Section 7.
The right of the people to information on governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in
matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.
VALMONTE v. BELMONTE
F: 1986, Atty. Valmonte invoked Section 7 of the Bill of Rights
in a letter to GSIS general manager, Hon. Belmonte
requesting access to the list of the names of the Batasang
Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-
Laban who secured loans immediately before the February 7
election guaranteed by then First Lady Imelda Marcos. GSIS
Deputy General Counsel Tiro replied that the transactions
must remain private between GSIS and their clients for it
would compromise GSIS reputation. Not receiving the
alleged reply, Valmonte joined other petitioners and filed an
action. Respondents sought the dismissal of the case by saying
that petitioners did not exhaust all administrative remedies
before going to court. However, the petitioners submitted a
question on law: whether or not they have the right to such
information, and that If mandamus can compel GSIS to
release such pertinent information if affirmed.
I: 1. W/N petitioners have locus standi
2. W/N the information falls within those excluded by law
3. W/N GSIS as a government corporation hold information
outside the coverage of peoples rights to public records
H: 1. YES. The public nature of the loanable funds of the
GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make
the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and
concern.
-An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in
political, moral and artistic thought and data relative to them,
and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon,
is vital to the democratic government envisioned under our
Constitution. The cornerstone of this republican system of
government is delegation of power by the people to the State.
In this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate
within the limits of the authority conferred by the people.
Denied access to information on the inner workings of
government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and
caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The
postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in
the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from
abuse of governmental power, would certainly be mere empty
words if access to such information of public concern is denied,
except under limitations prescribed by implementing
legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.
- The right to information is an essential premise of a
meaningful right to speech and expression. But this is not to
say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and
therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the
freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to
information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies
of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is
meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in
government.
-The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government
and its employees and the administrator of various insurance
programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds
assume a public character. Moreover, the supposed borrowers
were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who
themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were
therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS
performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that
all its transactions were above board.
2. ON POLICY OF CONFIDENTIALITY: NO.
-Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the
privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of
this petition. His position is apparently based merely on
considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy
issues.
-From Morfe v. Mutuc: "The concept of limited government
has always included the idea that governmental powers stop
short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.
This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute
and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the
individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the
absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government
safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual,
firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state
can control.
-When the information requested from the government
intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a potential conflict
between the rights to information and to privacy may arise.
However, the competing interests of these rights need not be
resolved in this case. Apparent from the above-quoted
statement of the Court in Morfe is that the right to privacy
belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to
public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover,
the right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS.
As held in the case of Vassar College v. Loose Wills Biscuit
Co.: a corporation has no right of privacy in its name since the
entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings
and sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no
such ground for relief.
- It may be observed, however, that in the instant case, the
concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they
choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public
offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to
have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the
interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures,
most especially those holding responsible positions in
government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as
compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject
to closer public scrutiny.
3. NO. The Court said that the government, WHETHER
CARRYING OUT ITS SOVEREIGN ATTRIBUTES OR
RUNNING SOME BUSINESS, DISCHARGES THE
SAME FUNCTION OF SERVICE TO THE PEOPLE.
-Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was
exercising a proprietary function would not justify the
exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope of
the right to information.
- ALTHOUGH CITIZENS ARE AFFORDED THE
RIGHT TO INFORMATION AND, PURSUANT
THERETO, ARE ENTITLED TO "ACCESS TO
OFFICIAL RECORDS," THE CONSTITUTION DOES
NOT ACCORD THEM A RIGHT TO COMPEL
CUSTODIANS OF OFFICIAL RECORDS TO PREPARE
LISTS, ABSTRACTS, SUMMARIES AND THE LIKE IN
THEIR DESIRE TO ACQUIRE INFORMATION OR
MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN. (in short, hindi sila
yaya ng sambayanan)
-Petition granted.
CHAVEZ v. PCGG
F: Francisco Chavezhero, tax payer, and former government
officialinstigated the action against the Marcoses after news
reports exposed (1) the alleged billions of dollars of Marcos
assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and
(2) the alleged execution of a compromise, between the
government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to
split or share these assets.
-Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information 3
and the correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its
transactions involving the national interest, demands that
respondents make public any and all negotiations and
agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the
Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth.
-Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a
compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs. They claim,
though, that petitioner's action is premature, because there is
no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the
negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG
may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the
proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not
become effective and binding.
-Then Pres. Fidel Ramos, in his memorandum sent to PCGG
Chairman, said he has not authorized said Chairman to
approve the Compromise Agreement between PCGG and the
Marcoses.
-This petition is not confined to the Agreements that have
already been drawn, but likewise to any other ongoing or
future undertaking towards any settlement on the alleged
Marcos loot. Ineluctably, the core issue boils down to the
precise interpretation, in terms of scope, of the twin
constitutional provisions on "public transactions."
I: 1. W/N petitioner has locus standi
2. W/N the Court has jurisdiction
3. W/N the terms of an agreement-perfected or not- can be
publicly disclosed pursuant to the freedom of information.
4. W/N PCGG should have a compromise agreement with
the Marcoses
H: 1. YES. The mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the
requirement of personal interest, when the proceeding involves
the assertion of a public right, such as in this case where public
funds are at the center of controversy. In any event, the
question on the standing of Petitioner Chavez is rendered
moot by the intervention of the Jopsons, who are among the
legitimate claimants to the Marcos wealth. The standing of the
Jopsons is not seriously contested by the solicitor general.
Indeed, said petitioners-intervenors have a legal interest in the
subject matter of the instant case, since a distribution or
disposition of the Marcoses' ill-gotten properties may adversely
affect the satisfaction of their claims.
2. YES. Respondents aver that Petitioners should have filed
the case with the Sandiganbayan. However, this was not a
question of fact but a question of law: whether stipulations of
agreements by government entities should be disclosed.
3. YES.
-Respondents contend that because there has been no
approval from the president, no perfection of the agreement,
right of action is still wanting. That the provisions of the
constitution refer to COMPLETED and OPERATIVE
official acts.
-The "information" and the "transactions" referred to in the
subject provisions of the Constitution have as yet no defined
scope and extent. There are no specific laws prescribing the
exact limitations within which the right may be exercised or
the correlative state duty may be obliged. However, the
following are some of the recognized restrictions:
(1) national security matters and intelligence information,
(2) trade secrets and banking transactions,
(3) criminal matters, and
(4) other confidential information.
- The Ethical Standards Act further prohibits public officials
and employees from using or divulging "confidential or
classified information officially known to them by reason of
their office and not made available to the public."
Other acknowledged limitations to information access include
diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and
executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the
internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.
-LEGASPI v. CSC: "In determining whether or not a
particular information is of public concern there is no
rigid test which can be applied. 'Public concern' like
'public interest' is a term that eludes exact definition.
Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which
the public may want to know, either because these
directly affect their lives, or simply because such
matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary
citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to
determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at
issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or
affects the public."
- With such pronouncements of our government, whose
authority emanates from the people, there is no doubt that the
recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter
of public concern and imbued with public interest. 42 We may
also add that "ill-gotten wealth," by its very nature,
assumes a public character. Based on the aforementioned
Executive Orders, "ill-gotten wealth" refers to assets and
properties purportedly acquired, directly or indirectly, by
former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and
close associates through or as a result of their improper or
illegal use of government funds or properties; or their having
taken undue advantage of their public office; or their use of
powers, influences or relationships, "resulting in their unjust
enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines." Clearly,
the assets and properties referred to supposedly originated
from the government itself. To all intents and purposes,
therefore, they belong to the people. As such, upon
reconveyance they will be returned to the public treasury,
subject only to the satisfaction of positive claims of certain
persons as may be adjudged by competent courts. Another
declared overriding consideration for the expeditious recovery
of ill-gotten wealth is that it may be used for national
economic recovery.
-Mr. OPLE (during constitutional deliberations): The
'transactions' used here, I suppose, is generic and, therefore, it
can cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a
consummated contract, Mr. Presiding. Officer.
-Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we
believe that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as
well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient
public information on any proposed settlement they have
decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of
ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to
definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to
intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or
communications 44 during the stage when common assertions
are still in the process of being formulated or are in the
"exploratory" stage. There is a need, of course, to observe the
same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as
discussed earlier such as on matters involving national
security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other
classified information.
4. Petitioner lastly contends that any compromise agreement
between the government and the Marcoses will be a virtual
condonation of all the alleged wrongs done by them, as well as
an unwarranted permission to commit graft and corruption.
- One of the consequences of a compromise, and usually its
primary object, is to avoid or to end a litigation.
- The Court held that in the absence of an express prohibition,
the rule on compromises in civil actions under the Civil Code
is applicable to PCGG cases. Such principle is pursuant to the
objectives of EO No. 14, particularly the just and expeditious
recovery of ill-gotten wealth, so that it may be used to hasten
economic recovery.
-However, any compromise relating to the civil liability arising
from an offense does not automatically terminate the criminal
proceeding against or extinguish the criminal liability of the
malefactor.
-PROVISIONS THAT ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
-Under Item No. 2 of the General Agreement, the PCGG
commits to exempt from all forms of taxes the properties to
be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of
the Constitution. The power to tax and to grant tax
exemptions is vested in the Congress and, to a certain
extent, in the local legislative bodies.
-The government binds itself to cause the dismissal of all
cases against the Marcos heirs, pending before the
Sandiganbayan and other courts. 63 This is a direct
encroachment on judicial powers, particularly in regard to
criminal jurisdiction. Well-settled is the doctrine that once a
case has been filed before a court of competent jurisdiction,
the matter of its dismissal or pursuance lies within the full
discretion and control of the judge.
-The government also waives all claims and counterclaims,
"whether past, present, or future, matured or inchoate,"
against the Marcoses. 67 Again, this all-encompassing
stipulation is contrary to law. Under the Civil Code, an
action for future fraud may not be waived.
-The Agreements do not provide for a definite or
determinable period within which the parties shall fulfill
their respective prestations. It may take a lifetime before the
Marcoses submit an inventory of their total assets.
-The Agreements do not state with specificity the standards
for determining which assets shall be forfeited by the
government and which shall be retained by the Marcoses,
except those pertaining to the deposits in Swiss accounts.
-WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The General
and Supplemental Agreements dated December 28, 1993,
which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby
declared NULL AND VOID for being contrary to law and the
Constitution.
NERI v. SENATE
F: The competing interests in the case at bar are the claim of
executive privilege by the President, on the one hand, and the
respondent Senate Committees' assertion of their power to
conduct legislative inquiries, on the other.
-2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication
(DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhing Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of
equipment and services for the National Broadband Network
(NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $329,481,290
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be
financed by the People's Republic of China.
-Subsequently, various senate resolutions were passed, one of
Mar Roxas directed the cancellation of the ZTE contract.
The rest directed the Committee on National Defense and
Security to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, and others
amended certain laws, like Procurement Reform Act, to
include treaties, international or executive agreements that
involve funding the procurement of infrastructure projects, as
well as the Official Development Assistant act, which imposes
safeguards in the process of contracting loans.
-The committees initiated investigation and one of the
speakers invited was petitioner as Director General of NEDA.
-Businessman Jose de Venecia III testified that several high
executive officials and power brokers were using their
influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the
NEDA. It appeared that the Project was initially approved as a
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) project but, on March 29,
2007, the NEDA acquiesced to convert it into a government-
to-government project, to be financed through a loan from the
Chinese Government.
-On September 26, 2007, petitioner disclosed that then
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin
Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval
of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed
President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she
instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed
further on what they discussed about the NBN Project,
petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive privilege". In
particular, he refused to answer the questions on
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN
Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
-Committees issued Subpoena Ad Testificandum in response
to the invocation of executive privilege. Executive Secretary
replied that Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, the
foregoing questions fall under conversations and
correspondence between the President and public officials
which are considered executive privilege Considering that
Sec. Neri has been lengthily interrogated on the subject in an
unprecedented 11-hour hearing, wherein he has answered all
questions propounded to him except the foregoing questions
involving executive privilege, we therefore request that his
testimony on 20 November 2007 on the ZTE/NBN project be
dispensed with.
-The committee sent him a letter warning him that he can be
cited in contempt for not appearing after summons. Petitioner
replied that he has no intention to evade the summons it was
only that he thought he has answered all but 3 questions which
were afforded executive privilege-confirmed by Executive
Secretary. And that he be given prior notice to prepare if there
are more proceedings.
-Respondent Committees found petitioner's explanations
unsatisfactory. Without responding to his request for advance
notice of the matters that he should still clarify, they issued the
Order dated January 30, 2008, citing him in contempt of
respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention
at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time
that he would appear and give his testimony.
-Petitioner filed for certiorari because the letter of the
respondent committees result in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
I: 1. W/N the 3 questions fall within executive privilege
2. W/N the respondent committees committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing contempt order
3. W/N executive privilege can bar the right to information
H:
-Article 6 of Constitution: Section 21- Senate may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation
Section 22- Heads of department, upon request of either
house, may appear before and be heard by such House on any
matter pertaining to their departments.
- Senate cautions that while the above provisions are closely
related and complementary to each other, they should not be
considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress.
Section 21 relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation, its aim is to elicit information that may be used for
legislation, while Section 22 pertains to the power to conduct a
question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information
in pursuit of Congress' oversight function. 19 Simply stated,
while both powers allow Congress or any of its committees to
conduct inquiry, their objectives are different.
- When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how
department heads are implementing the statutes which it
has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative
as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such
department heads must give a report of their performance
as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in
keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress
may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the
inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is 'in
aid of legislation' under Section 21, the appearance is
mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.
In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be
facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is
performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with
the intent discerned from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.
1. YES. The context in which executive privilege is being
invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might
impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the
People's Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in
which these information were conveyed to the President, he
cannot provide the Committee any further details of these
conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is
designed to protect.
First, the communications relate to a "quintessential and non-
delegable power" of the President, i.e. the power to enter into
an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of
the President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the
communications are "received" by a close advisor of the
President. Under the "operational proximity" test, petitioner
can be considered a close advisor, being a member of
President Arroyo's cabinet. And third, there is no adequate
showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation
of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
- IN RE SEALED CASE: (2) kinds of executive privilege; one
is the
(a) presidential communications privilege:
"communications, documents or other materials that reflect
presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the
President believes should remain confidential."
(b) deliberative process privilege. advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a
process by which governmental decisions and policies are
formulated."
-Courts ruled early that the Executive has a right to withhold
documents that might reveal military or state secrets identity of
government informers in some circumstances, and information
related to pending investigations. An area where the privilege
is highly revered is in foreign relations.
-THE ELEMENTS OF PRESIDENTIAL
COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE:
1) The protected communication must relate to a
"quintessential and non-delegable presidential power."
2) The communication must be authored or "solicited
and received" by a close advisor of the President or the
President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be
in "operational proximity" with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a
qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of
adequate need, such that the information sought "likely
contains important evidence" and by the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
- United States. v. Nixon held that a claim of executive
privilege is subject to balancing against other interest.
In other words, confidentiality in executive privilege is
not absolutely protected by the Constitution.
- The respondent Committees should cautiously tread into the
investigation of matters which may present a conflict of
interest that may provide a ground to inhibit the Senators
participating in the inquiry if later on an impeachment
proceeding is initiated on the same subject matter of the
present Senate inquiry.
2. YES.
(a) Claim of Executive Privilege is valid.
(b) The invitations did not contain "possible needed statute
which prompted the need for the inquiry", along with "the
usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions
relative to and in furtherance thereof."
(c) Only a minority of the members of the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee were present during the deliberation. There were
only 7 (Cayetano being chair and 7th member during
deliberations)
(d) Senate did not publish rules of procedure
(e) Respondent Committees' issuance of the contempt Order is
arbitrary and precipitate. It must be pointed out that
respondent Committees did not first pass upon the claim of
executive privilege and inform petitioner of their ruling.
Instead, they curtly dismissed his explanation as
"unsatisfactory" and simultaneously issued the Order citing
him in contempt and ordering his immediate arrest and
detention.
-We have been shown no evidence indicating that Congress
itself attaches any particular value to this interest. In these
circumstances, we think the need for the tapes premised solely
on an asserted power to investigate and inform cannot justify
enforcement of the Committee's subpoena.
3. YES. The right to public information, like any other right, is
subject to limitation. The provision itself expressly provides the
limitation, i.e. as may be provided by law. Some of these laws
are Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, 51 Article 229
52 of the Revised Penal Code, Section 3 (k) 53 of R.A. No.
3019, and Section 24 (e) 54 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
These are in addition to what our body of jurisprudence
classifies as confidential 55 and what our Constitution
considers as belonging to the larger concept of executive
privilege. Clearly, there is a recognized public interest in the
confidentiality of certain information. We find the information
subject of this case belonging to such kind.
- More than anything else, though, THE RIGHT OF
CONGRESS OR ANY OF ITS COMMITTEES TO
OBTAIN INFORMATION IN AID OF LEGISLATION
CANNOT BE EQUATED WITH THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT
TO PUBLIC INFORMATION. The former cannot claim
that every legislative inquiry is an exercise of the people' right
to information. The distinction between such rights is laid
down in Senate v. Ermita:
There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the
right of Congress to information which underlies the
power of inquiry and the right of people to information
on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a
citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his
right to information does not have the same obligatory
force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress.
Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the
power to exact testimony from government officials.
These powers belong only to Congress, not to individual
citizen.
Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives
elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a
highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power
of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to
information.
AKBAYAN v. AQUINO
F: Petitioners seek to obtain the full text of the Japanese-
Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement. including the
Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the
negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes
thereto.
-Congressmen Taada III and Aguja filed House Resolution
551, calling for an inquiry into the bilateral trade agreements
then being negotiated by the Philippine government,
particularly the JPEPA. The Resolution became the basis of an
inquiry subsequently conducted by the House Special
Committee on Globalization (the House Committee) into the
negotiations of the JPEPA.
- In the course of its inquiry, the House Committee requested
herein respondent Undersecretary Tomas Aquino (Usec.
Aquino), Chairman of the Philippine Coordinating Committee
created under Executive Order No. 213 ("CREATION OF A
PHILIPPINE COORDINATING COMMITTEE TO
STUDY THE FEASIBILITY OF THE JAPAN-
PHILIPPINES ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP
AGREEMENT") to study and negotiate the proposed JPEPA,
and to furnish the Committee with a copy of the latest draft of
the JPEPA. Usec. Aquino did not heed the request, however.
- Congressman Aguja later requested for the same document,
but Usec. Aquino, by letter of November 2, 2005, replied that
the Congressman shall be provided with a copy thereof "once
the negotiations are completed and as soon as a thorough legal
review of the proposed agreement has been conducted."
-In a separate move, the House Committee requested for "all
documents on the subject including the latest draft of the
proposed agreement, the requests and offers etc" from the
Executive Secretary Ermita. To which Ermita answered that
the proposed agreement has been a work in progress for 3
years which makes it difficult to furnish the appurtenant
documents, however, they will ensure the delivery of said
documents as soon as it is settled and complete.
- Congressman Aguja also requested NEDA Director-General
Romulo Neri and Tariff Commission Chairman Edgardo
Abon, by letter of July 1, 2005, for copies of the latest text of
the JPEPA.
- Chairman Abon replied, however, by letter of July 12, 2005
that the Tariff Commission does not have a copy of the
documents being requested, albeit he was certain that Usec.
Aquino would provide the Congressman with a copy "once the
negotiation is completed". And by letter of July 18, 2005,
NEDA Assistant Director-General Margarita R. Songco
informed the Congressman that his request addressed to
Director-General Neri had been forwarded to Usec. Aquino
who would be "in the best position to respond" to the request.
- In its third hearing conducted on August 31, 2005, the House
Committee resolved to issue a subpoena for the most recent
draft of the JPEPA, but the same was not pursued because by
Committee Chairman Congressman Teves' information, then
House Speaker Jose de Venecia had requested him to hold in
abeyance the issuance of the subpoena until the President gives
her consent to the disclosure of the documents.
- Amid speculations that the JPEPA might be signed by the
Philippine government within December 2005, the present
petition was filed on December 9, 2005.
- The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade
agreement to be entered into by the Philippines with another
country in the event the Senate grants its consent to it, covers a
broad range of topics which respondents enumerate as follows:
trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless
trading, trade in services, investment, intellectual property
rights, government procurement, movement of natural
persons, cooperation, competition policy, mutual recognition,
dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of the
business environment, and general and final provisions.
While the final text of the JPEPA has now been made
accessible to the public since September 11, 2006,
respondents do not dispute that, at the time the petition was
filed up to the filing of petitioners' Reply when the JPEPA
was still being negotiated the initial drafts thereof were kept
from public view.
- Petitioners assert:
first, that the refusal of the government to disclose the
documents bearing on the JPEPA negotiations violates their
right to information on matters of public concernand
contravenes other constitutional provisions on transparency,
such as that on the policy of full public disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest.
Second, they contend that non-disclosure of the same
documents undermines their right to effective and reasonable
participation in all levels of social, political, and economic
decision-making.
Lastly, they proffer that divulging the contents of the JPEPA
only after the agreement has been concluded will effectively
make the Senate into a mere rubber stamp of the Executive, in
violation of the principle of separation of powers.
I: 1. W/N diplomatic negotiations are considered part of
executive privilege
2. W/N JPEPAs presumptive privilege subsists
3. W/N members of Congress can invoke freedom of
information
4. W/N Privilege only applies at cetain stages
5. W/N this petitioners showed sufficient public interest to
overcome the privilege
H:
1. YES. it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may
not be kept perpetually confidential since there should be
"ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is
approved" the offers exchanged by the parties during the
negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is
published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese
representatives submitted their offers with the understanding
that "historic confidentiality" 27 would govern the same.
Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the
Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign
governments in future negotiations.
- "A complicated negotiation . . . cannot be carried
through without many, many private talks and
discussion, man to man; many tentative suggestions
and proposals. Delegates from other countries come and tell
you in confidence of their troubles at home and of their
differences with other countries and with other delegates; they
tell you of what they would do under certain circumstances
and would not do under other circumstances. . . If these
reports . . . should become public . . . who would ever trust
American Delegations in another conference?
-Chavez v. PCGG held that "information on inter-
government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties
and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable
safeguards for the sake of national interest."
-PMPF v. Manglapus: The nature of diplomacy requires
centralization of authority and expedition of decision
which are inherent in executive action. Another essential
characteristic of diplomacy is its confidential nature. Although
much has been said about "open" and "secret" diplomacy,
with disparagement of the latter, Secretaries of State Hughes
and Stimson have clearly analyzed and justified the practice.
In the words of Mr. Stimson:
"A complicated negotiation . . . cannot be carried through without
many, many private talks and discussion, man to man; many tentative
suggestions and proposals. Delegates from other countries come and
tell you in confidence of their troubles at home and of their
differences with other countries and with other delegates; they tell you
of what they would do under certain circumstances and would not do
under other circumstances. . . If these reports . . . should become
public . . . who would ever trust American Delegations in another
conference?
-same: "The President is the sole organ of the nation in
its external relations, and its sole representative with
foreign nations. He makes treaties with the advice and
consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the
field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and
Congress itself is powerless to invade it."
2.
- deliberative process privilege. advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a
process by which governmental decisions and policies are
formulated."
-Negotiations between two countries to draft a treaty represent
a true example of a deliberative process. Much give-and-take
must occur for the countries to reach an accord. A description
of the negotiations at any one point would not provide an
onlooker a summary of the discussions which could later be
relied on as law. It would not be "working law" as the points
discussed and positions agreed on would be subject to change
at any date until the treaty was signed by the President and
ratified by the Senate.
The policies behind the deliberative process privilege support
non-disclosure. Much harm could accrue to the negotiations
process if these notes were revealed. Exposure of the pre-
agreement positions of the French negotiators might well
offend foreign governments and would lead to less candor by
the U. S. in recording the events of the negotiations process.
- EXEMPTION 5 OF THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT (FOIA):
(1) it must be either inter-agency or intra-agency in nature,
and
(2) it must be both pre-decisional and part of the agency's
deliberative or decision-making process.
-Going back to the present case, the Court recognizes that the
information sought by petitioners includes documents
produced and communicated by a party external to the
Philippine government, namely, the Japanese representatives
in the JPEPA negotiations, and to that extent this case is closer
to the factual circumstances of CIEL than those of Fulbright.
-Nonetheless, for reasons which shall be discussed
shortly, this Court echoes the principle articulated in
Fulbright that the public policy underlying the
deliberative process privilege requires that diplomatic
negotiations should also be accorded privileged status,
even if the documents subject of the present case cannot
be described as purely internal in character.
- In this jurisdiction, however, there is no counterpart of the
FOIA, nor is there any statutory requirement similar to FOIA
Exemption 5 in particular. Hence, Philippine courts, when
assessing a claim of privilege for diplomatic negotiations, are
more free to focus directly on the issue of whether the privilege
being claimed is indeed supported by public policy.
3. YES. Petitioners in the present case include members of the
House of Representatives who invoke their right to
information not just as citizens but as members of Congress.
-Clearly, the privilege for diplomatic negotiations may be
invoked not only against citizens' demands for information,
but also in the context of legislative investigations.
4. NO. Chavez v. PCGG: We rule, therefore, that the
constitutional right to information includes official
information on on-going negotiations before a final
contract. The information, however, must constitute
definite propositions by the government and should not
cover recognized exceptions like privileged information,
military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters
affecting national security and public order.
5. NO. Thus, as in the case of petitioners suing in their
capacity as private citizens, petitioners-members of the House
of Representatives fail to present a "sufficient showing of need"
that the information sought is critical to the performance of
the functions of Congress, functions that do not include treaty-
negotiation.
-Petitioners did not overcome the privilege. Petitioners go on
to assert that the non-involvement of the Filipino people in the
JPEPA negotiation process effectively results in the bargaining
away of their economic and property rights without their
knowledge and participation, in violation of the due process
clause of the Constitution. They claim, moreover, that it is
essential for the people to have access to the initial offers
exchanged during the negotiations since only through such
disclosure can their constitutional right to effectively
participate in decision-making be brought to life in the context
of international trade agreements.
- By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office,
the President, as head of State, is the sole organ and authority
in the external affairs of the country. In many ways, the
President is the chief architect of the nation's foreign policy; his
"dominance in the field of foreign relations is (then) conceded."
Wielding vast powers and influence, his conduct in the
external affairs of the nation, as Jefferson describes, is
"executive altogether.
As regards the power to enter into treaties or international
agreements, the Constitution vests the same in the President,
subject only to the concurrence of at least two thirds vote of all
the members of the Senate.
2 KINDS OF PUBLIC INTEREST:
1.In favor of keeping the subject information
confidential, which is the reason for the privilege in the first
place
2.The public interest in favor of disclosure, the
existence of which must be shown by the party asking for
information.
CRITERIA TO DETERMINE IF THERE IS SUFFICIENT
PUBLIC INTEREST
US v. Nixon: the need to balance such claim of privilege
against the constitutional duty of courts to ensure a fair
administration of criminal justice.
Senate Select Committee v. Nixon: the need to balance such
claim with the duty of Congress to perform its legislative
functions
In re sealed cases: can be overcome by a sufficient showing of
need. This need determination is to be made flexibly on a
case-by-case, ad hoc basis
- DISMISSED. To recapitulate, petitioners' demand to be
furnished with a copy of the full text of the JPEPA has become
moot and academic, it having been made accessible to the
public since September 11, 2006. As for their demand for
copies of the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during
the JPEPA negotiations, the same must be denied,
respondents' claim of executive privilege being valid.
NORTH COTABATO v. GRP PANEL
F: Consolidated cases assailing the constitutionality of MOA-
AD.
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their
respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-
AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of
2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
-The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the
MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon motion of
petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the
scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from
signing the same.
- When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office,
the military offensive against the MILF was suspended and the
government sought a resumption of the peace talks. The
MILF, according to a leading MILF member, initially
responded with deep reservation, but when President Arroyo
asked the Government of Malaysia through Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return to
the negotiating table, the MILF convened its Central
Committee to seriously discuss the matter and, eventually,
decided to meet with the GRP.
The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with
the talks being facilitated by the Malaysian government, the
parties signing on the same date the Agreement on the
General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks
Between the GRP and the MILF. The MILF thereafter
suspended all its military actions.
-A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya,
Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which ended with the signing of
the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the
Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire status between
the parties. This was followed by the Implementing Guidelines
on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development
Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, which was signed on
May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia. Nonetheless, there were
many incidence of violence between government forces and
the MILF from 2002 to 2003.
- In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the
parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting of
the draft MOA-AD in its final form, which, as mentioned, was
set to be signed last August 5, 2008.
I: READ TEXT PROVIDED
H:
SERENO v. COMMITTEE
F: Committee on Tariff and Related Matters , an office under
NEDA, held a meeting in which it resolved to recommend to
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo the lifting of the
suspension of the tariff reduction schedule on petrochemicals
and certain plastic products, thereby reducing the Common
Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) rates on products covered
by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 161 from 7% or 10% to 5%
starting July 2005.
-On June 9, 2005, Wilfredo A. Paras (Paras), then the
Chairman of the Association of Petrochemical Manufacturers
of the Philippines (APMP), the main industry association in the
petrochemical sector, wrote to the CTRM Secretariat,
through its Director Brenda Mendoza (Director Mendoza), to
request a copy of the minutes of the meeting held on May 23,
2005.
-Director Mendoza denied the request through her letter of
June 20, 2005, saying they cannot disclose the positions and
views of the CTRM members during the meeting but that the
decision reached was that The CTRM agreed to reduce the
CEPT rates on petrochemical resins and plastic products
covered under EO 161 from 7%/ 10% to 5% starting July
2005, and to revert the CEPT rates on these products to EO
161 levels once the proposed naphtha cracker plant is in
commercial operation.
-An exchange of the same nature transpired. Dir. Mendoza
now invoked executive privilege, as the meeting was a closed-
door cabinet meeting.
-The APMP, through Paras and Concepcion I. Tanglao,
respectively its Chairman and President at the time, sent letters
dated December 12, 20057 and January 10, 20068 to the
Office of the President (OP), stating the reasons why the
recommendation of the CTRM should be rejected, but the OP
did not respond to the letters.
-Meanwhile, President Arroyo signed Executive Order No.
486,10 dated January 12, 2006, to lift the suspension of the
tariff reduction on petrochemical resins and other plastic
products under the ASEAN Free Trade Area Common
Effective Preferential Tariff (AFTA-CEPT) Scheme.
-Paras et al filed with the RTC an Urgent Motion for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. RTC
dismissed. The RTC declared that the CTRM is an advisory
body composed of various department heads or secretaries and
is classified as cabinet meetings and inter-agency
communications; and that the record of the communications
of such body falls under the category of privileged
information because of the sensitive subject matter which
could seriously affect public interest.
- In his capacity as a citizen and as the Executive Director of
the APMP, the petitioner has sought to obtain official
information dealing with the policy recommendation of the
CTRM with respect to the reduction of tariffs on
petrochemical resins and plastic products. He has asserted that
the recommendation, which would be effected through E.O.
No. 486, not only brought significant losses to the
petrochemical industry that undermined the industrys long-
term viability and survival, but also conflicted with official
government pronouncements, policy directives, and
enactments designed to support and develop an integrated
petrochemical industry. He has claimed that the
implementation of E.O. No. 486 effectively deprived the
industry of tariff support and market share, thereby
jeopardizing large investments without due process of law.
I: 1. W/N meetings of the CTRM and the minutes thereof
exempt from the Constitutional right of access to information
2. W/N Assuming arguendo that the minutes of CTRM
meetings are privileged or confidential, is privilege or
confidentiality absolute
3. W/N privilege or confidentiality be invoked to evade public
accountability, or worse, to cover up incompetence and malice
H: 1.YES.
-Chavez v. Public Estates Authority32 that a frank
exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free
from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested
parties, is essential to protect the independence of
decision- making of those tasked to exercise
Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power.
-In Almonte v. Vasquez, the Court has stressed the need for
confidentiality and privacy, stating thusly: A President and
those who assist him must be free to explore
alternatives in the process of shaping policies and
making decisions and to do so in a way many would be
unwilling to express except privately.
2. NOT ABSOLUTE, BUT GRANTED.
- Every claim of exemption, being a limitation on a right
constitutionally granted to the people, is liberally construed in
favor of disclosure and strictly against the claim of
confidentiality. However, the claim of privilege as a cause for
exemption from the obligation to disclose information must be
clearly asserted by specifying the grounds for the exemption.
In case of denial of access to the information, it is the
government agency concerned that has the burden of showing
that the information sought to be obtained is not a matter of
public concern, or that the same is exempted from the
coverage of the constitutional guarantee.36 We reiterate,
therefore, that the burden has been well discharged herein.
- The respondents further assert that the information sought
fell within the concept of established privilege provided by
jurisprudence under Section 3 (c) of Rule IV of the Rules
Implementing R.A. No. 6713, the May 23, 2005 meeting
being regarded as a closed-door Cabinet meeting.
-We have said that executive privilege is properly invoked in
relation to specific categories of information, not to categories
of persons. As such, the fact that some members of the
committee were not part of the Presidents Cabinet was of no
moment. What should determine whether or not information
was within the ambit of the exception from the peoples right
to access to information was not the composition of the body,
but the nature of the information sought to be accessed. A
different holding would only result to the unwanted situation
wherein any concerned citizen, like the petitioner, invoking the
right to information on a matter of public concern and the
State's policy of full public disclosure, could demand
information from any government agency under all conditions
whenever he felt aggrieved by the decision or recommendation
of the latter.
3. NO. In case of conflict, there is a need to strike a balance
between the right of the people and the interest of the
Government to be protected. Here, the need to ensure the
protection of the privilege of non-disclosure is necessary to
allow the free exchange of ideas among Government officials
as well as to guarantee the well-considered recommendation
free from interference of the inquisitive public.
-PETITION DENIED.
SECTION 8. The right of the people, including
those employed in the public and private sectors, to
form unions, associations, or societies for purposes
not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
MNL PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS v. LAGUIO jr.
F: The series of events that touched off these cases started with
the so-called "mass action" undertaken by some 800 public
school teachers, among them members of the petitioning
associations in both cases, on September 17, 1990 to
"dramatize and highlight" the teachers' plight resulting from
the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon
grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's
attention:
the immediate payment of due chalk,
clothing allowances,
13th month pay for 1989 arising from the
implementation of the Salary Standardization Law,
the recall of DECS Orders 39 s. 1990 directing the
oversizing of classes and overloading of teachers
pursuant to the cost-cutting measures of the
government,
the hiring of 47,000 new teachers to ease the overload
of existing teachers,
the return of the additional 1% real property taxes
collected by local government units to education
purposes to be administered by the Local Schools
Boards,
and consequent recall of DBM Circulars Nos. 904
and 9011 and local budget circular No. 47 consistent
with RA 5447
and the new Constitution mandating that education
shall enjoy the highest budgetary priority in the
national budget, and other equally important
demands.
-Sept 1990, the teachers staged a protest rally. Ignored, the
ongoing protest mass actions on September 17, 1990 which fell
on a Monday. Undoubtedly most of the teachers did not hold
class on that day. During the protest, at 1pm, 3 of the
representatives were allowed to meet the Secretary of
Education who allegedly brushed off their pleas and warned
them that they would lose their jobs for going on illegal and
unauthorized mass leave. Upon leaving said respondent's
presence, they were handed an order directing all participants
in the mass action to return to work in 24 hours or face
dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials
concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who
did not comply and to hire their replacements. 5 Those
directives notwithstanding, the mass actions contained into the
week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed. In
its issue of September 19, 1990, the newspaper Manila
Standard reported that the day previous, the respondent
Secretary of Education had relieved 292 teachers who did not
return to their classes. The next day, however, another daily,
Newsday, reported that the Secretary had revoked his
dismissal order and instead placed 56 of the 292 teachers
under preventive suspension, despite which the protesters'
numbers had swelled to 4,000.
- On the record, what did happen was that, based on reports
submitted by the principals of the various public schools in
Metro Manila, the respondent Secretary of Education had
filed motu propio administrative complaints against the
teachers who had taken part in the mass actions and defied the
return-to-work order on assorted charges like grave
misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of the Civil
Service Law, absence without official leave, etc., and placed
them under 90-day preventive suspension. The respondents
were served copies of the charge sheets and given five (5) days
to submit answer or explanation. Later, on October 8, 1990,
the respondent Secretary constituted an investigating
committee of four (4) to determine and take the appropriate
course of action on the formal charges and designated the
special prosecutors on detail with the DECS to handle their
prosecution during the formal hearings.
-On October 11, 1990, the respondent Secretary of Education
rendered the first of his now-questioned decisions on the
administrative complaints. In Case No. DECS 90-002, he
found twenty (20) respondent teachers guilty of the charges
proffered against them and dismissed then from office,
effective immediately. In the other investigations that followed
and as of December 3, 1990, 658 teachers were dismissed, 40
were suspended for one (1) year, 33 for nine (9) months, and
122 for six (6) months; 398 were exonerated.
I: 1. W/N the teachers were afforded due process
H: YES.All of striking teachers were served with the
suspension orders and the charge sheets notifying them of the
charges and giving them five (5) days from receipt of the
charge sheets within which to file their respective answers.
- Petitioners in G.R. No. 95545 and 'G.R. No. 95590' admit
having received the charge sheets and notices of preventive
suspension
- Many striking teachers received their preventive suspension
orders and the charge sheets from their respective principals
when they visited their schools. Many refused to receive and
sign receipt therefor; others tore up the preventive suspension
orders and charge sheets in front of their principals.
- Many of the striking teachers refused to appear at the
hearings but preferred to submit their case on the basis of their
answers.
-IMPORTANT: That this Court had already definitely ruled
that employees in the public (civil) service, unlike those in the
private sector, do not have the right to strike, although
guaranteed the right to self-organization, to petition Congress
for the betterment of employment terms and conditions and to
negotiate with appropriate government agencies for the
improvement of such working conditions as are not fixed by
law.
PADCOM v. ORTIGAS CENTER
F: Petitioner Padcom Condominium Corporation (hereafter
PADCOM) owns and manages the Padilla Office
Condominium Building (PADCOM Building) located at
Emerald Avenue, Ortigas Center, Pasig City. The land it
stands on was originally acquired from the OCLP (Ortigas) BY
Tierra Development Corporation. Among the terms and
conditions in the deed of sale was the requirement that the
transferee and its successor-in-interest must become members
of an association for realty owners and long-term lessees in the
area later known as the Ortigas Center. Subsequently, the said
lot, together with improvements thereon, was conveyed by
TDC in favor of PADCOM in a Deed of Transfer dated 25
February 1975.
In 1982, respondent Ortigas Center Association, Inc.
(hereafter the Association) was organized to advance the
interests and promote the general welfare of the real estate
owners and long-term lessees of lots in the Ortigas Center.
-It sought the collection of membership dues in the amount of
P2,724.40 per month from PADCOM. The corporate books
showed that PADCOM owed the Association P639,961.47,
representing membership dues, interests and penalty charges
from April 1983 to June 1993. The letters exchanged between
the parties through the years showed repeated demands for
payment, requests for extensions of payment, and even a
settlement scheme proposed by PADCOM in September
1990. In view of PADCOM's failure and refusal to pay its
arrears in monthly dues, including interests and penalties
thereon, the Association filed a complaint for collection of sum
of money before the trial court below, which was docketed as
Civil Case No. 63801. The Association averred that
purchasers of lands within the Ortigas Center complex from
OCLP are obligated under their contracts of sale to become
members of the Association. This obligation was allegedly
passed on to PADCOM when it bought the lot from TDC, its
predecessor-in-interest.
- In its answer, PADCOM contended that it is a non-stock,
non-profit association, and for it to become a special member
of the Association, it should first apply for and be accepted for
membership by the latter's Board of Directors. No automatic
membership was apparently contemplated in the Association's
By-laws. PADCOM added that it could not be compelled to
become a member without violating its right to freedom of
association. RTC dismissed. CA affirmed RTC that they have
in fact become members, they were included in the list of bona
fide members and acknowledged receipt of demand for
payments and even asked for extensions.
I: W/N compelling petitioner to be a part of the association
violated section 8.
H: NO.
As lot owner, PADCOM is a regular member of the
Association. No application for membership is necessary. If at
all, acceptance by the Board of Directors is a ministerial
function considering that PADCOM is deemed to be a regular
member upon the acquisition of the lot pursuant to the
automatic membership clause annotated in the Certificate of
Title of the property and the Deed of Transfer.
Neither are we convinced by PADCOM's contention that the
automatic membership clause is a violation of its freedom of
association. PADCOM was never forced to join the
association. It could have avoided such membership by not
buying the land from TDC. Nobody forced it to buy the land
when it bought the building with the annotation of the
condition or lien on the Certificate of Title thereof and
accepted the Deed. PADCOM voluntarily agreed to be bound
by and respect the condition, and thus to join the Association.
SECTION 9. Private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation.
REPUBLIC v. Vda. DE CASTELVI
F: Plaintiff-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines,
(hereinafter referred to as the Republic) filed, on June 26,
1959, a complaint for eminent domain against defendant-
appellee, Carmen M. vda. de Castellvi, judicial administratrix
of the estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi hereinafter
referred to as Castellvi), over a parcel of land situated in the
barrio of San Jose, Floridablanca, Pampanga.
Petitioner alleges that the provisional value of the lands be
fixed at P259,669.10, according to its fair market value price.
That the court orders plaintiff to pay treasury of Pampanga
said amount to take possession of the said land.
- In her "motion to dismiss" Castellvi alleged, that the land
under her administration, being a residential land, had a fair
total market value of P11,389,485.00; that the Republic,
through the Armed Forces of the Philippines, particularly the
Philippine Air Force, had been, despite repeated demands,
illegally occupying her property since July 1, 1956, thereby
preventing her from using and disposing of it, thus causing her
damages by way of unrealized profits. This defendant prayed
that the complaint be dismissed, or that the Republic be
ordered to pay her P15.00 per square meter, or a total of
P11,389,485.00, plus interest thereon at 6% per annum from
July 1, 1956; that the Republic be ordered to pay her
P5,000,000.00 as unrealized profits, and the costs of the suit.
-After the Republic had deposited with the Provincial
Treasurer of Pampanga the amount of P259,669.10, the trial
court ordered that the Republic be placed in possession of the
lands. The Republic was actually placed in possession of the
lands on August 10, 1959.
-The Gozuns also claim the same thing (land was valued at
15.00 /sqm.
-Commissioners were appointed. They deemed the lands to be
worth 10.00 /sqm. (RTC awarded 10.00 /sqm and 6% per
annum interest.
I: 1.W/N the taking of property was under the power of
eminent domain.
2. W/N CA gave just compensation to the defendants
H: 1. NO. Appellee Castellvi, on the other hand, maintains
that the "TAKING" OF PROPERTY UNDER THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN REQUIRES TWO
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS, to wit: (1) entrance and
occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more
than a momentary or limited period, and (2) devoting it to a
public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him
of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
This appellee argues that in the instant case the first element is
wanting, for the contract of lease relied upon provides for a
lease from year to year; that the second element is also
wanting, because the Republic was paying the lessor Castellvi
a monthly rental of P445.58; and that the contract of lease
does not grant the Republic the "right and privilege" to buy
the premises "at the value at the time of occupancy."
- It should be noted that the Castellvi property had been
occupied by the Philippine Air Force since 1947 under a
contract of lease for the period of July 1, 1952 to June 30,
1953. June 1956, Castellvi refused to renew the lease on the
land. Lieutenant General Alfonso Arellano, Chief of Staff,
answered the letter of Castellvi, saying that it was difficult for
the army to vacate the premises in view of the permanent
installations and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that
were erected and already established on the property, and
that, there being no other recourse, the acquisition of the
property by means of expropriation proceedings would be
recommended to the President. Castellvi filed for ejectment.
And the expropriation proceedings herein was instituted
during the former.
- 'TAKING' UNDER THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN MAY BE DEFINED GENERALLY AS:
1. ENTERING UPON PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR
MORE THAN A MOMENTARY PERIOD, AND,
2. UNDER THE WARRANT OR COLOR OF LEGAL
AUTHORITY,
3. DEVOTING IT TO A PUBLIC USE,
4. OR OTHERWISE INFORMALLY APPROPRIATING
OR
5. INJURIOUSLY AFFECTING IT IN SUCH A WAY AS
SUBSTANTIALLY TO OUST THE OWNER AND
DEPRIVE HIM OF ALL BENEFICIAL ENJOYMENT
THEREOF.
- The aforecited lease contract was for a period of one year,
renewable from year to year. The entry on the property, under
the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. The fact
that the Republic, through the AFP, constructed some
installations of a permanent nature does not alter the fact that
the entry into the land was transitory, or intended to last a
year, although renewable from year to year by consent of the
owner of the land. By express provision of the lease agreement
the Republic, as lessee, undertook to return the premises in
substantially the same condition as at the time the property
was first occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that the intention
of the lessee was to occupy the land permanently, as may be
inferred from the construction of permanent improvements.
But this "intention" cannot prevail over the clear and express
terms of the lease contract. Intent is to be deduced from the
language employed by the parties, and the terms of the
contract, when unambiguous, as in the instant case, are
conclusive in the absence of averment and proof of mistake or
fraud the question being not what the intention was, but
what is expressed in the language used.
- It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Castellvi's property
for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have
taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy
the property as lessee thereof. We find merit in the contention
of Castellvi that two essential elements in the "taking" of
property under the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that
the entrance and occupation by the condemnor must be for a
permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting the
property to public use the owner was ousted from the property
and deprived of its beneficial use, were not present when the
Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi property in 1947.
The lower court did not commit an error when it held that the
"taking" of the property under expropriation commenced with
the filing of the complaint in this case.
2. Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, 16 the
"just compensation" is to be determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint. This Court has ruled that when the
taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with
the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes
place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent
domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint.
- The taking of those lands, therefore, must also be reckoned as
of June 26, 1959, the date of the filing of the complaint for
eminent domain.
- In determining the value of land appropriated for public
purposes, the same consideration are to be regarded as in a
sale of property between private parties. The inquiry, in such
cases, must be what is the property worth in the market,
viewed not merely with reference to the uses to which it is at
the time applied, but with reference to the uses to which it is
plainly adapted, that is to say, What is it worth from its
availability for valuable uses
- In expropriation proceedings, therefore, the owner of the
land has the right to its value for the use for which it would
bring the most in the market. 17 The owner may thus show
every advantage that his property possesses, present and
prospective, in order that the price it could be sold for in the
market may be satisfactorily determined. 18 The owner may
also show that the property is suitable for division into village
or town lots. 19
The trial court, therefore, correctly considered, among other
circumstances, the proposed subdivision plans of the lands
sought to be expropriated in finding that those lands are
residential lots.
- AWARDED BY SC: the fair market value of the lands of the
appellees is fixed at P5.00 per square meter;
(c) the Republic must pay appellee Castellvi the sum of
P3,796,495.00 as just compensation for her one parcel of land
that has an area of 759,299 square meters, minus the sum of
P151,859.80 that she withdrew out of the amount that was
deposited in court as the provisional value of the land, with
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from July 10, 1959 until
the day full payment is made or deposited in court;
(d) the Republic must pay appellee Toledo-Gozun the
sum of P2,695,225.00 as the just compensation for her two
parcels of land that have a total area of 539,045 square meters,
minus the sum of P107,809.00 that she withdrew out of the
amount that was deposited in court as the provisional value of
her lands, with interest at the rate of 6%, per annum from July
10, 1959 until the day full payment is made or deposited in
court.
US v. CAUSBY
F: This is a case of first impression. The problem presented is
whether respondents' property was taken within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment by frequent and regular flights of
army and navy aircraft over respondents' land at low altitudes.
- Respondents own 2.8 acres near an airport outside of
Greensboro, North Carolina. It has on it a dwelling house, and
also various outbuildings which were mainly used for raising
chickens. The end of the airport's northwest-southeast runway
is 2,220 feet from respondents' barn and 2,275 feet from their
house. The path of glide to this runway passes directly over the
property-which is 100 feet wide and 1,200 feet long. The 30 to
1 safe glide angle approved by the Civil Aeronautics Authority
passes over this property at 83 feet, which is 67 feet above the
house, 63 feet above the barn and 18 feet above the highest
tree.
-The use by the United States of this airport is pursuant to a
lease executed in May, 1942, for a term commencing June 1,
1942 and ending June 30, 1942, with a provision for renewals
until June 30, 1967, or six months after the end of the national
emergency, whichever is the earlier.
- Since the United States began operations in May, 1942, its
four-motored heavy bombers, other planes of the heavier type,
and its fighter planes have frequently passed over respondents'
land buildings in considerable numbers and rather close
together. They come close enough at times to appear barely to
miss the tops of the trees and at times so close to the tops of the
trees as to blow the old leaves off. The noise is startling. And at
night the glare from the planes brightly lights up the place. As
a result of the noise, respondents had to give up their chicken
business. As many as six to ten of their chickens were killed in
one day by flying into the walls from fright. The total chickens
lost in that manner was about 150.
- Respondents are frequently deprived of their sleep and the
family has become nervous and frightened. Although there
have been no airplane accidents on respondents' property,
there have been several accidents near the airport and close to
respondents' place. These are the essential facts found by the
Court of Claims. On the basis of these facts, it found that
respondents' property had depreciated in value. It held that
the United States had taken an easement over the property on
June 1, 1942, and that the value of the property destroyed and
the easement taken was $2,000.
-It was argued that since these flights were within the
minimum safe altitudes of flight which had been prescribed,
they were an exercise of the declared right of travel through
the airspace. The United States concludes that when flights are
made within the navigable airspace without any physical
invasion of the property of the landowners, there has been no
taking of property.
- It also argues that the landowner does not own superadjacent
airspace which he has not subjected to possession by the
erection of structures or other occupancy. Moreover, it is
argued that even if the United States took airspace owned by
respondents, no compensable damage was shown.
I: W/N airspace is property that can be taken
H: YES.
-If, by reason of the frequency and altitude of the flights,
respondents could not use this land for any purpose, their loss
would becomplete. 6 It would be as complete as if the United
States had entered upon the surface of the land and taken
exclusive possession of it.
-But that general principle does not control the present case.
For the United States conceded on oral argument that if the
flights over respondents' property rendered it uninhabitable,
there would be a taking compensable under the Fifth
Amendment. It is the owner's loss, not the taker's gain, which
is the measure of the value of the property taken.
- Hence, the flights in question were not within the navigable
airspace which Congress placed within the public domain. If
any airspace needed for landing or taking off were included,
flights which were so close to the land as to render it
uninhabitable would be immune. But the United States
concedes, as we have said, that in that event there would be a
taking. Thus, it is apparent that the path of glide is not the
minimum safe altitude of flight within the meaning of the
statute.
-Reversed but remanded.
PENN CENTRAL TRANSPORT v. NYC
F: The question presented is whether a city may, as part of a
comprehensive program to preserve historic landmarks and
historic districts, place restrictions on the development of
individual historic landmarks - in addition to those imposed by
applicable zoning ordinances - without effecting a "taking"
requiring the payment of "just compensation." Specifically, we
must decide whether the application of New York City's
Landmarks Preservation Law to the parcel of land occupied by
Grand Central Terminal has "taken" its owners' property in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
-NYC adopted Landmarks Preservation Law in 1965. The city
believed that comprehensive measures to safeguard desirable
features of the existing urban fabric would benefit its citizens in
a variety of ways: e. g., fostering "civic pride in the beauty and
noble accomplishments of the past"; protecting and enhancing
"the city's attractions to tourists and visitors"; "support[ing]
and stimul[ating] business and industry"; "strengthen[ing] the
economy of the city"; and promoting "the use of historic
districts, landmarks, interior landmarks and scenic landmarks
for the education, pleasure and welfare of the people of the
city."
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I: READ TEXT.
H: