LABOR LAW 1 CASE DIGEST PART 2
CASE FACTS
PLDT VS. NLRC >Amparo Balbastro was employed by petitioner in 1978 as its telephone operator.
(G.R. NO. 157202, >She was dismissed by petitioner for her absences without authorized leave due to
March 28, 2007) unconfirmed sick leave on June 28 to July 14, 1989, which constituted her third
Offense punishable by dismissal under petitioner's rules and regulations.
>Balbalstro filed a Complaint with the Labor Arbiter against PLDT and its President,
Antonio Cojuangco, for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salary wage, premium pay for
rest day, 13th month pay, and damages.
>She contended that despite her presentation of medical certificates from her attending
physicians which were not considered by petitioner's medical doctors.
> PLDT filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that private respondent's habitual and
unjustified absences was a just and valid cause for her termination under its rules and
regulations.
> Petitioner's doctor, Dr. Eduardo Co, confirmed private respondent's leave of absence
from August 6 to 8, 1989 but did not confirm the rest because her absences from August
9 to 12, 1989 were not covered by a medical certificate her illness did not warrant
prolonged absence and it was medically impossible for her to contract the same illness
which she contracted the previous month since it is a medical fact that there is no such
thing as an immediately recurrent viral infection.
>The Labor Arbiter held that private respondent's first incident of absence from March 19
to 29, 1989 were unauthorized but not as to the other succeeding absences.
> The Labor Arbiter gave more credence to the doctor who actually attended to private
respondent rather than to the medical opinion of petitioner's doctors. It concluded that
petitioner's doctors should have coordinated with private respondent's attending
physicians to settle any doubts as to the medical certificates.
>The NLRC found that company practice allows leave of absence due to sickness if
supported by a medical certificate issued by the attending physician that a difference in
opinion by the Medical Director from that of the attending physician should not prejudice
private respondent since the Medical Director can consider absences unauthorized only
in cases of forgery and patent abuse of sick leave privileges which were not proven in
this case that if the Medical Director entertained doubts as to the
medical certificate, he should have asked the attending physician to submit himself
for cross examination and then present an independent physician for an expert opinion
on the matter.
STAR PAPER > Star Paper Corp. is a corporation engaged in trading principally of paper products.
CORP. VS. SIMBOL Josephine Ongsitco is its Manager of the Personnel and Administration Department
ET.AL. while Sebastian Chua is its Managing Director.
(G.R. NO. 164774, >Ronaldo Simbol was employed by the company on October 27, 1993. He met Alma
April 12, 2006) Dayrit, also an employee of the company, whom he married on June 27, 1998. Prior to
the marriage, Ongsitco advised the couple that should they decide to get married, one of
them should resign pursuant to a company policy promulgated in 1995. Simbol resigned
on June 20, 1998 pursuant to the company policy.
> Comia was hired by the company on February 5, 1997. She met Howard Comia, a co-
employee, whom she married on June 1, 2000. Ongsitco likewise reminded them that
pursuant to company policy, one must resign should they decide to get married.
Comia resigned on June 30, 2000.
>Estrella was hired on July 29, 1994. She met Luisito Zuiga (Zuiga), also a coworker.
Petitioners stated that Zuiga, a married man, got Estrella pregnant. The company
allegedly could have terminated her services due to immorality but she opted to resign
on December 21, 1999.
RJP NOTES 2016
ISSUE RULING
W/N Amparo Balbastro was illegally >The burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for just and valid cause
dismissed for abusing her sick leave and failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal was not justified and, therefore, was
privileges. illegal. For dismissal to be valid, the evidence must be substantial and not arbitrary and must be
founded on clearly established facts. We find that petitioner had discharged this burden.
-NO, Private respondent was validly >Private respondent's unconfirmed absences from June 28 to July 14, 1989 is the crucial period in
dismissed by petitioner. this particular case.
>The medical certificate issued by Dr. Damian showed that private respondent was under his
professional care from June 25 to July 12, 1989. However, the medical progress note dated
October 10, 1989 of the same doctor showed that private respondent consulted him only on June
25, 27, and 29, 1989. It was never mentioned that Dr. Damian had seen private respondent after
June 29, 1989. Thus, there was even a discrepancy between the medical certificate dated July 13,
1989 and the medical progress note as to the time frame that private respondent was seen by Dr.
Damian. The medical certificate did not cover private respondent's absences from July 13 to 14,
1989 and she only reported for work on July 15, 1989.
>It bears stressing that from the time private respondent called in sick on June 25,
1989 due to sore eyes, she never called up petitioner again until she reported for work on July 15,
1989. She never went to petitioner's doctors for them to verify her sickness.
> Private respondent had committed the first two offenses of unauthorized absences in the same
year. First, she did not report for work from March 19 to 29, 1989 without notice to petitioner, thus
her absence was treated as unauthorized and considered her first offense for which she was
penalized with suspension. Second, she again did not report for work from June 5 to 13, 1989 and
when she reported for work and presented her medical certificate, it covered the period from June
5 to 8, 1989 only but she did not report for work until June 14, 1989. Petitioner's doctor did not
confirm her absences from June 11 to 13, 1989, thus, the same was considered unauthorized and
her second offense for which she was penalized again with suspension. These two unauthorized
absences together with her third unauthorized absences committed from June 28 to July 14, 1989
are sufficient bases for petitioner's finding that private respondent patently abused her sick leave
privileges.
>It had also been established that petitioner's doctors confirmed most of her sick leave out of
compassion and that her medical records showed that there were several warnings given her
regarding her unconfirmed sick leave.
>The law in protecting the rights of the employees authorizes neither oppression nor self-
destruction of the employer. It should be made clear that when the law tilts the scale of justice in
favor of labor, it is but a recognition of the inherent economic inequality between labor and
management. Justitia nemini neganda est (Justice is to be denied to none).
Whether the policy of the employer >The cases of Duncan and PT&T instruct us that the requirement of reasonableness must be
banning spouses from working in the clearly established to uphold the questioned employment policy. The employer has the burden to
same company violates the rights of the prove the existence of a reasonable business necessity.
employee under the Constitution and the >We do not find a reasonable business necessity in the case at bar.
Labor Code or is a valid exercise of >Petitioners' sole contention that "the company did not just want to have two (2) or more of its
management prerogative. employees related between the third degree by affinity and/or consanguinity" is lame. That the
second paragraph was meant to give teeth to the first paragraph of the questioned rule is evidently
not the valid reasonable business necessity required by the law.
>It is significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired after they were found fit for
the job, but were asked to resign when they married a coemployee. Petitioners failed to show how
the marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of
the Repacking Section, could be detrimental to its business operations. Neither did petitioners
explain how this detriment will happen in the case of Wilfreda Comia, then a Production Helper in
the Selecting Department, who married Howard Comia, then a helper in the cuttermachine.
The policy is premised on the mere fear that employees married to each other will be less efficient.
If we uphold the questioned rule without valid justification, the employer can create policies based
 LABOR LAW 1 CASE DIGEST PART 2
> Respondents offer a different version of their dismissal. Simbol and Comia allege that
they did not resign voluntarily they were compelled to resign in view of an illegal
company policy.
>As to respondent Estrella, she alleges that she had a relationship
with co-worker Zuiga who misrepresented himself as a married but separated man.
After he got her pregnant, she discovered that he was not separated. Thus, she
severed her relationship with him to avoid dismissal due to the company policy.
>Respondents later filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive dismissal,
separation pay and attorney's fees. They averred that the aforementioned company
policy is illegal and contravenes Article 136 of the Labor Code. They also contended that
they were dismissed due to their union membership.
>On May 31, 2001, Labor Arbiter Melquiades Sol del Rosario dismissed the complaint
for lack of merit saying that the company policy was decreed pursuant to what the
respondent corporation perceived as management prerogative.
>On appeal to the NLRC, the Commission affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter on
January 11, 2002.
ACUA VS. CA >Petitioners are Filipino overseas workers deployed by private respondent Join
(G.R. No. 159832, International Corporation (JIC), a licensed recruitment agency, to its principal, 3D Pre-
May 5, 2006) Color Plastic, Inc., (3D) in Taiwan, Republic of China, under a uniformly-worded
employment contract for a period of two years to which they paid a placement fee of
P14,850.00 as evidenced by receipts.
>Upon arriving in Taiwan, they discovered that they had unsatisfactory working and living
conditions for a lower salary than the contract they signed before leaving the Philippines.
>They informed their employer that they wanted to return home, which they were
allowed to do after signing a waiver. When they came back, they demanded that JIC
return their placement fees and plane fares, which the respondent refused to do.
However, the private respondents later on offered a settlement.
>Petitioners, invoking Republic Act No. 8042, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and
non-payment/underpayment of salaries or wages, overtime pay, refund of transportation
fare, payment of salaries/wages for 3 months, moral and exemplary damages, and
refund of placement fee before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
> Labor arbiter: ruled in favor of petitioners
>NLRC: ruled partially in favor of private respondents
>CA: ruled in favor of respondents
G & M PHILS, INC >Cuambot was an overseas worker who was deployed to Saudi Arabia to work as a car
VS. CUAMBOT bodybuilder in Al Waha Workshop in Unaizah City, by petitioner G & M Philippines.
(G.R. No. 162308, Before his two year contract was terminated Cuambot returned to the Philippines where
November 22, 2006) he filed a complaint in the NLRC against his recruitment agency, herein petitioner, for
unpaid wages, withheld salaries, refund of plane ticket and repatriation bond, later
amended to include illegal dismissal, claim for the unexpired portion of his employment
contract, actual, exemplary and moral damages, and attorneys fees.
RJP NOTES 2016
Whether petitioners were illegally
dismissed under Rep. Act No. 8042, thus
entitling them to benefits plus damages.
>No.
>However, SC rule that private
respondents are solidarily liable with the
foreign principal for the overtime pay
claims of petitioners.
>On the award of moral and exemplary
damages, we hold that such award lacks
legal basis. No bad faith in the part of
respondents.
>whether or not the respondents
signatures are mere forgeries
>whether respondent executed the
resignation letter
on an unproven presumption of a perceived danger at the expense of an employee's right to
security of tenure. Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one employee marries
a coemployee, but they are free to marry persons other than coemployees.
The questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it creates
a disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only way it could pass judicial
scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect.
The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the questioned policy
cannot prejudice the employee's right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based upon
stereotypes of married persons working together in one company.
>Lastly, the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our jurisdiction
cannot benefit the petitioners. The protection given to labor in our jurisdiction is vast and extensive
that we cannot prudently draw inferences from the legislature's silence that married persons are
not protected under our Constitution and declare valid a policy based on a prejudice or stereotype.
Thus, for failure of petitioners to present undisputed proof of a reasonable business necessity, we
rule that the questioned policy is an invalid exercise of management prerogative. Corollarily, the
issue as to whether respondents Simbol and Comia resigned voluntarily has become moot and
academic.
>As we have held previously, constructive dismissal covers the involuntary resignation resorted to
when continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable or unlikely when there is a
demotion in rank or a diminution in pay or when a clear discrimination, insensibility
or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to an employee.
>In this case, the appellate court found that petitioners did not deny that the accommodations were
not as homely as expected. In the petitioners memorandum, they admitted that they were told by
the principal, upon their arrival, that the dormitory was still under construction and were requested
to bear with the temporary inconvenience and the dormitory would soon be finished. We likewise
note that petitioners did not refute private respondents assertion that they had deployed
approximately sixty other workers to their principal, and to the best of their knowledge, no other
worker assigned to the same principal has resigned, much less, filed a case for illegal dismissal.
>To our mind these cited circumstances do not reflect malice by private respondents nor do they
show the principals intention to subject petitioners to unhealthy accommodations. Under these
facts, we cannot rule that there was constructive dismissal.
>Private respondents also claim that petitioners were not entitled to overtime pay, since they had
offered no proof that they actually rendered overtime work. Petitioners, on the other hand, say that
they could not show any documentary proof since their employment records were all in the custody
of the principal employer. It was sufficient, they claim, that they alleged the same with particularity.
On this matter, we rule for the petitioners. The claim for overtime pay should not have been
disallowed because of the failure of the petitioners to substantiate them.
>The claim of overseas workers against foreign employers could not be subjected to same rules of
evidence and procedure easily obtained by complainants whose employers are locally based.
>While normally we would require the presentation of payrolls, daily time records and similar
documents before allowing claims for overtime pay, in this case, that would be requiring the near-
impossible.
>To our mind, it is private respondents who could have obtained the records of their principal to
refute petitioners claim for overtime pay. By their failure to do so, private respondents waived their
defense and in effect admitted the allegations of the petitioners.
>After examination of the evidence on record, the petition must fail. The petitioners attempts at
establishing its case are not enough to convince the court of the veracity of its claims. Amongst
other things, the petitioner failed to submit the original copies of the pay slips and the resignation
letter to prove that they were actually penned by respondent, they failed to submit an original copy
of the employment contract to prove that they had actually given a copy of such to respondent for
him to sign, and a cursory look at the resignation letter and the handwritten payslips show that they
were written by one person. Indeed, the rule is that all doubts in the implementation and the
 LABOR LAW 1 CASE DIGEST PART 2
>Petitioner, in defense, presented copies of 7 payslips issued in favor of Cuambot.
Cuambot countered that his signatures in the payslips were forged and further claims
that he never got his salaries except only for the SAR100 as monthly
allowance. G&M answered back by saying that there was great possibility that Cuambot
had changed his signature while abroad so that he could file a complaint or illegal
dismissal upon his return.
NAVARRO VS. >Alberto Navarro was an employee of the respondent CocaCola Bottlers Phils., Inc.
COCACOLA (CocaCola) for more than a decade. Specifically, he worked as a forklift operator for
(G.R. No. 162583, CocaCola from November 1, 1987 to February 27, 1998.
June 8, 2007) > On August 11, 1997, petitioner did not report to work because of heavy rains which
flooded the entire barangay where he resided. He was required to explain in writing
within 24 hours why no disciplinary action should be imposed on him for his tenth
absence without permission. In response, petitioner submitted a written explanation
accompanied by a Certification from his Barangay Captain, stating that his absence was
due to heavy rains and subsequent flooding that hit his barangay. Later, petitioner filed a
Supplemental Written Explanation, in lieu of answers to a questionnaire provided by the
company. Petitioner stated that on August 11, 1997, his house was heavily flooded and
that on the next day, he immediately filed an application for leave of absence. Despite his
compliance and explanation, petitioner was dismissed on February 27, 1998 and given a
notice of termination which enumerated the dates of his absences without permission.
>Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter, which
was dismissed for lack of merit.
>The NLRC reversed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter
>The Court of Appeals annulled the resolution of the NLRC.
LTRA VS. VENUS >A 10-year Agreement between the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) and the Metro
ET.AL. Transit Organization Inc. Was declared void by the Commission on Audit thus the LRTA
(G.R. No. 163782, purchased all the shares of stock of MTOI and formally declared it as a wholly-owned
March 24, 2006) subsidiary. The Agreement expired in 1994 and was extended on a month-to-month
basis. In July, 2000, the rank-and-file employees of Metro stated a strike which resulted
in paralysing the operations of the LRT subsequently, the LRT decided not to renew the
contract Metro ceased its operation in September, 2000. Respondents, employees of
Metro, claimed monetary benefits from the LRTA.
>Respondent Pili, aside from monetary claims, also filed a complaint for illegal dismissal,
averring that he was employed as Liaison Assistant from 1984 up to September, 2000.
The other respondents asserted monetary benefits invoking Article 4.05 of the
Agreement, where LRTA contractually bound itself to shoulder and provide all Operating
Expenses of Metro. Operating Expenses is defined in the Agreement as:
RJP NOTES 2016
>WHETHER PETITIONERS
APPLICATION FOR LEAVE OF
ABSENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN
ALLOWED BY THE
COMPANY
>YES
>Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction
over the LRTA.
>Whether or not the LRTA is liable for
monetary claims of the respondents.
The petition has no merit
interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, in order to give effect to the
policy of the State to afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and
employers, and to assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security
of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. It is a well-settled doctrine, that if doubts exist
between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be
tilted in favor of the latter. It is a time-honored rule that in controversies between a laborer and his
master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of agreements and
writing should be resolved in the formers favor. The policy is to extend the doctrine to a greater
number of employees who can avail of the benefits under the law, which is in consonance with the
avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection of labor. Moreover, one who pleads
payment has the burden of proving it. The reason for the rule is that the pertinent personnel files,
payrolls, records, remittances and other similar documents which will show that overtime,
differentials, service incentive leave, and other claims of workers have been paid are not in the
possession of the worker but in the custody and absolute control of the employer. Thus, the burden
of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged with payment falls on the
debtor, in accordance with the rule that one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Only
when the debtor introduces evidence that the obligation has been extinguished does the burden
shift to the creditor, who is then under a duty of producing evidence to show why payment does not
extinguish the obligation In this case, petitioner was unable to present ample evidence to prove its
claim that respondent had received all his salaries and benefits in full.
>On this point, we are in agreement that petitioners application for leave should have been
approved by the company. His absence was due to a fortuitous event outside of petitioners
control.
>In our view, petitioner had no wrongful, perverse or even negligent attitude, intended to defy the
order of his employer when he absented himself. He did so because heavy rains flooded their
residential area which was along the railroad. In his favor, the Barangay Captain certified that
indeed there was flooding in their place of residence.
>A worker cannot be reasonably expected to anticipate times of sickness nor emergency.
Hence, to require prior notice of such times would be absurd. He can only give proper notice after
the occurrence of the event which is what petitioner did in this case.
>We reiterate that the State policy is to afford full protection to labor. When conflicting
interests of labor and capital are weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence of
capital should be counterbalanced by the compassion that the law accords the less privileged
workingman. Under Article 279of the Labor Code, an employee who is unjustly
dismissed is entitled to reinstatement, without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, and to
the payment of full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary
equivalent, computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him.
Jurisdiction of the NLRC over LRTA Monetary Claims
>All of the respondents allege that they were employed by Metro. Thus, there is no real issue as
far as the employer-employee relationship is concerned the respondents themselves do not
claim to be employed by LRTA. While Pili claims that LRTA should also be considered his true
employer based on the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, this argument, as discussed below is
baseless and erroneous. The employees were employed solely by Metro as Metro and LRTA each
maintained their separate juridical personalities. We have already consistently recognized, in clear
and categorical terms, that LRTA, even after it purchased all the shares of stock of Metro,
maintained and continued to have its separate and juridical personality. Nonetheless, the
argument of LRTA that only the CSC may exercise jurisdiction over it even for monetary claims,
must necessarily fail.
>The NLRC acquired jurisdiction over LRTA not because of the employer-employee relationship of
the respondents and LRTA (because there is none) but rather because LRTA expressly assumed
 LABOR LAW 1 CASE DIGEST PART 2
x x x all salaries, wages and fringe benefits (both direct and indirect) up to the rank of
Manager, and a lump sum amount to be determined annually as top Management
compensation (above the rank of Manager up to the President).
>The respondents, except Pili, further allege that LRTA sanctioned and approved all the
CBAs Metro entered with its employees that LRTA and Metro jointly declared the
continued implementation of the Agreement and that there would be no interruption in
the employment of the employees of the former MTOI (now Metro).
>LRTA argues that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case as it is a government-
owned and controlled corporation, and that only the Civil Service Commission (CSC) can
take cognizance of the matter. Further, LRTA maintains that it has a separate legal
personality from Metro, and thus there can be no illegal dismissal and no basis for the
monetary claims of the employees of Metro.
>The Labor Arbiter ruled in favour of all the respondents. The NLRC partially granted
LRTAs appeal and ruled that Pilis dismissal was valid on account of the termination of
the Agreement between Metro and LRTA.
>The CA, on the other hand, reversed the NLRC ruling. It held that Pili was illegally
dismissed as the expiration of the Agreement between LRTA and Metro was not a valid
ground to terminate Pilis employment.
PEOPLE VS. >Accused Antonio Nogra is the operations manager of Loran International Overseas
NOGRA Recruitment Agency, a duly licensed overseas employment agency. He was assigned in
(G.R. No. 170834, the Naga City Branch office with the added responsibility of handling the advertisement
August 29, 2008) as well. The main office of the agency is in Libertad Mandaluyong and owned by Lorna
Orciga and Kataru Tanaka. Private complainants all applied at the branch office where
Nogra is assigned. They paid the placement fee but the agencywas unable to deploy
them. The agency was also unable to return the amount paid upon demand, prompting
the complainants to institute the criminal case of illegal recruitment in a large scale
against the agency, its owners and petitioner. Nogra was the only one arraigned as the
others still remained at large. Nogra contends is that he is just a mere employee and that
all the money paid was deposited into the account of Lorna Orciga and he did not retain
any portion of the same.
RJP NOTES 2016
particularly to update the Metro Inc. Employees Retirement Fund and to ensure that it fully covers
all the retirement benefits payable to the employees of Metro.
and existing pursuant to an original charter (Executive Order No. 603) and that they are
employer. We find this argument untenable. Pili cannot claim to be employed by LRTA merely on
Is the complainant guilty of illegal
recruitment in large scale despite being a
mere employee? Laws Applicable: Article
13(b) of the Labor Code and RA 8042
the monetary obligations of Metro to its employees. In the Agreement, LRTA was obligated to
reimburse Metro for the latters Operating Expenses which included the salaries, wages and fringe
benefits of certain employees of Metro. Moreover, the Board of Directors of LRTA issued
Resolution No. 00-44 where again, LRTA assumed the monetary obligations of Metro more
> As such, the NLRC may exercise jurisdiction over LRTA on the issue of the monetary obligations.
Jurisdiction of the NLRC over LRTA Illegal Dismissal
>However, as far as the claim of illegal dismissal is concerned, we find that NLRC cannot exercise
jurisdiction over LRTA. The NLRC and Labor Arbiter erred when it took cognizance of such matter.
In Hugo v. LRTA, we have already addressed the issue of jurisdiction in relation to illegal dismissal
complaints, to wit: The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC do not have jurisdiction over LRTA.
Petitioners themselves admitted in their complaint that LRTA is a government agency organized
employees of METRO.3 (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)
>Pili admits that he was employed by Metro. However, in the same breath, he argues that the
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil should be applied and LRTA should also be considered his
the bare allegation that the corporate veil must be pierced based on LRTAs ownership of the
shares of stock of Metro. This Court has already rejected such proposition there is no sufficient
evidence to support the application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil and LRTA, even
after it purchased all the shares of stock of Metro, maintained and continued to have its separate
juridical personality.
Worse, if LRTA was his true employer, as he claims, it is CSC which would have jurisdiction to hear
his complaint against LRTA. LRTA is a government-owned and controlled corporation any
allegation of illegal dismissal against it by its employees should have been brought to the CSC.
However, the fact remains that Pili was an employee of Metro alone the Labor Arbiter and NLRC
could not have acquired jurisdiction over LRTA insofar as the illegal dismissal complaint is
concerned.
Monetary Claims of the Former Employees of Metro
The respondents, except Pili, all have purely monetary claims against LRTA. They all anchor their
claims on the Agreement, more particularly the definition of Operating Expenses in relation to
Article 4.05.1 thereof, which states that LRTA shall reimburse Metro for the latters Operating
Expenses. Moreover, LRTAs Resolution No. 00-44 provides that LRTA assumes the obligation to
ensure full payment of the retirement/separation pay of the employees of Metro. LRTA had already
paid the first fifty percent (50%) of the separation pay to some of the employees of Metro.
Therefore, the respondents, except Pili, are merely claiming their unpaid balance, or the unpaid
separation pay, unpaid wages and other benefits which have accrued during their employment with
Metro.
>Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed Nogras conviction of life imprisonment and penalty of
P500,000. The Court held that appellant Nogra is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale even if
he is a mere employee. RA 8042 sufficiently broadened the concept of illegal recruitment in adding
that a non licensee or non-holder along with licensees and holders of authority. The illegal
recruitment has been committed against more than three persons which squarely puts the same
under the ambit of the law defining illegal recruitment in large scale. He is nevertheless guilty of
illegal recruitment in large scale because of the provision of Section 6 of RA 8042 providing that
principals, accomplices and accessories are included in those that may be charged and in case of
juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of the business. In the case
at bar, he is guilty of the same as his job title of Operations Manager, makes him an active and
conscious participant of the recruitment process.
>Opinion: I concur with the Courts decision. In my opinion, Nogra, being a mere employee in
charge of recruitment and advertisement, is still an active participant of failure to deploy the
 LABOR LAW 1 CASE DIGEST PART 2
PEOPLE VS. > Accused Ruth, Monchito, Eddie, Avelin Sulaiman and Marcos (appellant), all surnamed
BRION Ganigan, were charged with illegal recruitment.
(G.R. No. 178204, > The three private complainants Leonora Domingo (Leonora), Mauro Reyes (Mauro),
August 20, 2008) and Valentino Crisostomo (Valentino) narrated that they first met appellant in the house
of Manolito Reyes in Plaridel, Bulacan in June 1998. Appellant allegedly made
representations to private complainants, among others, that his
brother, Monchito, and his sisterinlaw, Ruth, had the capacity to recruit apple and grape
pickers for employment in New Zealand.
> Ruth and appellant allegedly promised them that they would leave for New Zealand
before October 1998. When they were unable to leave, however, they were told that their
prospective employer would arrive in the Philippines on 22 November 1998. On the
designated date, they were informed that their prospective employer fell down the
stairway of the airplane. An interview was then scheduled on 29 December 1998 but on
that day, they were told that their prospective employer had been held up. This prompted
the complainants to go to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to
check on the background of the accused.
> They learned that appellant, Ruth and Monchito do not have the authority to recruit
workers for employment abroad. Certifications to that effect were issued by the POEA.
>Appellant denied having recruited private complainants for work abroad. He claimed
that he himself was also a victim as he had also paid P3,000.00 for himself and
P2,000.00 for his daughter. He likewise attended the bible study sessions as a
requirement for the overseas employment. He contended that he was merely implicated
in the case because he was the only one apprehended among the accused.
>The trial court rendered judgment convicting appellant of the crime of illegal
recruitment.
>On 14 November 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision.
PEOPLE VS. > Charlie Comila, Aida Comila and one Indira Ram Singh Lastra were charged with
COMILA Illegal Recruitment committed in large scale by a syndicate.
(G.R. No. 171448, > Estafa cases were also filed against the same accused.
February 28, 2007) > Of the three accused named in all the aforementioned two sets of Informations, only
accused Aida Comila and Charlie Comila were brought under the jurisdiction of the trial
court, the third, Indira Ram Singh Lastra, being then and still is at large.
> Of the twelve (12) complainants in both the illegal recruitment and estafa charges, the
prosecution was able to present only seven (7) of them.
> October 3, 2000, the trial court found both accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crimes of Illegal Recruitment committed in large scale by a syndicate.
> On December 29, 2005, the appellate court affirmed that of the trial court.
> On the charge of illegal recruitment, this appellant argues that she was merely trying to
help the applicants to process their papers, believing that Indira Ram Sighn Lastra and
Erlinda Ramos would really send the applicants to Italy. With respect to coappellant
Charlie Comila, the defense submits that the prosecution miserably failed to prove his
participation in the illegal recruitment and estafa.
RJP NOTES 2016
Whether Marcos Ganigan is liable for
illegal recruitment.
>YES.
Whether Sps. Comila were liable for illegal
recruitment in large scale by a syndicate.
>YES.
applicants. As operations manager, he has the task of overseeing that the applicants will be
successfully deployed to job to which the agency promised them. His duties and responsibilities
are not confined within recruitment alone. His duty extends until the applicants are deployed. It
may be true that the money paid by the applicants were paid to Orciga. His being not able to profit
from such act of failure to deploy the complainant does not exempt him from liability. Thus, I
believe that the Courts rendered the right decision
>The crime of illegal recruitment is committed when these two elements concur: (1) the offenders
have no valid license or authority required by law to enable them to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers and (2) the offenders undertake any activity within the
meaning of recruitment and placement defined in Article 13(b) or any prohibited practices
enumerated in Article 34 of the Labor Code. In case of illegal recruitment in large scale, a third
element is added that the accused commits the acts against three or more persons, individually or
as a group.
>Since appellant, along with the other accused, made misrepresentations concerning their
purported power and authority to recruit for overseas employment, and in the process collected
from private complainants various amounts in the guise of placement fees, the former clearly
committed acts constitutive of illegal recruitment. In fact, this Court held that illegal recruiters need
not even expressly represent themselves to the victims as persons who have the ability to send
workers abroad. It is enough that these recruiters give the impression that they have the ability to
enlist workers for job placement abroad in order to induce the latter to tender payment of fees.
> It is clear from the testimonies of private complainants that appellant undertook to recruit them
for a purported employment in New Zealand and in the process collected various amounts from
them as assurance fees and other fees related thereto.
> Verily, we agree with the OSG that the testimonies of private complainants have adequately
established the elements of the crime, as well as appellants indispensable participation therein.
Appellant recruited at least three persons, the private complainants in this case, giving them the
impression that he and his relatives had the capability of sending them to New Zealand for
employment as fruit pickers. The OSG adds that appellant went to Bulacan to invite the victims and
accompanied them to a fellowship and briefing in La Union that appellant misrepresented that
joining the religious group would ensure their overseas employment and that appellant without any
license or authority to recruit, collected various amounts from private complainants.
>The combined testimonies of the prosecution witnesses point to appellant Aida
Comila as the one who promised them foreign employment and assured them of placement
overseas through the help of their coaccused Indira Ram Singh Lastra. For sure, it was Aida
herself who informed them of the existence of job orders from Palermo, Italy, and of the documents
needed for the processing of their applications. Aida, in fact, accompanied the applicants to
undergo medical examinations in Manila. And relying completely on Aidas representations, the
applicants complainants entrusted their money to her only to discover later that their hopes for an
overseas employment were but vain.
> Charlie Comila could not, likewise, feign ignorance of the illegal transactions. It is contrary to
human experience, hence, highly incredible for a husband not to have known the activities of his
wife who was living with him under the same roof.
> It is well established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and convicted for both illegal
recruitment and estafa. The reason therefor is not hard to discern: illegal recruitment is malum
prohibitum, while estafa is malum in se.
> Here, it has been sufficiently proven that both appellants represented themselves to the
complaining witnesses to have the capacity to send them to Italy for employment, even as they do
not have the authority or license for the purpose. Doubtless, it is this misrepresentation that
induced the complainants to part with their hard-earned money for placement and medical fees.
Such act on the part of the appellants clearly constitutes estafa under Article 315, paragraph (2), of
the Revised Penal Code.
 LABOR LAW 1 CASE DIGEST PART 2
DUSIT HOTEL >11/5/01 - Wage Order No. 9 (WO#9) took effect. It granted P30 ECOLA to all private
NIKKOMANILA VS. sector workers and employees in NCR with a daily wage rate of P 250 to P 290
NATIONAL UNION > 3/20/02 - NUWHRAIN (Union) sent a letter to Director Maraan of DOLE-NCR reporting
OF WORKERS the non-compliance of Dusit with the ECOLA required under WO#9 while there was an
DUSIT HOTEL ongoing compulsory arbitration before the NLRC due to a bargaining deadlock between
NIKKO CHAPTER the Union and Dusit.
(G.R. No. 181972, >Labor Standards Officer Navidad conducted 2 inspections of the hotel. The first
August 25, 2009) inspection revealed the employees were receiving more than P 290 daily wage, hence
WO#9 did not apply (note: payrolls were not submitted yet). The second inspection
revealed there were 144 employees affected by WO#9
>10/09/02 -NLRC rendered a decision in the compulsory arbitration granting 3 rounds of
wage increases
(P 500/mo. retroacting to Jan. 1, 2001 P 550/mo. in Jan 1, 2002 P 600/mo. in Jan. 1,
2003).
>10/22/02 - DOLE-NCR issued a Compliance Order directing the hotel to pay the 144
affected employees the total amount of P1,218,240 corresponding to unpaid ECOLA
under WO#9, plus the penalty of double indemnity, pursuant to Section 12 of RA 6727.
>Dusit filed an MR. It alleged the DOLE-NCR Order had become moot and academic
considering the wage increase granted by the NLRC, which took the employees out of
the coverage of WO#9. DOLE-NCR set aside its Order and dismissed the complaint of
the Union.
>The Union appealed before the DOLE Secretary, maintaining the wage increases
granted by the NLRC should not be deemed compliance by Dusit with WO#9. DOLE
Acting Sec. Imson initially granted the Union's appeal, but later reversed upon Dusit's
MR. He admitted he had disregarded that the wage increase granted in the NLRC
decision retroacted to Jan. 1, 2001. Hence, the wage increase already constituted
complience with WO#9. Union filed an MR which was denied.
>The Union appealed to the CA, which ruled in their favor. Referring to Section 13 of
WO#9, the CA declared that wage increases/allowances granted by the employer shall
not be credited as compliance with the prescribed increase in the WO, unless so
provided in the law or the CBA itself. CA ordered Dusit to pay ECOLA to the 144
employees. Dusit filed an MR which was denied.
BECMEN SERVICE >Jasmin Cuaresma, a nurse working in Saudi Arabia was found dead. Her parents
EXPORTER VS. received insurance benefits from the OWWA (Overseas Workers Welfare
SPOUSES Administration). But when they found out based on an autopsy conducted in the
SIMPLICIO and Philippines that Jasmin was raped and thereafter killed, her parents (Simplicio and Mila
MILA CUARESMA Cuaresma) filed for death and insurance benefits with damages from the recruitment and
(G.R. Nos. placement agency which handled Jasmin (Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion,
18297879, April 7, Inc.).
2009) >The case reached the Supreme Court where the Supreme Court ruled that since
Becmen was negligent in investigating the true cause of death of Jasmin ( a violation of
RA 8042), it shall be liable for damages. The Supreme Court also ruled that pursuant to
Section 10 of RA 8042, the directors and officers of Becmen are themselves jointly and
solidarily liable with Becmen.
>Eufrocina Gumabay and the other officers of Becmen filed a motion for leave to
intervene. They aver that Section 10 is invalid.
SUNACE > Respondent Divina Montehermozo is a domestic helper deployed to Taiwan by Sunace
INTERNATIONAL International Management Services (Sunace) under a 12-month contract. Such
MANAGEMENT employment was made with the assistance of Taiwanese broker Edmund Wang. After the
SERVICES, INC VS. expiration of the contract, Montehermozo continued her employment with her Taiwanese
NLRC employer for another 2 years.
RJP NOTES 2016
W/N the 144 affected employees are still
entitled to the ECOLA under WO#9
despite the wage increases
tranch of ECOLA, equivalent to P15 per day.
Whether or not Section 10 of RA 8042 is
invalid
Whether or not the 2-year extension of
Montehermozos employment was made
with the knowledge and consent of
Sunace
> There is an implied revocation of an
>NO. Only 82 employees are still entitled to the ECOLA (1st tranch) after applying the wage
increase.
>The reliance of the Union on Section 13 of WO#9 is misplaced. This section would apply only
if Dusit were proposing to pay its employees the wage increases in place of the ECOLA. The
position of Dusitis merely that the retroactive increases place said employees beyond the coverage
of WO No. 9.
>The retroactively increased salaries of the employees granted in the NLRC decision should be
used asbases for determining W/N they were entitled to ECOLA under WO#9. Otherwise, the
Court would besanctioning unjust enrichment on the part of the employees.
>After applying the 1st round of the wage increase, only 82 hotel employees had daily
salaryrates falling within the range of P250 to P290.
Thus, upon the effectivity of WO#9, only the said 82employees were entitled to receive the first
>After the 2nd round of the wage increase, the daily salary rates of all hotel employees
were alreadyabove P 290. Consequently, by 01/01/02, no hotel employee was qualified to receive
ECOLA.
W/N (as Dusit argues) the 82 employees' receipt of their shares in the service charges
already constituted substantial compliance with WO#9 NO.
>Pursuant to Labor Code Art. 96, the hotel employees have a right to their share in the service
charges. Undoubtedly, their right to their shares in the service charges collected by Dusit is distinct
and separate from their right to ECOLA gratification by Dusit of one does not result in the
satisfaction of the other.
W/N Dusit is liable for the penalty of double indemnity NO.
>Under Section 2(m) of DOLE Department Order No. 10, Series of 1998, the Notice of Inspection
Result (issued prior to the Compliance Order) should contain an advice that the employer shall be
liable for double indemnity in case of refusal/failure to correct the violation within 5 calendary days.
Here, the Notice of Inspection Reult dated 05/29/02 did not contain such an advice. This deprived
Dusit of the opportunity to decide and act accordingly within the 5-day period so as to avoid the
penalty.
>Section 10: The liability of corporate officers and directors is not automatic. To make them jointly
and solidarily liable with their company, there must be a finding that they were remiss in directing
the affairs of that company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the conduct of illegal activities.
> The liability of Gumabay et al is not automatic. However, the SC reconsidered its earlier ruling
that Gumabay et al are solidarily and jointly liable with Becmen there being no evidence on record
which shows that they were personally involved in their companys particular actions or omissions
in Jasmins case.
> Clearly, Rajab, Becmen and White Falcons acts and omissions are against public policy because
they undermine and subvert the interest and general welfare of our OFWs abroad, who are entitled
to full protection under the law. They set an awful example of how foreign employers and
recruitment agencies should treat and act with respect to their distressed employees and workers
abroad.
>Thus, in view of the foregoing, the Court holds that the Cuaresmas are entitled to moral damages,
which Becmen and White Falcon are jointly and solidarily liable to pay, together with exemplary
damages for wanton and oppressive behavior, and by way of example for the public good.
> Contrary to the Court of Appeals finding, the alleged continuous communication was with the
Taiwanese broker Wang, not with the foreign employer.
>The finding of the Court of Appeals solely on the basis of the telefax message written by Wang to
Sunace, that Sunace continually communicated with the foreign "principal" (sic) and therefore was
aware of and had consented to the execution of the extension of the contract is misplaced. The
 LABOR LAW 1 CASE DIGEST PART 2
(G.R. No. 161757, >When Montehermozo returned to the Philippines, she filed a complaint against Sunace,
January 25, 2006) Wang, and her Taiwanese employer before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). She alleges that she was underpaid and was jailed for three months in Taiwan.
She further alleges that the 2-year extension of her employment contract was with the
consent and knowledge of Sunace. Sunace, on the other hand, denied all the
allegations.
>The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Montehermozo and found Sunace liable thereof. The
National Labor Relations Commission and Court of Appeals affirmed the labor arbiters
decision. Hence, the filing of this appeal.
BISIG > Tryco Pharma Corp. is a manufacturer of veterinary medicines. Tryco and BMT (rank-
MANGGAGAWA in-file union) signed separate MOA, providing for a compressed workweek. The MOA
SA TRYCO VS. was entered into pursuant to DO No. 21, Series of 1990, Guidelines on the
NLRC Implementation of Compressed Workweek. As provided in the MOA, 8:00 a.m. to 6:12
(G.R. No. 151309, p.m., from Monday to Friday, shall be considered as the regular working hours, and no
October 15, 2008) overtime pay shall be due and payable to the employee for work rendered during those
hours. However, should an employee be permitted or required to work beyond 6:12 p.m.,
such employee shall be entitled to overtime pay.
>Tryco informed the BWC of the DOLE of the implementation of a compressed
workweek in the company. Meantime, Tryco received a Letter from the Bureau of Animal
Industry of the Department of Agriculture reminding it that its production should be
conducted in San Rafael, Bulacan, not in its main office in Caloocan City.
>The concerned employees were directed to report at the companys plant site. BMT
opposed the transfer of its members to San Rafael, Bulacan, contending that it
constitutes unfair labor practice. In protest, BMT declared a strike, claiming that the
transfer was inconvenient and amounts to ULP.
RJP NOTES 2016
agency relationship when after the
termination of the original employment
contract, the foreign principal directly
negotiated with the employee and entered
into a new and separate employment
contract.
>Parenthetically, since the telefax message is dated February 21, 2000, it is safe to assume that it
Whether or not Tryco is liable for unfair
labor practice.
>NO
workweek scheme in the company will help temper any inconvenience that will be caused the
message does not provide evidence that Sunace was privy to the new contract executed after the
expiration on February 1, 1998 of the original contract. That Sunace and the Taiwanese broker
communicated regarding Montehermozos allegedly withheld savings does not necessarily mean
that Sunace ratified the extension of the contract.
>As can be seen from that letter communication, it was just an information given to Sunace that
Montehermozo had taken already her savings from her foreign employer and that no deduction
was made on her salary. It contains nothing about the extension or Sunaces consent thereto.
was sent to enlighten Sunace who had been directed, by Summons issued on February 15, 2000,
to appear on February 28, 2000 for a mandatory conference following Montehermozos filing of the
complaint on February 14, 2000.
>Respecting the decision of Court of Appeals following as agent of its foreign principal, [Sunace]
cannot profess ignorance of such an extension as obviously, the act of its principal extending
[Montehermozos] employment contract necessarily bound it, it too is a misapplication, a
misapplication of the theory of imputed knowledge.
>The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the agent, Sunace, to the principal,
employer, not the other way around. The knowledge of the principal-foreign employer cannot,
therefore, be imputed to its agent Sunace.
>There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented to be bound under the 2-
year employment contract extension, it cannot be said to be privy thereto. As such, it and its
"owner" cannot be held solidarily liable for any of Montehermozos claims arising from the 2-year
employment extension. As the New Civil Code provides, Contracts take effect only between the
parties, their assigns, and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the
contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. Furthermore,
as Sunace correctly points out, there was an implied revocation of its agency relationship with its
foreign principal when, after the termination of the original employment contract, the foreign
principal directly negotiated with Montehermozo and entered into a new and separate employment
contract in Taiwan. Article 1924 of the New Civil Code states that the agency is revoked if the
principal directly manages the business entrusted to the agent, dealing directly with third persons.
>Absent any evidence that the Bureau of Animal Industry conspired with Tryco, the allegation is not
only highly irresponsible but is grossly unfair to the government agency concerned.
>The transfer of its production activities to San Rafael, Bulacan, regardless of whether it was made
pursuant to the letter of the Bureau of Animal Industry, was within the scope of its inherent right to
control and manage its enterprise effectively.
>Managements prerogative of transferring and reassigning employees from one area of operation
to another in order to meet the requirements of the business is, therefore, generally not constitutive
of constructive dismissal. Indisputably, in the instant case, the transfer orders do not entail a
demotion in rank or diminution of salaries, benefits and other privileges of the petitioners.
>Mere incidental inconvenience is not sufficient to warrant a claim of constructive dismissal.
Personal inconvenience or hardship that will be caused to the employee by reason of the transfer
is not a valid reason to disobey an order of transfer.Moreover, the adoption of a compressed
petitioners by their transfer to a farther workplace.
>The transfer orders do not amount to ULP. Contrary to BMTs claim, mere transfer of its members
will not paralyze and render the union ineffective. The union was not deprived of the membership
of the petitioners whose work assignments were only transferred to another location. There was no
showing or any indication that the transfer orders were motivated by an intention to interfere with
the petitioners right to organize.
>The MOA is enforceable and binding against the petitioners (esp. waiver of overtime). Where it is
shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was
doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be
 LABOR LAW 1 CASE DIGEST PART 2
RFM CORP VS. >Petitioner RFM Corporation, a domestic corporation enteredinto collective bargaining
KASAPIAN agreements (CBAs) with the Kasapianng Manggagawang Pinagkaisa-RFM (KAMPI-
NG NAFLU-KMU) and Sandigan at Ugnayanng Manggagawang Pinagkaisa-SFI (SUMAPI-
MANGGAGAWANG NAFLU-KMU).
PINAGKAISARFM >Under the CBA, RFM agreed to make payment to all daily paid employees on Black
(G.R. No. 162324, Saturday, November 1andDecember 31 if declared as special holidays by the national
February 4, 2009) government.
>During the first year of the effectivity of the CBAs in2000, December 31which fell on a
Sunday was declared by the national government as a special holiday. Respondent
unions thus claimed payment of their members salaries, invoking the CBA provision.
>RFM refused the claims for payment, averring that December 31, 2000 was not
compensable as it was a rest day. The controversy resulted in a deadlock, drawing the
parties to submit the same for voluntary arbitration. The Voluntary Arbitrator (VA)
declared that the provision of the CBA is clear, ruling in favor of KAMPI-NAFLU-KMU and
SUMAPI-NAFLU-KMU and ordered RFM to pay their salaries. The Court of
Appeals(CA)affirmed the decision
PIGCAULAN VS. >Canoy and Pigcaulan were both employed by SCII as security guards and were
SECURITY and assigned to SCIIs different clients. Subsequently, however, Canoy and Pigcaulan filed
CREDIT with the Labor Arbiter separate complaints for underpayment of salaries and non-
INVESTIGATION, payment of overtime, holiday, rest day, service incentive leave and 13th month pays.
INC. > Canoy and Pigcaulan, in support of their claim, submitted their respective daily time
(G.R. No. 173648, records reflecting the number of hours served and their wages for the same. They
January 16, 2012) likewise presented itemized lists of their claims for the corresponding periods served.
>Pigcaulan, Labor Arbiter Manuel P. Asuncion awarded them their monetary claims in his
Decision dated June 6, 2002.
>The Labor Arbiter held that the payroll listings presented by the respondents did not
prove that Canoy and Pigcaulan were duly paid as same were not signed by the latter or
by any SCII officer. The 13th month payroll was, however, acknowledged as sufficient
proof of payment, for it bears Canoys and Pigcaulans signatures.
P.I. MNFG, INC.VS. > President signed into law Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6640 providing, among others, an
P.I. MNFG increase in the statutory minimum wage and salary rates of employees and workers in
SUPERVISORS the private sector.
AND FOREMAN > petitioner and respondent PIMASUFA entered into a new Collective Bargaining
ASSOC. Agreement (1987 CBA) whereby the supervisors were granted an increase of P625.00
(G.R. No. 167217, per month and the foremen, P475.00 per month.
February 4, 2008) > respondents PIMASUFA and NLU filed a complaint with the Arbitration Branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), docketed as NLRC NCR Case No.
000100584, charging petitioner with violation of R.A. No. 6640.
>Respondents attached to their complaint a numerical illustration of wage distortion
resulting from the implementation of R.A. No. 6640.
> Labor Arbiter rendered his Decision in favor of respondents.
Petitioner was ordered to give the members of respondent PIMASUFA wage increases
equivalent to 13.5% of their basic pay they were receiving prior to December 14, 1987
> On appeal by petitioner, the NLRC, in its Resolution dated January 8, 1991, affirmed
the Labor Arbiters judgment.
RJP NOTES 2016
Whether or not the employees are entitled
to the questioned salary according to the
provision of the CBA
IS THE EMPLOYEE REQUIRED TO
DISPROVE PAYMENT OF BENEFITS
DUE HIM?
whether the implementation of R.A. No.
6640 resulted in
a wage distortion and whether such
distortion was cured or remedied by the
1987 CBA.
recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. Notably, the MOA complied with the following
conditions set by the DOLE, under D.O. No. 21.
> Petitioner insists that the CBA provision in question was intended to protect the employees from
reduction of their take home pay, hence, it was not meant to remunerate them on Sundays, which
are rest days, nor to increase their salaries.
>If the terms of a CBA are clear and have no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, as
in the herein questioned provision, the literal meaning thereof shall prevail. That is settled.
As such, the daily paid employees must be paid their regular salaries on the holidays which are so
declared by the national government, regardless of whether they fall on rest days.
Holiday pay is a legislated benefit enacted as part of the Constitutional imperative that the
State shall afford protection to labor. Its purpose is not merely to prevent diminution of the monthly
income of the workers on account of work interruptions. In other words, although the worker is
forced to take a rest, he earns what he should earn, that is, his holiday pay.
>The CBA is the law between the parties, hence, they are obliged to comply with its provisions.
Indeed, if petitioner and respondents intended the provision in question to cover
payment only during holidays falling on work or weekdays, it should have been so incorporated
therein.
>Petitioner maintains, however, that the parties failed to foresee a situation where the special
holiday would fall on a rest day. The Court is not persuaded. The Labor Code specifically enjoins
that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, it should be
interpreted in favor of labor.
>Respondents having been compelled to litigate as a result of petitioners failure to satisfy
their valid claim, the Court deems it just and equitable to sustain the award of attorneys fees.
SCII (employer) presented payroll listings and transmittal letters to the bank to show that Canoy
and Pigcaulan (employees) received their salaries as well as benefits which it claimed are already
integrated in the employees monthly salaries. However, the documents presented do not prove
SCIIs allegation. SCII failed to show any other concrete proof by means of records, pertinent files
or similar documents reflecting that the specific claims have been paid. With respect to 13th month
pay, SCII presented proof that this benefit was paid but only for the years 1998 and 1999. To
repeat, the burden of proving payment of these monetary claims rests on SCII, being the employer.
It is a rule that one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even when the plaintiff
alleges non-payment, still the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove
payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. Since SCII failed to provide convincing
proof that it has already settled the claims, Pigcaulan should be paid his holiday pay, service
incentive leave benefits and proportionate 13th month pay for the year 2000.
> wage distortion means the disappearance or virtual disappearance of pay differentials between
lower and higher positions in an enterprise because of compliance with a wage order
> In this case, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that a wage distortion occurred due to the
implementation of R.A. No. 6640
> Notably, the implementation of R.A. No. 6640 resulted in the increase of P10.00 in the wage
rates of Alcantara, supervisor, and Morales and Salvo, both foremen. They are petitioners lowest
paid supervisor and foremen. As a consequence, the increased wage rates of foremen Morales
and Salvo exceeded that of supervisor Buencuchillo. Also, the increased
wage rate of supervisor Alcantara exceeded those of supervisors Buencuchillo and Del
Prado. Consequently, the P9.79 gap or difference between the wage rate of supervisor Del
Prado and that of supervisor Alcantara was eliminated. Instead, the latter gained a P.21 lead over
Del Prado. Like a domino effect, these gaps or differences between and among the wage rates of
all the above employees have been substantially altered and reduced. It is therefore
undeniable that the increase in the wage rates by virtue of R.A. No. 6640 resulted in wage
distortion or the elimination of the intentional quantitative differences in the wage rates of the above
employees.
 LABOR LAW 1 CASE DIGEST PART 2
> On July 21, 2004, the appellate court rendered its Decision affirming the Decision of
the NLRC with modification by raising the 13.5% wage increase to 18.5%.
METROPOLITAN >On October 17, 1995, the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board, Region II,
BANK AND TRUST Tuguegarao, Cagayan (RTWPB) issued Wage Order No. R0203
COMPANY, INC., (WageOrder), as follows:
VS. NATIONAL Section 1. Upon effectivity of this Wage Order, all employees/workers in the private
WAGES AND sector throughout Region II, regardless of the status of employment are granted an
PRODUCTIVITY across the board increase of P15.00 daily.
COMMISSION > May 7, 1996, the Bankers Council for Personnel
(G.R. NO. 144322, Management (BCPM), on behalf of its memberbanks,
February 6, 2007) requested for a ruling on the eligibility of
establishments with head offices outside Region II to seek exemption from the coverage
of the
Wage Order since its member banks
are already paying more than the prevailing minimum wage
rate in the National Capital Region (NCR), which is their principal place of business
> the NWPC stated that the member banks of BCPM are covered by the Wage Order
and do not fall under the exemptible categories listed under the Wage Order.
> 1996, the RTWPB clarified that the Wage Order covers all private establishments
situated in Region II
> the petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA
seeking nullification of the Wage Order on grounds that the RTWPB acted without
authority when it issued the questioned Wage Order that even assuming that the
RTWPB was vested with the authority to prescribe an increase, it exceeded its authority
when it did so without any ceiling or qualification that the implementation of the Wage
Order will cause the petitioner, and other similarly situated employers, to incur huge
financial losses and suffer labor unrest
> respondents filed their Comment praying that the petition should be dismissed outright
for petitioners procedural lapses that certiorari and prohibition are unavailing since
petitioner failed to avail of the remedy of appeal prescribed by the Wage Order that the
Wage Order has long been in effect and that the issuance of the Wage Order was
performed in the exercise of a purely administrative function
> the CA rendered its Decision denying the petition. The appellate court
held that a writ of prohibition can no longer be issued since implementation of the Wage
Order had long become fait accompli, the Wage Order having taken effect on January 1,
1996 and its implementing rules approved on February 14, 1996 that a writ of certiorari
is improper since the Wage Order was issued in the exercise of a purely administrative
function, not judicial or quasijudicial that the letterquery did not present justiciable
controversies ripe for consideration by the respondents in the exercise of their wage
fixing function, since no appeal from the Wage Order was filed
SLL Respondents were supposedly employed by petitioner as project employees in 11996,
INTERNATIONAL 1997, 1998, and 1999. They were paid less than the minimum wage for the four periods
CABLES of their employment. During their 4th employment, Lagon, the employer, due to
SPECIALIST VS. economic constraints, had to cut down on the overtime work of the employees. Thus,
RJP NOTES 2016
W/N the Wage Order No. R020 is void and
of no legal effect
separability clause of the Wage Order, Section 1 is declared valid with respect to employees
1. Whether or not the employees were
entitled to minimum wage
2. Whether or not the free board and
> we are convinced that the same were cured or remedied when respondent PIMASUFA entered
into the 1987 CBA with petitioner after the effectivity of R.A. No. 6640. The 1987 CBA increased
the monthly salaries of the supervisors by P625.00 and the foremen, by P475.00, effective May 12,
1987. These increases re-established and broadened the gap, not only between the supervisors
and the foremen, but also between them and the rankandfile employees. Significantly, the 1987
CBA wage increases almost doubled that of the P10.00 increase under R.A. No. 6640. The
P625.00/month means P24.03 increase per day for the supervisors, while the P475.00/month
means P18.26 increase per day for the foremen. These increases were to be observed every year,
starting May 12, 1987 until July 26, 1989. Clearly, the gap between the wage rates of the
supervisors and those of the foremen was inevitably reestablished.
> In the present case, the RTWPB did not determine or fix the minimum wage rate by the
Floorwage method or the salary ceiling method in issuing the Wage Order. The RTWPB did not
set a wage level nor a range to which a wage adjustment or increase shall be added. Instead, it
granted an across the board wage increase of P15.00 to all employees and workers of Region 2.
In doing so, the RTWPB exceeded its authority by extending the coverage of the Wage Order to
wage earners receiving more than the prevailing minimum wage rate, without a denominated
salary ceiling. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the Wage Order granted additional benefits
not contemplated by R.A. No. 6727.
> In no uncertain terms must it be stressed that the function of promulgating rules and
regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of
a law. The power of administrative agencies is confined to implementing the law or putting it
into effect. Corollary to this guideline is that administrative regulation cannot extend the law and
amend a legislative enactment.
It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere
administrative rule issued for its implementation.
Indeed, administrative or executive acts, orders, and regulations shall be valid only when they are
not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
> Thus, the Court finds that Section 1, Wage Order No. R0203
is void insofar as it grants a
wage increase to employees earning more than the minimum wage rate and pursuant to the
earning the prevailing minimum wage rate.
The petition is denied.
LABOR LAW: Allowable deductions from employees wages.
 LABOR LAW 1 CASE DIGEST PART 2
NLRC when respondent-employees asked for overtime work, Lagon had to refuse them, and
(G.R. No. 172161, told them that if they insist, they would have to go home at their own expense and that
March 2, 2011) they would not be given any more time nor be allowed to stay in their quarters. The case
was brought before the Labor Arbiter, on a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment
of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, among other things, against the employer.
The employer reasoned that the employees were project employees, since they were
employed for a specific undertaking, and thus were not regular employees entitled to
minimum wage. Further, the employer reasoned that the employees were actually paid
above the minimum wage, since the allowances for snacks, lodging house, electricity,
water, and transportation should be included in the wages.
The LA opined that private respondents were regular employees because they were
repeatedly hired by petitioners and they performed activities which were usual,
necessary and desirable in the business or trade of the employer. With regard to the
underpayment of wages, the LA found that private respondents were underpaid. It ruled
that the free board and lodging, electricity, water, and food enjoyed by them could not be
included in the computation of their wages because these were given without their
written consent. The LA, however, found that petitioners were not liable for illegal
dismissal.The LA viewed private respondent's act of going home as an act of indifference
when petitioners decided to prohibit overtime work. The NLRC and CA affirmed and
ruled against the employer.
GSIS VS. NLRC Tomas Lanting, doing business under the name and style of Lanting Security and
(G.R. NO. 157647, Watchman Agency (LSWA)entered into a Security Service Contract to provide security
October 15, 2007) guards to the properties of the Government ServiceInsurance System (GSIS) at the
contract rate of P3,000.00 per guard per month.During the effectivity of the contract,
LSWA requested the GSIS for an upward adjustment of the contract rate inview of
Section 7 of Wage Order No. 1 and Section 3 of Wage Order No. 2, which were issued
by the RegionalTripartite Wages and Productivity Board-NCR pursuant to Republic Act
No. 6727, otherwise known as the WageRationalization Act.Acting on the request of
LSWA, the GSIS, through its Board of Trustees and under Board Resolution No. 207,
datedMay 24, 1991, approved the upward adjustments of the contract price from
P3,000.00 to P3,716.07 per guard, permonth effective November 1, 1990 to January 7,
1991, and P4,200.00 effective January 8, 1991 to May 31, 1991. LSWAassigned security
guards Daniel Fanila, Hector Moreno, Isauro Ferrer, Rubin Wilfredo, Jesus Delima Jr.,
MariaLegaspi, Santiago Noto Jr., and Virgilio Soriano (hereafter complainants) to guard
one of GSIS's properties.On March 15, 1993, GSIS terminated the Security Service
Contract with LSWA. All the complainants, except VirgilioSoriano, were absorbed by the
incoming security agency. On March 7, 1994, complainants filed separate
complaintsagainst LSWA for underpayment of wages and non-payment of labor standard
benefits from March 1991 to March15, 1993. Virgilio Soriano also complained of illegal
dismissal.In its Position Paper, LSWA alleged that complainants were estopped from
claiming that they were underpaid because they were informed that the pay and benefits
given to them were based on the contract rate of P103.00 pereight hours of work or
about P3,100.00 per month
RJP NOTES 2016
lodging, electricity, water, and food
enjoyed by the employees should be
included in the computation of the wages
Whether GSIS is solidarily liable for
payment of complainants-respondnents'
salary differentials.
Preliminarily, the Court noted that the case involves factual disputes decided by the trial courts,
whose decisions the Court cannot disturb. Settled is the fact that decisions by labor arbiters, due to
their expertise, cannot be disturbed and are accorded respect and finality when supported by
substantial evidence. Thus it cannot decide on the issue of whether the employees are project or
regular employees, and must affirm the ruling that they are regular employees. In any case, project
employees are entitled to the minimum wage, since they are not among the exclusions
enumerated in the Labor Code Implementing Rules.
On the issue of whether the facilities should be included as wages, a four-pronged test must be
completed: proof must be shown that such facilities are customarily furnished by the trade second,
the provision of deductible facilities must be voluntarily accepted in writing by the employee and
finally, facilities must be charged at reasonable value.Mere availment is not sufficient to allow
deductions from employees wages.
These requirements, however, have not been met in this case. SLL failed to present any company
policy or guideline showing that provisions for meals and lodging were part of the employees
salaries. It also failed to provide proof of the employees written authorization, much less show how
they arrived at their valuations.At any rate, it is not even clear whetherprivaterespondents actually
enjoyed said facilities.
Yes. Articles 106 and 107 of the Labor Code provide:ART. 106. Contractor or subcontractor.
Whenever an employer enters into contract with another person forthe performance of the
former's work, the employees of the contractor and of the latter's subcontractor, if any, shall be paid
in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wage of his employees in
accordance with this Code,the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his contractor or
subcontractor to such employees to the extentof the work performed under the contract, in the
same manner and extent that he is liable to employees directlyemployed by him.ART. 107 Indirect
employer.
The provisions of the immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply toany person, partnership,
association or corporation which, not being an employer, contracts with an independentcontractor
for the performance of any work, task, job or project.In this case, the GSIS cannot evade liability by
claiming that it had fully paid complainants' salaries by incorporatingin the Security Service
Contract the salary rate increases mandated by Wage Order Nos. 1 and 2 by increasing
thecontract price from P3,000.00 to P3,176.07 per guard per month effective November 1, 1990 to
January 7, 1991, andP4,200.00 effective January 8, 1991 to May 31, 1991.In Rosewood
Processing, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 25 the Court explained the rationale for
the joint and several liability of the employer, thus:
The joint and several liability of the employer or principal was enacted to ensure compliance with
the provisions ofthe Code, principally those on statutory minimum wage. The contractor or
subcontractor is made liable by virtue ofhis or her status as a direct employer, and the principal as
the indirect employer of the contractor's employees. Thisliability facilitates, if not guarantees,
payment of the workers' compensation, thus, giving the workers ampleprotection as mandated by
the 1987 Constitution. This is not unduly burdensome to the employer. Should theindirect employer
be constrained to pay the workers, it can recover whatever amount it had paid in accordance
withthe terms of the service contract between itself and the contractor.Thus, the Court does not
agree with the GSIS's claim that a double burden would be imposed upon the latter becauseit
would be paying twice for complainants' services. Such fears are unfounded. Under Article 1217 of
 LABOR LAW 1 CASE DIGEST PART 2
AMERICAN WIRE American Wire and Cable Co., Inc., is a corporation engaged in the manufacture of wires
AND CABLE DAILY and cables. There are two unions in this company, the American Wire andCable Monthly-
RATED Rated Employees Union and the American Wire and Cable Daily-Rated Employees. An
EMPLOYEES original action was filed before the NCMB of the Departmentof Labor and Employment
UNION VS. (DOLE) by the two unions for voluntary arbitration. Thepetitioner submits that the
AMERICAN WIRE withdrawal of the private respondent of the 35%premium pay for selected days during
AND CABLE CO., the Holy Week and Christmas season, theholding of the Christmas Party and its
INC. incidental benefits, and the giving of serviceawards, which they have long enjoyed,
(G.R. No. 155059. violated Article 100 of the Labor Code.A decision was rendered by the Voluntary
April 29, 2005) Arbitrator in favor of the privaterespondent.Onappeal, CA affirmed and upheld the
Arbitrators decision.
ASSOCIATION OF >On March 1, 1985, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) issued PPA Administrative
INTERNATIONAL Order (AO) No. 03-85 substantially adopting the provisions of Customs Administrative
SHIPPING Order (CAO) No. 15-65[4] on the payment of additional charges for pilotage
LINES, INC. VS. service[5] rendered between 1800H to 1600H, or on Sundays or Holidays, practically
UNITED HARBOR referring to nighttime and overtime pay.
PILOTS > responding to the clamor of harbor pilots for the increase and rationalization of
ASSOC. OF THE pilotage service charges, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Executive Order
PHILS, INC., (EO) No. 1088 providing for uniform and modified rates for pilotage services rendered in
(G.R. No. 172029, all Philippine ports. It fixed the rate of pilotage fees on the basis of the vessels tonnage
August 6, 2008) and provided that the rate for docking and undocking anchorage, conduction and shifting
and other related special services is equal to 100%.
> pursuant to EO No. 1088, the PPA issued several resolutions disallowing overtime
premium or charge and recalling its recommendation for a reasonable night premium
pay or night differential pay
>On the strength of PPA Resolution No. 1486, petitioners Association of International
Shipping Lines (AISL) and its members refused to pay respondent United Harbor Pilots
Association of the Philippines, Inc. (UHPAP)s claims for nighttime and overtime pay.[10] In
response, UHPAP threatened to discontinue pilotage services should their claims be
continually ignored
> the RTC granted the petition and declared that respondent UHPAP is not authorized to
collect any overtime or night shift differential for pilotage services rendered. The trial
court said that in view of the repealing clause in EO No. 1088, it was axiomatic that all
prior issuances inconsistent with it were deemed repealed. Thus, the provisions of
Section 16 of PPA AO No. 03-85 on nighttime and overtime pay were effectively stricken-
RJP NOTES 2016
Whether or not private respondent is guilty
of violating Article 100 of the LaborCode,
as amended, when the
benefits/entitlements given to the
members of petitioner union were
withdrawn.
UHPAP filed directly before this Court a
petition for review on certiorari, docketed
as G.R. No. 133763, raising the following
legal issues for determination:
(1) whether EO No. 1088 repealed the
provisions of CAO No. 15-65 and PPA
AO No. 03-85, as amended, on payment
of additional pay for holidays work and
premium pay for nighttime service (2)
whether the rates, as fixed in the schedule
of fees based on tonnage in EO No. 1088,
are to be imposed on every pilotage
movement and (3) whether EO No. 1088
deprived the PPA of its right, duty and
obligation to promulgate new rules and
rates for payment of fees, including
additional pay for holidays and premium
pay for nighttime services.
the Civil Code,if the GSIS should pay the money claims of complainants, it has the right to recover
from LSWA whatever amount ithas paid in accordance with the terms of the service contract
between the LSWA and the GSIS. Joint and solidaryliability is simply meant to assure aggrieved
workers of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them. Thisis in line with the policy of
the State to protect and alleviate the plight of the working class.
The Court ruled that respondent is not guilty of violating Art. 100 of the Labor Code.
ART. 100. PROHIBITION AGAINST ELIMINATION OR DIMINUTION OF BENEFITS. Nothing in
this Book shall be construed to eliminate or in any way diminishsupplements, or other employee
benefits being enjoyed at the time of promulgationof this Code.
The benefits and entitlements mentioned in the instant case are all considered bonuses which
were given by the private respondent out of its generosity andmunificence. A bonus is an amount
granted and paid to an employee for his industry and loyaltywhich contributed to the success of the
employers business and made possible therealization of profits. The granting of a bonus is a
management prerogative,something given in addition to what is ordinarily received by or strictly
due therecipient. Thus, a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable obligation, exceptwhen it is
made part of the wage, salary or compensation of the employee.
For a bonus to be enforceable, it must have been promised by the employer andexpressly agreed
upon by the parties or it must have had a fixed amount and had been a long and regular practice
on the part of the employer. The assailed benefitswere never subjects of any agreement between
the union and the company. It wasnever incorporated in the CBA. To be considered a regular
practice, the giving of the bonus should have beendone over a long period of time, and must be
shown to have been consistent anddeliberate. The downtrend in the grant of these two bonuses
over the yearsdemonstrates that there is nothing consistent about it. To hold that an employer
should be forced to distribute bonuses which it grantedout of kindness is to penalize him for his
past generosity.
>Court granted the petition and reversed the RTC
> Section 3 of E.O. No. 1088 is a general repealing clause, the effect of which falls under the
category of an implied repeal as it does not identify the orders, rules or regulations it intends to
abrogate. A repeal by implication is frowned upon in this jurisdiction.
> There is nothing in E.O. No. 1088 that reveals any intention on the part of Former President
Marcos to amend or supersede the provisions of PPA AO No. 03-85 on nighttime and overtime pay.
> Unfortunately for AISL, we find no inconsistency between E.O. No. 1088 and the provisions of
PPA AO No. 03-85. At this juncture, it bears pointing out that these two orders dwell on entirely
different subject matters. E.O. No. 1088 provides for uniform and modified rates for pilotage
services rendered to foreign and coastwise vessels in all Philippine ports, public or private. The
purpose is to rationalize and standardize the pilotage service charges nationwide. Upon the other
hand, the subject matter of the controverted provisions of PPA AO No. 03-85 is the payment of the
additional charges of nighttime and overtime pay. Plainly, E.O. No. 1088 involves the basic
compensation for pilotage service while PPA AO No. 03-85 provides for the additional charges
where pilotage service is rendered under certain circumstances. Just as the various wage orders
do not repeal the provisions of the Labor Code on nighttime and overtime pay, the same principle
holds true with respect to E.O. No. 1088 and PPA AO 03-85. Moreover, this Court adheres to the
rule that every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a
uniform system of jurisprudence. E.O. No. 1088 and PPA AO No. 03-85 should thus be read
together and harmonized to give effect to both.
> While E.O. No. 1088 prescribes the rates of pilotage fees on the basis of the vessels tonnage,
however, this does not necessarily mean that the said rate shall apply to the totality of pilotage
services. If it were so, the benefit intended by E.O. No. 1088 to harbor pilots would be rendered
useless and ineffectual. It would create an unjust if not an absurd situation of reducing take home
 LABOR LAW 1 CASE DIGEST PART 2
off the books. It further held that since the rate of pilotage fees enumerated in EO No.
1088 was based on the vessels tonnage, it meant that such rate referred to the entire
package of pilotage services. According to the trial court, to rule otherwise is to frustrate
the uniformity envisioned by the rationalization scheme.
RJP NOTES 2016
pay of the harbor pilots to a single fee, regardless of the number of services they rendered from the
time a vessel arrives up to its departure. It must be remembered that pilotage services cover a
variety of maneuvers such as docking, undocking anchorage, conduction, shifting and other related
special services. To say that the rate prescribed by E.O. No. 1088 refers to the totality of all these
maneuvers is to defeat the benefit intended by the law for harbor pilots. It should be stressed that
E.O. No. 1088 was enacted in response to the clamor of harbor pilots for the increase and
rationalization of pilotage service charges through the imposition of uniform and adjusted rates.
Hence, in keeping with the benefit intended by E.O. No. 1088, the schedule of fees fixed therein
based on tonnage should be interpreted as applicable to each pilotage maneuver and not to the
totality of the pilotage services.
> The charges and fees provided for in E.O. No. 1088 are therefore to be imposed for every
pilotage maneuver performed by the harbor pilots, as properly interpreted by the PPA, the agency
charged with its implementation.
> on the third issue, we rule that E.O. No. 1088 does not deprive the PPA of its power and
authority to promulgate new rules and rates for payment of fees, including additional charges.
The power of the PPA to fix pilotage rates and its authority to regulate pilotage still remain
notwithstanding the fact that a schedule for pilotage fees has already been prescribed by the
questioned executive order (referring to E.O. No. 1088). PPA is at liberty to fix new rates of pilotage
subject only to the limitation that such new rates should not go below the rates fixed under E.O.
No. 1088