PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST PART 4
ALAVADO VS TACLOBAN CITY
FACTS:
Petitioner assailed the decision of the defunct
Workmen's Compensation Commission which dismissed
petitioner's death benefits claim for the death of her husband,
Ricardo Alavado, a former employee of the City Engineer's
Office in Tacloban City
Ricardo A. Alavado was employed as a carpenter-
foreman by the City Engineer's Office, Tacloban City
His last day of service was on April 19, 1974 since he
was on leave from April 23, 1974 to May 23, 1974
On August 6, 1974 when he reported to work he
suffered severe headache when he was supervising laborers
on a construction project in Leyte.
He died the following day of CVA-Cerebral
Hemorrhage.
Petitioner, the surviving spouse, filed a claim for death
benefits in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children.
Respondent city filed a notice of controversion of the
claimant's right to compensation
On March 31, 1975, the hearing officer of Regional
Office No. 9 in Tacloban City issued an award granted
petitioner of death benefits and reimbursement of burial
expenses
Respondent city appealed
Petitioner showed certified true copy of marriage cert
in the absence of marriage contract
According to P, they lived together as man and wife
continuously for a period of 35 years in their conjugal abode up
to the time of Ricardo's death
WCC dismissed the claim for the death benefit due to
lack of filiation between claimant and the deceased
To prove filiation, claiming spouse should present:
1. original marriage contract or marriage cert duly signed by
LCR -primary
2. affidavit of the claimant and at least three witnesses to the
marriage cohabitation secondary
To prove filiation of children, birth cert should be presented,
baptismal cert is not sufficient
ISSUE:
W/N a marriage certificate can satisfactory proof marital status
in the absence of any evidence to the contrary? W/N Petitioner
should be entitled for her claim of death benefits?
HELD:
SC reinstated the awarding of the claim
Rationale
Section 5 of Rule 31 of the Rules of Court provides:
That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason
is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties
were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they
would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law.
(Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee)
Marriage certificate indubitably establishes claimant's
marriage to the deceased. There was no evidence showed to
JUI NOTES
overthrow the presumption that P and the deceased were
married.
RIVERA VS. IAC
FACTS:
Corazon Legamia lived with Emilio N. Reyes for 19 years from
November 8, 1955 to September 26, 1974, when Emilio died.
During their live-in arrangement they produced a boy who was
named Michael Raphael Gabriel L. Reyes. He was born on
October 18, 1971.
From the time Corazon and Emilio lived together until the
latter's death, Corazon was known as Corazon L. Reyes; she
styled herself as Mrs. Reyes; and Emilio introduced her to
friends as Mrs. Reyes.
Emilio was Branch Claim Manager Naga Branch, of the
Agricultural Credit Administration when he died. On October
29, 1974, or shortly after Emilio's death, Corazon filed a letter
in behalf of Michael with the Agricultural Credit Administration
for death benefits. The letter was signed "Corazon L. Reyes."
The voucher evidencing payment of Michael's claim in the
amount of P2,648.76 was also signed "Corazon L. Reyes."
For using the name Reyes although she was not married to
Emilio, Felicisima Reyes who was married to Emilio filed a
complaint which Corazon Legamia was accused of using an
alias in violation of Commonwealth Act No. 142.
Commonwealth Act No. 142 provides in Section 1:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema,
television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events
where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no
person shall use any name different from the one with which he was
registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry, or with which
he was baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien, with which he
was registered in the Bureau of Immigration upon entry; or such
substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court:
Provided, That persons, whose births have not been registered in any
local civil registry and who have not been baptized have one year from
the approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil
registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic
name and one or two surnames.
ISSUE:
Did the petitioner violate the law in the light of the facts
abovestated?
HELD:
It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to
represent herself as the wife and use the name of the man she
is living with despite the fact that the man is married to another
woman. The practice, to be sure, is not encouraged but neither
is it unduly frowned upon. A number of women can be
Identified who are living with men prominent in political,
business and social circles. The woman publicly holds herself
out as the man's wife and uses his family name blithely
ignoring the fact that he is not her husband. And yet none of
the women has been charged of violating the C.A. No. 142
because ours is not a bigoted but a tolerant and understanding
society. It is in the light of our cultural environment that the law
must be construed.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST PART 4
In the case at bar, Corazon had been living with Emilio for
almost 20 years. He introduced her to the public as his wife
and she assumed that role and his name without any sinister
purpose or personal material gain in mind. She applied for
benefits upon his death not for herself but for Michael who as a
boy of tender years was under her guardianship. Surely, the
lawmakers could not have meant to criminalize what Corazon
had done especially because some of them probably had their
own Corazons.
PILAPIL VS IBAY SOMERA
FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were married in
Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, such
connubial disharmony eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce
proceeding against Pilapil in Germany. The Local Court,
Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce
on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree,
Geiling filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal
of Manila alleging in one that, while still married to said Geiling,
Pilapil had an affair with a certain William Chia. The Assistant
Fiscal, after the corresponding investigation, recommended the
dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal
Victor approved a resolution directing the filing of 2 complaint
for adultery against the petitioner. The case entitled PP
Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia was assigned to the court
presided by the respondent judge Ibay-Somera.
A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was
denied by the respondent. Pilapil filed this special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, seeking
the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her
motion to quash.
As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus
presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at
the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.
ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing
of the complaint for adultery, considering that it was done after
obtaining a divorce decree?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying
petitioners MTQ is SET ASIDE and another one entered
DISMISSING the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The TRO
issued in this case is hereby made permanent.
NO
Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be
prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the
offended spouse. It has long since been established, with
unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a
jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended
spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such
initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation
to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a
logical consequence since the raison detre of said provision of
law would be absent where the supposed offended party had
ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of
the filing of the criminal case.
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Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary
in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the
marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be
unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the
action by the former against the latter.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a
valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany,
is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is
concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on
the matter of status of persons Under the same considerations
and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband
of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery
case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at
the time he filed suit.
VILLANUEVA VS SPS. FROILAN
FACTS:
Gonzalo Villanueva, represented by his heirs, sued Spouses
Branoco to recover a parcel of land. The former claimed
ownership over the property thru purchase from Vere, who in
turn, bought the property from Rodrigo. Gonzalo declared
the property in his name for tax purposes soon after acquiring
it.
In their answer, the Spouses Baranoco similarly claimed
ownership over the property thru purchase from Rodriguez,
who in turn, acquired the property from Rodrigo by way of
donation. The Spouses entered the property and paid taxes
afterwards.
The trial court ruled in favor of Gonzalo and declared him
owner of the property, and ordered the Spouses Branoco
to surrender possession to Gonzalo. The trial court rejected
Spouses Branocos claim of ownership after treating the Deed
as a donation mortis causa which Rodrigo effectively cancelled
by selling the Property to Vere. Thus, by the time Rodriguez
sold the property to the Spouses, she had no title to transfer.
On appeal, the CA granted the Spouses appeal and set aside
the trial court's ruling. It held that the deed of donation is one
of inter vivos.
In his petition, Gonzalo seeks the reinstatement of the
trial court'sruling. Alternatively, petitioner claims ownership ove
r the Property through acquisitive prescription, having allegedly
occupied it for more than 10 years.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contract between Rodrigo and
Rodriguez is a donation or a devise?
HELD: It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked
title to Rodriguez under a perfected donation inter vivos.
First. Rodrigo stipulated that "if the herein Donee predeceases
me, the [Property] will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be
inherited by the heirs of x x x Rodriguez," signalling their
revocability of the passage of title to Rodriguez's estate,
waiving Rodrigo's right to reclaim title. This transfer of title was
perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguez's
acceptance of the disposition which, being reflected in the
Deed, took place on the day of its execution on 3May 1965.
Rodrigo's acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence
as a gift in presenti, not in futuro, as only donations inter
vivos need acceptance by the recipient.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST PART 4
Indeed, had Rodrigo wished to retain full title over the Property,
she could have easily stipulated, as the testator did in another
case, that "the donor, may transfer, sell, or encumber to any
person or entity the properties here donated x x x" or used
words to that effect. Instead, Rodrigo expressly waived title
over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her.
Second. What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the
beneficial title to the Property, evident from Rodriguez's
undertaking to "give one [half] x x x of the produce of the land
to Apoy Alve during her lifetime." Thus, the Deed's stipulation
that "the ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my
demise," taking into account the non-reversion clause, could
only refer to Rodrigo's beneficial title. Indeed, if Rodrigo still
retained full ownership over the Property, it was unnecessary
for her to reserve partial usufructuary right over it.
Third. The existence of consideration other than the donor's
death, such as the donor's love and affection to the donee and
the services the latter rendered, while also true of devises
,nevertheless "corroborates the express irrevocability of x x x
inter vivos] transfers." Thus, the CA committed no error in
giving weight to Rodrigo's statement of "love and affection"
for Rodriguez, her niece, as consideration for the gift, to
underscore its finding.
Nor can petitioner capitalize on Rodrigo's post-donation
transfer of the Property to Vere as proof of her retention of
ownership. If such were the barometer in interpreting deeds
of donation, not only will great legal uncertainty be visited on
gratuitous dispositions, this will give license to rogue property
owners to set at naught perfected transfers of titles, which,
while founded on liberality, is a valid mode of passing
ownership. The interest of settled property dispositions
counsels against licensing such practice. Accordingly, having
irrevocably transferred naked title over the Property to
Rodriguez in1965, Rodrigo "cannot afterwards revoke the
donation nor dispose of the said property in favor of another."
Thus, Rodrigo's post-donation sale of the Property vested no
title to Vere. As Vere's successor-in-interest, petitioner acquired
no better right than him. On the other hand, respondents
bought the Property from Rodriguez, thus acquiring the latter's
title which they may invoke against all adverse claimants,
including petitioner.
ROSALINO MARABLE VS MYRNA MARABLE
FACTS: Petitioner seeks the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with respondent based on his psychological
incapacity. The marriage between petitioner and respondent
was at first smooth, but turned sour shortly after they got
married. They fought frequently, which got worse when their
business ventures were failing and had financial trouble.
Another factor that lead to the escalation of their bickering was
that their children were spoiled by petitioner, and that such
made the children unsociable. Petitioner eventually had a
short-lived affair with another woman, which lead to even more
fighting. Petitioner eventually left respondent, and filed for a
declaration of nullity of marriage due to psychological
incapacity. In court, petitioner presented the findings of a
specialist, who declared petitioner was psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill his marriage obligations. The specialist
said that petitioner exhibited "antisocial behavior disorder"
which made petitioner seek too much attention to himself, and
thus making him incapable of complying with his marriage
obligations. It was stated that petitioner had a father who was a
womanizer, which lead petitioner to develop feelings of
JUI NOTES
insecurity and need for attention.
The trial court found such sufficient to declare the marriage of
petitioner void. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed said
decision. It ruled that petitioner failed to substantiate his
incapacity, to show that the problem is incurable, and that it is
rooted in a psychological problem present upon the marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marriage obligations.
HELD:
Petition is without merit.
Civil Law: It is the burden of the party asserting the incapacity
to show that said disorder is rooted in a psychological problem
and existed during the celebration of the marriage. In the case
at bar, petitioner failed to establish such. All the specialist did is
to make general assumptions that petitioner indeed has
antisocial personality disorder. There are no factual bases to
support such a conclusion. In fact, the events leading to the
filing of the suit says otherwise. The marriage between the
petitioner and respondent did have good moments. The
petitioner is also a doting father to his children, to the point of
spoiling them even. This shows that petitioner is not the self-
centered attention seeker he is claiming to be. Even his history
with his womanizing father does not completely substantiate
his claim. It can be seen that it was the general dissatisfaction
with his marriage that made him seek comfort elsewhere.
Hence, the petition to declare the marriage void for
psychological incapacity must be denied.
WIEGEL VS SEMPIO-DY
FACTS:
Karl Wiegel was married to Lilia Wiegel on July 1978. Lilia was
married with a certain Eduardo Maxion in 1972. Karl then filed
a petition in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia on the ground of
latters former marriage. Having been allegedly force to enter
into a marital union, she contents that the first marriage is null
and void. Lilia likewise alleged that Karl was married to
another woman before their marriage.
ISSUE: Whether Karls marriage with Lilia is void.
HELD:
Yes. It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first
marriage was vitiated with force because it will not be void but
merely voidable (Art. 85, Civil Code). Such marriage is valid
until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is
clear that when she married Karl, she is still validly married to
her first husband. Consequently, her marriage to Karl is
void. Likewise, there is no need of introducing evidence on
Lilia's prior marriage for then such marriage though void still
needs a judicial declaration before she can
remarry. Accordingly, Karl and Lilias marriage are regarded
void under the law.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL. VS BERMUDEZ-LORINO
Respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino and her husband were
married on June 12, 1987.
Before they got married, Gloria was unaware of her husbands
irresponsible attitude and violent character. She decided it
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST PART 4
would be safer to leave him behind. In order to support her
children, she was compelled to work abroad.
From the time of her physical separation from her husband in
1991, Gloria has not heard of him at all. She had absolutely
no communications with him, or with any of his relatives.
On August 14, 2000, nine years after she left her husband,
Gloria filed a verified petition with the Regional Trial Court
under the rules on Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family
Law provided for in the Family Code. She alleged that after
nine years, there was absolutely no news about her husband,
Francisco Lorino, and she believes that he is already dead and
is now seeking through a petition for the Court to declare that
her husband is judicially presumed dead for the purpose
of remarriage. Petition was published in a newspaper of
general circulation. RTC rendered a decision rendering
Francisco Lorino presumptively dead. Judgment immediately
final and executory. Despite judgment being final and
executory, OSG filed an appeal. RTC elevated the records to
the CA. In its decision, the CA, treating the case as an ordinary
appealed case denied the Republics appeal. Without filing a
motion for reconsideration, the Republic filed a petition for
review on certiorari under rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
HELD:
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code,
there is no reglementary period within which to perfect an
appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by
express provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are
immediately final and executory.
It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due
course to the Republics appeal and order the transmittal of the
entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals. An appellate
court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which,
by express provision of law, is immediately final and
executory. As in the case of Veloria vs. Comelec the right to
appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it
is merely a statutory privilege.
Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code,
all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in
Family Law are immediately final and executory, the right to
appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein. The
Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for
declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated
differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC decision of
November 7, 2001.It was therefore erroneous for the CA to
dismiss it for lack of merit and should have dismissed the
appeal outright for lack of jurisdiction over the case because
decision sought to be appealed is immediately final and
executory. Petition of Republic is denied.
TERRE VS TERRE
FACTS:
On December 24, 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged
respondent Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with
grossly immoral conduct, consisting of contracting a second
marriage and living with another woman other than
complainant, while his prior marriage with complainant
remained subsisting No judicial action having been initiated or
any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior
marriage of respondent with complainant.
JUI NOTES
Respondent was charged with abandonment of minor and
bigamy by complainant. Dorothy Terre was then married to a
certain Merlito Bercenillo her first cousin, with this fact, Atty.
Jordan Terre succesfully convinced complainant that her
marriage was void ab initio and they are free to contract
marriage. In their marriage license, despite her objection, he
wrote single as her status. After getting the complainant
pregnant, Atty. Terre abandoned them and subsequently
contracted another marriage to Helina Malicdem believing
again that her previous marriage was also void ab initio.
ISSUE:
(1) WON a judicial declaration of nullity is needed to enter into
a subsequent marriage
HELD:
Yes. The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent
Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the first place,
respondent has not rebutted complainants evidence as to the
basic fact which underscores that bad faith of respondent
Terre. In the second place, the pretended defense is the same
argument by which he inveigled complainant into believing that
her prior marriage or Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and
void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins
to each other), she was free to contract a second marriage with
the respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer,
knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter
to the prevailing case law of the Supreme Court which holds
that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally
free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that
the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL. VS NOLASCO
FACTS:
Nolasco, a seaman, first met Janet Monica Parker in a bar in
England. After that, she lived with him on his ship for 6 months.
After his seaman's contract has expired, he brought her to his
hometown in San Jose, Antique. They got married in January
1982.
After the marriage celebration, he got another employment
contract and left the province. In January 1983, Nolasco
received a letter from his mother that 15 days after Janet gave
birth to their son, she left. He cut short his contract to find
Janet. He returned home in November 1983.
He did so by securing another contract which England is one of
its port calls. He wrote several letters to the bar where he and
Janet first met, but all were returned to him. He claimed that he
inquired from his friends but they too had no news about Janet.
In 1988, Nolasco filed before the RTC of Antique a petition for
the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet.
RTC granted the petition. The Republic through the Solicitor-
General, appealed to the CA, contending that the trial court
erred in declaring Janet presumptively dead because Nolasco
had failed to show that there existed a well-founded belief for
such declaration. CA affirmed the trial court's decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife
is already dead.
HELD:
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST PART 4
No. Nolasco failed to prove that he had complied with the third
requirement under the Article 41 of the Family Code, the
existence of a "well-founded belief" that Janet is already dead.
Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise
has been shortened to 4 years; however, there is a need for
judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse
present to marry. However, Article 41 imposes a stricter
standard before declaring presumptive death of one spouse. It
requires a "well-founded belief" that the absentee is already
dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can
be granted.
In the case at bar, the Court found Nolasco's alleged attempt to
ascertain about Janet's whereabouts too sketchy to form the
basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was
already dead.
Nolasco, after returning from his employment, instead of
seeking help of local authorities or of the British Embassy,
secured another contract to London. Janet's alleged refusal to
give any information about her was too convenient an excuse
to justify his failure to locate her. He did not explain why he
took him 9 months to finally reached San Jose after he asked
leave from his captain. He refused to identify his friends whom
he inquired from. When the Court asked Nolasco about the
returned letters, he said he had lost them. Moreover, while he
was in London, he did not even dare to solicit help of
authorities to find his wife.
The circumstances of Janet's departure and Nolasco's
subsequent behavior make it very difficult to regard the claimed
belief that Janet was dead a well-founded one.
COJUANGCO VS PALMA
FACTS:
On June 22, 1982, respondent Atty. Leo J. Palma, despite his
subsisting marriage, wed Maria Luisa Cojuangco, the daughter
of complainant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. Thus, the latter filed
on November 1982, a complaint disbarment against
respondent. Palma moved to dismiss the complaint.
On March 2, 1983, the court referred the case to OSG for
investigation and recommendation. The Assistant Solicitor
General heard the testimonies of the complainant and his
witness in the presence of respondents counsel.
On March 19, 1984 respondent filed with the OSG an urgent
motion to suspend proceedings on the ground that the final
actions of his civil case for the declaration of nullity of marriage
between him and his wife Lisa, poses a prejudicial question to
the disbarment proceeding, but it was denied.
The OSG transferred the disbarment case to the IBP, the latter
found respondent guilty of gross immoral conduct and violation
of his oath as a lawyer, hence, was suspended from the
practice of law for a period of three years.
In his motion for reconsideration, respondent alleged that he
acted under a firm factual and legal conviction in declaring
before the Hong Kong Marriage Registry that he is a bachelor
because his first marriage is void even if there is judicial
JUI NOTES
declaration of nullity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a subsequent void marriage still needs a
judicial declaration of nullity for the purpose of remarriage.
HELD:
Respondents arguments that he was of the firm factual and
legal conviction when he declared before the HIC authorities
that he was a bachelor since his first marriage is void and does
not need judicial declaration of nullity cannot exonerate him. In
Terre vs Terre, the same defense was raised by respondent
lawyer whose disbarment was also sought. We held:
xxx respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should
have known that such an argument ran counter to the
prevailing case law of this court which holds that purposes of
determining whether a person is legally free to contract a
second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage
was null and void an initio is essential. Even if we were to
assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken
belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we are to
hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his frist marriage to
complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the
result that his second marriage must be regarded as bigamous
and criminal.
PABLO-GUALBERTO VS COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
On June 22, 1982, respondent Atty. Leo J. Palma, despite his
subsisting marriage, wed Maria Luisa Cojuangco, the daughter
of complainant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. Thus, the latter filed
on November 1982, a complaint disbarment against
respondent. Palma moved to dismiss the complaint.
On March 2, 1983, the court referred the case to OSG for
investigation and recommendation. The Assistant Solicitor
General heard the testimonies of the complainant and his
witness in the presence of respondents counsel.
On March 19, 1984 respondent filed with the OSG an urgent
motion to suspend proceedings on the ground that the final
actions of his civil case for the declaration of nullity of marriage
between him and his wife Lisa, poses a prejudicial question to
the disbarment proceeding, but it was denied.
The OSG transferred the disbarment case to the IBP, the latter
found respondent guilty of gross immoral conduct and violation
of his oath as a lawyer, hence, was suspended from the
practice of law for a period of three years.
In his motion for reconsideration, respondent alleged that he
acted under a firm factual and legal conviction in declaring
before the Hong Kong Marriage Registry that he is a bachelor
because his first marriage is void even if there is judicial
declaration of nullity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a subsequent void marriage still needs a
judicial declaration of nullity for the purpose of remarriage.
HELD:
Respondents arguments that he was of the firm factual and
legal conviction when he declared before the HIC authorities
that he was a bachelor since his first marriage is void and does
not need judicial declaration of nullity cannot exonerate him. In
Terre vs. Terre, the same defense was raised by respondent
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST PART 4
lawyer whose disbarment was also sought. We held: assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken
xxx respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we are to
have known that such an argument ran counter to the hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to
prevailing case law of this court which holds that purposes of complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the
determining whether a person is legally free to contract a result that his second marriage must be regarded as bigamous
second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage and criminal.
was null and void an initio is essential. Even if we were to

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