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EDITORIAL
MICHAEL STARKS
The launch of a new journal stimulates a lot of basic questions. Who are we?
What are we trying to do and why? What defines the subject matter suffi-
ciently to distinguish this venture from the range of journals which already
cover media and telecommunications?
Where to start? Well, the editors have a mix of academic and professional
experience and are of three different nationalities (our biographical details are
included at the end of this issue). We hope that our contributors and our read-
ership will be similarly mixed, since our aim is to bring together the work of
academics, policy-makers and practitioners from across the globe. We would
like to see the journal build up, and disseminate, an understanding of digital
television in different countries, as digital switchover takes place progressively
and as the television industry enters a new era as a result.
The backdrop to our initiative is the switchover process, now widespread
internationally, of introducing digital television transmission and, after a
transition period which may be as short as a year or last a decade or more,
switching off analogue terrestrial television. The first regional digital switcho-
ver was accomplished in Berlin in 2003. The first complete national analogue
terrestrial switch offs were achieved by the Netherlands and Luxembourg in
2006, followed by Finland and Sweden in 2007. Switzerland and Germany
came next and the United States achieved its nationwide analogue terrestrial
switch-off in June 2009. The UK and several other European countries have
switched off in certain regions. During the next three or four years most of the
advanced economies of the world are expected to complete their own national
switchovers and many more will embark upon the process.
Nowhere has switchover been without risks or problems – whether com-
mercial, legal or political – and generally, it has proved much easier to start
digital broadcasting than to end analogue. Thus there is plenty of scope for
learning from comparative study.
However, the journal’s role will be much broader than this. Digital televi-
sion transmission is part of the pattern of digitization of nearly all forms of
audio and video production, distribution and reception – and this common
reliance on the digital coding of signals has led to the well-known convergence
of the television, computer and telecommunications technologies. This in turn
has sparked innovation in the service provision and consumer usage of televi-
sion and a blurring of the distinction between broadcasting and the Internet.
So the journal will explore the expanding agenda of issues around the result-
ing transformation of television’s operations and audiences, examining the
editorial, financial, social and cultural dimensions.
Closely related is the question of the implications for regulation: first,
what regulatory approach is required in order to achieve digital switchover
and, second, how then to reconcile the historically relatively strict regulation
of television content with the generally lighter system of telecommunications
regulation?
Given the strength of the current of convergence, is it practical – in setting
the journal’s scope – to continue to separate digital television from related
forms of digital telecommunications? Does digital television retain any
distinctive character within an all-digital communications framework? Our
answer is ‘Not entirely and probably decreasingly, but, even so, yes’. For the
medium term at any rate, television and telecommunications, while over-
lapping, have a different focus from one another, conventionally expressed
as the distinction between ‘one to many’ and ‘one to one’ communications.
Moreover, digital TV is being shaped not just by synergies with telecommu-
nications but also by two other developments (which in many countries pre-
ceded digital switchover):
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JEFFREY A. HART
Indiana University, USA
The Transition to
Digital Television
in the United States:
The Endgame
ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
The switching off of analogue television on 12 June 2009 and the delays that led digital television (DTV)
up to it are the focus of the analysis here. All digital transitions are difficult but high definition
the US transition was successful in the end, in spite of a number of decisions and television (HDTV)
policies that made life confusing and overly complicated at one time or another digital transition
for all concerned. The decision to delay the analogue switch off from 17 February analogue switch off
to 12 June 2009 was one of the first initiatives undertaken by the newly elected Federal Communications
Obama administration. The delay was necessary because of the under-funding of Commission (FCC)
a programme to provide coupons for analogue-digital converter boxes to those still multicasting
dependent on over-the-air broadcasts. must-carry rules
INTRODUCTION
The entire US broadcasting system made the transition from analogue to dig-
ital broadcasting on 12 June 2009; on this date, all analogue transmissions
ceased, with only minor exceptions. The transition to digital television (DTV)
was originally scheduled to take place at the end of 2006, but that deadline was
set back: first to 31 December 2008, then to 17 February 2009, and then finally
to 12 June 2009. The setting back of these deadlines reveals a lot about contem-
porary American politics and even more about the politics of broadcasting.
To understand the debates over deadlines it will be necessary to review
both the original decisions to adopt a DTV standard in the United States and
those made later. One major factor in the most recent delay was the election
of Barack Obama in November 2008, so some effort will be made here to
discuss how the DTV transition became an issue during and after the 2008
presidential campaign.
One way to explain the delays is to examine closely the FCC’s decisions
in the 1990s to adopt a DTV standard during the Clinton administration,
and subsequent FCC policies adopted during the administration of George
W. Bush. The FCC (Federal Communications Commission) was the primary
forum for decision making about how to implement the transition. It was
responsible for monitoring the performance of other agencies, such as the
National Telecommunications and Information Agency (NTIA), who were put
in charge of certain aspects of the transition. The relationship between the
FCC and Congress is central to explaining the FCC’s policies. The relation-
ships between the FCC and powerful private interest groups like the National
Association of Broadcasters, the National Cable Television Association, and
the Consumer Electronics Association were also important.
10
“ 30 “
“ 60 “
1920 x 1080 24 “
“ 30 “
“ 60 interlaced
Note: See discussion below for an explanation of the difference between progressive
scanning and interlacing.
Table 1: Six video formats in the Grand Alliance system as of November 1994.
and decoding both interlaced and progressively scanned source material. The
interlaced material would have 960 scanning lines at 30 frames per second;
the progressive would have 720 lines at 60 frames per second (see Table 1).
The original press release for the Grand Alliance announcement reported
that all displays larger than 34 inches would be progressively scanned, but
apparently that was an error. The Grand Alliance members felt that this
would be an unnecessary handicap for them should non-members decide
to offer (presumably cheaper) interlaced displays for large screen TVs. Since
they could not legally force all non-members to use progressive displays, they
decided to abandon the requirement.
In the meantime, Reed Hundt had not yet been confirmed as Chairman
of the FCC and the Clinton administration initially showed little interest in
HDTV or the ACATS deliberations. Hundt himself was noncommittal. He
was influenced in his views by his discussions with Negroponte and other
computer industry notables. Hundt was looking for HDTV to play a role in the
emergence of the National Information Infrastructure (NII). He wanted HDTV
to be more like what George Gilder called a ‘teleputer’ – a television/compu-
ter device that was seamlessly connected with computer networks. Wiley was
worried that Hundt and the rest of the Clinton administration would scrap
the HDTV deals made by the Republicans in the Bush administration. He felt
that he no longer had the support of the Chairman of the FCC as he did under
Al Sikes. The National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) chose this time of
vulnerability to weigh in again against HDTV.
John Abel of the NAB began to focus on the opportunities presented by
digital television as opposed to HDTV. Digital TV did not have to involve HDTV
images. Instead, digital compression of standard definition signals would ena-
ble existing broadcasters to compress more than one programme service into
a single channel, allowing them to provide a greater diversity of programming
through what came to be called ‘multicasting’. A digital broadcasting environ-
ment would permit broadcasters to offer all sorts of digital services such as data
broadcasting, e-mail, paging, telephony, software delivery, etc.
In February 1994, Michael Sherlock, Vice President of NBC, said that many
broadcasters were interested in using the second channel that they would be
11
given in the transition to HDTV for digital services. He knew that the only reason
that the second channel was being given to broadcasters was so that they would
be able to provide free over-the-air services for analogue (NTSC) set owners
until a large proportion of the viewing public could receive digital broadcasts.
Nevertheless, he argued that the non-HDTV digital services might be more
lucrative for the broadcasters than HDTV itself (Brinkley 1997: 289–290).
Similarly, in March 1994, Rupert Murdoch began to talk about satellite
and cable systems with large numbers of channels. In a March 1994 interview
with Forbes magazine, Murdoch said
The current proposal is that the FCC will give us that spectrum for high-
definition television. But high definition is a luxury. Compared with a
modern TV set it’s not that different. Why shouldn’t that extra spectrum be
given to me or you or anyone to put on that extra number of channels?
(Brinkley 1997: 304)
12
Richard Wiley, the head of ACATS, to put pressure on the Grand Alliance
members to complete their system.
Hundt’s perception of the value of HDTV had changed noticeably. Hundt
was impressed with the emerging Grand Alliance system – particularly its usage
of a packetized data structure similar to those used in telecommunications sys-
tems. A Grand Alliance HDTV receiver was a lot more like a computer than ear-
lier HDTV receivers, as it had the ability to process a variety of video signals and
to display both interlaced and progressive-scan images, The successful intro-
duction of digital NTSC satellite services in the form of the Thomson/Hughes
DirecTV or DSS services, using a direct broadcast satellite to deliver digitized
signals to homes with small satellite dishes, satellite tuners, and regular NTSC
televisions, may also have influenced Hundt’s change of perspective. The rapid
consumer adoption of DBS services was eating into the audience share of both
cable operators and terrestrial broadcasters, thanks to the very high quality of
the images and the large number of channels available on DBS services. Many
of the successful satellite and cable channels in Europe and Asia also relied on
digitized signals, especially for pay-TV channels where encryption was neces-
sary to exclude non-subscribers from receiving the signal.
On 12 September 1995, the Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee,
Senator Larry Pressler (R-South Dakota), unveiled a plan to auction off HDTV
and other advanced TV spectrum in the largest 25 television markets. According
to Pressler, the auction would raise more than $14 billion, which Pressler
wanted to use to establish a trust fund for public broadcasting. Federal fund-
ing for NPR and PBS was under attack from the new Republican majority in
Congress. The National Association of Broadcasters immediately criticized the
plan and announced that they would oppose it. Pressler dropped his proposal
on 28 September.
Debates over the desirability of spectrum auctions continued, however (see
section below on round two of the auctions debate). The FCC issued a request
for comments on the issue. The due date for comments was 18 October 1995.
FCC replies were due 1 December 1995. Larry Irving of the NTIA continued to
favour an auction. So did the Benton Foundation, Americans for Tax Reform,
and Thomas Hazlett, an economist and an expert on telecommunications
policy. In early December, the Clinton administration floated a proposal for
the auctioning of HDTV spectrum to create a fund for subsidizing consumer
purchases of digital TV converters. The proposal called for a subsidy of around
$50 per consumer. The NAB and MSTV again objected to the idea of auc-
tions and Irving’s idea was strongly opposed by an FCC official on a televised
debate. Nothing more of substance on auctions appeared until the middle of
the 1996 election campaign.
13
Vertical pixels by
horizontal lines Aspect ratio Frame rates
“ 4:3 “
14
FCC, would decide whether the spectrum needed for HDTV broadcasts would
be auctioned, but that the FCC would still decide whether licensees were
required to use their new spectrum for HDTV broadcasts. He also argued that
broadcasters might be required to provide ‘public services’ in exchange for
the privilege of licensing the new spectrum. Hundt raised the question of the
degree to which the regulatory structure already in use for NTSC broadcasting
would translate into an appropriate structure for the new digital broadcasting
system. He left this issue open for future discussion and deliberation.
At the 12 December hearings, Bruce M. Allan, Senior Vice President for
Business Development at Thomson Consumer Electronics, urged the FCC to
give prompt approval for the Grand Alliance digital system. Allan argued that
‘consumers are ready for the superior pictures and sound of digital TV’. The
Advanced Television (ATV) Task Force of the Electronic Industries Association
(which became the Consumer Electronics Association in 1999), an organiza-
tion that primarily represented the manufacturers of consumer electronics
equipment, agreed with Bruce Allan.
Also at the 12 December hearings, a new organization called the Computer
Industry Coalition on Advanced Television Services (CICATS), represented by
Joseph Tasker of Compaq Corporation, argued for abandonment of the inter-
laced video format. Tasker warned that:
Unless the deficits of the proposed standards are remedied, the poten-
tial of the technology revolution will be stifled at birth... Television will
fail to live up to its potential, but will instead remain simply a vehicle for
entertainment, news, documentaries, and advertisements.
15
Congress, the White House and the FCC began talking about an acceler-
ated transition to DTV of seven years instead of the ten to fifteen years men-
tioned earlier. This would speed up the return of the analogue channels to the
FCC. The revenues obtained from auctioning that spectrum would then help
to reduce the budgetary deficit a bit sooner than previously anticipated. FCC
Commissioner James Quello objected to this policy shift because he thought
that people would hang on to their NTSC sets for considerably longer than
seven years and that they would be angry if they had to scrap them prema-
turely (Van and Jones 1996).
On 20 June 1996, at the Senate Commerce Committee Hearing on HDTV
standards, Chairman Hundt again endorsed the idea of auctioning spectrum.
Dr Peter Bingham, President of Philips Research Laboratories, said that the
spectrum auction hung ‘like a sword of Damocles over this digital revolution’.
He argued that the auction would only produce a marginal improvement in
deficit reduction but that it would certainly undermine the economic incen-
tives for broadcasters to introduce digital television expeditiously.
During the week of 22 July 1996, the House of Representatives was sched-
uled to consider an amendment to the FY 1997 FCC appropriations bill pro-
posed by Rep. Barney Frank (D-Massachusetts) that would prohibit the FCC
from assigning licenses for ATV services. This amendment was designed to
stymie efforts by the FCC to allocate ATV channels at a meeting on 25 July.
Apparently the FCC was planning to free up channels 2–6 and 52–69 for non-
television uses. The FCC promptly received a letter from the three major net-
works, ALTV, MSTV, NAB, Chris-Craft and Tribune opposing this. Senator
McClain used the occasion to lecture Chairman Hundt in a letter to ‘keep
government intrusion to a minimum’ and avoid freezing innovation by setting
inappropriate standards. Nevertheless, the FCC voted to announce its inten-
tion to allocate ATV channels at the 25 July meeting, although it left the deci-
sion about what channels to allocate (and when) to a later time.
The combined lobbying efforts of the members of CICATS apparently con-
vinced President Clinton to take a stand. On 23 September 1996, in an inter-
view with a reporter from Broadcasting and Cable magazine, Clinton weighed
in on the side of digital convergence:
The best standard would be one developed and supported by all the
affected industries, which could then be endorsed by the FCC... We
want to make sure that there are no roadblocks to future compatibility
between televisions and computers.
(Corcoran 1997)
16
them to pursue their own strategies. It also helped to smooth over the conflict
between the broadcasters and the set manufacturers, since few broadcasters
at the time wanted to be forced to broadcast HDTV formats such as 720p and
1080p. The set manufacturers thought that it would be difficult to sell new
sets if they were limited to displaying standard definition video. A letter docu-
menting the compromise was signed on 27 November 1996, in Washington
by Michael Sherlock of NBC, representing the Broadcasters Caucus, Gary
Shapiro of the Consumer Electronics Association, and Paul Misener of Intel
representing CICATS. This cleared the way for the FCC to issue its decisions
on DTV without fear of further reprisals from the computer industry.
17
18
The US was the first to opt for all-digital as opposed to a hybrid digital-
analogue standard. The US government, unlike those in Europe and Japan,
did not support standards put forward by a coalition of consumer electronics
manufacturers and broadcasters. US regulatory institutions were sensitive to a
number of issues that were ignored elsewhere, such as the cost to consumers
of purchasing new equipment and the need to promote continued innova-
tion in digital technologies. On the negative side, the final US government
decisions on DTV standards resulted in considerable confusion on the part of
manufacturers, broadcasters, and consumers. Coping with that confusion and
dealing with the inability, or reluctance, of some broadcasters and customers
to pay for new DTV equipment became the key challenge of completing the
transition to digital television in the US.
19
1080i was the choice of CBS and its affiliates because of their strong belief that
720p did not provide a high enough quality increment over standard definition
analogue TV to make consumers willing to pay the premium for DTV signals.
Their preference for interlacing was partly the result of the relationship between
CBS and Sony, in which the latter provided 1080i equipment to the former. CBS
also had allies in the film industry, including Sony Pictures (formerly Columbia
Pictures), who swore by 1080i as a better format in which to view movies.
1080p had the least support of the main alternative formats because it was
the most expensive to produce and display. Some of the technological compo-
nents necessary to produce content in that format were still not widely avail-
able in 2005. Nevertheless, all the chips that were in ATSC-compatible HDTV
tuners (DTV tuners for short) were capable of decoding 1080p images and so
some companies were betting that the higher picture quality of 1080p would
eventually triumph over the other alternatives.
To deal with the diversity of signal formats, the FCC mandated in 2002
the progressive phasing in of TV sets with DTV tuners, requiring that new
sets with a given screen size, or larger, contain tuners. Here are the specific
phase-in requirements:
By mid 2007, therefore, all new TV sets with 13-inch screens or larger would
be required to have DTV tuners.
In the meantime, consumers would continue to have to cope with com-
plexity in stores where labelling of DTV sets and equipment includes such
unfamiliar terms as HDTV-ready, HDTV-capable, HDTV-compatible, and
HDTV-upgradeable. The sets themselves came in the following technological
varieties: CRT (direct view), CRT-based projection, LCD flat panel, LCD pro-
jection, DLP projection, and LCOS projection (I will not bother to explain the
acronyms here). On the back of the receiver there were the following kinds
of ‘secure’ DTV connectors: DVI, HDMI, and Broadcast Flag. There were also
a variety of connectors for antennas, VCRs, DVDs, DVRs, set-top boxes, and
other such devices. Customers would be asked if they wanted to get their sig-
nal over the air, or via cable or satellite. If customers wanted to connect a DTV
to a Windows Media Center personal computer, they would be in yet another
vast new world of acronym-filled complexity. For the fanatics and insanely
rich, there was the world of the ‘home theatre’ to master. The rich would sim-
ply pay someone who knew enough about all this stuff to do it for them, but
then they were left with the problem of figuring out how to make it all work
the way it was supposed to.
20
while continuing to provide analogue services. The FCC’s idea was that once
the digital transition was complete the analogue channels would be returned
to the government to dispose of as needed. The return of spectrum would
permit the FCC to auction it off to the highest bidder, so the government
had a strong incentive to get back all those old analogue TV channels as soon
as possible. The revenues from auctions were already being included in esti-
mates of future government revenues during the Clinton administration, so
key members of the government were eager to push for the rapid completion
of the digital transition.
The problem was that the FCC and Congress had recognized that the ana-
logue signals should not be shut off until a good percentage of consumers
were receiving or at least able to receive digital broadcasts. In 1997, when
the DTV transition plan was launched, Congress passed a ‘sense of Congress’
resolution as part of an intelligence reform act that stipulated that the spec-
trum would be returned on 31 December 2006, but only if 85 per cent of the
residents of any given local community had the necessary equipment to dis-
play digital signals. The interpretation of this somewhat vague rule would be
left to the FCC.
Less than three percent of American homes had sets capable of decod-
ing DTV signals as of early 2005, although a much larger percentage, perhaps
more than 80 per cent, received TV signals in digital formats from either cable
or satellite services and the 2006 deadline was fast approaching. The sales
of such sets were growing rapidly, especially as lower cost DTVs started to
be featured in the major consumer stores. The number of cable and satellite
services offering HDTV-quality signals was also growing rapidly. In 2006, the
prices of flat panel plasma TVs were expected to continue to descend below
the current average price of around $2,000, especially as the larger LCD TVs
also were expected to decline in price from the current $2,000 average to
around $1,000.
An additional problem, highlighted by outgoing FCC Commissioner
Michael Powell was that many households possessed more than one TV, but
were not likely to be receiving digital signals on every set they own. Also,
a number of over-the-air broadcasters failed to comply with FCC orders to
begin broadcasting in DTV formats, so households with DTV sets in those
localities but without cable or satellite services would obviously not be able to
contribute to meeting the 85 per cent goal.
As a result, the FCC, in its desire to get the spectrum back sooner rather
than later, proposed a new deadline of 31 December 2008 and an easier test
of the ability of households to decode DTV signals: i.e., that the use of cable
or satellite services where the service provides a digital signal either to a set-
top box, or, even less ambitiously, to a nearby connection point, would count
toward the 85 per cent goal. If the household opted not to purchase a DTV
set, therefore, it might still enjoy TV broadcasts if it either purchased or was
given a box to convert the DTV signal to a standard definition analogue sig-
nal. All cable subscribers qualified as DTV-ready households by that standard.
Problem of rapid transition solved!
That proposal, engineered in January 2005 by Kenneth Ferree, the Chief of
the FCC’s Media Bureau, had not been approved as of February 2005 (Ferree
2004). Ferree left the FCC soon after making the proposal. The plan was
strongly opposed by NAB, whose members were not in a hurry to return their
analogue channels to the federal government. They claimed that to meet the
85 per cent goal, 73 million sets not connected to a cable or satellite service would
21
have to be fitted with a converter at an estimated cost of around $300 per unit
(at a total estimated cost of $22 billion). It should not come as a surprise that
the $300 price tag given by the NAB was contested. Motorola Corporation, for
example, estimated the boxes could be produced in high volume for between
$50 and $75 per unit. Motorola and other electronics manufacturers like Intel
were interested in seeing the analogue spectrum returned and auctioned off
for new wireless uses.
The important underlying issue, however, was that the shutting off of the
analogue signals would greatly inconvenience millions of TV watchers, who
either could not afford or were not willing to purchase the necessary convert-
ers and therefore raised the question of whether there needed to be govern-
ment subsidies to allow these individuals to continue using their analogue
equipment (Brinkley 2005).
MUST CARRY
Another difficult question was how to set the rules for the relationships
between over-the-air broadcasters and cable and satellite service providers
during and after the transition. Cable operators were bound by ‘must carry’
rules that impelled them to give their customers access to the analogue signals
of local over-the-air broadcasters via the cable service. The cable operators
did not get paid for this service, even though the local broadcasters continued
to receive advertising revenues based on the audience (cable plus non-cable)
that their signal could reach. This really irritated the cable operators so they
looked for ways to get compensated for carrying the signals of local broad-
casters on increasingly scarce cable bandwidth. No such must carry rules gov-
erned the relationship between local over-the-air broadcasters and satellite
service providers.
Cable operators – led by Ted Turner initially – challenged the ‘must carry’
rules on constitutional grounds as a violation of their right to free speech, but
ultimately lost this battle in the Supreme Court. They insisted that they could
not be forced to carry digital signals the way they had been forced to carry
analogue ones, especially multicasts, because this violated the intention of
policy makers to promote a higher quality of broadcasts not simply a prolifer-
ation of channels. They wanted over-the-air broadcasters and cable network
programmers to compete on an equal basis for cable bandwidth and obvi-
ously to pay for carriage, and they wanted local cable operators to have full
control over the programming packages offered to cable customers in their
service area. Cable companies particularly objected to efforts of broadcasters
to get compensation for providing DTV signals for carriage by cable opera-
tors (especially HDTV coverage of popular sporting events). A spokesman for
Time Warner Cable, Keith Cocozza, said ‘The issue at heart is that broadcast-
ers are trying to insist that they are compensated for something that they get
from the government for free’ (Walker 2005).
What the local broadcasters wanted was for both cable and satellite to
be bound by ‘must carry’ rules for digital signals, especially those who had
already invested in multicast technology (e.g. Belo). They also wanted the
cable operators to pay them for carrying their content on cable networks. The
DTV decisions of the 1990s gave the local broadcasters the right to use their
digital channel either for HDTV or for other purposes including multicast-
ing. Some broadcasting networks opted for multicasting, thus defining the
choice for their local affiliates. The problem was that the cable companies did
22
not want to carry the multicasts, which they saw as direct competition. They
wanted to be compensated for whatever they decided to carry. In short, disa-
greements over these matters were blocking cable carriage not just of multi-
casts but also of local- and network-produced HDTV-quality digital signals
(Cotlar 2005; Frieden 2005–2006).
23
with Digital Cable Ready televisions. The FCC held firm on both the Digital
Cable Ready and ‘plug and play’ decisions, however, and both set manufac-
turers and cable operators began to plan their next moves accordingly.
24
been requested but only 16 million had been redeemed. Nielsen estimated
that 7.8 million households (6.8 per cent) were still completely unready for
the transition.
25
Date Percentage
26
CONCLUSIONS
There is certainly much to criticize about the handling of the DTV transition
in the US. The original standards decisions resulted in confusing choices for
both producers and consumers. Broadcasters were not required (as in other
countries) to use their digital channels for HDTV and many chose to use them
instead for multicasting. No clear must-carry rules were provided to cable and
satellite operators until rather late in the game. The FCC’s CableCard deci-
sions simply added expense to receivers without helping consumers because
the cable companies insisted on providing their own set-top boxes with two-
way capabilities. The FCC was slow to mandate an end to the production and
sales of analogue TVs. The FCC relied too much on industry to educate con-
sumers about the transition.
The Republican-controlled Congress did not adequately fund the converter-
box coupon programme and the NTIA was forced to end the distribution of
coupons too early. Partisan politics played a large role in Congressional over-
sight of the FCC and the NTIA. The Republicans, and especially the Republic
appointees to the FCC, tended to favour the broadcasters and the consumer
electronics manufacturers over consumer groups like the Consumers Union.
Democrats and their appointees to the FCC were more concerned about con-
sumers, minorities, the poor and the elderly, and less willing to follow the
lead of broadcasters and equipment manufacturers.
When Barack Obama ran for the presidency in 2007–2008, his cam-
paign took a relatively strong position on the DTV transition consistent with
the views of influential Democrats like Ed Markey, John Dingell, and Jay
Rockefeller. After the 2008 election, the FCC, the Congress, and the White
House arrived at a set of policies that helped to make the long-awaited transi-
tion successful. Delaying the transition from February to June of 2009 helped
to avoid major disruptions to the daily lives of citizens, while additional efforts
undertaken by the FCC and the NTIA after the November elections to fix the
converter-box coupon programme and educate consumers helped to reduce
adjustment costs for the poor and the elderly.
The US DTV transition was a large and complicated affair. One of the
basic problems in digital transitions is the problem of properly timing the
switching off of analogue. Doing it successfully depends on many uncertain
and often unpredictable variables like the willingness and ability of consumers
to purchase digital receivers or converter boxes or to subscribe to cable and
satellite services. It also depends on the cost of equipment and services, which
is itself a function of many hard to predict variables. All of this occurs within
a broader social and political context where democratic partisanship and the
politics of social inequality can further complicate the transition.
It is unlikely that digital transitions in other countries will be simpler. In
wealthy democratic countries, there will generally be a combination of govern-
mental mandates and reliance on the market and consumer choices. In poorer
countries, authority may be more centralized in the government and consumer
interests may be ignored, but at the expense of forcing consumers to pay for
services that they may not be able to afford. Nevertheless, it is helpful to analyze
carefully each transition as it comes along in the search for answers about how
to do it better next time (see, for example, Galperin 2004; Block 2008).
27
REFERENCES
Block, Joshua T. (2008), ‘Regulating the Transition from Analogue to Digital
Television Broadcasting in North America: A Comparison of the Canadian,
US., and Mexican Experiences’, Media Law and Policy, 17 (Spring), pp. 19–35.
Brinkley, Joel (1997), Defining Vision: The Battle for the Future of Television, New
York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
Brinkley, Joel (2005), ‘Defining Vision: The End is Nigh!’, Ultimate AV, February,
http://ultimateavmag.com/joelbrinkley/205jb/. Accessed 21 September
2009.
Carnevale, Mary Lu (1993), ‘FCC Panel Urges New Set of HDTV Tests’, Wall
Street Journal, February 6, p. B7.
Cheney, Suzanne (2009), ‘Digital TV Transition: Almost All Are Ready’,
MSNBC.com, 26 May, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30888579/. Accessed
21 September 2009.
Corcoran, Elizabeth (1997), A Bit of Bill in Every Box: Gates’s Vision of
Microsoft’s Future Moves from PCs to TV, Phone, Washington Post,
10 August, p. H1.
Cotlar, Andrew D. (2005), ‘The Road Not Yet Traveled: Why the FCC Should
Issue Digital Must-Carry Rules for Public Television “First”’, Federal
Communications Law Journal, 57 (1), pp. 49–80.
Eggerton, John (2009), ‘DTV Converter-Box Program Hits Ceiling’, Broadcasting
& Cable, 5 January, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/161609-DTV_
Converter_Box_Program_Hits_Ceiling.php. Accessed 21 September 2009.
Federal Communications Commission (1996a), Fifth Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, in MM Docket No. 87–268, FCC 96–207, adopted 9 May.
Federal Communications Commission (1996b), Fourth Report and Order, Before
the Federal Communications Commission, In the Matter of Advanced Television
Systems and Their Impact Upon the Existing Television Broadcast Service, in
MM Docket No. 87–268, FCC 96–493, adopted 24 December.
Federal Communications Commission (1997), Statement of Chairman Reed
Hundt on the Adoption of Television Allotment and Service Rules Reports and
Orders, 3 April.
Federal Communications Commission (2001), Report and Order and Further
Notice of Proposed Rule Making in MM Docket No. 00–39, 16 FCC 01–24.
Federal Communications Commission (2002), Second Report and Order and
Second Memorandum Opinion and Order in MM Docket No. 00–39, FCC
02–030, adopted 8 August.
Federal Communications Commission (2003), In the Matter of Implementation
of Section 304 of the Communications Act of 1996; Commercial Availability
of Navigation Devices; Compatibility between Cable Systems and Consumer
Electronics Equipment, CS Docket No. 97–80 and PP Docket No. 00–97,
released 9 October.
Ferree, Kenneth W. (2004), Advancing the DTV Transition: An Examination
of the FCC Media Bureau Proposal: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and the Internet, 108th Congress, http://bulk.resource.
org/gpo.gov/hearings/108h/95439.pdf. Accessed 21 September 2009.
Frieden, Rob (2005–2006), Analogue and Digital Must-Carry Obligations of
Cable and Satellite Television Operators in the United States, Media Law
and Policy, 15 (2), pp. 230–246.
Galperin, Hernan (2004), New Television, Old Politics: The Transition to Digital TV
in the United States and Britain, New York: Cambridge University Press.
28
SUGGESTED CITATION
Hart, J. A. (2010), ‘The Transition to Digital Television in the United States:
The Endgame’, International Journal of Digital Television 1: 1, pp. 7–29,
doi: 10.1386/jdtv.1.1.7/1
CONTRIBUTOR DETAILS
Jeffrey A. Hart is Professor of Political Science at Indiana University where
he teaches courses on international relations and international political econ-
omy. His research focuses mostly on the politics of international competition
in high technology industries. He is an Associate Editor of the International
Journal of Digital Television. Fuller biographical details are given at the end of
the journal.
E-mail: hartj@indiana.edu
29
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ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
This article begins by challenging what we describe as a developing analytical ortho- digital television
doxy around the development of digital television, an orthodoxy which produces post-broadcast
a story about the end of television. We argue that the social practice of television television
is far from over, and that it is changing in ways which reflect continuities with convergence
past practices as well as the effects of emerging economic, technological and cultural the end of television
formations of production and use. The article draws upon our research into some
Asian television markets (part of a collaborative international research project on
post-broadcast television) in order to highlight the contingency of these changes and
thus the importance of a highly nuanced, locally grounded, and culturally informed
analysis of what is becoming of television in the digital age. The article also draws
attention to the current difficulties confronting such comparative analysis, in that we
lack a common, simple and comprehensive means of measuring, benchmarking and
mapping the various formations of what we still call ‘television’ around the globe.
INTRODUCTION
The history of technological change warns us against attributing agency to
emergent technologies; it also provides abundant evidence of the unreliability
of the enthusiasm of the early adopters as a guide to mainstream patterns
31
of take-up. Histories of the mass media, in particular, tell us that while each
emerging technology may initially shape up as if to challenge those already in
place, it is rare for them to actually displace or render the existing technologies
obsolete. Nonetheless, as each new technology emerges, they are inevitably
accompanied by an ancillary industry of analysis and prognosis predicting
the total collapse of nominated current technologies or markets as the result
of the newcomer stealing their audiences. The predictions are rarely borne
out; in many cases, both the technologies and their users end up behaving in
totally unexpected ways. Video did not ‘kill the radio star’, after all, but the
music industry is looming as an early casualty of the Internet’s emergence as
an entertainment platform; music downloads and piracy are now threatening
the viability of the local music store and the retail market for CDs.
In this article, derived from a continuing study of post-broadcast televi-
sion, we begin by challenging what we describe as a developing analytical
orthodoxy around the development of digital television. We emphasize the
need to recognize that the social practice of television is changing in highly
contingent ways in specific markets – ways that reflect continuities with past
practices as well as the effects of emerging economic and cultural formations
of production and use. Our objective, pursued by drawing in particular on
Asian examples from our collaboration on an international research project on
post-broadcast television, is to highlight the unpredictability of these changes
as well as the current difficulty in finding a simple and comprehensive means
of measuring and mapping – and therefore of properly understanding – what
is becoming of what we still call ‘television’.
32
who argue against both of these positions (Turner and Tay 2009; Miller
2009), but at present it would have to be said that there remains a ‘digital
orthodoxy’ (Turner 2009) which blends the accounts of the digital optimists
and the broadcast pessimists into a highly influential diagnosis of what
amounts to the declaration of the ‘end of television’.
We do not accept that this diagnosis is sufficient and in what follows we
outline some of the competing evidence which highlights the complexity and
diversity of the international experience of the era of digital television. As a
starting point, it is important to recognize how geographically specific the ‘end
of television’ argument is. Once you look beyond North America, Europe, and
certain Anglophone countries such as Australia and New Zealand, such an
argument loses much of its claim to relevance; in most other locations (and
remember, these include the largest television audience in the world, China),
broadcast (let alone) television is far from experiencing decline. Athique (2009)
argues that India, for instance, is only now entering its ‘age of television’, and
its markets are dominated by broadcasting.
We have noted elsewhere (Tay and Turner 2008) that a number of state reg-
ulatory and policy regimes – for instance, those in the UK and Australia – have
accepted a vision of the future of television that implicitly regards the American
experience as an evolutionary model. That is, these regimes operate on the
assumption that the stages through which the American market has evolved
will be more or less replicated, over time, throughout the globe. We argue that
there is every reason to question such an assumption; indeed, it might actually
make more sense to regard the American market as significantly anomalous,
rather than as standing in an exemplary relation to the rest of the global market.
For example, it is important to recognize that there are particular aspects of the
regulatory and market conditions in the US at present (as well as a number of
other markets regulated towards the US model) which artificially appear to rein-
force the end of television thesis: the national transition from analogue to digital
broadcasting, for instance, does lend support to this position in various ways that
mask its contingency. At the simplest level, the analogue switchover is regarded
by many in the US as the final nail in the coffin for an ailing broadcasting indus-
try. While this will not necessarily be the case, in fact (and there are convincing
opposing arguments), the convergence of technologies further enabled by the
switch to digital has the capacity to blur the specificity of television over time and
is doing so, as we write, in a number of markets. More importantly, however, a
pattern is emerging in which the traditional broadcasters have approached the
switch from analogue to digital with some trepidation – as the point at which
the clock starts to tick on their established business models. At the same time,
convergent media proprietors have embraced this development as the moment
when traditional television surrenders some of its commercial advantages.
It is also important to highlight another consideration which seems to us to
be especially relevant to academic debates within television and media studies
at this conjuncture. Most of the information we receive about the application
of new technologies, about their take-up among audiences and consumers,
and about possible developments in the future, comes to us directly from the
media industries – often through corporate press releases or other products of
a publicity and promotions process, as well as through more putatively grass-
roots platforms such as industry blogs or online newsletters. While there is
certainly academic research in these areas, and while there has also been con-
siderable academic input into the development and application of these new
media technologies, at the moment we seem especially dependent upon the
33
Source: Adapted from R. Briel (2007) with additional demographic information from
Wikipedia.
34
Middle East@ 2 2 0 2 11 22
report. Certainly, the recent growth rates are even higher than those reported
by Briel, according to the 2009 figures (Broadband Forum 2009); the year’s
growth in Latin America and Eastern Europe, for instance, clocked in respec-
tively at 109.85% and 109.38%. Again, however, the raw numbers encourage
caution; in Latin America, the result of such a percentage increase is still only a
total of 23,467 subscribers. An even more sober perspective, however, is gained
when we look at Informa’s forecasts, which take us up to 2013 and predict that
by then IPTV will still only account for 4% of global TV households.
What this table suggests is that while IPTV may still continue to record
what can be presented as impressive gains in percentage terms, the realistic
expectation is that IPTV is destined to be only a niche delivery platform for TV
in the future not, as the booster rhetoric would have it, the future of TV.
It is probably worth emphasizing at this point that there is good reason to
doubt even the raw figures provided by the media industries on new media
audiences, let alone the implications that might be read from them. An exam-
ple of this comes from the US Internet industry’s confusion over the vast
disparity in the size of the audience attributed to online video site Hulu by
competing ratings companies: in March 2009, Nielsen reported a total of 8.9
million visitors to the site, while comScore came up with 42 million. These dis-
crepancies have provoked considerable controversy in the news media as well
as in the industry but so far no satisfactory explanation has emerged, with both
organizations defending their methods in the face of advertisers’ demands for
more reliable figures (Stelter 2009). This dispute takes on added significance
because the Internet industry has always claimed that online usage is more
‘measurable’ than television audiences and thus represents a more account-
able platform for advertisers. They claim (though this can be challenged) that
the hit rate provides direct evidence of consumption, for instance. The lesson
seems to be that, with discrepancies so large and over such important consid-
erations, and with the industry reports so strongly motivated by the need to
boost markets, this is not the time to abandon our scepticism about the valid-
ity and motivations of industry-sourced figures.
35
% Diff Absolute
Yr to Yr Diff Yr
(4Q08 to Yr
to (4Q08 to
4Q08 3Q08 4Q07 4Q07) 4Q07)
Watching TV in
the home* 151:03 140:48 145:49 3.6% 5:13
Watching time-
shifted TV* 7:11 6:27 5:24 33.0% 1:47
Using the
Internet** 27:04 27:18 26:08 3.6% 0:56
Watching video
on Internet** 2:53 2:31 n/a n/a n/a
Mobile sub-
scribers watch-
ing video on a
mobile phone 3:37 n/a n/a n/a
36
viewing in the home (time-shifting increased by 37.3% [!] over the first quarter
of 2009) (Nielsen 2009b). It is true that the audience share for broadcast net-
works compared to cable networks is steadily declining; nonetheless, certain
broadcast events continue to demonstrate their capacity to draw a massive
national television audience: the Obama presidential debates, for instance,
drew figures that were comparable with those achieved during the Reagan
campaign (Miller 2009) and they, in turn, constitute a historic peak. While the
US networks have their difficulties, then, it is simply not the case that people
are not watching as much television as before, or that they are demonstrating
a clear preference for watching television online via their computers.
Of course, there is no doubt that television is mutating across platforms
and the contexts through which it is consumed are multiplying. While this is
the case, it would seem that, far from approaching its demise, television is
alive and well. If we move away from the US example and look at some other
large national markets and examine the mix of platforms, systems of delivery,
and audience preferences in play we begin to get a more nuanced sense of the
sheer diversity of the ways in which the futures of broadcast, pay, and online
video play out in different nation-states and geo-linguistic regional markets.
An Australian report from 2008, for instance, found that 42% of its respond-
ents said they watched less TV as a result of being connected to the Internet,
while 54% said there was no change in their behaviour (Ewing, Thomas and
Schiessl 2008). This report, it should be noted, is based on what the respond-
ents said about their behaviours, rather than the kind of electronic monitoring
of actual behaviour that a people meter provides.
37
38
3. When A Dog Loves TVB 31.4 3. When A Dog Loves TVB 28.9
A Cat A Cat
Jade Jade
(drama) (drama)
4. Super Trio Supreme TVB 29.8 4. On The Road (III) TVB 27.5
(live variety) (documentary)
Jade Jade
5. Best Selling Secrets TVB 29.4 5 Chua’s Choice TVB 27
(drama) (drama)
Jade Jade
demonstrate this. The staple choices in both markets are Chinese urban dra-
mas revolving around family and careers, variety shows (such as the Super Trio
Supreme), and carnivalesque game shows. Although reality television has made
an impact in introducing greater diversity to all of these national markets, it
rates most highly in China where Mongolian Cow Yoghurt Super Girl (modelled
on the Pop Idol format) and Journey to Shangri-La (modelled on Survivor) courted
controversy and made national and international headlines as well as attracting
hundreds of thousands of prospective participants (BBC News 2001).
Similarly, with Singapore television (Table 6), Chinese language melodra-
mas again lead the ratings – just slightly ahead of locally produced lifestyle
entertainment. It is important to note however that, within these apparently
similar broad patterns of genre preference, at the level of the individual texts
there are significant differences which reflect the cultural specificities of each
location. In Hong Kong, for instance, the urban soap operas are often ‘rags
to riches’ (and back again) stories which feature characters enjoying enor-
mous wealth, exploiting the narrative spectacle of a wealthy lifestyle setting.
In the Singapore dramas, however, extreme wealth is rarely depicted at all,
as the texts channel their aspirational message towards a relatively homo-
geneous middle class-ness instead. A significant difference in terms of the
political economy underlying these patterns of consumption is that prime
time drama serials in Hong Kong are mainly locally produced by TVB, and
the leading drama and light entertainment programmes in Taiwan are also
produced locally, whereas, in Singapore, prime time drama is likely to come
from Singapore, Hong Kong or South Korea.
39
40
must pull together what will be (to a greater or lesser extent) incommensurate
information from a diverse range of sources. Tables 4, 5 and 6 set out the top
five programmes over a week of programming in Singapore and Taiwan. In
the case of Hong Kong, two weeks have been included to accommodate the
spike around the Olympic Games opening ceremony: this was to indicate its
scale as a special event, while the inclusion of the second week was used to
reflect a more comparable spread of audience choices.
Notwithstanding the once widespread expectations that the globali-
zation of television would result in increasingly homogeneous content
(Moran 1998; Waisbord 2004), as well as more recent but in many ways
analogous projections of transnational markets for satellite television in
Europe (Chalaby 2005), it is not hard to find significant and longstanding
national differences in audience programming preferences at the level of
genre, not just of the individual text – and even between closely articu-
lated English language markets such as the US, the UK and Australia. In
Australia, the most consistent long-term presences on the top ten rating
programmes have been the broadcast networks’ evening news, reality and
lifestyle formats, and local drama. In the US, however, network news does
not even make it into the top twenty programmes; instead they are com-
posed of reality TV, talent shows and Hollywood drama. In the UK, it is
primarily soap opera and reality TV, with the ten o’clock news just squeez-
ing in at number ten. Further comparisons of idiosyncratic local prefer-
ences might pick up the dominance of prime time telenovelas (and masked
wrestling!) in Mexico, and of locally produced carnivalesque game shows
in Japan. While there are certainly many common elements in program-
ming and scheduling around the world – the international formats Pop Idol
and Big Brother, for instance, the various versions and adaptations of the
Latin American telenovelas, and international sports coverage – there is lit-
tle that is homogeneous or predictable about how these trends play out in
the choices which make up the top ten rating programmes of the week in
particular markets or territories.
Such comparisons reinforce our view that, globalizing media markets not-
withstanding, the influence of local conditions has been underplayed in recent
accounts of the rise of digital and global television – perhaps because the focus
of most accounts has largely been on Anglophone transnational media com-
panies. This is particularly true of accounts of television futures coming from
the US, where television scholars (with significant exceptions, such as Marwan
Kraidy 2009) tend to see their local experience as normative. Even a rich and
valuable study such as Amanda Lotz’s The Television will be Revolutionized
(2007) is largely unreflective about the particularity of the American experi-
ence and the possibility that ‘the television’ might turn out quite differently
elsewhere. This habit of mind is one of the reasons why, for instance, western
media scholars have often misunderstood the cultural politics of the rise of
convergent media markets in China (see Tay 2009; Sun and Zhao 2009).
Notwithstanding the anglophone world’s comfortable sense of the devel-
opment of an increasingly integrated global media culture, there are plenty of
examples of relatively autonomous and highly distinctive media cultures, which,
in some cases, are massive in their scale and density. China is always mentioned
in this connection, of course, but another, less noticed, example is Mexican tel-
evision, which dominates its national market in much the same naturalized
manner that American television dominates the American market (and indeed
operates hegemonically within its geo-linguistic region in much the way that
41
42
the top rating pay channels were News channel at 18.1%, the Movie Channel
at 7.1% and the Entertainment Channel at 6.4%).
Media consumption in Hong Kong has always been relatively high. In his
recent study of the consumption of news in Hong Kong, Li Xigen refers to
about a dozen local daily newspapers, and reports that 89% of the population
consume newspapers daily, spending about an hour a day on this activity (Li
2006). This interest in news and global information is also reflected in the use
of the Internet in Hong Kong. According to the World Internet Project, 66.8%
of the population are Internet users and news is one of the leading applications,
with Internet users of news standing at 11%– more than multimedia (movies
and music), for instance, which comes in at 9% (Hong Kong Internet Survey
Project 2007). The take-up of new technologies highlights what becomes an
important issue in discussing the specifics of what happens to digital television
in particular markets. Local and regional differences in the uses and empha-
sis of the Internet and other communications applications (such as the mobile
phone) alert us to the importance of divergent cultural consumption practices
that ultimately determine which (and how) new technologies and platforms will
be used. If we were to compare how the Internet is used for social communica-
tion and networking in Hong Kong, for instance, we would find that e-mails
are marginally more popular among Internet users in Hong Kong than instant
messaging sites such as QQ (Chinese language) or MSN (English language). In
China, however, it is dramatically the reverse, with instant messaging recording
participation rates of 81.4% to e-mail use of 56.5% (December 2007) (CNNIC
43
MEASURING ‘TELEVISION’
The question for us now, then, is not so much a matter of whether we are see-
ing the end of television as a form of content, but rather a matter of mapping
the varying formations and configurations of the presentation and distribution
of television – and asking of each, as does Joshua Green (2008), ‘how is this
still television?’ This reiterates the question Raymond Williams asked more
than thirty years ago in Television: Technology and Cultural Form (1974): what
are the alternative uses and social functions of these new forms? There is still
almost as much to be done now as when Williams first asked that question
to establish just what it is that remains fundamental to television. The spe-
cific question for television studies in the digital era is whether the advent of
digital technology has categorically changed the social practice of watching
television.
It would have to be acknowledged that the evidence so far points in sev-
eral different directions. For instance, when we think about the aesthetic and
spectacular dimension of television as a regime of visual culture, there are two
contradictory movements observable in most developed markets. On the one
hand, there is the move to the home theatre with high definition digital tel-
evision on large flat screens and surround sound, in which the quality of the
audience’s audio-visual experience is of paramount importance. The shift to
this model of home entertainment is a recent development made possible by
technological advancements in the integration of television and hi-fi systems
as well as in digital and high definition television; the idea of the home theatre
explicitly aims at replicating the aesthetically ‘superior’ cinematic experience.
On the other hand, and apparently working in entirely the opposite direction,
there are the increasing numbers who choose to access video through the
Internet. In this case, they are consuming material where the technical and
aesthetic quality of the experience – the image has poor resolution, it is inter-
rupted by delays in downloading, and uses low-fi sound – is often at quite
primitive levels. The compensation for this seems to lie in the consumer’s
commitment to the benefits of customization; the accessing of large menus of
otherwise inaccessible material takes precedence over the audio-visual qual-
ity of the texts themselves. Arching over all of this, of course, is a regime of
visual culture that remains, on balance, anchored within the larger context of
the home and thus infers many of the issues of domesticity that have always
framed the practices of television consumption.
Similarly, among the key attributes of broadcast television has been
the sense of ‘co-presence’ (Ellis 2002) – the perception that we are
watching as part of a larger, customarily national, audience and that this
44
45
46
END NOTE
The research project from which this article derives is a funded study of post-
broadcast television which examines trends and experiences in the usual
anglophone countries (UK, US, Australia, Canada) as well as in the geo-
linguistic markets of Asia and Latin America. The project is led by Graeme
Turner and has two research fellows, Jinna Tay and Anna Pertierra, working
in the foreign language markets. It has been running since 2007 and is funded
until the end of 2011. So far, it has produced one edited volume that attempts
to give some sense of the issues and the diversity of experiences upon which
it has focused (Turner and Tay 2009).
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Radice trans.), Bristol: Intellect.
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and New York: I.B.Taurus.
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in Australia, CCI Digital Futures Report, ARC Centre for Excellence for
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television services and “old” television’, Media International Australia,
No. 126, pp. 95–106.
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Communication: City University of Hong Kong, http://newmedia.cityu.
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48
49
SUGGESTED CITATION
Tay, J. and Turner, G. (2010), ‘Not the Apocalypse: Television Futures in
the Digital Age’, International Journal of Digital Television 1: 1, pp. 31–50,
doi: 10.1386/jdtv.1.1.31/1
CONTRIBUTOR DETAILS
Jinna Tay is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Centre for Critical and
Cultural Studies at the University of Queensland, Australia, working on
Graeme Turner’s international project, Television in the Post-Broadcast Era.
She is the Co-editor (with Graeme Turner) of Television Studies After TV:
Understanding Television in the post-broadcast era (Routledge, 2009), and has
published on fashion journalism, Asian television, and creative industries.
E-mail: J.Tay@uq.edu.au
50
JOCK GIVEN
Swinburne University, Australia
PAUL NORRIS
New Zealand Broadcasting School
ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
‘Freeview’ is the survival strategy for free-to-view TV in the digital age in the Freeview
United Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia. It is mix of marketing, services digital television
and technology, and of defensive and offensive elements. The mix is different in free-to-view television
different places: public service
broadcasting
• In the UK, where the concept was launched in 2002, digital terrestrial television satellite television
(DTT) became Freeview, now the most popular form of digital TV. Freeview high definition
represented a fresh strategy to relaunch DTT after the failure of the first model. television
• In New Zealand, where DTT started in 2008, DTT is Freeview, but Freeview broadband
was a satellite service first, appealing mainly to those with poor analogue recep- video-on-demand
tion. The concept was imported from the UK as the proven way to make DTT
work, and deployed from the outset by broadcasters with government backing.
• In Australia, as this article was finalized in August 2009, Freeview is still mainly
a marketing campaign rather than a TV service. Broadcasters have not deployed it
enthusiastically to launch the medium, but reluctantly, many years on, as part of
the government-mandated push to digital switchover.
This article explores the origins and development of these three Freeviews. It provides
an unusual case study of a related, though different, set of products marketed under
51
the same name in different countries. It also speculates about their future as televi-
sion morphs into new shapes, especially encouraged by the growth of high definition,
hard-drive-recording and broadband-connected receivers. Identifying both similari-
ties and differences across the three Freeviews, the authors conclude that although
‘Freeview’ is helping to make it possible to switch off analogue services and free
up spectrum for other purposes in all three countries, the national differences defy
reduction to a single definition. Freeview, like television itself, is different in these
different places and is changing over time.
INTRODUCTION
‘Freeview’ is the survival strategy for free-to-view television in the digital age
in the UK, New Zealand and Australia. It is mix of marketing, services and
technology, and of defensive and offensive elements. The mix is different in
different places. This article explores the origins and differences among these
Freeviews. It provides an unusual case study of related, though different, prod-
ucts marketed under the same name in different countries. The article con-
cludes by speculating about the futures of the three Freeviews, as television
morphs into new shapes, especially encouraged by the growth of high defini-
tion, hard-drive-recording-and-playback and broadband-connected receivers.
52
a pay platform. With DTT now steering away from pay TV, BSkyB’s involve-
ment as a content provider but not a controller of transmission facilities was
less troubling for the competition regulator (Starks 2007: 80).
Freeview was immediately popular, eventually becoming the dominant
digital TV platform. Within a year, it was being called ‘this year’s most unlikely
must-have for Christmas’. The formula was finally breaking the resistance of:
53
54
Get ready for more of the same with Freeview … You can watch the same
thing on up to four different channels … You can watch sports you’ve never
heard of, news you can’t understand … There’s even an electronic program
guide to help you look up which show Channel Nine will run 20 minutes
late tonight … Freeview. I bet you can’t wait … to upgrade to broadband.
(‘Freeview: More of the Same Sh#t’)
The mainstream press was less savage but hardly more supportive, calling it
‘lipstick on a TV pig’ (Browne 2009) and ‘little more than a marketing cam-
paign to steer us towards buying Freeview-approved TV receivers and set-top
boxes’ (Blundell 2009). ‘The reason the Freeview campaign doesn’t tell you
much is simple: there’s not much to tell’ (Turner 2009).
55
UK NZ Australia
DTT Policy
Date initial policy 1996 2006 1998
settled
Date DTT services November 1998 May 2007: DTH 1 Jan 2001, progressively to
commenced 2004 in regional areas
April 2008: DTT
Initial switchover 2006–2010 Anticipated 6–10 years 8 years after commence-
date after commencement ment
Current switchover 2007–2012 Firm switchover date 2010–13: starting in coun-
date will be announced try Victoria/NSW (Mildura/
Switchover
when digital penetra- Sunraysia) first half
completed in some
tion reaches 75% of 2010, ending major cities
areas, commencing
households, or 2012, December 2013
in Whitehaven
whichever is sooner.
Target date to be
set once penetration
reaches 60% of homes
Multichannel TV 26.4 (June 1998) 45 20
take up at DTT
launch
(% of hhs)
Three Freeviews
Date Freeview 30 Oct 2002 May 2007: DTH Announced formation
commenced [ter- July 2008; appointed CEO,
April 2008: DTT
restrial/satellite] launch and roadblock ad.
November; further road-
block ad. 24 April 2009
Type of entity, Managed by DTT Non-profit consortium Owned by national public
governance Services Ltd, a company of FTA broadcast- service (ABC, SBS), com-
owned and run by its ers TVNZ (operators mercial networks (Seven,
shareholders – initially of TVOne and TV2), Nine, TEN) and regional
BBC, BSkyB and Crown MediaWorks NZ commercial networks
Castle (now Arqiva), (operators of TV3 and (Southern Cross, Prime,
ITV and C4 admitted C4), Maori TV and WIN)
later Radio NZ
Services and func- 30 TV channels plus 11–13 TV channels plus 5 TV channels each
tions offered at audio channels 3–4 audio channels simulcast in SD and HD
launch plus ABC and SBS audio
Most existing FTA Most existing FTA
channels
services, several new services, 2 new services
services Most existing FTA services,
no new services
56
UK NZ Australia
Services and 48 TV channels Broadcasters can choose TV:
functions offered whether to broadcast • All five FTA networks
24 audio channels
now (generally on Freeview satellite or offer separate SD and
mid-2009) Freeview+ branded Freeview DTT HD, so HD channels but little
products – hard drive platforms have slightly difference in program-
and DVD recorders, different offerings. ming
players and integrated
DTH (May 2009) 13 TV • ABC2 since March
digital TVs
and 4 radio 2005. ABC3 Kids fund-
Freeview also available channels: ing committed in May
as part of pay pack- • TVOne, TV2, TV3, budget, launch later
ages from BT, Setanta, C4, Maori TV, 2009
TopUp TV: eg. Top Up TVNZ 6, TVNZ 7, • Commercial network
TV Freeview+ STBs TV3 Plus 1. Ten’s OneHD [sport]
give access to Freeview since March 2009
• TVNZ Sport Extra,
channels + pay pack-
Stratos, Parliament • SBS2 since June 2009
ages and include hard
TV, Cue, Te Reo. • 9 networks GO! since
drive recording
• Radio: Radio NZ August 2009
National, Radio NZ • 7 network multichannel
Concert, George likely late 2009
FM,
Base FM. Radio
• ABC and SBS national
DTT (May 2009) has
and local stations includ-
11–12 TV and 3 radio
ing extra digital stations
channels.
launched on digital radio
July 2009
Current DTT take Q2 2009 June 2009 except Sky Q2 2009
up [% of house- • DTT/Freeview: • Freeview DTH: • DTT 53% of all house-
holds] 70.2% 10.6% holds, ranging from
• Digital pay TV: • Freeview DTT: 5.6% 22% in remote areas
49.6% • Sky digital pay TV to 75% in Mildura/
• All digital TV: 89.8% 45% [Dec 08] Sunraysia
• All digital TV 61.2% • Further 13% get at least
some FTA channels via
pay TV
57
Freeview makes it very hard for any government to try and make the
BBC a pay-television service. The more Freeview boxes out there, the
harder it will be to switch the BBC to a subscription service since most of
the boxes can’t be adapted for pay-TV.
(Gibson 2004)
58
RESISTANCE TO DTT
Resistance to DTT came from similar directions, though not identical places.
Former Thames TV, BSkyB and Channel 5 executive David Elstein argued in
2002 DTT ‘would not exist at all but for political intervention’. It was ‘a political
project designed to protect public service broadcasting’, motivated by ‘fear – of
Murdoch, of choice and of loss of control’ – and by government greed about
the potential revenue from auctioning vacated spectrum. Writing at the time of
ITV Digital’s collapse, Elstein was sceptical of the possibility and even the desir-
ability of shutting down analogue TV, and scathing about the amount of public
money poured into digital. This money came through the increase in the licence
fee to help fund the BBC’s central role and new channels, and through revenue
foregone by giving free access to additional spectrum for all the terrestrial broad-
casters and reducing the fees for continuing access to their analogue spectrum.
The failure of ITV Digital, Elstein thought, offered ministers ‘a golden chance
to detach themselves from the tar baby. History – and the British public – will
judge them harshly for failing to take it’ (Elstein 2002).
The nascent pay TV and competitive telecommunications operators in
Australia arrived late to the DTT debate, finding most of the big decisions already
effectively taken. Reviewing the entire broadcasting sector in 2000, the govern-
ment’s micro-economic advisory body, the Productivity Commission, saw digital
TV as an historic opportunity to reshape it, but was highly critical of the scheme
adopted two years earlier. It thought the digital conversion plan was ‘at serious
risk of failure’, and, in any case, continued the long history of ‘quid pro quos’ in
broadcasting regulation. Broadcasters were privileged in the allocation of spec-
trum and by legislative protection from further competition. In exchange, they
accepted continued regulation of matters like ownership (subsequently liberal-
ized) and local programming, and new obligations to transmit minimum amounts
of high definition content. The Commission wanted a more open and competitive
but less regulated broadcasting industry. ‘Rapid and certain conversion to digital
television is the key to unlocking the spectrum’ for new players and new services.
It recommended setting a firm and final date of 1 January 2009 for national ana-
logue switch off; providing for early digital conversion and release of spectrum;
59
and removing content restrictions and requirements on digital services. The first
two recommendations were not accepted. The special content restrictions were
only modified several years later, allowing the commercial networks to introduce
multichannels as well as high definition simulcasts of their existing channels
(Productivity Commission 2000).
By delaying policy about DTT, New Zealand was able to conduct the most
searching analysis of its benefits and costs. It was the only one of the three
countries that tried to assess the net benefits of the transition by comparing
it with what might have occurred anyway. The UK conducted a cost benefit
analysis but well after DTT had started. It did not compare digital switchover
with the pre-1998 analogue-only status quo, but with the then current situ-
ation, simulcasting analogue and digital signals forever. The UK study con-
cluded ‘switching off, rather than maintaining dual transmission systems, is in
the economic interest of the UK’. The New Zealand study found introducing
digital transmission without a commitment to shutting down analogue would
generate a net cost to the nation, using its baseline assumptions for take-up of
digital free-to-air and pay TV. Net benefits could be confidently expected to
accrue only if all viewers were forced to migrate (DTI/DCMS 2005; Spectrum
Strategy Consultants 2006; Starks 2007: 93–95; Given 2007: 280–286). The pre-
dictable resistance to publicly-supported DTT from pay TV interests in New
Zealand was bolstered by this independent analysis. It meant the government
needed other reasons to support DTT other than its measurable net benefits.
It found this reason in the survival of free-to-air, public service television.
60
61
TECHNOLOGY
Since they adopted DTT at different times, different possibilities were available
in New Zealand, Australia and the UK. None had much cable TV, and relied
heavily on terrestrial transmission, making the switchover task a big one. All
chose a version of the European DVB-T transmission standard. Starting lat-
est, New Zealand could be said to have achieved a late mover advantage. It
was able to choose the MPEG4 standard for terrestrial transmission and, with
the benefit of its better compression, offer high definition channels from the
outset. TVOne, TV2 and TV3 were made available in HD, although it was
stressed that few programmes would be in HD in the early stages. This bold
move prompted considerable debate behind closed doors. The HD terrestrial
box is more expensive than the satellite one – NZ$300 as opposed to around
NZ$200. But within a few months of DTT’s launch, integrated television sets
were available with the Freeview HD tuner built in. By early 2009 sales of
these integrated sets had overtaken sales of DTT decoders.
Australia too made HD available from the outset. But using the MPEG2
standard and compelled by government to transmit both HD and SD simul-
casts, there was little scope for additional content, even if the legislation had
allowed it. Starting earliest and also using MPEG2, no provision was initially
made for HD in the UK. HD was first deployed in this market by pay satellite
and cable operators. The first BBC HD channel was offered on these platforms
before terrestrial. Offering HD now is more complicated and expensive for
DTT broadcasters, who are reorganizing multiplex capacity, and for their viewers,
who need new receivers (Ofcom 2008; Holmwood 2009). Clearly, the high
take-up of Freeview in the UK has occurred without the added incentive of
HD. In Australia, however, viewers cite better picture quality as one of the
most important reasons for taking up DTT, as discussed further below. The
impact of HD on digital free-to-air take-up in New Zealand is not yet clear,
although take-up of DTT (the HD service) is now growing faster than DTH.
New Zealand also confronted the choices between satellite and terrestrial
earliest. A satellite-only platform was an option, ruled out because of the risk
of satellite failure and extra cost of a dish for non-Sky consumers. The coun-
try’s terrain, however, makes it hard to reach the entire population on a ter-
restrial platform, and a significant role for satellite was always envisaged. The
current Freeview terrestrial service reaches 75% of the population. The gov-
ernment policy accepted this meant the other 25% would need to rely on the
Freeview satellite service launched about a year earlier. Freeview would like to
extend this to 85%, but this would require further investment.
The UK answered the choice between satellite and terrestrial differently.
The regulator, OFCOM, chose to match analogue terrestrial coverage as closely
as possible with digital, requiring digital transmission from all 1100 sites cur-
rently used to get television to 98.5% of UK households (Starks 2007: 96–7).
Launching digital services from all those sites, however, would inevitably be
slow. In the meantime, BSkyB offered a multichannel satellite service available
62
FUTURES
TV’s reinvention is being helped by DTT but not simply in the ways imagined
by those who developed the technology. The initial priorities of the develop-
ers of the DVB standard adopted in the United Kingdom, New Zealand and
Australia were ‘classical or typical of broadcasting’. These included better and
more robust picture and sound quality, capacity for more channels, mobile
reception on pocket receivers, and integration with other digital media. Before
services commenced, these developmental priorities shifted. Improved defini-
tion and mobile reception became less important to Europeans; the capacity for
multichannel TV as well as radio services and digital media integration became
more important. Conditional access emerged as a priority (Reimers 2001: 9–11).
In launching and adapting DTT services, priorities shifted again, especially
about high definition TV. Throughout these processes, the three countries set
their own priorities. These, in turn, are being modified over time.
In the places where the new platform has proved most popular, the mul-
tichannel experience enabled by DTT appears to have been a significant influ-
ence. This is most obvious in the United Kingdom, where the new channels
eventually offered on Freeview were genuinely original content and not just
repeats or time-shifted channels (Iosifidis 2005). The significance of addi-
tional, highly-valued content is also demonstrated in the small markets in
Australia where digital-only channels delivered the third commercial network
that had long been available in the rest of the country. Image and sound qual-
ity, so important in the early thinking about the development of digital TV,
has played a very different role in DTT in the three markets. The lack of HD in
the United Kingdom, both when DTT launched and relaunched as Freeview,
has not prevented DTT becoming the dominant digital platform. BSkyB’s suc-
cess with satellite-delivered subscription HD channels since 2006, however,
inspired the Freeview partners to make some of their own available – first via
satellite and cable and, with a target of late 2009, on DTT as well (Plumb 2009;
Ofcom 2008).
In Australia, where commercial multichannel services were banned ini-
tially but at least some HD content was required, ‘better picture quality/better
clarity’ is the single biggest reason for a positive attitude towards digital TV
(cited by 19% of nearly 10,000 respondents in the first quarter of 2009), well
ahead of ‘more channels/programs/choice’ (13%). In addition, many cited
63
‘better reception’ (7%) and ‘better quality sound’ (3%), although the high
numbers saying either ‘indifferent/not interested’ (19%) or ‘TV not important
to me’ (8%) suggest many are buying into digital TV merely because they
know that eventually they will have to (Digital Switchover Taskforce 2009). As
Chris Tryhorn wrote of the British market:
What does Freeview’s story so far say about the development of mul-
tichannel TV? … It may be that plenty of people never really wanted
the new era of choice and are happy with a cheap one-off payment that
gives them pretty much what they had before, maybe with slighter bet-
ter picture quality. The digital revolution has been proclaimed from on
high as a Good Thing, but many viewers may have thought they had
plenty enough to watch already and now feel rather bewildered by the
dizzying range of channels vying for their attention.
(Tryhorn 2006)
In New Zealand, the early launch of a satellite Freeview service deployed dig-
ital TV as a solution to terrestrial reception problems. It is still too early to be
confident about what may drive digital take-up in a country with relatively
strong pay TV take-up (like the UK, unlike Australia) but limited government
capacity to fund new content because of the small population (unlike the UK,
more like Australia). Being a late mover with digital TV, as with analogue
black-and-white and colour, has ensured the first services are of better techni-
cal quality and use spectrum more efficiently.
Despite its capacity to deliver subscription services, DTT has not generally
been deployed for this purpose, though the UK did introduce a Top-Up option.
On the contrary, ‘Free’ has become the centrepiece of the consumer propo-
sition, encapsulated in the Freeview brand. This is a striking contrast to the
expectations that developed as the first DTT services were being planned. The
United Kingdom and New Zealand appeared to be moving towards the Peacock
Committee’s all-pay TV future; Australian commercial broadcasters were look-
ing for ways both to resist it and to be part of whatever form it took. By convinc-
ing governments to make them central parts of a universally-accessible digital
future, public service broadcasters in the United Kingdom and New Zealand
secured their own futures, at least for the time being. Turning away from sub-
scription services was a crucial part of the political deal. Governments made
up the budgetary difference. For Australia’s commercial broadcasters, ‘Free’ is a
less lucrative strategy. The advertisers that pay for most of the Free in Australia’s
Freeview may be even harder to win over than governments.
The ‘view’ in Freeview might not seem to have altered fundamentally.
More channels and better, wider pictures can seem like marginal changes to
the medium of television. The more revolutionary transformations promised
by DTT, especially about interactivity, so far have not been big factors. BBC
Red Button offers some options, but interactivity has come to television mainly
through other means. Audience participation has been enabled more success-
fully via SMS, where interaction triggers revenue. On-demand TV viewing
has been better served by broadband streaming and downloads. The BBC
has pursued this opportunity with the iPlayer, the ABC with iView and ABC
Shop Downloads, TVNZ with TVNZ ondemand. The commercial networks in
Australia and TVNZ ondemand are all offering ad-inserted downloads, like
Hulu in the United States. This is definitely not ‘The Internet On Television’.
Fanciful early claims that DTT could be the vehicle for making the Internet
64
65
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SUGGESTED CITATION
Given, J. and Norris, P. ‘Would the real Freeview please stand up?’, International
Journal of Digital Television 1: 1, pp. 51–68, doi: 10.1386/jdtv.1.1.51/1
CONTRIBUTOR DETAILS
Jock Given is Professor of Media and Communications at Swinburne
University’s Institute for Social Research and Associate Editor of the
International Journal of Digital Television. His book, Turning off the Television:
Broadcasting’s Uncertain Future, was published by UNSW Press in 2003. Full
biographical details are given at the end of the journal.
67
E-mail: jgiven@swin.edu.au
68
ANDREW STIRLING
UK-based Consultant
ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
This article is an introduction to a major spectrum opportunity that is now catch- white spaces
ing the eye of regulators, worldwide, as they seek capacity for more ubiquitous and spectrum
affordable broadband Internet access. digital dividend
At a time when the demand for spectrum has never been greater, white spaces in broadband Internet
television broadcast spectrum are a prime, largely unused, resource. Wireless tech-
nologies have advanced rapidly over the last decade, to the point where the technical
capabilities to harness white spaces now exist. The missing piece of the jigsaw has
been a regulatory framework that would allow the new applications to share the
UHF bands with the broadcast television and supporting services. However, spec-
trum regulators are now laying the foundations for this, with the United States
(FCC) and the United Kingdom (Ofcom) leading the way.
The most pressing potential application of white spaces is the extension of broad-
band Internet access. Broadcasters may benefit from this, as the popularity of inter-
active services grows.
INTRODUCTION
The flight to digital has been a time of disruption and change in broadcasting.
It presents both opportunities and challenges for broadcasters as they seek
to retain audiences and renew business models. Meanwhile other spectrum
users and economists have been eyeing the spectrum that can be released
69
70
71
Source: Ofcom.
The lack of flexibility arises from the high cost of infrastructure, scarcity of suit-
able sites and not least from the network planning process. The fact that high
power transmissions inevitably spill over international borders means that broad-
cast network planning requires extensive coordination with administrations in
72
neighbouring countries. In Region 1 (Europe, Africa, the Middle East), the first
such exercise, for analogue television in the UHF bands, was in Stockholm in
1960. The plan and rules were updated in 1997 to allow digital services to com-
mence, alongside analogue services. In 2006, the plan was replaced with an
all-digital broadcast plan covering the 120 countries in Region 1. This was a
mammoth exercise, requiring years of preparation and costing tens of millions
of Euros. This latest plan enables administrations to make changes to their own
implementation, such as introducing new services, provided they stay within
the ‘interference allowance’ that has been agreed. In principle, broadcasters
could change to lower power, more dense, transmitter networks. This would
improve indoor coverage for portables as well as reducing the impact on service
planning in neighbouring countries. However, the costs of such networks could
be an order of magnitude higher to roll-out and operate and therefore do not fit
well with current broadcast business models.
Some argue that the move to single frequency terrestrial networks (SFNs)
eliminates geographic white spaces, because no gaps need be left between
transmitter coverage areas. (The transmitters within an SFN reinforce rather
than interfere with each other, using a special feature of the digital terres-
trial modulation technology.) This is correct within the area covered by the
transmitters operating in such a network, however the SFNs themselves have
boundaries. Although, in principle, it might be possible to build SFNs cov-
ering very large regions, the differing content requirements of regions and
countries mean that such networks need to be partitioned and suitable gaps
left between those using the same frequency. Another limitation on the intro-
duction of SFNs is the spacing of transmitters – existing sites may not be suf-
ficiently closely spaced.
73
74
SHARING WORKS
Spectrum sharing is now a familiar fact of life, with millions of Wi-Fi and
Bluetooth devices in everyday use across the world, all using the 2.4 GHz
band. Whilst some experts cite interference in the 2.4 GHz band (Mass
2009: 82) as an issue, Wi-Fi hotspots and home use continue to grow.
Some features of the 2.4 GHz band are less than ideal:
• The 2.4 GHz band was considered ‘junk’ spectrum, when released by
regulators on a licence-exempt basis. Electromagnetic pollution from
microwave ovens played a major role in this. Lack of license-by-rule
capacity in other bands forced a number of different technologies to
co-habit
• In a way, the band is like a ‘wireless dark ages’ core sample in which vari-
ous stages of wireless evolution can be observed. Species arriving later,
such as Bluetooth and newer versions of Wi-Fi technology (e.g. 802.11n)
have developed better coping strategies for this interference-prone region
of spectrum and use the bandwidth available more efficiently.
75
Essentially, white spaces are a good medium for applications that require reli-
able home-wide or even neighbourhood-wide coverage. From a public policy
perspective, the most important of these is Internet access, especially given
its economic significance and the fact that many areas still lack an adequate
connection.
76
types of device acquire white space interfaces alongside other more estab-
lished interfaces.
77
HOME NETWORKING
White space networks do not need to stop at delivering content and services
to the home: UHF’s favourable propagation characteristics enable them to be
useful for in-home distribution too.
Growing consumer expectations on convenience of access to content and
services within the home is raising industry interest in developing new high
capacity in-home networks. Wireless technologies are increasingly used to
improve ease of setting up systems and reduce both the inconvenience and
negative visual impact of cabling.
Consumers want to be in control and able to access their digital content
wherever they are in their home. Even outside the home, consumers value
access to familiar content and services – as products such as those from Sling
Media have demonstrated.
As the cost of adding wireless network interfaces falls, more consumer prod-
ucts are acquiring such interfaces: particularly devices that handle digital content.
Two technical challenges must be faced as home networking embraces
in-home content distribution:
White spaces are well placed to meet these requirements and can be used
together with other license-by-rule bands. With anticipated capacity typically
ranging from 90 to 200 MHz, it should be possible for white spaces to support
multiple video connections with reliable coverage throughout the home.
IN-HOME TV DISTRIBUTION
Although many homes have a fixed rooftop aerial serving their main televi-
sion, it is far less likely to be connected to secondary receivers. Typically, these
sets are used with portable antennas, with users often tolerating lower picture
quality than could be obtained with a fixed antenna. After switchover to dig-
ital TV, however, a number of these homes may find that portable reception
is no longer usable.
In addition to serving home networking in general, white spaces could
serve to distribute content to a range of different types of receiver in the home.
Freedom from the usual broadcast coverage constraints could help enable a
much wider range of devices providing access to digital television and radio
services within the home, perhaps embedded in other objects, such as furni-
ture. It would also make hand-held receivers practical, since they would no
longer require large antennas.
78
REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
White spaces are an administrative arrangement, preserved to protect
broadcast television services from interfering with each other. The key
to their exploitation is to develop a new regulatory framework that con-
tinues the protection but allows flexibility for new applications to emerge
and flourish.
79
whilst still protecting the existing services through a simple set of device
requirements:
UNITED STATES
The United States has led the way in opening up white spaces. The Federal
Communication’s decision, in November 2008, to allow white space devices
access is a landmark in the evolution of wireless technology.
In the early years of this decade, white spaces started to attract attention
from a rather different sector of industry, in the United States. A number of
major players in the PC and Internet industry came together to support the
opening up of white spaces for new consumer applications. They included
Dell, HP, Google, Intel, Microsoft, and Philips – later becoming known as
the White Space Coalition. Their main aim was promotion of ubiquitous and
affordable broadband Internet access.
The first move occurred in around 2002, when these major technology
vendors suggested that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
should open up the white spaces in UHF. The FCC duly started a process of
inquiry into the feasibility of allowing license-by-rule access, without compro-
mising terrestrial TV reception.
This was a radical proposal, which produced an immediate, strong, reac-
tion from US broadcasters, who were appalled at the prospect of sharing their
bands. A key concern for the broadcasters was potential interference to television
reception, given that ordinary consumers might adopt the proposed white space
80
UK
The UK was ahead of other European countries in thinking about how to
exploit UHF spectrum, after the switchover to digital television, which is due
to be completed by 2012. Starting in late 2005, Ofcom’s Digital Dividend
81
Review looked at how best to proceed with allocating the 112 MHz it was
expecting could be released to new applications. The review also noted the
potential capacity in white space, but was mainly interested in white space
packages that were substantial enough to be auctioned off.
However, at the end of 2007, Ofcom committed to allowing white space
devices on a license-by-rule basis, subject to being satisfied that licensed serv-
ices and applications would be adequately protected against interference. It
therefore formed a cognitive access working-group that guided development
of the regulatory framework, culminating in the release of proposals earlier
this year (Ofcom 2009: 2). Ofcom’s proposals allow geo-location and spec-
trum sensing as alternative approaches, but are cautious on the parameters to
be satisfied by sensing-only devices.
EUROPE
Spectrum management is still a national responsibility, though EU members
put considerable efforts into coordination and harmonization. The European
Commission has been considering the potential of white spaces, request-
ing opinions from leading experts in the CEPT (the association of European
spectrum regulators) and in its own Radio Spectrum Policy Group. CEPT has
recently started its own programme of work, laying the technical foundations
for white space devices to be allowed access to spectrum.
INDUSTRY PROGRESS
With greater regulatory certainty emerging, industry has started to engage in
developing products that can tap this new capacity. The first important stage
is the creation of standards that will enable compliance with the regula-
tion and the economies of scale that will be needed to make the technology
affordable. One group of companies, called CogNeA (Cognitive Networking
Alliance), has already started the process of getting its proposals standard-
ized, through the European body ECMA (formerly the European Computer
Manufacturers Association).
A separate industry group has been working on realizing a database-
service architecture to support the geo-location approach approved by the
regulator. This is essential to the exploitation of white spaces.
CONCLUSION
In this short introduction to white spaces, I have attempted to provide an
overview of the opportunities and issues surrounding the opening up of white
spaces. The stage is set for growing interest in this topic over the coming few
years, across the globe.
The white spaces in UHF represent a major opportunity to help extend
the benefits of broadband Internet access to all. Regulators and industry
need to seize it.
82
REFERENCES
Broadcast Engineering (2008), FCC continues tests of white space spectrum, 0623,
23 June. Penton Media Inc., Kansas, USA.
Cambridge Strategic Management Group (2008), ‘Potential for more efficient
user of spectrum by wireless microphones’, p. 3, 4th November, CSMG,
London. (A report prepared for Ofcom)
FCC (2008), Second Report and Order and Memorandum opinion and Order
(FCC 08-260), 1: 85, p. 35.
Lipoff, S. (2002), ‘Exploring the Feasibility of Sharing TV Band Spectrum with
Unlicensed RF Devices’, FCC ET-Docket 02-380, 6: 3, p. 19.
Mass (2009), ‘Estimating the Utilisation of Key Licence-Exempt Spectrum
Bands’, 10: 1, p. 82. Final report, Issue 3, April, Published by Mass Consultants
Limited, Cambridge, UK.
Mishra, S. and Sahai, A. (2005), ‘How much white space is there?’ Technical
Report No. UCB/EECS-2009-3, pp. 1–13, University of California at
Berkeley, Electronic Engineering and Computer Science.
Ofcom (2006), ‘Access to interleaved spectrum for programme-making and
special events after digital switchover’, 5: 2, p. 10.
Ofcom (2009), ‘Digital dividend: cognitive access’, 2: 2 p. 2–4, 1 July.
Paramvir Bahl et al, (2009), ‘White Space Networking with Wi-Fi like
Connectivity’, SIGCOMM’09, p. 1, 17th-21st August, Barcelona, Spain.
Rose, A. (2008), ‘Evolution of the BBC iPlayer’, EBU Technical Review, 2008: 4,
pp. 1–14.
Tonge, G. and De Vries, P. (2007), ‘The Role of Licence-Exemption in Spectrum
Reform’, International journal of digital economics, 67: 3, pp. 85–106.
SUGGESTED CITATION
Stirling, A. (2010), ‘White spaces – the new Wi-Fi?’, International Journal of
Digital Television 1: 1, pp. 69–83, doi: 10.1386/jdtv.1.1.69/1
CONTRIBUTOR DETAILS
Andrew Stirling is an independent regulatory consultant, with a special
interest in spectrum and broadcast platform regulation. He currently rep-
resents Microsoft in spectrum policy and in particular on white spaces.
Other clients include BT and the BBC. After studying Physics at Imperial
College, Andrew started his career at the BBC’s Research and Development
Centre. He went on to a joint venture between Philips and Panasonic in
AV network technology and from there into Arthur D. Little, an interna-
tional management consulting company. At the ITC/Ofcom he worked on
switchover policy development and associated spectrum issues in prepara-
tion for its Digital Dividend Review.
E-mail: Andrew@larkhillconsultco.uk
83
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COMMENTARIES
NORIO KUMABE
Japan Council for Better Radio and Television
ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
Now that Germany and the USA have switched over to digital terrestrial television Japan
(DTT), Japan is one of the countries with a large number of television households digital switchover
that are preparing for digital switchover in two to three years. It is planning to digital terrestrial
switchover on 24 July 2011, in less than two years. The Japanese Ministry of Internal television (DTT)
Affairs and Communications (MIC) has accelerated preparations since 2008. This is
a brief report on the present situation concerning digital switchover in Japan.
85
DTT coverage reached 97% of Japan in June 2009. But the percentage of
households that had DTT receivers by March 2009 was estimated at 60.7%
according to the survey sponsored by MIC, which meant the remaining 40% of
Japanese television households were still watching analogue television only.
In addition, DTT broadcasts are not retransmitted at all via satellite
television. Cable television companies are retransmitting DTT programmes,
but only 40% of the television households subscribe to cable television. This
means that more households may face the risk of losing television signals
than in the USA or Germany, where 80–90% of households could watch DTT
via cable or satellite even before switchover.
PREPARATIONS ACCELERATED
MIC has accelerated preparations for the switchover, together with broadcast-
ers, electronic manufacturers and other stakeholders, by setting up 51 televi-
sion audience support centres throughout the country. The centres are now
holding many grass-roots meetings to explain what should be done at each
home in order not to lose television signals at switchover.
The government has increased subsidies to promote the penetration of
digital television receivers. Actually, it decided to grant converter boxes free of
charge to 2.6 million low-income households. It also introduced an ecological
point system; this grants payback shopping coupons to those who buy des-
ignated energy saving electronic devices including digital television sets. This
system is one of many measures taken to boost the Japanese economy, which
has been seriously affected by the current worldwide recession.
CHALLENGES REMAINING
As explained above, DTT broadcasts can be received in most areas of Japan.
However, it was estimated that only 60% of households had DTT sets or
86
SUGGESTED CITATION
Kumabe, N. (2010), ‘Preparations for digital switchover in Japan: an
update’, International Journal of Digital Television 1: 1, pp. 85–87,
doi: 10.1386/jdtv.1.1.85/7
CONTRIBUTOR DETAILS
Norio Kumabe is Senior Managing Director of the Japan Council for Better
Radio and Television, having previously been a Visiting Professor of Global
Information and Telecommunication Studies at Waseda University.
E-mail: Kumabe@gol.com
87
Digital Television
Switchover in China:
Editor’s Note
88
MICHAEL STARKS
Editor, International Journal of Digital Television
China’s Digital
Switchover:
International Context
ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
This short article introduces the subject of digital switchover in China to readers China
from other countries, providing some context and highlighting some of the distinctive digital television
characteristics of the Chinese transition, to complement the two following articles, digital switchover
submitted as a pair, by academics from the Communication University of China.
China will not be among the first group of countries to complete digital tel-
evision switchover but it will certainly be the biggest. As such, it faces some
formidable challenges. Many of these are similar to the issues facing oth-
ers: selecting technical standards; developing new digital content to attract
consumers; regulating relationships between platforms; ensuring collabora-
tion between industry players; and providing a mix of commercial and public
investment. Designing the interplay between public policy and the market is
central to digital switchover in every country.
However, in three respects, China’s situation and experience is very
distinctive:
89
A brief account of each may help position China’s digital switchover within
the framework of international comparative study.
90
91
China’s main progress towards digital switchover has so far been in con-
verting its extensive cable systems.
92
cable operators receive new revenue from the basic subscription increase but,
as in Beijing, need to supplement the basic revenue by selling subscription
services, a range of add-on services, new forms of advertising, sponsorship
and other commercial deals.
REFERENCES
Screen Digest (2007), ‘Digital TV Migration in China’, July.
Zhao, Yuezhi and Guo, Zhenzhi, Television in China: history, political economy
and ideology in Wasko, Janet, (2005), A Companion to Television, Malden:
Blackwell.
SUGGESTED CITATION
Starks, M. (2010), ‘China’s digital switchover: international context’, International
Journal of Digital Television 1: 1, pp. 89–93, doi: 10.1386/jdtv.1.1.89/7
CONTRIBUTOR DETAILS
Michael Starks, Editor of the International Journal of Digital Television (for bio-
graphical please details see end of journal).
E-mail: m.starks@ntlworld.com
93
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ZHOU YAN
Communication University of China
ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
Digital television research and development started in China in the 1980s. China Digital TV
Implementation has been underway over the last decade and the digitalization of the (DTV)
three platforms (cable, terrestrial and satellite) is in progress. Focusing on the strategic China DTV positioning
positioning of these three digital TV platforms, this article outlines the current situa- China DTV current
tion, including take-up, coverage, service pattern, government support, and the main situation
techniques – and then expounds the two problems confronting digital TV in China.
Digital television research started in China in the middle of the 1980s. In line
with a policy decision under the Media Digitalization strategy, it came into
market operation in 2001. Through the last eight years digital TV has devel-
oped in China, as the digitalization of the three platforms (cable, terrestrial
and satellite) has progressed.
95
City+ Digital About ten TV and Now given 2.5 billion RMB Compulsory
Rural terrestrial radio channels, plus state financial support for and basic
Area TV Regional Information development, to cover service.
Service capital cities, other cities Free
designated in the State Plan
and municipalities.
96
97
98
Government Affairs:
• current policy
• proposals
• administrative guides
Viewers’ ways of navigating programmes before and after using digital TV.
99
analogue). Moreover, viewing habits have changed due to digital TV. First,
there has been an increase. The data for 2007 shows that digital TV users’
average viewing time is 10% greater than that of non-digital TV users. The
wide-ranging and useful content is attractive. Second, viewing behaviour has
become more proactive, as viewers make use of the programme booking,
channel list editing, and ‘search’ functions that analogue viewers lack.
Moreover, viewers are more and more inclined to use the value-added
services of digital TV. Although watching TV is and will continue to be the
basic function for digital TV, the public information services, VOD, distance
learning and transactions are highly recognized by users. Digital cable TV in
China has come of age.
3. DIGITAL TERRESTRIAL TV
Terrestrial transmission and reception are widely used at present. Given the
scale of its coverage across very diverse areas, the process of digitalization
here will take relatively longer. China has spent nearly ten years developing
digital terrestrial TV, which is to be positioned as a free public service sup-
ported by state finance.
100
In view of all of these factors, it will take a long time to undertake the transition
from analogue to digital TV in China. Thus, a long period of coexistence of
analogue and digital signals is definitely necessary (Zhou Yan: 2009a). In order
to ensure that people can receive the basic television and radio services free,
terrestrial broadcasting organisations cannot encrypt or charge for their broad-
casts. Digital terrestrial television will be provided as a free public service.
101
subsidy to users who buy and install satellite television receiving equipment in
poor and western areas. (Zhou Yan: 2009b)
102
103
advertising agencies know that the ratings need to be adjusted in cities with
many new digital services and they take this factor into account in their business
dealings. Therefore, the advertising income of traditional TV channels is affected,
and they are not willing to promote digital TV’s development actively.
To strengthen their position, most TV stations have started subscription chan-
nels, but many of them do not operate well and are unable to make ends meet.
These facts further smother the TV stations’ passion for digitalization. However,
digitalization cannot advance without the support of content. Insufficient content
impedes the progress of digitalization. Based on the above perspectives, we can
see that content providers are in conflict with the platforms.
In fact, content providers and networks are interdependent in serving
the consumer. Thus the two should cooperate with each other, since neither
can build a healthy industry by itself (just like P&G and Wal Mart rely on
each other). How to coordinate the relationship between content providers
and networks requires hard thinking. At present, the State Administration of
Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) has focused great attention on this prob-
lem and some local broadcasting organizations have promoted better coor-
dination through equity holdings in network companies. Therefore, we hope
content providers and networks will have a harmonious future.
REFERENCES
Wang Xiaojie (2009), Media chief editor symposium, the State Administration
of Radio, Film and Television, 8 April.
Zhou Yan (2009a), ‘The positioning and development project of terrestrial
digital TV’, Journal of Media, 6: 3, pp. 30–32.
Zhou Yan (2009b), ‘When DBS meets Cable TV to Every Village’, Journal of
Media, 6: 4, pp. 34–36.
Zhou Yan, Wang Wei and Liu Shan (2009), ‘Digitalization of TV and
Broadcasting: comprehensive upgrade and innovative development, an
interview of Wang Xiaojie, director general of technology department of
the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television’, Journal of Media,
6: 1, pp. 22–25.
Zhang Haitao (2009), ‘CCBN theme lecture’, CCBN2009: Beijing exhibition
hall, 20 March.
SUGGESTED CITATION
Zhou Yan (2010), ‘The Positioning and Current Situation of China’s
Digital TV’, International Journal of Digital Television 1: 1, pp. 95–104,
doi: 10.1386/jdtv.1.1.95/7
CONTRIBUTOR DETAILS
Dr Zhou Yan is an Associate Professor of the Communication University of
China and Chief Editor of Media Magazine, which covers research into man-
agement reform and industrialization of traditional media. Her publications
include: Great Changes in China’s Media Market; New Theory of Radio and TV
Industrial Operation; A Study on Formation of the Industrial Policy of Digital TV
in China; 20 years operation of China’s Satellite TV industry; China Digital New
Media Development Strategy Research.
E-mail: zhou.yan@163.com
104
WANG WEI
Communication University of China
A Description of China’s
Digital Cable TV Services
ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
Over one third of China’s cable households have now been converted to digital TV. China digital cable TV
Most are served by a one-way network but a growing number have two-way inter- Digital TV (DTV)
active systems and China’s goal is ‘two-way interactivity and a full service’. This service
article will introduce some widely operated and typical services of China’s advanced DTV profit model
digital cable systems and their business models. There are five service types: dig- China DTV trend
ital TV broadcasting; personalized viewing services; information service; interactive
value-added service and telecommunications service. Their business models can be
divided into subscription fees and advertising rates. Then the author will discuss
development trends.
At present, China has cable, terrestrial and satellite digital television, now
that digital terrestrial TV has been trialled in over 100 cities and Chinasat-9
satellite has successfully launched the ‘Cable TV to Every Village’ project.
However, digital cable TV is the most mature platform: terrestrial and satellite
TV are still in their infancy, and are positioned for free public service but not
for commercial operations. So digital cable TV is selected for discussion in this
paper, and its business model and development trends will be analysed.
The reason why the development of digital cable television is the most
mature is because China has adopted a ‘cable first’ strategy. Since the cable
is in more than 200 cities, residents’ standard of living and spending there
are higher, and they have more spiritual and cultural needs; their needs for
105
1. TYPES OF SERVICE
While watching television programmes remains the basic service of digital TV,
digital cable has brought new ways of viewing, such as on-demand and cus-
tomizing schedules, and explored a variety of value-added services, such as
information services, online payments, and interactive games. Cable opera-
tors have been implementing two-way networks that are essential for fully
interactive services and will support the launch of further new services in the
future.
106
network operator can push a variety of video e-books to their set-top boxes dur-
ing off-peak hours, so that the farmers can watch when they wish and learn
agricultural knowledge. From the users’ point of view, this feels like interactive
television, while for the network operator it is an efficient use of bandwidth and
avoids the need for the high-cost investment of a two-way cable system.
‘The EPG is the gate keeper in a new era. It determines what the user can
see, and what can be more easily seen’ (Huang Shengmin 2002). From the
subscribers’ point of view, the EPG can provide a range of features, such as
a ‘programme parade’ for the week, content retrieval, programme booking,
channel list editing, and programme recommendation. Through these diverse
functions, the EPG can help users to get a customized and personalized view-
ing environment. It is also very common for network operators to use the EPG
interface for advertising.
With a ‘catch-up’ time shift service, cable users can watch the content
broadcast in the past and use the remote control for fast forward, rewind,
pause and other functions by time shift service. A number of operators have
provided this service, including Zibo Skynet Video Company, WASU and
Shanghai Oriental Cable Network.
107
2. BUSINESS MODELS
Subscription fees and advertising revenue are the main sources of income of
digital television.
108
3. DEVELOPMENT TRENDS
China’s digital cable TV has developed from scratch, with its own characteris-
tics. The goal is two-way interactivity and a full service and, in achieving this,
marketing will be an important factor.
109
Zhang also said that SARFT will publish customer service standards for digital
cable TV.
110
REFERENCES
General Office of the State Council (1999), Circular on Strengthening
Construction and Management of Radio and Television Cable Networks,
Beijing: The General Office of the State Council.
General Office of the State Council (2008), Policies on Encouraging the
Development of Digital Television Industry, Beijing: The General Office of
the State Council.
Huang Shengmin (2002), ‘Digital TV industry management and business
model’, Wuja Press in China, Beijing.
Media Magazine (2009), ‘The report of value-added services of cable digital
television in 12 areas in China’, 240: 27, p. 102.
Wang Taihua, Minister of the State Administration of Radio Film and
Television [SARFT, (2006), speech at The conference of National digitaliza-
tion of digital television promotion, Dalian.
Zhang Haitao (Deputy minister of the State Administration of Radio Film and
Television [SARFT]) (2009), ‘The theme speech’, China Cable Broadcasting
Network Exhibition 2009, Beijing Exhibition Hall, 21 March.
SUGGESTED CITATION
Wang Wei (2010), ‘A description of China’s digital cable TV services’, International
Journal of Digital Television 1: 1, pp. 105–111, doi: 10.1386/jdtv.1.1.105/7
CONTRIBUTOR DETAILS
Wang Wei, Ph.D., is a Lecturer at the Communication University of China
and Editorial Director of Media Magazine, which is engaged in digital new
media research. Publications include: Information Platform of the Family: New
Breakthroughs in Digital TV Business; China Digital TV Report 2007; China Digital
New Media Development Strategy Research.
E-mail: adweiwei@yahoo.com.cn
111
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CONFERENCE REPORTS
MICHAEL STARKS
Editor
Digital Television in
Developing Countries?
Reflections from the
Commonwealth
Broadcasting Association’s
Asia-Pacific Conference in
Tonga
There can be few more exotic locations to gather for a broadcasting conference
than the South Pacific Island Kingdom of Tonga, where the Commonwealth
Broadcasting Association (CBA) held its Asia-Pacific regional conference in
February 2009. Tonga lies north-east of New Zealand and east of Fiji, close
to the International Date Line. It has a population of just over 100,000 but
encompasses 171 separate islands (to which another one was recently added
113
by a volcanic eruption from the sea). Most of the people live on the main
island, Tongatapu, and it was in the capital city here that the CBA organized
its conference.
The conference delegates were drawn from Australia, New Zealand and
South Africa, India, Sri Lanka, Brunei, and Taiwan, as well as the Pacific Island
nations of Fiji, Papua-New Guinea, the Cook Islands, the Solomon Islands,
Samoa, Vanuatu and Kiribati. Digital television was a sub-set of the main
agenda, with the focus on regulatory and technical planning. Australian and
New Zealand broadcasters and regulators, in particular, had plenty of experi-
ence of the challenges of launching digital television within a strategy designed
to lead to analogue switch off. However, the conference session aimed prima-
rily to provide a forum in which to consider the relevance of digital television
to less developed and – certainly in the case of the Pacific Islands – often very
small countries.
A starting assumption, voiced by one of the Tongan representatives, was
that this was a development which could wait for a decade or two, after all
the large economically-advanced nations had completed their digital tran-
sitions, streamlined the process and brought the costs down. However, a
Fijian government representative was a platform speaker, explaining how
his country was already planning to embark on the transition, and South
Africa has already started.
Opening ceremony for the Commonwealth Broadcasting Association’s Asia-Pacific conference in Tonga.
114
• Once the main advanced economies of the world have switched fully
to digital television, analogue broadcasting equipment, from cameras to
transmitters, will slowly become obsolescent (although, of course, this can
also bring a temporary increase in second-hand discarded gear).
• In other spheres, from airplanes to audio equipment, modern technology
often penetrates developing countries quite swiftly and sits, somewhat
incongruously, within a relatively under-developed agricultural economy.
• There can be advantages in technological ‘leapfrogging’, as exemplified
by the spread of the mobile phone in countries with limited landline net-
works: if you were going to start a new television system from scratch
now, you would certainly think about an all-digital design.
• The substitution of digital terrestrial television for analogue, with a tran-
sition period of simulcasting, can take many years (just look at the UK,
where planning started in the mid-1990s and analogue switch off will be
complete at the end of 2012). Low consumer spending power and lim-
ited public funding can prolong the transition period. Therefore, even if
a developing country sees analogue switch off as at least a decade away,
there may still be a case for starting work in areas like spectrum planning.
• For small countries which belong to a wider economic group, there may
be advantage to be gained, through economies of scale, in collaborating
with like-minded neighbours, e.g. in the choice of technical standards and
the specification of equipment.
Indeed, on this last point, Rick Ellis, Chief Executive of TVNZ, having described
New Zealand’s own plans for digital switchover, stated:
115
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MICHAEL STARKS
Editor
Digital TV and
Democratic Media in
Post-Communist Europe:
Reflections from the
‘Beyond East and West’
Conference Hosted by the
Central European University
in Budapest
The ‘Beyond East and West’ conference held in Budapest in June 2009 looked
at two decades of media transformation in Central and Eastern Europe fol-
lowing the collapse of Communism in 1989. It was organized by the Center
for Media and Communication Studies at the Central European University in
Budapest, in collaboration with the International Communication Association
(ICA) and the Annenberg School of Communication at the University of
Pennsylvania. It also marked the closure of the European Co-operation in the
117
118
‘Beyond East and West’ conference at the Central European University in Budapest.
119
FORTHCOMING EVENTS
Some diary dates for events of international interest in the first half of 2010.
120
REVIEWS
The first sentence of this book is entirely factual but startling; it reminds us
that YouTube was only launched in 2005. Like all cultural phenomena, it is
now impossible to imagine life – and certainly the Internet – without YouTube.
Burgess (a Research Fellow at Queensland University of Technology) and
Green (a Postdoctoral Fellow at Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
track the website’s short but intense history with the aim of pinpointing ‘the
YouTubeness of YouTube’ [p. 39].
The most fascinating part of the book is the authors’ survey of the 4000-odd
most popular videos on YouTube between August to November 2007. This
highlights how users consume and engage with user-generated videos and
mainstream media videos in subtly different ways. One significant distinction
that emerged was that while videos sourced from mainstream media – which
incidentally had mostly been uploaded by individual users – were the most
popular in terms of number of views, it was the user-generated videos which
were inspiring most discussion and responses.
Some of the case studies, such as the analysis of Corey Delaney and his
infamous party invitation, are entertaining but now seem somewhat dated.
More recent episodes such as the Susan Boyle video and the use of YouTube
during the Iran election would obviously resonate more with readers. There
121
CONTRIBUTOR DETAILS
Abigail Thomas is Head of Strategic Development, ABC Innovation, Australian
Broadcasting Corporation, Sydney.
E-mail: Thomas.abigail.e@abc.net.au
122
Ever since the introduction of digital television began, trying to keep track of
what was happening in different countries has been far from straightforward:
the pace of change was too fast. No sooner had a short report on a country’s
position been published than it would go out of date. Regulatory bodies might
have second thoughts; companies new and old might reconsider their busi-
ness plans, or founder under market pressure. New technology variants might
come along to upset recently established certainties or to open more options.
Cautious governments were circumspect about setting dates for the closure
of analogue services, while incautious ones chose wildly optimistic timescales
for doing so, and soon had to think again. Now, more than ten years after the
first digital television services launched, markets are maturing, digital switch-
overs are taking place (or are complete) in an increasing number of countries,
and those nations yet to introduce digital services have the benefit of a clearer
road map in the example of those that have successfully gone before. Perhaps
now, because things are beginning to settle down, the editors of this new
survey, Digital Television in Europe, will find that their publication may enjoy a
longer shelf life, although they acknowledge in their introduction that change
is still happening rapidly and that their overview can only be a snapshot of a
particular moment in time.
In compiling this work the editors – Wendy Van den Broeck and Jo Pierson,
both academics at Vrije Universiteit Brussel in Belgium – have commissioned
reports on most of the countries of the EU, written in each case by nationals
of those countries, in an initiative that came from within COST – European
Co-operation in the field of Scientific and Technical Research.
Most of the contributors are academics – ranging from Ph.D. students to
professors – all of whom declare an interest in, and very often a participation
in, studies relating to the emerging and converging communications technol-
ogies and the way they might impinge upon various facets of society, with a
fashionable emphasis on interactive television and the once widely-held belief
that it will facilitate all manner of new services which feature on the e-business
and e-government wish lists. A number, in their helpful brief biographies
at the end of the book, mention their involvement with one or other of the
COST working groups. In their search for detail, these contributors have been
assiduous in trawling the byways of websites belonging to the responsible
national organizations, public and private, helpfully listing them in a handy
reference section at the end of each entry.
Twenty-three European countries within the European Union are covered
in this book. There is much detail in all the entries, some of which are longer
than others. The editors have sought to impose a common structure for each
entry: a description of the country and its TV market; an account of the intro-
duction of digital television; the present status with details of each platform
and what role the government has played. However, many contributors stray
from this, often inventing their own section titles. Some put detailed com-
parisons between platform service offerings in tabular form, but there is little
123
consistency of approach here, and many contributors choose not to use tables.
This is a pity since comparing the costs to the consumer and the multiple
service offerings of three platforms, cable, satellite and terrestrial (or in some
cases four, where IPTV services have launched) is necessarily complex, and
the effect of these inconsistencies is to make it difficult for the reader to draw
comparisons between countries.
Perhaps the most worrying inconsistency is in the treatment of interac-
tive services – or the lack of them. While some contributors have written
quite good accounts of the introduction of digital television, with references
to interactive content in passing (the entry on Spain’s convoluted roll-out is
particularly good), others have written mainly about the history of interactive
service pilots and service launches (and failures) in their country with only
the scantiest reference to the all important context of television broadcast-
ing. One wonders at times whether some of the contributors understand their
subject sufficiently well, especially since there is an almost universal lack of
discussion about the technology used by competing systems. The UK entry
gets the balance about right, and makes some useful observations about the
limitations of interactivity on a television set. This entry provides good exam-
ples of how, apart from one or two particular applications, the early hopes
of a multitude of innovative services have evaporated in the face of technical
shortcomings, usability issues, and lack of interest on the part of a public (who
much prefer this kind of thing on their computers).
Despite its inconsistencies and shortcomings, this is a useful reference
work, available at modest cost, and is probably unique outside the very
expensive subscription studies which appear from time to time from specialist
publishers.
CONTRIBUTOR DETAILS
After being a television producer for much of his career, Martin L. Bell worked
for ten years on the introduction of digital television broadcasting; first at the
BBC, where he was responsible for some early demonstrations of DTT and
formulated procedures for the digital simulcasting of widescreen programmes,
and later, he was Director of Communications for the Digital TV Group, a
cross-industry association. His book, Inventing Digital Television – The Inside
Story of a Technology Revolution, was published in 2007.
E-mail: martinbell42@btinternet.com
124
It has been many years now since the owner of a car could open the bonnet,
look at the engine inside it and, without the benefit of any specialist training,
have a fairly good idea what all the bits were for. And the kid standing on a sta-
tion platform trainspotting knew intuitively how a steam engine worked just by
looking at it. The old idea that if you used machinery you should know some-
thing about how it worked has gone, and I blame electronics. The miracle com-
munications devices of the present generation seem to be all black boxes (or in
the case of my old PC, a rather undistinguished grey) and what goes on inside
goes completely unremarked by users. Opening up the box and peering inside
doesn’t help. The worry is that as large numbers of our brightest youngsters
opt for media and communications studies at school and university, they will
qualify and proceed to their chosen careers without the foggiest idea of how the
kit actually works. Imagine having an airline pilot who didn’t know how the
aircraft functioned, and just sat there and pointed it in the right direction.
So it comes as a great relief to know that the Institute of Communications
Studies at the University of Leeds counts amongst its teaching staff Stephen
Lax, who is Senior Lecturer in Communications Technology, and the author
of this book, Media and Communication Technologies – A Critical Introduction,
which should be compulsory reading for every undergraduate heading, starry-
eyed, towards the ephemeral glamour of the media.
Lax gives capable summaries of the various communications technologies
that have appeared, including the very earliest semaphore telegraphs of the eight-
eenth century, through the appearance of telegraphy – wired in the mid-1800s
and wireless after 1900 – telephony and its wireless relative radio of the 1920s,
television broadcasting after 1936 and their digital descendants in the 1990s. He
also explores cable and satellite distribution – first with communications satel-
lites in the 1960s, then high powered satellite-to-cable-head-end distribution
(the pioneers Home Box Office and CNN in the mid-1960s) and finally direct-
to-home medium powered satellites (the original Sky TV began broadcasting in
1982). Taking a deep breath, Stephen Lax then goes on to deal with the rise of
computers, the web, mobile communications and, inevitably, convergence.
This is a broad canvas indeed, and while the brushwork (so to speak) is
deft and assured the effect in places is that of pointillism. Explanations of the
various technologies are necessarily simple and succinct, as are the accompa-
nying accounts of the social, economic and political contexts which encour-
aged each technical advance. Lax’s narrative has a clarity and bounce while
dealing with the relatively simple technologies of telegraphy, telephony
and analogue broadcasting. From time to time some basic technologies are
explained in separate boxed sections on the page with the use of diagrams.
The author is less clear when dealing with the highly complex technologies
of digital broadcasting. I can forgive him this: I struggled for years to com-
prehend MPEG coding and the modulation system COFDM, which is used
125
in DAB and DVB-T (amongst others). And I know, because I have tried and
failed to find it, that there exists no simple explanation of Coded Orthogonal
Frequency Division Multiplexing! But it is a very clever set of mathematical
tools which, even half understood, is wondrous. Lax regrettably fails to com-
municate the wondrousness of the more recently invented technologies, but
then that is not, I suppose, his main purpose, but he is good on the awe with
which the earlier technologies were greeted by an enthusiastic public.
I have some minor quibbles. In the chapter on early television broadcast-
ing Lax does not properly explain Baird’s ‘Intermediate Film System’ (a classic
technological dead end if ever there was one), or point out that extensive use
of this technique took place in Germany in the 1930s, pre-dating Baird’s adop-
tion of it. And reading about the launch of the BBC Television Service in 1936,
I was irritated at the description of the competing all-electronic system as ‘the
Emitron system’. The Emitron was the trade name of EMI’s all-electronic cam-
era tube: the system was – and is – properly called the Marconi-EMI system.
The two companies formed a partnership, with EMI concentrating on the cam-
era and studio systems, and Marconi largely on the transmitter and aerial. And
in a rather confused section, Lax says that Europe adopted the 405-line system.
This is not the case: many differing standards were in use before and immedi-
ately after World War II, but Britain was the only country to use 405-lines. And
the 625-line system was later conceived as a pan-European standard and was
universally adopted in both West and Eastern Europe and many other coun-
tries where American influence did not prevail. But these examples are surely
the understandable result of condensing a complex subject into 200-odd pages,
and seeking explanations which will require no previous technical knowledge.
The author’s sure touch largely returns in the later chapters on comput-
ers, convergence and mobile communications, in which there is more about
digital audio broadcasting technologies, and useful explanations of things like
WAP, GPRS and 3G, and of Wi-Fi and the concept of a wirelessly intercon-
nected home.
In his final chapter, ‘An Information Society?’, Stephen Lax writes a con-
vincingly measured judgement on what this ever quickening onrush of new
communications technologies means for our society. He is at pains to refute
the claims made often – by politicians seeking credit, by journalists looking
for a story, but also by widely quoted academics – that we are entering a new
‘knowledge society’ or ‘information age’ where our society will be reformed
and further democratized in a final move away from the industrial society
of the last two hundred years. In a careful critique of these views, he argues
instead that these new technologies have reinforced rather than fundamen-
tally altered the way our society is ordered.
This is a useful book, well researched and written, worth having not just
as the reference work it was probably intended to be, but because it is a good
read which offers worthwhile perspectives on the introduction of new com-
munications technologies and their social causes and effects.
CONTRIBUTOR DETAILS
Martin L. Bell’s biographical details are given at the end of the preceding book
review.
E-mail: martinbell42@btinternet.com
126
MICHAEL STARKS
Michael Starks is an Associate of Oxford University’s Programme in
Comparative Media Law and Policy. He is a leading expert in digital television
and, in particular, in the field of public policy associated with the switch of
entire nations to digital TV. He is the author of Switching to Digital Television,
published in 2007 by Intellect Books and the University of Chicago Press.
From 2002 to 2004, Michael Starks managed the UK Digital TV Project,
working for the UK Government in close collaboration with all the stakehold-
ers, to plan the strategy for the UK’s full transition to digital. Prior to that, he
led the BBC’s initial feasibility study of digital television and its Free-to-View
Digital TV Project, which culminated in the launch of Freeview. He was the
founding Chairman of the UK Digital TV Group.
Michael Starks now works in Oxford – writing, lecturing and consult-
ing on digital television. He is a member of the Senior Common Room at
Lady Margaret Hall. In 2007 he was a Research Visitor at the University of
Melbourne in Australia and in 2008 became a Visiting Fellow at the China
Media Centre at the University of Westminster. Between 2005 and 2007
he advised the New Zealand Government and, in 2008, the Broadcasting
Commission and Government of Jamaica on digital switchover policy.
JEFFREY A. HART
Jeffrey Hart is Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Bloomington,
where he has taught international politics and international political economy
since 1981. His first teaching position was at Princeton University from 1973
to 1980. He was a professional staff member of the President’s Commission
for a National Agenda for the Eighties from 1980 to 1981. He worked as
an internal contractor at the Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S.
Congress 1985–86 and helped to write their report, International Competition
in Services (1987). Jeffrey Hart’s books include The New International Economic
Order (1983), Interdependence in the Post Multilateral Era (1985), Rival Capitalists
(1992), Globalization and Governance (1999), Managing New Industry Creation
(2001), (with Joan Spero) The Politics of International Economic Relations 5th, 6th,
and 7th editions, and Technology, Television, and Competition (2004).
JOCK GIVEN
Jock Given is Professor of Media and Communications at the Institute of Social
Research at Swinburne University in Melbourne, Australia. He is the author
of Turning Off the Television: Broadcasting’s Uncertain Future and America’s Pie:
Trade and Culture after 9/11. He was previously Director of the Communications
Law Centre at the University of New South Wales (UNSW), Policy Advisor
at the Australian Film Commission and Director, Broadcasting Legislation
and Industry Economics, Department of Transport and Communications in
Canberra. His book Turning off the Television: Broadcasting’s Uncertain Future
was published by UNSW Press in 2003. His doctoral thesis about Ernest Fisk
(managing director of AWA in Sydney from 1917–44 and of EMI in London
from 1945–51) was accepted by the University of Melbourne in 2007. He
now writes, researches and teaches about communications law and policy,
especially digital broadcasting, media ownership, international trade and the
history of multinational media enterprises.
127