Republic of the Philippines 3.
Transferring to himself one-half of the
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 1625 February 12, 1990
ANGEL L. BAUTISTA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista on May 19, 1976,
respondent Ramon A. Gonzales was charged with malpractice, deceit,
gross misconduct and violation of lawyer's oath. Required by this Court to
answer the charges against him, respondent filed on June 19, 1976 a
motion for a bill of particulars asking this Court to order complainant to
amend his complaint by making his charges more definite. In a resolution
dated June 28, 1976, the Court granted respondent's motion and required
complainant to file an amended complaint. On July 15, 1976, complainant
submitted an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent
committed the following acts:
1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with
his clients, namely, Alfaro Fortunado,
Nestor Fortunado and Editha Fortunado
[hereinafter referred to as the Fortunados]
to pay all expenses, including court fees,
for a contingent fee of fifty percent (50%)
of the value of the property in litigation.
2. Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in
Civil Case No. Q-15143, wherein Eusebio
Lopez, Jr. is one of the defendants and,
without said case being terminated, acting
as counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil
Case No. Q-15490;
properties of the Fortunados, which
properties are the subject of the litigation
in Civil Case No. Q-15143, while the case
was still pending;
4. Inducing complainant, who was his
former client, to enter into a contract with
him on August 30, 1971 for the
development into a residential subdivision
of the land involved in Civil Case No. Q-
15143, covered by TCT No. T-1929,
claiming that he acquired fifty percent
(50%) interest thereof as attorney's fees
from the Fortunados, while knowing fully
well that the said property was already sold
at a public auction on June 30, 1971, by the
Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte and
registered with the Register of Deeds of
Iligan City;
5. Submitting to the Court of First Instance
of Quezon City falsified documents
purporting to be true copies of "Addendum
to the Land Development Agreement dated
August 30, 1971" and submitting the same
document to the Fiscal's Office of Quezon
City, in connection with the complaint for
estafa filed by respondent against
complainant designated as I.S. No.
7512936;
6. Committing acts of treachery and
disloyalty to complainant who was his
client;
7. Harassing the complainant by filing
several complaints without legal basis
before the Court of First Instance and the
Fiscal's Office of Quezon City;
8. Deliberately misleading the Court of First
Instance and the Fiscal's Office by making
false assertion of facts in his pleadings;
9. Filing petitions "cleverly prepared (so)
that while he does not intentionally tell a
he, he does not tell the truth either."
Respondent filed an answer on September 29, 1976 and an amended
answer on November 18, 1976, denying the accusations against him.
Complainant filed a reply to respondent's answer on December 29, 1976
and on March 24, 1977 respondent filed a rejoinder.
In a resolution dated March 16, 1983, the Court referred the case to the
Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. In the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General,
complainant presented himself as a witness and submitted Exhibits "A" to
"PP", while respondent appeared both as witness and counsel and
submitted Exhibits "1" to "11". The parties were required to submit their
respective memoranda.
On May 16, 1988 respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
against him, claiming that the long delay in the resolution of the complaint
against him constitutes a violation of his constitutional right to due process
and speedy disposition of cases. Upon order of the Court, the Solicitor
General filed a comment to the motion to dismiss on August 8, 1988,
explaining that the delay in the investigation of the case was due to the
numerous requests for postponement of scheduled hearings filed by both
parties and the motions for extension of time to file their respective
memoranda." [Comment of the Solicitor General, p. 2; Record, p. 365].
Respondent filed a reply to the Solicitor General's comment on October 26,
1988. In a resolution dated January 16, 1989 the Court required the
Solicitor General to submit his report and recommendation within thirty
(30) days from notice.
On April 11, 1989, the Solicitor General submitted his report with the
recommendation that Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales be suspended for six (6)
months. The Solicitor General found that respondent committed the
following acts of misconduct:
a. transferring to himself one-half of the properties of his
clients during the pendency of the case where the
properties were involved;
b. concealing from complainant the fact that the property
subject of their land development agreement had already
been sold at a public auction prior to the execution of said
agreement; and
c. misleading the court by submitting alleged true copies of
a document where two signatories who had not signed the
original (or even the xerox copy) were made to appear as
having fixed their signatures [Report and Recommendation
of the Solicitor General, pp. 17-18; Rollo, pp. 403-404].
Respondent then filed on April 14, 1989 a motion to refer the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation and disposition
pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court. Respondent
manifested that he intends to submit more evidence before the IBP. Finally,
on November 27, 1989, respondent filed a supplemental motion to refer
this case to the IBP, containing additional arguments to bolster his
contentions in his previous pleadings.
I.
Preliminarily, the Court will dispose of the procedural issue raised by
respondent. It is respondent's contention that the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Solicitor General was limited to the determination of
whether or not there is sufficient ground to proceed with the case and that
under Rule 139 the Solicitor General still has to file an administrative
complaint against him. Respondent claims that the case should be referred
to the IBP since Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that:
This Rule shall take effect on June 1, 1988 and shall
supersede the present Rule 139 entitled DISBARMENT OR
SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS. All cases pending
investigation by the Office of the Solicitor General shall be
transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors for investigation and disposition as provided in
this Rule except those cases where the investigation has
been substantially completed.
The above contention of respondent is untenable. In the first place,
contrary to respondent's claim, reference to the IBP of complaints against
lawyers is not mandatory upon the Court [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
Nos. 79690-707; Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578, October 7, 1988].
Reference of complaints to the IBP is not an exclusive procedure under the
terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court [Ibid]. Under Sections 13
and 14 of Rule 139-B, the Supreme Court may conduct disciplinary
proceedings without the intervention of the IBP by referring cases for
investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court
or judge of a lower court. In such a case, the report and recommendation
of the investigating official shall be reviewed directly by the Supreme
Court. The Court shall base its final action on the case on the report and
recommendation submitted by the investigating official and the evidence
presented by the parties during the investigation.
Secondly, there is no need to refer the case to the IBP since at the time of
the effectivity of Rule 139-B [June 1, 1988] the investigation conducted by
the Office of the Solicitor General had been substantially completed.
Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that only pending cases, the
investigation of which has not been substantially completed by the Office
of the Solicitor General, shall be transferred to the IBP. In this case the
investigation by the Solicitor General was terminated even before the
effectivity of Rule 139-B. Respondent himself admitted in his motion to
dismiss that the Solicitor General terminated the investigation on
November 26, 1986, the date when respondent submitted his reply
memorandum [Motion to Dismiss, p. 1; Record, p. 353].
Thirdly, there is no need for further investigation since the Office of the
Solicitor General already made a thorough and comprehensive
investigation of the case. To refer the case to the IBP, as prayed for by the
respondent, will result not only in duplication of the proceedings conducted
by the Solicitor General but also to further delay in the disposition of the
present case which has lasted for more than thirteen (13) years.
Respondent's assertion that he still has some evidence to present does not
warrant the referral of the case to the IBP. Considering that in the
investigation conducted by the Solicitor General respondent was given
ample opportunity to present evidence, his failure to adduce additional
evidence is entirely his own fault. There was therefore no denial of
procedural due process. The record shows that respondent appeared as
witness for himself and presented no less than eleven (11) documents to
support his contentions. He was also allowed to cross-examine the
complainant who appeared as a witness against him.
II.
The Court will now address the substantive issue of whether or not
respondent committed the acts of misconduct alleged by complainant
Bautista.
After a careful review of the record of the case and the report and
recommendation of the Solicitor General, the Court finds that respondent
committed acts of misconduct which warrant the exercise by this Court of
its disciplinary power.
The record shows that respondent prepared a document entitled "Transfer
of Rights" which was signed by the Fortunados on August 31, 1971. The
document assigned to respondent one-half (1/2) of the properties of the
Fortunados covered by TCT No. T-1929, with an area of 239.650 sq. mm.,
and TCT No. T-3041, with an area of 72.907 sq. m., for and in consideration
of his legal services to the latter. At the time the document was executed,
respondent knew that the abovementioned properties were the subject of a
civil case [Civil Case No. Q-15143] pending before the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City since he was acting as counsel for the Fortunados
in said case [See Annex "B" of Original Complaint, p. 12; Rollo, p. 16]. In
executing the document transferring one-half (1/2) of the subject
properties to himself, respondent violated the law expressly prohibiting a
lawyer from acquiring his client's property or interest involved in any
litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his profession [Article
1491, New Civil Code]. This Court has held that the purchase by a lawyer of
his client's property or interest in litigation is a breach of professional
ethics and constitutes malpractice [Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 774
(1920); Go Beltran v. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248 (1940)].
However, respondent notes that Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional
Ethics, which states that "[t]he lawyer should not purchase any interests in
the subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting," does not
appear anymore in the new Code of Professional Responsibility. He
therefore concludes that while a purchase by a lawyer of property in
litigation is void under Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, such purchase is no
longer a ground for disciplinary action under the new Code of Professional
Responsibility.
This contention is without merit. The very first Canon of the new Code
states that "a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law and legal process" (Emphasis supplied),
Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court requires every
lawyer to take an oath to 44 obey the laws [of the Republic of the
Philippines] as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein." And for any violation of this oath, a lawyer may be suspended or
disbarred by the Supreme Court [Rule 138, Sec. 27, Revised Rules of
Court]. All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of
our legal system. The transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer is a
repulsive and reprehensible act which the Court will not countenance. In
the instant case, respondent, having violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code,
must be held accountable both to his client and to society.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that the persons mentioned in Art. 1491
of the Civil Code are prohibited from purchasing the property mentioned
therein because of their existing trust relationship with the latter. A lawyer
is disqualified from acquiring by purchase the property and rights in
litigation because of his fiduciary relationship with such property and
rights, as well as with the client. And it cannot be claimed that the new
Code of Professional Responsibility has failed to emphasize the nature and
consequences of such relationship. Canon 17 states that "a lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him." On the other hand, Canon 16 provides that "a
lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession." Hence, notwithstanding the absence of a
specific provision on the matter in the new Code, the Court, considering
the abovequoted provisions of the new Code in relation to Art. 1491 of the
Civil Code, as well as the prevailing jurisprudence, holds that the purchase
by a lawyer of his client's property in litigation constitutes a breach of
professional ethics for which a disciplinary action may be brought against
him.
Respondent's next contention that the transfer of the properties was not
really implemented, because the land development agreement on which
the transfer depended was later rescinded, is untenable. Nowhere is it
provided in the Transfer of Rights that the assignment of the properties of
the Fortunados to respondent was subject to the implementation of the
land development agreement. The last paragraph of the Transfer of Rights
provides that:
 ... for and in consideration of the legal services of ATTY.
RAMON A. GONZALES, Filipino, married to Lilia Yusay, and a
resident of 23 Sunrise Hill, New Manila, Quezon City,
rendered to our entire satisfaction, we hereby, by these
presents, do transfer and convey to the said ATTY. RAMON
A. GONZALES, his heirs, successor, and assigns, one-half
(1/2) of our rights and interests in the abovedescribed
property, together with all the improvements found therein
[Annex D of the Complaint, Record, p. 28; Emphasis
supplied].
It is clear from the foregoing that the parties intended the transfer of the
properties to respondent to be absolute and unconditional, and irrespective
of whether or not the land development agreement was implemented.
Another misconduct committed by respondent was his failure to disclose to
complainant, at the time the land development agreement was entered
into, that the land covered by TCT No. T-1929 had already been sold at a
public auction. The land development agreement was executed on August
31, 1977 while the public auction was held on June 30, 1971.
Respondent denies that complainant was his former client, claiming that
his appearance for the complainant in an anti-graft case filed by the latter
against a certain Gilbert Teodoro was upon the request of complainant and
was understood to be only provisional. Respondent claims that since
complainant was not his client, he had no duty to warn complainant of the
fact that the land involved in their land development agreement had been
sold at a public auction. Moreover, the sale was duly annotated at the back
of TCT No. T-1929 and this, respondent argues, serves as constructive
notice to complainant so that there was no concealment on his part.
The above contentions are unmeritorious. Even assuming that the
certificate of sale was annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929, the fact
remains that respondent failed to inform the complainant of the sale of the
land to Samauna during the negotiations for the land development
agreement. In so doing, respondent failed to live up to the rigorous
standards of ethics of the law profession which place a premium on
honesty and condemn duplicitous conduct. The fact that complainant was
not a former client of respondent does not exempt respondent from his
duty to inform complainant of an important fact pertaining to the land
which is subject of their negotiation. Since he was a party to the land
development agreement, respondent should have warned the complainant
of the sale of the land at a public auction so that the latter could make a
proper assessment of the viability of the project they were jointly
undertaking. This Court has held that a lawyer should observe honesty and
fairness even in his private dealings and failure to do so is a ground for
disciplinary action against him [Custodio v. Esto, Adm. Case No. 1113,
February 22, 1978, 81 SCRA 517].
Complainant also charges respondent with submitting to the court falsified
documents purporting to be true copies of an addendum to the land
development agreement.
Based on evidence submitted by the parties, the Solicitor General found
that in the document filed by respondent with the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City, the signatories to the addendum to the land development
agreement namely, Ramon A. Gonzales, Alfaro T. Fortunado, Editha T.
Fortunado, Nestor T. Fortunado, and Angel L. Bautistawere made to
appear as having signed the original document on December 9, 1972, as
indicated by the letters (SGD.) before each of their names. However, it was
only respondent Alfaro Fortunado and complainant who signed the original
and duplicate original (Exh. 2) and the two other parties, Edith Fortunado
and Nestor Fortunado, never did. Even respondent himself admitted that
Edith and Nestor Fortunado only signed the xerox copy (Exh. 2-A) after
respondent wrote them on May 24, 1973, asking them to sign the
said xerox copy attached to the letter and to send it back to him after
signing [Rejoinder to Complainant's Reply, pp. 4-6; Rollo, pp. 327-329].
Moreover, respondent acknowledged that Edith and Nestor Fortunado had
merely agreed by phone to sign, but had not actually signed, the alleged
true copy of the addendum as of May 23, 1973 [Respondent's
Supplemental Motion to Refer this Case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, p. 16]. Thus, when respondent submitted the alleged true copy
of the addendum on May 23, 1973 as Annex "A" of his Manifestation filed
with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, he knowingly misled the
Court into believing that the original addendum was signed by Edith
Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado. Such conduct constitutes willful disregard
of his solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a manner consistent
with the truth. A lawyer should never seek to mislead the court by an
artifice or false statement of fact or law [Section 20 (d), Rule 138, Revised
Rules of Court; Canon 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 10, Rule
10.01, Code of Professional Responsibility].
Anent the first charge of complainant, the Solicitor General found that no
impropriety was committed by respondent in entering into a contingent fee
contract with the Fortunados [Report and Recommendation, p. 8; Record,
p. 394]. The Court, however, finds that the agreement between the
respondent and the Fortunados, which provides in part that:
We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee,
provided, you [respondent Ramon Gonzales] defray all
expenses, for the suit, including court fees.]
[Annex A to the Complaint, Record, p. 4].
is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides
that a lawyer may not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the
expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of Professional
Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the
expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to reimbursement. The
agreement between respondent and the Fortunados, however, does not
provide for reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid by
him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of
proceedings to enforce the client's rights is champertous [JBP Holding Corp.
v. U.S. 166 F. Supp. 324 (1958)]. Such agreements are against public policy
especially where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry on the
action at his own expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of
the thing in dispute [See Sampliner v. Motion Pictures Patents Co., et al.,
255 F. 242 (1918)]. The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary
relationship between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must
incur administrative sanctions.
The Solicitor General next concludes that respondent cannot be held liable
for acting as counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490 while
acting as counsel for the Fortunados against the same Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in
Civil Case No. Q-15143. The Court, after considering the record, agrees
with the Solicitor General's findings on the matter. The evidence presented
by respondent shows that his acceptance of Civil Case No. Q-15490 was
with the knowledge and consent of the Fortunados. The affidavit executed
by the Fortunados on June 23, 1976 clearly states that they gave their
consent when respondent accepted the case of Eusebio Lopez, Jr. [Affidavit
of Fortunados, dated June 23, 1976; Rollo, p. 198]. One of the recognized
exceptions to the rule against representation of conflicting interests is
where the clients knowingly consent to the dual representation after full
disclosure of the facts by counsel [Canon 6, Canons of Professional Ethics;
Canon 15, Rule 15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility].
Grounds 6, 8 and 9 alleged in the complaint need not be discussed
separately since the above discussion on the other grounds sufficiently
cover these remaining grounds.
The Court finds clearly established in this case that on four counts the
respondent violated the law and the rules governing the conduct of a
member of the legal profession. Sworn to assist in the administration of
justice and to uphold the rule of law, he has "miserably failed to live up to
the standards expected of a member of the Bar." [Artiaga v. Villanueva,
Adm. Matter No. 1892, July 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 638, 647]. The Court
agrees with the Solicitor General that, considering the nature of the
offenses committed by respondent and the facts and circumstances of the
case, respondent lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of six (6) months.
WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Attorney Ramon A. Gonzales
committed serious misconduct, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent
from the practice of law for SIX (6) months effective from the date of his
receipt of this Resolution. Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all
courts of the country for their information and guidance, and spread in the
personal record of Atty. Gonzales.
SO ORDERED.

Complainant also claims that respondent filed several complaints against

him before the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City
for the sole purpose of harassing him.

The record shows that at the time of the Solicitor General's investigation of
this case, Civil Case No. Q-18060 was still pending before the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City, while the complaints for libel (I.S. No. 76-5912)
and perjury (I.S. No. 5913) were already dismissed by the City Fiscal for
insufficiency of evidence and lack of interest, respectively [Report and
Recommendation, pp. 16-17; Rollo, pp. 402-403]. The Solicitor General
found no basis for holding that the complaints for libel and perjury were
used by respondent to harass complainant. As to Civil Case No. Q-18060,
considering that it was still pending resolution, the Solicitor General made
no finding on complainants claim that it was a mere ploy by respondent to
harass him. The determination of the validity of the complaint in Civil Case
No. Q-18060 was left to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City where
the case was pending resolution.

The Court agrees with the above findings of the Solicitor General, and
accordingly holds that there is no basis for holding that the respondent's
sole purpose in filing the aforementioned cases was to harass complainant.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 79690-707 February 1, 1989

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M.
GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman
under the 1987 Constitution, respondents.

G.R. No. 80578 February 1, 1989

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALES, claiming to be and acting as
Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

We have examined carefully the lengthy and vigorously written Motion for
Reconsideration dated October 18, 1988 filed by counsel for respondent
Raul M. Gonzalez, relating to the per curiam Resolution of the Court dated
October 7, 1988. We have reviewed once more the Court's extended per
curiam Resolution, in the light of the argument adduced in the Motion for
Reconsideration, but must conclude that we find no sufficient basis for
modifying the conclusions and rulings embodied in that Resolution. The
Motion for Reconsideration sets forth copious quotations and references to
foreign texts which, however, whatever else they may depict, do not reflect
the law in this jurisdiction.

Nonetheless, it might be useful to develop further, in some measure, some

of the conclusions reached in the per curiam Resolution, addressing in the
process some of the "Ten (10) Legal Points for Reconsideration," made in
the Motion for Reconsideration.
 1. In respondent's point A, it is claimed that it was error for
this Court "to charge respondent [with] indirect contempt
and convict him of direct contempt."
In the per curiam Resolution (page 50), the Court concluded that
"respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie
curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of
the bar." The Court did not use the phrase "in facie curiae" as a technical
equivalent of "direct contempt," though we are aware that courts in the
United States have sometimes used that phrase in speaking of "direct
contempts' as "contempts in the face of the courts." Rather, the court
sought to convey that it regarded the contumacious acts or statements
(which were made both in a pleading filed before the Court and in
statements given to the media) and the misconduct of respondent
Gonzalez as serious acts flaunted in the face of the Court and constituting
a frontal assault upon the integrity of the Court and, through the Court, the
entire judicial system. What the Court would stress is that it required
respondent, in its Resolution dated 2 May 1988, to explain "why he should
not be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative
sanctions" and in respect of which, respondent was heard and given the
most ample opportunity to present all defenses, arguments and evidence
that he wanted to present for the consideration of this Court. The Court did
not summarily impose punishment upon the respondent which it could
have done under Section 1 of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court had it
chosen to consider respondent's acts as constituting "direct contempt."
2. In his point C, respondent's counsel argues that it was
"error for this Court to charge respondent under Rule 139
(b) and not 139 of the Revised Rules of Court."
In its per curiam Resolution, the Court referred to Rule 139 (b) of the
Revised Rules of Court pointing out that:
[R]eference of complaints against attorneys either to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General
is not mandatory upon the Supreme Court such reference
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor
General is certainly not an exclusive procedure under the
terms of Rule 139 (b) of the Revised Rules of Court,
especially where the charge consists of acts done before
the Supreme Court.
The above statement was made by the Court in response to respondent's
motion for referral of this case either to the Solicitor General or to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines under Rule 139 (b). Otherwise, there
would have been no need to refer to Rule 139 (b). It is thus only necessary
to point out that under the old rule, Rule 139, referral to the Solicitor
General was similarly not an exclusive procedure and was not the only
course of action open to the Supreme Court. It is well to recall that under
Section 1 (entitled "Motion or complaint") of Rule 139, "Proceedings for the
removal or suspension of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court,
(1) on its own motion, or (2) upon the complaint under oath of another in
writing" (Parentheses supplied). The procedure described in Sections 2 et
seq. of Rule 139 is the procedure provided for suspension or disbarment
proceedings initiated upon sworn complaint of another person, rather than
a procedure required for proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court on its
own motion. It is inconceivable that the Supreme Court would initiate motu
proprio proceedings for which it did not find probable cause to proceed
against an attorney. Thus, there is no need to refer a case to the Solicitor
General, which referral is made "for investigation to determine if there is
sufficient ground to proceed with the prosecution of the respondent"
(Section 3, Rule 139), where the Court itself has initiated against the
respondent. The Court may, of course, refer a case to the Solicitor General
if it feels that, in a particular case, further factual investigation is needed.
In the present case, as pointed out in the per curiam Resolution of the
Court (page 18), there was "no need for further investigation of facts in the
present case for it [was] not substantially disputed by respondent Gonzalez
that he uttered or wrote certain statements attributed to him" and that "in
any case, respondent has had the amplest opportunity to present his
defense: his defense is not that he did not make the statements ascribed
to him but that those statements give rise to no liability on his part, having
been made in the exercise of his freedom of speech. The issues which thus
need to be resolved here are issues of law and of basic policy and the
Court, not any other agency, is compelled to resolve such issues."
In this connection, we note that the quotation in page 7 of the Motion for
Reconsideration is from a dissentingopinion of Mr. Justice Black in Green v.
United State. 1 It may be pointed out that the majority in Green v. United
States,through Mr. Justice Harlan, held, among other things, that: Federal
courts do not lack power to impose sentences in excess of one year for
criminal contempt; that criminal contempts are not subject to jury trial as a
matter of constitutional right; nor does the (US) Constitution require that
contempt subject to prison terms of more than one year be based on grand
jury indictments.
In his concurring opinion in the same case, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter said:
Whatever the conflicting views of scholars in construing
more or less dubious manuscripts of the Fourteenth
Century, what is indisputable is that from the foundation of
the United States the constitutionality of the power to
punish for contempt without the intervention of a jury has
not been doubted. The First Judiciary Act conferred such a
power on the federal courts in the very act of their
establishment, 1 State 73, 83, and of the Judiciary
Committee of eight that reported the bill to the Senate, five
member including the chairman, Senator, later to be Chief
Justice, Ellsworth, had been delegates to the Constitutional
 Convention (Oliver Ellsworth, Chairman, William Paterson,
Caleb Strong, Ricard Basett, William Few. 1 Annals of Cong
17). In the First Congress itself no less than nineteen
member including Madison who contemporaneously
introduced the Bill of Rights, had been delegates to the
Convention. And when an abuse under this power
manifested itself, and led Congress to define more
explicitly the summary power vested in the courts, it did
not remotely deny the existence of the power but merely
defined the conditions for its exercise more clearly, in an
Act "declaratory of the law concerning contempts of court."
Act of Mar. 2, 1831, 4 Stat 487.
xxxxxxxxx
Nor has the constitutionality of the power been doubted by
this Court throughout its existence . In at least two score
cases in this Court, not to mention the vast mass of
decisions in the lower federal courts, the power to punish
summarily has been accepted without question. ... 2
To say that a judge who punishes a contemnor judges his own cause, is
simplistic at best. The judge who finds himself compelled to exercise the
power to punish for contempt does so not really to avenge a wrong
inflicted upon his own person; rather he upholds and vindicates the
authority, dignity and integrity of the judicial institution and its claim to
respectful behaviour on the part of all persons who appears before it, and
most especially from those who are officers of the court.
3. In his point D, respondent counsel urges that it is error
"for this Court to apply the "visible tendency" rule rather
than the "clear and present danger" rule in disciplinary and
contempt charges."
The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible
tendency," it was, more modestly, simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of
Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court which penalizes a variety of
contumacious conduct including: "any improper conduct tending, directly
or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice."
The "clear and present danger" doctrine invoked by respondent's counsel
is not a magic incantation which dissolves all problems and dispenses with
analysis and judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims to free
speech, and which compels a court to exonerate a defendant the moment
the doctrine is invoked, absent proof of impending apocalypse. The clear
and present danger" doctrine has been an accepted method for marking
out the appropriate limits of freedom of speech and of assembly in certain
contexts. It is not, however, the only test which has been recognized and
applied by courts. In Logunzad v. Vda. de Gonzales, 3
this Court, speaking
through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera said:
...The right of freedom of expression indeed, occupies a
preferred position in the "hierarchy of civil liberties"
(Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v.
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 191 [1963]. It
is not, however, without limitations. As held in Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835, 858 [1960]:
"From the language of the specific constitutional provision,
it would appear that the right is not susceptible of any
limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of
speech and of the press. The realities of life in a complex
society preclude however, a literal interpretation. Freedom
of expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to
insist that all times and under all circumstances it should
remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other
societal values that press for recognition."
The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present
danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion for
permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the
press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as
radio, television and the movies, is the "balancing-of-
interests test" (Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando on the Bill
of Rights, 1970 ed., p. 79). The principle "requires a court
to take conscious and detailed consideration of the
interplay of interests observable in a given situation or
type of situation (Separate Opinion of the late Chief Justice
Castro in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, supra, p.
899). (Emphasis Supplied) 4
Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-
interest test," we believe that the statements here made by respondent
Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in such a manner and under
such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible limits of free speech.
This conclusion was implicit in the per curiamResolution of October 7,
1988. It is important to point out that the "substantive evil" which the
Supreme Court has a right and a duty to prevent does not, in the instant
case, relate to threats of physical disorder or overt violence or similar
disruptions of public order. 5 What is here at stake is the authority of the
Supreme Court to confront and prevent a "substantive evil" consisting not
only of the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but
also the avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial
system of a country and the destruction of the standards of professional
conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the courts. The
"substantive evil" here involved, in other words, is not as palpable as a
threat of public disorder or rioting but is certainly no less deleterious and
more far reaching in its implications for society.
 4. In his point H, respondent's counsel argues that it is were, the key to the restoration of his rights and privileges
error "for this Court to hold that intent is irrelevant in as a lawyer in his own hands. That sanction has the effect
charges of misconduct." What the Court actually said on of giving respondent the chance to purge himself in his
this point was: own good time of his contempt and misconduct by
acknowledging such misconduct, exhibiting appropriate
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and repentance and demonstrating his willingness and capacity
denigrate the Court. The subjectivities of the respondent to live up to the exacting standards of conduct rightly
are irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct or demanded from every member of the bar and officer of the
misconduct is concerned. He will not, however, be allowed courts.
to disclaim the natural and plain import of his words and
acts. It is, upon the other hand, not irrelevant to point out ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration
that the respondent offered no apology in his two (2) for lack of merit. The denial is FINAL.
explanations and exhibited no repentance (Resolution, p. 7;
footnotes omitted). The Court also NOTED the Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion, dated
October 25, 1988 and the Supplemental Manifestation, dated October 27,
The actual subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant because such 1988, filed by respondent
subjectivities (understood as pyschological phenomena) cannot be
ascertained and reached by the processes of this Court. Human intent can
only be shown derivatively and implied from an examination of acts and
statements. Thus, what the Court was saying was that respondent's
disclaimer of an intent to attack and denigrate the Court, cannot prevail
over the plain import of what he did say and do. Respondent cannot negate
the clear import of his acts and statements by simply pleading a secret
intent or state of mind incompatible with those acts or statements. It is
scarcely open to dispute that, e.g., one accused of homicide cannot
successfully deny his criminal intent by simply asserting that while he may
have inserted a knife between the victim's ribs, he actually acted from high
motives and kind feelings for the latter.

5 In his point 1, respondent's counsel argues that it is error

"for this Court to punish respondent for contempt of court
for out of court publications."

Respondent's counsel asks this Court to follow what he presents as alleged

modern trends in the United Kingdom and in the United States concerning
the law of contempt. We are, however, unable to regard the texts that he
cites as binding or persuasive in our jurisdiction. The Court went to some
length to document the state of our case law on this matter in its per
curiam Resolution. There is nothing in the circumstances of this case that EN BANC
would suggest to this Court that that case law, which has been followed for
at least half a century or so, ought to be reversed. [SBC Case No. 519. July 31, 1997]

6. In his point J, respondent's counsel pleads that the PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant, vs. SIMEON BARRANCO,
imposition of indefinite suspension from the practice of law JR., respondent.
constitutes "cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment". The
Court finds it difficult to consider this a substantial RESOLUTION
constitutional argument. The indefiniteness of the
respondent's suspension, far from being "cruel" or
"degrading" or "inhuman," has the effect of placing, as it ROMERO, J.:
 In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned
that respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal
profession. Respondent had passed the 1970 bar examinations on the
fourth attempt, after unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967 and
1968. Before he could take his oath, however, complainant filed the instant
petition averring that respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a
child out of wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his
repeated promises to marry her.
The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor
F. Sevilla in June and July 1971. Respondent and complainant were
townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were both in their
teens, they were steadies. Respondent even acted as escort to
complainant when she reigned as Queen at the 1953 town
fiesta. Complainant first acceded to sexual congress with respondent
sometime in 1960. Their intimacy yielded a son, Rafael Barranco, born on
December 11, 1964.[1] It was after the child was born, complainant
alleged, that respondent first promised he would marry her after he passes
the bar examinations. Their relationship continued and respondent
allegedly made more than twenty or thirty promises of marriage. He gave
only P10.00 for the child on the latters birthdays. Her trust in him and their
relationship ended in 1971, when she learned that respondent married
another woman. Hence, this petition.
Upon complainants motion, the Court authorized the taking of
testimonies of witnesses by deposition in 1972. On February 18, 1974,
respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case citing
complainants failure to comment on the motion of Judge Cuello seeking to
be relieved from the duty to take aforesaid testimonies by
deposition. Complainant filed her comment stating that she had justifiable
reasons in failing to file the earlier comment required and that she remains
interested in the resolution of the present case. On June 18, 1974, the
Court denied respondents motion to dismiss.
On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss
on the ground of abandonment filed by respondent on September 17,
1979.[2] Respondents third motion to dismiss was noted in the Courts
Resolution dated September 15, 1982.[3] In 1988, respondent repeated his
request, citing his election as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active participation in civic organizations
and good standing in the community as well as the length of time this case
has been pending as reasons to allow him to take his oath as a lawyer. [4]
On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint
for failure of complainant to prosecute the case for an unreasonable period
of time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyers oath upon
payment of the required fees.[5]
Respondents hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when
the Court, in response to complainants opposition, resolved to cancel his
scheduled oath-taking. On June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The IBPs report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of
the case and that respondent be allowed to take the lawyers oath.
We agree.
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyers oath in 1971
because of the charges of gross immorality made by complainant. To
recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate child with his sweetheart,
Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to
marry her after he passes the bar examinations.
We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting
the permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His
engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to
marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the same does
not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify
suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral,
but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and
false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to
be reprehensible to a high degree.[6] It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless
act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable
members of the community.[7]
We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang [8] quite relevant because
mere intimacy between a man and a woman, both of whom possess no
impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on
the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to
warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a
result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock. [9]
Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations
were evidently consensual. We do not find complainants assertions that
she had been forced into sexual intercourse, credible. She continued to see
and be respondents girlfriend even after she had given birth to a son in
1964 and until 1971. All those years of amicable and intimate relations
refute her allegations that she was forced to have sexual congress with
him. Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued
their relationship and was not an innocent young girl who could be easily
led astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle
permanently with another woman. We cannot castigate a man for seeking
out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond
which should be entered into because of love, not for any other reason.
 We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of
a woman scorned, bitter and unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to
make respondent suffer severely and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing the
profession he worked very hard to be admitted into. Even assuming that
his past indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that respondent has
been prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment
therefor. During this time there appears to be no other indiscretion
attributed to him.[10] Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of age, should
thus be allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the lawyers oath.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent
Simeon Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon
payment of the proper fees.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A. M. No. 2104 August 24, 1989
NARCISO MELENDREZ and ERLINDA DALMAN, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. REYNERIO I. DECENA, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint 1 dated 25 September 1979, the spouses Erlinda
Dalman and Narciso Melendrez charged Reynerio I. Decena, a member of
the Philippine Bar, with malpractice and breach of trust. The complainant
spouses alleged, among others, that respondent had, by means of fraud
and deceit, taken advantage of their precarious financial situation and his
knowledge of the law to their prejudice, succeeded in divesting them of
their only residential lot in Pagadian City; that respondent, who was their
counsel in an estafa case against one Reynaldo Pineda, had compromised
that case without their authority.
In his answer dated 18 March 1980, respondent denied all the charges
levelled against him and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
By resolution dated 14 April 1980, the administrative complaint was
referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.
Accordingly, the Solicitor General forthwith deputized the City Fiscal of
Pagadian City, Jorge T. Almonte, to conduct the necessary investigation,
with instructions to submit thereafter this report and recommendation
thereon. Fiscal Almonte held several hearings on the administrative case
until 15 July 1982, when he requested the Solicitor General to release him
from the duty of investigating the case.
On 10 September 1982, the Solicitor General granted Fiscal Almonte's
request and in his stead appointed the Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga del
Sur, Pedro S. Jamero, who resumed hearings on 15 June 1983.
Respondent filed with this Court on 9 June 1987, a motion seeking to inhibit
Fiscal Jamero from hearing the case followed by an urgent motion for
indefinite postponement of the investigation. Both motions were denied by
the Court in a Resolution dated 21 September 1987 with instructions to the
Solicitor General to complete the investigation of the administrative case
and to render his report and recommendation thereon within thirty (30)
days from notice.
On 19 July 1988, the Solicitor General submitted his Report and
Recommendation 2 dated 21 June 1988. In as Report, after setting out the
facts and proceedings held in the present case, the Solicitor General
presented the following:
FINDINGS
Complainants allege that on August 5, 1975, they obtained
from respondent a loan of P 4,000.00. This loan was
secured by a real estate mortgage (Annex C, Complainants'
Complaint, p. 16, records).lwph1.t In the said Real
Estate Mortgage document, however, it was made to
appear that the amount borrowed by complainants was
P5,000.00. Confronted by this discrepancy, respondent
assured complainants that said document was a mere
formality, and upon such assurance, complainants signed
the same. The document was brought by complainant
Narciso Melendres to a Notary Public for notarization. After
the same was notarized, he gave the document to
respondent. Despite the assurance, respondent exacted
from complainants P500.00 a month as payment for what
is beyond dispute usurious interest on the P5,000.00 loan.
Complainants religiously paid the obviously usurious
interest for three months: September, October and
November, 1975. Then they stopped paying due to
financial reverses. In view of their failure to pay said
amounts as interest, respondent prepared a new document
on May 7, 1976, a Real Estate Mortgage (Annex D,
Complaint, p. 18, records) over the same lot 3125-C,
replacing the former real estate mortgage dated August 5,
1975, but this time the sum indicated in said new contract
of mortgage is P 10,000.00, purportedly with interest at
19% per annum. In this new Real Estate Mortgage, a
special power of attorney in favor of respondent was
inserted, authorizing him to sell the mortgaged property at
public auction in the event complainants fail to pay their
obligation on or before May 30, 1976. Without explaining
the provisions of the new contract to complainants,
respondent insisted that complainants sign the same,
again upon the assurance that the document was a mere
formality. Unsuspecting of the motive of respondent,
complainants signed the document. Complainants Narciso
Melendres again brought the same document to a Notary
Public for notarization. After the document was notarized,
he brought the same to respondent without getting a copy
of it.
Complainants, relying on the assurance of the respondent
that the second Real Estate Mortgage was but a formality,
neither bothered to ask from respondent the status of their
lot nor tried to pay their obligation. For their failure to pay
the obligation, the respondent on October 12, 1976,
applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the second real
estate mortgage (Exhibit 16, Respondent's Position Paper).
All the requirements of Act No. 3135, as amended, re
extrajudicial sale of mortgage were ostensibly complied
with by respondent. Hence, finally, title was transferred to
him, and on June 20, 1979, respondent sold the involved
property to Trinidad Ylanan for P12,000.00.
When informed of the above by one Salud Australlado on
the first week of March 1979 (see Sworn Statement of
complainant Narciso Melendres, p. 6, Folder No. 2 of case),
and not having known the legal implications of the
provisions of the second Real Estate Mortgage which they
had executed, complainants could not believe that title to
their lot had already been transferred to respondent and
that respondent had already sold the same to a third
person.
Upon learning of the sale in March, 1979, complainants
tried to raise the amount of P10,000.00 and went to
respondent's house on May 30, 1979 to pay their
obligation, hoping that they could redeem their property,
although three years had already lapsed from the date of
the mortgage.
Respondent did not accept the proffered P10,000.00, but
instead gave complainants a sheet of paper (Annex B,
Complainants' Position Paper), which indicated that the
total indebtedness had soared to P20,400.00. The
computation was made in respondent's own handwriting.
Complainants went home with shattered hopes and with
grief in their hearts. Hence, the instant competent for
disbarment against respondent filed on October 5, 1979.
Respondent DENIES all the allegations of complainants. He
maintains that what appears on the two documents
allegedly executed by complainants, i.e., that they
obtained a loan of P5,000.00 on August 5, 1975 and
another P10,000.00 on May 7,1976, is allegedly the truth,
and claims that he in truth delivered the alleged amount of
P5,000.00 to complainants and not P4,000.00. With respect
to the second loan, respondent claims that he delivered to
complainants P8,000.00, plus the P2,000.00 loan
previously extended [to] complainants [by] one Regino
Villanueva, which loan had been indorsed to respondent for
collection, thus making a total of P10,000.00, as appearing
on said document. Respondent denies that he exacted
usurious interest of 10% a month or P500.00 from
complainants. He asserts that the fact that complainants
were able to secure a loan from the Insular Bank of Asia
and America (IBAA) only proves the truth of his allegation
that the title of the property, at the time complainants
obtained a loan from IBAA on April 1976, was clear of any
encumbrance, since complainants had already paid the
original loan of P5,000.00 obtained from respondent; that
complainants knew fully well all the conditions of said
mortgage; and that his acquisition of the property in
question was in accordance with their contract and the law
on the matter. Thus, he denies that he has violated any
right of the complainants.
After weighing the evidence of both complainants and
respondent, we find against respondent.
While complainants are correct in their claim that they
actually obtained an actual cash of P4,000.00, they are
only partly correct in the claim that out of the P10,000.00
appearing in the second Real Estate Mortgage, P6,000.00
was applied to interest considering that not all the
P6,000.00 but only P4,000.00 was applied to interest,
computed as follows: the first loan of P5,000.00 was
supposedly due on August 31, 1975. Complainants paid
10% monthly interest or P500.00 on September 30, 1975,
October 31, 1975 and November 30, 1975. Consequently,
beginning December 31, 1975 up to May 31, 1976 (the
date of the execution of the second Real Estate Mortgage)
a total of six (6) months lapsed. Six (6) months at P500.00
equals P 3,000.00, which amount plus the P2,000.00
complainants' loan to one Engr. Villanueva (indorsed to
respondent for collection) totals P5,000.00. Adding this
amount to the previous P5,000.00 indicated loan secured
by the first mortgage results in P10,000.00, the amount
appearing in the second Real Estate Mortgage. Section 7,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 7. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms
of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be
considered as complaining all such terms, and, therefore,
there can be, as between the parties and their successors
in interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement
other than the contents of the writing, except in the
following cases:
(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its
failure to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties, or the validity of the agreement is put in issue by
the pleadings;
(b) Where there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. The
term "agreement" includes wills.
There is no dispute that the two documents denominated
Real Estate Mortgages covering the supposed original loan
of P5,000.00 and the inflated P10,000.00, respectively,
were voluntarily signed by the complainants. The general
rule is that when the parties have reduced their agreement
to writing, it is presumed that they have made the writing
the only repository and memorial of the truth, and
whatever is not found in the writing must be understood to
have been waived and abandoned.
However, the rule is not absolute as it admits of some
exceptions, as aforequoted. One of the exceptions, that is,
failure to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties, applies in this case. From the facts obtaining in the
case, it is clear that the complainants were induced to sign
the Real Estate Mortgage documents by the false and
fraudulent representations of respondent that each of the
successive documents was a are formality.
While it may be true that complainants are not at all
illiterate, respondent, being a lawyer, should have at least
explained to complainants the legal implications of the
provisions of the real estate mortgage, particularly the
provision appointing him as the complainants' attorney-in-
fact in the event of default in payments on the part of
complainants. While it may be conceded that it is
presumed that in practice the notary public apprises
complainants of the legal implications of the contract, it is
of common knowledge that most notaries public do not go
through the desired practice. Respondent at least could
have informed the complainants by sending a demand
letter to them to pay their obligation as otherwise he would
proceed to sell the lot at public auction as per their
contract. This respondent failed to do, despite the fact that
he knew fully wen that complainants were trying their best
to raise money to be able to pay their obligation to him, as
shown by the loan obtained by complainants from the IBAA
on April 8, 1976. In this connection, it may be stated that
complainants, per advice of respondent himself, returned
the proceeds of the IBAA loan to the bank immediately on
April 30, 1976, considering that the net proceeds of the
loan from said bank was only P4,300.00 and not enough to
pay the indicated loan from respondent of P5,000.00,
which per computation of respondent would already have
earned interest of P2,500.00 for five (5) months (December
1975 to April, 1976).
Respondent claims that complainants had paid him the
original loan of P5,000.00, and that this was the reason
why complainants were able to mortgage the lot to the
bank free from any encumbrance. This claim is incorrect.
The reason why the title (T-2684) was free from any
encumbrance was simply because of the fact that the first
Real Estate Mortgage for the indicated loan of P5,000.00
(the actual amount was only P 4,000.00) had not been
annotated at the back of the title (see Annex B, p. 14, rec.).
Respondent also denies that complainants offered to him
the amount of Pl0,000. 00 as payment of the loan, alleging
that if the offer were true, he could have readily accepted
the same since he sold the lot for almost the same amount,
for only P12,000.00, a difference of a few thousand pesos.
Respondent's denial is spacious.
Indeed, complainants made the offer, but respondent
refused the same for the simple reason that the offer was
made on May 30,1979, three (3) years after the execution
of the mortgage on May 31, 1976. With its lapse of time,
respondent demanded obviously the payment of the
accumulated substantial interest for three years, as shown
by his own computation in as own handwriting on a sheet
of paper (Annex C, Complainants' Position Paper, Folder No.
2).lwph1.t
In view of all the foregoing, the observation made by the
Hearing Officer is worth quoting:
In the humble opinion of the undersigned the pivotal
question with respect to this particular charge is whose
version is to be believed. Is it the version of the
complainants or the version of the respondent.
In resolving this issue the possible motive on the part of
the complainants in filing the present complaint against the
respondent must be carefully examined and considered. At
the beginning there was a harmonious relationship
between the complainants and the respondent so much so
that respondent was even engaged as counsel of the
complainants and it is but human nature that when
respondent extended a loan to the complainants the latter
would be grateful to the former. However, in the case at
bar, complainants filed a complaint against the respondent
in spite of the great disparity between the status of the
complainants and the respondent. Admittedly, respondent
is in a better position financially, socially and intellectually.
To the mind of the undersigned, complainants were only
compelled to file the above entitled complaint against the
respondent because they felt that they are so aggrieved of
what the respondent has done to them. It is for this reason
therefore that the undersigned is inclined to believe the
version of the complainants rather than of the respondent.
In addition thereto, the respondent as a lawyer could really
see to it that the transaction between the complainants
and himself on papers appear legal and in order. Besides,
there is ample evidence in the records of its case that
respondent is actually engaged in lending money at least
in a limited way and that the interest at the rate of ten per
cent a month is but common among money lenders during
the time of the transactions in question'
Going now into the second charge, complainants alleged
that respondent, who was their counsel (private
prosecutor) in Criminal Case No. 734, for estafa, against
accused Reynaldo Pineda, compromised the case with the
accused without their consent and received the amount of
P500.00 as advance payment for the amicable settlement,
without however, giving to the complainants the Id amount
nor informing them of said settlement and payment.
Again, respondent denies the allegation and claims that
the amicable settlement was with the consent of
complainant wife Erlinda Dalman Melendre[z].
We are inclined to believe the version of the complainants.
It is admitted that complainants were not interested in
putting the accused Reynaldo Pineda to jail but rather in
merely recovering their money of P2,000.00. At this stage,
relationship between complainants and respondent was not
yet strained, and respondent, as counsel of the
complainants in this case, knew that complainants were
merely interested in said recovery. Knowing this,
respondent on his own volition talked to accused and tried
to settle the case amicably for P2,000.00. He accepted the
amount of P500.00 as advance payment, being then the
only amount carried by the accused Pineda. A receipt was
signed by both respondent and accused Pineda (Annex M,
p. 34, record). However, respondent did not inform
complainants about this advance payment, perhaps
because he was still waiting for the completion of the
payment of P2,000.00 before turning over the whole
amount to complainants.
At any rate, complainants saw accused Pineda give the
abovementioned P500.00 to respondent, but they were
ashamed then to ask directly of respondent what the
money was all about.
On June 27, 1979, barely a month after May 30, 1979,
when the complainants had already lost their trust and
respect and/or confidence in respondent upon knowing
what happened to their lot and, more so, upon
respondent's refusal to accept the Pl0,000.00 offered by
complainants to redeem the same, Narciso Melendre[z]
saw the accused Pineda on his way home and confronted
him on the P500.00 that had been given to respondent.
Accused then showed complainant Melendres the receipt
(Annex M, Id.) showing that the P500.00 was an advance
payment for the supposed settlement/dismissal of the case
filed by complainants against him.
Sensing or feeling that respondent was fooling them,
complainants then filed a motion before the court which
was trying the criminal case and relieved respondent as
their counsel.
The Investigating Fiscal, who heard the case and saw the
demeanor of the witnesses in testifying, had this to say:
With respect to the second charge, the fact that
respondent received P500.00 from Reynaldo Pineda is duly
established. Both the complainants and the respondent
 agreed that the said amount was given to the respondent
in connection with a criminal case wherein the
complainants were the private offended parties: that
Reynaldo Pineda is the accused and that the respondent is
the private prosecutor of the said case. The pivotal issue in
this particular charge is whether the respondent received
the amount of P500.00 from Reynaldo Pineda as an
advance payment of an amicable settlement entered into
by the complainants and the accused or the respondent
received said amount from the accused without the
knowledge and consent of the complainants. If it is true as
alleged by the respondent that he only received it for and
in behalf of the complainants as advance payment of an
amicable settlement why is it that the same was
questioned by the complainants? Why is it that it was not
the complainants who signed the receipt for the said
amount? How come that as soon as complainants knew
that the said amount was given to the respondent, the
former filed a motion in court to relieve respondent as their
counsel on the ground that they have lost faith and
confidence on him? If it is really true that complainants
have knowledge and have consented to this amicable
settlement they should be grateful to the efforts of their
private prosecutor yet the fact is that they resented the
same and went to the extent of disqualifying the
respondent as their private prosecutor. Reynaldo Pineda
himself executed an affidavit belying the claim of the
respondent.'
Clearly, the complained acts as described and levelled
against respondent Decena are contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals for which he may be
suspended. The moral turpitude for which an attorney may
be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his
professional or non- professional attitude (Royong v.
Oblena, 7 SCRA 859). The complained acts of respondent
imply something immoral in themselves, regardless of the
fact whether they are punishable by law. The doing of the
act itself, and not its prohibition by statute, fixes the moral
turpitude (Bartos vs. U.S. Dist. Court for District of
Nebraska C.C.C. Neb] 19 F [2d] 722).
A parting comment.
All the above is not to say that complainants themselves
are faultless.
Complainants should likewise be blamed for trusting the
respondent too much. They did not bother to keep a copy
of the documents they executed and considering that they
admitted they did not understand the contents of the
documents, they did not bother to have them explained by
another lawyer or by any knowledgeable person in their
locality. Likewise, for a period of three years, they did not
bother to ask for respondent the status of their lot and/or
their obligation to him. Their complacency or apathy
amounting almost to negligence contributed to the
expedient loss of their property thru the legal manuevers
employed by respondent. Hence, respondent's liability
merits mitigation. (Emphasis supplied)
and made the following recommendation:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty.
Reynerio I. Decena be suspended from the practice of law
for a period of five (5) years. 3
The Office of the Solicitor General, through Fiscals Almonte and Jamero,
held several hearings during the investigation of the present administrative
case: City Fiscal Jorge T. Almonte was able to hold six (6) actual hearings
out of twenty-five (25) resettings 4 While only five (5) actual hearings, out
of forty (40) resettings 5 were held under Provincial Fiscal Pedro S. Jamero.
In those hearings, the complainants presented a number of witnesses who,
after their direct testimony, were cross-examined by the counsel for
respondent; complainant Narciso Melendrez also testified and was
accordingly cross-examined. Considering the long delay incurred in the
investigation of the administrative case and having been pressed by the
Solicitor General immediately to complete the investigation, Fiscal Jamero
posed a change of procedure, from trial type proceedings to requiring the
parties to submit their respective position papers. The complainants
immediately filed their position paper which consisted of their separate
sworn statements, (that of Narciso Melendrez was in a question and answer
form), their documentary exhibits and an affidavit of one Jeorge G. Santos.
Respondent also filed his counter-affidavit and affidavits of his witnesses,
with several annexes in support thereof In the healing of 28 October 1987,
which had been set for the cross examination of the complainants and their
witnesses by respondent, the complainants refused to submit themselves
to cross-examination on the ground that the order of the hearing officer
dated 17 December 1986 declaring respondent's right of cross examination
as having been waived, had become final and executory. Respondent
questions now the evidentiary value of the complainants' position paper,
not having passed through any cross-examination and argues that the non-
submission of the complainants and their witnesses to cross-examination
constitutes a denial of his right to due process.
We do not think respondent's right to confront the complainants and their
witnesses against him has been violated, Respondent in fact cross-
examined complainant Narciso Melendrez and some of the witnesses which
complainants had presented earlier. As pointed out by the Solicitor
General, the record of the proceedings shows that respondent had all the
opportunity to cross-examine the other witnesses of the complainants
(those whose affidavits were attached to complainants' position paper) had
he wanted to, but had forfeited such opportunity by asking for numerous
continuances which indicated a clear attempt on his part to delay the
investigation proceedings. Respondent had in fact requested a total of
twenty three (23) resettings during the investigation proceedings: he had
eight (8) under Fiscal Almonte and fifteen (15) under Fiscal Jamero. There
were also instances where respondent asked for postponement and at the
same time reset the hearing to a specific date of his choice on which
neither he nor as counsel would appear. That attitude of respondent
eventually led the hearing officer to declare his (respondent's) right to
cross-examine the complainants and their witnesses as having been
waived in his order of 17 December 1986. Respondent can not now claim
that he had been deprived below of the opportunity to confront the
complainants and their witnesses.
After carefully going through the record of the proceedings as well as the
evidence presented by both parties, we agree with the findings and
conclusions of the Solicitor General.
The following acts of respondent:
1. making it appear on the 5 August 1975 real estate
mortgage that the amount loaned to complainants was
P5,000.00 instead of P4,000.00;
2. exacting grossly unreasonable and usurious interest;
3. making it appear in the second real estate mortgage of 7
May 1976 that the loan extended to complainants had
escalated to P10,000.00;
4. failing to inform complainants of the import of the real
mortgage documents and inducing them to sign those
documents with assurances that they were merely for
purposes of "formality";
5. failing to demand or refraining from demanding payment
from complainants before effecting extrajudicial foreclosure
of the mortgaged property; and
6. failing to inform or refraining from informing
complainants that the real estate mortgage had already
been foreclosed and that complainants had a right to
redeem the foreclosed property within a certain period of
time.
constitute deception and dishonesty and conduct unbecoming a member
of the Bar. We agree with the Solicitor General that the acts of respondent
"imply something immoral in themselves regardless of whether they are
punishable by law" and that these acts constitute moral turpitude, being
"contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals." The standard
required from members of the Bar is not, of course, satisfied by conduct
which merely avoids collision with our criminal law. Even so, respondent's
conduct, in fact, may be penalizable under at least one penal statute the
anti-usury law.
The second charge against respondent relates to acts done in his
professional capacity, that is, done at a time when he was counsel for the
complainants in a criminal case for estafa against accused Reynaldo
Pineda. There are two (2) aspects to this charge: the first is that
respondent Decena effected a compromise agreement concerning the civil
liability of accused Reynaldo Pineda without the consent and approval of
the complainants; the second is that, having received the amount of
P500.00 as an advance payment on this "settlement," he failed to inform
complainants of that advance payment and moreover, did not turn over
the P500.00 to the complainants. The facts show that respondent "settled"
the estafa case amicably for P2,000.00 without the knowledge and consent
of complainants. Respondent informed complainants of the amicable
"settlement" and of the P500.00 advance payment only after petitioner
Narciso Melendrez had confronted him about these matters. And
respondent never did turn over to complainants the P500.00. Respondent
is presumed to be aware of the rule that lawyers cannot "without special
authority, compromise their clients' litigation or receive anything in
discharge of a client's claim, but the full amount in cash. 6 Respondent's
failure to turn over to complainants the amount given by accused Pineda
as partial "settlement" of the estafa case underscores his lack of honesty
and candor in dealing with his clients.
Generally, a lawyer should not be suspended or disbarred for misconduct
committed in his personal or non-professional capacity. Where however,
misconduct outside his professional dealings becomes so patent and so
gross as to demonstrate moral unfitness to remain in the legal profession,
the Court must suspend or strike out the lawyer's name from the Rollo of
Attorneys. 7 The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he
shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law, in the
exercise of privileges of members of the Bar. Gross misconduct on the part
of a lawyer, although not related to the discharge of professional duties as
a member of the Bar, which puts his moral character in serious doubt,
renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law. 8
In the instant case, the exploitative deception exercised by respondent
attorney upon the complainants in his private transactions with them, and
the exacting of unconscionable rates of interest, considered together with
the acts of professional misconduct committed by respondent attorney,
compel this Court to the conviction that he has lost that good moral
character which is indispensable for continued membership in the Bar.

WHEREFORE, respondent Reynerio I. Decena is hereby DISBARRED and his

name shall be stricken from the Rollo of Attorneys. Let a copy of this
Resolution be FURNISHED each to the Bar Confidant and spread on the
personal records of respondent attorney, and to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 EN BANC
A.M. No. 1334 November 28, 1989
ROSARIO DELOS REYES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR, respondent.
Federico A. Blay for complainant.
Luciano Babiera for respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed against respondent on the ground
of gross immorality.
Complainant, a second year medical student of the Southwestern
University (Cebu), alleged in her verified complaint that respondent Atty.
Jose B. Aznar, then chairman of said university, had carnal knowledge of
her for several times under threat that she would fail in her Pathology
subject if she would not submit to respondent's lustful desires.
Complainant further alleged that when she became pregnant, respondent,
through a certain Dr. Gil Ramas, had her undergo forced abortion.
In compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated July 9, 1974,
respondent filed his Answer denying any personal knowledge of
complainant as well as all the allegations contained in the complaint and
by way of special defense, averred that complainant is a woman of loose
morality.
On September 2, 1974, the Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation.
The findings of the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:
EVIDENCE FOR THE COMPLAINANT
Complainant Rosario delos Reyes testified that:
1) she was a second year medical student
of the Southwestern University, the
Chairman of the Board of which was
respondent Jose B. Aznar (pp. 11, 15, tsn,
June 6, 1975);
2) she however failed in her Pathology
subject which prompted her to approach
respondent in the latter's house who
assured her that she would pass the said
subject (pp. 15,16, 26, 33, tsn, June 6,
1975);
3) despite this assurance, however, she
failed (p. 33, tsn, June 6, 1975);
4) sometime in February, 1973, respondent
told her that she should go with him to
Manila, otherwise, she would flunk in all her
subjects (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6,
1975); ... ... ... ;
5) on February 12, 1973, both respondent
and complainant boarded the same plane
(Exh. "A") for Manila; from the Manila
Domestic Airport, they proceeded to Room
905, 9th Floor of the Ambassador Hotel
where they stayed for three days (Exhs.
"K", "K-1" to "K-6"; p. 55, tsn, June 6, 1
975);
6) after arriving at the Ambassador Hotel,
they dined at a Spanish restaurant at San
Marcelino, Malate, Manila for around three
hours (pp 56-57, tsn, June 6, 1975);
7) they returned to the hotel at around
twelve o'clock midnight, where respondent
had carnal knowledge of her twice and
then thrice the next morning (p. 59, tsn,
June 6, 1975; pp. 154, 155 & 157, tsn, July
18, 1975);
8) complainant consented to the sexual
desires of respondent because for her, she
would sacrifice her personal honor rather
than fail in her subjects (p.6l, tsn, June 6,
1975); ... ... ...;
 9) sometime in March, 1973, complainant
told respondent that she was suspecting
pregnancy because she missed her
menstruation (p. 76, tsn, July 17,
1975); ... ... ...;
10) later, she was informed by Dr.
Monsanto (an instructor in the college of
medicine) that respondent wanted that an
abortion be performed upon her (p.82, tsn,
July l7, 1975); ... ... ... ;
11) thereafter, Ruben Cruz, a confidant of
respondent, and Dr. Monsato fetched her at
her boarding house on the pretext that she
would be examined by Dr. Gil Ramas (pp.
87-88, tsn, July 17, 1975);
12) upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Ramas
she was given an injection and an
inhalation mask was placed on her mouth
and nose (pp. 88-90, tsn, July 17, 1 975);
13) as a result, she lost consciousness and
when she woke up, an abortion had already
been performed upon her and she was
weak, bleeding and felt pain all over her
body (pp. 90-91, tsn, July 17, 1975); ... ... ...
(Rollo, pp. 38-40)
Monica Gutierrez Tan testified that she met complainant
and a man whom complainant introduced as Atty. Aznar in
front of the Ambassador Hotel (pp. 183-184, tsn, Sept. 10,
1975; Rollo, p. 41).
Dr. Rebecca Gucor and Dr. Artemio Ingco, witnesses for the complainant,
testified that abdominal examinations and x-ray examination of the
lumbro-sacral region of complainant showed no signs of abnormality (Rollo,
p. 42).
The evidence for the respondent as reported by the Solicitor General is
summarized as follows:
Edilberto Caban testified that:
1. In December, 1972, respondent Atty.
Aznar stayed at Ambassador Hotel with his
wife and children; respondent never came
to Manila except in December, 1972; (pp.
8-9,. tsn, Nov. 24, 1977);
2. He usually slept with respondent
everytime the latter comes to Manila (p.
13, tsn, Nov. 24, 1977; Rollo, pp. 42-43).
Oscar Salangsang, another witness for the respondent
stated that:
1. In February, 1973, he went to
Ambassador Hotel to meet respondent; the
latter had male companions at the hotel
but he did not see any woman companion
of respondent Aznar;
2. He usually slept with respondent at the
Ambassador Hotel and ate with him outside
the hotel together with Caban (pp. 8-9, 13-
15, tsn, Jan. 13, 1978; Rollo, p. 43).
The Court notes that throughout the period of the investigation conducted
by the Solicitor General, respondent Aznar was never presented to refute
the allegations made against him.
In his Answer, respondent Aznar alleges that he does not have any
knowledge of the allegations in the complaint. As special defense,
respondent further alleged that the charge levelled against him is in
furtherance of complainant's vow to wreck vengeance against respondent
by reason of the latter's approval of the recommendation of the Board of
Trustees barring complainant from enrollment for the school year 1973-
1974 because she failed in most of her subjects. It is likewise contended
that the defense did not bother to present respondent in the investigation
conducted by the Solicitor General because nothing has been shown in the
hearing to prove that respondent had carnal knowledge of the
complainant.
Contrary to respondent's averments, the Solicitor General made a
categorical finding to the effect that respondent had carnal knowledge of
complainant, to wit:
From the foregoing, it is clear that complainant was
compelled to go to Manila with respondent upon the threat
of respondent that if she failed to do so, she would flunk in
all her subjects and she would never become a medical
intern (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975). As respondent was
Chairman of the College of Medicine, complainant had
every reason to believe him.
 It has been established also that complainant was brought
by respondent to Ambassador Hotel in Manila for three
days where he repeatedly had carnal knowledge of her
upon the threat that if she would not give in to his lustful
desires, she would fail in her Pathology subject (Exhs. "A",
"K", "K-1" to "K-6" pp. 51, 52, 55-59, tsn, June 6, 1975);
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, respondent did not bother to appear
during the hearing. It is true that he presented Edilberto
Caban and Oscar Salangsang who testified that respondent
usually slept with them every time the latter came to
Manila, but their testimony (sic) is not much of help. None
of them mentioned during the hearing that they stayed and
slept with respondent on February 12 to February 14, 1973
at Ambassador Hotel. ... ... ... Besides, Edilberto Caban
testified that respondent stayed at Ambassador Hotel with
his wife and children in December, 1972. The dates in
question, however, are February 12 to 14, 1973, inclusive.
His (Caban's) testimony, therefore, is immaterial to the
present case" (Rollo, pp. 43-44).
In effect, the Solicitor General found that the charge of immorality against
respondent Aznar has been substantiated by sufficient evidence both
testimonial and documentary; while finding insufficient and uncorroborated
the accusation of intentional abortion. The Solicitor General then
recommends the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for a
period of not less than three (3) years.
On March 16, 1989, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Move in
the premises to determine whether any intervening event occurred which
would render the case moot and academic (Rollo, p. 69).
On April 12, 1989, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation and motion
praying that the case at bar be considered submitted for decision on the
bases of the report and recommendation previously submitted together
with the record of the case and the evidence adduced (Rollo, p. 75).
After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the finding of
the Solicitor General that respondent Aznar, under the facts as stated in
the Report of the investigation conducted in the case, is guilty of "grossly
immoral conduct" and may therefore be removed or suspended by the
Supreme Court for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar (Sec. 27,
Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Respondent failed to adduce evidence sufficient to engender doubt as to
his culpability of the offense imputed upon him. With the exception of the
self-serving testimonies of two witnesses presented on respondent's
behalf, the records are bereft of evidence to exonerate respondent of the
act complained of, much less contradict, on material points, the
testimonies of complainant herself.
While respondent denied having taken complainant to the Ambassador
Hotel and there had sexual intercourse with the latter, he did not present
any evidence to show where he was at that date. While this is not a
criminal proceeding, respondent would have done more than keep his
silence if he really felt unjustly traduced.
It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in issue, to
satisfy this Court that he is a fit and proper person to enjoy continued
membership in the Bar. He cannot dispense with nor downgrade the high
and exacting moral standards of the law profession (Go v. Candoy, 21 SCRA
439 [1967]). As once pronounced by the Court:
When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not
enough that he denies the charges against him; he must
meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator
(Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show
proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality
and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. ... In
the case of United States v. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice
Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not
to the State. If he does not perform that duty, he may not
always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to
meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to
meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardy indeed if
he demand and expect that same full and wide
consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those
who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is
particularly so when he not only declines to help himself
but actively conceals from the State the very means by
which it may assist him (Quingwa SCRA 439 [1967]).
The Solicitor General recommends that since the complainant is partly to
blame for having gone with respondent to Manila knowing fully well that
respondent is a married man ,with children, respondent should merely be
suspended from the practice of law for not less than three (3) years (Rollo,
p. 47).
On the other hand, respondent in his manifestation and motion dated April
18, 1989 alleges that since a period of about ten (10) years had already
elapsed from the time the Solicitor General made his recommendation for
a three (3) years suspension and respondent is not practicing his
profession as a lawyer, the court may now consider the respondent as
having been suspended during the said period and the case dismissed for Immoral conduct has been defined as 'that which is willful,
being moot and academic. flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
We disagree. members of the community' (7 C.J.S. 959).

Complainant filed the instant case for disbarment not because respondent
reneged on a promise to marry (Quingwa v. Puno, supra). More importantly.
complainant's knowledge of of respondent's marital status is not at issue in
the case at bar. Complainant submitted to respondent's solicitation for
sexual intercourse not because of a desire for sexual gratification but
because of respondent's moral ascendancy over her and fear that if she
would not accede, she would flunk in her subjects. As chairman of the
college of medicine where complainant was enrolled, the latter had every
reason to believe that respondent could make good his threats. Moreover,
as counsel for respondent would deem it "worthwhile to inform the the
Court that the respondent is a scion of a rich family and a very rich man in
his own right and in fact is not practicing his profession before the court"
(Rollo, p. 70), mere suspension for a limited period, per se, would therefore
serve no redeeming purpose. The fact that he is a rich man and does not
practice his profession as a lawyer, does not render respondent a person of
good moral character. Evidence of good moral character precedes
admission to bar (Sec.2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and such requirement is
not dispensed with upon admission thereto. Good moral character is a
continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to continue in the practice
of law. The ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members
the highest standard of morality (Quingwa v. Puno, supra).
Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect
of a child became pregnant by reason of intimacy with a
married lawyer who was the father of six children,
disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral
conduct was justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).
In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man
with children, to have taken advantage of his position as chairman of the
college of medicine in asking complainant, a student in said college, to go
with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under the threat
that she would flunk in all her subjects in case she refused.
WHEREFORE, respondent Jose B. Aznar is hereby DISBARRED and his name
is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

Under Section 27, Rule 138, "(a) member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, ... " In Arciga v. Maniwang (106 SCRA 591,
[1981]), this Court had occasion to define the concept of immoral conduct,
as follows:

A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or

by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. A member of the bar should have moral integrity
in addition to professional probity.

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible

standard as to what is grossly immoral conduct or to
specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a
lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The
rule implies that what appears to be unconventional
behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral
conduct that warrants disbarment.
 Jose M. Luison for respondents.

CASTRO, J.:

The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago, have been commuting to
this Court for more than a decade.

In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas Henson filed a

replevin suit against Pastor Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila to
recover certain machineries (civil case 27251). In 1957 judgment was
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering Ago to return the machineries
or pay definite sums of money. Ago appealed, and on June 30, 1961 this
Court, in Ago vs. Castaeda, L-14066, affirmed the judgment. After
remand, the trial court issued on August 25, 1961 a writ of execution for
the sum of P172,923.87. Ago moved for a stay of execution but his motion
was denied, and levy was made on Ago's house and lots located in Quezon
City. The sheriff then advertised them for auction sale on October 25, 1961.
Ago moved to stop the auction sale, failing in which he filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the
petition and Ago appealed. On January 31,1966 this Court, in Ago vs. Court
of Appeals, et al., L-19718, affirmed the dismissal. Ago thrice attempted to
obtain a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing
the writ of execution "to save his family house and lot;" his motions were
denied, and the sheriff sold the house and lots on March 9, 1963 to the
highest bidders, the petitioners Castaeda and Henson. Ago failed to
redeem, and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff executed the final deed of sale in
favor of the vendees Castaeda and Henson. Upon their petition, the Court
of First Instance of Manila issued a writ of possession to the properties.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu
Manila Ago, as his co-plaintiff, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance
of Quezon City (civil case Q-7986) to annul the sheriff's sale on the ground
that the obligation of Pastor Ago upon which judgment was rendered
FIRST DIVISION against him in the replevin suit was his personal obligation, and that
Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half share in their conjugal residential house and lots
which were levied upon and sold by the sheriff could not legally be reached
for the satisfaction of the judgment. They alleged in their complaint that
G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975 wife Lourdes was not a party in the replevin suit, that the judgment was
rendered and the writ of execution was issued only against husband Pastor,
and that wife Lourdes was not a party to her husband's venture in the
VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON, petitioners, logging business which failed and resulted in the replevin suit and which
vs. did not benefit the conjugal partnership.
PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of
preliminary injunction restraining the petitioners, the Register of Deeds and
Quijano and Arroyo for petitioners. the sheriff of Quezon City, from registering the latter's final deed of sale,
from cancelling the respondents' certificates of title and issuing new ones
to the petitioners and from carrying out any writ of possession. A situation
thus arose where what the Manila court had ordered to be done,
the Quezon City court countermanded. On November 1, 1965, however,
the latter court lifted the preliminary injunction it had previously issued,
and the Register of deeds of Quezon City cancelled the respondents'
certificates of title and issued new ones in favor of the petitioners. But
enforcement of the writ of possession was again thwarted as the Quezon
City court again issued a temporary restraining order which it later lifted
but then re-restored. On May 3, 1967 the court finally, and for the third
time, lifted the restraining order.
While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the restraining
order was being fought in the Quezon City court, the Agos filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with this Court under date of May 26, 1966,
docketed as L-26116, praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
the sheriff from enforcing the writ of possession. This Court found no merit
in the petition and dismissed it in a minute resolution on June 3, 1966;
reconsideration was denied on July 18, 1966. The respondents then filed on
August 2, 1966 a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 37830-R), praying for the same preliminary
injunction. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition. The
respondents then appealed to this Court (L-27140).1wph1.t We jurisdiction to issue the latter also has jurisdiction to issue the former,
dismissed the petition in a minute resolution on February 8, 1967.
The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where they
filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction (CA-G.R. 39438-R). The said court gave due course to the
petition and granted preliminary injunction. After hearing, it rendered
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary injunction from
enforcement of the writ of possession on and ejectment
from the one-half share in the properties involved
belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago dated June 15, 1967 is made
permanent pending decision on the merits in Civil Case No.
Q-7986 and ordering respondent Court to proceed with the
trial of Civil Case No. Q-7986 on the merits without
unnecessary delay. No pronouncement as to costs.
Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castaeda and Henson
filed the present petition for review of the aforesaid decision.
1. We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere with the
orders of a co-equal court can apply in the case at bar. The Court of First
Instance of Manila, which issued the writ of possession, ultimately was not
interfered with by its co-equal court, the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City as the latter lifted the restraining order it had previously issued
against the enforcement of the Manila court's writ of possession; it is the
Court of Appeals that enjoined, in part, the enforcement of the writ.
2. Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia, et al., 1 where the wife was a party in
one case and the husband was a party in another case and a levy on their
conjugal properties was upheld, the petitioners would have Lourdes Yu Ago
similarly bound by the replevin judgment against her husband for which
their conjugal properties would be answerable. The case invoked is not at
par with the present case. In Comilang the actions were admittedly
instituted for the protection of the common interest of the spouses; in the
present case, the Agos deny that their conjugal partnership benefited from
the husband's business venture.
3. Relying upon Omnas vs. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, the Court of Appeals held
that a writ of possession may not issue until the claim of a third person to
half-interest in the property is adversely determined, the said appellate
court assuming that Lourdes Yu Ago was a "stranger" or a "third-party" to
her husband. The assumption is of course obviously wrong, for, besides
living with her husband Pastor, she does not claim ignorance of his
business that failed, of the relevant cases in which he got embroiled, and
of the auction sale made by the sheriff of their conjugal properties. Even
then, the ruling in Omnas is not that a writ of possession may not issue
until the claim of a third person is adversely determined, but that the writ
of possession being a complement of the writ of execution, a judge with
unless in the interval between the judicial sale and the issuance of the writ
of possession, the rights of third parties to the property sold have
supervened. The ruling in Omnas is clearly inapplicable in the present
case, for, here, there has been no change in the ownership of the
properties or of any interest therein from the time the writ of execution was
issued up to the time writ of possession was issued, and even up to the
present.
4. We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge Lourdes P. San
Diego) that it is much too late in the day for the respondents Agos to raise
the question that part of the property is unleviable because it belongs to
Lourdes Yu Ago, considering that (1) a wife is normally privy to her
husband's activities; (2) the levy was made and the properties advertised
for auction sale in 1961; (3) she lives in the very properties in question; (4)
her husband had moved to stop the auction sale; (5) the properties were
sold at auction in 1963; (6) her husband had thrice attempted to obtain a
preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of
execution; (7) the sheriff executed the deed of final sale on April 17, 1964
when Pastor failed to redeem; (8) Pastor had impliedly admitted that the
conjugal properties could be levied upon by his pleas "to save his family
house and lot" in his efforts to prevent execution; and (9) it was only on
May 2, 1964 when he and his wife filed the complaint for annulment of the
sheriff's sale upon the issue that the wife's share in the properties cannot
be levied upon on the ground that she was not a party to the logging
business and not a party to the replevin suit. The spouses Ago had every
opportunity to raise the issue in the various proceedings hereinbefore
discussed but did not; laches now effectively bars them from raising it.
 Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it
or declined to assert it. 2
5. The decision of the appellate court under review suffers from two fatal
infirmities.
(a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and ejectment
from the one-half share in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu
Ago. This half-share is not in esse, but is merely an inchoate interest, a
mere expectancy, constituting neither legal nor equitable estate, and will
ripen into title when only upon liquidation and settlement there appears to
be assets of the community. 3 The decision sets at naught the well-settled
rule that injunction does not issue to protect a right not in esse and which
may never arise. 4
(b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or even the impossibility, of
its enforcement. The Ago spouses admittedly live together in the same
house 5 which is conjugal property. By the Manila court's writ of possession
Pastor could be ousted from the house, but the decision under review
would prevent the ejectment of Lourdes. Now, which part of the house
would be vacated by Pastor and which part would Lourdes continue to stay
in? The absurdity does not stop here; the decision would actually separate
husband and wife, prevent them from living together, and in effect divide
their conjugal properties during coverture and before the dissolution of the
conjugal union.
6. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the
annulment of the sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986), elementary justice
demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the
replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos, abetted by
their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted
the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the
extended prejudice of the petitioners. The respondents, with the assistance
of counsel, maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly resist
execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one court to
another (5 times in the Supreme Court).
We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who,
far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek
justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of
justice. 6
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted
position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to
become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a
mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of
technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the
primacy of truth and moral justice.
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and
honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be
commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a
lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's
position, as in the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a
layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the
merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's
cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise
the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the
incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and
caprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity to
litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is
superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is
indisputable. 7
7. In view of the private respondents' propensity to use the courts for
purposes other than to seek justice, and in order to obviate further delay in
the disposition of the case below which might again come up to the
appellate courts but only to fail in the end, we have motu proprio examined
the record of civil case Q-7986 (the mother case of the present case). We
find that
(a) the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more than 11 years ago) but
trial on the merits has not even started;
(b) after the defendants Castaedas had filed their answer with a
counterclaim, the plaintiffs Agos filed a supplemental complaint where they
impleaded new parties-defendants;
(c) after the admission of the supplemental complaint, the Agos filed a
motion to admit an amended supplemental complaint, which impleads an
additional new party-defendant (no action has yet been taken on this
motion);
(d) the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted supplemental
complaint; and
(e) the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated April 20, 1974, grants
an extension to the suspension of time to file answer. (Expediente, p. 815)
We also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint,
supplemental complaint and amended supplemental complaint are all
untenable, for the reasons hereunder stated. The Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that the sheriff levied upon
conjugal properties of the spouses Ago despite the fact that the judgment
to be satisfied was personal only to Pastor Ago, and the business venture
that he entered into, which resulted in the replevin suit, did not redound to
the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The issue here, which is whether or
not the wife's inchoate share in the conjugal property is leviable, is the
same issue that we have already resolved, as barred by laches, in striking
down the decision of the Court of Appeals granting preliminary injunction,
the dispositive portion of which was herein-before quoted. This ruling
applies as well to the first cause of action of the complaint.
Upon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that on January 5, 1959
the Castaedas and the sheriff, pursuant to an alias writ of seizure, seized
and took possession of certain machineries, depriving the Agos of the use
thereof, to their damage in the sum of P256,000 up to May 5, 1964. This
second cause of action fails to state a valid cause of action for it fails to
allege that the order of seizure is invalid or illegal.
It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's sale of the conjugal
properties was irregular, illegal and unlawful because the sheriff did not
require the Castaeda spouses to pay or liquidate the sum of P141,750
(the amount for which they bought the properties at the auction sale)
despite the fact that there was annotated at the back of the certificates of
title a mortgage of P75,000 in favor of the Philippine National Bank;
moreover, the sheriff sold the properties for P141,750 despite the
pendency of L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the amount of
P99,877.08 out of the judgment value of P172,923.37 in civil case 27251;
and because of said acts, the Agos suffered P174,877.08 in damages.
Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under no obligation to
require payment of the purchase price in the auction sale because "when
the purchaser is the judgment creditor, and no third-party claim has been
filed, he need not pay the amount of the bid if it does not exceed the
amount of his judgment." (Sec. 23, Rule 39, Rules of Court)
The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the concern of the vendees
Castaedas but did not affect the sheriff's sale; the cancellation of the
annotation is of no moment to the Agoo.
Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of P99,877.08 out of
the amount of the judgment was dismissed by this Court on January 31,
1966.
This third cause of action, therefore, actually states no valid cause of action
and is moreover barred by prior judgment.
The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages allegedly suffered by
the Agos on account of the acts complained of in the preceding causes of
action. As the fourth cause of action derives its life from the preceding
causes of action, which, as shown, are baseless, the said fourth cause of
action must necessarily fail.
The Counterclaim
As a counterclaim against the Agos, the Castaedas aver that the action
was unfounded and as a consequence of its filing they were compelled to
retain the services of counsel for not less than P7,500; that because the
Agos obtained a preliminary injunction enjoining the transfer of titles and
possession of the properties to the Castaedas, they were unlawfully
deprived of the use of the properties from April 17, 1964, the value of such
deprived use being 20% annually of their actual value; and that the filing of
the unfounded action besmirched their feelings, the pecuniary worth of
which is for the court to assess.
The Supplemental Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after the filing of the
complaint, the defendants, taking advantage of the dissolution of the
preliminary injunction, in conspiracy and with gross bad faith and evident
intent to cause damage to the plaintiffs, caused the registration of the
sheriff's final deed of sale; that, to cause more damage, the defendants
sold to their lawyer and his wife two of the parcels of land in question; that
the purchasers acquired the properties in bad faith; that the defendants
mortgaged the two other parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation while the defendants' lawyer and his wife also mortgaged the
parcels bought by them to the Rizal Commercial Bank; and that the bank
also acted in bad faith.
The second cause of action consists of an allegation of additional damages
caused by the defendants' bad faith in entering into the aforesaid
agreements and transactions.
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
The amendment made pertains to the first cause of action of the
supplemental complaint, which is, the inclusion of a paragraph averring
that, still to cause damage and prejudice to the plaintiffs, Atty. & Mrs. Juan
Quijano, in bad faith sold the two parcels of land they had previously
bought to Eloy Ocampo who acquired them also in bad faith, while
Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas Henson in bad faith sold the two other
parcels to Juan Quijano (60%) and Eloy Ocampo (40%) who acquired them
in bad faith and with knowledge that the properties are the subject of a
pending litigation.
Discussion on The Causes of Action
of The Supplemental Complaint And
The Amended Supplemental Complaint

Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first cause of action

of the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint,
the validity of the cause of action would depend upon the validity of the
first cause of action of the original complaint, for, the Agos would suffer no
transgression upon their rights of ownership and possession of the
properties by reason of the agreements subsequently entered into by the
Castaedas and their lawyer if the sheriff's levy and sale are valid. The
reverse is also true: if the sheriff's levy and sale are invalid on the ground
that the conjugal properties could not be levied upon, then the transactions
would perhaps prejudice the Agos, but, we have already indicated that the
issue in the first cause of action of the original complaint is barred by
laches, and it must therefore follow that the first cause of action of the
supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint is also
barred.

For the same reason, the same holding applies to the remaining cause of
action in the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental
complaint.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is set

aside. Civil case Q-7986 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is ordered
dismissed, without prejudice to the re-filing of the petitioners' counterclaim
in a new and independent action. Treble costs are assessed against the
spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu Ago, which shall be paid by their
lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison. Let a copy of this decision be made a part of Republic of the Philippines
the personal file of Atty. Luison in the custody of the Clerk of Court. SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

March 23, 1929

In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,

Duran & Lim for respondent.

Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose for the Government.

MALCOLM, J.:

The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of

the provincial board of Isabela, admits that previous to the last general
elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano, which, in
translation, reads as follows:
 LUIS B. TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
Province of Isabela
(NOTE. As notary public, he can execute for you a deed
of sale for the purchase of land as required by the cadastral
office; can renew lost documents of your animals; can
make your application and final requisites for your
homestead; and can execute any kind of affidavit. As a
lawyer, he can help you collect your loans although long
overdue, as well as any complaint for or against you. Come
or write to him in his town, Echague, Isabela. He offers free
consultation, and is willing to help and serve the poor.)
The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to
a lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality written in Ilocano, which
letter, in translation, reads as follows:
ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928
MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the
approaching date for our induction into office as member of
the Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of next month.
Before my induction into office I should be very glad to
hear your suggestions or recommendations for the good of
the province in general and for your barrio in particular. You
can come to my house at any time here in Echague, to
submit to me any kind of suggestion or recommendation as
you may desire.
I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board
I will have my residence here in Echague. I will attend the
session of the Board of Ilagan, but will come back home on
the following day here in Echague to live and serve with
you as a lawyer and notary public. Despite my election as
member of the Provincial Board, I will exercise my legal
profession as a lawyer and notary public. In case you
cannot see me at home on any week day, I assure you that
you can always find me there on every Sunday. I also
inform you that I will receive any work regarding
preparations of documents of contract of sales and
affidavits to be sworn to before me as notary public even
on Sundays.
I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the
reason that some people are in the belief that my
residence as member of the Board will be in Ilagan and
that I would then be disqualified to exercise my profession
as lawyer and as notary public. Such is not the case and I
would make it clear that I am free to exercise my
profession as formerly and that I will have my residence
here in Echague.
I would request you kind favor to transmit this information
to your barrio people in any of your meetings or social
gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to
live and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and
notary public. If the people in your locality have not as yet
contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with
the registration of their land titles, I would be willing to
handle the work in court and would charge only three
pesos for every registration.
Yours respectfully,
(Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public.
The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the applicable
legal provisions. Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure as originally
conceived related to disbarments of members of the bar. In 1919 at the
instigation of the Philippine Bar Association, said codal section was
amended by Act No. 2828 by adding at the end thereof the following: "The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice."
The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of
Professionals Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908 and
by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of
Ethics provide:
27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. The most worthy and
effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and
especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.
This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and
conduct. The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business
cards, being a matter of personal taste or local custom, and
sometimes of convenience, is not per se improper. But solicitation
of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal
communications or interview not warranted by personal relations,
is unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business
by indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real
estate firms or trust companies advertising to secure the drawing
of deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for executorships
 or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect
advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper
comments concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude
of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position,
and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the
tone of our high calling, and are intolerable.
28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. It
is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a
lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or
trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not
only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is
disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action
and inform thereof in order to the employed to bring suit, or to
breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal
injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to
secure them as clients, or to employ agents or runners for like
purposes, or to pay or reward directly or indirectly, those who bring
or influence the bringing of such cases to his office, or to
remunerate policemen, court or prison officials, physicians, hospital
attaches or others who may succeed, under the guise of giving
disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick
and the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek his professional
services. A duty to the public and to the profession devolves upon
every member of the bar having knowledge of such practices upon
the part of any practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the
end that the offender may be disbarred.
Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted
facts, the respondent stands convicted of having solicited cases in defiance
of the law and those canons. Accordingly, the only remaining duty of the
court is to fix upon the action which should here be taken. The provincial
fiscal of Isabela, with whom joined the representative of the Attorney-
General in the oral presentation of the case, suggests that the respondent
be only reprimanded. We think that our action should go further than this if
only to reflect our attitude toward cases of this character of which
unfortunately the respondent's is only one. The commission of offenses of
this nature would amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as
mitigating, circumstances working in favor of the respondent there are,
first, his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts,
second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not
to commit a similar mistake in the future. A modest period of suspension
would seem to fit the case of the erring attorney. But it should be distinctly
understood that this result is reached in view of the considerations which
have influenced the court to the relatively lenient in this particular instance
and should, therefore, not be taken as indicating that future convictions of
practice of this kind will not be dealt with by disbarment.
In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is
that the respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the
practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one month from April 1,
1929,

Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels

between individuals was a crime at the common law, and one of the
penalties for this offense when committed by an attorney was disbarment.
Statutes intended to reach the same evil have been provided in a number
of jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar itself, and have been
upheld as constitutional. The reason behind statutes of this type is not
difficult to discover. The law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer
may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do
so would be unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17
Ann. Cas., 625; People vs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L.,
1097.)

It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of

solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a great
profession. It lowers the standards of that profession. It works against the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar. It
results in needless litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully
inclined citizens.

The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment

or suspension. That should be distinctly understood.
 Republic of the Philippines It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation
SUPREME COURT by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen
Manila solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly
provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for
EN BANC the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise
his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession
A.C. No. L-1117 March 20, 1944 and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his
THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant, services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles
vs. the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent. old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment
Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Feria for of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.
complainant. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct."
Francisco Claravall for respondent. (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)

OZAETA, J.:
The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for
having published an advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943,
which reads as follows:
Marriage
license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of
delay or publicity avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to
wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor.
Everything confidential.
In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the
practice of law for the period of one month for advertising his services and
soliciting work from the public by writing circular letters. That case,
however, was more serious than this because there the solicitations were
repeatedly made and were more elaborate and insistent.
Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the
misconduct, the Court is of the opinion and so decided that the respondent
should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.

Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.

Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published

the said advertisement; but subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted
having caused its publication and prayed for "the indulgence and mercy" of
the Court, promising "not to repeat such professional misconduct in the
future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the law profession."
In further mitigation he alleged that the said advertisement was published
only once in the Tribune and that he never had any case at law by reason
thereof.

Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
July 30, 1979
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME
"SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO." LUCIANO
E. SALAZAR, FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ.
GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES. JR.,
ANDRES G. GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN,
ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R.
CENIZA, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE V.
PESIGAN,petitioners.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE
USE OF THE FIRM NAME "OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA &
REYES." RICARDO J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN M. DE LEON, ROMAN
MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA, REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE
LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F. BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:+.wph!1
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving
partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the
surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14,
1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their
firms, the names of partners who had passed away. In the Court's
Resolution of September 2, 1976, both Petitions were ordered consolidated.
Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:
1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its
business under a firm name which includes the name of a deceased
partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the Civil Code explicitly sanctions the
practice when it provides in the last paragraph that: t.hqw practice of including in its firm name that of a deceased partner, C.D.
The use by the person or partnership continuing the
business of the partnership name, or the name of a
deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make
the individual property of the deceased partner liable for
any debts contracted by such person or partnership. 1
2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering,
the legislature has authorized the adoption of firm names without any
restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of the name of a deceased
partner; 2 the legislative authorization given to those engaged in the
practice of accountancy a profession requiring the same degree of trust
and confidence in respect of clients as that implicit in the relationship of
attorney and client to acquire and use a trade name, strongly indicates
that there is no fundamental policy that is offended by the continued use
by a firm of professionals of a firm name which includes the name of a
deceased partner, at least where such firm name has acquired the
characteristics of a "trade name." 3
3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued
use of the name of a deceased partner in the firm name of a law
partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
adopted by the American Bar Association declares that: t.hqw
... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former
partner when permissible by local custom, is not unethical
but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is
practiced through this use. ... 4
4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of
their respective deceased partners were well-publicized in all newspapers
of general circulation for several days; the stationeries now being used by
them carry new letterheads indicating the years when their respective
deceased partners were connected with the firm; petitioners will notify all
leading national and international law directories of the fact of their
respective deceased partners' deaths. 5
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's
name in a professional firm's name; 6 there is no custom or usage in the
Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that
the name of a law firm necessarily Identifies the individual members of the
firm. 7
6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law
partnerships has been consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an
accepted practice in the legal profession of most countries in the world. 8
The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by
this Court in 1953 when a law firm in Cebu (the Deen case) continued its
Johnston. The matter was resolved with this Court advising the firm to
desist from including in their firm designation the name of C. D. Johnston,
who has long been dead."
The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R.
No. L-11964, entitled Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking
Corporation. The law firm of Perkins & Ponce Enrile moved to intervene
as amicus curiae. Before acting thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of April
15, 1957, stated that it "would like to be informed why the name of Perkins
is still being used although Atty. E. A. Perkins is already dead." In a
Manifestation dated May 21, 1957, the law firm of Perkins and Ponce
Enrile, raising substantially the same arguments as those now being raised
by petitioners, prayed that the continued use of the firm name "Perkins &
Ponce Enrile" be held proper.
On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: t.hqw such division are not lawyers and because such payments will not
After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys
Alfonso Ponce Enrile and Associates for their continued use
of the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court found
no reason to depart from the policy it adopted in June 1953
when it required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen
of Cebu City to desist from including in their firm
designation, the name of C. D. Johnston, deceased. The
Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential
nature of the relations between attorney and client, and
the high standards demanded in the canons of professional
ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a
remote degree could give rise to the possibility of
deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop
the name "PERKINS" from their firm name.
Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far
enunciated by the Court.
The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid
down.
A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and
"Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and Reyes" are partnerships, the use
in their partnership names of the names of deceased partners will run
counter to Article 1815 of the Civil Code which provides: t.hqw qualifications of its individual members. Thus, it has been held that a
Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm
name, which may or may not include the name of one or
more of the partners.
Those who, not being members of the partnership, include
their names in the firm name, shall be subject to the
liability, of a partner.
It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a
partnership must either be those of living partners and. in the case of non-
partners, should be living persons who can be subjected to liability. In fact,
Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person from including his
name in the firm name under pain of assuming the liability of a partner.
The heirs of a deceased partner in a law firm cannot be held liable as the
old members to the creditors of a firm particularly where they are non-
lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics "prohibits an
agreement for the payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of
a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received from the future
business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both because the recipients of
represent service or responsibility on the part of the recipient. "
Accordingly, neither the widow nor the heirs can be held liable for
transactions entered into after the death of their lawyer-predecessor. There
being no benefits accruing, there ran be no corresponding liability.
Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use
by law firms of the names of deceased partners. The public relations value
of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and
disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without
connections will have to make a name for himself starting from scratch.
Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old
firm's reputation established by deceased partners.
B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by
petitioners, supra, the first factor to consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of
Title IX of the Code entitled "Dissolution and Winding Up." The Article
primarily deals with the exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved
partnership, of the individual property of the deceased partner for debts
contracted by the person or partnership which continues
the business using the partnership name or the name of the deceased
partner as part thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a hold-over
situation preparatory to formal reorganization.
Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a
good will to protect rather than of a professional partnership, with no
saleable good will but whose reputation depends on the personal
saleable goodwill can exist only in a commercial partnership and cannot
arise in a professional partnership consisting of lawyers. 9t.hqw
As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial
partnership the succeeding partners or parties have the
right to carry on the business under the old name, in the
 absence of a stipulation forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a
commercial partnership is a partnership asset inseparable
from the good will of the firm. ... (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p.
115) (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, t.hqw
... a professional partnership the reputation of which
depends or; the individual skill of the members, such as
partnerships of attorneys or physicians, has no good win to
be distributed as a firm asset on its dissolution, however
intrinsically valuable such skill and reputation may be,
especially where there is no provision in the partnership
agreement relating to good will as an asset. ... (ibid, s 203,
p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)
C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships
formed by other professionals or for business. For one thing, the law on
accountancy specifically allows the use of a trade name in connection with
the practice of accountancy. 10 t.hqw American Bar Association" in support of their petitions.
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It
is a mere relationship or association for a particular
purpose. ... It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of
carrying on trade or business or of holding
property." 11 Thus, it has been stated that "the use of a
nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is
improper. 12
The usual reason given for different standards of conduct
being applicable to the practice of law from those
pertaining to business is that the law is a profession.
Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the
Survey of the Legal Profession, (The Lawyer from Antiquity
to Modern Times, p. 5) defines a profession as "a group of
men pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the
spirit of public service, no less a public service because
it may incidentally be a means of livelihood."
xxx xxx xxx
Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal
profession from business are:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a
byproduct, and in which one may attain the highest
eminence without making much money.
2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of
justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity, and
reliability.
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by
candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current
business methods of advertising and encroachment on
their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. 13
"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the
nature of a privilege or franchise. 14 It is limited to persons of good moral
character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. 15 The
right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing
and attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly
personal and partaking of the nature of a public trust." 16
D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of
the name of a deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law
partnership when such a practice is permissible by local custom but the
Canon warns that care should be taken that no imposition or deception is
practiced through this use.
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or
allows the continued use of a deceased or former partner's name in the
firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under our custom, Identify
the more active and/or more senior members or partners of the law firm. A
glimpse at the history of the firms of petitioners and of other law firms in
this country would show how their firm names have evolved and changed
from time to time as the composition of the partnership changed. t.
hqw
The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or
more of the partners designated by it is proper only where
sustained by local custom and not where by custom this
purports to Identify the active members. ...
There would seem to be a question, under the working of
the Canon, as to the propriety of adding the name of a new
partner and at the same time retaining that of a deceased
partner who was never a partner with the new one. (H.S.
Drinker, op. cit., supra, at pp. 207208) (Emphasis supplied).
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where
the name of a deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out.
A person in search of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of
a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.
E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the
continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law
partnerships. But that is so because it is sanctioned by custom.
In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d
733) which petitioners Salazar, et al. quoted in their memorandum, the
New York Supreme Court sustained the use of the firm name Alexander &
Green even if none of the present ten partners of the firm bears either
name because the practice was sanctioned by custom and did not offend
any statutory provision or legislative policy and was adopted by agreement
of the parties. The Court stated therein: t.hqw The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the
The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of
custom and offends no statutory provision or legislative
policy. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of
both the American Bar Association and the New York State
Bar Association provides in part as follows: "The continued
use of the name of a deceased or former partner, when
permissible by local custom is not unethical, but care
should be taken that no imposition or deception is
practiced through this use." There is no question as to local
custom. Many firms in the city use the names of deceased
members with the approval of other attorneys, bar
associations and the courts. The Appellate Division of the
First Department has considered the matter and reached
The conclusion that such practice should not be prohibited.
(Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the
practice in question. The use of the firm name herein is
also sustainable by reason of agreement between the
partners. 18
Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the
practice. Custom has been defined as a rule of conduct formed by
repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally
binding and obligatory. 19 Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A
custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. 20 A
local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice
unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any
other fact. 21 We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of
the elements requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely
because something is done as a matter of practice does not mean that
Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical
custom. Juridical custom must be differentiated from social custom. The
former can supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of such
statute. Not so with the latter.
Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of
the legal system. 22 When the Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins
cases issued its Resolutions directing lawyers to desist from including the
names of deceased partners in their firm designation, it laid down a legal
rule against which no custom or practice to the contrary, even if proven,
can prevail. This is not to speak of our civil law which clearly ordains that a
partnership is dissolved by the death of any partner. 23 Custom which are
contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced. 24
administration of justice and should not be considered like an ordinary
"money-making trade." t.hqw
... It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a
spirit of public service. A trade ... aims primarily at
personal gain; a profession at the exercise of powers
beneficial to mankind. If, as in the era of wide free
opportunity, we think of free competitive self assertion as
the highest good, lawyer and grocer and farmer may seem
to be freely competing with their fellows in their calling in
order each to acquire as much of the world's good as he
may within the allowed him by law. But the member of a
profession does not regard himself as in competition with
his professional brethren. He is not bartering his services
as is the artisan nor exchanging the products of his skill
and learning as the farmer sells wheat or corn. There
should be no such thing as a lawyers' or physicians' strike.
The best service of the professional man is often rendered
for no equivalent or for a trifling equivalent and it is his
pride to do what he does in a way worthy of his profession
even if done with no expectation of reward, This spirit of
public service in which the profession of law is and ought to
be exercised is a prerequisite of sound administration of
justice according to law. The other two elements of a
profession, namely, organization and pursuit of a learned
art have their justification in that they secure and maintain
that spirit. 25
In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes
of the public must bow to legal and ethical impediment.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised
to drop the names "SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names.
Those names may, however, be included in the listing of individuals who
have been partners in their firms indicating the years during which they
served as such.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ.,
concur
ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant
vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO,
VICENTE A. TORRES, RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L.
SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS, LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO,
NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A. CURAMMENG, JR., respondents.
Adriano E. Dacanay for and his own behalf.

Fernando, C.J. and Abad Santos, J., took no part. Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law Office for respondents.

AQUINO, J.:

Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980

verified complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other
lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a law
firm organized in Illinois.

In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using

the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten
lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay
Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.

Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any

liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he be informed whether
the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what is your purpose
in using the letterhead of another law office." Not having received any
reply, he filed the instant complaint.

We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice
law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the
respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional
partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and
associates in 30 cities around the world. Respondents, aside from being
members of the Philippine bar, practising under the firm name of Guerrero
& Torres, are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name
Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated with
Republic of the Philippines the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to
SUPREME COURT multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and
Manila investment" (p. 3, respondents' memo). This is unethical because Baker &
McKenzie is not authorized to practise law here. (See Ruben E. Agpalo,
EN BANC Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.)

Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985

WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the SO ORDERED.
firm name Baker & McKenzie.