G.R. No.

L-51078 October 30, 1980

CRISTINA DE KNECHT, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PEDRO JL. BAUTISTA, as Judge presiding over Branch III of the Court of First Instance
(Pasay City) and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.:

The petitioner alleges that than ten (10) years ago, the government through the Department
of Public Workmen's and Communication (now MPH) prepared a extension to Epifanio de
los Santos Avenue (EDSA) to Roxas Boulevard; that the proposed extension, an adjunct of
building program, the Manila Cavite Coastal Read Project, would pass through Cuneta
Avenue up to Roxas Boulevard that this route would be a straight one taking into account the
direction of EDSA.
That shortly thereafter the Department of Public Highways decided to make the proposed
extension go through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets which are lined with old
substantial houses; that upon learning of the changed the owners of the residential houses
that would be affected, the herein petitioner being one of them, filed on April 15, 1977 a
formal petition to President Ferdinand E. Marcos asking him to order the Ministry of Public
Highways to adoption, the original plan of making the extension of EDSA through Araneta
Avenue instead of the new plan going through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets.
that the President then referred the matter to the Human Settlements Commission for
investigation and recommendation
the Settlements Commission submitted a report recommending the reversion of the
extension of EDSA to the original plan passing through Cuneta Avenue;
and that notwithstanding the said report and recommendation, the Ministry of Public
Highways insisted on implementing the plan to make the extension of EDSA go through
Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. 2
In February 1979, the government filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch III,
Pascual City presided by the respondent Judge, a complaint for expropriation against the
owners of the houses standing along Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets, among them the
herein petitioner. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 7001-P and
entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Concepcion Cabarrus Vda. de Santos, etc.
"In June 1979 the Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession of the property sought to be expropriated on the ground that said Republic had
made the required deposit with the Philippine National Bank.
The respondent judge issued a writ of possession dated June 14, 1979 authorizing the
Republic of the Philippines to take and enter upon the possession of the properties sought
be condemned. 3
The petitioner contends that "Respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction or gravely
abused its discretion in issuing the order to take over and enter upon the possession of the
properties sought to be expropriated-petitioner having raised a constitutional question which
respondent court must resolve before it can issue an order to take or enter upon the
possession of properties sought to be expropriated." 4

ISSUE
WON the respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction or gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the order to take over and enter upon the possession of the properties
sought to be expropriated.
 WON there is a genuine need to expropriate the properties owned by De knecht and
others.

In the same case the Supreme Court concluded:

There is no question as to the right of the Republic of the Philippines to take private property
for public use upon the payment of just compensation. Section 2, Article IV of the
Constitution of the Philippines provides: "Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation."
It is recognized, was, that the government may not capriciously or arbitrarily' choose what
private property should be taken. In J. M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure administration
31 SCRA, 413, 433, the Supreme Court said:
With due recognition then of the power of Congress to designate the particular property to be
taken and how much thereof may be condemned in the exercise of the power of
expropriation, it is still a judicial question whether in the exercise of such competence, the
party adversely affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. That the equal protection
clause will not allow. (p. 436)
In the instant case, it is a fact that the Department of Public Highways originally establish the
extension of EDSA along Cuneta Avenue. It is to be presumed that the Department of Public
Highways made studies before deciding on Cuneta Avenue. It is indeed odd why suddenly
the proposed extension of EDSA to Roxas Boulevard was changed to go through Fernando
Rein-Del Pan Streets which the Solicitor General con- cedes "... the Del Pan Fernando
Rein Streets line follows northward and inward direction. While admit "that both lines, Cuneta
Avenue and Del Pan Fernando Rein Streets lines, meet satisfactorily planning and design
criteria and therefore are both acceptable ... the Solicitor General justifies the change to Del
Pan Fernando Rein Streets on the ground that the government "wanted to the social
impact factor or problem involved." 8
It is doubtful whether the extension of EDSA along Cuneta Avenue can be objected to on the
ground of social impact. The improvements and buildings along Cuneta Avenue to be
affected by the extension are mostly motels. Even granting, arguendo, that more people be
affected, the Human Setlements Commission has suggested coordinative efforts of said
Commission with the National Housing Authority and other government agencies in the
relocation and resettlement of those adversely affected. 9
The course of the decision in this case consequently boils down to the soul-searching and
heart-rending choice between people on one hand and progress and development on the
other. In deciding in favor of the latter, the Hearing Board is not unmindful that progress and
development are carried out by the State precisely and ultimately for the benefit of its people
and therefore, recommends the reverend of the extension project to alignment 1.
From all the foregoing, the facts of record and recommendations of the Human Settlements
Commission, it is clear that the choice of Fernando Rein Del Pan Streets as the line
through which the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue should be extended to Roxas Boulevard is
arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval. The respondent judge committed a grave
abuse of discretion in allowing the Republic of the Philippines to take immediate possession
of the properties sought to be expropriated.
G.R. No. 87335 February 12, 1990

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
CRISTINA DE KNECHT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Villanueva, Talamayan, Nieva, Elegado, and Ante Law Offices for respondent Cristina de Knecht.

GANCAYCO, J.:

The issue posed in this case is whether an expropriation proceeding that was determined by
a final judgment of this Court may be the subject of a subsequent legislation for
expropriation.

On August 8, 1981 defendants Maria Del Carmen Roxas Vda. de Elizalde, Francisco
Elizalde and Antonio Roxas moved to dismiss the expropriation action in compliance with the
dispositive portion of the aforesaid decision of this Court which had become final and in
order to avoid further damage to same defendants who were denied possession of their
properties. The Republic filed a manifestation on September 7, 1981 stating, among others,
that it had no objection to the said motion to dismiss as it was in accordance with the
aforestated decision.

On September 2, 1983, the Republic filed a motion to dismiss said case due to the
enactment of the Batas Pambansa Blg. 340 expropriating the same properties and for the
same purpose. The lower court in an order of September 2, 1983 dismissed the case by
reason of the enactment of the said law. The motion for reconsideration thereof was denied
in the order of the lower court dated December 18, 1986.

De Knecht appealed from said order to the Court of Appeals wherein in due course a
decision was rendered, dismissing the expropriation proceedings (Civil Case No. 51078)
before the lower court on the ground that the choice of Fernando Rein-Del Pan Streets as
the line through which the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue should be extended is arbitrary and
should not receive judicial approval.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ENACTMENT OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 340 IS THE

PROPER GROUND FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE EXPROPRIATION CASE.
(PROPERLY PUT, WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE
 ABUSE OF DIS CRETION IN DISMISSING CIVIL CASE NO. 7001-P UPON
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF B.P. BLG. 340).

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE DPWH'S "CHOICE" OF LAND TO BE EXPROPRIATED IS

STILL AN ISSUE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, SAID "CHOICE" HAVING BEEN
SUPPLANTED BY THE LEGISLATURE'S CHOICE.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE LAW OF THE CASE THEORY SHOULD BE APPLIED TO

THE CASE AT BAR. 4

HELD

There is no question that in the decision of this Court dated October 30, 1980 in De Knecht
vs. Bautista, G.R. No. L-51078, this Court held that the "choice of the Fernando Rein-Del
Pan streets as the line through which the EDSA should be extended to Roxas Boulevard is
arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval." 5 It is based on the recommendation of the
Human Settlements Commission that the choice of Cuneta street as the line of the extension will
minimize the social impact factor as the buildings and improvement therein are mostly motels. 6

Said decision having become final no action was taken by the lower court on the said
directive of this Court to dismiss the case. Subsequently B.P. Blg. 340 was enacted by the
Batasang Pambansa on February 17, 1983. On the basis of said law petitioner filed a motion
to dismiss the case before the trial court and this was granted.

On appeal by de Knecht to the Court of Appeals the appellate court held that the decision of
the Supreme Court having become final, the petitioner's right as determined therein should
no longer be disturbed and that the same has become the law of the case between the
parties involved. Thus, the appellate court set aside the questioned order of the trial court
and issued another order dismissing the expropriation proceedings before the lower court
pursuant to the ruling in De Knecht case.

While it is true that said final judgment of this Court on the subject becomes the law of the
case between the parties, it is equally true that the right of the petitioner to take private
properties for public use upon the payment of the just compensation is so provided in the
Constitution and our laws. 7 Such expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by the
petitioner not only by voluntary negotiation with the land owners but also by taking appropriate
court action or by legislation. 8

When on February 17, 1983 the Batasang Pambansa passed B.P. Blg. 340 expropriating the
very properties subject of the present proceedings, and for the same purpose, it appears that
it was based on supervening events that occurred after the decision of this Court was
 rendered in De Knecht in 1980 justifying the expropriation through the Fernando Rein-Del
Pan Streets.

The social impact factor which persuaded the Court to consider this extension to be arbitrary
had disappeared. All residents in the area have been relocated and duly compensated.
Eighty percent of the EDSA outfall and 30% of the EDSA extension had been completed.
Only private respondent remains as the solitary obstacle to this project that will solve not
only the drainage and flood control problem but also minimize the traffic bottleneck in the
area.

The Court finds justification in proceeding with the said expropriation proceedings through
the Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets from ESDA to Roxas Boulevard due B.P. Blg. 340
therefore effectively superseded the aforesaid final and executory decision of this Court. And
the trial court committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case pending before
it on the ground of the enactment of B.P. Blg. 340.

Moreover, the said decision, is no obstacle to the legislative arm of the Government in
thereafter (over two years later in this case) making its own independent assessment of the
circumstances then prevailing as to the propriety of undertaking the expropriation of the
properties in question and thereafter by enacting the corresponding legislation as it did in this
case. The Court agrees in the wisdom and necessity of enacting B.P. Blg. 340. Thus the
anterior decision of this Court must yield to this subsequent legislative flat.

G.R. No. L-59603 April 29, 1987

EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, and SAN ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
Elena M. Cuevas for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The question raised in this petition is whether or not Presidential Decrees Numbered 76,
464, 794 and 1533 have repealed and superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Revised
Rules of Court, such that in determining the just compensation of property in an
expropriation case, the only basis should be its market value as declared by the owner or as
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
 On January 15, 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued Proclamation No. 1811,
reserving a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu,
Island of Mactan, Cebu and covering a total area of 1,193,669 square meters, more or less,
for the establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone
Authority (EPZA).

Not all the reserved area, however, was public land. The proclamation included, among
others, four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 22,328 square meters owned and
registered in the name of the private respondent. The petitioner, therefore, offered to
purchase the parcels of land from the respondent in acccordance with the valuation set forth
in Section 92, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 464, as amended. The parties failed to reach
an agreement regarding the sale of the property.

The petitioner filed with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu
City, a complaint for expropriation with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession
against the private respondent, to expropriate the aforesaid parcels of land pursuant to P.D.
No. 66, as amended, which empowers the petitioner to acquire by condemnation
proceedings any property for the establishment of export processing zones, in relation to
Proclamation No. 1811, for the purpose of establishing the Mactan Export Processing Zone.

On February 17, 1981, the respondent judge issued the order of condemnation declaring the
petitioner as having the lawful right to take the properties sought to be condemned, upon the
payment of just compensation to be determined as of the filing of the complaint. The
respondent judge also issued a second order, subject of this petition, appointing certain
persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the
properties sought to be expropriated.

The petitioner maintains that the respondent judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction and
with grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and in
setting the commissioner's report for hearing because under P.D. No. 1533, which is the
applicable law herein, the basis of just compensation shall be the fair and current market
value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated or such market value
as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. Therefore, there is no more need to
appoint commissioners as prescribed by Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court and for said
commissioners to consider other highly variable factors in order to determine just
compensation. The petitioner further maintains that P.D. No. 1533 has vested on the
assessors and the property owners themselves the power or duty to fix the market value of
the properties and that said property owners are given the full opportunity to be heard before
the Local Board of Assessment Appeals and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
Thus, the vesting on the assessor or the property owner of the right to determine the just
compensation in expropriation proceedings, with appropriate procedure for appeal to higher
administrative boards, is valid and constitutional.

ISSUE:
The only issue raised in this petition is whether or not Sections 5 to 8, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules
of Court had been repealed or deemed amended by P.D. No. 1533 insofar as the appointment of
commissioners to determine the just compensation is concerned. Stated in another way, is the
exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in P.D. No. 1533 valid and
constitutional?

HELD:

We are constrained to declare the provisions of the Decrees on just compensation unconstitutional
and void and accordingly dismiss the instant petition for lack of merit.

Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have the power to
determine the just compensation for the property, following the applicable decrees, its task would be
relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the
assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint commissioners
under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process clause in the
taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial proceeding was
not had before the actual taking. However, the strict application of the decrees during the
proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only to choose
between the valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the
lower of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just
or fair. Even a grade school pupil could substitute for the judge insofar as the determination of
constitutional just compensation is concerned.

In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same question of whether the courts
under P.D. 1533, which contains the same provision on just compensation as its predecessor
decrees, still have the power and authority to determine just compensation, independent of what is
stated by the decree and to this effect, to appoint commissioners for such purpose.

This time, we answer in the affirmative.

We are convinced and so rule that the trial court correctly stated that the valuation in the decree may
only serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may
not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at
such amount. A return to the earlier well-established doctrine, to our mind, is more in keeping with
the principle that the judiciary should live up to its mission "by vitalizing and not denigrating
constitutional rights." (See Salonga v. Cruz Pao, 134 SCRA 438, 462; citing Mercado v. Court of
First Instance of Rizal, 116 SCRA 93.) The doctrine we enunciated in National Housing Authority v.
Reyes, supra, therefore, must necessarily be abandoned if we are to uphold this Court's role as the
guardian of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the due process and equal protection clauses and
as the final arbiter over transgressions committed against constitutional rights.

The basic unfairness of the decrees is readily apparent.

Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full
equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its
surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered.

In this particular case, the tax declarations presented by the petitioner as basis for just compensation
were made by the Lapu-Lapu municipal, later city assessor long before martial law, when land was
not only much cheaper but when assessed values of properties were stated in figures constituting
only a fraction of their true market value. The private respondent was not even the owner of the
properties at the time. It purchased the lots for development purposes. To peg the value of the lots
on the basis of documents which are out of date and at prices below the acquisition cost of present
owners would be arbitrary and confiscatory.

Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific properties singled out for expropriation.
The values given by provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas covering several
barrios or even an entire town with the exception of the poblacion. Individual differences are never
taken into account. The value of land is based on such generalities as its possible cultivation for rice,
corn, coconuts, or other crops. Very often land described as "cogonal" has been cultivated for
generations. Buildings are described in terms of only two or three classes of building materials and
estimates of areas are more often inaccurate than correct. Tax values can serve as guides but
cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation.

To say that the owners are estopped to question the valuations made by assessors since they had
the opportunity to protest is illusory. The overwhelming mass of land owners accept unquestioningly
what is found in the tax declarations prepared by local assessors or municipal clerks for them. They
do not even look at, much less analyze, the statements. The Idea of expropriation simply never
occurs until a demand is made or a case filed by an agency authorized to do so.

It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the
tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow
the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court
promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and
arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a
fair and just determination have been judiciously evaluated.

The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The
executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims
a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use
without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from
looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.

We, therefore, hold that P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the court's discretion to appoint
commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and void. To hold
otherwise would be to undermine the very purpose why this Court exists in the first place.