we held that a lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice in connection with his profession, but also for
gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity, thus:

The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney, and the
statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorney, uniformly require that an attorney shall be a person of good moral
character. xxx So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also
for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the
principles which his license and the law confer upon him. (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent likewise violated the Attorneys Oath that he will, among others, obey the laws; and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically the following provisions:

Cannon 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Dante A. Carandang is declared GUILTY of serious misconduct and violations of the Attorneys Oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility.As recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for six (6) months effective from notice.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the
land for their information and guidance.The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to spread a copy of this Decision on the
personal record of Atty. Carandang.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6963 February 9, 2006

VICTORINA BAUTISTA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. SERGIO E. BERNABE, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In a Complaint1 filed before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on November 16, 2004,
complainant Victorina Bautista2 prays for the suspension or disbarment of respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe for malpractice and
unethical conduct in the performance of his duties as a notary public and a lawyer.

Complainant alleged that on January 3, 1998, respondent prepared and notarized a Magkasanib na Salaysay3purportedly executed by
Donato Salonga and complainants mother, Basilia de la Cruz. 4 Both affiants declared that a certain parcel of land in Bigte,
Norzagaray, Bulacan, was being occupied by Rodolfo Lucas and his family for more than 30 years. Complainant claimed that her
mother could not have executed the joint affidavit on January 3, 1998 because she has been dead since January 28, 1961. 5

In his Answer,6 respondent denied that he falsified the Magkasanib na Salaysay. He disclaimed any knowledge about Basilias death.
He alleged that before he notarized the document, he requested for Basilias presence and in her absence, he allowed a certain
Pronebo, allegedly a son-in-law of Basilia, to sign above the name of the latter as shown by the word "by" on top of the name of
Basilia. Respondent maintained that there was no forgery since the signature appearing on top of Basilias name was the signature of
Pronebo.

On April 4, 2005, respondent filed a manifestation7 attaching thereto the affidavit of desistance8 of complainant which reads in part:

Ako na si, VICTORINA BAUTISTA CAPA, x x x matapos makapanumpa ng naaayon sa batas ay malaya at kusang loob na
nagpapahayag ng mga sumusunod:

1. Na ako ang siyang tumatayong nagrereklamo laban kay Abogado, SERGIO EXQUIVEL BERNABE, sa isang kaso sa Tanggapan
ng Integrated Bar of the Philippines na may Blg. CBD CASE NO. 04-1371;

2. Na ang nasabing habla ay hindi ko kagustuhan sapagkat iyon ay pinapirmahan lamang sa akin ni ELISEO OLOROSO at ng
kanyang Abogado na si Atty. MARCIAL MORFE MAGSINO at sa katunayan hindi ako nakaharap sa Notaryo Publiko na si Abogado
CARLITOS C. VILLARIN;

3. Na ang pagpapapirma sa akin ay isang panlilinlang at ako ay ginawang kasangkapan para sirain ang magandang pangalan nitong si
Abogado SERGIO ESQUIVEL BERNABE;

4. Na dahil sa ganitong pangyayari, aking hinihiling sa Tanggapan ng Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) na ang reklamo ko laban
sa nasabing Abogado SERGIO ESQUIVEL BERNABE ay mapawa[la]ng bisa.

In the report dated August 29, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner9 recommended that:

1. Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe be suspended from the practice of the legal profession for one (1) month;
2. Any existing commission of Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe as notary public, be revoked; and

3. Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe be barred from being granted a notarial commission for a period of one (1) year.10

In a resolution dated October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner with modification that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and his notarial
commission be revoked and that he be disqualified for reappointment as notary public for two years.

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

The records sufficiently established that Basilia was already dead when the joint affidavit was prepared on January 3, 1998.
Respondents alleged lack of knowledge of Basilias death does not excuse him. It was his duty to require the personal appearance of
the affiant before affixing his notarial seal and signature on the instrument.

A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The presence of the parties to the deed will
enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant. 11

Respondents act of notarizing the Magkasanib na Salaysay in the absence of one of the affiants is in violation of Rule 1.01, 12 Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law.13 By affixing his signature and notarial seal on the instrument, he led
us to believe that Basilia personally appeared before him and attested to the truth and veracity of the contents of the affidavit when in
fact it was a certain Pronebo who signed the document. Respondents conduct is fraught with dangerous possibilities considering the
conclusiveness on the due execution of a document that our courts and the public accord on notarized documents. Respondent has
clearly failed to exercise utmost diligence in the performance of his function as a notary public and to comply with the mandates of the
law.14

Respondent was also remiss in his duty when he allowed Pronebo to sign in behalf of Basilia. A member of the bar who performs an
act as a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed
and personally appeared before him. The acts of the affiants cannot be delegated to anyone for what are stated therein are facts of
which they have personal knowledge. They should swear to the document personally and not through any representative. Otherwise,
their representatives name should appear in the said documents as the one who executed the same. That is the only time the
representative can affix his signature and personally appear before the notary public for notarization of the said document. Simply put,
the party or parties who executed the instrument must be the ones to personally appear before the notary public to acknowledge the
document.15

Complainants desistance or withdrawal of the complaint does not exonerate respondent or put an end to the administrative
proceedings. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What
matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been
proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action
where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and
afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the
purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to
answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have
in the proper administration of justice.16

We find the penalty recommended by the IBP to be in full accord with recent jurisprudence. In Gonzales v. Ramos,17 respondent
lawyer was found guilty of notarizing the document despite the non-appearance of one of the signatories. As a result, his notarial
commission was revoked and he was disqualified from reappointment for a period of two years. In addition, he was suspended from
the practice of law for one year.

Finally, it has not escaped our notice that in paragraph 2 18 of complainants affidavit of desistance, she alluded that Atty. Carlitos C.
Villarin notarized her Sinumpaang Salaysay19 dated November 12, 2004 which was attached to the complaint filed with the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, without requiring her to personally appear before him in violation of the Notarial Law. This
allegation must likewise be investigated.

WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional Responsibility, the notarial commission of respondent Atty.
Sergio E. Bernabe, is REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two years. He is
also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year, effective immediately. He is further WARNED that a repetition
of the same or of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of receipt of this Decision in
order to determine when his suspension shall take effect.

The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is DIRECTED to investigate the allegation that Atty.
Carlitos C. Villarin notarized the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Victorina Bautista dated November 12, 2004 without requiring the latters
personal appearance.lavvph!1.net

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all over
the country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5377 June 30, 2014

VICTOR C. LINGAN, Complainant,

vs.
ATTYS. ROMEO CALUBAQUIB and JIMMY P. BALIGA, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

This court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When this court orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of
law, the lawyer must desist from performing all functions requiring the application of legal knowledge within the period of
suspension. This includes desisting from holding a position in government requiring the authority to practice law.

For our resolution is respondent Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga's motion to lift one-year suspension from the practice of law.1

In the resolution2 dated June 15, 2006, this court found Attys. Romeo I. Calubaquib and Jimmy P. Baliga guilty of violating Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility3 and of the Lawyer's Oath.4 Respondents allowed their secretaries to notarize
documents in their stead, in violation of Sections 245 5 and 2466 of the Notarial Law. This court suspended respondents from the
practice of law for one year, revoked their notarial commissions, and disqualified them from reappointment as notaries public for two
years.

Complainant Victor C. Lingan filed his motion for reconsideration, 7 praying that respondents be disbarred, not merely suspended from
the practice of law. In the resolution8 dated September 6, 2006, this court denied complainant Lingan's motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit.

On March 22, 2007, Atty. Baliga, also the Regional Director of the Commission on Human Rights Regional Office for Region II, filed
the undated ex parte clarificatory pleading with leave of court.9

In his ex parte clarificatory pleading, Atty. Baliga alleged that on July 14, 2006, complainant Lingan wrote the Commission on Human
Rights. Lingan requested the Commission to investigate Atty. Baliga following the latter's suspension from the practice of law.

After this court had suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, the Commission on Human Rights En Banc issued the
resolution10 dated January 16, 2007, suspending him from his position as Director/Attorney VI of the. Commission on Human Rights
Regional Office for Region II. According to the Commission on Human Rights En Banc, Atty. Baliga's suspension from the practice of
law "prevent[ed] [him] from assuming his post [as Regional Director] for want of eligibility in the meantime that his authority to
practice law is suspended."11

Atty. Baliga argued that he cannot be suspended for acts not connected with his functions as Commission on Human Rights Regional
Director. According to Atty. Baliga, his suspension from the practice of law did not include his suspension from public office. He
prayed for clarification of this court's resolution dated June 15, 2006 "to prevent further injury and prejudice to [his] rights." 12

This court noted without action Atty. Baliga's ex parte clarificatory pleading as this court does not render advisory opinions. 13

On May 8, 2009, this court received a letter from complainant Lingan. In his letter 14 dated May 4, 2009, Lingan alleged that Atty.
Baliga continued practicing law and discharging his functions as Commission on Human Rights Regional Director, in violation of this
court's order of suspension.

Complainant Lingan allegedly received a copy of the Commission on Human Rights En Banc 's resolution suspending Atty. Baliga as
Regional Director. On Atty. Baliga's motion, the ommission reconsidered Atty. Baliga's suspension and instead admonished him for
"[violating] the conditions of his commission as a notary public." 15According to complainant Lingan, he was not served a copy of Atty.
Baliga's motion for reconsideration.16

Complainant Lingan claimed that the discharge of the functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director necessarily
required the practice of law. A Commission on Human Rights Regional Director must be a member of the bar and is designated as
Attorney VI. Since this court suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, Atty. Baliga was in effect "a non-lawyer . . . and [was]
disqualified to hold the position of [Regional Director] [during the effectivity of the order of suspension]." 17 The Commission on
Human Rights, according to complainant Lingan, should have ordered Atty. Baliga to desist from performing his functions as
Regional Director. Complainant Lingan prayed that this court give "favorable attention and action on the matter." 18

This court endorsed complainant Lingan's letter to the Office of the Bar Confidant for report and recommendation. 19

In its report and recommendation20 dated June 29, 2009, the Office of the Bar Confidant found that the period of suspension of Attys.
Calubaquib and Baliga had already lapsed. It recommended that respondents be required to file their respective motions to lift order of
suspension with certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Executive Judge of the court where they might appear
as counsel and state that they desisted from practicing law during the period of suspension.

On the claim that the Commission on Human Rights allowed Atty. Baliga to perform his functions as Regional Director during the
period of suspension, the Office of the Bar Confidant said that the Commission "deliberate[ly] disregard[ed]" 21 this court's order of
suspension. According to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Commission on Human Rights had no power to "[alter, modify, or set
aside any of this court's resolutions] which [have] become final and executory. "22

Thus, with respect to Atty. Baliga, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that this court require him to submit a certification
from the Commission on Human Rights stating that he desisted from performing his functions as Regional Director while he was
suspended from the practice of law.23

The Office of the Bar Confidant further recommended that Atty. Baliga and the Commission .on Human Rights be required to
comment on complainant Lingan's allegation that Atty. Baliga continued to perform his functions as Regional Director while he was
suspended from the practice of law.

On July 17, 2009, Atty. Baliga filed a manifestation, 24 arguing that his suspension from the practice of law did not include his
suspension from public office. Atty. Baliga said, "[t]o stretch the coverage of [his suspension from the practice of law] to [his] public
office would be tantamount to [violating] his constitutional rights [sic] to due process and to the statutory principle in law that what is
not included is deemed excluded."25

In the resolution26 dated September 23, 2009, this court required respondents to file their respective motions to lift order of suspension
considering the lapse of the period of suspension. This court further ordered Atty. Baliga and the Commission on Human Rights to
comment on complainant Lingari's allegation that Atty. Baliga continued performing his functions as Regional Director while he was
suspended from the practice of law. The resolution dated September 23, 2009 provides:

Considering that the period of suspension from the practice of law and disqualification from being commissioned as notary public
imposed on respondents have [sic] already elapsed, this Court resolves:
(1) to require both respondents, within ten (10) days from notice, to FILE their respective motions to lift relative to their suspension
and disqualification from being commissioned as notary public and SUBMIT certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and Executive Judge of the Court where they may appear as counsel, stating that respondents have actually ceased and desisted from
the practice of law during the entire period of their suspension and disqualification, unless already complied with in the meantime;

(2) to require Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga to SUBMIT a certification from the Commission on Human Rights [CHR] stating that he has been
suspended from office and has stopped from the performance of his functions for the period stated in the order of suspension and
disqualification, within ten (10) days from notice hereof;

(3) to require respondent Atty. Baliga and the CHR to COMMENT on the allegations of complainant against them, both within ten
(10) days from receipt of notice hereof; ...27 (Emphasis in the original)

In compliance with this court's order, Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga filed their respective motions to lift order of suspension. 28 Atty.
Baliga also filed his comment on complainant Lingan's allegation that he continued performing his functions as Regional Director
during his suspension from the practice of law.

In his comment29 dated November 13, 2009, Atty. Baliga alleged that as Regional Director, he "perform[ed], generally, managerial
functions,"30 which did not require the practice of law. These managerial functions allegedly included ."[supervising] ... the day to day
operations of the regional office and its personnel"; 31 "monitoring progress of investigations conducted by the [Commission on Human
Rights] Investigation Unit";32 "monitoring the implementation of all other services and assistance programs of the [Commission on
Human Rights] by the different units at the regional level"; 33 and "[supervising] . . . the budgetary requirement preparation and
disbursement of funds and expenditure of the [Regional Office]." 34 The Commission allegedly has its own "legal services unit which
takes care of the legal services matters of the [Commission]."35

Stating that his functions as Regional Director did not require the practice of law, Atty. Baliga claimed thaf he "faithful[ly] [complied]
with [this court's resolution suspending him from the practice of law]."36

The Commission on Human Rights filed its comment 37 dated November 27, 2009. It argued that "the penalty imposed upon Atty.
Baliga as a member of the bar is separate and distinct from any penalty that may be imposed upon him as a public official for the same
acts."38 According to the Commission, Atty. Baliga's suspension from the practice of law is a "bar matter" 39 while the imposition of
penalty upon a Commission on Human Rights official "is an entirely different thing, falling as it does within the exclusive authority of
the [Commission as] disciplining body."40

Nevertheless, the Commission manifested that it would defer to this court's resolution of the issue and would "abide by whatever
ruling or decision [this court] arrives at on [the] matter. " 41 In reply42 to Atty. Baliga's comment, complainant Lingan argued that Atty.
Baliga again disobeyed this. court. Atty. Baliga failed to submit a certification from the Commission on Human Rights stating that he
was suspended from office and desisted from performing his functions as Regional Director.

As to Atty. Baliga's claim that he did not practice law while he held his position as Regional Director and only performed generally
managerial functions, complainant Lingan countered that Atty. Baliga admitted to defying the order of suspension. Atty. Baliga
admitted to performing the functions of a "lawyer-manager," 43 which under the landmark case of Cayetano v. Monsod 44 constituted
practice of law. Complainant Lingan reiterated that the position of Regional Director/ Attorney VI requires the officer "to be a lawyer
[in] good standing."45 Moreover, as admitted by Atty. Baliga, he had supervision and control over Attorneys III, IV, and V. Being a
"lawyer-manager," Atty. Baliga practiced law while he held his position as Regional Director.

With respect to Atty. Baliga's claim that he was in good faith in reassuming his position as Regional Director, complainant Lingan
countered that if Atty. Baliga were really in good faith, he should have followed the initial resolution of the Commission on Human
Rights suspending him from office. Atty. Baliga did not even furnish this court a copy of his motion for reconsideration of the
Commission on Human Right's resolution suspending him from office. By "playing ignorant on what is 'practice of law', twisting facts
and philosophizing,"46 complainant Lingan argued that Atty. Baliga "[no longer has that] moral vitality imperative to the title of an
attorney."47Compfainant Lingan prayed that Atty. Baliga be disbarred.

On February 17, 2010, this court lifted the order of suspension of Atty. Calubaquib. 48 He was allowed to resume his practice of law
and perform notarial acts subject to compliance with the requirements for issuance of a notarial commission.

On the other hand, this court referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report, and recommendation Atty. Baliga's
motion to lift one-year suspension and the respective comments of Atty. Baliga and the Commission on Human Rights. 49

In its report and recommendation 50 dated October 18, 2010, the Office of the Bar Confidant stated that Atty. Baliga "should not [have
been] allowed to perform his functions, duties, and responsibilities [as Regional Director] which [required acts constituting] practice
.of law."51 Considering that Atty. Baliga claimed that he did not perform his functions as Regional Director which required the practice
of law, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the Commission on Human Rights be required to comment on this claim.
The Office of the Bar Confidant also recommended holding in abeyance the resolution of Atty. Baliga's motion to lift suspension
"pending [the Commission on Human Right's filing of comment]."52

In the resolution53 dated January 12, 2011, this court held in abeyance the resolution of Atty. Baliga's motion to lift one-year
suspension. The Commission on Human Rights was ordered to comment on Atty. Baliga's claim that he did not practice law while he
held his position as Regional Director.

In its comment54 dated April 6, 2011, the Commission on Human Rights reiterated that the penalty imposed on Atty. Baliga as a
member of the bar is separate from the penalty that might be imposed on him as Regional Director. The Commission added that it is
"of honest belief that the position of [Regional Director] is managerial and does not [require the practice of law]." 55 It again manifested
that it will "abide by whatever ruling or decision [this court] arrives on [the] matter." 56

The issue for our resolution is whether Atty. Baliga's motion to lift order of suspension should be granted.

We find that Atty. Baliga violated this court's order of suspension. We, therefore, suspend him further from the practice of law for six
months.

Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience."57 It includes "[performing] acts which are characteristics of the [legal] profession" 58 or "[rendering any kind of] service
[which] requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."59

Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge is considered practice. of law. In Cayetano v. Monsod, 60 this court cited
the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission and agreed that work rendered by lawyers in the Commission on Audit
requiring "[the use of] legal knowledge or legal talent"61 is practice of law.

The Commission on Human Rights is an independent office created under the Constitution with power to investigate "all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights[.]" 62 It is divided into regional offices with each office having primary
responsibility to investigate human rights violations in its territorial jurisdiction. 63 Each regional office is headed by the Regional
Director who is given the position of Attorney VI.

Under the Guidelines and Procedures in the Investigation and Monitoring of Human Rights Violations and Abuses, and the Provision
of CHR Assistance,64 the Regional Director has the following powers and functions:

a. To administer oaths or affirmations with respect to "[Commission on Human Rights] matters;" 65

b. To issue mission orders in their respective regional offices;66

c. To conduct preliminary evaluation or initial investigation of human rights complaints in the absence of the legal officer or
investigator;67

d. To conduct dialogues or preliminary conferences among parties and discuss "immediate courses of action and protection remedies
and/or possible submission of the matter to an alternative dispute resolution"; 68

e. To issue Commission on Human Rights processes, including notices, letter-invitations, orders, or subpoenas within the territorial
jurisdiction of the regional office;69 and

f. To review and approve draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by the legal officer.70

These powers and functions are characteristics of the legal profession. Oaths and affirmations are usually performed by members of
the judiciary and notaries public71 - officers who are necessarily members of the bar.72Investigating human rights complaints are
performed primarily by the Commission's legal officer.73 Discussing immediate courses of action and protection remedies and
reviewing and approving draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by the legal officer require the use of extensive legal
knowledge.

The exercise of the powers and functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director constitutes practice of law. Thus, the
Regional Director must be an attorney - a member of the bar in good standing and authorized to practice law. 74 When the Regional
Director loses this authority, such as when he or she is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law, the Regional Director loses a
necessary qualification to the position he or she is holding. The disbarred or suspended lawyer must desist from holding the position of
Regional Director.

This court suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law for one year on June 15, 2006, "effective immediately." 75From the time
Atty. Baliga received the court's order of suspension on July 5, 2006, 76 he has been without authority to practice law. He lacked a
necessary qualification to his position as Commission on Human Rights Regional Director/ Attorney VI. As the Commission on
Human Rights correctly resolved in its resolution dated January 16, 2007:

WHEREAS, this suspension under ethical standards, in effect, prevents Atty. Baliga from assuming his post, for want of eligibility in
the meantime that his authority to practice law is suspended. This is without prejudice to the investigation to be conducted to the
practice of law of Atty. Baliga, which in the case of all Regional Human Rights Directors is not generally allowed by the Commission;

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines resolved to put into effect and
implement the legal implications of the SC decision by decreeing the suspension of Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga in the discharge of his
functions and responsibilities as Director/Attorney VI of CHRP-Region II in Tuguegarao City for the period for which the Supreme
Court Resolution is in effect.77 (Emphasis in the original)

In ordering Atty. Baliga suspended from office as Regional Director, the Commission on Human Rights did not violate Atty. Baliga's
right to due process. First, he was only suspended after: investigation by the Commission on Human Rights Legal and Investigation
Office.78 Second, the Commission gave Atty. Baliga an opportunity to be heard when he filed his motion for reconsideration.

Atty. Baliga's performance of generally managerial functions was not supported by the record. It was also immaterial.1wphi1 He held
the position of Commission on Human Rights Regional Director because of his authority to practice law. Without this authority, Atty.
Baliga was disqualified to hold that position.

All told, performing the functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director constituted practice of law. Atty. Baliga
should have desisted from holding his position as Regional Director.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court is a ground for
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he
is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

In Molina v. Atty. Magat,79 this court suspended further Atty. Ceferino R. Magat from the practice of law for six months for practicing
his profession despite this court's previous order of suspension.

We impose the same penalty on Atty. Baliga for holding his position as Regional Director despite lack.of authority to practice
law.1wphi1

We note that the Commission on Human Rights En Banc issued the resolution dated April 13, 2007, reconsidering its first resolution
suspending Atty. Baliga as Regional Director/ Attorney VI. Instead, the Commission admonished Atty. Baliga and sternly warned him
that repeating the same offense will cause his dismissal from the service. The resolution with CHR (III) No. A2007-045 dated April
13, 2007 reads:

In his Motion for Reconsideration dated March 15, 2007, respondent Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga prays before the Honorable Commission to
recall and annul his suspension as Regional Director/ Attorney VI of the Commission on Human Rights - Regional Office No. II, per
16 January 2007 Commission en Banc Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007-013.

The grounds relied upon the motion are not sufficient to convince the Commission that Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga is totally blameless and
should not suffer the appropriate penalty for breach of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his Lawyer's oath.

The Commission, in the exercise of its authority to discipline, is concerned with the transgression by Atty. Baliga of his oath of office
as government employee. As records have it, the Commission granted Atty. Baliga authority to secure a commission as a notary
public. With this, he is mandated to act as a notary public in accordance with the rules and regulations, to include the conditions
expressly set forth by the Commission.

With the findings clearly enunciated in the Supreme Court resolution in SC Administrative Case No. 5277 dated 15 June 2006, the
Commission cannot close its eyes to the act of Atty. Baliga that is clearly repugnant to the conduct of an officer reposed with public
trust.

This is enough just cause to have this piece of word, short of being enraged, and censure Atty. Baliga for having contravened the
conditions of his commission as a notary public. What was granted to Atty. Baliga is merely a privilege, the exercise of which requires
such high esteem to be in equal footing with the constitutional mandate of the Commission. Clearly, Atty. Baliga should keep in mind
that the Commission exacts commensurate solicitude from whatever privilege the Commission grants of every official and employee.

The Commission notes that by now Atty. Baliga is serving the one year suspension imposed on him pursuant to the Supreme Court
resolution. The Commission believes that the further suspension of Atty. Baliga from the office may be too harsh in the meantime that
the Supreme Court penalty is being served. This Commission is prevailed upon that the admonition of Atty. Baliga as above expressed
is sufficient to complete the cycle of penalizing an erring public officer.

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby modifies its ruling in Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007-013 and imposes the penalty of
admonition with a stem warning that a repetition of the same will merit a penalty of dismissal from the service. 80 (Emphasis in the
original)

The Commission on Human Rights erred in issuing the resolution dated April 13, 2007. This resolution caused Atty. Baliga to
reassume his position as Regional Director/ Attorney VI despite lack of authority to practice law.

We remind the Commission on Human Rights that we have the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. 81 The
Commission cannot, by mere resolutions and .other issuances, modify or defy this court's orders of suspension from the practice of
law. Although the Commission on Human Rights has the power to appoint its officers and employees, 82 it can only retain those with
the necessary qualifications in the positions they are holding.

As for Atty. Baliga, we remind him that the practice of law is a "privilege burdened with conditions." 83 To enjoy the privileges of
practicing law, lawyers must "[adhere] to the rigid standards of mental fitness, [maintain] the highest degree of morality[,] and
[faithfully comply] with the rules of [the] legal profession."84

WHEREFORE, we further SUSPEND Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga from the practice of law for six ( 6) months. Atty. Baliga shall serve a
total of one (1) year and six (6) months of suspension from the practice of law, effective upon service on Atty. Baliga of a copy of this
resolution.

SERVE copies of this resolution to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and the Commission on
Human Rights.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. Nos. 5907 and 5942 July 21, 2006

ELSA L. MONDEJAR, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VIVIAN G. RUBIA, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

By two separate complaints filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Elsa L. Mondejar (complainant) sought the
disbarment of Atty. Vivian G. Rubia (respondent) and the cancellation of her notarial commission for allegedly committing deceitful
acts and malpractice in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The facts which gave rise to the filing of the administrative complaints are as follows:

Sometime in 2002, complainant charged Marilyn Carido (Marilyn) and her common law husband Japanese national Yoshimi
Nakayama (Nakayama) before the Digos City Prosecutor's Office for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law, 1claiming that the Bamiyan
Group of Enterprises (Bamiyan) which was capitalized at P15 million and which was engaged in, among other things, money lending
business and operation of miki and siopao factory was actually owned by Nakayama but it was made to appear that Marilyn was the
owner.2

Marilyn, by her Counter-Affidavit dated November 6, 2002 which she filed before the Prosecutor's Office, denied the charge, in
support of which she attached a Memorandum of Joint Venture Agreement 3 (the document) forged by her and Nakayama,
acknowledged before respondent on January 9, 2001 but appearing to have been entered in respondent's notarial register for 2002 and
bearing respondent's Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) No. issued in 2002. The document purported to show that Marilyn owned
Bamiyan, albeit its capital was provided by Nakayama.

Contending that the January 9, 2001 document did not exist before she filed the criminal charge in 2002 before the Prosecutor's Office,
complainant, who was formerly an employee of Bamiyan, filed the first above captioned administrative complaint against respondent,
as well as criminal complaints for falsification of public document and use of falsified public document before the Prosecutor's Office
also against respondent, together with Marilyn, Nakayama, and the witnesses to the document Mona Liza Galvez and John Doe. 4

It appears that on April 20, 2001, respondent notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale 5 of a parcel of land situated in Digos City, purportedly
executed by Manuel Jose Lozada (Lozada) as vendor and Marilyn as vendee. Complainant alleged that respondent falsified the
document by forging the signature of Lozada who has been staying in Maryland, U.S.A. since 1992. 6 Hence, spawned the second
above-captioned administrative complaint.

After respondent submitted her Comment to which she attached her November 18, 2002 Counter-Affidavit 7 to the Affidavit-Complaint
of Marilyn charging her with falsification before the Prosecutor's Office, the administrative complaints were referred to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days from notice. 8

Commissioner Doroteo Aguila, to whom the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline assigned the cases, set them for mandatory
conference on November 24, 2003. It turned out that complainant had died on September 15, 2003. Complainant's husband Celso
Mondejar had requested, however, that consideration of the cases continue on the basis of documentary evidence already submitted. 9

In her Position Paper filed with the IBP, respondent argued that complainant was neither a party nor a witness to the document as well
as to the Deed of Absolute Sale, hence, devoid of legal standing to question the authenticity and due execution thereof. 10 Besides,
added respondent, complainant had passed away.11

To her Position Paper respondent again attached her November 18, 2002 Counter-Affidavit which she filed with the Digos City
Prosecutor's Office wherein she explained that the discrepancies of dates appearing in the document executed by Nakayama and
Marilyn on January 9, 2001 came about when the document was "revise[d] and amend[ed]" in 2002.12
After evaluation of the evidence of the parties, Investigating Commissioner Aguila, by Report and Recommendation 13 dated May 12,
2004, recommended the dismissal of the second complainant (Administrative Case No. 5942) relative to respondent's notarization of
the Deed of Sale.

As for the first complaint (Administrative Case No. 5907) relative to the discrepancies of dates appearing in the document,
Commissioner Aguila found respondent to have violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reading:

Canon 1, Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct,

and recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for One Month.

Pertinent portions of Atty. Aguila's Report read:

[T]here is sufficient proof to discipline the respondent in Adm. Case No. 5907. In the Memorandum of a Joint Venture Agreement,
Atty. Rubia stated in the acknowledgment portion thereof that the partiespersonally appeared before her "on this 9th day of
January, 2001." But then this document . . . was enteredin respondent's notarial register as Document No. 5707; Page No. 1144; Book
No 25; Series of 2002 [Annex "A-1," Petition]. It is further pointed out that respondent's PTR Number as indicated in this document
is PTRNumber 4574844 that is likewise indicated as being issued on January 3, 2002. On the other hand, the [Counter] Affidavit of
Marilyn Carido, which Atty. Rubia notarized . . . was notarized on November 6, 2002[Annex "B-2" of the Petition]. This [counter]
affidavit also indicates respondent's PTR Number as 4574844issued on January 3, 2002. It must be stressed that this is the same
Number indicated in the Memorandum of a Joint Venture Agreement [notarized on January 9, 2001]. But then a Deed of Absolute
Sale dated 28 March 2001 between one Leandro Prosia and Jocelyn Canoy-Alson [Annex "D," Petition] that was also notarized by
respondent, indicates that her PTR for the year 2001 was PTR No. 4320009 [p. 14, SC Records].

As already pointed out, the [January 9, 2001] Memorandum of a Joint Venture Agreement indicates that it was entered
as Document No. 5707, Series of 2002 in respondent's notarial register. On the other hand, the [November 6, 2002] Affidavit of
Marilyn Carido was entered as Document No. 2791, Series of 2002. Since the [Counter] Affidavit was notarized [o]n 06 November
2002, it is illogical why the document number for the Memorandum of a Joint Venture is greater (higher) than that of the
former since the latter was supposed to have been notarized many months earlier, or specifically, on 09January 2001.

All of the foregoing show that the respondent effectively made an untruthful declaration in a public document when she attested that
the Memorandum of a Joint Venture Agreement was acknowledged before her on 09 January 2001 when evidence clearly shows
otherwise.14 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

By Resolution of July 30, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors (BOG) adopted the finding of the Investigating Commissioner's Report
that respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for making a false declaration in a public document . It,
however, modified the recommended sanction in that, instead of suspension from the practice of law for One Month, it merely
WARNED respondent that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future would be dealt with more severely.15

By Resolution of March 12, 2005, the BOG denied respondent's motion for reconsideration.16

Hence, the elevation of the first administrative case to this Court by respondent who reiterates her challenge to the standing of
complainant's husband in pursuing the cases.

Rule 139-B, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "[p]roceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys
may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any
person."

That an administrative complaint filed by any person against a lawyer may be acted upon by this Court is settled.In re
Almacen17 explains the raison d'tre:

. . . [D]isciplinary proceedings [against lawyers] are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not and
does not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the
end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a
prosecutor. (Emphasis supplied)

Complainant's husband's pursuance of the cases was thus in order.

Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, thus rendering the document admissible in
evidence without further proof of its authenticity.18

Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are thus mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to their office, such duties
being dictated by public policy impressed with public interest. 19 A graver responsibility is placed upon them by reason of their solemn
oath to obey the laws, to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any, 20 and to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangement,21 and other duties and responsibilities.

In exculpation, respondent, in her November 18, 2002 Counter Affidavit, proffered the following explanation, quoted verbatim:

xxxx

5. That way back in the early 2001, specifically in January of the year 2001, Marilyn A. Carido and Yoshimi Nakayama, had me
prepared [sic] a document in preparation of the business enterprises to be established by Marilyn A. Carido, wherein Yoshimi
Nakayama, will grant the former CAPITAL for the establishment of the proposed enterprises, the main purpose of which is to secure
the future of Marilyn A. Carido, their children, and the family of Marilyn A. Carido. A copy of the said agreement is hereto attached as
ANNEX "A," with its corresponding submarking;

xxxx

7. That in fact, on May 10, 2002, Marilyn A. Carido and Yoshimi Nakayama came to my office, for two (2) purposes: First, Yoshimi
Nakayama had me prepared a document which would be an ADDENDUM to their original transaction in January 2001, wherein
Yoshimi Nakayama gave Marilyn A. Carido additional capital to augment the operation of the "Bamiyan Superstore;" Second, that
Marilyn A. Carido and Yoshimi Nakayama wanted me to REVISE and AMEND the original agreement made by them in January,
2001, because Yoshimi Nakayama wanted to add certain conditions to the original agreement, specifically referring to the flow of
money unto the coffers of the enterprises of Marilyn A. Carido, and as to the fact of the technical assistance that he is giving Marilyn
A. Carido, because, at that time, there were already many problems in the operations of the Bamiyan enterprises. That, for the first
purpose, I prepared the ADDENDUM to the original agreement between Marilyn A. Carido and Yoshimi Nakayama. A copy of the
said addendum is hereto attached and made another part hereof as ANNEX "C," with its corresponding submarking;

8. That for the second purpose referring to the REVISION or AMENDMENT of the original transaction, I told both Marilyn A.
Carido and Yoshimi Nakayama, to submit to me all the copies of the original agreement in their possession, and I will just make
another instrument which would supplant or replace the old onewhile incorporating the needed conditions suggested by Yoshimi
Nakayama. That I told them that I will be making a new and/or revised agreement, but I will retain the original date of the first
transaction made in January, 2001, because anyway, I have not yet submitted the documents which I have notarized for the
year 2001, since my notarial commission will expire yet on the last day of December, 2002;

9. That, therefore, on the same date, Marilyn A. Carido and Yoshimi Nakayama submitted to me all the copies in their possession of
the old agreement, and I proceeded to have another one encoded in my computer by my secretary, Mona Liza Galvez, incorporating
the needed additional conditions in accordance with the wishes of my said clients. A copy of the said REVISED agreement is hereto
attached as ANNEX "D," with the its corresponding submarkings;

10. That in fact, on November 6, 2002, I attached a copy of the revised agreement on the COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT of Marilyn A.
Carido, in the case for a violation of the Anti-Dummy law filed against her by an assumed witness, Elsa Mondejar who is also the
assumed complainant in this instant investigation; That, however, while I was going over the documents of Marilyn A. Carido, I
noticed that the revised agreement referred to above, although retained the original date of the original one as January,
2001, mistakenly or erroneously bear the series of 2002 in my notarial register, and likewise bear my new PROFESSIONAL TAX
RECEIPT (PTR) NO. and IBP No. for the year 2002;

11. That even before then, I already instructed my secretary to make the necessary corrections in the said revised document because
the accountant and administrator of the Bamiyan, Felicisima Abo, had already brought the erroneous entries to my attention when all
the legal papers of Marilyn A. Carido were turned over to her profession, as early as June, 2002. That, however, because of my
workload, I forgot to remind my secretary about the corrections that she should made therein. However, I already told Marilyn A.
Carido and Yoshimi Nakayama, that the corrections are proper because I will just make the necessary initials on the corrected portions;
12. That, again because of the fact, that I had to arrange certain matters on the labor aspects of all the Bamiyan enterprises, because at
these times, both Marilyn A. Carido and Yoshimi Nakayama, were in Japan, it was only after I filed the counter-affidavit of Marilyn A.
Carido, in the said Anti-Dummy case, that I was reminded on the said erroneous entries. Therefore, on November 8, 2002, I had
Mona Liza Galvez,my secretary, make the necessary corrections; A copy of the corrected revised agreement is hereto attached as
ANNEX "E," with the corresponding submarkings; as well as copies of the memos that I had issued in behalf of my principal, Marilyn
A. Carido, for the Bamiyan, are likewise hereto attached as ANNEXES "F" TO "I," respectively;

x x x x22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In sum, respondent claimed that the document was forged on January 9, 2001 but she made a "new and/or revised agreement" in 2002
to incorporate additional conditions thereto, retaining, however, its original date January 9, 2001; that on noticing that the document
"mistakenly or erroneously [b]ore the series of 2002 in [her] notarial register and likewise b[ore] her new . . . [PTR] No. and IBP No.
for the year 2002," she instructed her secretary to make the necessary corrections, but on account of her workload, she forgot to
remind her secretary to comply therewith; and that it was only after Marilyn's Counter-Affidavit of November 6, 2002 was filed before
the Prosecutor's Office that she (respondent) was reminded of the erroneous entries, hence, she had her secretary make the corrections
on November 8, 2002.

And as reflected in her above-quoted portions of her Counter-Affidavit, respondent further claimed that she retained the original
January 9, 2001 date of the document since the "documents which [she] notarized for the year 2001" were not yet submitted as her
notarial commission was to expire yet on the last day of December, 2002.23

Respondent's explanation does not impress as it betrays her guilt.

The document clearly appears to have been ante-dated in an attempt to exculpate Marilyn from the Anti-Dummy charge against her in
2002.

The document was allegedly notarized on January 9, 2001 but a new revised/amended document was made in 2002 bearing the
original date of execution/acknowledgment. If that were so, how could an error have been committed regarding the other year 2001
original entries in the notarial register, when the purported new document was to retain the original January 9, 2001 date as it would
merely input additional conditions thereto? The above-quoted discussion by the Investigating IBP Commissioner of why he
discredited respondent's explanation behind the conflicting dates appearing in the document is thus well-taken.

As for respondent's submission that corrections could be subsequently made on the document, she not having anyway submitted the
documents she notarized for the year 2001 since her notarial commission was still to expire in 2002, the same does not lie.

One of the grounds for revocation of notarial commission is the failure of the notary to send a copy of notarized documents to the
proper clerk of court or Executive Judge (under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice) within the first ten (10) days of the month next
following.24

In fine, the recommendation of Investigating IBP Commissioner Aguila merits this Court's approval.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Vivian Rubia, for violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, is
suspended for One (1) Month, and warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondent's personal records in this Court.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6010 August 28, 2006

 ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY LABORATORY HIGH SCHOOL (SLU-LHS) FACULTY and STAFF, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROLANDO C. DELA CRUZ, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff of the Saint Louis University-Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS)
against Atty. Rolando C. Dela Cruz, principal of SLU-LHS, predicated on the following grounds:

1) Gross Misconduct:

From the records of the case, it appears that there is a pending criminal case for child abuse allegedly committed by him against a high
school student filed before the Prosecutors Office of Baguio City; a pending administrative case filed by the Teachers, Staff, Students
and Parents before an Investigating Board created by SLU for his alleged unprofessional and unethical acts of misappropriating money
supposedly for the teachers; and the pending labor case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty before the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative
Region, on alleged illegal deduction of salary by respondent.

2) Grossly Immoral Conduct:

In contracting a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage; and

3) Malpractice:

In notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission.

According to complainant, respondent was legally married to Teresita Rivera on 31 May 1982 at Tuba, Benguet, before the then
Honorable Judge Tomas W. Macaranas. He thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with one Mary Jane Pascua, before the
Honorable Judge Guillermo Purganan. On 4 October 1994, said second marriage was subsequently annulled for being bigamous.

On the charge of malpractice, complainant alleged that respondent deliberately subscribed and notarized certain legal documents on
different dates from 1988 to 1997, despite expiration of respondents notarial commission on 31 December 1987. A
Certification1 dated 25 May 1999 was issued by the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court (RTC), Baguio City, to the effect that
respondent had not applied for commission as Notary Public for and in the City of Baguio for the period 1988 to 1997. Respondent
performed acts of notarization, as evidenced by the following documents:

1. Affidavit of Ownership2 dated 8 March 1991, executed by Fernando T. Acosta, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

2. Affidavit3 dated 26 September 1992, executed by Maria Cortez Atos, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

3. Affidavit4 dated 14 January 1992, executed by Fanolex James A. Menos, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

4. Affidavit5 dated 23 December 1993, executed by Ponciano V. Abalos, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

5. Absolute Date of Sale6 dated 23 June 1993, executed by Danilo Gonzales in favor of Senecio C. Marzan, notarized by Rolando Dela
Cruz;

6. Joint Affidavit By Two Disinherited Parties 7 dated 5 March 1994, executed by Evelyn C. Canullas and Pastora C. Tacadena,
subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

7. Sworn Statement8 dated 31 May 1994, executed by Felimon B. Rimorin, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

8. Deed of Sale9 dated 17 August 1994, executed by Woodrow Apurado in favor of Jacinto Batara, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;

9. Joint Affidavit by Two Disinterested Parties 10 dated 1 June 1994, executed by Ponciano V. Abalos and Arsenio C. Sibayan,
subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
10. Absolute Deed of Sale11 dated 23 March 1995, executed by Eleanor D.Meridor in favor of Leonardo N. Benter, notarized by
Rolando Dela Cruz;

11. Deed of Absolute Sale12 dated 20 December 1996, executed by Mandapat in favor of Mario R. Mabalot, notarized by Rolando
Dela Cruz;

12. Joint Affidavit By Two Disinterested Parties13 dated 17 April 1996, executed by Villiam C. Ambong and Romeo L. Quiming,
subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

13. Conditional Deed of Sale14 dated 27 February 1997, executed by Aurelia Demot Cados in favor of Jose Ma. A. Pangilinan,
notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;

14. Memorandum of Agreement15 dated 19 July 1996, executed by JARCO represented by Mr. Johnny Teope and AZTEC
Construction represented by Mr. George Cham, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz.

Quite remarkably, respondent, in his comment, denied the charges of child abuse, illegal deduction of salary and others which are still
pending before the St. Louis University (SLU), National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Prosecutors Office. He did
not discuss anything about the allegations of immorality in contracting a second marriage and malpractice in notarizing documents
despite the expiration of his commission.

After the filing of comment, We referred 16 the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report and
recommendation.

The IBP conducted the mandatory preliminary conference.

The complainants, thereafter, submitted their position paper which is just a reiteration of their allegations in their complaint.

Respondent, on his part, expressly admitted his second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage, and the subsequent
nullification of the former. He also admitted having notarized certain documents during the period when his notarial commission had
already expired. However, he offered some extenuating defenses such as good faith, lack of malice and noble intentions in doing the
complained acts.

After the submission of their position papers, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.

On 30 March 2005, Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco submitted his report and recommended that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent be administratively penalized for the following
acts:

a. For contracting a second marriage without taking the appropriate legal steps to have the first marriage annulled first, he be
suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, and

b. For notarizing certain legal documents despite full knowledge of the expiration of his notarial commission, he be suspended from
the practice of law for another one (1) year or for a total of two (2) years.17

On 17 December 2005, the IBP Board of Governors, approved and adopted the recommendation of Commissioner Pacheco, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A" and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that Respondent
contracted a second marriage without taking appropriate legal steps to have the first marriage annulled, Atty. Rolando C. dela Cruz is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and for notarizing legal documents despite full knowledge of the
expiration of his notarial commission Atty. Rolando C. dela Cruz is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for another one (1) year,
for a total of two (2) years Suspension from the practice of law.18

This Court finds the recommendation of the IBP to fault respondent well taken, except as to the penalty contained therein.
At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show
that they possess the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only during good behavior, and he can be deprived of it
for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without
invading any constitutional privilege or right, an attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend, based on
conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood that the
purpose of suspending or disbarring him as an attorney is to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him
unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of attorney and, thus, to protect the public and those
charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish an attorney. Elaborating on this, we said on Maligsa v. Atty.
Cabanting,19 that the Bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings
honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A member of the
legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in
the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession. Towards this end, an attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any
violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court, all of these being broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private
capacity.

Equally worthy of remark is that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards among its members. There is no
distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a
lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. 20 Thus, not only his
professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter may reflect unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the
profession and the courts, may at any time be the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities. 21

One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. Possession of such moral
character as requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice must be continuous. Otherwise, "membership in the bar may
be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral conduct."22

In the case at bench, there is no dispute that respondent and Teresita Rivera contracted marriage on 31 May 1982 before Judge Tomas
W. Macaranas. In less than a year, they parted ways owing to their irreconcilable differences without seeking judicial recourse. The
union bore no offspring. After their separation in-fact, respondent never knew the whereabouts of Teresita Rivera since he had lost all
forms of communication with her. Seven years thereafter, respondent became attracted to one Mary Jane Pascua, who was also a
faculty member of SLU-LHS. There is also no dispute over the fact that in 1989, respondent married Mary Jane Pascua in the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Baguio City, Branch 68. Respondent even admitted this fact. When the second marriage was entered
into, respondents prior marriage with Teresita Rivera was still subsisting, no action having been initiated before the court to obtain a
judicial declaration of nullity or annulment of respondents prior marriage to Teresita Rivera or a judicial declaration of presumptive
death of Teresita Rivera.

Respondent was already a member of the Bar when he contracted the bigamous second marriage in 1989, having been admitted to the
Bar in 1985. As such, he cannot feign ignorance of the mandate of the law that before a second marriage may be validly contracted,
the first and subsisting marriage must first be annulled by the appropriate court. The second marriage was annulled only on 4 October
1994 before the RTC of Benguet, Branch 9, or about five years after respondent contracted his second marriage. The annulment of
respondents second marriage has no bearing to the instant disbarment proceeding. Firstly, as earlier emphasized, the annulment came
after the respondents second bigamous marriage. Secondly, as we held in In re: Almacen, a disbarment case is sui generis for it is
neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal
of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a
disbarment case does not affect its course, then neither will the judgment of annulment of respondents second marriage also exonerate
him from a wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof - clear preponderance of evidence - in disciplinary
proceedings against members of the Bar is met, then liability attaches.23

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court cites grossly immoral conduct as a ground for disbarment.

The Court has laid down with a common definition of what constitutes immoral conduct, vis--vis, grossly immoral conduct. Immoral
conduct is "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community" and what is "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree."24

Undoubtedly, respondents act constitutes immoral conduct. But is it so gross as to warrant his disbarment? Indeed, he exhibited a
deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage which
is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while the first marriage was still in
place, is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.25
However, measured against the definition, we are not prepared to consider respondents act as grossly immoral. This finds support in
the following recommendation and observation of the IBP Investigator and IBP Board of Governors, thus:

The uncontested assertions of the respondent belies any intention to flaunt the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession,
to wit:

a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or for a period of almost seven (7) years, he has not been
romantically involved with any woman;

b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total love for his wife, whom he described to be very intelligent person;

c. He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child;

d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry (sic) with relation to his wife;

e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted ways when the mother and child went to Australia;

f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate.26

In the case of Terre v. Terre, 27 respondent was disbarred because his moral character was deeply flawed as shown by the following
circumstances, viz: he convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio and that she was
legally single and free to marry him. When complainant and respondent had contracted their marriage, respondent went through law
school while being supported by complainant, with some assistance from respondents parents. After respondent had finished his law
course and gotten complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant without support and without the wherewithal for
delivering his own child safely to a hospital.

In the case of Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, 28 respondent was also disbarred for his grossly immoral acts such as: first, he abandoned his
lawful wife and three children; second, he lured an innocent young woman into marrying him; third, he mispresented himself as a
"bachelor" so he could contract marriage in a foreign land; and fourth, he availed himself of complainants resources by securing a
plane ticket from complainants office in order to marry the latters daughter. He did this without complainants knowledge.
Afterwards, he even had the temerity to assure complainant that "everything is legal."

Such acts are wanting in the case at bar. In fact, no less than the respondent himself acknowledged and declared his abject apology for
his misstep. He was humble enough to offer no defense save for his love and declaration of his commitment to his wife and child.

Based on the reasons stated above, we find the imposition of disbarment upon him to be unduly harsh. The power to disbar must be
exercised with great caution, and may be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character
of the lawyer as an officer of the Court. Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty could accomplish the end
desired.29 In line with this philosophy, we find that a penalty of two years suspension is more appropriate. The penalty of one (1) year
suspension recommended by the IBP is too light and not commensurate to the act committed by respondent.

As to the charge of misconduct for having notarized several documents during the years 1988-1997 after his commission as notary
public had expired, respondent humbly admitted having notarized certain documents despite his knowledge that he no longer had
authority to do so. He, however, alleged that he received no payment in notarizing said documents.

It has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization of a private
document converts the document into a public one making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial
document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face and, for this reason, notaries public must observe with the utmost care
the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of
conveyance would be undermined.30

The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a mere casual formality. The Court has
characterized a lawyers act of notarizing documents without the requisite commission to do so as "reprehensible, constituting as it
does not only malpractice but also x x x the crime of falsification of public documents." 31

The Court had occasion to state that where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when
he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action or one, performing a notarial act
without such commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by
making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate
falsehood, which the lawyers oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." By acting as a notary public without the proper commission to do so, the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7 of the same
Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.

In the case of Buensuceso v. Barera,32 a lawyer was suspended for one year when he notarized five documents after his commission as
Notary Public had expired, to wit: a complaint for ejectment, affidavit, supplemental affidavit, a deed of sale, and a contract to sell.
Guided by the pronouncement in said case, we find that a suspension of two (2) years is justified under the circumstances. Herein
respondent notarized a total of fourteen (14) documents33 without the requisite notarial commission.

Other charges constituting respondents misconduct such as the pending criminal case for child abuse allegedly committed by him
against a high school student filed before the Prosecutors Office of Baguio City; the pending administrative case filed by the
Teachers, Staff, Students and Parents before an Investigating Board created by SLU; and the pending labor case filed by SLU-LHS
Faculty before the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged illegal deduction of salary by respondent, need not be
discussed, as they are still pending before the proper forums. At such stages, the presumption of innocence still prevails in favor of the
respondent.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Rolando Dela Cruz guilty of immoral conduct, in disregard of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, and another two (2) years for
notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission or a total of four (4) years of suspension.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Court Administrator, as well as the IBP, the Office of the
Bar Confidant, and recorded in the personal records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.

CATHERINE JOIE P. VITUG A.C. No. 6313

Complainant,

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The allegations raised in this complaint for disbarment are more sordid, if not tawdry, from the usual. As such, close scrutiny of these
claims is called for. Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should be imposed
with great caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar is
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.[1]
Under consideration is the administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Catherine Joie P. Vitug (complainant) against Atty.
Diosdado M. Rongcal (respondent). A classic case of he said, she said, the parties conflicting versions of the facts as culled from the
records are hereinafter presented.

Complainant narrates that she and respondent met sometime in December 2000 when she was looking for a lawyer to assist her in
suing Arnulfo Aquino (Aquino), the biological father of her minor daughter, for support. Her former classmate who was then a
Barangay Secretary referred her to respondent. After several meetings with complainant, respondent sent a demand letter [2] in her
behalf to Aquino wherein he asked for the continuance of the monthly child support Aquino used to give, plus no less
than P300,000.00 for the surgical operation their daughter would need for her congenital heart ailment.

At around this point, by complainants own admission, she and respondent started having a sexual relationship. She narrates that this
twist in the events began after respondent started calling on her shortly after he had sent the demand letter in her behalf. Respondent
allegedly started courting her, giving her financial aid. Soon he had progressed to making sexual advances towards complainant, to the
accompaniment of sweet inducements such as the promise of a job, financial security for her daughter, and his services as counsel for
the prospective claim for support against Aquino. Complainant acknowledges that she succumbed to these advances, assured by
respondents claim that the lawyer was free to marry her, as his own marriage had already been annulled.
On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant to sign an Affidavit of Disclaimer [3] (Affidavit) categorically stating
that even as Aquino was denoted as the father in the birth certificate[4] of her daughter, he was, in truth, not the real father. She was not
allowed to read the contents of the Affidavit, she claims. Respondent supposedly assured her that the document meant nothing,
necessary as it was the only way that Aquino would agree to give her daughter medical and educational support.Respondent
purportedly assured complainant that despite the Affidavit, she could still pursue a case against Aquino in the future because the
Affidavit is not a public document.Because she completely trusted him at this point, she signed the document without even taking a
glance at it.[5]

On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant that Aquino gave him P150,000.00 cash and P58,000.00 in two (2)
postdated checks to answer for the medical expenses of her daughter. Instead of turning them over to her, respondent handed her his
personal check[6] in the amount of P150,000.00 and promised to give her the balance of P58,000.00 soon thereafter. However,
sometime in April or May 2001, respondent informed her that he could not give her the said amount because he used it for his political
campaign as he was then running for the position of Provincial Board Member of the 2nd District of Pampanga.

Complainant maintains that inspite of their sexual relationship and the fact that respondent kept part of the money intended for her
daughter, he still failed in his promise to give her a job. Furthermore, he did not file the case against Aquino and referred her instead to
Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr. (Atty. Tolentino).

Sometime in 2002, assisted by Atty. Tolentino, complainant filed a criminal case for child abuse as well as a civil case against
Aquino. While the criminal case was dismissed, the civil case was decided on 30 August 2004 by virtue of a compromise agreement.
[7]
It was only when said cases were filed that she finally understood the import of the Affidavit.

Complainant avers that respondent failed to protect her interest when he personally prepared the Affidavit and caused her to sign the
same, which obviously worked to her disadvantage. In making false promises that all her problems would be solved, aggravated by his
assurance that his marriage had already been annulled, respondent allegedly deceived her into yielding to his sexual desires. Taking
advantage of the trust and confidence she had in him as her counsel and paramour, her weak emotional state, and dire financial need at
that time, respondent was able to appropriate for himself money that rightfully belonged to her daughter. She argues that respondents
aforementioned acts constitute a violation of his oath as a lawyer as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code),
particularly Rule 1.01, Rule 1.02, Rule 16.01, Rule 16.02, and Canon 7.[8]Hence, she filed the instant complaint[9] dated 2 February
2004.

Expectedly, respondent presents a different version. According to him, complainant needed a lawyer who would file the
aforementioned action for support. Complainants former high school classmate Reinilda Bansil Morales, who was also his fellow
barangay official, referred her to him. He admits sending a demand letter to her former lover,Aquino, to ask support for the child.
[10]
Subsequently, he and Aquino communicated through an emissary. He learned that because of Aquinos infidelity, his relationship
with his wife was strained so that in order to settle things the spouses were willing to give complainant a lump sum provided she
would execute an affidavit to the effect that Aquino is not the father of her daughter.

Respondent relayed this proposal to complainant who asked for his advice. He then advised her to study the proposal thoroughly and
with a practical mindset. He also explained to her the pros and cons of pursuing the case. After several days, she requested that he
negotiate for an out-of-court settlement of no less than P500,000.00. When Aquino rejected the amount, negotiations ensued until the
amount was lowered to P200,000.00. Aquino allegedly offered to issue four postdated checks in equal amounts within four
months. Complainant disagreed. Aquino then proposed to rediscount the checks at an interest of 4% a month or a total
of P12,000.00. The resulting amount wasP188,000.00.

Complainant finally agreed to this arrangement and voluntarily signed the Affidavit that respondent prepared, the same Affidavit
adverted to by complainant. He denies forcing her to sign the document and strongly refutes her allegation that she did not know what
the Affidavit was for and that she signed it without even reading it, as he gave her the draft before the actual payment was made. He
notes that complainant is a college graduate and a former bank employee who speaks and understands English. He likewise
vehemently denies pocketing P58,000.00 of the settlement proceeds. When complainant allegedly signed the Affidavit, the emissary
handed to her the sum of P150,000.00 in cash and she allegedly told respondent that he could keep the remaining P38,000.00,
not P58,000.00 as alleged in the complaint. Although she did not say why, he assumed that it was for his attorneys fees.

As regards their illicit relationship, respondent admits of his sexual liaison with complainant. He, however, denies luring her with
sweet words and empty promises.According to him, it was more of a chemistry of (sic) two consensual (sic) adults, [11] complainant
then being in her thirties. He denies that he tricked her into believing that his marriage was already annulled. Strangely, respondent
devotes considerable effort to demonstrate that complainant very well knew he was married when they commenced what was to him,
an extra-marital liaison. He points out that, first, they had met through his colleague, Ms. Morales, a friend and former high school
classmate of hers. Second, they had allegedly first met at his residence where she was actually introduced to his wife. Subsequently,
complainant called his residence several times and actually spoke to his wife, a circumstance so disturbing to respondent that he had to
beg complainant not to call him there. Third, he was the Punong Barangay from 1994 to 2002, and was elected President of the
Association of Barangay Council (ABC) and as such was an ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Guagua, Pampanga. He
ran for the position of Provincial Board Member in 2001. Thus, he was known in his locality and it was impossible for complainant
not to have known of his marital status especially that she lived no more than three (3) kilometers away from his house and even
actively helped him in his campaign.

Respondent further alleges that while the demand for support from Aquino was being worked out, complainant moved to a rented
house in Olongapo City because a suitor had promised her a job in the Subic Naval Base. But months passed and the promised job
never came so that she had to return to Lubao, Pampanga. As the money she received from Aquino was about to be exhausted, she
allegedly started to pester respondent for financial assistance and urged him to file the Petition for Support against Aquino. While
respondent acceded to her pleas, he also advised her to look for the right man[12] and to stop depending on him for financial
assistance. He also informed her that he could not assist her in filing the case, as he was the one who prepared and notarized the
Affidavit. He, however, referred her to Atty. Tolentino.

In August 2002, respondent finally ended his relationship with complainant, but still he agreed to give her monthly financial assistance
of P6,000.00 for six (6) months. Since then, they have ceased to meet and have communicated only through an emissary or by
cellphone. In 2003, complainant begged him to continue the assistance until June when her alleged fianc from the United States would
have arrived. Respondent agreed. In July 2003, she again asked for financial assistance for the last time, which he turned down. Since
then he had stopped communicating to her.

Sometime in January 2004, complainant allegedly went to see a friend of respondent. She told him that she was in need of P5,000.00
for a sari-sari store she was putting up and she wanted him to relay the message to respondent. According to this friend, complainant
showed him a prepared complaint against respondent that she would file with the Supreme Court should the latter not accede to her
request. Sensing that he was being blackmailed, respondent ignored her demand. True enough, he alleges, she filed the instant
complaint.

On 21 July 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
[13]
After the parties submitted their respective position papers and supporting documents, the Investigating Commissioner rendered his
Report and Recommendation[14] dated 2 September 2005. After presenting the parties conflicting factual versions, the Investigating
Commissioner gave credence to that of complainant and concluded that respondent clearly violated the Code, reporting in this wise, to
wit:

Respondent, through the above mentioned acts, clearly showed that he is wanting in good moral character, putting in doubt his
professional reputation as a member of the BAR and renders him unfit and unworthy of the privileges which the law confers to
him. From a lawyer, are (sic) expected those qualities of truth-speaking, high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty and the
strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which throughout the passage of time have been compendiously described as
MORAL CHARACTER.

Respondent, unfortunately took advantage and (sic) every opportunity to entice complainant to his lascivious hungerness (sic). On
several occasions[,] respondent kept on calling complainant and dropped by her house and gave P2,000.00 as aid while waiting
allegedly for the reply of (sic) their demand letter for support. It signals the numerous visits and regular calls all because of
[l]ewd design. He took advantage of her seeming financial woes and emotional dependency.

xxxx

Without doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the impositions (sic) of the appropriate penalty,
including suspension and disbarment. x x x[15]

It was then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and that he be ordered to return to
complainant the amount ofP58,000.00 within two months. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said Report and
Recommendation in a Resolution[16] dated 17 December 2005, finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents obviously taking advantage of the lawyer-client relationship and the
financial and emotional problem of his client and attempting to mislead the Commission, [17] respondent was meted out the penalty of
suspension for one (1) year with a stern warning that a repetition of similar acts will merit severe sanctions. He was likewise ordered
to return P58,000.00 to complainant.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory Questioning [18] (Motion) dated 9 March
2006 with the IBP and a Motion to Reopen/Remand Case for Clarificatory Questioning dated 22 March 2006 with the Supreme
Court. He reiterates his own version of the facts, giving a more detailed account of the events that transpired between him and
complainant. Altogether, he portrays complainant as a shrewd and manipulative woman who depends on men for financial support and
who would stop at nothing to get what she wants. Arguing that the IBP based its Resolution solely on complainants bare allegations
that she failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence, he posits the case should be re-opened for clarificatory questioning in order
to determine who between them is telling the truth.
In a Resolution[19] dated 27 April 2006, the IBP denied the Motion on the ground that it has no more jurisdiction over the case as the
matter had already been endorsed to the Supreme Court.

While we find respondent liable, we adjudicate the matter differently from what the IBP has recommended.

On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet,
and which act is not so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree [20] in
order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.

One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. Said requirement persists as
a continuing condition for the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of
such privilege.[21] As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good
moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community.[22] The Court has held that to
justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. [23] A grossly immoral act is one
that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. [24] It
is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community.[25]

While it is has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to
warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior,[26] it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.[27] Even if
not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and
immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws.[28]

By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code which states that a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The next question to consider is whether this act is aggravated
by his alleged deceitful conduct in luring complainant who was then in low spirits and in dire financial need in order to satisfy his
carnal desires. While the IBP concluded the question in the affirmative, we find otherwise.

Complainants allegations that she succumbed to respondents sexual advances due to his promises of financial security and because of
her need for legal assistance in filing a case against her former lover, are insufficient to conclude that complainant deceived her into
having sexual relations with her. Surely, an educated woman like herself who was of sufficient age and discretion, being at that time in
her thirties, would not be easily fooled into sexual congress by promises of a job and of free legal assistance, especially when there is
no showing that she is suffering from any mental or physical disability as to justify such recklessness and/or helplessness on her part.
[29]
Respondents numerous visits and regular calls to complainant do not necessarily prove that he took advantage of her. At best, it
proves that he courted her despite being a married man, precisely the fact on which the finding of immorality is rooted. Moreover, the
circumstance that he gave her P2,000.00 as aid does not induce belief that he fueled her financial dependence as she never denied
pleading with, if not badgering, him for financial support.

Neither does complainants allegation that respondent lied to her about his marital status inspire belief. We find credence in
respondents assertion that it was impossible for her not to have known of his subsisting marriage. She herself admitted that they were
introduced by her friend and former classmate, Ms. Morales who was a fellow barangay official of respondent. She admitted that she
knew his residence phone number and that she had called him there. She also knew that respondent is an active barangay official who
even ran as Provincial Board Member in 2001. Curiously, she never refuted respondents allegations that she had met and talked to his
wife on several occasions, that she lived near his residence, that she helped him in his campaign, or that she knew a lot of his friends,
so as not to have known of his marital status. Considering that she previously had an affair with Aquino, who was also a married man,
it would be unnatural for her to have just plunged into a sexual relationship with respondent whom she had known for only a short
time without verifying his background, if it were true that she preferred to change [her] life for the better,[30] as alleged in her
complaint. We believe that her aforementioned allegations of deceit were not established by clear preponderant evidence required in
disbarment cases.[31] We are left with the most logical conclusion that she freely and wittingly entered into an illicit and immoral
relationship with respondent sans any misrepresentation or deceit on his part.

Next, complainant charged respondent of taking advantage of his legal skills and moral control over her to force her to sign the clearly
disadvantageous Affidavit without letting her read it and without explaining to her its repercussions. While acting as her counsel, she
alleged that he likewise acted as counsel for Aquino.

We find complainants assertions dubious. She was clearly in need of financial support from Aquino especially that her daughter was
suffering from a heart ailment. We cannot fathom how she could abandon all cares to respondent who she had met for only a couple of
months and thereby risk the welfare of her child by signing without even reading a document she knew was related to the support case
she intended to file. The Affidavit consists of four short sentences contained in a single page. It is unlikely she was not able to read it
before she signed it.
Likewise obscure is her assertion that respondent did not fully explain to her the contents of the Affidavit and the consequences of
signing it. She alleged that respondent even urged her to use her head as Arnulfo Aquino will not give the money for Alexandras
medical and educational support if she will not sign the said Affidavit of Disclaimer.[32]If her own allegation is to be believed, it shows
that she was aware of the on-going negotiation with Aquino for the settlement of her claim for which the latter demanded the
execution of the Affidavit. It also goes to show that she was pondering on whether to sign the same. Furthermore, she does not deny
being a college graduate or that she knows and understands English. The Affidavit is written in short and simple sentences that are
understandable even to a layman. The inevitable conclusion is that she signed the Affidavit voluntarily and without any coercion
whatsoever on the part of respondent.

The question remains as to whether his act of preparing and notarizing the Affidavit, a document disadvantageous to his client, is a
violation of the Code. We rule in the negative.

It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering into a settlement with Aquino after explaining all available options to
her. The law encourages the amicable settlement not only of pending cases but also of disputes which might otherwise be filed in
court.[33] Moreover, there is no showing that he knew for sure that Aquino is the father of complainants daughter as paternity remains
to be proven. As complainant voluntarily and intelligently agreed to a settlement with Aquino, she cannot later blame her counsel
when she experiences a change of heart. Besides, the record is bereft of evidence as to whether respondent also acted as Aquinos
counsel in the settlement of the case. Again, we only have complainants bare allegations that cannot be considered evidence.
[34]
Suspicion, no matter how strong, is not enough. In the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the
respondent has regularly performed his duty in accordance with his oath.[35]

Complainant further charged respondent of misappropriating part of the money given by Aquino to her daughter. Instead of turning
over the whole amount, he allegedly issued to her his personal check in the amount of P150,000.00 and pocketed the
remaining P58,000.00 in violation of his fiduciary obligation to her as her counsel.

The IBP did not make any categorical finding on this matter but simply ordered respondent to return the amount of P58,000.00 to
complainant. We feel a discussion is in order.

We note that there is no clear evidence as to how much Aquino actually gave in settlement of complainants claim for support. The
parties are in agreement that complainant received the amount of P150,000.00. However, complainant insists that she should have
received more as there were two postdated checks amounting to P58,000.00 that respondent never turned over to her. Respondent
essentially agrees that the amount is in fact more than P150,000.00 but only P38,000.00 more and complainant said he could have it
and he assumed it was for his attorneys fees.

We scrutinized the records and found not a single evidence to prove that there existed two postdated checks issued by Aquino in the
amount of P58,000.00. On the other hand, respondent admits that there is actually an amount of P38,000.00 but presented no evidence
of an agreement for attorneys fees to justify his presumption that he can keep the same. Curiously, there is on record a photocopy of a
check issued by respondent in favor of complainant for P150,000.00. It was only in his Motion for Reconsideration where respondent
belatedly proffers an explanation. He avers that he cannot recall what the check was for but he supposes that complainant requested
for it as she did not want to travel all the way to Olongapo City with a huge sum of money.

We find the circumstances rather suspicious but evidence is wanting to sustain a finding in favor of either party in this respect. We
cannot and should not rule on mere conjectures. The IBP relied only on the written assertions of the parties, apparently finding no
need to subject the veracity of the assertions through the question and answermodality. With the inconclusive state of the evidence, a
more
in-depth investigation is called for to ascertain in whose favor the

AMADOR Z. MALHABOUR, A.C. No. 5417[1]

Complainant,

Present:

PUNO, J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
versus CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.

Promulgated:
ATTY. ALBERTI R. SARMIENTO,
 Respondent. March 31, 2006

x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is a complaint for disbarment filed by Amador Z. Malhabour against Atty. Alberti R. Sarmiento.

Complainant was private respondent in CA-G.R. SP No. 50835, HY2LB Shipping & Management Services, Inc. and New Ocean Ltd.
v. The National Labor Relations Commission and Amador Malhabour.

Respondent, then a lawyer of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), was complainants counsel in National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) Case No. 009719-95. After the respondent retired from the PAO in March 1997, complainant asked him to continue assisting
him in said labor case.

The facts are:

On May 29, 1993, HY2LB Shipping and Management Services, Inc., (HY2LB Shipping), a local manning agency, hired complainant
as electrician for M/V Gold Faith, a vessel owned by New Ocean Ltd., a foreign principal based in Hongkong. The employment
contract was for a period of 12 months and that complainants monthly salary would be six hundred US dollars ($600.00). He had to
work 48 hours a week with 30% overtime pay.

Complainant rendered service on board the vessel for four months and nine days only. On August 5, 1993, HY2LB Shipping asked
him to disembark on the ground that the foreign principal was reducing its personnel. Thus, complainant filed with the Philippine
Overseas Employment and Administration Office (POEA), a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal against HY2LB Shipping, New Ocean
Ltd., and Premier Insurance and Surety Corporation.

On June 14, 1995, the POEA Adjudication Office rendered judgment in favor of complainant, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents HY2LB Shipping and Management Services, Inc., New Ocean Ltd. and Premier
Insurance are hereby ordered jointly and severally to pay complainant or in Philippine Peso at the exchange rate prevailing during
actual payment, the following:

1. The sum of US$4,680.00 representing the unexpired portion of the contract;

2. The sum of US$220.00 representing the unpaid salary of complainant; and

3. The sum of US$774.00 representing the fixed overtime pay of complainant.

No other pronouncement.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal by HY2LB Shipping, New Ocean Ltd., and Premier Insurance and Surety Corporation, the NLRC rendered its Decision
affirming the POEA judgment. Their motions for reconsideration were denied.

HY2LB Shipping then filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari against NLRC and complainant.

In its Decision dated June 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed HY2LB Shippings petition, holding that in affirming the POEA
judgment, the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion. HY2LB Shipping filed a Motion for Reconsideration, invoking Section 10 of
R.A. No. 8042.[2] The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution of February 15, 2000, modified the NLRC Decision, in the sense that
complainant is entitled to only three (3) months salary considering that this is the lesser amount of his one year employment contract;
[3]
and overtime pay since this was provided in the parties contract of employment.

Immediately upon receipt of the Court of Appeals Resolution, complainant requested respondent to file a motion for
reconsideration. But the latter merely filed a Notice to File Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation to File an Appeal in case
Same is Denied.[4] Respondent advised complainant to accept the Decision of the Court of Appeals and that filing a motion for
reconsideration will just prolong the litigation. Complainant did not heed respondents advice and filed the motion for reconsideration
himself. But it was denied by the Appellate Court for being late by 43 days.[5] At this point, complainant urged respondent to file with
this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari. Respondent agreed but delayed its filing. On July 24, 2000, this Court issued a
Resolution[6] denying complainants petition for being late.

Meantime, unknown to complainant, respondent sent a letter dated April 7, 2000 to the NLRC stating that complainant gave him a
Special Power of Attorney authorizing him to receive the judgment award. Respondent then filed a Motion for Execution alleging that
complainant decided to terminate the case and will no longer file a motion for reconsideration of the February 15, 2000 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals.[7]

On June 16, 2000, respondent received from the NLRC a check[8] dated June 14, 2000 in the amount of P99,490.00 which he deposited
with the Ecology Bank, Banawe Branch, under his personal account.

Subsequently, complainant came to know of the NLRC Order dated June 6, 2000 directing the NLRC cashier to release to respondent
the sum of P99,490.00 representing the money judgment.

Thereupon, complainant sought the assistance of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force. [9] Then he filed with the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) a complaint for estafa thru falsification of a public document. The NBI referred the matter to the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.

During their confrontation at the NBI, respondent paid complainant P40,000.00 as partial payment of the P60,000.00 awarded to the
latter.

Later, or on January 30, 2001,[10] respondent paid complainant only P10,000.00, leaving a balance of P10,000.00. This prompted
complainant to file with this Court the instant complaint for disbarment.

In his Comment dated June 1, 2001, respondent alleged inter alia that this case arose from a quarrel between a client and his counsel;
that after the promulgation of the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 50835, HY2LB Shipping filed with
this Court a Petition for Review of Certiorari; that at this time, he (respondent) filed with the NLRC a Motion for Execution; that the
NLRC partially granted his motion by issuing a check in the amount of P100,000.00 by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney signed
by complainant; that pursuant to their agreement that their shares in the award is on a 40-60 ratio, he (respondent) kept complainants
share of P60,000.00; and that he was ready to give complainant his share but he did not make any demand and refused to receive the
balance on June 30, 2001.

On August 27, 2001, this Court referred the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. In its Report and Recommendation[11] dated April 15, 2002, the IBP through Investigating Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala, made the following findings:

It was apparent that the complainant did not agree with the modified decision of the Court of Appeals and instructed respondent to file
a Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court. All the while and without his knowledge and consent, respondent filed a Motion for
Execution with the NLRC who awarded complainant the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).Respondent
admitted that he was able to encash the check awarded to complainant by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney which complainant
denies having executed. x x x.

x x x. When respondent received the amount of money awarded to complainant by the NLRC, he took it upon himself to divide the
money into 60-40 ratio because complainant owed him his attorneys fees; however, he failed to inform complainant beforehand of his
plan, and only when complainant filed a criminal complaint against him that respondent paid complainant and on installment basis at
that. Respondent in fact still has a balance of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). Respondent claims that complainant exceeded and
abused his goodness and kindness but it is the other way around.

and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law and as a member of the Bar for one year.
On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-397 adopting and approving the Report and
Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Maala.

We sustain the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.

Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Respondent failed to comply with the above provisions. Records show and as found by Investigating Commissioner, respondent
committed deceit by making it appear that complainant executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing him (respondent) to file with
the NLRC a Motion for Execution and to collect the money judgment awarded to the former. Worse, after receiving from the NLRC
cashier the check amounting to P99,490.00, he retained the amount. It was only when complainant reported the matter to the NBI that
respondent paid him P40,000.00 as partial payment of the award. In fact, there still remains an outstanding balance
of P10,000.00. Moreover, as correctly found by IBP Commissioner Maala, respondent has no right to retain or appropriate unilaterally
his lawyers lien[12] by dividing the money into 60-40 ratio. Obviously, such conduct is indicative of lack of integrity and propriety.
[13]
He was clinging to something not his and to which he had no right.

It bears stressing that as a lawyer, respondent is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the
administration of law and the dispensation of justice.[14] As such, he should make himself more an exemplar for others to emulate and
should not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.[15] This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity
and good moral character of members of the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession[16] and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.[17] Membership in the legal profession is a privilege.[18] And whenever it is made to
appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of
this Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.
[19]
Respondents conduct blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but also that of the legal profession. His conduct fell
short of the exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of law and justice.

Accordingly, administrative sanction against respondent is warranted. In Lao v. Medel,[20] we considered a lawyers violation of Canon
1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as in this case, as an act constituting gross misconduct. In line with Lao,
citing Co v. Bernardino,[21] Ducat, Jr. v. Villalon, Jr.,[22] and Saburnido v. Madroo[23] which also involved gross misconduct of lawyers
we find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one year sufficient.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Alberti R. Sarmiento is hereby declared guilty of violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and isSUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective immediately.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Court Administrator for his distribution to all courts of the land, the IBP, the Office of the
Bar Confidant, and entered into respondents personal records as a member of the Philippine Bar.

substantial evidence level tilts. Hence, we are constrained to remand the case to the IBP for further reception of evidence solely on this
aspect.

We also are unable to grant complainants prayer for respondent to be made liable for the cost of her childs DNA test absent proof that
he misappropriated funds exclusively earmarked for the purpose.

Neither shall we entertain complainants claim for moral damages and attorneys fees. Suffice it to state that an administrative case
against a lawyer is sui generis, one that is distinct from a civil or a criminal action.[36] It is an investigation by the Court into the fitness
of a lawyer to remain in the legal profession and be allowed the privileges as such. Its primary objective is to protect the Court and the
public from the misconduct of its officers with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and
honest administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable
men and women in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.[37] As such, it involves no private interest and affords no redress
for private grievance.[38] The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the lawyers alleged misconduct is in no
sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.
[39]

Respondents misconduct is of considerable gravity. There is a string of cases where the Court meted out the extreme penalty of
disbarment on the ground of gross immorality where the respondent contracted a bigamous marriage, [40] abandoned his family to
cohabit with his paramour,[41] cohabited with a married woman,[42] lured an innocent woman into marriage,[43] or was found to be a
womanizer.[44] The instant case can be easily differentiated from the foregoing cases.
We, therefore, heed the stern injunction on decreeing disbarment where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would
accomplish the end desired.[45] In Zaguirre v. Castillo,[46] respondent was found to have sired a child with another woman who knew he
was married. He therein sought understanding from the Court pointing out the polygamous nature of men and that the illicit
relationship was a product of mutual lust and desire. Appalled at his reprehensible and amoral attitude, the Court suspended him
indefinitely. However, in Fr. Sinnott v. Judge Barte,[47] where respondent judge consorted with a woman not his wife, but there was no
conclusive evidence that he sired a child with her, he was fined P10,000.00 for his conduct unbecoming a magistrate despite his
retirement during the pendency of the case.
We note that from the very beginning of this case, herein respondent had expressed remorse over his indiscretion and had in fact ended
the brief illicit relationship years ago. We take these as signs that his is not a character of such severe depravity and thus should be
taken as mitigating circumstances in his favor.[48] Considering further that this is his first offense, we believe that a fine of P15,000.00
would suffice. This, of course, is without prejudice to the outcome of the aspect of this case involving the alleged misappropriation of
funds of the client.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal GUILTY of immorality and impose on him a FINE
of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client is REMANDED to the IBP for further investigation, report and recommendation
within ninety (90) days from receipt of this Decision.

Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney and as a member of the Bar, and furnished
the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

CASE DIGEST:

SORIANO vs. DIZON

FACTS:

A complaint-affidavit for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by Roberto Soriano with the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) of the Intergrated Bar of the Philippines. Complainant Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and that the conviction of the latter for frustrated homicide, which involved moral
turpitude, should result in his disbarment. According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to comply
with this particular undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the Court of Appeals

ISSUE:

Whether or not the atty. Dizon violates Canon 1 of rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibilities

HELD:

Yes. It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities. He has thus brazenly violated the
law and disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts. We remind him that, both in his attorneys oath and in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he bound himself to obey the laws of the land.

All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in even a basic sense of justice. He obtained the
benevolence of the trial court when it suspended his sentence and granted him probation. And yet, it has been four years since he was
ordered to settle his civil liabilities to complainant. To date, respondent remains adamant in refusing to fulfill that obligation. By his
extreme impetuosity and intolerance, as shown by his violent reaction to a simple traffic altercation, he has taken away the earning
capacity, good health, and youthful vigor of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges complainant the measly amount that could never
even fully restore what the latter has lost.
 PAGCOR VS. ATTY. DANTE A. CARANDANG

FACTS:

Atty. Carandang, respondent, is the president of Bingo Royale, Incorporated (Bingo Royale), a private corporation organized
under the laws of the Philippines.

On February 2, 1999, PAGCOR and Bingo Royale executed a Grant of Authority to Operate Bingo Games. Article V of
this document mandates Bingo Royale to remit 20% of its gross sales to PAGCOR. This 20% is divided into 15% to
PAGCOR and 5% franchise tax to the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

In the course of its operations, Bingo Royale incurred arrears amounting to P6,064,833.14 as of November 15, 2001. Instead
of demanding the payment therefor, PAGCOR allowed Bingo Royale and respondent Atty. Carandang to pay the said amount
in monthly installment of P300,000.00 from July 2001 to June 2003.

Bingo Royale then issued to PAGCOR twenty four (24) Bank of Commerce checks in the sum of P7,200,000.00 signed by
respondent.

However, when the checks were deposited after the end of each month at the Land Bank, U.N. Avenue Branch, Manila, they
were all dishonored by reason of Bingo Royales Closed Account.

Despite PAGCORs demand letters dated November 12 and December 12, 2001, and February 12, 2002, respondent failed to
pay the amounts of the checks. Thus, PAGCOR filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila criminal complaints
for violations of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 against respondent.

PAGCOR contends that in issuing those bouncing checks, respondent is liable for serious misconduct, violation of the
Attorneys Oath and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and prays that his name be stricken from the Roll
of Attorneys.

In his Opposition to the complaint, respondent averred that he is not liable for issuing bouncing checks because they were
drawn by Bingo Royale. His act of doing so is not related to the office of a lawyer.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Atty. Carandang is liable for serious misconduct and violated the Attorneys oath and code of
professional responsibility.

HELD:

Whether to issue or not checks in favor of a payee is a voluntary act. It is clearly a choice for an individual
(especially one learned in the law), whether in a personal capacity or officer of a corporation, to do so after assessing and
weighing the consequences and risks for doing so. As President of BRI, he cannot be said to be unaware of the probability
that BRI, the company he runs, could not raise funds, totally or partially, to cover the checks as they fell due. The desire to
continue the operations of his company does not excuse respondents act of violating the law by issuing worthless checks.
Moreover, inability to pay is not a ground, under the Civil Code, to suspend nor extinguish an obligation. Specifically,
respondent contends that because of business reverses or inability to generate funds, BRI should be excused from making
good the payment of the checks. If this theory is sustained, debtors will merely state that they no longer have the capacity to
pay and, consequently, not obliged to pay on time, nor fully or partially, their debt to creditors. Surely, undersigned cannot
agree with this contention.

VICTOR Lingan VS. Attys. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmu P. Baliga

A.C. No. 5377, June 15, 2006
FACTS:

A complaint for disbarment was filed by Victor Lingan against Attys. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy Baliga on November
16, 2000. Complainant alleged that respondents, both notaries public, falsified certain public documents, as follows:
A complaint for annulment of title with damages filed by Isaac Villegas against complainant with the Regional Trial Court
of Tuguegarao, Cagayan. Respondent Calubaquib signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping of the
complaint as notary public and entered the same as Doc. No. 182; Page No. 38; Book No. CLXXII; Series of 1996, which
according to the records of the National Archives, the document entered as Doc. No. 182; Page 38; Book No. CLXXII;
Series of 1996 in respondent Calubaquibs notarial register was an affidavit of one Daniel Malayao.

A special power of attorney dated September 10, 1996 executed by Isaac Villegas appointing respondent Calubaquib as his
attorney-in-fact to enter into a compromise agreement under such terms and conditions acceptable to him which was
notarized by respondent Baliga and entered as Doc. No. 548, Page No. 110; Book No. VIII; Series of 1996, which
according to respondent Baligas notarial register, Doc. No. 548; Page No. 110; Book No. VIII; Series of 1996 pertains to
an affidavit of loss of one Pedro Telan, dated August 26, 1996.

A petition for reappointment as notary public for and in Tuguegarao,Cagayan by respondent Baliga, which was notarized by
respondent Calubaquib and entered in his notarial register as Doc. No. 31, Page No. 08, Book No. CXXX, Series of
1995. However, Notarial Register Book No. CXXX was for the year 1996 and entered there as Doc. No. 31, Page No. 08
was a cancellation of real estate mortgage dated January 11, 1996.

Respondents Calubaquib and Baliga both admitted the incorrectness of the entries and simply attributed them to the
inadvertence in good faith of their secretary and legal assistants to whom they had left the task of entering all his notarial documents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondents violated the Notarial Practice Law

HELD:

It is abundantly clear that the notary public is personally accountable for all entries in his notarial register. Section 245 of
the Notarial Law provides that every notary public shall keep a register to be known as the notarial register, wherein record shall be
made of all his official acts as notary; and he shall supply a certified copy of such record, or any part thereof, to any person applying
for it and paying the legal fees therefore. Section 246 of the same law also provides that the notary public shall enter in such register,
in chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the person executing, swearing
to, or acknowledging the instrument, the witnesses, if any, to the signature, the date of execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the
instrument, the fees collected by him for his services as notary in connection therewith, and, when the instrument is a contract, he shall
keep a correct copy thereof as part of his records, and shall likewise enter in said records a brief description of the substance thereof
and shall give to each entry a consecutive number, beginning with number one in each calendar year. The notary shall give to each
instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on
the instrument the page or pages of his register on which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries.

In this connection, Section 249(b) provides that the failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in
his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law shall, in the discretion of the proper judge of first
instance, be sufficient ground for the revocation of his commission:

Respondents cannot be relieved of responsibility for the violation of the aforesaid sections by passing the buck to their
secretaries, a reprehensible practice which to this day persists despite our open condemnation.

Notarization is not an empty, meaningless or routinary act but one invested with substantive public interest, such that only
those who are qualified or authorized to do so may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those
not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from inflicting themselves upon the public, the courts and the administrative
offices in general.
 Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public one and makes it admissible in evidence without
further proof of its authenticity. Notaries public must therefore observe utmost care with respect to the basic requirements of their
duties.

ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY V. DELA CRUZ (2006) DISBARMENT, IMMORAL CONDUCT

Doctrine:

Immoral conduct is that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the
good and respectable members of the community and what is grossly immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.

The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and may be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously
affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court. Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser
penalty could accomplish the end desire.

FACTS:

This is a disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff of the Saint Louis University-Laboratory High School
(SLU-LHS) against Atty. Rolando C. Dela Cruz, principal of SLU-LHS, predicated on the following grounds: 1. Gross Misconduct:
(a) pending criminal case for child abuse allegedly committed by him against a high school student; (b) pending administrative case
for his alleged unprofessional and unethical acts of misappropriating money supposedly for the teachers; and (c) pending labor case on
alleged illegal deduction of salary by respondent. 2. Grossly Immoral Conduct: In contracting a second marriage (with Mary Jane
Pascua) despite the existence of his first marriage (with Teresita Rivera); and 3. Malpractice: In notarizing (14) documents from 1988
to 1997 despite the expiration of his notarial commission on December 31, 1987.

ISSUE:

1. W/N Dela Cruz should be disbarred?

HELD:

1. NO.

A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the court into the
conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case against him,
or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course, then neither will the judgment of annulment of
respondents second marriage also exonerate him from a wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof - clear
preponderance of evidence - in disciplinary proceedings against members of the Bar is met, then liability attaches.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court cites grossly immoral conduct as a ground for disbarment. Undoubtedly, respondents
act constitutes immoral conduct. But is it so gross as to warrant his disbarment? Indeed, he exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree
of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage, which is a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity. Respondent was already a member of the Bar when he contracted the bigamous second marriage in
1989, having been admitted to the Bar in 1985. As such, he cannot feign ignorance of the mandate of the law that before a second
marriage may be validly contracted, the first and subsisting marriage must first be annulled by the appropriate court.

Moreover, notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested with substantive public interest,
such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face and, for this reason, notaries public must observe with the utmost care the basic requirements in the performance
of their duties.

The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such privilege. It must be understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring someone as
an attorney is to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to an office of attorney and, thus, to protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice,
rather than to punish an attorney. However, in this case, the Court held that respondents act was not grossly immoral as to warrant his
disbarment. From the recommendation and observation of the IBP investigator, the respondent had no intention to flaunt the law and
the high moral standard of the legal profession as shown by the following: (a) after his first failed marriage and prior to his second
marriage (for 7 years), he has not been romantically involved with any woman; (b) his second marriage was a show of his noble
intentions and total love for his wife; (c) he never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child; (d) he never
disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry with relation to his wife; (e) since up to now, he remained celibate.

VITUG VS. RONGCAL

FACTS:

Catherine Joie P. Vitug sought the service of respondent Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal who was introduced to her by her former
classmate. Complainant asked Atty. Rongcal to represent her in the support case she was going to file against her former lover, Arnulfo
Aquino. Soon after, herein complainant and respondent started having sexual relationship with each other. According to Vitug,
respondent also gave her sweet inducements such as the promise of a job, financial security for her daughter, and his services as
counsel for the prospective claim for support against Aquino.

Respondent allegedly convinced complainant to sign an Affidavit of Disclaimer which the latter signed without reading the said
affidavit. On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant that Aquino gave him P150,000.00 cash and P58,000.00 in
two (2) postdated checks to answer for the medical expenses of her daughter. Instead of turning them over to her, respondent handed
her his personal check in the amount of P150,000.00 and promised to give her the balance of P58,000.00 soon thereafter.
However,sometime in April or May 2001, respondent informed her that he could not give her the said amount because he used it for
his political campaign as he was then running for the position of Provincial Board Member of the 2nd District of Pampanga
Complainant argues that respondent's acts constitute a violation of his oath as a lawyer. She filed an administrative case against
Rongcal which was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
It was then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and that he be ordered to
return to complainant the amount of P58,000.00 within two months. The same was approved by the IBP Board of Governors.
Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for ClarificatoryQuestioning with the IBP and a Motion
to Reopen/Remand Case for Clarificatory Questioning with the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not respondent be disbarred for immorality

(2) Whether or not respondents act of preparing and notarizing the Affidavit, a document disadvantageous to his client, is a violation
of the Code.

HELD:

(1) NO.

One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. Said requirement
persists as a continuing condition for the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the
revocation of such privilege. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. On sexual relation and on respondents subsequent marriage, by his
own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code which statesthat a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The Court find credence in respondent's assertion that it was impossible
for her not to have known of his subsisting marriage, complainants allegations of deceit were not established by clear preponderant
evidence required in disbarment cases.
(2) NO.

It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering into a settlement with Aquino after explaining all available
options to her. The law encourages the amicable settlement not only of pending cases but also of disputes which might otherwise be
filed in court. Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that: A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid,
end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement. As complainant voluntarily and intelligently agreed to a settlement with
Aquino, she cannot later blame her counsel when she experiences a change of heart. Suspicion, no matter how strong, is not
enough in the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duty
in accordance with his oath.