EN BANC Chiu Hap Chiu to Lo Hap Chiu for the reason that the
latter is the name he used while studying in the school
[G.R. No. L-20018. April 30, 1966.]
CHIU HAP CHIU, Petitioner-Appellee, v. REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellant.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, First Assistant
Solicitor General E. Umali and J. Domingo de
Leon, for oppositor and Appellant.
Teodoro P. Labtic for petitioner and appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CHANGE OF NAME; NATURE. The state has an
interest in the names borne by individuals and entities
for purposes of identification, and a change of name is
a privilege and not a matter of right.
2. ID.; REQUISITES OR GROUNDS FOR GRANT OF
PETITION. Before a person can be authorized to
change the name given to him either in his certificate
of birth or in the civil registry, he must show proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason which may
justify. such change. Otherwise, the request should be
denied (Ong Peng Gan v. Republic, G.R. No. L-8035,
November 29, 1957). The following may be considered,
among others, as proper and reasonable causes that
may warrant the grant of a petition for change of
name: (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) when the request for change is a consequence of a
change of status, such as when a natural child is
acknowledged or legitimized; and (3) when the change
is necessary to avoid confusion (Tolentino, Civil Code of
the Philippines, 1953 ed. Vol. I, p. 660).
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Chiu Hap Chiu seeks to change his name to Lo Hap
Chiu in a petition filed before the Court of First Instance
of Davao. He testified that he was 30 years old, single,
a doctor of medicine, and a resident of Davao City; that
the name given him at birth is Lo Hap Chiu; that during
his school days, or from elementary school to college,
he was called by his classmates as Lo Hap Chiu for
which he was called by his classmates as Lo Hap Chiu
for which reason he desires to have said name adopted
instead of Chiu Hap Chiu to avoid confusion in the use
of his name; and that the name given him in his alien
certificate of registration is Chiu Hap Chiu.
After the reception of the evidence, the court a quo
granted the petition. It found that petitioner was born
on February 1, 1930 at Kulagsu, Fuken, China; that he
is a Chinese citizen holding an alien certificate of
residence; that he is a physician by profession and has
no criminal record; that he has paid all his taxes to the
government; that he desires to change his name from
and because his present name and surname are the
same.
The government opposed the petition in view of its
failure to find sufficient justification for the change of
name desired by petitioner.
This court has already had occasion to express the
view that the State has an interest in the names borne
by individuals and entities for purposes of identification
and that a change of name is a privilege and not a
matter of right. So that before a person can be
authorized to change the name given him either in his
certificate of birth or in the civil registry he must show
proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason
which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request
should be denied (Ong Peng Oan v. Republic, G.R. No.
L-8035, November 29, 1957). The following may be
considered, among others, as proper and reasonable
causes that may warrant the grant of petition for
change of name: (1) when the name is ridiculous,
tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write
or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a
consequence of a change of status, such as when a
natural child is acknowledged or legitimized; and (3)
when the change is necessary to avoid confusion
(Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed., Vol. I,
p. 660).
Petitioner has not shown any proper or compelling
reason that may justify the request for change of name
other than his desire to use the name Lo Hap Chiu on
the alleged reason that that is the name given him in
his birth certificate and in the schools he attended, but
this claim was not satisfactorily proven, for aside from
his own testimony and a photostatic copy of a
certification issued in his favor as Doctor of Medicine
by the University of Santo Tomas wherein it appears
that his name is Lo Hap Chiu, there is nothing in the
record to show that he used said name from grade
school to college for he failed to present any
documentary evidence to prove it. The truth is that he
was registered in the Bureau of Immigration as Chiu
Hap Chiu and in all the clearances secured by him from
said Bureau the name used therein was Chiu Hap Chiu
thereby indicating that he considered himself as such
as regards the public. He has not shown that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name, and
as a matter of fact he was referred to as Dr. Chiu Hap
Chiu in his clearance from the Court of First Instance of
Davao. Since the State has an interest in the name
borne by an individual, especially an alien, and the
latters identity as a rule is established by the name
appearing in his alien certificate of registration, we find
no plausible reason for authorizing the change of name
desired by petitioner.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside. No
costs.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-48762 September 12, 1988
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs. HON. SEGUNDO M. ZOSA, Judge of the Court
of Firt Instance of Samar, Catbalogan, Samar,
Branch I, and LEE KING SING, Respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.chanrobles virtual
law library
Lope C. Quimbao for private respondent.
BIDIN, J.:
The Republic of the Philippines appealed from the order
dated July 20, 1978 of the former Court of First
Instance of Samar granting the petition of respondent
Lee King Sing for change of his name to Antonio C. Lee
and ordering the civil registrar of Samar to enter in the
civil registry record the said
name.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The facts of the case are as follows: chanrobles virtual
law library
On February 10, 1977, respondent Lee King Sing filed a
petition with the CFI of Samar for change of name. For
clarity, the said petition docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 5634 is reproduced herein as follows:
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME , SPEC PROC.
NO. 5634
LEE KING SING,
Petitioners
PETITION
COMES, the Petitioner through the undersigned counsel
and to this Honorable Court, most respectfully
states: chanrobles virtual law library
1. That the petitioner is a bona fide resident of
Catbalogan, Samar for at least three years prior to the
filing of this petition since his birth on January 3, 1934
to the present continuously; chanrobles virtual law
library
2. That the petitioner is a naturalized Filipino citizen
per Certificate of Naturalization No. 007217 (Pet No.
001844-A) issued by the Special Committee on
Naturalization on December 20,1976 pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1055, after taking his Oath of
Allegiance on December 15, 1976 and it is his desire to
be known with a Filipino name inasmuch as his
associates, friends and all other persons with which he
is dealing are Filipinos and petitioner is known to them
and they call him Antonio or Tony;chanrobles virtual
law library
3. That he desires that his present name be changed to
ANTONIO C. LEE. The Lee appearing in his present
name is in fact his surname but in the Chinese way of
writing the name, the surname is stated first; hence,
his desire to have ANTONIO as his first name, C. in the
first letter of his mother' surname and LEE his present
surname which he desires to be written after his first
name as it is the Filipino way. The name he now asked
for is ANTONIO C.
LEE.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that after
due publication and hearing, the Honorable Court
issues an order changing the name of the petitioner
LEE KING SING to ANTONIO C.
LEE.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Catbalogan, Samar, February 10,
1977.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
(SGD) LOPE C. QUIMBOchanrobles virtual law library
Counsel for the Petitioner (pp. 47-48, Rollo).
On February 15, 1917, the lower court issued an order
setting the petition for hearing. Said order was
subsequently published in the Leyte Forum on February
22, March 1, and March
3,1977.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
On March 18, 1977, herein petitioner through the
Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss the petition
on the ground that the name sought to be adopted by
respondent and other names by which he is known are
not indicated or included in the title of the petition. On
December 10, 1977, respondent filed an opposition to
the motion to dismiss. On March 8, 1978, the lower
court denied the aforesaid
motion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
After trial and hearing, the court a quo on July 20,
1978, as already stated, granted the petition; hence,
the instant appeal, petitioner raising a lone assignment
of error:
THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF SAMAR ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE
OF THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME DESPITE
SUBSTANTIAL DEFECT IN THE PETITION AND
PUBLICATION OF THE NOTICE OF HEARING. (p. 84,
Rollo).
The proceeding for a change of name is a proceeding
in rem. Jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition
for change of name is acquired after due publication of
the order containing certain data, among which is the
name sought to be adopted, a matter which should be
indicated in the title of the petition [Pabellar vs.
Republic, 70 SCRA 16 (1976); Gil Go vs. Republic, 77
SCRA 65 (1977)] chanrobles virtual law library
In a petition for change of name the title of the petition
should include (1) the applicant's real name, (2) his
aliases or other names, if any, and (3) the name sought
to be adopted even if these data are found in the body
of the petition. For the Publication to be valid and
effective, the published order should reproduce the
title of the petition containing the data already stated
and should contain correct information as to (1) the
name or names of the applicant; (2) the cause for the
changed name, and (3) the new name asked for
(Republic vs. Lee Wai Lam, 28 SCRA 1043 (1969)
Republic vs. Tanada, 42 SCRA 419 (1971); Republic vs.
Reyes, 45 SCRA 570 (1972); Secan Kok vs. Republic, 52
SCRA 322 (1973).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
In the present case, the petition itself, as well as the
order published, carries the following title "In Re:
Petition for Change of Name Lee King Sing, Petitioner."
It does not contain the name (Antonio C. Lee) sought to
be adopted and the names by which petitioner was
known to his friends and associates. The title should
have read "In the Matter of the Change of Name of Lee
King Sing, otherwise known as Antonio or Tony to
Antonio C. Lee, Lee King Sing, Petitioner." The petition
does not indicate in its title or caption that herein
respondent desires to change his name to Antonio C.
Lee. The published order setting his petition for hearing
reproduced that defective title. The failure to include
the name sought to be adopted in the title of the
petition nor in the title or caption of the notices
published in the newspapers renders the trial court
without jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition
[Republic vs. Reyes,
(supra)].chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The reason for the rule requiring the inclusion of the
name sought to be adopted by and the other names or
aliases of the applicant in the title of the petition or in
the caption of the published order is that the ordinary
reader only glances fleetingly at the caption of the
published order or the title of the petition in a special
proceeding. Only if the caption or the title strikes him
does he proceed to read the contents of the order. And
the probability is great that he does not at all notice
the other names or aliases of the applicant if these are
mentioned only in the body of the order or petition.
The non-inclusion of all the names or aliases of the
applicant in the caption of the order or in the title of
the petition defeats the very purpose of the required
publication (Go vs. Republic, (supra); Telmo vs.
Republic, 73 SCRA 29
[1976]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Considering that the title of the petition in this case
and the order setting it for hearing are defective as
indicated above, the lower court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the proceeding (Jesus Ng Yao Siong vs.
Republic, 16 SCRA 483 [1966]); Go Chin Beng vs.
Republic, 46 SCRA 617 [1972]). Its dismissal is in
order.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
WHEREFORE, the lower court's order under appeal is
Reversed and the petition for change of name is
Denied. No costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-16384. April 26, 1962.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO CHANGE
THE NAME OF GO CHANG TO JAYME S. TAN. JAYME
S. TAN, Petitioner-Appellee, v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellant.
Francisco E. F. Remotigue for Petitioner-
Appellee.
Solicitor General for Oppositor-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL REGISTRY; CHANGE OF NAME; PROCEEDINGS
IN REM; STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS OF
PUBLICATION. Petitions for change of name being
proceedings in rem, strict compliance with the
requirements of publication is essential, for it is by
such means that the Court acquires jurisdiction (Aida
Jacobo v. Republic, 52 Off. Gaz., No. 9, p. 2928).
2. ID.; ID.; DEFECT IN SPELLING OF NAME IN THE
PETITION AND IN THE ORDER SUBSTANTIAL. In
proceedings in charge of name, any defect in the
petition and the order, as to the spelling of name of the
petitioner, is substantial, because it does not correctly
the party to said proceedings.
DECISION
PAREDES, J.:
On March 12, 1959, Go Chang, a citizen of the Republic
of Nationalist China, but born in the Philippines, filed
with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, a verified
petition for change of name (Sp. Proc. No. 189-R), to
Jayme S. Tan. The jurisdictional facts as to age, status,
citizenship, residence, place of birth and name of
parents were alleged. In the petition it was further
stated that he (petitioner), was registered with the
Local Civil Registrar and the Immigration Bureau under
the name of Go Chang; baptized as Jaime Descals Go
Chang; that at tender age, he was taken under the care
of an uncle; that in his studies (from Grade I to 2nd
year in College), he has been enrolled under the name
Jayme S. Tan, Tan being the surname of his uncle and
the middle initial "S" standing for the surname of his
mother Lim Sy; that all his friends know him as Jayme
S. Tan; and that by seeking the change of his name it
was not his intention to conceal or hide any
unfavorable record but to correct an error.

During the hearing, documentary evidence (Exhibits A,
A-1 to A- 3), consisting of the affidavit of the Publisher
of the "La Prensa", and clippings of the order (of
hearing), respectively, were presented to prove
compliance with the legal requirement of publication.
The motion for Bill of Particulars, presented by the
Provincial Fiscal was denied by the trial court on the
ground that same was improper and would serve only
to delay the proceedings. The petitioner testified that
when he started schooling at the "Colegio de Santa
Maria", San Juan, Rizal, he was enrolled under the
name of Jayme S. Tan, which name he has continuously
used up to College; that he desires to change his name
to clear up an error and avoid confusion and that
because of the discrepancy about his name in his
school records and alien certificate of registration, the
Board of Medical Examiners refused to issue him a
"Medical Number" to be considered as a medical
student, unless he secures a court order, allowing him
to use the name Jayme S. Tan, appearing in his school
records.
The Provincial Fiscal, who represented the Solicitor
General filed no written opposition to the petition but
attended the hearing and cross-examined the
petitioner. After trial, the lower court on August 29,
1959, rendered judgment, pertinent portions of which
read
"The evidence presented proved the truth of the
petitioners allegations in his petition. Besides, it has
also been established in evidence that the petition has
no pending obligation with the Government; that he
has never been accused of any offense, nor any suit
filed against him and that his purpose in asking that he
be allowed to use his name of Jaime S. Tan by which he
was enrolled in school and known by his friends is to
have same as his sole official name; that without a
judicial authority to use the name, he would not be
allowed by the Board of Medical Examiners to take the
board examinations for physicians; that it is in good
faith that he asked the authority and no confusion of
identity will be caused or created by the use of said
name and furthermore he is not intending to change
his Chinese nationality by the use of said name.
The Court under these circumstances feels fully
justified in granting the petition, under the authority of
Rule 103, of the Rules of Court, and said petition is
hereby granted and, from now on the petitioner will
use, as his official name, to identify himself, the name
JAIME S. TAN after this name is duly registered in the
office of corresponding local Civil Registrar."
Under date of September 3, 1959, the Provincial Fiscal
of Cebu, moved for the reconsideration of the above
judgment. The motion was denied on September 12,
1959. The appeal of the State is anchored on two
points, viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) The lower court erred in taking cognizance of the
instant petition for change of name filed despite the
fact that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by
reason of a substantial defect in the petition and
publication of the Order for hearing; and
(2) The lower court erred in granting the petition
despite the fact that the petitioner failed to adduce any
proper and reasonable reason for changing his name.
A discrepancy exists in the petition and the published
Order. Whereas in the published Order the name of
petitioner was spelled Jaime S. Tan, the verified petition
spells his name as Jayme S. Tan (Exhs. A-1 to A-3).
Even the affidavit of the publisher of "La Prensa" (Exh.
A), the name appearing is Jaime S. Tan. Petitions for
change of name being proceedings in rem, strict
compliance with the requirements of publication is
essential, for it is by such means that the Court
acquires jurisdiction (Aida Jacobo v. Republic, 52 O.G.,
No. 9, p. 2928). Considering the fact that the
proceedings is one for change of name, the defect in
the petition and the order, as to the spelling of the
name of the petitioner, is substantial, because it did
not correctly identify the party to said proceedings. As
the Solicitor General has aptly observed
". . . Not only was it misleading to the courts of justice,
but also prejudiced the interests of the general public.
By said act, he made it difficult or virtually impossible
for anyone who might have an adverse interest, to
oppose his petition. In the eyes of the law, therefore
petitioner has not complied strictly with the legal
requirement regarding publication, thereby rendering
the entire proceeding had in the court below null and
void."cralaw virtua1aw library
It may be argued that the difference in the spelling is
minor, that is the "i" has been erroneously typewritten
as "y", or vice versa. The difference of one letter in a
name may mean the distinction of identity of one
person with that of another. If the projected change
means so great to the petitioner, he should, at least,
have exerted efforts to correct the mistake, if it was a
mistake at all.
We find also that no reasonable circumstance exists or
was proven to warrant petitioners change of name.
Petitioner in his petition alleges that he was baptized
as Jayme Go Chang and that throughout his school
days he has been enrolled under the name of Jayme S.
Tan. His own documents, however, belie said
allegations because his baptismal certificate (Exh. D),
shows that his baptismal name is "Jaime Descals Go
Chang." Except his own testimony, no other evidence
was introduced to show that in school and to his
friends he was using and/or was known by the name of
Jayme S. Tan. Because of the discrepancy existing in
his school records and his alien certificate of
registration, the Board of Medical Examiners allegedly
refused to give him a "Medical Number" to be
considered a medical student, unless he secures a
court order allowing him to use the name Jayme S. Tan.
No corroborative evidence was adduced to show the
veracity of this assertion. The fact that the Certificate
of Enrollment issued by the "Southwestern College"
(Exh. E), mentions a certain Jaime S. Tan as officially
enrolled in the College of Medicine, would show that
what petitioner has alleged to the effect that since his
first enrollment in Grade I until college, he was
continuously using the name Jayme S. Tan, cannot be
true. If the purpose of changing his name is to correct
an error or avoid confusion, the petitioner should retain
the use of his name "Go Chang" appearing in the Civil
Registrar and Bureau of Immigration, the real and
official name, rather than change it. The real name of a
person is that given him in the Civil registrar, not the
name by which he was baptized in his church or by
which he has been known in the community, or which
he has adopted (Chomi v. Local Civil Registrar of
Manila, G.R. No. L-9203, Sept. 28 1956, 52 O.G., No. 15,
p. 6541). There was no reason for the Medical Board to
require the change of his name to Jayme S. Tan,
considering the fact that the Certificate of Enrollment
from the Southwestern College mentions already of a
medical student bearing a similar name. It would seem
that the change of name sought for in the petition,
would only add confusion to the already confused state
of things. There would also be no practical purpose in
allowing his name to be changed, in order to give him a
"medical number" as he claims, because not being a
Filipino, he could not be admitted to take the Medical
Board Examinations. Moreover, petitioner-appellee has
continuously been violating the Anti-Alias Law (Comm.
Act No. 142), for having been using the name Jayme S.
Tan, for various purposes. The granting of the instant
petition would in effect be sanctioning an illegal act,
which we cannot do.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
reversed, and the petition of Go Chang to change his
name to Jayme S. Tan denied. Costs taxed against
the Petitioner-Appellee.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 174689 : October 22, 2007]
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES
SILVERIO, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness
of God; He created them male and female. (Genesis
5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by
Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside the
bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us
out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then
twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit
open. Out came two human beings; one was a male
and the other was a female. Amihan named the man
"Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda"
(Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman?
In particular, does the law recognize the changes made
by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with
regard to a person's sex? May a person successfully
petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the
birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex
reassignment surgery?cra lawlibrary
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto
Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his
first name and sex in his birth certificate in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition,
docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the
civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the
City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio
and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name
was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in
his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex
was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that
is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a
female" and that he had always identified himself with
girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man's body,
he consulted several doctors in the United States. He
underwent psychological examination, hormone
treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to
transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January
27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment
surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter
examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic
and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who
issued a medical certificate attesting that he
(petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in
fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his
name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel
Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was
published in the People's Journal Tonight, a newspaper
of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three
consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil
registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional
requirements were established. No opposition to the
petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also
presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fianc,
Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision 4 in
favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any
law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any
unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making
his birth records compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is
entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the
petition would be more in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-
assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought
and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique
of a female. Petitioner's misfortune to be trapped in a
man's body is not his own doing and should not be in
any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or]
prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community
in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the
petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on
the part of the petitioner and her [fianc] and the
realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause
or ground to deny the present petition despite due
notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through
the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any
[o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING
the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to
change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth
of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner's first name
from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner's gender
from "Male" to FEMALE.5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines
(Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in
the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law
allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by
reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals 7 rendered
a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the
trial court's decision lacked legal basis. There is no law
allowing the change of either name or sex in the
certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment
through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted
the Republic's petition, set aside the decision of the
trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-
105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it
was denied.9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his
name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under
Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and
108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Person's First Name Cannot Be Changed On the
Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground
for his petition for change of name and sex. As found
by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any
law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any
unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of
making his birth records compatible with his
present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the
physical features of a female, he became entitled to
the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by
individuals and entities for purposes of
identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a
right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by
statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil
Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname
without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048
(Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048
provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or
Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. - No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order, except
for clerical or typographical errors and change of first
name or nickname which can be corrected or changed
by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general in accordance with the provisions of this
Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It
vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for
change of first name to the city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law,
therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of
first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and
effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name
from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and
108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an
administrative petition for change of name is first filed
and subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the
corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum,
the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of
first name are primarily administrative in nature, not
judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which
change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or
Nickname. - The petition for change of first name or
nickname may be allowed in any of the following
cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to
be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been
habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and
he has been publicly known by that first name or
nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner's basis in praying for the change of his first
name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make
his first name compatible with the sex he thought he
transformed himself into through surgery. However, a
change of name does not alter one's legal capacity or
civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of
first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather
than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner's first
name for his declared purpose may only create grave
complications in the civil registry and the public
interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he
must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change. 19 In addition,
he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of
his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to
show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might
suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it
prayed for the change of petitioner's first name was
not within that court's primary jurisdiction as the
petition should have been filed with the local civil
registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done.
It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy
was administrative, that is, that provided under RA
9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper
venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila
where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it
had no merit since the use of his true and official name
does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the
Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner's
petition in so far as the change of his first name was
concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth
Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
The determination of a person's sex appearing in his
birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look
to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the
Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed
or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this
provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical
or typographical errors are involved. The correction or
change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a
judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the
ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction
of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to
substantial changes and corrections in entries in the
civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or
typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act,
the following terms shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake
committed in the performance of clerical work in
writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the
civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as
misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the
like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected or changed only
by reference to other existing record or
records: Provided, however, That no correction must
involve the change of nationality, age, status
or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry
involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which
the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code
and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil
Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning
the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil
register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil
register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal
separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship;
(13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of
filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and
(16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under
Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that
occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable
interpretation of the provision can justify the
conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground
of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to
remove the faults or error from" while to change means
"to replace something with something else of the same
kind or with something that serves as a
substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner
contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all
correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the
civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations,
acknowledgments of illegitimate children and
naturalization), events (such as births, marriages,
naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such
as legal separations, annulments of marriage,
declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions,
naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil
interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and
changes of name). These acts, events and judicial
decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon
the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person.
Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In
contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or
events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it
recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly
or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal
situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and
incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality
and his family membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal
qualities and relations, more or less permanent in
nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will,
such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being
married or not. The comprehensive term status' include
such matters as the beginning and end of legal
personality, capacity to have rights in general, family
relations, and its various aspects, such as birth,
legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage,
divorce, and sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis
supplied)
A person's sex is an essential factor in marriage and
family relations. It is a part of a person's legal capacity
and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the
Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the
registration of civil status shall be governed by special
laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines
governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal
to petitioner's cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law)
provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. - The
declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance
at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of
either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient
for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such
declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp
tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later
than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or
midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent
of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall
certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth;
(b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names,
citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father
is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of
parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f)
such other data as may be required in the regulations
to be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a
historical record of the facts as they existed at the time
of birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined at
birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the
infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a
person's sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not
attended by error,30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be
given their common and ordinary meaning in the
absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words
"sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register
Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all
other laws) should therefore be understood in their
common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative
intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined
as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function
that distinguish a male from a female"32 or "the
distinction between male and female."33 Female is "the
sex that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is
"the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for
fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female"
in everyday understanding do not include persons who
have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore,
"words that are employed in a statute which had at the
time a well-known meaning are presumed to have
been used in that sense unless the context compels to
the contrary."36Since the statutory language of the Civil
Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and
remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term
"sex" as used then is something alterable through
surgery or something that allows a post-operative
male-to-female transsexual to be included in the
category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have
succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law
authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil
registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for
his petition for the correction or change of the entries
in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to
First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of
Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was
in consonance with the principles of justice and equity.
It believed that allowing the petition would cause no
harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and
wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences.
First, even the trial court itself found that the petition
was but petitioner's first step towards his eventual
marriage to his male fianc. However, marriage, one of
the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract
of permanent union between a man and a
woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal
capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male
and a female.38 To grant the changes sought by
petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly
alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will
allow the union of a man with another man who has
undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-
operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws
which apply particularly to women such as the
provisions of the Labor Code on employment of
women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal
Code40and the presumption of survivorship in case of
calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the
public policy in relation to women which could be
substantially affected if petitioner's petition were to be
granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that
"[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment
by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of
the law." However, it is not a license for courts to
engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is
to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature,
should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines
should govern the recognition of the effects of sex
reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines
becomes particularly important in this case where the
claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions
for change of first name and for correction or change of
entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed,
what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be
presented and what procedures shall be observed. If
the legislature intends to confer on a person who has
undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change
his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it
has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in
turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write
a protocol on when a person may be recognized as
having successfully changed his sex. However, this
Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter,
or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law
where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the
written word of its co-equal branch of government,
Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also
entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the]
realization of their dreams." No argument about that.
The Court recognizes that there are people whose
preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the
commonly recognized parameters of social convention
and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal.
However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve
questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1
Petitioner went for his elementary and high school, as
well as his Bachelor of Science in Statistics and Master
of Arts, in the University of the Philippines. He took up
Population Studies Program, Master of Arts in Sociology
and Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology at the University
of Hawaii, in Manoa, Hawaii, U.S.A. Rollo, p. 48.
2
This consisted of "penectomy [surgical removal of
penis] bilateral oschiectomy [or orchiectomy which is
the surgical excision of the testes] penile skin inversion
vaginoplasty [plastic surgery of the vagina] clitoral
hood reconstruction and augmentation mammoplasty
[surgical enhancement of the size and shape of the
breasts]." Id.
3
On January 23, 2003, January 30, 2003 and February
6, 2003.
4
Penned by Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr. Rollo, pp. 51-
53.
5
Id., pp. 52-53 (citations omitted).
6
Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 78824.
7
Special Sixth Division.
8
Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-
Lontok with Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and
Aurora Santiago-Lagman concurring. Rollo, pp. 25-33.
9
Resolution dated September 14, 2006, id., pp. 45-46.
10
An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil
Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a Clerical or
Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First
Name or Nickname in the Civil Register Without Need
of a Judicial Order, Amending for the Purpose Articles
376 and 412 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
11
Wang v. Cebu City Civil Registrar, G.R. No. 159966,
30 March 2005, 454 SCRA 155.
12
Id.
13
K v. Health Division, Department of Human
Resources, 277 Or. 371, 560 P.2d 1070 (1977).
14
Under Section 2 (6) of RA 9048, "first name" refers to
a name or nickname given to a person which may
consist of one or more names in addition to the middle
names and last names. Thus, the term "first name" will
be used here to refer both to first name and nickname.
15
The last paragraph of Section 7 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 7. Duties and Powers of the Civil Registrar
General. - xxx xxx xxx
Where the petition is denied by the city or municipal
civil registrar or the consul general, the petitioner may
either appeal the decision to the civil registrar general
or file the appropriate petition with the proper court.
16
SECTION 3. Who May File the Petition and Where. -
Any person having direct and personal interest in the
correction of a clerical or typographical error in an
entry and/or change of first name or nickname in the
civil register may file, in person, a verified petition with
the local civil registry office of the city or municipality
where the record being sought to be corrected or
changed is kept.
In case the petitioner has already migrated to another
place in the country and it would not be practical for
such party, in terms of transportation expenses, time
and effort to appear in person before the local civil
registrar keeping the documents to be corrected or
changed, the petition may be filed, in person, with the
local civil registrar of the place where the interested
party is presently residing or domiciled. The two (2)
local civil registrars concerned will then communicate
to facilitate the processing of the petition.
Citizens of the Philippines who are presently residing or
domiciled in foreign countries may file their petition, in
person, with the nearest Philippine Consulates.
The petitions filed with the city or municipal civil
registrar or the consul general shall be processed in
accordance with this Act and its implementing rules
and regulations.
All petitions for the clerical or typographical errors
and/or change of first names or nicknames may be
availed of only once.
17
SECTION 5. Form and Contents of the Petition. - The
petition shall be in the form of an affidavit, subscribed
and sworn to before any person authorized by the law
to administer oaths. The affidavit shall set forth facts
necessary to establish the merits of the petition and
shall show affirmatively that the petitioner is
competent to testify to the matters stated. The
petitioner shall state the particular erroneous entry or
entries, which are sought to be corrected and/or the
change sought to be made.
The petition shall be supported with the following
documents:
(1) A certified true machine copy of the certificate or of
the page of the registry book containing the entry or
entries sought to be corrected or changed;
(2) At least two (2) public or private documents
showing the correct entry or entries upon which the
correction or change shall be based; and
(3) Other documents which the petitioner or the city or
municipal civil registrar or the consul general may
consider relevant and necessary for the approval of the
petition.
In case of change of first name or nickname, the
petition shall likewise be supported with the documents
mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph. In
addition, the petition shall be published at least once a
week for two (2) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation. Furthermore, the petitioner shall
submit a certification from the appropriate law
enforcement agencies that he has no pending case or
no criminal record.
18
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97906, 21 May
1992, 209 SCRA 189.
19
Supra note 11.
20
Id.
21
In re Ladrach, 32 Ohio Misc.2d 6, 513 N.E.2d 828
(1987).
22
Lee v. Court of Appeals, 419 Phil. 392 (2001).
23
Id.
24
Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, 23
February 2004, 423 SCRA 420.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Beduya v. Republic of the Philippines, 120 Phil. 114
(1964).
28
Salonga, Jovito, Private International Law, 1995
Edition, Rex Bookstore, p. 238.
29
This, of course, should be taken in conjunction with
Articles 407 and 412 of the Civil Code which authorizes
the recording of acts, events and judicial decrees or the
correction or change of errors including those that
occur after birth. Nonetheless, in such cases, the
entries in the certificates of birth are not be corrected
or changed. The decision of the court granting the
petition shall be annotated in the certificates of birth
and shall form part of the civil register in the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar. (Co v. Civil Register of
Manila, supra note 24)
30
The error pertains to one where the birth attendant
writes "male" or "female" but the genitals of the child
are that of the opposite sex.
31
Moreover, petitioner's female anatomy is all man-
made. The body that he inhabits is a male body in all
aspects other than what the physicians have supplied.
32
Black's Law Dictionary, 8th edition (2004), p.1406.
33
Words and Phrases, volume 39, Permanent Edition, p.
106.
34
In re Application for Marriage License for Nash, 2003-
Ohio-7221 (No. 2002-T-0149, slip op., Not Reported in
N.E.2d, 2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio App. 11 Dist.,
December 31, 2003), citing Webster's II New College
Dictionary (1999).
35
Id.
36
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911),
31 S.Ct. 502, 55 L.Ed. 619.
37
Article 1, Family Code.
38
Article 2(1), Id.
39
These are Articles 130 to 138 of the Labor Code
which include nightwork prohibition, facilities for
women, prohibition on discrimination and stipulation
against marriage, among others.
40
These include Article 333 on adultery, Articles 337 to
339 on qualified seduction, simple seduction and acts
of lasciviousness with the consent of the offended
party and Articles 342 and 343 on forcible and
consented abduction, among others.
41
Section 3(jj)(4).
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 166676, September 12, 2008]
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. JENNIFER B.
CAGANDAHAN, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court raising purely questions of law and seeking a
reversal of the Decision1 dated January 12, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan,
Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of
Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B.
Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of
entries in Cagandahan's birth certificate: (1) the name
"Jennifer Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff Cagandahan"
and (2) gender from "female" to "male."
The facts are as follows.
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer
Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in
Birth Certificate2 before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan,
Laguna.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on
January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the
Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she
developed secondary male characteristics and was
diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia
(CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted
possess both male and female characteristics. She
further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral
hyperthropy in her early years and at age six,
underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that
she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed
that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has
stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual
development. She then alleged that for all interests
and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she
has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her
birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be
changed from female to male and her first name be
changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
The petition was published in a newspaper of general
circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and was
posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the
court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance
and authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to
appear in his behalf.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented
the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department
of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine
General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical
certificate stating that respondent's condition is known
as CAH. He explained that genetically respondent is
female but because her body secretes male hormones,
her female organs did not develop normally and she
has two sex organs - female and male. He testified that
this condition is very rare, that respondent's uterus is
not fully developed because of lack of female
hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He
further testified that respondent's condition is
permanent and recommended the change of gender
because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted
to her chosen role as male, and the gender change
would be advantageous to her.
The RTC granted respondent's petition in a Decision
dated January 12, 2005 which reads:
The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily
shown that he is entitled to the reliefs prayed [for].
Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court very
clear and convincing proofs for the granting of his
petition. It was medically proven that petitioner's body
produces male hormones, and first his body as well as
his action and feelings are that of a male. He has
chosen to be male. He is a normal person and wants to
be acknowledged and identified as a male.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of
Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to make the following
corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer
Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees:
a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to
JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and
b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.
It is likewise ordered that petitioner's school records,
voter's registry, baptismal certificate, and other
pertinent records are hereby amended to conform with
the foregoing corrected data.
SO ORDERED.3
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) seeking a reversal of the abovementioned ruling.
The issues raised by petitioner are:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION
CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE
RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH;
AND,
II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT
ALLOW CHANGE OF "SEX" OR "GENDER" IN THE BIRTH
CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENT'S MEDICAL
CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA
DOES NOT MAKE HER A "MALE"4
Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred
in ordering the correction of entries in the birth
certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender,
from female to male, on the ground of her medical
condition known as CAH, and her name from "Jennifer"
to "Jeff," under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally
defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108
of the Rules of Court because while the local civil
registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries under Section 3,
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondent's petition
before the court a quo did not implead the local civil
registrar.5 The OSG further contends respondent's
petition is fatally defective since it failed to state that
respondent is a bona fide resident of the province
where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years
prior to the date of such filing as mandated under
Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.6 The OSG
argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or
gender in the birth certificate and respondent's
claimed medical condition known as CAH does not
make her a male.7
On the other hand, respondent counters that although
the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not
formally named a party in the Petition for Correction of
Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar
was furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to
publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings,
orders or processes in the course of the
proceedings,8 respondent is actually a male person and
hence his birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect
his true sex/gender,9 change of sex or gender is
allowed under Rule 108,10 and respondent substantially
complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108
of the Rules of Court.11
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
SECTION 1. Venue. - A person desiring to change his
name shall present the petition to the Regional Trial
Court of the province in which he resides, [or, in the
City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court].
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. - A petition for change of
name shall be signed and verified by the person
desiring his name changed, or some other person on
his behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of
the province where the petition is filed for at least
three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's
name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.
SEC. 3. Order for hearing. - If the petition filed is
sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an order
reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and
place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a
copy of the order be published before the hearing at
least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in
some newspaper of general circulation published in the
province, as the court shall deem best. The date set for
the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to
an election nor within four (4) months after the last
publication of the notice.
SEC. 4. Hearing. - Any interested person may appear at
the hearing and oppose the petition. The Solicitor
General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall
appear on behalf of the Government of the Republic.
SEC. 5. Judgment. - Upon satisfactory proof in open
court on the date fixed in the order that such order has
been published as directed and that the allegations of
the petition are true, the court shall, if proper and
reasonable cause appears for changing the name of
the petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in
accordance with the prayer of the petition.
SEC. 6. Service of judgment. - Judgments or orders
rendered in connection with this rule shall be furnished
the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the
court issuing the same is situated, who shall forthwith
enter the same in the civil register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. - Any person
interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition
for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. -
Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in
the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a)
births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations;
(e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f)
judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization;
(k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil
interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n)
voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of
name.
SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an
entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar
and all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. - Upon the filing of the
petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and
place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. - The civil registrar and any person
having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last
date of publication of such notice, file his opposition
thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. - The court in which
the proceedings is brought may make orders
expediting the proceedings, and may also grant
preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights
of the parties pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. - After hearing, the court may either
dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a
certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the
civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same
in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally
defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108
of the Rules of Court because respondent's petition did
not implead the local civil registrar. Section 3, Rule 108
provides that the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceedings.
Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be made
a party in a proceeding for the correction of name in
the civil registry. He is an indispensable party without
whom no final determination of the case can be
had.12 Unless all possible indispensable parties were
duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall be
considered as falling much too short of the
requirements of the rules.13 The corresponding petition
should also implead as respondents the civil registrar
and all other persons who may have or may claim to
have any interest that would be affected
thereby.14 Respondent, however, invokes Section
6,15 Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states that
courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote
their objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy
and inexpensive disposition of the matters brought
before it. We agree that there is substantial compliance
with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of the
petition to the local civil registrar.
The determination of a person's sex appearing in his
birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look
to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the
Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed
or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 37616 of the Civil Code, this
provision was amended by Republic Act No. 9048 17 in
so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved.
The correction or change of such matters can now be
made through administrative proceedings and without
the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No.
9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now
applies only to substantial changes and corrections in
entries in the civil register.18
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil
registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change
for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.19
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code
and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil
Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning
the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil
register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil
register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal
separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship;
(13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of
filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and
(16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under
Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that
occur after birth.20
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition
causes the early or "inappropriate" appearance of male
characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this
condition produces too much androgen, a male
hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes
coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with
the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous
genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2)
normal internal structures of the female reproductive
tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as
the child grows older, some features start to appear
male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and
failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to
18,000 children are born with CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions21 that involve intersex
anatomy. During the twentieth century, medicine
adopted the term "intersexuality" to apply to human
beings who cannot be classified as either male or
female.22 The term is now of widespread use. According
to Wikipedia, intersexuality "is the state of a living
thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex
chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex
characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively
male nor female. An organism with intersex may have
biological characteristics of both male and female
sexes."
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by
different cultures. In most societies, intersex
individuals have been expected to conform to either a
male or female gender role.23 Since the rise of modern
medical science in Western societies, some intersex
people with ambiguous external genitalia have had
their genitalia surgically modified to resemble either
male or female genitals.24 More commonly, an intersex
individual is considered as suffering from a "disorder"
which is almost always recommended to be treated,
whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime
medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as
possible into the category of either male or female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate
calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex
as variations which should not be subject to outright
denial. "It has been suggested that there is some
middle ground between the sexes, a `no-man's land'
for those individuals who are neither truly `male' nor
truly `female'"25 The current state of Philippine statutes
apparently compels that a person be classified either
as a male or as a female, but this Court is not
controlled by mere appearances when nature itself
fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a
female, then there is no basis for a change in the birth
certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based
on medical testimony and scientific development
showing the respondent to be other than female, then
a change in the
subject's birth certificate entry is in order.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed
(neither consistently and categorically female nor
consistently and categorically male) composition.
Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However,
respondent's body system naturally produces high
levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result,
respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the
phenotypic features of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is
biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor
in his gender classification would be what the
individual, like respondent, having reached the age of
majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and
considering that his body produces high levels of male
hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological
support for considering him as being male. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the
gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at
maturity that the gender of such persons, like
respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course
and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere
with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has
already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent
could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like
taking lifelong medication,26 to force his body into the
categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose
not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in
respondent's development to reveal more fully his
male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will
not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so
innately private as one's sexuality and lifestyle
preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo
medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to
CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having
erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to
become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court
force respondent to undergo treatment and to take
medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as
society commonly currently knows this gender of the
human species. Respondent is the one who has to live
with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human
right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to
him should belong the primordial choice of what
courses of action to take along the path of his sexual
development and maturation. In the absence of
evidence that respondent is an "incompetent">27 and
in the absence of evidence to show that classifying
respondent as a male will harm other members of
society who are equally entitled to protection under the
law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the
respondent's position and his personal judgment of
being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the
diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with
what nature has handed out. In other words, we
respect respondent's congenital condition and his
mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult
for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how
respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus
help make his life easier, considering the unique
circumstances in this case.
As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103,
this Court has held that a change of name is not a
matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised
in the light of the reasons adduced and the
consequences that will follow.28 The trial court's grant
of respondent's change of name from Jennifer to Jeff
implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine
name. Considering the consequence that respondent's
change of name merely recognizes his preferred
gender, we find merit in respondent's change of name.
Such a change will conform with the change of the
entry in his birth certificate from female to male.
WHEREFORE, the Republic's petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio-Morales, Tinga, Velasco, Jr., and Brion,
JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
 syndrome. [Intersexuality
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersexual> (visited
August 15, 2008).]
Rollo, pp. 29-32. Penned by Judge Florenio P. Bueser.
1

22
Intersexuality<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersexua
2
Id. at 33-37.
l> (visited August 15, 2008).
3
Id. at 31-32. 23
Intersexuality<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersexua
l> visited August 15, 2008), citing Gagnon and Simon
4
Id. at 97.
1973.
5
Id. at 99. 24
Intersexuality
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersexual> (visited
6
Id. at 103.
August 15, 2008).
7
Id. at 104. 25
M.T. v. J.T. 140 N.J. Super 77 355 A. 2d 204.
8
Id. at 136. 26
The goal of treatment is to return hormone levels to
normal. This is done by taking a form of cortisol
9
Id. at 127.
(dexamethasone), fludrocortisone, or hydrocortisone)
every day. Additional doses of medicine are needed
10
Id. at 134.
during times of stress, such as severe illness or
surgery.
11
Id. at 136.
xxxx
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103695, March
12

15, 1996, 255 SCRA 99, 106.

Parents of children with congenital adrenal hyperplasia
should be aware of the side effects of steroid therapy.
Ceruila v. Delantar, G.R. No. 140305, December 9,
13
They should report signs of infection and stress to their
2005, 477 SCRA 134, 147.
health care provider because increases in medication
may be required. In additional, steroid medications
Republic v. Benemerito, G.R. No. 146963, March 15,
14
cannot be stopped suddenly, or adrenal
2004, 425 SCRA 488, 492.
insufficiency will result.
15
SEC. 6. Construction.- These Rules shall be liberally
xxxx
construed in order to promote their objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
The outcome is usually associated with good health,
every action and proceeding.
but short stature may result even with treatment.
Males have normal fertility. Females may have a
16
Art. 376. No person can change his name or surname
smaller opening of the vagina and lower fertility.
without judicial authority.
Medication to treat this disorder must be continued for
life. (Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia )
17
AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A 27
The word "incompetent" includes persons suffering
CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY
the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized
AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE
lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to
CIVIL REGISTRAR WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL
read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even
ORDER, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE ARTICLES 376
though they have lucid intervals, and persons not
AND 412 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease,
APPROVED, MARCH 22, 2001.
weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without
outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their
Silverio v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No.
18
property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit
174689, October 19, 2007, 537 SCRA 373, 388.
and exploitation. (See Sec. 2 of Rule 92 of the Rules of
Court)
19
Id. at 389.
28
Yu v. Republic of the Philippines, 123 Phil. 1106, 1110
20
Id. at 389.
(1966).
21
(1) 5-alpha reductase deficiency; (2) androgen
insensitivity syndrome; (3) aphallia; (4) clitoromegaly;
(5) congenital adrenal hyperplasia; (6) gonadal
dysgenesis (partial & complete); (7) hypospadias; (8) SECOND DIVISION
Kallmann syndrome; (9) Klinefelter syndrome; (10)
micropenis; (11) mosaicism involving sex G. R. No. 118387 - October 11, 2001
chromosomes; (12) MRKH (mullerian agenesis; vaginal
agenesis; congenital absence of vagina); (13) ovo-
testes (formerly called "true hermaphroditism"); (14) MARCELO LEE, ALBINA LEE-YOUNG, MARIANO
partial androgen insensitivity syndrome; (15) progestin LEE, PABLO LEE, HELEN LEE, CATALINO K. LEE,
induced virilization; (16) Swyer syndrome; (17) Turner
EUSEBIO LEE, EMMA LEE, and TIU
CHUAN, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS and HON.
LORENZO B. VENERACION and HON. JAIME T. HAMOY, in
their capacities as Presiding Judge of Branch 47,
Regional Trial Court of Manila and Branch 130, Regional
Trial Court of Kalookan City, respectively and RITA K.
LEE, LEONCIO LEE TEK SHENG in their personal
capacities and ROSA K. LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY K.
LEE-CHIN, LUCIA K. LEE TEK SHENG, JULIAN K. LEE,
HENRY K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE, VICTORIANO K. LEE,
NATIVIDAD K. LEE-MIGUEL, and THOMAS K. LEE,
represented by RITA K. LEE, Respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, with Prayer for
the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, seeks the reversal of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated October 28,
1994 in CA-G.R. SP NO. 317862 . The assailed decision
of the Court of Appeals upheld the Orders issued by
respondents Judges Hon. Lorenzo B. Veneracion3 and
Hon. Jaime T. Hamoy4 taking cognizance of two (2)
separate petitions filed by private respondents before
their respective salas for the cancellation and/or
correction of entries in the records of birth of
petitioners pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
This is a story of two (2) sets of children sired by one
and the same man but begotten of two (2) different
mothers. One set, the private respondents herein, are
the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his lawful wife, Keh
Shiok Cheng. The other set, the petitioners herein, are
allegedly children of Lee Tek Sheng and his concubine,
Tiu Chuan.
Rita K. Lee, Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng, Rosa K. Lee-
Vanderlek, Melody K. Lee-Chin, Lucia K. Lee Tek Sheng-
Ong, Julian K. Lee, Henry K. Lee, Martin K. Lee,
Victoriano K. Lee, Natividad K. Lee-Miguel and Thomas
K. Lee (hereinafter referred to as private respondents)
filed two (2) separate petitions for the cancellation
and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of
Marcelo Lee, Albina Lee-Young, Mariano Lee, Pablo Lee,
Helen Lee, Catalino K. Lee, Eusebio Lee, and Emma Lee
(hereinafter referred to as petitioners). On December 2,
1992, the petition against all petitioners, with the
exception of Emma Lee, was filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila and docketed as SP. PROC.
NO. 92-636925 and later assigned to Branch 47
presided over by respondent Judge Lorenzo B.
Veneracion. On February 3, 1993, a similar petition
against Emma Lee was filed before the RTC of Kalookan
and docketed as SP. PROC. NO. C-16746 and assigned
to the sala of respondent Judge Jaime T. Hamoy of
Branch 130.
Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false
and erroneous entries in all pertinent records of birth of
petitioners by deleting and/or canceling therein the
name of "Keh Shiok Cheng" as their mother, and by
substituting the same with the name "Tiu Chuan", who
is allegedly the petitioners' true birth mother.
The private respondents alleged in their petitions
before the trial courts that they are the legitimate
children of spouses Lee Tek Sheng and Keh Shiok
Cheng who were legally married in China sometime in
1931. Except for Rita K. Lee who was born and raised
in China, private respondents herein were all born and
raised in the Philippines.
Sometime in October, 1948, Lee Tek Sheng, facilitated
the arrival in the Philippines from China of a young girl
named Tiu Chuan. She was introduced by Lee Tek
Sheng to his family as their new housemaid but far
from becoming their housemaid, Tiu Chuan
immediately became Lee Tek Sheng's mistress. As a
result of their illicit relations, Tiu Chuan gave birth to
petitioners.
Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents,
every time Tiu Chuan gave birth to each of the
petitioners, their common father, Lee Tek Sheng,
falsified the entries in the records of birth of petitioners
by making it appear that petitioners' mother was Keh
Shiok Cheng.
Since the birth of petitioners, it was Tiu Chuan who
gave maternal care and guidance to the petitioners.
They all lived in the same compound Keh Shiok Cheng
and private respondents were residing in. All was well,
therefore, before private respondents' discovery of the
dishonesty and fraud perpetrated by their father, Lee
Tek Sheng.
The tides turned after Keh Shiok Cheng's demise on
May 9, 1989. Lee Tek Sheng insisted that the names of
all his children, including those of petitioners', be
included in the obituary notice of Keh Shiok Cheng's
death that was to be published in the newspapers. It
was this seemingly irrational act that piqued private
respondents' curiosity, if not suspicion.7
Acting on their suspicion, the private respondents
requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
conduct an investigation into the matter. After
investigation and verification of all pertinent records,
the NBI prepared a report that pointed out, among
others, the false entries in the records of birth of
petitioners, specifically the following.
1. As per Birth Certificate MARCELO LEE (Annex F-1),
their father, LEE TEK SHENG made it appear that he is
the 12th child of Mrs. KEH SHIOK CHENG, but upon
investigation, it was found out that her Hospital
Records, the mother who gave birth to MARCELO LEE
had given birth for the 1st time, as per diagnosis of the
attending physician, Dr. R. LIM, it was "GRAVIDA I, PARA
I" which means "first pregnancy, first live birth
delivery" (refer to: MASTER PATIENT'S RECORDS
SUMMARY Annex I). Also, the age of the mother when
she gave birth to MARCELO LEE as per record was only
17 years old, when in fact and in truth, KEH SHIOK
CHENG's age was then already 38 years old. The
address used by their father in the Master Patient
record was also the same as the Birth Certificate of
MARCELO LEE (2425 Rizal Avenue, Manila). The name
of MARCELO LEE was recorded under Hospital No.
221768, page 73.
2. As per Birth Certificate of ALBINA LEE (Annex F-2), it
was made to appear that ALBINA LEE was the third
child which is without any rationality, because the 3rd
child of KEH SHIOK CHENG is MELODY LEE TEK SHENG
(Annex E-2). Note also, that the age of the mother as
per Hospital Records jump (sic) from 17 to 22 years
old, but the only age gap of MARCELO LEE and ALBINA
LEE is only 2 years.
3. As per Birth Certificate of MARIANO LEE (Annex F-3),
it was made to appear that MARIANO LEE was the 5th
child, but the truth is, KEH SHIOK CHENG's 5th child is
LUCIA LEE TEK SHENG (Annex E-4). As per Hospital
Record, the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG was only 23
years old, while the actual age of KEH SHIOK CHENG,
was then already 40 years old.
4. As per Birth Certificate of PABLO LEE (Annex F-4), it
was made to appear that PABLO LEE was the 16th child
of KEH SHIOK CHENG which is impossible to be true,
considering the fact that KEH SHIOK CHENG have
stopped conceiving after her 11th child. Also as per
Hospital Record, the age of the mother was omitted in
the records. If PABLO LEE is the 16th child of KEH
SHIOK CHENG, it would only mean that she have (sic)
given birth to her first born child at the age of 8 to 9
years, which is impossible to be true.
Based on the birth record of MARIANO LEE in 1953, the
recorded age of KEH SHIOK CHENG was 23 years old.
Two years after PABLO LEE was born in 1955, the
difference is only 2 years, so it is impossible for PABLO
LEE to be the 16th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, as it will
only mean that she have (sic) given birth at that
impossible age.
5. As per Birth Certificate of HELEN LEE (Annex F-5), it
was made to appear that she is the 6th child of KEH
SHIOK CHENG, but as per Birth Certificate of JULIAN
LEE (Annex E-5), he is the true 6th child of KEH SHIOK
CHENG. Per Hospital Record, KEH SHIOK CHENG is only
28 years old, while KEH SHIOK CHENG'S true age at
that time was 45 years old.
6. EMMA LEE has no record in the hospital because, as
per complainant's allegation, she was born at their
house, and was later admitted at Chinese General
Hospital.
7. As per Birth Certificate of CATALINO LEE (Annex F-7),
it was made to appear that he is the 14th child of KEH
SHIOK CHENG, and that the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG
a.k.a. Mrs. LEE TEK SHENG, jumped from 28 years old
at the birth of HELEN LEE on 23 August 1957 to 38
years old at the birth of CATALINO LEE on 22 April
1959.
8. As per Birth Certificate of EUSEBIO LEE, the alleged
last son of KEH SHIOK CHENG, the age of the mother is
48 years old. However, as per Hospital Record, the age
of Mrs. LEE TEK SHENG, then was only 39 years old.
Considering the fact, that at the time of MARCELO's
birth on 11 May 1950. KEH SHIOK CHENG's age is 38
years old and at the time of EUSEBIO's birth, she is
already 48 years old, it is already impossible that she
could have given birth to 8 children in a span of only
10 years at her age. As per diagnosis, the alleged
mother registered on EUSEBIO's birth indicate that she
had undergone CEASARIAN SECTION, which Dr. RITA K.
LEE said is not true.
In view of the foregoing facts, the NBI concluded that:
10. In conclusion, as per Chinese General Hospital
Patients Records, it is very obvious that the mother of
these 8 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but
a much younger woman, most probably TIU CHUAN.
Upon further evaluation and analysis by these Agents,
LEE TEK SHENG, is in a quandary in fixing the age of
KEH SHIOK CHENG possibly to conform with his grand
design of making his 8 children as their own legitimate
children, consequently elevating the status of his 2nd
family and secure their future. The doctor lamented
that this complaint would not have been necessary had
not the father and his 2nd family kept on insisting that
the 8 children are the legitimate children of KEH SHIOK
CHENG.8
It was this report that prompted private respondents to
file the petitions for cancellation and/or correction of
entries in petitioners' records of birth with the lower
courts.
The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both petitions
SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692 and SP. PROC. NO. C-1674 on
the grounds that: (1) resort to Rule 108 is improper
where the ultimate objective is to assail the legitimacy
and filiation of petitioners; (2) the petition, which is
essentially an action to impugn legitimacy was filed
prematurely; and (3) the action to impugn has already
prescribed.9
On February 12, 1993, respondent Judge Veneracion
denied the motion to dismiss SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692
for failure of the herein petitioners (defendants in the
lower court) to appear at the hearing of the said
motion.10 Then on February 17, 1993, Judge Veneracion
issued an Order, the pertinent portion of which, reads
as follows:
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and
substance, the same is hereby given due course. Let
this petition be set for hearing on March 29, 1993 at
8:30 in the morning before this Court located at the 5th
Floor of the City Hall of Manila.
Notice is hereby given that anyone who has any
objection to the petition should file on or before the
date of hearing his opposition thereto with a statement
of the grounds therefor.
Let a copy of this Order be published, at the expense of
the petitioners, once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines.
Let copies of the verified petition with its annexes and
of this Order be served upon the Office of the Solicitor
General, and the respondents, and be posted on the
Bulletin Board of this Court, also at the expense of the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.11
On the other hand, respondent Judge Hamoy issued an
Order dated April 15, 1993 taking cognizance of SP.
PROC. No. C-1674, to wit:
It appearing from the documentary evidence presented
and marked by the petitioners that the Order of the
Court setting the case for hearing was published in
"Media Update" once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks, that is on February 20, 27, and March 6, 1993
as evidenced by the Affidavit of Publication and the
clippings attached to the affidavit, and by the copies of
the "Media Update" published on the aforementioned
dates; further, copy of the order setting the case for
hearing together with copy of the petition had been
served upon the Solicitor General, City Prosecutor of
Kalookan City, Civil Registrar of Kalookan City and the
private respondents, the Court holds that the
petitioners have complied with the jurisdictional
requirements for the Court to take cognizance of this
case.
xxx - xxx - xxx
SO ORDERED. 12
Petitioners' attempts at seeking a reconsideration of
the above-mentioned orders of Judge Veneracion and
Judge Hamoy failed, hence their recourse to the Court
of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
with Application for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Petitioners averred that respondents judges had acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders
allowing the petitions for the cancellation and/or
correction of entries in petitioners' records of birth to
prosper in the lower courts.
In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the
petitioners raised the following arguments: (1) Rule
108 is inappropriate for impugning the legitimacy and
filiation of children; (2) Respondents judges are
sanctioning a collateral attack against the filiation and
legitimacy of children; (3) Respondents judges are
allowing private respondents to impugn the legitimacy
and filiation of their siblings despite the fact that their
undisputed common father is still alive; (4)
Respondents judges are entertaining petitions which
are already time-barred; and (5) The petitions below
are part of a forum-shopping spree.13
Finding no merit in petitioners' arguments, the Court of
Appeals dismissed their petition in a Decision dated
October 28, 1994.14 Petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration of the said decision was also denied by
the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated December
19, 1994.15
Hence, this petition.
1. Petitioners contend that resort to Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court is improper since private
respondents seek to have the entry for the name of
petitioners' mother changed from "Keh Shiok Cheng" to
"Tiu Chuan" who is a completely different person. What
private respondents therefore seek is not merely a
correction in name but a declaration that petitioners
were not born of Lee Tek Sheng's legitimate wife, Keh
Shiok Cheng, but of his mistress, Tiu Chuan, in effect a
"bastardization of petitioners."16 Petitioners thus label
private respondents' suits before the lower courts as a
collateral attack against their legitimacy in the guise of
a Rule 108 proceeding.
Debunking petitioners' above contention, the Court of
Appeals observed:
xxx - xxx - xxx
As correctly pointed out by the private respondents in
their comment . . . , the proceedings are simply aimed
at establishing a particular fact, status and/or right.
Stated differently, the thrust of said proceedings was to
establish the factual truth regarding the occurrence of
certain events which created or affected the status of
persons and/or otherwise deprived said persons of
rights.17
xxx - xxx - xxx
It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such
as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court to establish the status or right of a
party, or a particular fact.18 The petitions filed by
private respondents for the correction of entries in the
petitioners' records of birth were intended to establish
that for physical and/or biological reasons it was
impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and
given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth
records. Contrary to petitioners' contention that the
petitions before the lower courts were actually actions
to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to
declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh
Shiok Cheng, but to establish that the former are not
the latter's children. There is nothing to impugn as
there is no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok
Cheng and petitioners.19
Further sanctioning private respondents' resort to Rule
108, the Court of Appeals adverted to our ruling in the
leading case of Republic vs. Valencia20 where we
affirmed the decision of Branch XI of the then Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Cebu City ordering the correction
in the nationality and civil status of petitioner's minor
children as stated in their records of birth from
"Chinese" to "Filipino", and "legitimate" to
"illegitimate", respectively. Although recognizing that
the changes or corrections sought to be effected are
not mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous
nature, this Court, sitting en banc, held therein that
even substantial errors in a civil register may be
corrected and the true facts established provided the
parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of
the appropriate adversary proceeding.21 In the said
case, we also laid down the rule that a proceeding for
correction and/or cancellation of entries in the civil
register under Rule 108 ceases to be summary in
nature and takes on the characteristics of an
appropriate adversary proceeding when all the
procedural requirements under Rule 108 are complied
with. Thus we held:
"Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings
where all relevant facts have been fully and properly
developed, where opposing counsel have been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and
where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered, the suit or proceeding is 'appropriate.'
The pertinent sections of rule 108 provide:
'SECTION 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of
an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar
and all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.'
'SECTION 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of
the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time
and place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once in a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.'
'SECTION 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any
person having or claiming any interest under the entry
whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the
last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto.'
"Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a
proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of
an entry in the civil register are (1) the civil registrar,
and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the
petition, it becomes the duty of the court to (1) issue
an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of
the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
The following are likewise entitled to oppose the
petition: (1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person
having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought.
"If all these procedural requirements have been
followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of
entries in the record of birth even if filed and
conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court can no longer be described as "summary". There
can be no doubt that when an opposition to the
petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any
person having or claiming any interest in the entries
sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and the
opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings
thereon become adversary proceedings."22 (Emphasis
supplied.)
To the mind of the Court of Appeals, the proceedings
taken in both petitions for cancellation and/or
correction of entries in the records of birth of
petitioners in the lower courts are appropriate
adversary proceedings.
We agree. As correctly observed by the Court of
Appeals:
In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or
correction of entries of birth was filed by private
respondents and pursuant to the order of the RTC-
Manila, dated February 17, 1993, a copy of the order
setting the case for hearing was ordered published
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. In
the RTC-Kalookan, there was an actual publication of
the order setting the case for hearing in "Media
Update" once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks.
In both cases notices of the orders were ordered served
upon the Solicitor General, the Civil Registrars of
Manila and Kalookan and upon the petitioners herein.
Both orders set the case for hearing and directed the
Civil Registrars and the other respondents in the case
below to file their oppositions to the said petitions. A
motion to dismiss was consequently filed by herein
petitioners Marcelo, Mariano, Pablo, Helen, Catalino
and Eusebio, all surnamed Lee, and Albina Lee-Young in
the RTC-Manila, and an opposition was filed by Emma
Lee in the RTC-Kalookan.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the petitions
filed by the private respondents in the courts below by
way of a special proceeding cancellation and/or
correction of entries in the civil registers with the
requisite parties, notices and publications could very
well be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate
action.23(Emphasis supplied.)
The petitioners assert, however, that making the
proceedings adversarial does not give trial courts the
license to go beyond the ambit of Rule 108 which is
limited to those corrections contemplated by Article
412 of the New Civil Code or mere clerical errors of a
harmless or innocuous nature.24 The petitioners point
to the case of Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic,25 which is of a
later date than Republic vs. Valencia,26 where this
Court reverted to the doctrine laid down in earlier
cases,27 starting with Ty Kong Tin vs.
Republic,28 prohibiting the extension of the application
of Rule 108 beyond innocuous or harmless changes or
corrections. Petitioners contend that as held in Go, et
al. vs. Civil Registrar,29 allowing substantial changes
under Rule 108 would render the said rule
unconstitutional as the same would have the effect of
increasing or modifying substantive rights.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that in the cited
case of Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic,30 the reason we
declared null and void the portion of the lower court's
order directing the change of Labayo-Rowe's civil
status and the filiation of one of her children as
appearing in the latter's record of birth, is not because
Rule 108 was inappropriate to effect such changes, but
because Labayo-Rowe's petition before the lower court
failed to implead all indispensable parties to the case.
We explained in this wise:
"x x x An appropriate proceeding is required wherein all
the indispensable parties should be made parties to
the case as required under Section 3, Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
"In the case before Us, since only the Office of the
Solicitor General was notified through the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal, representing the Republic of the
Philippines as the only respondent, the proceedings
taken, which is summary in nature, is short of what is
required in cases where substantial alterations are
sought. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General,
all other indispensable parties should have been made
respondents. They include not only the declared father
of the child but the child as well, together with the
paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights
would be adversely affected thereby. All other persons
who may be affected by the change should be notified
or represented x x x.
xxx - xxx - xxx
"The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her
parents would be substantially impaired if her status
would be changed from 'legitimate' to 'illegitimate'.
Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation and
embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an
illegitimate filiation that she will bear thereafter. The
fact that the notice of hearing of the petition was
published in a newspaper of general circulation and
notice thereof was served upon the State will not
change the nature of the proceedings taken. Rule 108,
like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was
promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its
rule-making authority under Section 13, Article VIII of
the 1973 Constitution, which directs that such rules
'shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights.' If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond
innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors
which are visible to the eye or obvious to the
understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and
controversial alterations concerning citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of
marriage, without observing the proper proceedings as
earlier mentioned, said rule would thereby become an
unconstitutional exercise which would tend to increase
or modify substantive rights. This situation is not
contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil
Code."31 (italics supplied).
Far from petitioners' theory, this Court's ruling in
Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic32 does not exclude recourse
to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to effect
substantial changes or corrections in entries of the civil
register. The only requisite is that the proceedings
under Rule 108 be an appropriate adversary
proceeding as contra-distinguished from a summary
proceeding. Thus:
"If the purpose of the petition [for cancellation and/or
correction of entries in the civil register] is merely to
correct the clerical errors which are visible to the eye
or obvious to the understanding, the court may, under
a summary procedure, issue an order for the correction
of a mistake. However, as repeatedly construed,
changes which may affect the civil status from
legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial
and controversial alterations which can only be allowed
after appropriate adversary proceedings depending
upon the nature of the issues involved. Changes which
affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are
substantial in character and should be threshed out in
a proper action depending upon the nature of the
issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who
may be affected by the entries are notified or
represented and evidence is submitted to prove the
allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary
admitted x x x."33 (Emphasis supplied.)
It is true that in special proceedings formal pleadings
and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy
granted upon mere application or motion. But this is
not always the case, as when the statute expressly
provides.34 Hence, a special proceeding is not always
summary. One only has to take a look at the procedure
outlined in Rule 108 to see that what is contemplated
therein is not a summary proceeding per se. Rule 108
requires publication of the petition three (3) times, i.e.,
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks (Sec.4).
The Rule also requires inclusion as parties of all
persons who claim any interest which would be
affected by the cancellation or correction (Sec. 3). The
civil registrar and any person in interest are also
required to file their opposition, if any, within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last
date of publication of such notice (Sec. 5). Last, but not
the least, although the court may make orders
expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the
court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order
granting the same (Sec. 7).
Thus, we find no reason to depart from our ruling
in Republic vs. Valencia,35 that Rule 108, when all the
procedural requirements thereunder are followed, is
the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect
substantial corrections and changes in entries of the
civil register.
It must be conceded, however, that even
after Republic vs. Valencia36 there continues to be a
seesawing of opinion on the issue of whether or not
substantial corrections in entries of the civil register
may be effected by means of Rule 108 in relation to
Article 412 of the New Civil Code. The more recent
cases of Leonor vs. Court of Appeals37 and Republic vs.
Labrador38 do seem to signal a reversion to the Ty Kong
Tin ruling which delimited the scope of application of
Article 412 to clerical or typographical errors in entries
of the civil register.
In Republic vs. Labrador, the Court held that Rule 108
cannot be used to modify, alter or increase substantive
rights, such as those involving the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child. We ruled thus:
"This issue has been resolved in Leonor vs. Court of
Appeals. In that case, Respondent Mauricio Leonor filed
a petition before the trial court seeking the cancellation
of the registration of his marriage to Petitioner Virginia
Leonor. He alleged, among others, the nullity of their
legal vows arising from the "non-observance of the
legal requirements for a valid marriage." In debunking
the trial court's ruling granting such petition, the Court
held as follows:
'On its face, the Rule would appear to authorize the
cancellation of any entry regarding "marriages" in the
civil registry for any reason by the mere filing of a
verified petition for the purpose. However, it is not as
simple as it looks. Doctrinally, the only errors that can
be canceled or corrected under this Rule are
typographical or clerical errors, not material or
substantial ones like the validity or nullity of a
marriage. A clerical error is one which is visible to the
eyes or obvious to the understanding; error made by a
clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing
(Black vs. Republic, L-10869, Nov. 28, 1958); or some
harmless and innocuous change such as a correction of
name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of
the occupation of the parent (Ansalada vs. Republic, L-
10226, Feb. 14, 1958).'
'Where the effect of a correction in a civil registry will
change the civil status of petitioner and her children
from legitimate to illegitimate, the same cannot be
granted except only in an adversarial x x x .'
'Clearly and unequivocally, the summary procedure
under Rule 108, and for that matter under Article 412
of the Civil Code cannot be used by Mauricio to change
his and Virginia's civil status from married to single
and of their three children from legitimate to
illegitimate x x x '
"Thus, where the effect of a correction of an entry in a
civil registry will change the status of a person from
"legitimate to "illegitimate," as in Sarah Zita's case, the
same cannot be granted in summary proceedings."39
It is, therefore, high time that we put an end to the
confusion sown by pronouncements seemingly in
conflict with each other, and perhaps, in the process,
stem the continuing influx of cases raising the same
substantial issue.
The basis for the pronouncement that extending the
scope of Rule 108 to substantial corrections is
unconstitutional is embodied in the early case of Ty
Kong Tin vs. Republic40 that first delineated the extent
or scope of the matters that may be changed or
corrected pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code.
The Supreme Court ruled in this case that:
"x x x After a mature deliberation, the opinion was
reached that what was contemplated therein are mere
corrections of mistakes that are clerical in nature and
not those that may affect the civil status or the
nationality or citizenship of the persons involved. If the
purpose of the petition is merely a clerical error then
the court may issue an order in order that the error or
mistake may be corrected. If it refers to a substantial
change, which affects the status or citizenship of a
party, the matter should be threshed out in a proper
action depending upon the nature of the issue
involved. Such action can be found at random in our
substantive and remedial laws the implementation of
which will naturally depend upon the factors and
circumstances that might arise affecting the interested
parties. This opinion is predicated upon the theory that
the procedure contemplated in article 412 is summary
in nature which cannot cover cases involving
controversial issues."41
This doctrine was taken a step further in the case
of Chua Wee, et al. vs. Republic42 where the Court said
that:
"From the time the New Civil Code took effect on
August 30, 1950 until the promulgation of the Revised
Rules of Court on January 1, 1964, there was no law nor
rule of court prescribing the procedure to secure
judicial authorization to effect the desired innocuous
rectifications or alterations in the civil register pursuant
to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court now provides for such a
procedure which should be limited solely to the
implementation of Article 412, the substantive law on
the matter of correcting entries in the civil
register. Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the
Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court
pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13
of Art. VIII of the Constitution, which directs that such
rules of court 'shall not diminish or increase or modify
substantive rights.' If Rule 108 were to be extended
beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections
of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the
understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and
controversial alterations concerning citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of
marriage, said Rule 108 would thereby become
unconstitutional for it would be increasing or modifying
substantive rights, which changes are not authorized
under Article 412 of the New Civil Code."43 (Italics
supplied).
We venture to say now that the above pronouncements
proceed from a wrong premise, that is, the
interpretation that Article 412 pertains only to clerical
errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, effectively
excluding from its domain, and the scope of its
implementing rule, substantial changes that may affect
nationality, status, filiation and the like. Why the
limited scope of Article 412? Unfortunately, Ty Kong
Tin does not satisfactorily answer this question except
to opine that the procedure contemplated in Article
412 is summary in nature and cannot, therefore, cover
cases involving controversial issues. Subsequent cases
have merely echoed the Ty Kong Tin doctrine without,
however, shedding light on the matter.
The flaw in Ty Kong Tin lies in its theory that Article 412
contemplates a summary procedure.
First of all, Article 412 is a substantive law that
provides as follows:
"No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected, without a judicial order."
It does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be
followed except to say that the corrections or changes
must be effected by judicial order. As such, it cannot be
gleaned therefrom that the procedure contemplated for
obtaining such judicial order is summary in nature.
Secondly, it is important to note that Article 412 uses
both the terms "corrected" and "changed". In its
ordinary sense, to correct means to make or set right";
"to remove the faults or errors from"44 while to change
means "to replace something with something else of
the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute".45 The provision neither qualifies as to the
kind of entry to be changed or corrected nor does it
distinguish on the basis of the effect that the correction
or change may have. Hence, it is proper to conclude
that all entries in the civil register may be changed or
corrected under Article 412. What are the entries in the
civil register? We need not go further than Articles 407
and 408 of the same title to find the answer.
"Art. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning
the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil
register."
"Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil
register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal
separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship;
(13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of
filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and
(16) changes of name."
It is beyond doubt that the specific matters covered by
the preceding provisions include not only status but
also nationality. Therefore, the Ty Kong Tin
pronouncement that Article 412 does not contemplate
matters that may affect civil status, nationality or
citizenship is erroneous. This interpretation has the
effect of isolating Article 412 from the rest of the
articles in Title XVI, Book I of the New Civil Code, in
clear contravention of the rule of statutory construction
that a statute must always be construed as a whole
such that the particular meaning to be attached to any
word or phrase is ascertained from the context and the
nature of the subject treated.46
Thirdly, Republic Act No. 904847 which was passed by
Congress on February 8, 2001 substantially amended
Article 412 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
"SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or
Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed
or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical
or typographical errors and change of first name or
nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general in accordance with the provisions of this Act
and its implementing rules and regulations."
The above law speaks clearly. Clerical or typographical
errors in entries of the civil register are now to be
corrected and changed without need of a judicial order
and by the city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general. The obvious effect is to remove from the
ambit of Rule 108 the correction or changing of such
errors in entries of the civil register. Hence, what is left
for the scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial
changes and corrections in entries of the civil register.
This is precisely the opposite of what Ty Kong Tin and
other cases of its genre had said, perhaps another
indication that it was not sound doctrine after all.
It may be very well said that Republic Act No. 9048 is
Congress' response to the confusion wrought by the
failure to delineate as to what exactly is that so-
called summary procedure for changes or corrections
of a harmless or innocuous nature as distinguished
from that appropriate adversary proceeding for
changes or corrections of a substantial kind. For we
must admit that though we have constantly referred to
an appropriate adversary proceeding, we have failed to
categorically state just what that procedure is. Republic
Act No. 9048 now embodies that summary procedure
while Rule 108 is that appropriate adversary
proceeding. Be that as it may, the case at bar cannot
be decided on the basis of Republic Act No. 9048 which
has prospective application. Hence, the necessity for
the preceding treatise.
II. The petitioners contend that the private respondents
have no cause of action to bring the cases below as
Article 171 of the Family Code allows the heirs of the
father to bring an action to impugn the legitimacy of
his children only after his death.48
Article 171 provides:
"The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of
the child within the period prescribed in the preceding
article only in the following cases:
"(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of
the period fixed for bringing this action;
"(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint,
without having desisted therefrom; or
"(3) If the child was born after the death of the
husband."
Petitioner's contention is without merit.
In the recent case of Babiera vs. Catotal,49 we upheld
the decision of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the
judgment of the RTC of Lanao del Norte declaring the
birth certificate of one Teofista Guinto as null and void
ab initio, and ordering the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan
City to cancel the same from the Registry of Live
Births. We ruled therein that private respondent
Presentacion Catotal, child of spouses Eugenio Babiera
and Hermogena Cariosa, had the requisite standing to
initiate an action to cancel the entry of birth of Teofista
Babiera, another alleged child of the same spouses
because she is the one who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.50
We likewise held therein that:
"x x x Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable
to the present case. A close reading of the provision
shows that it applies to instances in which the father
impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The
provision, however, presupposes that the child was the
undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case
alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to
petitioner. In other words, the prayer therein is not to
declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of
Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the
latter's child at all x x x. ''51
Similarly, we ruled in Benitez-Badua vs. Court of
Appeals52 that:
"Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles
164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code to the case
at bench cannot be sustained. x x x.
xxx - xxx - xxx
"A careful reading of the above articles will show that
they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant
case, where a child is alleged not be the child of nature
or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these
articles govern a situation where a husband (or his
heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under
Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the
legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically
impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his
wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for
biological or other scientific reasons, the child could
not have been his child; (3) that in case of children
conceived through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification by either parent was
obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation
or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this
reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within
which the husband or any of his heirs should file the
action impugning the legitimacy of said child.
Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it
refused to apply these articles to the case at bench.
For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the
late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his
child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that
petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our
ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned
decision is apropos, viz:
'Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil
Code [now Art. 170 of the Family Code] is not well
taken. This legal provision refers to an action to
impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case
because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy
of a child, but an action of the private respondents to
claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless
deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner
Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the
deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at
all. Being neither legally adopted child, nor an
acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction
of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the
deceased. "'53
III. Petitioners claim that private respondents' cause of
action had already prescribed as more than five (5)
years had lapsed between the registration of the latest
birth among the petitioners in 1960 and the filing of
the actions in December of 1992 and February of
1993.54
We disagree. As correctly pointed out by the Court of
Appeals, inasmuch as no law or rule specifically
prescribes a fixed time for filing the special proceeding
under Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the New
Civil Code, it is the following provision of the New Civil
Code that applies:
"Art. 1149. other actions whose periods are not fixed in
this Code or in other laws must be brought within five
years from the time the right of action accrues."
The right of action accrues when there exists a cause
of action, which consists of three (3) elements, namely:
a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means
and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an
obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such
right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff. It is only
when the last element occurs or takes place that it can
be said in law that a cause of action has arisen. 55
It is indubitable that private respondents have a cause
of action. The last element of their cause of action, that
is, the act of their father in falsifying the entries in
petitioners' birth records, occurred more than thirty
(30) years ago. Strictly speaking, it was upon this
occurrence that private respondents' right of action or
right to sue accrued. However, we must take into
account the fact that it was only sometime in 1989 that
private respondents discovered that they in fact had a
cause of action against petitioners who continue to use
said falsified birth records.
Hence, it would result in manifest injustice if we were
to deprive private respondents of their right to
establish the truth about a fact, in this case,
petitioners' true mother, and their real status, simply
because they had discovered the dishonesty
perpetrated upon them by their common father at a
much later date. This is especially true in the case of
private respondents who, as their father's legitimate
children, did not have any reason to suspect that he
would commit such deception against them and
deprive them of their sole right to inherit from their
mother's (Keh Shiok Cheng's) estate. It was only
sometime in 1989 that private respondents' suspicions
were aroused and confirmed. From that time until 1992
and 1993, less than five (5) years had lapsed.
Petitioners would have us reckon the five-year
prescriptive period from the date of the registration of
the last birth among the petitioners-siblings in 1960,
and not from the date private respondents had
discovered the false entries in petitioners' birth records
in 1989. Petitioners base their position on the fact that
birth records are public documents, hence, the period
of prescription for the right of action available to the
private respondents started to run from the time of the
registration of their birth certificates in the Civil
Registry.
We cannot agree with petitioners' thinking on that
point.
It is true that the books making up the Civil Register
and all documents relating thereto are public
documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the
facts therein contained.56 Petitioners liken their birth
records to land titles, public documents that serve as
notice to the whole world. Unfortunately for the
petitioners, this analogy does not hold water. Unlike a
title to a parcel of land, a person's parentage cannot be
acquired by prescription. One is either born of a
particular mother or not. It is that simple.
IV. Finally, petitioners accuse private respondents of
forum shopping. They enumerate the other actions
filed by private respondents against them prior to the
filing of their Rule 108 petitions in the lower courts, as
follows:
(1) A criminal complaint for falsification of entries in
the birth certificates filed against their father as
principal and against defendants as alleged
accessories;
(2) A petition for the cancellation of the naturalization
certificate of their father, Lee Tek Sheng; and
(3) A petition for partition of Keh Shiok Cheng's
estate.57
According to the petitioners, all the three (3) actions
above-mentioned, as well as the Rule 108 petitions,
subject of the case before us, raise the common issue
of whether petitioners are the natural children of Keh
Shiok Cheng or Tiu Chuan. They contend that in all
these cases, the judge or hearing officer would have to
resolve this issue in order to determine whether or not
to grant the relief prayed for.58
Forum shopping is present when in the two or more
cases pending there is identity of parties, rights or
causes of action and reliefs sought.59 Even a cursory
examination of the pleadings filed by private
respondents in their various cases against petitioners
would reveal that at the very least there is no identity
of rights or causes of action and reliefs prayed for. The
present case has its roots in two (2) petitions filed
under Rule 108, the purpose of which is to correct
and/or cancel certain entries in petitioners' birth
records. Suffice it to state, the cause of action in these
Rule 108 petitions and the relief sought therefrom are
very different from those in the criminal complaint
against petitioners and their father which has for its
cause of action, the commission of a crime as defined
and penalized under the Revised Penal Code, and
which seeks the punishment of the accused; or the
action for the cancellation of Lee Tek Sheng
naturalization certificate which has for its cause of
action the commission by Lee Tek Sheng of an immoral
act, and his ultimate deportation for its object; or for
that matter, the action for partition of Keh Shiok
Cheng's estate which has for its cause of action the
private respondents' right under the New Civil Code to
inherit from their mother's estate.
We therefore concur in the finding of the Court of
Appeals that there is no forum shopping to speak of in
the concept that this is described and contemplated in
Circular No. 28-91 of the Supreme Court. HCISED
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated October
28, 1994 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.