Republic of the Philippines
00, with FGU Instance Corporation
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-62100 May 30, 1986
RICARDO L. MANOTOC, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HONS. SERAFIN E.
CAMILON and RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as
Judges of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig
branches, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
the SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMISSION,
HON. EDMUNDO M. REYES, as Commissioner of
Immigration, and the Chief of the Aviation Security
Command (AVSECOM), respondents.
FERNAN, J.:
The issue posed for resolution in this petition for review
may be stated thus: Does a person facing a criminal
indictment and provisionally released on bail have an
unrestricted right to travel?
Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the two
principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management,
Inc. and the Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage
house. Having transferred the management of the latter
into the hands of professional men, he holds no officer-
position in said business, but acts as president of the
former corporation.
Following the "run" on stock brokerages caused by stock
broker Santamaria's flight from this jurisdiction,
petitioner, who was then in the United States, came
home, and together with his co-stockholders, filed a
petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission
for the appointment of a management committee, not
only for Manotoc Securities, Inc., but likewise for Trans-
Insular Management, Inc. The petition relative to the
Manotoc Securities, Inc., docketed as SEC Case No.
001826, entitled, "In the Matter of the Appointment of a
Management Committee for Manotoc Securities, Inc.,
Teodoro Kalaw, Jr., Ricardo Manotoc, Jr., Petitioners",
was granted and a management committee was
organized and appointed.
Pending disposition of SEC Case No. 001826, the
Securities and Exchange Commission requested the then
Commissioner of Immigration, Edmundo Reyes, not to
clear petitioner for departure and a memorandum to this
effect was issued by the Commissioner on February 4,
1980 to the Chief of the Immigration Regulation
Division.
When a Torrens title submitted to and accepted by
Manotoc Securities, Inc. was suspected to be a fake, six
of its clients filed six separate criminal complaints
against petitioner and one Raul Leveriza, Jr., as president
and vice-president, respectively, of Manotoc Securities,
Inc. In due course, corresponding criminal charges for
estafa were filed by the investigating fiscal before the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal, docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 45399 and 45400, assigned to
respondent Judge Camilon, and Criminal Cases Nos.
45542 to 45545, raffled off to Judge Pronove. In all
cases, petitioner has been admitted to bail in the total
amount of P105,000.
as surety.
On March 1, 1982, petitioner filed before each of the
trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for permission to
leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire
to go to the United States, "relative to his business
transactions and opportunities." 1 The prosecution
opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial
judges denied the same. The order of Judge Camilon
dated March 9, 1982, reads:
Accused Ricardo Manotoc Jr. desires to
leave for the United States on the all
embracing ground that his trip is ...
relative to his business transactions and
opportunities.
The Court sees no urgency from this
statement. No matter of any magnitude
is discerned to warrant judicial
imprimatur on the proposed trip.
In view thereof, permission to leave the
country is denied Ricardo Manotoc, Jr.
now or in the future until these two (2)
cases are terminated . 2
On the other hand, the order of Judge Pronove dated
March 26, 1982, reads in part:
6.-Finally, there is also merit in the
prosecution's contention that if the Court
would allow the accused to leave the
Philippines the surety companies that
filed the bail bonds in his behalf might
claim that they could no longer be held
liable in their undertakings because it
was the Court which allowed the
accused to go outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippine Court,
should the accused fail or decide not to
return.
WHEREFORE, the motion of the
accused is DENIED. 3
It appears that petitioner likewise wrote the Immigration
Commissioner a letter requesting the recall or
withdrawal of the latter's memorandum dated February
4, 1980, but said request was also denied in a letter dated
May 27, 1982.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus before the then Court of Appeals 4 seeking to
annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges
Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as well as the
communication-request of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, denying his leave to travel abroad. He
likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ
commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the
Chief of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM)
to clear him for departure.
On October 5, 1982, the appellate court rendered a
decision 5 dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
Dissatisfied with the appellate court's ruling, petitioner
filed the instant petition for review on certiorari. Pending
resolution of the petition to which we gave due course
on April 14, 1983 6 petitioner filed on August 15, 1984 a
motion for leave to go abroad pendente lite. 7 In his
motion, petitioner stated that his presence in Louisiana,
U.S.A. is needed in connection "with the obtention of
foreign investment in Manotoc Securities, Inc." 8 He
attached the letter dated August 9, 1984 of the chief
executive officer of the Exploration Company of
Louisiana, Inc., Mr. Marsden W. Miller 9 requesting his
presence in the United States to "meet the people and
companies who would be involved in its investments."
Petitioner, likewise manifested that on August 1, 1984,
Criminal Cases Nos. 4933 to 4936 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati (formerly Nos. 45542-45545) had been
dismissed as to him "on motion of the prosecution on the
ground that after verification of the records of the
Securities and Exchange Commission ... (he) was not in
any way connected with the Manotoc Securities, Inc. as
of the date of the commission of the offenses imputed to
him." 10 Criminal Cases Nos. 45399 and 45400 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, however, remained
pending as Judge Camilon, when notified of the
dismissal of the other cases against petitioner, instead of
dismissing the cases before him, ordered merely the
informations amended so as to delete the allegation that
petitioner was president and to substitute that he was
"controlling/majority stockholder,'' 11 of Manotoc
Securities, Inc. On September 20, 1984, the Court in a
resolution en banc denied petitioner's motion for leave to
go abroad pendente lite. 12
Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a
matter of right, neither the courts which granted him bail
nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has
no jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent him from
exercising his constitutional right to travel.
Petitioner's contention is untenable.
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to
bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary
consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as
the security required and given for the release of a
person who is in the custody of the law, that he will
appear before any court in which his appearance may be
required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.
Its object is to relieve the accused of
imprisonment and the state of the
burden of keeping him, pending the
trial, and at the same time, to put the
accused as much under the power of the
court as if he were in custody of the
proper officer, and to secure the
appearance of the accused so as to
answer the call of the court and do what
the law may require of him. 13
The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself
available at all times whenever the court requires his
presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to
travel. As we have held in People vs. Uy Tuising, 61
Phil. 404 (1935).
... the result of the obligation assumed
by appellee (surety) to hold the accused
amenable at all times to the orders and
processes of the lower court, was to
prohibit said accused from leaving the
jurisdiction of the Philippines, because,
otherwise, said orders and processes will
be nugatory, and inasmuch as the
jurisdiction of the courts from which
they issued does not extend beyond that
of the Philippines they would have no
binding force outside of said
jurisdiction.
Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the
Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed
beyond the reach of the courts.
The effect of a recognizance or bail
bond, when fully executed or filed of
record, and the prisoner released
thereunder, is to transfer the custody of
the accused from the public officials
who have him in their charge to keepers
of his own selection. Such custody has
been regarded merely as a continuation
of the original imprisonment. The
sureties become invested with full
authority over the person of the
principal and have the right to prevent
the principal from leaving the state. 14
If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal
from leaving the state, more so then has the court from
which the sureties merely derive such right, and whose
jurisdiction over the person of the principal remains
unaffected despite the grant of bail to the latter. In fact,
this inherent right of the court is recognized by petitioner
himself, notwithstanding his allegation that he is at total
liberty to leave the country, for he would not have filed
the motion for permission to leave the country in the first
place, if it were otherwise.
To support his contention, petitioner places reliance
upon the then Court of Appeals' ruling in People vs.
Shepherd (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-R, February 13, 1980)
particularly citing the following passage:
... The law obliges the bondsmen to
produce the person of the appellants at
the pleasure of the Court. ... The law
does not limit such undertaking of the
bondsmen as demandable only when the
appellants are in the territorial confines
of the Philippines and not demandable if
the appellants are out of the country.
Liberty, the most important consequence
of bail, albeit provisional, is indivisible.
If granted at all, liberty operates as fully
within as without the boundaries of the
granting state. This principle perhaps
accounts for the absence of any law or
jurisprudence expressly declaring that
liberty under bail does not transcend the
territorial boundaries of the country.
The faith reposed by petitioner on the above-quoted
opinion of the appellate court is misplaced. The rather
broad and generalized statement suffers from a serious
fallacy; for while there is, indeed, neither law nor
jurisprudence expressly declaring that liberty under bail
does not transcend the territorial boundaries of the
country, it is not for the reason suggested by the
appellate court.
Also, petitioner's case is not on all fours with the
Shepherd case. In the latter case, the accused was able to
show the urgent necessity for her travel abroad, the
duration thereof and the conforme of her sureties to the
proposed travel thereby satisfying the court that she
would comply with the conditions of her bail bond. in
contrast, petitioner in this case has not satisfactorily
shown any of the above. As aptly observed by the contemplated by the above-quoted constitutional
Solicitor General in his comment: provision.

A perusal of petitioner's 'Motion for Finding the decision of the appellate court to be in
Permission to Leave the Country' will accordance with law and jurisprudence, the Court finds
show that it is solely predicated on that no gainful purpose will be served in discussing the
petitioner's wish to travel to the United other issues raised by petitioner.
States where he will, allegedly attend to
some business transactions and search WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby
for business opportunities. From the dismissed, with costs against petitioner.
tenor and import of petitioner's motion,
no urgent or compelling reason can be SO ORDERED.
discerned to justify the grant of judicial
imprimatur thereto. Petitioner has not
sufficiently shown that there is absolute
necessity for him to travel abroad.
Petitioner's motion bears no indication
that the alleged business transactions
could not be undertaken by any other
person in his behalf. Neither is there any
hint that petitioner's absence from the
United States would absolutely preclude
him from taking advantage of business
opportunities therein, nor is there any
showing that petitioner's non-presence
in the United States would cause him
irreparable damage or prejudice. 15

Petitioner has not specified the duration of the proposed

travel or shown that his surety has agreed to it. Petitioner
merely alleges that his surety has agreed to his plans as
he had posted cash indemnities. The court cannot allow
the accused to leave the country without the assent of the
surety because in accepting a bail bond or recognizance,
the government impliedly agrees "that it will not take
any proceedings with the principal that will increase the
risks of the sureties or affect their remedies against him.
Under this rule, the surety on a bail bond or
recognizance may be discharged by a stipulation
inconsistent with the conditions thereof, which is made
without his assent. This result has been reached as to a
stipulation or agreement to postpone the trial until after
the final disposition of other cases, or to permit the
principal to leave the state or country." 16 Thus, although
the order of March 26, 1982 issued by Judge Pronove
has been rendered moot and academic by the dismissal
as to petitioner of the criminal cases pending before said
judge, We see the rationale behind said order.

As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial courts and the

appellate court of the urgency of his travel, the duration
thereof, as well as the consent of his surety to the
proposed travel, We find no abuse of judicial discretion
in their having denied petitioner's motion for permission
to leave the country, in much the same way, albeit with
contrary results, that We found no reversible error to
have been committed by the appellate court in allowing
Shepherd to leave the country after it had satisfied itself
that she would comply with the conditions of her bail
bond.

The constitutional right to travel being invoked by

petitioner is not an absolute right. Section 5, Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution states:

The liberty of abode and of travel shall

not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court, or when necessary in
the interest of national security, public
safety or public health.

To our mind, the order of the trial court releasing

petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 99289-90 January 27, 1993
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman;
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Special
Prosecutor; SANDIGANBAYAN and REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, respondents.
Marciano P. Defensor for petitioner.
Nestor P. Ifurong for Maria S. Tatoy.
Danilo C. Cunanan for respondents.
RESOLUTION
REGALADO, J.:
Filed directly with the Court, ostensibly as an incident in
the present special civil action, is petitioner's so-called
"Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing
its Hold Departure Order with Prayer for the Issuance of
a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction, with Motion to Set Pending Incident for
Hearing." Despite the impropriety of the mode adopted
in elevating the issue to us, as will hereinafter be
discussed, we will disregard the procedural gaffe in the
interest of an early resolution hereof.
The chronology of events preceding the instant motion is
best summarized to readily provide a clear
understanding and perspective of our disposition of this
matter, thus:
1. On May 13, 1991, an information dated May 9, 1991
and docketed as Criminal Case No. 16698 was filed
against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for alleged
violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.
2. On May 14, 1991, an order of arrest was issued in said
case against herein petitioner by Presiding Justice
Francis E. Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, with bail
for the release of the accused fixed at P15,000.00. 1
3. On even date, petitioner filed an "Urgent Ex-
parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and
in Behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago," 2 which
pertinently states in part:
xxx xxx xxx
3. As a result of the vehicular collision,
she suffered extensive physical injuries
which required surgical intervention. As
of this time, her injuries, specifically in
the jaw or gum area of the mouth,
prevents her to speak (sic) because of
extreme pain. Further, she cannot for an
extended period be on her feet because
she is still in physical pain. . . . .
4. On the other hand, the accused
Miriam Defensor Santiago seeks leave
of this Honorable Court that she be
considered as having placed herself
under the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, for purposes of the required trial
and other proceedings and further seeks
leave of this Honorable Court that the
recommended bail bond of P15,000.00
that she is posting in cash be accepted.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed
of this Honorable Court that the bail
bond she is posting in the amount of
P15,000.00 be duly accepted, and that
by this motion, she be considered as
having placed herself under the custody
of this Honorable Court and dispensing
of her personal appearance for now until
such time she will (sic) have recovered
sufficiently from her recent near fatal
accident.
Further, on the above basis, it is also
respectfully prayed that the warrant for
her arrest be immediately recalled.
xxx xxx xxx
4. Also on the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution 3 authorizing petitioner to post a cash bond for
her provisional liberty without need for her physical
appearance until June 5, 1991 at the latest, unless by that
time her condition does not yet permit her physical
appearance before said court. On May 15, 1991,
petitioner filed a cash bond in the amount of P15,000.00,
aside from the other legal fees. 4
5. On May 21, 1991, respondent Ombudsman Conrado
M. Vasquez filed with the Sandiganbayan a
manifestation "that accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago
appeared in his office in the second floor of the Old
NAWASA Building located in Arroceros Street, Ermita,
Manila at around 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon of May
20, 1991. She was accompanied by a brother who
represented himself to be Atty. Arthur Defensor and a
lady who is said to be a physician. She came and left
unaided, after staying for about fifteen minutes. 5
6. Acting on said manifestation, the Sandiganbayan
issued a resolution also on May 21, 1991, setting the
arraignment of the accused for May 27, 1991, and
setting aside the court's resolution of May 14, 1991
which ordered her appearance before the deputy clerk of
the First Division of said court on or before June 5,
1991. 6
7. In a motion dated May 22, 1991, petitioner asked that
her cash bond be cancelled and that she be allowed
provisional liberty upon a recognizance. She contended
that for her to continue remaining under bail bond may
imply to other people that she has intentions of fleeing,
an intention she would like to prove as baseless. 7
8. Likewise on May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with this
Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction, and a subsequent addendum
thereto, seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the
Regional Trial Court of Manila from proceeding with
Criminal Cases Nos. 12298 (for violation of Section 3[e]
of Republic Act No. 3019), 91-94555 (violation of
Presidential Decree No. 46), and 91-94897 (for libel),
respectively. Consequently, a temporary restraining order
was issued by this Court on May 24, 1991, enjoining the
Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 3, from proceeding with the criminal cases
pending before them. This Court, in issuing said order,
took into consideration the fact that according to
petitioner, her arraignment, originally set for June 5,
1991, was inexplicably advanced to May 27, 1991,
hence the advisability of conserving and affording her
the opportunity to avail herself of any remedial right to
meet said contingency.
9. On May 27, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued an order
deferring: (a) the arraignment of petitioner until further
advice from the Supreme Court; and (b) the
consideration of herein petitioner's motion to cancel her
cash bond until further initiative from her through
counsel. 8
10. On January 18, 1992, this Court rendered a decision
dismissing the petition for certiorari and lifting and
setting aside the temporary restraining order previously
issued. 9 The motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner was eventually denied with finality in this
Court's resolution dated September 10, 1992.
11. Meanwhile, in a resolution adopted on July 6, 1992,
the Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against
petitioner which reads as follows:
Considering the information in media to
the effect that accused Santiago intends
to leave the country soon for an
extended stay abroad for study purposes,
considering the recent decision of the
Supreme Court dismissing her petition
promulgated on January 13, 1992,
although the same is still subject of a
Motion for Reconsideration from the
accused, considering that the accused
has not yet been arraigned, nor that she
has not (sic) even posted bail the same
having been by reason of her earlier
claim of being seriously indisposed, all
of which were overtaken by a
restraining order issued by the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. 99289 and No. 99290
dated May 24, 1991, the accused is
ordered not to leave the country and the
Commission on Immigration and
Deportation is ordered not to allow the
departure of the accused unless
authorized from (sic) this Court. 10
The hold departure order was issued by reason of the
announcement made by petitioner, which was widely
publicized in both print and broadcast media, that she
would be leaving for the United States to accept a
fellowship supposedly offered by the John F. Kennedy
School of Government at Harvard University. Petitioner
likewise disclosed that she would be addressing Filipino
communities in the United States in line with her
crusade against election fraud and other aspects of graft
and corruption.
In the instant motion submitted for our resolution,
petitioner argues that:
1. The Sandiganbayan acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the hold
departure order considering that it had
not acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the petitioner.
2. The Sandiganbayan blatantly
disregarded basic principles of judicial
comity and due deference owing to a
superior tribunal when it issued the hold
departure order despite the pendency of
petitioner's motion for reconsideration
with this Honorable Court.
3. The right to due process of law, the
right to travel and the right to freedom
of speech are preferred, pre-eminent
rights enshrined not only in the
Constitution but also in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights which can
be validly impaired only under stringent
criteria which do not obtain in the
instant case.
4. The hold departure order in the
instant case was issued under disturbing
circumstances which suggest political
harassment and persecution.
5. On the basis of petitioner's creditable
career in the bench and bar and her
characteristic transparency and candor,
there is no reasonable ground to fear that
petitioner will surreptitiously flee the
country to evade judicial processes. 11
I. Petitioner initially postulates that respondent court
never acquired jurisdiction over her person considering
that she has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily
surrendered, aside from the fact that she has not validly
posted bail since she never personally appeared before
said court. We reject her thesis for being factually and
legally untenable.
It has been held that where after the filing of the
complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the
accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either
voluntarily submitted himself to the court or was duly
arrested, the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the accused. 12 The voluntary appearance of the
accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the
merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other
pleadings requiring the exercise of the court's
jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment,
entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail,
since the same is intended to obtain the provisional
liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be
posted before custody of the accused has been acquired
by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or
voluntary surrender. 13
In the case at bar, it becomes essential, therefore, to
determine whether respondent court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of herein petitioner and,
correlatively, whether there was a valid posting of bail
bond.
We find and so hold that petitioner is deemed to have
voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of
respondent court upon the filing of her aforequoted
"Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail
Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-
Santiago" wherein she expressly sought leave "that she
be considered as having placed herself under the
jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the
required trial and other proceedings," and categorically
prayed "that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of
P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that by said motion
"she be considered as having placed herself under the
custody" of said court. Petitioner cannot now be heard to
claim otherwise for, by her own representations, she is
effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after she
had earlier recognized the jurisdiction of the court and
caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over the aforestated
pleadings she filed therein.
It cannot be denied that petitioner has posted a cash bail
bond of P15,000.00 for her provisional release as
evidenced by Official Receipt No. 4292925 dated May
15, 1991 and which is even attached as Annex C-2 to her
own motion now under consideration. This is further
buttressed by the fact that petitioner thereafter also filed
a motion for the cancellation of said cash bond and for
the court to allow her provisional liberty upon the
security of a recognizance. With the filing of the
foregoing motions, petitioner should accordingly and
necessarily admit her acquiescence to and
acknowledgment of the propriety of the cash bond she
posted, instead of adopting a stance which ignores the
injunction for candor and sincerity in dealing with the
courts of justice.
Petitioner would also like to make capital of the fact that
she did not personally appear before respondent court to
file her cash bond, thereby rendering the same
ineffectual. Suffice it to say that in this case, it was
petitioner herself, in her motion for the acceptance of the
cash bond, who requested respondent court to dispense
with her personal appearance until she shall have
recovered sufficiently from her vehicular accident. It is
distressing that petitioner should now turn around and
fault respondent court for taking a compassionate stand
on the matter and accommodating her own request for
acceptance of the cash bond posted in her absence.
II. Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan disregarded
the rule of judicial comity when it issued the hold
departure order despite the pendency of her motion for
reconsideration of the decision of this Court which
dismissed her petition. She claims that if the principle of
judicial comity applies to prevent a court from
interfering with the proceedings undertaken by a
coordinate court, with more reason should it operate to
prevent an inferior court, such as the Sandiganbayan,
from interfering with the instant case where a motion for
reconsideration was still pending before this Court. She
contends further that the hold departure order
contravenes the temporary restraining order previously
issued by this court enjoining the Sandiganbayan from
proceeding with the criminal case pending before it.
It will be remembered that the Court rendered a decision
in the present case on January 18, 1992 dismissing the
petition for certiorari filed in this case and lifting and
setting aside the temporary restraining order it
previously issued. It is petitioner's submission that the
filing of her motion for reconsideration stayed the lifting
of the temporary restraining order, hence respondent
court continued to be enjoined from acting on and
proceeding with the case during the pendency of the
motion for reconsideration. We likewise reject this
contention which is bereft of merit.
Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that,
unless otherwise ordered by the court, a judgment in an
action for injunction shall not be stayed after its
rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the
pendency of an appeal. And, the rule is that the
execution of a judgment decreeing the dissolution of a
writ of preliminary injunction shall not be stayed before
an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an
appeal, 14 and we see no reason why the foregoing
considerations should not apply to a temporary
restraining order. The rationale therefor is that even in
cases where an appeal is taken from a judgment
dismissing an action on the merits, the appeal does not
suspend the judgment, hence the general rule applies that
a temporary injunction terminates automatically on the
dismissal of the action. 15
It has similarly been held that an order of dissolution of
an injunction may be immediately effective, even though
it is not final. 16 A dismissal, discontinuance, or non-suit
of an action in which a restraining order or temporary
injunction has been granted operates as a dissolution of
the restraining order or temporary injunction 17 and no
formal order of dissolution is necessary to effect such
dissolution. 18 Consequently, a special order of the court
is necessary for the reinstatement of an
injunction. 19 There must be a new exercise of .judicial
power. 20
The reason advanced in support of the general rule has
long since been duly explained, to wit:
. . . The court of this State, relying upon
the last of the two clauses quoted, held
that an appeal from an order dissolving
an injunction continued the injunction in
force. The evils which would result from
such a holding are forcibly pointed out
by Judge Mitchell in a dissenting
opinion. He said: "Although a plaintiff's
papers are so insufficient on their face or
so false in their allegations that if he
should apply on notice for an injunction,
any court would, on a hearing, promptly
refuse to grant one, yet, if he can find
anywhere in the State a judge or court
commissioner who will improvidently
grant one ex parte, which the court on
the first and only hearing ever had
dissolves, he can, by appealing and
filing a bond, make the ex
parte injunction impervious to all
judicial interference until the appeal is
determined in this court." . . . Such a
result is so unjust and so utterly
inconsistent with all known rules of
equity practice that no court should
adopt such a construction unless
absolutely shut up to it by the clear and
unequivocal language of the
statute. . . . . 21
This ruling has remained undisturbed over the decades
and was reiterated in a case squarely in point and of
more recent vintage:
The SEC's orders dated June 27, 1989
and July 21, 1989 (directing the
secretary of UDMC to call a
stockholders' meeting, etc.) are not
premature, despite the petitioners then
pending motion for reconsideration of
the decision of the Court of Appeals.
 The lifting by the Court of Appeals of its
writ of preliminary injunction in C.A.-
G.R. SP No. 17435 cleared the way for
the implementation by the SEC's en
banc resolution in SEC EB Case No.
191. The SEC need not wait for the
Court of Appeals to resolve the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration
for a judgment decreeing the dissolution
of a preliminary injunction is
immediately executory. It shall not be
stayed after its rendition and before an
appeal is taken or during the pendency
of an appeal. . . . . 22
On the bases of the foregoing pronouncements, there is
no question that with the dismissal of the petition
for certiorari and the lifting of the restraining order,
nothing stood to hinder the Sandiganbayan from acting
on and proceeding with the criminal cases filed against
herein petitioner. At any rate, as we have earlier
mentioned, the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner was denied with finality in our resolution
dated September 10, 1992.
Petitioner further posits, however, that the filing of the
instant special civil action for certiorari divested the
Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction over the case therein.
Whether generated by misconception or design, we shall
address this proposition which, in the first place, had no
reason for being and should not hereafter be advanced
under like or similar procedural scenarios.
The original and special civil action filed with this Court
is, for all intents and purposes, an invocation for the
exercise of its supervisory powers over the lower courts.
It does not have the effect of divesting the inferior courts
of jurisdiction validly acquired over the case pending
before them. It is elementary that the mere pendency of a
special civil action for certiorari, commenced in relation
to a case pending before a lower court, does not even
interrupt the course of the latter when there is no writ of
injunction restraining it. 23 The inevitable conclusion is
that for as long as no writ of injunction or restraining
order is issued in the special civil action for certiorari,
no impediment exists and there is nothing to prevent the
lower court from exercising its jurisdiction and
proceeding with the case pending before it. And, even if
such injunctive writ or order is issued, the lower court
nevertheless continues to retain its jurisdiction over the
principal action.
III. It is further submitted by petitioner that the hold
departure order violates her right to due process, right to
travel and freedom of speech.
First, it is averred that the hold departure order was
issued without notice and hearing. Much is made by
petitioner of the fact that there was no showing that a
motion to issue a hold departure order was filed by the
prosecution and, instead, the same was issued ex mero
motu by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner is in error.
Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be
said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in
addition to those expressly conferred on them. 24 These
inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the
ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; 25 or
essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the
courts, 26 as well as to the due administration of
justice; 27 or are directly appropriate, convenient and
suitable to the execution of their granted powers; 28 and
include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and
render it effective in behalf of the litigants. 29
Therefore, while a court may be expressly granted the
incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction,
a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive
legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental
powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing
laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly
constituted court has the power to do all things that are
reasonably necessary for the administration of justice
within the scope of its jurisdiction. Hence, demands,
matters, or questions ancillary or incidental to, or
growing out of, the main action, and coming within the
above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the
court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of
its authority over the principal matter, even though the
court may thus be called on to consider and decide
matters which, as original causes of action, would not be
within its cognizance.
Furthermore, a court has the inherent power to make
interlocutory orders necessary to protect its
jurisdiction. 30Such being the case, with more reason may
a party litigant be subjected to proper coercive measures
where he disobeys a proper order, or commits a fraud on
the court or the opposing party, the result of which is that
the jurisdiction of the court would be ineffectual. What
ought to be done depends upon the particular
circumstances. 31
Turning now to the case at bar, petitioner does not deny
and, as a matter of fact, even made a public statement
that she had every intention of leaving the country
allegedly to pursue higher studies abroad. We uphold the
course of action adopted by the Sandiganbayan in taking
judicial notice of such fact of petitioner's plan to go
abroad and in thereafter issuing sua sponte the hold
departure order, in justified consonance with our
preceding disquisition. To reiterate, the hold departure
order is but an exercise of respondent court's inherent
power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its
jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.
Second, petitioner asseverates that considering that she
is leaving for abroad to pursue further studies, there is no
sufficient justification for the impairment of her
constitutional right to travel; and that under Section 6,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the right to travel
may be impaired only when so required in the interest of
national security, public safety or public health, as may
be provided by law.
It will be recalled that petitioner has posted bail which
we have declared legally valid and complete despite the
absence of petitioner at the time of filing thereof, by
reason of the peculiar circumstances and grounds
hereinbefore enunciated and which warrant a relaxation
of the aforecited doctrine in Feliciano. Perforce, since
under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail
bond she holds herself amenable at all times to the
orders and processes of the court, she may legally be
prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency
of the case. This was the ruling we handed down
in Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 32 to the
effect that:
A court has the power to prohibit a
person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines. This is a necessary
consequence of the nature and function
of a bail bond.
 Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court defines bail as the security
required and given for the release of a
person who is in custody of the law, that
he will appear before any court in which
his appearance may be required as
stipulated in the bail bond or
recognizance.
Its object is to relieve the accused of
imprisonment and the state of the
burden of keeping him, pending the
trial, and at the same time, to put the
accused as much under the power of the
court as if he were in custody of the
proper officer, and to secure the
appearance of the accused so as to
answer the call of the court and do what
the law may require of him.
The condition imposed upon petitioner
to make himself available at all times
whenever the court requires his presence
operates as a valid restriction on his
right to travel. As we have held in
People vs. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404
(1935):
. . . the result of the
obligation assumed by
appellee (surety) to hold
the accused amenable at
all times to the orders
and processes of the
lower court, was to
prohibit said accused
from leaving the
jurisdiction of the
Philippines, because,
otherwise, said orders
and processes will be
nugatory, and inasmuch
as the jurisdiction of the
courts from which they
issued does not extend
beyond that of the
Philippines they would
have no binding force
outside of said
jurisdiction.
Indeed, if the accused were allowed to
leave the Philippines without sufficient
reason, he may be placed beyond the
reach of the courts.
This was reiterated in a more recent case where we held:
Petitioner thus theorizes that under the
1987 Constitution, Courts can impair the
right to travel only on the grounds of
"national security, public safety, or
public health."
The submission is not well taken.
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution should be interpreted to
mean that while the liberty of travel may
be impaired even without Court Order,
the appropriate executive officers or
administrative authorities are not armed
with arbitrary discretion to impose
limitations. They can impose limits only
on the basis of "national security, public
safety, or public health" and "as may be
provided by law," a limitive phrase
which did not appear in the 1973 text
(The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin, G.,
S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 197, p. 263).
Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987
Constitution was a reaction to the ban on
international travel imposed under the
previous regime when there was a
Travel Processing Center, which issued
certificates of eligibility to travel upon
application of an interested party (See
Salonga v. Hermoso & Travel
Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April
1980, 97 SCRA 121).
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution should by no means be
construed as delimiting the inherent
power of the Courts to use all means
necessary to carry their orders into
effect in criminal cases pending before
them. When by law jurisdiction is
conferred on a Court or judicial officer,
all auxiliary writs, processes and other
means necessary to carry it into effect
may be employed by such Court or
officer (Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of
Court).
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Holding an accused in a criminal
case within the reach of the Courts by
preventing his departure from the
Philippines must be considered as a
valid restriction on his right to travel so
that he may be dealt with in accordance
with law. The offended party in any
criminal proceeding is the People of the
Philippines. It is to their best interest
that criminal prosecutions should run
their course and proceed to finality
without undue delay, with an accused
holding himself amenable at all times to
Court Orders and processes. 33
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in
this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for
that matter, the same may be said of a number of
litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard
the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking
relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the
same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of
their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even
mandated bylaw to be sought therein. This practice must
be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the
precious time of this Court but also because of the
inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in
the adjudication of the case which often has to be
remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper
forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped
to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of
facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this
Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and
calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we elucidate
that such policy includes the matter of petitions or
motions involving hold departure orders of the trial or
lower courts. Parties with pending cases therein should
apply for permission to leave the country from the very
same courts which, in the first instance, are in the best
position to pass upon such applications and to impose
the appropriate conditions therefor since they are
conversant with the facts of the cases and the
ramifications or implications thereof. Where, as in the
present case, a hold departure order has been issued ex
parte or motu propio by said court, the party concerned
must first exhaust the appropriate remedies therein,
through a motion for reconsideration or other proper
submissions, or by the filing of the requisite application
for travel abroad. Only where all the conditions and
requirements for the issuance of the extraordinary writs
of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus indubitably
obtain against a disposition of the lower courts may our
power of supervision over said tribunals be invoked
through the appropriate petition assailing on
jurisdictional or clearly valid grounds their actuations
therein.

WHEREFORE, with respect to and acting on the motion

now before us for resolution, the same is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 94284 April 8, 1991
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G.
GAVIOLA, as Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch IX, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for petitioner.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court praying that the Decision of
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15827,
entitled "Ricardo C. Silverio vs. Hon. Benigno C.
Gaviola, etc., et al.," dated 31 January 1990, as well as
the Resolution of 29 June 1990 denying reconsideration,
be set aside.
On 14 October 1985, Petitioner was charged with
violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act
in Criminal Case No. CBU-6304 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for his
provisional liberty.
On 26 January 1988, or more than two (2) years after the
filing of the Information, respondent People of the
Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the
passport of and to issue a hold-departure Order against
accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone
abroad several times without the necessary Court
approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment
and scheduled hearings.
Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court, on 4
April 1988, issued an Order directing the Department of
Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioner's passport or to deny
his application therefor, and the Commission on
Immigration to prevent Petitioner from leaving the
country. This order was based primarily on the Trial
Court's finding that since the filing of the Information on
14 October 1985, "the accused has not yet been
arraigned because he has never appeared in Court on the
dates scheduled for his arraignment and there is evidence
to show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the
country and has gone abroad without the knowledge and
permission of this Court" (Rollo, p. 45). Petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration was denied on 28 July 1988.
Petitioner's Certiorari Petition before the Court of
Appeals met a similar fate on 31 January 1990. Hence,
this Petition for Review filed on 30 July 1990.
After the respective pleadings required by the Court
were filed, we resolved to give due course and to decide
the case.
Petitioner contends that respondent Court of Appeals
erred in not finding that the Trial Court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
issuing its Orders, dated 4 April and 28 July 1988, (1) on
the basis of facts allegedly patently erroneous, claiming
that the scheduled arraignments could not be held
because there was a pending Motion to Quash the
Information; and (2) finding that the right to travel can
be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on
grounds other than the "interest of national security,
public safety or public health."
We perceive no reversible error.
1) Although the date of the filing of the Motion to Quash
has been omitted by Petitioner, it is apparent that it was
filed long after the filing of the Information in 1985 and
only after several arraignments had already been
scheduled and cancelled due to Petitioner's non-
appearance. In fact, said Motion to Quash was set for
hearing only on 19 February 1988. Convincingly shown
by the Trial Court and conformed to by respondent
Appellate Court is the concurrence of the following
circumstances:
1. The records will show that the information
was filed on October 14, 1985. Until this date
(28 July 1988), the case had yet to be arraigned.
Several scheduled arraignments were cancelled
and reset, mostly due to the failure of accused
Silverio to appear. The reason for accused
Silverio's failure to appear had invariably been
because he is abroad in the United States of
America;
2. Since the information was filed, until this
date, accused Silverio had never appeared in
person before the Court;
3. The bond posted by accused Silverio had been
cancelled twice and warrants of arrest had been
issued against him all for the same reason
failure to appear at scheduled arraignments.
In all candidness, the Court makes the
observation that it has given accused Silverio
more than enough consideration. The limit had
long been reached (Order, 28 July 1988, Crim.
Case No. CBU-6304, RTC, Cebu, p. 5; Rollo, p.
73).
Patently, therefore, the questioned RTC Orders, dated 4
April 1988 and 28 July 1988, were not based on
erroneous facts, as Petitioner would want this Court to
believe. To all appearances, the pendency of a Motion to
Quash came about only after several settings for
arraignment had been scheduled and cancelled by reason
of Petitioner's non-appearance.
2) Petitioner's further submission is that respondent
Appellate Court "glaringly erred" in finding that the
right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the
Court, even on grounds other than the "interest of
national security, public safety or public health."
To start with, and this has not been controverted by
Petitioner, the bail bond he had posted had been
cancelled and Warrants of Arrest had been issued against
him by reason, in both instances, of his failure to appear
at scheduled arraignments. Warrants of Arrest having
been issued against him for violation of the conditions of
his bail bond, he should be taken into custody. "Bail is
the security given for the release of a person in custody
of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned
upon his appearance before any court when so required
by the Court or the Rules (1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, Rule 114, Secs. 1 and 2).
The foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to
make himself available at all times whenever the Court
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction of his
right to travel (Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
No. 62100, 30 May 1986, 142 SCRA 149). A person
facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court
from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to
return (Constitutional Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987
Edition, p. 138). So it is also that "An accused released
on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a
warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines
without prior permission of the Court where the case is
pending (ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd
par. ]).
Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the
1987 Constitution recognizes the power of the Courts to
curtail the liberty of abode within the limits prescribed
by law, it restricts the allowable impairment of the right
to travel only on grounds of interest of national security,
public safety or public health, as compared to the
provisions on freedom of movement in the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the liberty of abode and of
travel were treated under one provision.1wphi1 Article
III, Section 1(4) thereof reads:
The liberty of abode and of changing the same
within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired.
The 1973 Constitution altered the 1935 text by explicitly
including the liberty of travel, thus:
The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court
or when necessary in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health (Article
IV, Section 5).
The 1987 Constitution has split the two freedoms into
two distinct sentences and treats them differently, to wit:
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the
same within the limits prescribed by law shall
not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may
be provided by law.
Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987
Constitution, Courts can impair the right to travel only
on the grounds of "national security, public safety, or
public health."
The submission is not well taken.
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be
interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may
be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate
executive officers or administrative authorities are not
armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations.
They can impose limits only on the basis of "national
security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be
provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear
in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin
G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263). Apparently,
the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction
to the ban on international travel imposed under the
previous regime when there was a Travel Processing
Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel
upon application of an interested party (See Salonga vs.
Hermoso & Travel Processing Center, No. 53622, 25
April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by
no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power
of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their
orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them.
When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or
judicial officer, all auxillary writs, process and other
means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed
by such Court or officer (Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of
Court).
Petitioner's argument that the ruling in Manotoc, Jr., v.
Court of Appeals, et al. (supra), to the effect that the
condition imposed upon an accused admitted to bail to
make himself available at all times whenever the Court
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on
the right to travel no longer holds under the 1987
Constitution, is far from tenable. The nature and function
of a bail bond has remained unchanged whether under
the 1935, the 1973, or the 1987 Constitution. Besides,
the Manotoc ruling on that point was but a re-affirmation
of that laid down long before in People v. Uy Tuising, 61
Phil. 404 (1935).
Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail
but has violated the conditions thereof by failing to
appear before the Court when required. Warrants for his
arrest have been issued. Those orders and processes
would be rendered nugatory if an accused were to be
allowed to leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the
territorial confines of the country. Holding an accused in
a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by
preventing his departure from the Philippines must be
considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so
that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The
offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People
of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal
prosecutions should run their course and proceed to
finality without undue delay, with an accused holding
himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and
processes.
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner, Ricardo C.
Silverio.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 79269 June 5, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PROCORO J. DONATO, in his official
capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch XII, Manila; RODOLFO C. SALAS, alias
Commander Bilog, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Jose Suarez, Romeo Capulong, Efren Mercado and
Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity,
Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI) for Rodolfo Salas.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The People of the Philippines, through the Chief State
Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, the City Fiscal
of Manila and the Judge Advocate General, filed the
instant petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a
prayer for restraining order/preliminary injunction, to set
aside the order of respondent Judge dated July 7, 1987
granting bail to the accused Rodolfo
Salas alias "Commander Bilog" in Criminal Case No.
86-48926 for Rebellion,1 and the subsequent Order dated
July 30, 1987 granting the motion for reconsideration of
16 July 1987 by increasing the bail bond from
P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 but denying petitioner's
supplemental motion for reconsideration of July 17,
1987 which asked the court to allow petitioner to present
evidence in support of its prayer for a reconsideration of
the order of 7 July 1987.
The pivotal issues presented before Us are whether the
right to bail may, under certain circumstances, be denied
to a person who is charged with an otherwise bailable
offense, and whether such right may be waived.
The following are the antecedents of this petition:
In the original Information2 filed on 2 October 1986 in
Criminal Case No. 86-48926 of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, later amended in an Amended
Information3 which was filed on 24 October 1986,
private respondent Rodolfo Salas, alias "Commander
Bilog", and his co-accused were charged for the crime of
rebellion under Article 134, in relation to Article 135, of
the Revised Penal Code allegedly committed as follows:
That in or about 1968 and for some time before
said year and continuously thereafter until the
present time, in the City of Manila and
elsewhere in the Philippines, the Communist
Party of the Philippines, its military arm, the
New People's Army, its mass infiltration
network, the National Democratic Front with its
other subordinate organizations and fronts, have,
under the direction and control of said
organizations' leaders, among whom are the
aforenamed accused, and with the aid,
participation or support of members and
followers whose whereabouts and identities are
still unknown, risen publicly and taken arms
throughout the country against the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines for the
purpose of overthrowing the present
Government, the seat of which is in the City of
Manila, or of removing from the allegiance to
that government and its laws, the country's
territory or part of it;
That from 1970 to the present, the above-named
accused in their capacities as leaders of the
aforenamed organizations, in conspiracy with,
and in support of the cause of, the organizations
aforementioned, engaged themselves in war
against the forces of the government, destroying
property or committing serious violence, and
other acts in the pursuit of their unlawful
purpose, such as . . .
(then follows the enumeration of specific acts
committed before and after February 1986).
At the time the Information was filed the private
respondent and his co-accused were in military custody
following their arrest on 29 September 1986 at the
Philippine General Hospital, Taft Ave., Manila; he had
earlier escaped from military detention and a cash
reward of P250,000.00 was offered for his
capture.4
A day after the filing of the original information, or on 3
October 1986, a petition for habeas corpus for private
respondent and his co-accused was filed with this
Court5 which, as shall hereafter be discussed in detail,
was dismissed in Our resolution of 16 October 1986 on
the basis of the agreement of the parties under which
herein private respondent "will remain in legal custody
and will face trial before the court having custody over
his person" and the warrants for the arrest of his co-
accused are deemed recalled and they shall be
immediately released but shall submit themselves to the
court having jurisdiction over their person.
On November 7, 1986 , private respondent filed with the
court below a Motion to Quash the Information alleging
that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b)
the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the
defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability has
been extinguished,6 to which petitioner filed an
Opposition7 citing, among other grounds, the fact that in
the Joint Manifestation and Motion dated October 14,
1986, in G.R. No. 76009, private respondent
categorically conceded that:
xxx xxx xxx
Par. 2 (B) Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will
remain in legal custody and face trial before the
court having custody over his person.
In his Order of March 6, 1987, 8 respondent Judge denied
the motion to quash.
Instead of asking for a reconsideration of said Order,
private respondent filed on 9 May 1987 a petition for
bail,9which herein petitioner opposed in an Opposition
filed on 27 May 198710 on the ground that since
rebellion became a capital offense under the provisions
of P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834, which amended Article
135 of the Revised Penal Code, by imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death on those who promote,
maintain, or head a rebellion the accused is no longer
entitled to bail as evidence of his guilt is strong.
On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order
No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942
and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article
135 of the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the
amendatory decrees. Thus, the original penalty for
rebellion, prision mayor and a fine not to exceed
P20,000.00, was restored.
Executive Order No. 187 was published in the Official
Gazette in its June 15, 1987 issue (Vol. 83, No. 24)
which was officially released for circulation on June 26,
1987.
In his Order of 7 July 1987 11 respondent Judge, taking
into consideration Executive Order No. 187, granted
private respondent's petition for bail, fixed the bail bond
at P30,000.00 and imposed upon private respondent the
additional condition that he shall report to the court once
every two (2) months within the first ten (10) days of
every period thereof. In granting the petition respondent
Judge stated:
. . . There is no more debate that with the
effectivity of Executive Order No. 187, the
offense of rebellion, for which accused Rodolfo
Salas is herein charged, is now punishable with
the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not
exceeding P20,000.00, which makes it now
bailable pursuant to Section 13, Article III, 1986
Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114, 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Unlike the old
rule, bail is now a matter of right in non-capital
offenses before final judgment. This is very
evident upon a reading of Section 3, Rule 114,
aforementioned, in relation to Section 21, same
rule. In view, therefore, of the present
circumstances in this case, said accused-
applicant is now entitled to bail as a matter of
right inasmuch as the crime of rebellion ceased
to be a capital offense.
As to the contention of herein petitioner that it would be
dangerous to grant bail to private respondent considering
his stature in the CPP-NPA hierarchy, whose ultimate
and overriding goal is to wipe out all vestiges of our
democracy and to replace it with their ideology, and that
his release would allow his return to his organization to
direct its armed struggle to topple the government before
whose courts he invokes his constitutional right to bail,
respondent Judge replied:
True, there now appears a clash between the
accused's constitutional right to bail in a non-
capital offense, which right is guaranteed in the
Bill of Rights and, to quote again the
prosecution, "the existence of the government
that bestows the right, the paramount interest of
the state." Suffice to state that the Bill of Rights,
one of which is the right to bail, is a "declaration
of the rights of the individual, civil, political and
social and economic, guaranteed by the
Constitution against impairment or intrusion by
any form of governmental action. Emphasis is
placed on the dignity of man and the worth of
individual. There is recognition of certain
inherent and inalienable rights of the individual,
which the government is prohibited from
violating" (Quisumbing-Fernando, Philippine
Constitutional Law, 1984 Edition, p. 77). To this
Court, in case of such conflict as now pictured
by the prosecution, the same should be resolved
in favor of the individual who, in the eyes of the
law, is alone in the assertion of his rights under
the Bill of Rights as against the State. Anyway,
the government is that powerful and strong,
having the resources, manpower and the
wherewithals to fight those "who oppose,
threathen (sic) and destroy a just and orderly
society and its existing civil and political
institutions." The prosecution's fear may or may
not be founded that the accused may later on
jump bail and rejoin his comrades in the field to
sow further disorders and anarchy against the
duly constituted authorities. But, then, such a
fear can not be a reason to deny him bail. For the
law is very explicit that when it comes to
bailable offenses an accused is entitled as a
matter of light to bail. Dura est lex sed lex.
In a motion to reconsider12 the above order filed on 16
July 1987, petitioner asked the court to increase the bail
from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00 alleging therein that per
Department of Justice Circular No. 10 dated 3 July 1987,
the bail for the, provisional release of an accused should
be in an amount computed at P10,000.00 per year of
imprisonment based on the medium penalty imposable
for the offense and explaining that it is recommending
P100,000.00 because the private respondent "had in the
past escaped from the custody of the military authorities
and the offense for which he is charged is not an
ordinary crime, like murder, homicide or robbery, where
after the commission, the perpetrator has achieved his
end" and that "the rebellious acts are not consummated
until the well-organized plan to overthrow the
government through armed struggle and replace it with
an alien system based on a foreign ideology is attained."
On 17 July 1987, petitioner filed a supplemental motion
for reconsideration13 indirectly asking the court to deny
bail to the private respondent and to allow it to present
evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable
probability that the accused will not comply with this
main condition of his bail to appear in court for trial,"
a conclusion it claims to be buttressed "by the following
facts which are widely known by the People of the
Philippines and which this Honorable Court may have
judicial notice of:
1. The accused has evaded the authorities for
thirteen years and was an escapee from detention
when arrested;
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had
no known address;
3. He was using the false name "Manuel
Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and
presented a Driver's License to substantiate his
false identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit,
Cavite," turned out to be also a false address;
5. He and his companions were on board a
private vehicle with a declared owner whose
identity and address were also found to be false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11
January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was
offered and paid for his arrest,
which "clearly indicate that the accused does not
entertain the slightest intention to appear in court for
trial, if released." Petitioner further argues that the
accused, who is the Chairman of the Communist Party of
the Philippines and head of its military arm, the NPA,
together with his followers, are now engaged in an open
warfare and rebellion against this government and
threatens the existence of this very Court from which he
now seeks provisional release," and that while he is
entitled to bail as a matter of right in view of Executive
Order No. 187 which restored the original penalty for
rebellion under Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code,
yet, when the interest of the State conflicts with that of
an individual, that of the former prevails for "the right of
the State of self-preservation is paramount to any of the
rights of an individual enshrined in the Bill of Rights of
the Constitution." Petitioner further invokes precedents
in the United States of America holding "that there is no
absolute constitutional barrier to detention of potentially
dangerous resident aliens pending deportation
proceedings,14 and that an arrestee may be incarcerated
until trial as he presents a risk of flight; 15 and sustaining
a detention prior to trial of arrestee charged with serious
felonies who are found after an adversary hearing to
pose threat to the safety of individuals and to the
community which no condition of release can dispel. 16
On 30 July 1987 respondent Judge handed down the
Order17 adverted to in the introductory portion of this
decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing
considerations, the Court finds the
"supplemental" motion for reconsideration to be
without merit and hereby denies it but finds the
first motion for reconsideration to be meritorious
only insofar as the amount of bail is concerned
and hereby reconsiders its Order of July 7, 1987
only to increase the amount of bail from
P30,000.00 to P50,000.00, subject to the
approval of this Court, and with the additional
condition that accused Rodolfo Salas shall report
to the court once every two (2) months within
the first ten (10) days of every period thereof
(Almendras vs. Villaluz, et al., L-31665, August
6, 1975, 66 SCRA 58).
In denying the supplemental motion for reconsideration
the respondent Judge took into account the "sudden turn-
about" on the part of the petitioner in that a day earlier it
filed a motion for reconsideration wherein it conceded
the right of the private respondent to bail but merely
asked to increase the amount of bail; observed that it is
only a reiteration of arguments in its opposition to the
petition for bail of 25 May 1987; asserted that the
American precedents are not applicable since the cases
involved deportation of aliens and, moreover, the U.S.
Federal Constitution does not contain a proviso on the
right of an accused to bail in bailable offenses, but only
an injunction against excessive bail; and quoted the
concurring opinion of the late Justice Pedro Tuason in
the cases of Nava, et al. vs. Gatmaitan, L-4853,
Hernandez vs. Montesa, L-4964 and Angeles vs. Abaya,
L-5108, October 11, 1951, 90 Phil, 172.
Unable to agree with said Order, petitioner commenced
this petition submitting therein the following issues:
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE
PROCORO J. DONATO ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN
EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION, AND IN
TOTAL DISREGARD OF THE PREVAILING
REALITIES, WHEN HE DENIED
PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION WITH PRAYER
TO BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO
ADDUCE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF ITS
OPPOSITION TO THE GRANT OF BAIL TO
THE RESPONDENT RODOLFO SALAS.
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE
PROCORO J. DONATO ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN
EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION WHEN HE
GRANTED BAIL TO THE RESPONDENT
RODOLFO SALAS.
in support of which petitioner argues that private
respondent is estopped from invoking his right to bail,
having expressly waived it in G.R. No. 76009 when he
agreed to "remain in legal custody and face trial before
the court having custody of his person" in consideration
of the recall of the warrant of arrest for his co-petitioners
Josefina Cruz and Jose Concepcion; and the right to bail,
even in non-capital offenses, is not absolute when there
is prima facie evidence that the accused is a serious
threat to the very existence of the State, in which case
the prosecution must be allowed to present evidence for
the denial of bail. Consequently, respondent Judge acted
with grave abuse of discretion when he did not allow
petitioner to present all the evidence it may desire to
support its prayer for the denial of bail and when he
declared that the State has forfeited its right to do so
since during all the time that the petition for bail was
pending, it never manifested, much less hinted, its
intention to adduce such evidence. And that even if
release on bail may be allowed, respondent judge, in
fixing the amount of bail at P50,000.00 (originally
P30,000.00 only), failed to take into account the lengthy
record of private respondents' criminal background, the
gravity of the pending charge, and the likelihood of
flight.18
In Our resolution of 11 August 198719 We required the
respondents to comment on the petition and issued a
Temporary Restraining Order ordering respondent Judge
to cease and desist from implementing his order of 30
July 1987 granting bail to private respondent in the
amount of P50,000.00.
In his Comment filed on 27 August 1987, 20 private
respondent asks for the outright dismissal of the petition
and immediate lifting of the temporary restraining order
on the following grounds:
I
RESPONDENT SALAS NEVER WAIVED HIS
RIGHT TO BAIL; NEITHER IS HE
ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING SAID
RIGHT. ON THE CONTRARY IT IS
PETITIONER WHO IS ESTOPPED FROM
RAISING THE SAID ISSUE FOR THE FIRST
TIME ON APPEAL.
II
RESPONDENT SALAS ENJOYS NOT ONLY
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE
PRESUMED INNOCENT BUT ALSO THE
RIGHT TO BAIL.
III
 RESPONDENT SALAS IS NOT CHARGED
WITH A CAPITAL OFFENSE (RECLUSION
PERPETUA), HENCE HE HAS THE RIGHT
TO BAIL AS MANDATED BY THE
CONSTITUTION.
IV
THE ORDER OF JULY 30, 1987 DENYING
PETITIONER OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE IS CORRECT. PETITIONER'S
ALLEGED RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE
IS NON-EXISTENT AND/OR HAD BEEN
WAIVED.
V Section 13 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution which
THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER IN THIS CASE
VIOLATES NOT ONLY RESPONDENT
SALAS' RIGHT TO BAIL BUT ALSO HIS
OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS.
We required the petitioner to reply to the comment of
private respondent.21 The reply was filed on 18
September 1987.22
In Our resolution of 15 October 198723 We gave due
course to the petition and required the parties to file
simultaneously their memoranda within twenty days
from notice.
In their respective manifestations and motions dated 5
November24 and 23 November 198725 petitioner and
private respondents asked to be excused from filing their
Memoranda and that the petition and reply be considered
as the Memorandum for petitioner and the Comment as
the Memorandum for private respondent, which We
granted in Our resolution of 19 November 1987 26 and 1
December 1987,27 respectively.
In Our resolution of 14 September 1989 We required the
Solicitor General to express his stand on the issues
raised in this petitions,28 which he complied with by
filing his Manifestation on 30 May 1990 29 wherein he
manifests that he supports the petition and submits that
the Order of respondent Judge of July 7, July 17 and July
30, 1987 should be annulled and set aside asserting that
private respondent had waived the light to bail in view of
the agreement in G.R. No. 76009; that granting bail to
him is accepting wide-eyed his undertaking which he is
sure to break; in determining bail, the primary
consideration is to insure the attendance of the accused
at the trial of the case against him which would be
frustrated by the "almost certainty that respondent Salas
will lump bail of whatever amount"; and application of
the guidelines provided for in Section 10 of Rule 114,
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure on the amount of bail
dictates denial of bail to private respondent. The
Solicitor General likewise maintains that the right of the
petitioner to hearing on the application of private
respondent for bail cannot be denied by respondent
Judge.
And now on the issues presented in this case.
I.
Unquestionably, at the time the original and the amended
Informations for rebellion and the application for bail
were filed before the court below the penalty imposable
for the offense for which the private respondent was
charged was reclusion perpetua to death. During the
pendency of the application for bail Executive Order No.
187 was issued by the President, by virtue of which the
penalty for rebellion as originally provided for in Article
135 of the Revised Penal Code was restored. The
restored law was the governing law at the time the
respondent court resolved the petition for bail.
We agree with the respondent court that bail cannot be
denied to the private respondent for he is charged with
the crime of rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code to which is attached the penalty
of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding
P20,000.00.30 It is, therefore, a bailable offense under
provides thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
be released on recognizance as may be
prescribed by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail
shall not be required.
Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
also provides:
Bail, a matter of right: exception. All persons
in custody shall, before final conviction, be
entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those
charged with a capital offense or an offense
which, under the law at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application
for bail, is punishable by reclusion
perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.
Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter of
right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the
offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower
than reclusion perpetua.31 To that extent the right is
absolute.32
And so, in a similar case for rebellion, People vs.
Hernandez, et al., 99 Phil. 515, despite the fact that the
accused was already convicted, although erroneously, by
the trial court for the complex crime of rebellion with
multiple murders, arsons and robberies, and sentenced to
life imprisonment, We granted bail in the amount of
P30,000.00 during the pendency of his appeal from such
conviction. To the vigorous stand of the People that We
must deny bail to the accused because the security of the
State so requires, and because the judgment of
conviction appealed from indicates that the evidence of
guilt of Hernandez is strong, We held:
. . . Furthermore, individual freedom is too
basic, too transcendental and vital in a
republican state, like ours, to be derived upon
mere general principles and abstract
consideration of public safety. Indeed, the
preservation of liberty is such a major
preoccupation of our political system that, not
satisfied with guaranteeing its enjoyment in the
very first paragraph of section (1) of the Bill of
Rights, the framers of our Constitution devoted
paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (12),
(13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), and (21) of said
section (1) to the protection of several aspects of
freedom.
The 1987 Constitution strengthens further the right to
bail by explicitly providing that it shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. This overturns the Court's ruling in Garcia-
Padilla vs. Enrile, et al., supra., to wit:
The suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the
suspension of the right to bail, if the
government's campaign to suppress the rebellion
is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the
right to bail may be demanded during the
continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested,
captured and detained in the course thereof will
be released, they would, without the least doubt,
rejoin their comrades in the field thereby
jeopardizing the success of government efforts
to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or
insurrection.
Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable
by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of
discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is
strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining
whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. 33 But once it is
determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail
also becomes a matter of right. In Teehankee vs.
Director of Prisons, supra., We held:
The provision on bail in our Constitution is
patterned after similar provisions contained in
the Constitution of the United States and that of
many states of the Union. And it is said that:
The Constitution of the United States
and the constitution of the many states
provide that all persons shall be bailable
by sufficient sureties, except for capital
offenses, where the proof is evident or
the presumption of guilt is great, and,
under such provisions, bail is a matter of
right which no court or judge can
properly refuse, in all cases not
embraced in the exceptions. Under such
provisions bail is a matter of right even
in cases of capital offenses, unless the
proof of guilt is evident or the
presumption thereof is great!34
Accordingly, the prosecution does not have the
right to present evidence for the denial of bail in
the instances where bail is a matter of right.
However, in the cases where the grant of bail is
discretionary, due process requires that the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to
present, within a reasonable time, all the
evidence that it may desire to introduce before
the court should resolve the motion for bail.35
We agree, however, with petitioner that it was
error for the respondent court to fix the bond at
P30,000.00, then later at P50,000.00 without
hearing the prosecution. The guidelines for the
fixing of the amount of bail provided for in
Section 10 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court are
not matters left entirely to the discretion of the
court. As We stated in People vs. Dacudao, et
al., 170 SCRA, 489, 495:
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a
bailbond call for the presentation of
evidence and reasonable opportunity for
the prosecution to refute it. Among them
are the nature and circumstances of the
crime, character and reputation of the
accused, the weight of the evidence
against him, the probability of the
accused appearing at the trial, whether
or not the accused is a fugitive from
justice, and whether or not the accused
is under bond in other case. . . .
In the instant case petitioner has sufficiently
made out allegations which necessitate a grant of
an opportunity to be heard for the purpose of
determining the amount of bail, but not for the
denial thereof because aforesaid Section 10 of
Rule 114 does not authorize any court to deny
bail.
II.
It must, however, be stressed that under the
present state of the law, rebellion is no longer
punishable by prision mayor and fine not
exceeding P20,000.00. Republic Act No. 6968
approved on 24 October 1990 and which took
effect after publication in at least two
newspapers of general circulation, amended,
among others, Article 135 of the Revised Penal
Code by increasing the penalty for rebellion
such that, as amended, it now reads:
Article 135. Penalty for rebellion,
insurrection or coup d'etat. Any
person who promotes, maintains, or
heads a rebellion or insurrection shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Any person merely participating or
executing the commands of others in a
rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
xxx xxx xxx
This amendatory law cannot apply to the private
respondent for acts allegedly committed prior to
its effectivity. It is not favorable to him. "Penal
laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as
they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is
not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in
Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the
time of the publication of such laws a final
sentence has been pronounced and the convict is
serving the same.36
III.
We agree with Petitioner that private respondent
has, however, waived his right to bail in G.R.
No. 76009.
On 3 October 1986, or the day following the
filing of the original information in Criminal
Case No. 86-48926 with the trial court, a
petition for habeas corpus for herein private
respondent, and his co-accused Josefina Cruz
and Jose Concepcion, was filed with this Court
by Lucia Cruz, Aida Concepcion Paniza and
Beatriz Salas against Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen.
Fidel Ramos, Brig. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig.
Gen. Ramon Montao, and Col. Saldajeno
praying, among others, that the petition be given
due course and a writ of habeas corpus be issued
requiring respondents to produce the bodies of
herein private respondent and his co-accused
before the Court and explain by what authority
they arrested and detained them. The following
proceedings took place thereafter in said case:
1. In a resolution of 7 October 1986 We issued a
writ of habeas corpus, required respondents to
make a return of the writ on or before the close
of office hours on 13 October and set the
petition for hearing on 14 October 1986 at 10:00
o'clock in the morning.
2. On 13 October 1986 respondents, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Return To
The Writ of Habeas Corpus alleging therein that
private respondent and Josefina Cruz alias "Mrs.
Mercado", and Jose Milo
Concepcion alias "Eugene Zamora" were
apprehended by the military on September 29,
1986 in the evening at the Philippine General
Hospital Compound at Taft Ave., Mangga being
leaders or members of the Communist Party of
the Philippines, New People's Army and
National Democratic Front, organizations
dedicated to the overthrow of the Government
through violent means, and having actually
committed acts of rebellion under Article 134 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. After their
arrest they were forthwith charged with rebellion
before Branch XII of the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Region in Criminal Case No.
86-48926 and on 3 October warrants for their
arrest were issued and respondents continue to
detain them because of the warrants of arrest and
the pendency of the criminal cases against them.
Respondents further allege that, contrary to the
allegation in the petition, herein private
respondent was not a member of the NDF panel
involved in peace negotiations with the
Government; neither is he and his companions
Cruz and Concepcion covered by any, safe
conduct pass issued by competent authorities.
3. At the hearing on 14 October 1986 the parties
informed the Court of certain agreements
reached between them. We issued a resolution
reading as follows:
When this case was called for hearing
this morning, Attorneys Romeo
Capulong, Arno V. Sanidad, Efren H.
Mercado, Edgardo Pamin-tuan, Casiano
Sabile, Ramon Cura, and William Chua
appeared for the petitioners with Atty.
Capulong arguing for the petitioners.
Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordonez,
Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C. de
la Cruz and Trial Attorney Josue E.
Villanueva appeared for the respondents,
with Solicitor General Ordoez arguing
for the respondents.
Petitioners' counsel, Atty. Romeo
Capulong, manifested in open Court that
in conformity with the agreement
reached with the government, the
petition for habeas corpus will be
withdrawn with detainee Rodolfo Salas
to remain under custody, whereas his co-
detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion will be released
immediately.
Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoez, also
in open Court, confirmed the foregoing
statement made by petitioners' counsel
regarding the withdrawal of the petition
for habeas corpus, declaring that no
objection will be interposed to the
immediate release of detainees Josefina
Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion, and
that no bond will be required of them,
but they will continue to face trial with
their co-accused, Rodolfo Salas; further,
that they will not be rearrested on the
basis of the warrants issued by the trial
court provided that they manifest in
open Court their willingness to subject
themselves to the jurisdiction of the
Court and to appear in court when their
presence is required.
In addition, he stated that he is willing to
confer with petitioners' counsel today
relative to the compromise agreement
that they have previously undertaken to
submit.
Upon manifestation of petitioners'
counsel, Atty. Romeo Capulong, that on
his oath as member of the Bar, the
detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion have agreed to subject
themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial
court, the Court ordered their immediate
release.
Thereafter, the Court approved the
foregoing manifestations and statements
and required both parties to SUBMIT to
the Court their compromise agreement
by 4:00 o'clock this afternoon.
Teehankee, C.J., is on official leave.
4. At 3:49 o'clock in the afternoon of 14 October
1986 the parties submitted a Joint Manifestation
and Motion duly signed by Atty. Romeo
Capulong, counsel for petitioners, and Solicitor
General Sedfrey Ordoez, Assistant Solicitor
General Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial Attorney
Josue S. Villanueva, counsel for respondents,
which reads as follows:
COME NOW petitioners and the
respondents, assisted by their respective
counsel, and to this Honorable Tribunal
respectfully manifest:
1. That in the discussion between
Romeo Capulong, petitioners' counsel,
and Solicitor General Sedfrey A.
Ordoez on October 13, 1986
exploratory talks were conducted to find
out how the majesty of the law may be
preserved and human considerations
may be called into play.
2. That in the conference both counsel
agreed to the following terms of
agreement:
a. The petition for habeas
corpus will be withdrawn by
petitioners and Josefina Cruz
and Jose Milo Concepcion will
be immediately released but
 shall appear at the trial of the
criminal case for rebellion
(People v. Rodolfo Salas, et al.,
Criminal Case No. 4886 [should
be 86-48926], Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial
Region) filed against them
under their personal
recognizance.
b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will
remain in legal custody and face
trial before the court having
custody over his person.
c. The warrant of arrest for the
persons of Josefina Cruz and
Jose Milo Concepcion is hereby
deemed recalled in view of
formal manifestation before the
Supreme Court that they will
submit themselves to the court
having jurisdiction over their
person.
3. That on October 14, the Solicitor
General was able to obtain the
conformity of the Government to the
foregoing terms which were likewise
accepted by petitioner (sic) and their
counsel of record.
4. That the two counsel submitted their
oral manifestation during the hearing on
October 14 and the present
manifestation in compliance with the
resolution announced in court this
morning.
WHEREFORE, it is prayed that the
petition for habeas corpus be dismissed.
5. On 16 October 1986 We issued the following
resolution:
G.R. No. 76009 [In the Matter of the
Petition for Habeas Corpus of Rodolfo
Salas, Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion, et al. v. Hon. Juan Ponce
Enrile, Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, Brig. Gen.
Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon
Montao and Col. Virgilio Saldajeno]
considering the Joint Manifestation and
Motion dated October 14, 1986 filed by
Attorneys Romeo Capulong, Arno V.
Sanidad, Efren H. Mercado and Ricardo
Fernandez, Jr. as counsel for petitioners
and Solicitor General Sedfrey A.
Ordonez and Assistant Solicitor General
Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial Attorney
Josue S. Villanueva as counsel for
respondents which states that they have
entered into an agreement whereby: [a]
the petition for habeas corpus will be
withdrawn by petitioners, and Josefina
Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be
immediately released but shall appear at
the trial of the criminal case for
rebellion [People vs. Rodolfo Salas, et
al., Criminal Case No. 4886, Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, Branch XII, Manila], filed
against them, on their personal
recognizance; [b] petitioner Rodolfo
Salas will remain in legal custody and
face trial before the court having
custody over his person; and [c] the
warrant of arrest for the person of
Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion
is hereby deemed recalled in view of the
formal manifestation before this Court
that they will submit themselves to the
court having jurisdiction over their
person and in view of the said
agreement, the petition for habeas
corpus be dismissed, the Court Resolved
to DISMISS the petition for habeas
corpus but subject to the condition that
petitioners' lead counsel, Atty.
Capulong, upon his oath as member of
the Bar, shall abide by his commitment
to ensure the appearance of Josefina
Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion at the
trial of the criminal case for rebellion
filed against them. Teehankee, C.J., is
on official leave.
It is the stand of the petitioner that private respondent,
"in agreeing to remain in legal custody even during the
pendency of the trial of his criminal case, [he] has
expressly waived his right to bail." 37 Upon the other
hand, private respondent asserts that this claim is totally
devoid of factual and legal basis, for in their petition
for habeas corpus they precisely questioned the legality
of the arrest and the continued detention of Rodolfo
Salas, Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion, which
was not resolved by this Court or by the compromise
agreement of the parties but left open for further
determination in another proceeding. Moreover, the
matter of the right to bail was neither raised by either
party nor resolved by this Court, and the legal steps
promptly taken by private respondent after the
agreement was reached, like the filing of the motion to
quash on 7 November 1986 and the petition for bail on
14 May 1987, were clear and positive assertions of his
statutory and constitutional rights to be granted not only
provisional but final and permanent liberty. Finally,
private respondent maintains that the term "legal
custody" as used in the Joint Manifestation and Motion
simply means that private respondent agreed to continue
to be in the custody of the law or in custodia legis and
nothing else; it is not to be interpreted as waiver.
Interestingly, private respondent admits that:
"Custody" has been held to mean nothing less
than actual imprisonment. It is also defined as
the detainer of a person by virtue of a lawful
authority, or the "care and possession of a thing
or person." (Bouviers Law Dictionary, Third Ed,
Vol. I, pp. 741-742 citing Smith v. Com. 59 Pa.
320 and Rolland v. Com. 82 Pa. 306)
He further admits that, in the light of Section 1 of Rule
114 of the Rules of Court and settled jurisprudence, the
"constitutional right to bail is subject to the limitation
that the person applying for admission to bail should be
in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his
liberty."38
When the parties in G.R. No. 76009 stipulated that:
b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal
custody and face trial before the court having
custody over his person.
they simply meant that Rodolfo Salas, herein
respondent, will remain in actual physical custody of the
court, or in actual confinement or detention, as
distinguished from the stipulation concerning his co-
petitioners, who were to be released in view of
the recall of the warrants of arrest against them; they
agreed, however, "to submit themselves to the
court having jurisdiction over their persons." Note
should be made of the deliberate care of the parties in
making a fine distinction between legal
custody and court having custody over the person in
respect to Rodolfo Salas and court having jurisdiction
over the persons of his co-accused. Such a fine
distinction was precisely intended to emphasize the
agreement that Rodolfo Salas will not be released, but
should remain in custody. Had the parties intended
otherwise, or had this been unclear to private respondent
and his counsel, they should have insisted on the use of a
clearer language. It must be remembered that at the time
the parties orally manifested before this Court on 14
October 1986 the terms and conditions of their
agreement and prepared and signed the Joint
Manifestation and Motion, a warrant of arrest had
already been issued by the trial court against private
respondent and his co-accused. The stipulation that only
the warrants of arrest for Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion shall be recalled and that only they shall be
released, further confirmed the agreement that herein
petitioner shall remain in custody of the law, or detention
or confinement.
In defining bail as:
. . . the security given for the release of a person
in custody of the law, . . .
Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court
admits no other meaning or interpretation for the term
"in custody of the law" than that as above indicated. The
purpose of bail is to relieve an accused from
imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his
appearance at the trial. 39 It presupposes that the person
applying for it should be in the custody of the law or
otherwise deprived of liberty.40
Consequently, having agreed in G.R. No. 76009 to
remain in legal custody, private respondent had
unequivocably waived his right to bail.
But, is such waiver valid?
Article 6 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver
is contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law.
Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing
legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which
except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed;
the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable
person, of a right known by him to exist, with the intent
that such right shall be surrendered and such person
forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as
warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such
right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent with
claiming it."41
As to what rights and privileges may be waived, the
authority is settled:
. . . the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and
privileges of any character, and, since the word
"waiver" covers every conceivable right, it is the
general rule that a person may waive any matter
which affects his property, and any alienable
right or privilege of which he is the owner or
which belongs to him or to which he is legally
entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred
with statute, or guaranteed by
constitution, provided such rights and privileges
rest in the individual, are intended for his sole
benefit, do not infringe on the rights of others,
and further provided the waiver of the right or
privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not
contravene public policy; and the principle is
recognized that everyone has a right to waive,
and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or
rule made solely for the benefit and protection of
the individual in his private capacity, if it can be
dispensed with and relinquished without
infringing on any public right, and without
detriment to the community at large. . . .
Although the general rule is that any right or
privilege conferred by statute or guaranteed by
constitution may be waived, a waiver in
derogation of a statutory right is not favored,
and a waiver will be inoperative and void if it
infringes on the rights of others, or would be
against public policy or morals and the public
interest may be waived.
While it has been stated generally that all
personal rights conferred by statute
and guaranteed by constitution may be waived,
it has also been said that constitutional
provisions intended to protect property may be
waived, and even some of the constitutional
rights created to secure personal liberty are
subjects of waiver.42
In Commonwealth vs. Petrillo,43 it was held:
Rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime fall
naturally into two classes: (a) those in which the
state, as well as the accused, is interested; and
(b) those which are personal to the accused,
which are in the nature of personal privileges.
Those of the first class cannot be waived; those
of the second may be.
It is "competent for a person to waive a right guaranteed
by the Constitution, and to consent to action which
would be invalid if taken against his will."44
This Court has recognized waivers of constitutional
rights such as, for example, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures;45 the right to counsel
and to remain silent;46 and the right to be heard.47
Even the 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes a
waiver of rights guaranteed by its Bill of
Rights.1wphi1 Section 12(l) of Article III thereof on the
right to remain silent and to have a competent and
independent counsel, preferably of his own choice states:
. . . These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
This provision merely particularizes the form and
manner of the waiver; it, nevertheless, clearly suggests
that the other rights may be waived in some other form
or manner provided such waiver will not offend Article 6
of the Civil Code.

We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the

constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right
which is personal to the accused and whose waiver
would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person
with a right recognized by law.

The respondent Judge then clearly acted with grave

abuse of discretion in granting bail to the private
respondent.

WHEREFORE, the Orders of respondent Judge of July

7, 1987 and July 30, 1987 in Criminal Case No. 86-
48926 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo C.
Salas alias Commander Bilog/Henry, Josefina
Cruz alias Mrs. Mercado, and Jose Milo
Concepcion alias Eugene Zamora, for Rebellion, are
hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. MTJ-94-897 December 5, 1994
MINOR CYNTHIA L. LARDIZABAL THRU
COUNSEL ATTY. LUIS L.
LARDIZABAL, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE OSCAR A. REYES, respondent.
Luis Lardizabal for petitioner.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a verified complaint, dated 25 October 1993,
filed by minor Cynthia L. Lardizabal, through Atty. Luis
L. Lardizabal, against Judge Oscar A. Reyes, Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Tagudin-Suyo, Province of Ilocos
Sur, charging Judge Reyes with ignorance of the law
resulting in gross miscarriage of justice.
The complaint alleges that on 1 September 1993, the
complainant, a before bail was granted could be characterized as
12-year old girl, filed a criminal complaint for rape
against a certain Dionisio Lozano alias "Dioning"; that
after conducting the required preliminary investigation
of the complainant and her witnesses, respondent judge
issued on 2 September 1993 an order directing the arrest
of the accused, but at the same time, motu proprio, fixed
the bail of the accused in the amount of P80,000.00
without any application on the part of the accused to be
admitted to bail and without conducting any hearing
thereon; that when the accused filed on 7 September
1993 a motion to reduce bail from P80,000.00 to
P20,000.00, respondent judge, again, without prior
notice and hearing, reduced the bail to P40,000.00.
Asked to comment on the complaint, respondent Judge
Reyes explained that after carefully considering and
evaluating the evidence presented at the preliminary
investigation, acting with all honesty and good faith, he
arrived at a conclusion that the evidence adduced was
not strong enough to deny bail for the provisional liberty
of the accused; that he later reduced the bail to
P40,000.00 on the premise that justice must be tempered
with mercy and based also on the due process clause
which protects an accused against conviction except
upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which the accused
is charged.
The Court does not accept as satisfactory respondent's
explanation that good faith urged him to fix and grant
bail motu proprio for the provisional release of the
accused charged with rape. By so doing, he acted
irregularly, thereby depriving the prosecution of an
opportunity to interpose objections to the grant of bail.
The rule is explicit that when an accused is charged with
a serious offense punishable with reclusion perpetua,
such as rape, bail may be granted only after a motion for
that purpose has been filed by the accused and a hearing
thereon conducted by a judge to determine whether or
not the prosecution's evidence of guilt is strong.
Respondent could not have arrived at a fair conclusion
that the evidence was not strong enough to deny bail to
the accused when the prosecution had not been heard on
the matter. Respondent's unjustified haste in granting
bail and thereafter reducing the amount thereof, in both
instances, without hearing the side of the prosecution,
speaks poorly of his competence in applying the law and
jurisprudence on the matter.
Whether the motion for bail of an accused who is in
custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary
proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to present,
within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may
wish to introduce on the probable guilt of the accused,
before the court resolves the motion for bail. If, as in the
present case, the prosecution should be denied such an
opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due
process, and the order of the court granting bail should
be considered void on that ground. 1
We find disturbing respondent's unusual regard for the
rights of the accused to be protected from harassment, as
if the rights of the victim are not important enough.
Compassion is imperative and laudable. It should not
however be misplaced, for the victim and not only the
accused, is equally deserving of it. Justice, though due
the accused, is due the accuser also. The concept of
fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a
filament. We are to keep the balance true. Nor does it
suffice that the questions asked by respondent judge
searching. That fact did not cure an infirmity of a
jurisdictional character. 2
Respondent judge tried to absolve himself from the
charge of gross incompetence by stating that in the
absence of malice or any wrongful conduct, the judge
cannot be held administratively responsible, for no one
called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment.
Respondent must not hide behind that fundamental rule.
While the Court does not require perfection and
infallibility, it reasonably expects a faithful and
intelligent discharge of duty by those who are selected to
fill the position of administrators of justice. 3 Moreover,
the Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to act with
competence, integrity and independence and should so
behave at all times as to promote public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 4
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Oscar
A. Reyes GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law, and is
fined Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense
will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124640. November 29, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. JERRY A. CAPCO, ERWIN T. PANES,
CHARLIE M. PANES and RENATO D.
AGPOON, accused,
RENATO D. AGPOON, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JERRY ABAHO CAPCO, ERWIN TUAZON
PANES, CHARLIE MANILA PANES and RENATO DE
GUIA AGPOON were charged in Crim. Case No. 94062
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City with the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide and physical
injuries for robbing one Alberto S. Flores of P30,000.00
in cash and, on the occasion thereof, shot him to death as
well as inflicted physical injuries on his son Bolivar J.
Flores.[1]
On 12 October 1992 counsel for accused Erwin T.
Panes filed a motion to quash the Information on the
ground that it charged two (2) distinct offenses. [2] On 19
January 1993, after considering the motion to quash, the
opposition thereto, the reply to the opposition and
opposition/comment on the motion, the trial court
ordered the amendment of the Information. Accordingly,
on 20 January 1993 the Information was amended
charging all four (4) accused with robbery with homicide
but dropping physical injuries.[3]
On 8 August 1992 at around 11 oclock in the
evening, four (4) armed men barged into a grocery store
located in Kalawaan, Pasig City, owned by Alberto S.
Flores, and announced, dapa dapa, hold-up ito." Bolivar
Flores was then leisurely watching television while his
father Alberto Flores had already retired for the
night. Bolivar identified in court the intruders as Jerry
Capco, Erwin Panes, Charlie Panes and Renato
Agpoon. He, however, clarified later that only Jerry
Capco, Erwin Panes and one Eduardo Padawan came in
their store while Charlie Panes and Renato Agpoon stood
outside. Bolivar easily recognized Jerry Capco despite
his partially covered face because he used to work for
them as a houseboy. He was also able to identify the
companions of Jerry Capco as they were not wearing
any mask. He claimed that the accused were armed
with .38 caliber revolvers and kitchen knives. According
to him, Erwin struck him on the head with a gun; he fell
and hit the folding bed where his father was sleeping
thus waking him up; without saying a word, Erwin
aimed his gun at his father Alberto S. Flores and
mercilessly shot him twice hitting him on the lower left
portion of his chest while one of the accused took the
clutch bag containing the days sales of the store
amounting to P30,000.00, more or less. Fearing that he
would also be shot, Bolivar immediately stood up, ran
behind stocks of merchandise, turned off the lights, and
screamed for help. Alarmed by the confusion that ensued
the robbers scampered away. Some fifteen (15) minutes
later, Bolivar went out the store and sought the help of
a barangay tanod. It was then, according to Bolivar, that
he saw from a distance of one (1) meter Charlie Panes
and Renato Agpoon standing outside the store.[4]
Bolivar went to Antonio T. Flores, his grandfather,
to inform him of the incident and went back with him to
the store. They noticed a lot of people outside. When
they got inside they saw Antonio sprawled on the floor
soaked in his own blood. Bolivar rushed his father to the
Rizal Medical Center where he was later pronounced
dead.[5]
The autopsy conducted by Medico Legal Officer
and Chief of the NCR-PNP-PCCL Dr. Dario L. Gajardo
revealed that Alberto Flores succumbed to cardio-
respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage
secondary to gunshot wounds in the trunk.[6]
Victoriano G. Evangelista, barangay executive
officer of Bambang, Pasig, testified that shortly after 11
o'clock in the evening of 8 August 1992, while he was at
his post, a tricycle driver named Bernie informed him
about the robbery in the store of Alberto Flores. He
summoned two (2) of his barangay tanods to accompany
him to the place. There they heard someone shouting
that he was hit. Immediately upon entering they saw
Alberto lying on the ground bathed in his own
blood. Victoriano instructed Bernie to call the police as
no one yet had arrived at the crime scene. Alberto was
already being carried out of the store to be brought to the
hospital when the police and the relatives of the victim
arrived.[7]
The following day, 9 August 1992, at around 8
oclock in the morning, accused Jerry Capco was arrested
by SPO1 Leneal T. Matias and SPO1 Ernesto Mones on
the strength of the testimony of Bolivar identifying him
as one of those who barged into their store. Charlie
Panes, Erwin Panes and Renato Agpoon were also
arrested and subsequently charged with Jerry Capco for
the crime of robbery with homicide. Eduardo Padawan
was not apprehended and to this day has remained at
large.
Accused-appellant Renato Agpoon vehemently
denied the charges against him and interposed alibi as
his defense. He testified that at around 7 oclock in the
evening of 8 August 1992 he was with Erwin Panes at
the Megamall when the latter invited him to visit Charlie
Panes whose wife had just given birth. When they
arrived in Kalawaan, Charlie was drinking with Jerry
Capco and Eduardo Padawan in front of the store across
Charlie's house. After introductions were made, Renato
and Erwin joined Charlie and his companions who were
drinking beer. They drank for about three (3)
hours. While drinking Renato came to know that
Eduardo Padawan needed money as he was trying to
borrow some money from Jerry Capco. Jerry could not
lend him any but assured him that he could borrow from
his former employer by the name of Flores. At around
10 oclock in the evening he (Renato) begged leave and
proceeded to his girlfriends house in Novaliches where
he was joined by Erwin later that night.[8]
Accused Erwin Panes corroborated the testimony of
Renato Agpoon that he left them at 10 oclock in the
evening. According to Erwin he accompanied Jerry
Capco and Eduardo Padawan to the store of Alberto
Flores. When they arrived there he was left behind in
front of the store while Jerry and Eduardo entered the
grocery store. After a few moments he heard some
cursing, followed by two (2) shots which prompted him
to run away. He accidentally shoved Bolivar Flores in
the process, causing the latter to fall down. He
proceeded to the house of Renato in Novaliches and told
him what happened. The next morning the Pasig Police
accompanied by Charlie Panes and Jerry Capco
apprehended him and Renato. They were taken to the
police station where he was allegedly mauled and forced
to admit the crime. The police then brought him to Camp
Crame were he was tested for gunpowder traces. [9]
Jerry Capco, for his part, testified that at around 11
oclock in the evening of 8 August 1992 he went with
Eduardo Padawan and Erwin Panes to the place of
Alberto Flores to borrow money. According to him
instead of lending him money Alberto got mad and
cursed him so he replied, Mang Boy, do not curse me
because I am no longer your employee. Alberto
answered, P - t - ng ina mo, umalis ka na, and he
suddenly took a gun under his pillow. Jerry claimed that
when Eduardo Padawan saw this, he grappled for the
possession of the gun. Then he heard a shot and saw
Alberto fall on the floor. Then he (Jerry) went home.[10]
The next morning some barangay officials together
with the Pasig Police went to Jerry's house and invited
him to go with them. Thereafter, they went to Charlie
Panes house and also invited him to go with them to the
Kalawaan Barangay Headquarters. Jerry claimed that
they were asked about their companions at the drinking
binge the night before; they named Eduardo
Padawan, Renato Agpoon and Erwin Panes.[11]
Accused Charlie Panes denied any participation in
the crime and maintained that although Eduardo
Padawan and Jerry Capco tried to convince him to
accompany them to the house of Alberto Flores, he
declined because he had to take care of his newborn
child. He also claimed that Eduardo awakened him in the
early morning of the following day. Eduardo was in a
hurry. He requested that his gun be pawned so he could
have money to take his sick mother to the
hospital. Charlie accompanied Eduardo to Jose
Bacedonia and pawned the gun for P500.00. Later that
morning the Pasig Police together with Jerry Capco
arrived and arrested him.[12]
On 14 December 1995 the court a quo rendered its
decision holding all four (4) accused guilty as charged
and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua with all the
accessories provided by law, and ordered them to
indemnify the heirs of Alberto Flores jointly and
severally in the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay
them P30,000.00 representing the amount taken in the
robbery without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.[13]
All four (4) accused elevated their case to this Court
through a notice of appeal. However, on 18 August 1998
accused Jerry Capco, Erwin Panes and Charlie Panes
wrote this Court requesting for assistance in the
withdrawal of their appeal. [14] On 12 October 1998 the
Court directed counsel for accused-appellants, Atty.
Alfredo U. Malabaguio, to confer with his clients to
determine the voluntariness of the withdrawal of their
appeal and to submit a report thereon. [15] On 23
November 1998 Atty. Malabaguio submitted a letter of
compliance and motion stating that after conferring with
his clients as directed by the Court he was able to
determine that the withdrawal of their appeal was
voluntary. Atty. Malabaguio even attached a handwritten
note from Jerry Capco, Erwin Panes and Charlie Panes
confirming the voluntary withdrawal of their appeal.
[16]
On 3 February 1999 the Court granted the Motion to
Withdraw Appeal of Jerry Capco, Erwin Panes and
Charlie Panes and declared the case closed and
terminated as to them. [17] Consequently, this case is now
limited to the appeal of accused Renato Agpoon.
After a scrutiny of the records this Court cannot
avoid entertaining serious doubts on accused-appellants
supposed participation in the crime. Apparently, he was
implicated as one of the culprits by the lone testimony of
Bolivar Flores, which could fairly be expected
considering the circumstance which made possible
accused-appellant's arrest, i.e., when Jerry Capco was
asked who his companions were when they drank at the
store across Charlie Panes' house Jerry mentioned
accused-appellant's name. This, we could fairly surmise,
was what prompted Bolivar to point a finger at accused-
appellant as one of the malefactors. In fact, in
Bolivar's Sinumpaang Salaysay he stated that he only
saw accused-appellant for the first time at the police
headquarters. Of course he repudiated this in his
testimony in court. But, while it is settled that affidavits
are generally subordinate in importance to open court
declarations because the former are executed when an
affiant's mental faculties are not in such a state to afford
him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident
which has transpired,[18] we cannot help questioning
Bolivar's reason for changing his version. In other
words, that accused-appellant was posted as "lookout"
while the other accused entered the store of Alberto
Flores and then robbed and killed him was a mere
presumption or conjecture of Bolivar without any basis
in fact.
Also worthy of note were Bolivar's declarations in
court: first, he claimed that Renato Agpoon was one of
the four (4) persons who barged into their store that
evening of 8 August 1992. Thus -
Q: And what happened?
A: At 11:00 p.m., they entered our grocery.
Q: When you stated they, to whom are you referring
(to)?
INTERPRETER: Witness pointing to the 4 accused
who gave their names as Charlie Panes, Jerry
Capco, Renato Agpoon and Erwin Panes.[19]
Then, in another breath, Bolivar contradicted
himself by saying that only three (3) entered the store
not one of whom was Renato Agpoon.
Q: Who among the four accused entered your
grocery?
A: Jerry Capco, Erwin Panes and one who is still at
large.
Q: How did you come to know that they were the
ones who entered your grocery?
A: Because the two did not cover their faces and
Jerry Capco, even though his face was partially
covered, I can (sic) recognize him because he
worked for us for three months.[20]
Bolivar further testified that he saw Renato Agpoon
with Charlie Panes outside the store some fifteen (15)
minutes after Jerry Capco, Erwin Panes and the one who
was still at large had already ran away.[21] The one who
was at large (and who still is) was Eduardo Padawan.
From the foregoing, the uncertainty with which
Bolivar identified accused-appellant can easily be
gleaned even with the clarification made by Bolivar in
the course of his testimony as to who among the accused
actually went inside their store and announced the
robbery, and who stayed outside as lookouts, if any. We
however consider incredible Bolivars testimony that he
saw accused-appellant outside their store fifteen (15)
minutes after three (3) of the accused were already
gone. Well-settled is the rule that for evidence to be
believed it must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness but it must be credible itself. [22] Accused
Erwin, Jerry and Eduardo exited from the store through
the same entry point they took in getting in - where they
supposedly posted accused-appellant as "lookout" before
entering the store. Indeed, it is contrary to human
experience that someone, who is allegedly part of a
group that conspired to rob a store and kill its owner,
would choose to remain at the crime scene within a
considerable period of time when from his vantage point
he could naturally see his companions escape. One
logical explanation is that he was not there at all when
the other accused committed the crime and that Bolivar,
obviously, was telling a lie. Our doubt heightens when
we carefully consider the testimonies of the three (3)
repentant accused who have voluntarily withdrawn their
appeal that Renato Agpoon was no longer with them
when they entered the store of Alberto Flores as the
former left them earlier at 10 o'clock that evening.
Accused Charlie Panes testified that accused-
appellant was the first to leave their drinking session at
10 oclock in the evening.[23] He was corroborated by his
co-accused Erwin Panes and Jerry Capco. Erwin testified
-
Q: x x x x what time did you leave the place where
you and Charlie Panes together with his
companions were drinking?
A: We left there at 11:00 oclock in the evening, sir.
Q: What about this Renato Agpoon, your companion?
A: Renato Agpoon left earlier around 10:00 in the
evening, sir.[24]
Jerry also testified -
Q: You stated that after you decided to go to the store
of Alberto Flores, all of those companions of
yours in the drinking spree accompanied you to
the store of Alberto Flores?
A: No, sir.
Q: It was only you, Eddie Padawan, and Erwin Panes
who went to the store of Alberto Flores?
A: Yes, sir.[25]
Charlie, Erwin and Jerry have no reason not to
implicate accused-appellant Renato Agpoon if indeed he
was part of their group that went to the victims store to
stage the robbery. Neither do they have any reason to
protect him as only Erwin was established to be his
friend while Jerry and Charlie were new acquaintances
whom accused-appellant only met for the first time that
night.
As reasonable doubt is cast on the guilt of accused-
appellant Renato Agpoon, he must be set free as
conviction in criminal cases must rest on nothing less
than a moral certainty of guilt, nay, proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 151, of Pasig City in Crim. Case No.
94062 is MODIFIED. The conviction of Jerry Abaho
Capco, Erwin Tuazon Panes and Charlie Manila Panes
for robbery with homicide stands by reason of the
withdrawal of their appeal; hence, it has become
final. However, accused-appellant Renato De Guia
Agpoon is ACQUITTED of robbery with homicide on
reasonable doubt. His immediate release from
confinement is ORDERED unless he is detained for
some other lawful cause.
The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to
implement this Decision and to report to this Court
immediately the action taken hereon within three (3)
days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 131652. March 9, 1998]
BAYANI M. ALONTE, petitioner, vs. HON.
MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO JR., NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 131728. March 9, 1998]
BUENAVENTURA CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO SAVELLANO, JR., THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and
JUVIELYN Y.
PUNONGBAYAN, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Pending before this Court are two separate
petitions, one filed by petitioner Bayani M. Alonte,
docketed G.R. No. 131652, and the other by petitioner
Buenaventura Concepcion, docketed G.R. No. 131728,
that assail the decision of respondent Judge Maximo A.
Savellano, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"),
Branch 53, of Manila finding both petitioners guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. The two
petitions were consolidated.
On 05 December 1996, an information for rape was
filed against petitioners Bayani M. Alonte, an incumbent
Mayor of Bian, Laguna, and Buenaventura Concepcion
predicated on a complaint filed by Juvie-lyn
Punongbayan. The information contained the following
averments; thus:
That on or about September 12, 1996, in Sto. Tomas,
Bian, Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable court, the above named accused, who is the
incumbent mayor of Bian, Laguna after giving
complainant-child drinking water which made her dizzy
and weak, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with said JUVIELYN
PUNONGBAYAN against her will and consent, to her
damage and prejudice.
That accused Buenaventura `Wella Concepcion without
having participated as principal or accessory assisted in
the commission of the offense by bringing said
complainant child to the rest house of accused Bayani
`Arthur Alonte at Sto. Tomas, Bian, Laguna and after
receiving the amount of P1,000.00 left her alone with
Bayani Alonte who subsequently raped her.
Contrary to Law.[1]
The case was docketed Criminal Case No. 9619-B
and assigned by raffle to Branch 25 of the RTC of Bian,
Laguna, presided over by Judge Pablo B. Francisco.
On 13 December 1996, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan,
through her counsel Attorney Remedios C. Balbin, and
Assistant Chief State Prosecutor (ACSP) Leonardo
Guiyab, Jr., filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator a Petition for a Change of Venue
(docketed Administrative Matter No. 97-1-12-RTC) to
have the case transferred and tried by any of the
Regional Trial Courts in Metro Manila.
During the pendency of the petition for change of
venue, or on 25 June 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan,
assisted by her parents and counsel, executed an affidavit
of desistance, quoted herein in full, as follows:
AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE
I, JUVIE-LYN YAMBAO PUNONGBAYAN, 17 years
of age, a resident of No. 5 Uranus Street, Congressional
Avenue Subdivision, Quezon City, duly assisted by
private legal counsel and my parents, after having duly
sworn in accordance with law, depose and say:
1. That I am the Complainant in the rape case filed
against Mayor Bayani `Arthur Alonte of Bian, Laguna,
with the RTC-Branch 25 of Bian, Laguna;
2. That the case has been pending for some time, on
preliminary issues, specifically, (a) change of venue,
filed with the Supreme Court; (b) propriety of the appeal
to the Court of Appeals, and after its denial by said
court, brought to the Office of the President, on the
veracity of the findings of the Five-Man Investigating
Panel of the State Prosecutors Office, and the Secretary
of Justice, and (c) a hold-departure order filed with the
Bian Court;
3. That the legal process moves ever so slowly, and
meanwhile, I have already lost two (2) semesters of my
college residence. And when the actual trial is held after
all the preliminary issues are finally resolved, I
anticipate a still indefinite suspension of my schooling to
attend the hearings;
4. That during the entire period since I filed the case, my
family has lived a most abnormal life: my father and
mother had to give up their jobs; my younger brother,
who is in fourth grade, had to stop his schooling, like
myself;
5. That I do not blame anyone for the long, judicial
process, I simply wish to stop and live elsewhere with
my family, where we can start life anew, and live
normally once again;
6. That I pray that I be allowed to withdraw my
complaint for rape and the other charge for child abuse
wherein the Five-Man Investigating Panel of the Office
of the State Prosecutor found a prima facie case although
the information has not been filed, and that I will not at
any time revive this, and related cases or file new cases,
whether, criminal, civil, and/or administrative, here or
anywhere in the Philippines;
7. That I likewise realize that the execution of this
Affidavit will put to doubt my credibility as a witness-
complainant;
8. That this is my final decision reached without fear or
favor, premised on a corresponding commitment that
there will be no reprisals in whatever form, against
members of the police force or any other official of
officer, my relatives and friends who extended assistance
to me in whatever way, in my search for justice.
"WHEREOF, I affix my signature this 25 day of June,
1997, in Quezon City.
"(
Sgd) JUVIE-LYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN
 C the Executive Judge of Manila the complete records of
omplainant
"Assisted by:
(Sgd) ATTY. REMEDIOS C. BALBIN
Private Prosecutor
"In the presence of:
(Sgd) PABLO PUNONGBAYAN
Father
(Sgd) JULIE Y. PUNONGBAYAN
Mother
"SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25 day
of June, 1997, in Quezon City.
" Leonardo Guiyab.
(Sgd) Illegible
Ad
ministering Officer"[2]
On 28 June 1997, Atty. Ramon C. Casino, on behalf
of petitioners, moved to have the petition for change of
venue dismissed on the ground that it had become moot
in view of complainant's affidavit of desistance. On 22
August 1997, ACSP Guiyab filed his comment on the
motion to dismiss. Guiyab asserted that he was not
aware of the desistance of private complainant and
opined that the desistance, in any case, would not
produce any legal effect since it was the public
prosecutor who had direction and control of the
prosecution of the criminal action. He prayed for the
denial of the motion to dismiss.
On 02 September 1997, this Court issued a
Resolution (Administrative Matter No. 97-1-12-
RTC), granting the petition for change of venue. The
Court said:
"These affidavits give specific names, dates, and
methods being used to abort, by coercion or corruption,
the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 9619-B. It is thus
incorrect for oppositors Alonte and Concepcion to
contend that the fear of the petitioner, her private counsel
and her witnesses are too generalized if not
fabricated. Indeed, the probability that in desisting from
pursuing her complaint for rape, petitioner, a minor, may
have succumbed to some illicit influence and undue
pressure. To prevent possible miscarriage of justice is a
good excuse to grant the petition to transfer the venue of
Criminal Case No. 9619-B from Bian, Laguna to the
City of Manila.
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Change of Venue
from Bian, Laguna to the City of Manila is granted. The
Executive Judge of RTC Manila is ordered to raffle
Crim. Case No. 9619-B to any of its branches. The judge
to whom Crim. Case No. 9619-B shall be raffled shall
resolve the petitioner's Motion to Resume Proceedings
filed in Br. XXV of the RTC of Bian, Laguna and
determine the voluntariness and validity of petitioner's
desistance in light of the opposition of the public
prosecutor, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo
Guiyab. The branch clerk of court of Br. XXV of the
RTC of Bian, Laguna is ordered to personally deliver to
Crim. Case No. 9619-B upon receipt of this
Resolution."[3]
On 17 September 1997, the case, now re-docketed
Criminal Case No. 97-159955 by the Clerk of Court of
Manila, was assigned by raffle to Branch 53, RTC
Manila, with respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano,
Jr., presiding.
On 07 October 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan,
through Attorney Balbin, submitted to the Manila court a
"compliance" where she reiterated "her decision to abide
by her Affidavit of Desistance."
In an Order, dated 09 October 1997, Judge
Savellano found probable cause for the issuance of
warrants for the arrest of petitioners Alonte and
Concepcion without prejudice to, and independent of,
this Courts separate determination as the trier of facts, of
the voluntariness and validity of the [private
complainant's] desistance in the light of the opposition of
the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor
On 02 November 1997, Alonte voluntarily
surrendered himself to Director Santiago Toledo of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), while
Concepcion, in his case, posted the recommended bail
of P150,000.00.
On 07 November 1997, petitioners were arraigned
and both pleaded not guilty to the charge. The parties
manifested that they were waiving pre-trial. The
proceedings forthwith went on. Per Judge Savellano,
both parties agreed to proceed with the trial of the case
on the merits.[4] According to Alonte, however, Judge
Savellano allowed the prosecution to present evidence
relative only to the question of the voluntariness and
validity of the affidavit of desistance.[5]
It would appear that immediately following the
arraignment, the prosecution presented private
complainant Juvie-lyn Punongbayan followed by her
parents. During this hearing, Punongbayan affirmed the
validity and voluntariness of her affidavit of
desistance. She stated that she had no intention of giving
positive testimony in support of the charges against
Alonte and had no interest in further prosecuting the
action. Punongbayan confirmed: (i) That she was
compelled to desist because of the harassment she was
experiencing from the media, (ii) that no pressures nor
influence were exerted upon her to sign the affidavit of
desistance, and (iii) that neither she nor her parents
received a single centavo from anybody to secure the
affidavit of desistance.
Assistant State Prosecutor Marilyn Campomanes
then presented, in sequence: (i) Punongbayans parents,
who affirmed their signatures on the affidavit of
desistance and their consent to their daughters decision
to desist from the case, and (ii) Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Alberto Nofuente, who attested that the
affidavit of desistance was signed by Punongbayan and
her parents in his presence and that he was satisfied that
the same was executed freely and voluntarily. Finally,
Campomanes manifested that in light of the decision of
private complainant and her parents not to pursue the
case, the State had no further evidence against the
accused to prove the guilt of the accused. She, then,
moved for the "dismissal of the case" against both
Alonte and Concepcion.
 Thereupon, respondent judge said that "the case
was submitted for decision."[6]
On 10 November 1997, petitioner Alonte filed an
"Urgent Motion to Admit to Bail." Assistant State
Prosecutor Campomanes, in a Comment filed on the
same date, stated that the State interposed no objection
to the granting of bail and in fact Justice and Equity
dictates that it joins the accused in his prayer for the
granting of bail.
Respondent judge did not act on the application for
bail.
On 17 November 1997, Alonte filed anew an
Urgent Plea to Resolve the Motion for Bail. On even
date, ASP Campomanes filed a Manifestation deeming
"it proper and in accord with justice and fair play to join
the aforestated motion.
Again, the respondent judge did not act on the
urgent motion.
The records would indicate that on the 25th
November 1997, 1st December 1997, 8th December
1997 and 10th December 1997, petitioner Alonte filed a
Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Motion for Early
Resolution, respectively, in respect of his application for
bail.None of these motions were acted upon by Judge
Savellano.
On 17 December 1997, Attorney Philip Sigfrid A.
Fortun, the lead counsel for petitioner Alonte received a
notice from the RTC Manila, Branch 53, notifying him
of the schedule of promulgation, on 18 December 1997,
of the decision on the case. The counsel for accused
Concepcion denied having received any notice of the
scheduled promulgation.
On 18 December 1997, after the case was called,
Atty. Sigrid Fortun and Atty. Jose Flaminiano manifested
that Alonte could not attend the promulgation of the
decision because he was suffering from mild
hypertension and was confined at the NBI clinic and
that, upon the other hand, petitioner Concepcion and his
counsel would appear not to have been notified of the
proceedings. The promulgation, nevertheless, of the
decision proceeded in absentia; the reading concluded:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
two (2) accused Mayor Bayani Alonte and Buenaventura
`Wella Concepcion guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the heinous crime of RAPE, as defined and penalized
under Article 335(2) in relation to Article 27 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, for which each one of the them is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA or imprisonment for
twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years.
In view thereof, the bail bond put up by the accused
Buenaventura `Wella Concepcion for his provisional
liberty is hereby cancelled and rendered without any
further force and effect.
SO ORDERED.[7]
On the same day of 18th December 1997, petitioner
Alonte filed a motion for reconsideration. Without
waiting for its resolution, Alonte filed the instant "Ex
Abundante Ad Cautelam" for "Certiorari,
Prohibition, Habeas Corpus, Bail, Recusation of
respondent Judge, and for Disciplinary Action against an
RTC Judge." Petitioner Concepcion later filed his own
petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court.
Alonte submits the following grounds in support of
his petition seeking to have the decision nullified and the
case remanded for new trial; thus:
The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when he rendered a Decision in the case a quo (Annex
A) without affording the petitioner his Constitutional
right to due process of law (Article III, 1, Constitution).
The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when he rendered a Decision in the case a quo in
violation of the mandatory provisions of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, specifically, in the conduct and
order of trial (Rule 119) prior to the promulgation of a
judgment (Rule 120; Annex A).
The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when, in total disregard of the Revised Rules on
Evidence and existing doctrinal jurisprudence, he
rendered a Decision in the case a quo (Annex A) on the
basis of two (2) affidavits (Punongbayans and Balbins)
which were neither marked nor offered into evidence by
the prosecution, nor without giving the petitioner
an opportunity to cross-examine the affiants thereof,
again in violation of petitioners right to due process
(Article III, 1, Constitution).
The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when he rendered a Decision in the case a quo without
conducting a trial on the facts which would establish that
complainant was raped by petitioner (Rule 119, Article
III, 1, Constitution), thereby setting a dangerous
precedent where heinous offenses can result in
conviction without trial (then with more reason that
simpler offenses could end up with the same result). [8]
On the other hand, Concepcion relies on the
following grounds in support of his own petition; thus:
1. The decision of the respondent Judge rendered in the
course of resolving the prosecutions motion to dismiss
the case is a patent nullity for having been rendered
without jurisdiction, without the benefit of a trial and in
total violation of the petitioners right to due process of
law.
2. There had been no valid promulgation of judgment at
least as far as petitioner is concerned.
3. The decision had been rendered in gross violation of
the right of the accused to a fair trial by an impartial and
neutral judge whose actuations and outlook of the case
had been motivated by a sinister desire to ride on the
crest of media hype that surrounded this case and use
this case as a tool for his ambition for promotion to a
higher court.
4. The decision is patently contrary to law and the
jurisprudence in so far as it convicts the petitioner as a
principal even though he has been charged only as an
accomplice in the information.[9]
The petitions deserve some merit; the Court will
disregard, in view of the case milieu, the prematurity of
petitioners' invocation, i.e., even before the trial court
could resolve Alonte's motion for reconsideration.
The Court must admit that it is puzzled by the
somewhat strange way the case has proceeded
below. Per Judge Savellano, after the waiver by the
parties of the pre-trial stage, the trial of the case did
proceed on the merits but that -
"The two (2) accused did not present any countervailing
evidence during the trial. They did not take the witness
stand to refute or deny under oath the truth of the
contents of the private complainant's aforementioned
affidavit which she expressly affirmed and confirmed in
Court, but, instead, thru their respective lawyers, they
rested and submitted the case for decision merely on the
basis of the private complainant's so called 'desistance'
which, to them, was sufficient enough for their
purposes. They left everything to the so-called
'desistance' of the private complainant."[10]
According to petitioners, however, there was no
such trial for what was conducted on 07 November
1997, aside from the arraignment of the accused, was
merely a proceeding in conformity with the resolution of
this Court in Administrative Case No. 97-1-12-RTC to
determine the validity and voluntariness of the affidavit
of desistance executed by Punongbayan.
It does seem to the Court that there has been undue
precipitancy in the conduct of the proceedings. Perhaps
the problem could have well been avoided had not the
basic procedures been, to the Court's perception, taken
lightly. And in this shortcoming, looking at the records
of the case, the trial court certainly is not alone to blame.
Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of
the Constitution provides the fundamentals.
"(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law.
"(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial,
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that
he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable."
Jurisprudence[11] acknowledges that due process in
criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a) that the
court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with
judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it;
(b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the
person of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an
opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is
rendered only upon lawful hearing.[12]
The above constitutional and jurisprudential
postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded in
our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and
indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance
and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that
procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a
"law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds
upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial."[13]
The order of trial in criminal cases is clearly spelled
out in Section 3, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court; viz:
"Sec. 3. Order of trial. - The trial shall proceed in the
following order:
"(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the
charge and, in the proper case, the civil liability.
"(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his
defense, and damages, if any, arising from the issuance
of any provisional remedy in the case.
"(c) The parties may then respectively present rebutting
evidence only, unless the court, in furtherance of justice,
permits them to present additional evidence bearing
upon the main issue.
"(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be
deemed submitted for decision unless the court directs
the parties to argue orally or to submit memoranda.
"(e) However, when the accused admits the act or
omission charged in the complaint or information but
interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be
modified accordingly."
In Tabao vs. Espina,[14] the Court has underscored the
need to adhere strictly to the above rules. It reminds that
-
"x x x each step in the trial process serves a specific
purpose. In the trial of criminal cases, the constitutional
presumption of innocence in favor of an accused
requires that an accused be given sufficient opportunity
to present his defense. So, with the prosecution as to its
evidence.
"Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial
should always take into consideration the rights of all the
parties to the case, whether in the prosecution or
defense. In the exercise of their discretion, judges are
sworn not only to uphold the law but also to do what is
fair and just. The judicial gavel should not be wielded by
one who has an unsound and distorted sense of justice
and fairness.[15]
While Judge Savellano has claimed in his
Comment that -
"Petitioners-accused were each represented during the
hearing on 07 November 1997 with their respective
counsel of choice. None of their counsel interposed an
intention to cross-examine rape victim Juvielyn
Punongbayan, even after she attested, in answer to
respondent judge's clarificatory questions, the
voluntariness and truth of her two affidavits - one
detailing the rape and the other detailing the attempts to
buy her desistance; the opportunity was missed/not used,
hence waived. The rule of case law is that the right to
confront and cross-examine a witness 'is a personal one
and may be waived.'" (emphasis supplied) -
it should be pointed out, however, that the existence of
the waiver must be positively demonstrated. The
standard of waiver requires that it "not only must be
voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done
with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances
and likely consequences."[16] Mere silence of the holder
of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of
right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver.[17] The Solicitor General has
aptly discerned a few of the deviations from what
otherwise should have been the regular course of trial:
(1) Petitioners have not been directed to present
evidence to prove their defenses nor have dates therefor
been scheduled for the purpose;[18] (2) the parties have
not been given the opportunity to present rebutting
evidence nor have dates been set by respondent Judge
for the purpose;[19] and (3) petitioners have not admitted
the act charged in the Information so as to justify any
modification in the order of trial.[20] There can be no
short-cut to the legal process, and there can be no excuse
for not affording an accused his full day in court. Due
process, rightly occupying the first and foremost place of
honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and
invaluable right that cannot be denied even to the most
undeserving.
This case, in fine, must be remanded for further
proceedings. And, since the case would have to be sent
back to the court a quo, this ponencia has carefully
avoided making any statement or reference that might be
misconstrued as prejudgment or as pre-empting the trial
court in the proper disposition of the case. The Court
likewise deems it appropriate that all related proceedings
therein, including the petition for bail, should be subject
to the proper disposition of the trial court.
Nevertheless, it is needful to stress a few
observations on the affidavit of desistance executed by
the complainant.
Firstly, the affidavit of desistance of Juvie-Lyn
Punongbayan, hereinbefore quoted, does not contain any
statement that disavows the veracity of her complaint
against petitioners but merely seeks to "be allowed to
withdraw" her complaint and to discontinue with the
case for varied other reasons. On this subject, the case
of People vs. Junio,[21] should be instructive. The Court
has there explained:
The appellants submission that the execution of an
Affidavit of Desistance by complainant who was assisted
by her mother supported the `inherent incredibility of
prosecutions evidence is specious. We have said in so
many cases that retractions are generally unreliable and
are looked upon with considerable disfavor by the
courts. The unreliable character of this document is
shown by the fact that it is quite incredible that after
going through the process of having accused-appellant
arrested by the police, positively identifying him as the
person who raped her, enduring the humiliation of a
physical examination of her private parts, and then
repeating her accusations in open court by recounting
her anguish, Maryjane would suddenly turn around and
declare that `[a]fter a careful deliberation over the case,
(she) find(s) that the same does not merit or warrant
criminal prosecution.
Thus, we have declared that at most the retraction is an
afterthought which should not be given probative
value. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the
testimony taken before the court of justice simply
because the witness who has given it later on changed
his mind for one reason or another. Such a rule will
make a solemn trial a mockery and place the
investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous
witnesses. Because affidavits of retraction can easily be
secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for
monetary consideration, the Court has invariably
regarded such affidavits as exceedingly
unreliable. [Flores vs. People, 211 SCRA 622, citing De
Guzman vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 184 SCRA
128; People vs. Galicia, 123 SCRA 550.][22]
The Junio rule is no different from ordinary
criminal cases. For instance, in People vs. Ballabare,[23] a
murder case, the Court has ruled:
The contention has no merit. To begin with, the Affidavit
executed by eyewitness Tessie Asenita is not a
recantation. To recant a prior statement is to renounce
and withdraw it formally and publicly. [36 WORDS
AND PHRASES 683, citing Pradlik vs. State, 41-A 2nd,
906, 907.] In her affidavit, Tessie Asenita did not really
recant what she had said during the trial. She only said
she wanted to withdraw her testimony because her
father, Leonardo Tacadao, Sr., was no longer interested
in prosecuting the case against accused-appellant. Thus,
her affidavit stated:
3. That inasmuch as my father, Leonardo Tacadao, Sr.,
the complainant therein, was no longer interested to
prosecute the case as manifested in the Sworn Affidavit
of Desistance before the Provincial Prosecutor, I do
hereby WITHDRAW and/or REVOKE my testimony of
record to confirm (sic) with my fathers desire;
It is absurd to disregard a testimony that has undergone
trial and scrutiny by the court and the parties simply
because an affidavit withdrawing the testimony is
subsequently presented by the defense. In the first place,
any recantation must be tested in a public trial with
sufficient opportunity given to the party adversely
affected by it to cross-examine the recanting witness. In
this case, Tessie Asenita was not recalled to the witness
stand to testify on her affidavit. Her affidavit is thus
hearsay. It was her husband, Roque Asenita, who was
presented and the matters he testified to did not even
bear on the substance of Tessies affidavit. He testified
that accused-appellant was not involved in the
perpetration of the crime.
In the second place, to accept the new evidence
uncritically would be to make a solemn trial a mockery
and place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous
witnesses. [De Guzman vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 184 SCRA 128, 134, citing People vs. Morales,
113 SCRA 683.] For even assuming that Tessie Asenita
had made a retraction, this circumstance alone does not
require the court to disregard her original testimony. A
retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier
declaration. [People vs. Davatos, 229 SCRA 647.]For
this reason, courts look with disfavor upon retractions
because they can easily be obtained from witnesses
usually through intimidation or for monetary
considerations. [People vs. Clamor, 198 SCRA
642.] Hence, when confronted with a situation where a
witness recants his testimony, courts must not
automatically exclude the original testimony solely on
the basis of the recantation. They should determine
which testimony should be given credence through a
comparison of the original testimony and the new
testimony, applying the general rules of
evidence. [Reano vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA
525.] In this case we think the trial court correctly ruled.
[24]
It may not be amiss to state that courts have the
inherent power to compel the attendance of any person
to testify in a case pending before it, and a party is not
precluded from invoking that authority.[25]
Secondly, an affidavit of desistance by itself, even
when construed as a pardon in the so-called "private
crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal
case once the action has been instituted. The affidavit,
nevertheless, may, as so earlier intimated, possibly
constitute evidence whose weight or probative value,
like any other piece of evidence, would be up to the
court for proper evaluation. The decision in Junio went
on to hold -
While `[t]he offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or
acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except
upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her
parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor in any case, if the
offender has been expressly pardoned by the above
named persons, as the case may be, [Third par. of Art.
344, The Revised Penal Code.] the pardon to justify the
dismissal of the complaint should have been made prior
to the institution of the criminal action. [People vs.
Entes, 103 SCRA 162, cited by People vs. Soliao, 194
SCRA 250, which in turn is cited in People vs.
Villorente, 210 SCRA 647.] Here, the motion to dismiss
to which the affidavit of desistance is attached was filed
after the institution of the criminal case. And, affiant did
not appear to be serious in `signifying (her) intention to
refrain from testifying since she still completed her
testimony notwithstanding her earlier affidavit of
desistance. More, the affidavit is suspect considering that
while it was dated `April 1992, it was only submitted
sometime in August 1992, four (4) months after the
Information was filed before the court a quo on 6 April
1992, perhaps dated as such to coincide with the actual
filing of the case.[26]
In People vs. Miranda,[27] applying the pertinent
provisions of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code
which, in full, states -
"Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery,
concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape, and acts of
lasciviousness. The crimes of adultery and concubinage
shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by
the offended spouse.
"The offended party cannot institute criminal
prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if
they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have
consented or pardoned the offenders.
"The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of
lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended party or her parents,
grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the
offender has been expressly pardoned by the above
named persons, as the case may be.
"In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness
and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended
party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the
penalty already imposed upon him. The provisions of
this paragraph shall also be applicable to the
coprincipals, accomplices and accessories after the fact
of the above-mentioned crimes." -
the Court said:
"Paragraph 3 of the legal provision above quoted
prohibits a prosecution for seduction, abduction, rape, or
acts of lasciviousness, except upon a complaint made by
the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or
guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been
expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the
case may be. It does not prohibit the continuance of a
prosecution if the offended party pardons the offender
after the cause has been instituted, nor does it order the
dismissal of said cause. The only act that according to
article 344 extinguishes the penal action and the penalty
that may have been imposed is the marriage between the
offended and the offended party."[28]
In People vs. Infante,[29] decided just a little over a
month before Miranda, the Court similarly held:
"In this court, after the case had been submitted, a
motion to dismiss was filed on behalf of the appellant
predicated on an affidavit executed by Manuel Artigas,
Jr., in which he pardoned his guilty spouse for her
infidelity. But this attempted pardon cannot prosper for
two reasons. The second paragraph of article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code which is in question reads: 'The
offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution
without including both the guilty parties, if they are both
alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or
pardoned the offenders.' This provision means that the
pardon afforded the offenders must come before the
institution of the criminal prosecution, and means,
further, that both the offenders must be pardoned by the
offended party. To elucidate further, article 435 of the
old Penal Code provided: 'The husband may at any time
remit the penalty imposed upon his wife. In such case
the penalty imposed upon the wife's paramour shall also
be deemed to be remitted.' These provisions of the old
Penal Code became inoperative after the passage of Act
No. 1773, section 2, which had the effect of repealing
the same. The Revised Penal Code thereafter expressly
repealed the old Penal Code, and in so doing did not
have the effect of reviving any of its provisions which
were not in force. But with the incorporation of the
second paragraph of article 344, the pardon given by the
offended party again constitutes a bar to the prosecution
for adultery. Once more, however, it must be emphasized
that this pardon must come before the institution of the
criminal prosecution and must be for both offenders to
be effective - circumstances which do not concur in this
case."[30]
The decisions speak well for themselves, and the
Court need not say more than what it has heretofore
already held.
Relative to the prayer for the disqualification of
Judge Savellano from further hearing the case, the
Court is convinced that Judge Savellano should, given
the circumstances, be best excused from the
case. Possible animosity between the personalities here
involved may not all be that unlikely. The
pronouncement of this Court in the old case of Luque vs.
Kayanan[31] could again be said: All suitors are entitled
to nothing short of the cold neutrality of an independent,
wholly-free, disinterested and unbiased tribunal.Second
only to the duty of rendering a just decision is the duty
of doing it in a manner that will not arouse any suspicion
as to the fairness and integrity of the Judge.[32] It is not
enough that a court is impartial, it must also be
perceived as impartial.
The Court cannot end this ponencia without a
simple reminder on the use of proper language before
the courts. While the lawyer in promoting the cause of
his client or defending his rights might do so with fervor,
simple courtesy demands that it be done within the
bounds of propriety and decency. The use of intemperate
language and unkind ascriptions hardly can be justified
nor can have a place in the dignity of judicial
forum. Civility among members of the legal profession
is a treasured tradition that must at no time be lost to it.
Finally, it may be opportune to say, once again, that
prosecutors are expected not merely to discharge their
duties with the highest degree of excellence,
professionalism and skill but also to act each time with
utmost devotion and dedication to duty.[33] The Court is
hopeful that the zeal which has been exhibited many
times in the past, although regrettably a disappointment
on few occasions, will not be wanting in the proceedings
yet to follow.

WHEREFORE, conformably with all the foregoing,

the Court hereby RULES that -

(a) The submission of the "Affidavit of Desistance,"

executed by Juvie-Lyn Y. Punongbayan on 25 June 1997,
having been filed AFTER the institution of Criminal
Case No. 97-159935, DOES NOT WARRANT THE
DISMISSAL of said criminal case;

(b) For FAILURE OF DUE PROCESS, the assailed

judgment, dated 12 December 1997, convicting
petitioners is declared NULL AND VOID and thereby
SET ASIDE; accordingly, the case is REMANDED to
the trial court for further proceedings; and

(c) Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., presiding Judge of

Branch 53 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is
ENJOINED from further hearing Criminal Case No. 97-
159935; instead, the case shall immediately be scheduled
for raffle among the other branches of that court for
proper disposition.

No special pronouncement on costs.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 151249-50. February 26, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
ARIEL MACARANG, appellant.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us on automatic review is a Decision [1] of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (Branch 163) in
Criminal Cases Nos. 116969-H and 117275-H,
sentencing appellant Ariel Macarang to suffer the
penalty of death in each of said criminal cases for
qualified rape. The dispositive portion of said Decision
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 116969-H, the
accused is convicted of the crime of rape and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by lethal
injection and the accessory penalty provided by law and
to pay the costs.
In Criminal Case No. 117275-H, the accused is also
convicted of the crime of rape and is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of death by lethal injection and the accessory
penalties provided by law and to pay the costs.
On the civil aspects of the two cases the accused is
ordered to pay the victim, Armie Christine Macarang,
Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity and Php50,000.00 as
moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Appellant claims that the trial court erred in giving
weight and credence to the testimony of private
complainant and that appellants guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellee, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, filed its brief, entitled Brief For The Appellee
With Recommendation To Remand The Cases To The
Court A Quo For Further Proceedings, calling our
attention to the fact that the trial court had considered
appellant to have waived his right to present his
evidence without any showing that the latter was fully
aware of the consequences of such waiver.
As borne out by the records of the case, the
following proceedings took place in the trial court:
Two separate Infomations[2] were filed charging
appellant with the crime of qualified rape, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 116969-H
On or about November 8, 1999, in San Juan, Metro
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, being the father of Armie Christine
Macarang y Amboy, with lewd designs, by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with
said Armie Christine Macarang y Amboy, 13 years old,
against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
Criminal Case No. 117275-H
On or about June 12, 1998, in San Juan, Metro Manila
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused, being the father of Armie Christine Macarang y
Amboy, with lewd designs, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with said Armie
Christine Macarang y Amboy, 12 years old, against her
will and consent.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment on December 14, 1999 in
Criminal Case No. 116969-H and on April 11, 2000 in
Criminal Case No. 117275-H, appellant, with assistance
of counsel, pleaded NOT GUILTY to each
Information. The cases were then consolidated and
jointly heard before Branch 163 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City.
After pre-trial, the prosecution proceeded to present
evidence and thereafter, rested its case.
The initial hearing for the reception of defense
evidence was scheduled on March 13, 2001. Presiding
Judge Leili Suarez Acebo cancelled the setting as she
had to attend a seminar given by the Supreme
Court[3] and scheduled anew the hearing on April 24,
2001 and May 8 and 22, 2001. The April 24 hearing was
cancelled upon motion of public prosecutor who had to
attend a seminar at the COMELEC.[4] The May 8 hearing
was also cancelled as appellant informed the court that
his de parte counsel, Atty. Arnoldo Pabelonio, was
indisposed.[5] The trial court reset the hearing to May 22
as previously scheduled, and set additional hearings on
July 3, 17 & 24, 2001. The May 22 hearing was
cancelled for failure of counsel for appellant to appear in
court for the hearing.[6] Again, defense counsel was
absent for the July 3 hearing and the same was reset to
the next scheduled hearing dates.[7] On July 17, 2001,
defense counsel manifested in court that appellant was
contemplating on changing his plea from not guilty to
guilty and requested for more time for the appellant to
come to a decision. The trial court then cancelled the
July 17 and 24, 2001 hearings and re- scheduled the
same on August 14 and 28, 2001.[8] On August 14, the
trial court, apparently irked by the numerous
postponements of the cases, issued the following:
ORDER
When this case was called supposedly for the initial
presentation of defense evidence, the defense counsel
manifested that the accused had intimated to him that he
was not prepared to testify, the reason being that he was
just recuperating from an illness. However, when asked
by the Court, accused stated that it was up to his lawyer,
inspite of which, the Defense Counsel begged the
indulgence of the Court as he did not bring the record of
the case and was not prepared to call the accused to the
witness stand.
WHEREFORE, considering that the trial of this case had
been repeatedly postponed and that Defense Counsel had
been the subject at least two (2) show cause orders, reset
for the last time to August 28 and September 18, 2001
at 8:30 oclock in the morning, with a warning that if
on the next scheduled hearing accused would not still
be ready to present evidence, he would be deemed to
have waived his right to do so.
SO ORDERED.[9] (Emphasis supplied).
 On August 28, 2001, defense counsel filed an
Urgent Motion to be Allowed to Withdraw as Counsel,
[10]
stating therein that the delay in the hearing of the case
was due to the insistence of appellant that he moved for
postponements, in the hope that appellants daughter
would eventually cause the dismissal of the case. At the
hearing set on the same date, the trial court issued the
following:
ORDER
When these cases were called for trial, accused begged
the Court for one last resetting on the ground that he is
not prepared. The Public Prosecutor did not object to the
request for postponement on the condition that if on the
next scheduled hearing, accused would still not be able
to present evidence, he would rest his cases and the
cases would be deemed submitted for decision on the
basis of the prosecution evidence.
WHEREFORE, as prayed for, reset to September 18,
2001, as previously scheduled and additional settings on
September 25, 2001, October 2 & 9, 2001, all at 8:30
oclock in the morning. The pending motion to withdraw
as counsel filed by Atty. Arnoldo C. Pabelonio is denied
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Finally, at the hearing held on September 18, 2001,
the trial court issued the following:
ORDER
When this case was called supposedly for the
presentation of defense evidence, accused manifested
that he was still not ready to do so. Record shows that
such presentation had been repeatedly postponed mostly
at the instance of the accused and/or his lawyer.
Thus, as prayed for by the Public Prosecutor and
pursuant to the order of August 28, 2001, accused is
now deemed to have waived his right to present
evidence. As further prayed for, this case is now
deemed submitted for decision.
Moreover, the Urgent Motion to be Allowed to Withdraw
as Counsel filed by Atty. Arnoldo Pabelonio, is granted
with the consent of the accused.
SO ORDERED.[12] (Emphasis supplied).
Based on the prosecution evidence, the trial court,
on November 13, 2001 promulgated its Decision dated
October 17, 2001, convicting appellant of the crime of
qualified rape and sentencing him to suffer the ultimate
penalty of death in each of the criminal cases.
We are aware of the usual practice of presiding
judges in warning a party in a case that he will be
considered to have waived his right to adduce evidence
if he fails to present it at the next hearing, after prior
unwarranted postponements, despite previous agreement
of the parties. Its objective is to instill discipline on the
litigants and their counsel so that the proceedings of the
court would not be unduly delayed.
However, in criminal cases where the imposable
penalty may be death, as in the present cases, the
presiding judge is called upon to see to it that the
accused is made aware of the consequences of not
heeding the warning given by the trial court. It must be
noted that the waiver of the right to present defense
evidence in the present cases was not even voluntary nor
upon the instance of the appellant but imposed by the
trial court, apparently to penalize appellant, after he and
his counsel repeatedly moved for the postponements of
the scheduled hearings.
As stated by the trial court in its Order dated
September 18, 2001, appellant manifested in open court
that he was still not ready to do so, that is, that he was
not ready to present his evidence. Appellant never said
that he did not wish to present evidence. It should have
been clear to the trial court that appellant never intended
to waive his right to present his evidence. Thus, a simple
forewarning to the appellant that the next time that he
would not be ready with his defense evidence, he would
be deemed to have waived his right to present it, did not
satisfy appellants constitutional right to due process. The
trial court should have first apprised appellant or
explained to him in clear terms the exact nature and
consequences of a waiver. The trial court should have
satisfied itself that appellant understood the real import
of the courts action if it would consider him as having
waived his right to present his evidence if he would not
be ready to do so the next time the case would be called
for trial.
Moreover, in the same Order declaring appellant to
have waived his right to present evidence, the trial court
granted the motion of appellants counsel to withdraw his
appearance. Appellant, therefore, had no more
counsel. The trial court did not ask him if he would wish
to solicit the services of another counsel de parte or want
the court to designate a de oficio counsel for
him. Consequently, appellants inaction, after the
declaration by the trial court that he was deemed to have
waived his right to present evidence in spite of the fact
that there were other dates previously scheduled by the
trial court for reception of his evidence, should not be
taken against appellant. It did not justify the trial court to
render judgment against him on the basis of the
prosecution evidence and sentence him to suffer the
penalty of death in both cases, without first ensuring that
appellant was aware of the consequences of the waiver
of his right to present his evidence, and without exerting
any effort to ask him if he would like to be represented
by another lawyer of his own choice or through the
assistance of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) or
through a counsel de oficio appointed by the court.
It is obvious then that the appellant was deprived of
his right to due process.
We apply by analogy our ruling in People vs.
Bodoso,[13] to wit:
This Court notes with deep regret the failure of the trial
court to inquire from accused-appellant himself whether
he wanted to present evidence; or submit his
memorandum elucidating on the contradictions and
insufficiency of the prosecution evidence, if any; or in
default thereof, file a demurrer to evidence with prior
leave of court, if he so believes that the prosecution
evidence is so weak that it need not even be
rebutted. The inquiry is simply part and parcel of the
determination of the validity of the waiver, i.e., not only
must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and
done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences, which ought to
have been done by the trial court not only because this
was supposed to be an uncomplicated and routine task
on its part, but more importantly since accused-appellant
himself did not personally, on a person-to-person basis,
manifest to the trial court the waiver of his own right.

In the light of the foregoing, we have no other

recourse but to set aside the judgment of the trial court
convicting appellant and order the remand of the records
of the case to the trial court to conduct further
proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial

Court of Pasig City, Branch 163, in Criminal Cases Nos.
116969-H and 117275-H dated October 17, 2001 is SET
ASIDE.

Let the records of Criminal Cases Nos. 116969-H

and 117275-H be REMANDED to Branch 163 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City for further
appropriate proceedings to give appellant the
opportunity to present his evidence, if he so desires,
through a counsel of his choice or through the Public
Attorneys Office or any competent de oficio counsel to
be appointed by said court.

For this purpose, the proper law enforcement

officers are directed to TRANSFER appellant Ariel
Macarang from the New Bilibid Prison, where he is
presently incarcerated, to San Juan Municipal Jail, San
Juan, Metro Manila, with adequate security escort,
where he shall be DETAINED for the duration of the
proceedings in the trial court.

The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (Branch

163) is directed to dispose of said criminal cases without
further delay.

Costs de oficio

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC the land, must defer.[3] Constitutional doctrines must
remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides of
time. It cannot be simply made to sway and
LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO, G.R. No. 192935
Petitioner, accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor
itself to the whims and caprices of government and the
- versus -
people who run it.[4]
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION
OF 2010, For consideration before the Court are two consolidated
Respondent.
x-----------------------x cases[5] both of which essentially assail the validity and
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, G.R. No. 193036
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July
REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP.
SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP. Present:30, 2010, entitled Creating the Philippine Truth
ORLANDO B. FUA, SR., Commission of 2010.
Petitioners, CORONA,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil
- versus - NACHURA,
action forCASTRO,
LEONARDO-DE prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis
BRION,Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and
PERALTA,
taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
being violative of the legislative power of Congress
ABAD,
under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution [6] as it
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. MENDOZA,createand
a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.[7]
OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF SERENO,
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Promulgated:
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil
Respondents.
action
December for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners
7, 2010
Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A.
x Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-
--------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------ x legislators) as incumbent members of the House of
Representatives.

DECISION The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the

MENDOZA, J.:
When the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it
does not assert any superiority over the
other departments; it does not in reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn
and sacred obligation assigned to it by
the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the
rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them.
--- Justice Jose P. Laurel[1]
The role of the Constitution cannot be overlooked. It is
through the Constitution that the fundamental powers of
government are established, limited and defined, and by
which these powers are distributed among the several
departments.[2] The Constitution is the basic and
paramount law to which all other laws must conform and
to which all persons, including the highest officials of
events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when
then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his
staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his
slogan, Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap. The
Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his
ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the
good senator to the presidency.
To transform his campaign slogan into reality,
President Aquino found a need for a special body to
investigate reported cases of graft and corruption
allegedly committed during the previous administration.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the
President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No.
1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
(Truth Commission). Pertinent provisions of said
executive order read:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1
CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH
COMMISSION OF 2010

WHEREAS, Article XI, Section 1 of the
1987 Constitution of the Philippines
solemnly enshrines the principle that a
public office is a public trust and
mandates that public officers and
employees, who are servants of the
people, must at all times be accountable
to the latter, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives;
WHEREAS, corruption is among the
most despicable acts of defiance of this
principle and notorious violation of this
mandate;
WHEREAS, corruption is an evil and
scourge which seriously affects the
political, economic, and social life of a
nation; in a very special way it inflicts
untold misfortune and misery on the
poor, the marginalized and
underprivileged sector of society;
WHEREAS, corruption in the
Philippines has reached very alarming
levels, and undermined the peoples trust
and confidence in the Government and
its institutions;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent call for
the determination of the truth regarding
certain reports of large scale graft and
corruption in the government and to put
a closure to them by the filing of the
appropriate cases against those involved,
if warranted, and to deter others from
committing the evil, restore the peoples
faith and confidence in the Government
and in their public servants;
WHEREAS, the Presidents battlecry
during his campaign for the Presidency
in the last elections kung walang
corrupt, walang mahirap expresses a
solemn pledge that if elected, he would
end corruption and the evil it breeds;
WHEREAS, there is a need for a
separate body dedicated solely to
investigating and finding out the truth
concerning the reported cases of graft
and corruption during the previous
administration, and which will
recommend the prosecution of the
offenders and secure justice for all;
WHEREAS, Book III, Chapter 10,
Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Revised
Administrative Code of the Philippines,
gives the President the continuing
authority to reorganize the Office of the
President.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO
SIMEON AQUINO III, President of the
Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of
the powers vested in me by law, do
hereby order:
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission.
There is hereby created
the PHILIPPINE TRUTH
COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to
as the COMMISSION, which shall
primarily seek and find the truth on, and
toward this end, investigate reports of
graft and corruption of such scale and
magnitude that shock and offend the
moral and ethical sensibilities of the
people, committed by public officers and
employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories from the
private sector, if any, during the previous
administration; and thereafter
recommend the appropriate action or
measure to be taken thereon to ensure
that the full measure of justice shall be
served without fear or favor.
The Commission shall be composed of a
Chairman and four (4) members who
will act as an independent collegial
body.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The
Commission, which shall have all the
powers of an investigative body under
Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, is
primarily tasked to conduct a thorough
fact-finding investigation of reported
cases of graft and corruption referred to
in Section 1, involving third level public
officers and higher, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories from the
private sector, if any, during the previous
administration and thereafter submit its
finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the
Ombudsman.
In particular, it shall:
a) Identify and determine the reported
cases of such graft and corruption which
it will investigate;
b) Collect, receive, review and
evaluate evidence related to or regarding
the cases of large scale corruption which
it has chosen to investigate, and to this
end require any agency, official or
employee of the Executive Branch,
including government-owned or
controlled corporations, to produce
documents, books, records and other
papers;
c) Upon proper request or
representation, obtain information and
documents from the Senate and the
House of Representatives records of
investigations conducted by committees
thereof relating to matters or subjects
being investigated by the Commission;
d) Upon proper request and
representation, obtain information from
the courts, including the Sandiganbayan
and the Office of the Court
Administrator, information or
documents in respect to corruption cases
filed with the Sandiganbayan or the
regular courts, as the case may be;

e) Invite or subpoena witnesses and
take their testimonies and for that
purpose, administer oaths or
affirmations as the case may be;
f) Recommend, in cases where there
is a need to utilize any person as a state
witness to ensure that the ends of justice
be fully served, that such person who
qualifies as a state witness under the
Revised Rules of Court of the
Philippines be admitted for that purpose;
g) Turn over from time to time, for
expeditious prosecution, to the
appropriate prosecutorial authorities, by
means of a special or interim report and
recommendation, all evidence on
corruption of public officers and
employees and their private sector co-
principals, accomplices or accessories, if
any, when in the course of its
investigation the Commission finds that
there is reasonable ground to believe that
they are liable for graft and corruption
under pertinent applicable laws;
h) Call upon any government
investigative or prosecutorial agency
such as the Department of Justice or any
of the agencies under it, and the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, for
such assistance and cooperation as it
may require in the discharge of its
functions and duties;
i) Engage or contract the services of
resource persons, professionals and
other personnel determined by it as
necessary to carry out its mandate;
j) Promulgate its rules and
regulations or rules of procedure it
deems necessary to effectively and
efficiently carry out the objectives of
this Executive Order and to ensure the
orderly conduct of its investigations,
proceedings and hearings, including the
presentation of evidence;
k) Exercise such other acts incident
to or are appropriate and necessary in
connection with the objectives and
purposes of this Order.
SECTION 3. Staffing Requirements. x x
x.
SECTION 4. Detail of Employees. x x x.
SECTION 5. Engagement of Experts. x
xx
SECTION 6. Conduct of Proceedings. x
x x.
SECTION 7. Right to Counsel of
Witnesses/Resource Persons. x x x.
SECTION 8. Protection of
Witnesses/Resource Persons. x x x.
SECTION 9. Refusal to Obey Subpoena,
Take Oath or Give Testimony. Any
government official or personnel who,
without lawful excuse, fails to appear
upon subpoena issued by the
Commission or who, appearing before
the Commission refuses to take oath or
affirmation, give testimony or produce
documents for inspection, when
required, shall be subject to
administrative disciplinary action. Any
private person who does the same may
be dealt with in accordance with law.
SECTION 10. Duty to Extend
Assistance to the Commission. x x x.
SECTION 11. Budget for the
Commission. The Office of the President
shall provide the necessary funds for the
Commission to ensure that it can
exercise its powers, execute its
functions, and perform its duties and
responsibilities as effectively, efficiently,
and expeditiously as possible.
SECTION 12. Office. x x x.
SECTION 13. Furniture/Equipment. x x
x.
SECTION 14. Term of the
Commission. The Commission shall
accomplish its mission on or before
December 31, 2012.
SECTION 15. Publication of Final
Report. x x x.
SECTION 16. Transfer of Records and
Facilities of the Commission. x x x.
SECTION 17. Special Provision
Concerning Mandate. If and when in the
judgment of the President there is a need
to expand the mandate of the
Commission as defined in Section 1
hereof to include the investigation of
cases and instances of graft and
corruption during the prior
administrations, such mandate may be so
extended accordingly by way of a
supplemental Executive Order.
SECTION 18. Separability Clause. If
any provision of this Order is declared
unconstitutional, the same shall not
affect the validity and effectivity of the
other provisions hereof.
SECTION 19. Effectivity. This
Executive Order shall take effect
immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila,
Philippines, this 30th day of July 2010.
(SGD.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III
By the President:
(SGD.) PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.
Executive Secretary
Nature of the Truth Commission
 As can be gleaned from the above-quoted
provisions, the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a
mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the
President with the primary task to investigate reports of
graft and corruption committed by third-level public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices
and accessories during the previous administration, and
thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to
the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it
has been described as an independent collegial body, it is
essentially an entity within the Office of the President
Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it
constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one. [8]
To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all
the powers of an investigative body under Section 37,
Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It
is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot
adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards
in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is
gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and
corruption and make recommendations. It may have
subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in
contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a
fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if
probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an
information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it
cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties
or sanctions.
The PTC is different from the truth commissions
in other countries which have been created as official,
transitory and non-judicial fact-finding bodies to
establish the facts and context of serious violations of
human rights or of international humanitarian law in a
[9]
countrys past. They are usually established by states
emerging from periods of internal unrest, civil strife or
authoritarianism to serve as mechanisms for transitional
justice.
Truth commissions have been described as
bodies that share the following characteristics: (1) they
examine only past events; (2) they investigate patterns of
abuse committed over a period of time, as opposed to a
particular event; (3) they are temporary bodies that finish
their work with the submission of a report containing
conclusions and recommendations; and (4) they are
officially sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the
State.[10] Commissions members are usually empowered
to conduct research, support victims, and propose policy
recommendations to prevent recurrence of crimes.
Through their investigations, the commissions may aim
to discover and learn more about past abuses, or
formally acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare
the way for prosecutions and recommend institutional
reforms.[11]
Thus, their main goals range from retribution to
reconciliation. The Nuremburg and Tokyo war crime
tribunals are examples of a retributory or vindicatory
body set up to try and punish those responsible for
crimes against humanity. A form of a reconciliatory
tribunal is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of
South Africa, the principal function of which was to heal
the wounds of past violence and to prevent future
conflict by providing a cathartic experience for victims.
The PTC is a far cry from South Africas model.
The latter placed more emphasis on reconciliation than
on judicial retribution, while the marching order of the
PTC is the identification and punishment of perpetrators.
As one writer[12] puts it:
The order ruled out
reconciliation. It translated the
Draconian code spelled out by Aquino
in his inaugural speech: To those who
talk about reconciliation, if they mean
that they would like us to simply forget
about the wrongs that they have
committed in the past, we have this to
say: There can be no reconciliation
without justice. When we allow crimes
to go unpunished, we give consent to
their occurring over and over again.
The Thrusts of the Petitions
Barely a month after the issuance of Executive
Order No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to declare it
unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing
its functions. A perusal of the arguments of the
petitioners in both cases shows that they are essentially
the same. The petitioners-legislators summarized them
in the following manner:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the
separation of powers as it arrogates the
power of the Congress to create a public
office and appropriate funds for its
operation.
(b) The provision of Book III,
Chapter 10, Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 cannot
legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the
delegated authority of the President to
structurally reorganize the Office of the
President to achieve economy, simplicity
and efficiency does not include the
power to create an entirely new public
office which was hitherto inexistent like
the Truth Commission.
 (c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended
the Constitution and pertinent statutes
when it vested the Truth Commission
with quasi-judicial powers duplicating,
if not superseding, those of the Office of
the Ombudsman created under the 1987
Constitution and the Department of
Justice created under the Administrative
Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal
protection clause as it selectively targets
for investigation and prosecution
officials and personnel of the previous
administration as if corruption is their
peculiar species even as it excludes
those of the other administrations, past
and present, who may be indictable.
(e) The creation of the
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
violates the consistent and general
international practice of four decades
wherein States constitute truth
commissions to exclusively investigate
human rights violations, which
customary practice forms part of the
generally accepted principles of
international law which the Philippines
is mandated to adhere to pursuant to the
Declaration of Principles enshrined in
the Constitution.
(f) The creation of the Truth
Commission is an exercise in futility, an
adventure in partisan hostility, a
launching pad for trial/conviction by
publicity and a mere populist
propaganda to mistakenly impress the
people that widespread poverty will
altogether vanish if corruption is
eliminated without even addressing the
other major causes of poverty.
(g) The mere fact that previous
commissions were not constitutionally
challenged is of no moment because
neither laches nor estoppel can bar an
eventual question on the
constitutionality and validity of an
executive issuance or even a statute. [13]
In their Consolidated Comment,[14] the
respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), essentially questioned the legal standing
of petitioners and defended the assailed executive order
with the following arguments:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate
the powers of Congress to create a
public office because the Presidents
executive power and power of control
necessarily include the inherent power
to conduct investigations to ensure that
laws are faithfully executed and that, in
any event, the Constitution, Revised
Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No.
292), [15] Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1416[16] (as amended by P.D. No. 1772),
R.A. No. 9970,[17] and settled
jurisprudence that authorize the
President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the
power of Congress to appropriate funds
because there is no appropriation but a
mere allocation of funds already
appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does
not duplicate or supersede the functions
of the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), because it
is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-
judicial body and its functions do not
duplicate, supplant or erode the latters
jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does
not violate the equal protection clause
because it was validly created for
laudable purposes.
The OSG then points to the continued existence
and validity of other executive orders and presidential
issuances creating similar bodies to justify the creation
of the PTC such as Presidential Complaint and Action
Commission (PCAC) by President Ramon B.
Magsaysay, Presidential Committee on Administrative
Performance Efficiency (PCAPE) by President Carlos P.
Garcia and Presidential Agency on Reform and
Government Operations (PARGO) by President
[18]
Ferdinand E. Marcos.
From the petitions, pleadings, transcripts, and
memoranda, the following are the principal issues to be
resolved:
1. Whether or
not the petitioners have the legal
standing to file their respective petitions
and question Executive Order No. 1;
2. Whether or
not Executive Order No. 1 violates the
principle of separation of powers by
usurping the powers of Congress to
create and to appropriate funds for
public offices, agencies and
commissions;
3. Whether or not Executive
Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. Whether or not Executive
Order No. 1 violates the equal protection
clause; and
 5. Whether or not petitioners are
entitled to injunctive relief.
Essential requisites for judicial review
Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, the Court
needs to ascertain whether the requisites for a valid
exercise of its power of judicial review are present.
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the
power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling
for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question
the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise
stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must
be the very lis mota of the case.[19]
Among all these limitations, only the legal standing of
the petitioners has been put at issue.
Legal Standing of the Petitioners
The OSG attacks the legal personality of the
petitioners-legislators to file their petition for failure to
demonstrate their personal stake in the outcome of the
case. It argues that the petitioners have not shown that
they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any
personal injury attributable to the creation of the PTC.
Not claiming to be the subject of the commissions
investigations, petitioners will not sustain injury in its
creation or as a result of its proceedings. [20]
The Court disagrees with the
questioning the legal standing of the petitioners-
legislators to assail Executive Order No.
Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of
the power of the Congress as a body to which they
belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve
to take the cudgels for Congress as an institution and
present the complaints on the usurpation of their power
and rights as members of the legislature before the
Court. As held in Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez,[21]
To the extent the powers of
Congress are impaired, so is the power
of each member thereof, since his office
confers a right to participate in the
exercise of the powers of that institution.
An act of the Executive which
injures the institution of Congress causes
a derivative but nonetheless substantial
injury, which can be questioned by a
member of Congress. In such a case, any
member of Congress can have a resort to
the courts.
Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to
it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by
the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus,
they are allowed to question the validity of any official
action which, to their mind, infringes on their
prerogatives as legislators.[22]
With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as
a taxpayer, he has no standing to question the creation of
the PTC and the budget for its operations. [23] It
emphasizes that the funds to be used for the creation and
earliest
operation of the commission are to be taken from those
funds already appropriated by Congress. Thus, the
allocation and disbursement of funds for the
commission will not entail congressional action but will
simply be an exercise of the Presidents power over
contingent funds.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo
has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of
sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to
the implementation of Executive Order No. 1. Nowhere
in his petition is an assertion of a clear right that may
justify his clamor for the Court to exercise judicial
power and to wield the axe over presidential issuances in
defense of the Constitution. The case of David v.
Arroyo[24] explained the deep-seated rules on locus
standi. Thus:
Locus standi is defined as a
right of appearance in a court of justice
OSG in on a given question. In private suits,
standing is governed by the real-parties-
in interest rule as contained in Section 2,
1.
Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended. It provides
that every action must be prosecuted
or defended in the name of the real
party in interest. Accordingly, the real-
party-in interest is the party who stands
to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit or the party entitled
to the avails of the suit. Succinctly put,
the plaintiffs standing is based on his
own right to the relief sought.
The difficulty of
determining locus standi arises in public
suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a
public right in assailing an allegedly
illegal official action, does so as a Chinese League of the Philippines v.
representative of the general public. He Felix.[Emphases included. Citations
may be a person who is affected no omitted]
differently from any other person. He
could be suing as a stranger, or in the
category of a citizen, or taxpayer. In
either case, he has to adequately show Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine
that he is entitled to seek judicial that the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence,
protection. In other words, he has to
make out a sufficient interest in the can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary
vindication of the public order and the citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public
securing of relief as a citizen or
interest so requires, such as when the matter is
taxpayer.
of transcendental importance, of overreaching
Case law in most jurisdictions significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
now allows both citizen and taxpayer
[25]
standing in public actions. The
distinction was first laid down
in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc.
that the plaintiff in a taxpayers suit is in
a different category from the plaintiff in v. Torres,[26] the Court held that in cases of paramount
a citizens suit. In the former, the plaintiff importance where serious constitutional questions are
is affected by the expenditure of public
involved, the standing requirements may be relaxed and
funds, while in the latter, he is but the
mere instrument of the public a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no
concern. As held by the New York direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial
Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v.
Collins: In matter of mere public right, review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases,[27] ordinary
howeverthe people are the real partiesIt citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the
is at least the right, if not the duty, of
every citizen to interfere and see that a constitutionality of several executive orders although
public offence be properly pursued and they had only an indirect and general interest shared in
punished, and that a public grievance be
common with the public.
remedied. With respect to taxpayers
suits, Terr v. Jordan held that the right of
a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an The OSG claims that the determinants of
action in courts to restrain the unlawful transcendental importance[28] laid down in CREBA v.
use of public funds to his injury cannot
be denied. ERC and Meralco[29] are non-existent in this case. The
Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that
However, to prevent just about
any person from seeking judicial the petition covers matters of transcendental importance
interference in any official policy or act to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There
with which he disagreed with, and thus are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the
hinders the activities of governmental
agencies engaged in public service, the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness,
United State Supreme Court laid down novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are
the more stringent direct
injury test in Ex Parte Levitt, later of transcendental and paramount importance not only to
reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should
same Court ruled that for a private
be resolved for the guidance of all. [30] Undoubtedly, the
individual to invoke the judicial power
to determine the validity of an executive Filipino people are more than interested to know the
or legislative action, he must show that status of the Presidents first effort to bring about a
he has sustained a direct injury as a
result of that action, and it is not promised change to the country. The Court takes
sufficient that he has a general cognizance of the petition not due to overwhelming
interest common to all members of the
public. political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of
the public, but because the Court stands firm in its oath
This Court adopted the direct
to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal
injury test in our jurisdiction. In People
v. Vera, it held that the person who controversies with overreaching significance to society.
impugns the validity of a statute must
have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission
sustained, or will sustain direct injury
as a result. The Vera doctrine was In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935,
upheld in a litany of cases, such
as, Custodio v. President of the Biraogo asserts that the Truth Commission is a public
Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers office and not merely an adjunct body of the Office of
Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v.
the President.[31] Thus, in order that the President may
Secretary of Public Works and Anti-
create a public office he must be empowered by the
Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in him
by law. According to petitioner, such power cannot be
[32]
presumed since there is no provision in the
Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the
[33]
President to create a truth commission. He adds that
Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, granting
the President the continuing authority to reorganize his
office, cannot serve as basis for the creation of a truth
commission considering the aforesaid provision merely
uses verbs such as reorganize, transfer, consolidate,
[34]
merge, and abolish. Insofar as it vests in the President
the plenary power to reorganize the Office of the
President to the extent of creating a public office, Section
31 is inconsistent with the principle of separation of
powers enshrined in the Constitution and must be
deemed repealed upon the effectivity thereof.[35]
Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-
legislators argue that the creation of a public office lies
within the province of Congress and not with the
executive branch of government. They maintain that the
delegated authority of the President to reorganize under
Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code: 1) does
not permit the President to create a public office, much
less a truth commission; 2) is limited to the
reorganization of the administrative structure of the
Office of the President; 3) is limited to the restructuring
of the internal organs of the Office of the President
Proper, transfer of functions and transfer of agencies; and
4) only to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.
[36]
Such continuing authority of the President to
reorganize his office is limited, and by issuing Executive
Order No. 1, the President overstepped the limits of this
delegated authority.
The OSG counters that there is nothing
exclusively legislative about the creation by the
President of a fact-finding body such as a truth
commission. Pointing to numerous offices created by
past presidents, it argues that the authority of the
President to create public offices within the Office of the
[37]
President Proper has long been recognized. According
to the OSG, the Executive, just like the other two
branches of government, possesses the inherent authority
to create fact-finding committees to assist it in the
performance of its constitutionally mandated functions
and in the exercise of its administrative functions. [38] This
power, as the OSG explains it, is but an adjunct of the
plenary powers wielded by the President under Section 1
and his power of control under Section 17, both of
Article VII of the Constitution.[39]
It contends that the President is necessarily
vested with the power to conduct fact-finding
investigations, pursuant to his duty to ensure that all laws
are enforced by public officials and employees of his
department and in the exercise of his authority to assume
directly the functions of the executive department,
bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of his
officials.[40] The power of the President to investigate is
not limited to the exercise of his power of control over
his subordinates in the executive branch, but extends
further in the exercise of his other powers, such as his
power to discipline subordinates,[41] his power for rule
making, adjudication and licensing purposes[42] and in
order to be informed on matters which he is entitled to
know.[43]
The OSG also cites the recent case of Banda v.
Ermita,[44] where it was held that the President has the
power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the
executive department in line with his constitutionally
granted power of control and by virtue of a valid
delegation of the legislative power to reorganize
executive offices under existing statutes.
Thus, the OSG concludes that the power of
control necessarily includes the power to create offices.
For the OSG, the President may create the PTC in order
to, among others, put a closure to the reported large scale
graft and corruption in the government.[45]
The question, therefore, before the Court is
this: Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit
of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of
the Revised Administrative Code? Section 31
contemplates reorganization as limited by the following
functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the
internal organization of the Office of the President
Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units
thereof or transferring functions from one unit to
another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of
the President to any other Department/Agency or vice
versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the Office of
the President to any other Department/Agency or vice
versa. Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of
personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof
by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. These
point to situations where a body or an office is already
existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be
effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned,
much less envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the
answer to the question is in the negative.
 To say that the PTC is borne out of a According to the OSG, the power to create a
restructuring of the Office of the President under Section truth commission pursuant to the above provision finds
31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest statutory basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No.
meaning attributable to the term restructure an alteration 1772.[48] The said law granted the President the
of an existing structure. Evidently, the PTC was not part continuing authority to reorganize the national
of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the government, including the power to group, consolidate
enactment of Executive Order No. 1. As held in Buklod bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer
ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Executive Secretary,[46] functions, to create and classify functions, services and
activities, transfer appropriations, and to standardize
But of course, the list of legal salaries and materials. This decree, in relation to Section
basis authorizing the President to 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 has been invoked in
reorganize any department or agency in
the executive branch does not have to several cases such as Larin v. Executive Secretary.[49]
end here. We must not lose sight of the
very source of the power that which
The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D.
constitutes an express grant of power.
Under Section 31, Book III of Executive No. 1416 as a justification for the President to create a
Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the public office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic
Administrative Code of 1987), "the
President, subject to the policy in the and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then
Executive Office and in order to achieve President Marcos of the authority to reorganize the
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall
have the continuing authority to administrative structure of the national government
reorganize the administrative structure including the power to create offices and transfer
of the Office of the President." For this
appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the
purpose, he may transfer the functions
of other Departments or Agencies to the decree, embodied in its last Whereas clause:
Office of the President. In Canonizado
v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we WHEREAS,
ruled that reorganization "involves the the transition towards the parliamentary
reduction of personnel, consolidation of
form of government will necessitate
offices, or abolition thereof by reason of
flexibility in the organization of the
economy or redundancy of functions." It
national government.
takes place when there is an alteration
of the existing structure of
government offices or units therein,
including the lines of control,
authority and responsibility between Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of
them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to providing manageability and resiliency during the
the Department of Finance. It falls under
the Office of the President. Hence, it is interim, P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No.
subject to the Presidents continuing 1772, became functus oficio upon the convening of the
authority to reorganize. [Emphasis
First Congress, as expressly provided in Section 6,
Supplied]
Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. In fact, even the
Solicitor General agrees with this view. Thus:
In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not
justified by the Presidents power of control. Control is
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: Because P.D. 1416 was enacted was the last
essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set whereas clause of P.D. 1416 says it was
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the enacted to prepare the transition from
presidential to parliamentary. Now, in a
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment parliamentary form of government, the
[47]
of the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the power legislative and executive powers are
fused, correct?
of control is entirely different from the power to create
SOLICITOR
public offices. The former is inherent GENERAL
in the Executive,CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.
while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: That is why, that P.D. 1416 was issued. Now
from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute would you agree with me that P.D. 1416
the laws. should not be considered effective
anymore upon the promulgation,
adoption, ratification of the 1987
The question is this, is there a valid delegation of Constitution.
power from Congress, empowering the President to
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Not the whole of P.D. [No.] 1416, Your Honor.
create a public office?
CARPIO: The power of the President to reorganize the
entire National Government is deemed
repealed, at least, upon the adoption of
the 1987 Constitution, correct.
CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.[50]
While the power to create a truth commission cannot
pass muster on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as amended by
P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification
under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution,
imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the
laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:
Section 17. The President shall
have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed. (Emphasis supplied).
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the
allocation of power in the three principal branches of
government is a grant of all powers inherent in them.
The Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid
him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this
case, fundamental laws on public accountability and
transparency is inherent in the Presidents powers as the
Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to
conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute
this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution
or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such
authority.[51] As explained in the landmark case
of Marcos v. Manglapus: [52]
x x x. The 1987 Constitution,
however, brought back the presidential
system of government and restored the
separation of legislative, executive and
judicial powers by their actual
distribution among three distinct
branches of government with provision
for checks and balances.
It would not be accurate,
however, to state that "executive power"
is the power to enforce the laws, for the
President is head of state as well as head
of government and whatever powers
inhere in such positions pertain to the
office unless the Constitution itself
withholds it. Furthermore, the
Constitution itself provides that the
execution of the laws is only one of the
powers of the President. It also grants
the President other powers that do not
involve the execution of any provision
of law, e.g., his power over the country's
foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the
view that although the 1987 Constitution
imposes limitations on the exercise
of specific powers of the President, it
maintains intact what is traditionally
considered as within the scope of
"executive power." Corollarily, the
powers of the President cannot be said
to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. In other
words, executive power is more than the
sum of specific powers so enumerated.
It has been advanced that
whatever power inherent in the
government that is neither legislative
nor judicial has to be executive. x x x.
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring
that our laws are faithfully executed. As stated above,
the powers of the President are not limited to those
specific powers under the Constitution.[53] One of the
recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to
this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to
create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious
need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been
faithfully executed. Thus, in Department of Health v.
Camposano,[54] the authority of the President to issue
Administrative Order No. 298, creating an investigative
committee to look into the administrative charges filed
against the employees of the Department of Health for
the anomalous purchase of medicines was upheld. In
said case, it was ruled:
The Chief Executives power to create
the Ad hoc Investigating Committee
cannot be doubted. Having been
constitutionally granted full control of
the Executive Department, to which
respondents belong, the President has
the obligation to ensure that all
executive officials and employees
faithfully comply with the law. With AO
298 as mandate, the legality of the
investigation is sustained. Such validity
is not affected by the fact that the
investigating team and the PCAGC had
the same composition, or that the former
used the offices and facilities of the
latter in conducting the inquiry.
[Emphasis supplied]
It should be stressed that the purpose of
allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow
an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to
know so that he can be properly advised and guided in
the performance of his duties relative to the execution
and enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is
to be revisited, this was also the objective of the
investigative bodies created in the past like the PCAC,
PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo
Commission and the Zenarosa Commission. There being
no changes in the government structure, the Court is not
inclined to declare such executive power as non-existent
just because the direction of the political winds have "Investigate," commonly
understood, means to examine, explore,
changed. inquire or delve or probe into, research
on, study. The dictionary definition of
On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 "investigate" is "to observe or study
closely: inquire into systematically: "to
transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate funds search or inquire into: x x to subject to
for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say that an official probe x x: to conduct an
official inquiry." The purpose of
there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or
investigation, of course, is to discover, to
allocations of existing funds already find out, to learn, obtain information.
appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the Nowhere included or intimated is the
notion of settling, deciding or resolving
part of the Executive of the power of Congress to a controversy involved in the facts
appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify the inquired into by application of the law to
the facts established by the inquiry.
amount to be earmarked for the operation of the
commission because, in the words of the Solicitor The legal meaning of
"investigate" is essentially the same:
General, whatever funds the Congress has provided for
"(t)o follow up step by step by patient
the Office of the President will be the very source of the inquiry or observation. To trace or track;
funds for the commission.[55] Moreover, since the amount to search into; to examine and inquire
into with care and accuracy; to find out
that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to by careful inquisition; examination; the
existing auditing rules and regulations, there is no taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to
inquire; to make an investigation,"
impropriety in the funding. "investigation" being in turn described
as "(a)n administrative function, the
Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate exercise of which ordinarily does not
require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec.
257; x x an inquiry, judicial or
The Presidents power to conduct investigations to ensure
otherwise, for the discovery and
that laws are faithfully executed is well collection of facts concerning a certain
recognized. It flows from the faithful-execution clause of matter or matters."
the Constitution under Article VII, Section 17 thereof. "Adjudicate," commonly or
[56]
As the Chief Executive, the president represents the popularly understood, means to adjudge,
arbitrate, judge, decide, determine,
government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary
enforced by the officials and employees of his defines the term as "to settle finally (the
department. He has the authority to directly assume the rights and duties of the parties to a court
case) on the merits of issues raised: x x
functions of the executive department.[57] to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x
x act as judge." And "adjudge" means
"to decide or rule upon as a judge or
Invoking this authority, the President constituted the with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x
PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft and x to award or grant judicially in a case of
controversy x x."
corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As
In the legal sense, "adjudicate"
previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have been means: "To settle in the exercise of
vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of judicial authority. To determine finally.
Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest
persons who come before it. It has been said that Quasi- sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass
judicial powers involve the power to hear and determine on judicially, to decide, settle or decree,
or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to a judicial determination of a fact, and the
apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid entry of a judgment." [Italics included.
Citations Omitted]
down by law itself in enforcing and administering the
same law.[58] In simpler terms, judicial discretion is
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be
involved in the exercise of these quasi-judicial power,
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
such that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and
even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of
must be clearly authorized by the legislature in the case
receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts
of administrative agencies.
of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be
considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and
The distinction between the power to investigate
arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be
and the power to adjudicate was delineated by the Court
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the
in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights.[59] Thus:
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may
be decided or resolved authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to appeals or modes of review as
may be provided by law.[60] Even respondents themselves
admit that the commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial
power.[61]
Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not
supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their
respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of
the commission will complement those of the two
offices. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the
recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the
overall task of the commission to conduct a fact-finding
investigation.[62] The actual prosecution of suspected
offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of the
charges against them,[63] is certainly not a function given
to the commission. The phrase, when in the course of its
investigation, under Section 2(g), highlights this fact and
gives credence to a contrary interpretation from that of
the petitioners. The function of determining probable
cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before
the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the
Ombudsman.[64]
At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investigate under
R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other
similarly authorized government agencies. Thus, in the
case of Ombudsman v. Galicia,[65] it was written:
This power of investigation granted to
the Ombudsman by the 1987
Constitution and The Ombudsman Act is
not exclusive but is shared with other
similarly authorized government
agencies such as the PCGG and judges
of municipal trial courts and municipal
circuit trial courts. The power to conduct
preliminary investigation on charges
against public employees and officials is
likewise concurrently shared with the
Department of Justice. Despite the
passage of the Local Government Code
in 1991, the Ombudsman retains
concurrent jurisdiction with the Office
of the President and the
local Sanggunians to investigate
complaints against local elective
officials. [Emphasis supplied].
Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannot contravene the
power of the Ombudsman to investigate criminal cases
under Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770, which states:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on
its own or on complaint by any person,
any act or omission of any public officer
or employee, office or agency, when
such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It
has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and,
in the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any
stage, from any investigatory agency
of government, the investigation of
such cases. [Emphases supplied]
The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as
enunciated above contemplates the conduct of a
preliminary investigation or the determination of the
existence of probable cause. This is categorically out of
the PTCs sphere of functions. Its power to investigate is
limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide
the President in the performance of his duties relative to
the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. In
this regard, the PTC commits no act of usurpation of the
Ombudsmans primordial duties.
The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its
authority under Section 3 (2), Chapter 1, Title III, Book
IV in the Revised Administrative Code is by no means
exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body likewise
tasked to investigate the commission of crimes.
Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be
inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be accorded
conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide
Commission, the Feliciano Commission and the
Zenarosa Commission, its findings would, at best, be
recommendatory in nature. And being so, the
Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree of
latitude to decide whether or not to reject the
recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not
deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be
aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments
for violations of graft laws.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
Although the purpose of the Truth Commission
falls within the investigative power of the President, the
Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality
of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent
transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in
Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution. Section 1 reads:
Section 1. No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1
because it is violative of this constitutional
safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to
all members of the same class such that the intent of
singling out the previous administration as its sole object
makes the PTC an adventure in partisan hostility.
[66]
Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the
commission must also cover reports of graft and
corruption in virtually all administrations previous to
that of former President Arroyo.[67]
The petitioners argue that the search for truth
behind the reported cases of graft and corruption must
encompass acts committed not only during the
administration of former President Arroyo but also
during prior administrations where the same magnitude
of controversies and anomalies[68] were reported to have
been committed against the Filipino people. They assail
the classification formulated by the respondents as it
does not fall under the recognized exceptions
because first, there is no substantial distinction between
the group of officials targeted for investigation by
Executive Order No. 1 and other groups or persons who
abused their public office for personal gain; and second,
the selective classification is not germane to the purpose
of Executive Order No. 1 to end corruption. [69] In order
to attain constitutional permission, the petitioners
advocate that the commission should deal with graft and
grafters prior and subsequent to the Arroyo
administration with the strong arm of the law with equal
force.[70]
Position of respondents
According to respondents, while Executive
Order No. 1 identifies the previous administration as the
initial subject of the investigation, following Section 17
thereof, the PTC will not confine itself to cases of large
scale graft and corruption solely during the said
administration.[71] Assuming arguendo that the
commission would confine its proceedings to officials of
the previous administration, the petitioners argue that no
offense is committed against the equal protection clause
for the segregation of the transactions of public officers
during the previous administration as possible subjects
of investigation is a valid classification based on
substantial distinctions and is germane to the evils which
the Executive Order seeks to correct. [72]To distinguish the
Arroyo administration from past administrations, it
recited the following:
First. E.O. No. 1 was issued in
view of widespread reports of large
scale graft and corruption in the
previous administration which have
eroded public confidence in public
institutions. There is, therefore, an
urgent call for the determination of the
truth regarding certain reports of large
scale graft and corruption in the
government and to put a closure to them
by the filing of the appropriate cases
against those involved, if warranted, and
to deter others from committing the evil,
restore the peoples faith and confidence
in the Government and in their public
servants.
Second. The segregation of the
preceding administration as the object of
fact-finding is warranted by the reality
that unlike with administrations long
gone, the current administration will
most likely bear the immediate
consequence of the policies of the
previous administration.
Third. The classification of the
previous administration as a separate
class for investigation lies in the reality
that the evidence of possible criminal
activity, the evidence that could lead to
recovery of public monies illegally
dissipated, the policy lessons to be
learned to ensure that anti-corruption
laws are faithfully executed, are more
easily established in the regime that
immediately precede the current
administration.
Fourth. Many administrations
subject the transactions of their
predecessors to investigations to provide
closure to issues that are pivotal to
national life or even as a routine
measure of due diligence and good
housekeeping by a nascent
administration like the Presidential
Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), created by the late President
Corazon C. Aquino under Executive
Order No. 1 to pursue the recovery of
ill-gotten wealth of her predecessor
former President Ferdinand Marcos and
his cronies, and
the Saguisag Commission created by
former President Joseph Estrada under
Administrative Order No, 53, to form an
ad-hoc and independent citizens
committee to investigate all the facts
and circumstances surrounding
Philippine Centennial projects of his
predecessor, former President Fidel V.
Ramos.[73] [Emphases supplied]
Concept of the Equal Protection Clause
One of the basic principles on which this government
was founded is that of the equality of right which
is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is
embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and
fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause,
however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against
any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged
on the basis of the due process clause. But if the
particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted
partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down
is the equal protection clause.[74]
According to a long line of decisions, equal
protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. [75] It
requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
[76]
situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose
of the equal protection clause is to secure every person
within a states jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the states duly constituted authorities.[77] In other
words, the concept of equal justice under the law
requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not
draw distinctions between individuals solely on
differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
[78]
governmental objective.
The equal protection clause is aimed at all
official state actions, not just those of the legislature.
[79]
Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the
government including the political and executive
departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying
equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or
whatever guise is taken. [80]
It, however, does not require the universal
application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification.
Indeed, the equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid
must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
[81]
Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification.[82]
For a classification to meet the requirements of
constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons
who naturally belong to the class.[83] The classification
will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class
are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the
classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the
sense that the members of the class should possess the
same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial
similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all
those covered by the classification are to be treated
equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a
class differs from the other members, as long as that
class is substantially distinguishable from all others,
does not justify the non-application of the law to him. [84]
The classification must not be based on existing
circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude
addition to the number included in the class. It must be
of such a nature as to embrace all those who may
thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It
must not leave out or underinclude those that should
otherwise fall into a certain classification. As elucidated
in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union [85] and
reiterated in a long line of cases,[86]
The guaranty of equal protection
of the laws is not a guaranty of equality
in the application of the laws upon all
citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against
inequality, that every man, woman and
child should be affected alike by a
statute. Equality of operation of statutes
does not mean indiscriminate operation
on persons merely as such, but on
persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality,
not identity of rights. The Constitution
does not require that things which are
different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal
protection clause does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are
different. It does not prohibit legislation
which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by the territory
within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause
of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is
the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars. A law is
not invalid because of simple inequality.
The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying
that the mere fact of inequality in no
manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a
valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for
real differences, that it must be germane
to the purpose of the law; that it must
not be limited to existing conditions
only; and that it must apply equally to
each member of the class. This Court
 has held that the standard is satisfied if situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal
the classification or distinction is based
on a reasonable foundation or rational protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
basis and is not palpably arbitrary. differentiation clearly reverberates to label the
[Citations omitted]
commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive retribution.
Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the
Though the OSG enumerates several differences
equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the
between the Arroyo administration and other past
envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find
administrations, these distinctions are not substantial
out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and
enough to merit the restriction of the investigation to the
corruption during the previous administration[87] only.
previous administration only. The reports of widespread
The intent to single out the previous administration is
corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be taken
plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made
as basis for distinguishing said administration from
in at least three portions of the questioned executive
earlier administrations which were also blemished by
order. Specifically, these are:
similar widespread reports of impropriety. They are not
WHEREAS, there is a need for a inherent in, and do not inure solely to, the Arroyo
separate body dedicated solely to
administration. As Justice Isagani Cruz put it, Superficial
investigating and finding out the truth
concerning the reported cases of graft differences do not make for a valid classification. [88]
and corruption during the previous
administration, and which will
recommend the prosecution of the The public needs to be enlightened why
offenders and secure justice for all;
Executive Order No. 1 chooses to limit the scope of the
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. intended investigation to the previous administration
There is hereby created
the PHILIPPINE TRUTH only. The OSG ventures to opine that to include other
COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to past administrations, at this point, may unnecessarily
as the COMMISSION, which shall
overburden the commission and lead it to lose its
primarily seek and find the truth on, and
toward this end, investigate reports of effectiveness.[89] The reason given is specious. It is
graft and corruption of such scale and without doubt irrelevant to the legitimate and noble
magnitude that shock and offend the
moral and ethical sensibilities of the objective of the PTC to stamp out or end corruption and
people, committed by public officers and the evil it breeds.[90]
employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories from the
private sector, if any, during The probability that there would be difficulty in
the previous administration; and
unearthing evidence or that the earlier reports involving
thereafter recommend the appropriate
action or measure to be taken thereon to the earlier administrations were already inquired into is
ensure that the full measure of justice beside the point. Obviously, deceased presidents and
shall be served without fear or favor.
cases which have already prescribed can no longer be
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The the subjects of inquiry by the PTC. Neither is the PTC
Commission, which shall have all the
powers of an investigative body under expected to conduct simultaneous investigations of
Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the previous administrations, given the bodys limited time
Administrative Code of 1987, is and resources. The law does not require the
primarily tasked to conduct a thorough
[91]
fact-finding investigation of reported impossible (Lex non cogit ad impossibilia).
cases of graft and corruption referred to
in Section 1, involving third level public
officers and higher, their co-principals, Given the foregoing physical and legal
accomplices and accessories from the impossibility, the Court logically recognizes the
private sector, if any, during
unfeasibility of investigating almost a centurys worth of
the previous administration and
thereafter submit its finding and graft cases. However, the fact remains that Executive
recommendations to the President, Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification. The
Congress and the Ombudsman.
[Emphases supplied] PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching for the truth,
must not exclude the other past administrations. The
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, past administrations. While reasonable prioritization is
that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck
its own. Not to include past administrations similarly
down for being unconstitutional. In the often quoted
language of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,[92]
Though the law itself be fair on
its face and impartial in appearance,
yet, if applied and administered by
public authority with an evil eye and an
unequal hand, so as practically to make
unjust and illegal discriminations
between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their
rights, the denial of equal justice is still
within the prohibition of the
constitution. [Emphasis supplied]
It could be argued that considering that the PTC
is an ad hoc body, its scope is limited. The Court,
however, is of the considered view that although its
focus is restricted, the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection under the laws should not in any way be
circumvented. The Constitution is the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must
conform and in accordance with which all private rights
determined and all public authority administered.
[93]
Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should
be stricken down for being unconstitutional.[94] While the
thrust of the PTC is specific, that is, for investigation of
acts of graft and corruption, Executive Order No. 1, to
survive, must be read together with the provisions of the
Constitution. To exclude the earlier administrations in
the guise of substantial distinctions would only confirm
the petitioners lament that the subject executive order is
only an adventure in partisan hostility. In the case of US
v. Cyprian,[95] it was written: A rather limited number of
such classifications have routinely been held or assumed
to be arbitrary; those include: race, national origin,
gender, political activity or membership in a political
party, union activity or membership in a labor union, or
more generally the exercise of first amendment rights.
To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet
the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or
embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class.
[96]
Such a classification must not be based on existing
circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude
additions to the number included within a class, but must
be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may
thereafter be in similar circumstances and
conditions. Furthermore, all who are in situations and
circumstances which are relative to the discriminatory
legislation and which are indistinguishable from those of
the members of the class must be brought under the
influence of the law and treated by it in the same way as
are the members of the class.[97]
The Court is not unaware that mere
underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a law
under the equal protection clause.[98] Legislation is not
unconstitutional merely because it is not all-embracing
and does not include all the evils within its reach. [99] It
has been written that a regulation challenged under the
equal protection clause is not devoid of a rational
predicate simply because it happens to be incomplete.
[100]
In several instances, the underinclusiveness was not
considered a valid reason to strike down a law or
regulation where the purpose can be attained in future
legislations or regulations. These cases refer to the step
by step process.[101] With regard to equal protection
claims, a legislature does not run the risk of losing the
entire remedial scheme simply because it fails, through
inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil that might
conceivably have been attacked.[102]
In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no
inadvertence. That the previous administration was
picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be
gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least
three times in the assailed executive order.It must be
noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention
any particular act, event or report to be focused on
unlike the investigative commissions created in the past.
The equal protection clause is violated by purposeful and
intentional discrimination.[103]
To disprove petitioners contention that there is
deliberate discrimination, the OSG clarifies that the
commission does not only confine itself to cases of large
scale graft and corruption committed during the previous
administration.[104] The OSG points to Section 17 of
Executive Order No. 1, which provides:
SECTION 17. Special Provision
Concerning Mandate. If and when in the
judgment of the President there is a need
to expand the mandate of the
Commission as defined in Section 1
hereof to include the investigation of
cases and instances of graft and
corruption during the prior
administrations, such mandate may be
so extended accordingly by way of a
supplemental Executive Order.
The Court is not convinced. Although Section
17 allows the President the discretion to expand the
scope of investigations of the PTC so as to include the
acts of graft and corruption committed in other past
administrations, it does not guarantee that they would be
covered in the future. Such expanded mandate of the
commission will still depend on the whim and caprice of
the President. If he would decide not to include them, the
section would then be meaningless. This will only fortify
the fears of the petitioners that the Executive Order No.
1 was crafted to tailor-fit the prosecution of officials and
personalities of the Arroyo administration. [105]
The Court tried to seek guidance from the
pronouncement in the case of Virata v. Sandiganbayan,
[106]
that the PCGG Charter (composed of Executive
Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14) does not violate the equal
protection clause. The decision, however, was devoid of
any discussion on how such conclusory statement was
arrived at, the principal issue in said case being only the
sufficiency of a cause of action.
A final word
The issue that seems to take center stage at
present is - whether or not the Supreme Court, in the
exercise of its constitutionally mandated power of
Judicial Review with respect to recent initiatives of the
legislature and the executive department, is exercising
undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which is
expected to be the protector of the Constitution, itself
guilty of violating fundamental tenets like the doctrine of
separation of powers? Time and again, this issue has
been addressed by the Court, but it seems that the
present political situation calls for it to once again
explain the legal basis of its action lest it continually be
accused of being a hindrance to the nations thrust to
progress.
The Philippine Supreme Court, according to
Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is
vested with Judicial Power that includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the government.
Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested
with the power of judicial review which is the power to
declare a treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation unconstitutional. This power
also includes the duty to rule on the constitutionality of
the application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and
other regulations. These provisions, however, have been
fertile grounds of conflict between the Supreme Court,
on one hand, and the two co-equal bodies of
government, on the other. Many times the Court has
been accused of asserting superiority over the other
departments.
To answer this accusation, the words of Justice
Laurel would be a good source of enlightenment, to wit:
And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but
only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to
it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them.[107]
Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of
judicial review, is not imposing its own will upon a co-
equal body but rather simply making sure that any act of
government is done in consonance with the authorities
and rights allocated to it by the Constitution. And, if
after said review, the Court finds no constitutional
violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of
proscribing the actions under review. Otherwise, the
Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as void
and unconstitutional.
It cannot be denied that most government
actions are inspired with noble intentions, all geared
towards the betterment of the nation and its people. But
then again, it is important to remember this ethical
principle: The end does not justify the means. No matter
how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose of an
act, but if the means to be employed in accomplishing it
is simply irreconcilable with constitutional parameters,
then it cannot still be allowed.[108] The Court cannot just
turn a blind eye and simply let it pass. It will continue to
uphold the Constitution and its enshrined principles.
The Constitution must ever
remain supreme. All must bow to the
mandate of this law. Expediency must
not be allowed to sap its strength nor
greed for power debase its rectitude.[109]
 Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death
knell for a truth commission as nobly envisioned by the
present administration. Perhaps a revision of the
executive issuance so as to include the earlier past
administrations would allow it to pass the test of
reasonableness and not be an affront to the
Constitution. Of all the branches of the government, it
is the judiciary which is the most interested in knowing
the truth and so it will not allow itself to be a hindrance
or obstacle to its attainment. It must, however, be
emphasized that the search for the truth must be within
constitutional bounds for ours is still a government of
laws and not of men.[110]

WHEREFORE, the petitions

are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is
violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby

ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the
provisions of Executive Order No. 1.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 176389 December 14, 2010
ANTONIO LEJANO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 176864
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO,
MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO
FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER
ESTRADA and GERARDO BIONG, Appellants.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
Brief Background
On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters
Carmela, nineteen years old, and Jennifer, seven, were
brutally slain at their home in Paraaque City. Following
an intense investigation, the police arrested a group of
suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But
the trial court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered
them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real
perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the public
whose interests were aroused by the gripping details of
what everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre.
Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of
Investigation or NBI announced that it had solved the
crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of
its informers, who claimed that she witnessed the crime.
She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio
"Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael
A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter
Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the
culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo
Biong, as an accessory after the fact. Relying primarily
on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995 the public
prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide
against Webb, et al.1
The Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 274,
presided over by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only
seven of the accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey
Filart remained at large.2 The prosecution presented
Alfaro as its main witness with the others corroborating
her testimony. These included the medico-legal officer
who autopsied the bodies of the victims, the security
guards of Pitong Daan Subdivision, the former
laundrywoman of the Webbs household, police officer
Biongs former girlfriend, and Lauro G. Vizconde,
Estrellitas husband.
For their part, some of the accused testified, denying any
part in the crime and saying they were elsewhere when it
took place. Webbs alibi appeared the strongest since he
claimed that he was then across the ocean in the United
States of America. He presented the testimonies of
witnesses as well as documentary and object evidence to
prove this. In addition, the defense presented witnesses
to show Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the
incredible nature of her testimony.
But impressed by Alfaros detailed narration of the crime
and the events surrounding it, the trial court found a
credible witness in her. It noted her categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous, and frank testimony,
undamaged by grueling cross-examinations. The trial
court remained unfazed by significant discrepancies
between Alfaros April 28 and May 22, 1995 affidavits,
accepting her explanation that she at first wanted to
protect her former boyfriend, accused Estrada, and a
relative, accused Gatchalian; that no lawyer assisted her;
that she did not trust the investigators who helped her
prepare her first affidavit; and that she felt unsure if she
would get the support and security she needed once she
disclosed all about the Vizconde killings.
In contrast, the trial court thought little of the denials and
alibis that Webb, Lejano, Rodriguez, and Gatchalian set
up for their defense. They paled, according to the court,
compared to Alfaros testimony that other witnesses and
the physical evidence corroborated. Thus, on January 4,
2000, after four years of arduous hearings, the trial court
rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty as
charged and imposing on Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian,
Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and on Biong, an indeterminate
prison term of eleven years, four months, and one day to
twelve years. The trial court also awarded damages to
Lauro Vizconde.3
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts
decision, modifying the penalty imposed on Biong to six
years minimum and twelve years maximum and
increasing the award of damages to Lauro
Vizconde.4 The appellate court did not agree that the
accused were tried by publicity or that the trial judge
was biased. It found sufficient evidence of conspiracy
that rendered Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Fernandez, and
Estrada equally guilty with those who had a part in
raping and killing Carmela and in executing her mother
and sister.
On motion for reconsideration by the accused, the Court
of Appeals' Special Division of five members voted three
against two to deny the motion, 5 hence, the present
appeal.
On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in
this case, the Court issued a Resolution granting the
request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen
specimen taken from Carmelas cadaver, which
specimen was then believed still under the safekeeping
of the NBI. The Court granted the request pursuant to
section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence6 to give the
accused and the prosecution access to scientific evidence
that they might want to avail themselves of, leading to a
correct decision in the case.
Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the
Court that it no longer has custody of the specimen, the
same having been turned over to the trial court. The trial
record shows, however, that the specimen was not
among the object evidence that the prosecution offered
in evidence in the case.
This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent
motion to acquit on the ground that the governments
failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the
denial of his right to due process.
Issues Presented
Accused Webbs motion to acquit presents a threshold
issue: whether or not the Court should acquit him
outright, given the governments failure to produce the
semen specimen that the NBI found on Carmelas
cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence that would
prove his innocence.
In the main, all the accused raise the central issue of
whether or not Webb, acting in conspiracy with Lejano,
Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, Ventura, and
Filart, raped and killed Carmela and put to death her
mother and sister. But, ultimately, the controlling issues
are:
1. Whether or not Alfaros testimony as
eyewitness, describing the crime and identifying
Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada,
Rodriguez, and two others as the persons who
committed it, is entitled to belief; and
2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient
evidence to prove his alibi and rebut Alfaros
testimony that he led the others in committing
the crime.
The issue respecting accused Biong is whether or not he
acted to cover up the crime after its commission.
The Right to Acquittal
Due to Loss of DNA Evidence
Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland, 7 that he is
entitled to outright acquittal on the ground of violation
of his right to due process given the States failure to
produce on order of the Court either by negligence or
willful suppression the semen specimen taken from
Carmela.
The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela
was raped and, consistent with this, semen specimen was
found in her. It is true that Alfaro identified Webb in her
testimony as Carmelas rapist and killer but serious
questions had been raised about her credibility. At the
very least, there exists a possibility that Alfaro had lied.
On the other hand, the semen specimen taken from
Carmela cannot possibly lie. It cannot be coached or
allured by a promise of reward or financial support. No
two persons have the same DNA fingerprint, with the
exception of identical twins. 8 If, on examination, the
DNA of the subject specimen does not belong to Webb,
then he did not rape Carmela. It is that simple. Thus, the
Court would have been able to determine that Alfaro
committed perjury in saying that he did.
Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of
the State to produce the semen specimen at this late
stage. For one thing, the ruling in Brady v.
Maryland9 that he cites has long be overtaken by the
decision in Arizona v. Youngblood, 10 where the U.S.
Supreme Court held that due process does not require
the State to preserve the semen specimen although it
might be useful to the accused unless the latter is able to
show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the
police. Here, the State presented a medical expert who
testified on the existence of the specimen and Webb in
fact sought to have the same subjected to DNA test.
For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule
governing DNA evidence did not yet exist, the country
did not yet have the technology for conducting the test,
and no Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its
admissibility as evidence. Consequently, the idea of
keeping the specimen secure even after the trial court
rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come up.
Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the
matter of preserving the specimen in the meantime.
Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webbs
application for DNA testing, he allowed the proceeding
to move on when he had on at least two occasions gone
up to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to
challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken against him and
the other accused.11 They raised the DNA issue before
the Court of Appeals but merely as an error committed
by the trial court in rendering its decision in the case.
None of the accused filed a motion with the appeals
court to have the DNA test done pending adjudication of
their appeal. This, even when the Supreme Court had in
the meantime passed the rules allowing such test.
Considering the accuseds lack of interest in having such
test done, the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable
notice that it would be required to produce the semen
specimen at some future time.
Now, to the merit of the case.
Alfaros Story
Based on the prosecutions version, culled from the
decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, on
June 29, 1991 at around 8:30 in the evening, Jessica
Alfaro drove her Mitsubishi Lancer, with boyfriend Peter
Estrada as passenger, to the Ayala Alabang Commercial
Center parking lot to buy shabu from Artemio "Dong"
Ventura. There, Ventura introduced her to his friends:
Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano,
Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez,
Michael Gatchalian, and Joey Filart. Alfaro recalled
frequently seeing them at a shabu house in Paraaque in
January 1991, except Ventura whom she had known
earlier in December 1990.
As Alfaro smoked her shabu, Webb approached and
requested her to relay a message for him to a girl, whom
she later identified as Carmela Vizconde. Alfaro agreed.
After using up their shabu, the group drove to Carmelas
house at 80 Vinzons Street, Pitong Daan Subdivision, BF
Homes, Paraaque City. Riding in her car, Alfaro and
Estrada trailed Filart and Rodriguez who rode a Mazda
pick-up and Webb, Lejano, Ventura, Fernandez, and
Gatchalian who were on a Nissan Patrol car.
On reaching their destination, Alfaro parked her car on
Vinzons Street, alighted, and approached Carmelas
house. Alfaro pressed the buzzer and a woman came out.
Alfaro queried her about Carmela. Alfaro had met
Carmela twice before in January 1991. When Carmela
came out, Alfaro gave her Webbs message that he was
just around. Carmela replied, however, that she could not
go out yet since she had just arrived home. She told
Alfaro to return after twenty minutes. Alfaro relayed this
to Webb who then told the group to drive back to the
Ayala Alabang Commercial Center.
The group had another shabu session at the parking lot.
After sometime, they drove back but only Alfaro
proceeded to Vinzons Street where Carmela lived. The
Nissan Patrol and the Mazda pick-up, with their
passengers, parked somewhere along Aguirre Avenue.
Carmela was at their garden. She approached Alfaro on
seeing her and told the latter that she (Carmela) had to
leave the house for a while. Carmela requested Alfaro to
return before midnight and she would leave the
pedestrian gate, the iron grills that led to the kitchen, and
the kitchen door unlocked. Carmela also told Alfaro to
blink her cars headlights twice when she approached the
pedestrian gate so Carmela would know that she had
arrived.
Alfaro returned to her car but waited for Carmela to
drive out of the house in her own car. Alfaro trailed
Carmela up to Aguirre Avenue where she dropped off a
man whom Alfaro believed was Carmelas boyfriend.
Alfaro looked for her group, found them, and relayed
Carmelas instructions to Webb. They then all went back
to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center. At the parking
lot, Alfaro told the group about her talk with Carmela.
When she told Webb of Carmelas male companion,
Webbs mood changed for the rest of the evening ("bad
trip").
Webb gave out free cocaine. They all used it and some
shabu, too. After about 40 to 45 minutes, Webb decided
that it was time for them to leave. He said, "Pipilahan
natin siya [Carmela] at ako ang mauuna." Lejano said,
"Ako ang susunod" and the others responded "Okay,
okay." They all left the parking lot in a convoy of three
vehicles and drove into Pitong Daan Subdivision for the
third time. They arrived at Carmelas house shortly
before midnight.
Alfaro parked her car between Vizcondes house and the
next. While waiting for the others to alight from their
cars, Fernandez approached Alfaro with a suggestion
that they blow up the transformer near the Vizcondes
residence to cause a brownout ("Pasabugin kaya natin
ang transformer na ito"). But Alfaro shrugged off the
idea, telling Fernandez, "Malakas lang ang tama mo."
When Webb, Lejano, and Ventura were already before
the house, Webb told the others again that they would
line up for Carmela but he would be the first. The others
replied, "O sige, dito lang kami, magbabantay lang
kami."
Alfaro was the first to pass through the pedestrian gate
that had been left open. Webb, Lejano, and Ventura
followed her. On entering the garage, Ventura using a
chair mounted the hood of the Vizcondes Nissan Sentra
and loosened the electric bulb over it ("para daw walang
ilaw"). The small group went through the open iron grill
gate and passed the dirty kitchen. Carmela opened the
aluminum screen door of the kitchen for them. She and
Webb looked each other in the eyes for a moment and,
together, headed for the dining area.
As she lost sight of Carmela and Webb, Alfaro decided
to go out. Lejano asked her where she was going and she
replied that she was going out to smoke. As she eased
her way out through the kitchen door, she saw Ventura
pulling out a kitchen drawer. Alfaro smoked a cigarette
at the garden. After about twenty minutes, she was
surprised to hear a womans voice ask, "Sino yan?"
Alfaro immediately walked out of the garden to her car.
She found her other companions milling around it.
Estrada who sat in the car asked her, "Okay ba?"
After sitting in the car for about ten minutes, Alfaro
returned to the Vizconde house, using the same route.
The interior of the house was dark but some light filtered
in from outside. In the kitchen, Alfaro saw Ventura
searching a ladys bag that lay on the dining table. When
she asked him what he was looking for, he said: "Ikaw
na nga dito, maghanap ka ng susi." She asked him what
key he wanted and he replied: "Basta maghanap ka ng
susi ng main door pati na rin ng susi ng kotse." When
she found a bunch of keys in the bag, she tried them on
the main door but none fitted the lock. She also did not
find the car key.
Unable to open the main door, Alfaro returned to the
kitchen. While she was at a spot leading to the dining
area, she heard a static noise (like a television that
remained on after the station had signed off). Out of
curiosity, she approached the masters bedroom from
where the noise came, opened the door a little, and
peeked inside. The unusual sound grew even louder. As
she walked in, she saw Webb on top of Carmela while
she lay with her back on the floor. Two bloodied bodies
lay on the bed. Lejano was at the foot of the bed about to
wear his jacket. Carmela was gagged, moaning, and in
tears while Webb raped her, his bare buttocks exposed.
Webb gave Alfaro a meaningful look and she
immediately left the room. She met Ventura at the dining
area. He told her, "Prepare an escape. Aalis na tayo."
Shocked with what she saw, Alfaro rushed out of the
house to the others who were either sitting in her car or
milling on the sidewalk. She entered her car and turned
on the engine but she did not know where to go. Webb,
Lejano, and Ventura came out of the house just then.
Webb suddenly picked up a stone and threw it at the
main door, breaking its glass frame.
As the three men approached the pedestrian gate, Webb
told Ventura that he forgot his jacket in the house. But
Ventura told him that they could not get in anymore as
the iron grills had already locked. They all rode in their
cars and drove away until they reached Aguirre Avenue.
As they got near an old hotel at the Tropical Palace area,
Alfaro noticed the Nissan Patrol slow down. Someone
threw something out of the car into the cogonal area.
The convoy of cars went to a large house with high
walls, concrete fence, steel gate, and a long driveway at
BF Executive Village. They entered the compound and
gathered at the lawn where the "blaming session" took
place. It was here that Alfaro and those who remained
outside the Vizconde house learned of what happened.
The first to be killed was Carmelas mother, then
Jennifer, and finally, Carmella. Ventura blamed Webb,
telling him, "Bakit naman pati yung bata?" Webb replied
that the girl woke up and on seeing him molesting
Carmela, she jumped on him, bit his shoulders, and
pulled his hair. Webb got mad, grabbed the girl, pushed
her to the wall, and repeatedly stabbed her. Lejano
excused himself at this point to use the telephone in the
house. Meanwhile, Webb called up someone on his
cellular phone.
At around 2:00 in the morning, accused Gerardo Biong
arrived. Webb ordered him to go and clean up the
Vizconde house and said to him, "Pera lang ang katapat
nyan." Biong answered, "Okay lang." Webb spoke to his
companions and told them, "We dont know each other.
We havent seen each otherbaka maulit yan." Alfaro
and Estrada left and they drove to her fathers house. 12
1. The quality of the witness
Was Alfaro an ordinary subdivision girl who showed up
at the NBI after four years, bothered by her conscience
or egged on by relatives or friends to come forward and
do what was right? No. She was, at the time she revealed
her story, working for the NBI as an "asset," a stool
pigeon, one who earned her living by fraternizing with
criminals so she could squeal on them to her NBI
handlers. She had to live a life of lies to get rewards that
would pay for her subsistence and vices.
According to Atty. Artemio Sacaguing, former head of
the NBI Anti-Kidnapping, Hijacking, and Armed
Robbery Task Force (AKHAR) Section, Alfaro had been
hanging around at the NBI since November or December
1994 as an "asset." She supplied her handlers with
information against drug pushers and other criminal
elements. Some of this information led to the capture of
notorious drug pushers like Christopher Cruz Santos and
Orlando Bacquir. Alfaros tip led to the arrest of the
leader of the "Martilyo gang" that killed a police officer.
Because of her talent, the task force gave her "very
special treatment" and she became its "darling," allowed
the privilege of spending nights in one of the rooms at
the NBI offices.
When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime,
however, they teased her about it and she was piqued.
One day, she unexpectedly told Sacaguing that she knew
someone who had the real story behind the Vizconde
massacre. Sacaguing showed interest. Alfaro promised to
bring that someone to the NBI to tell his story. When this
did not happen and Sacaguing continued to press her, she
told him that she might as well assume the role of her
informant. Sacaguing testified thus:
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. Atty. Sacaguing, how did Jessica Alfaro
become a witness in the Vizconde murder case?
Will you tell the Honorable Court?
xxxx
A. She told me. Your Honor, that she knew
somebody who related to her the circumstances,
I mean, the details of the massacre of the
Vizconde family. Thats what she told me, Your
Honor.
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. And what did you say?
xxxx
A. I was quite interested and I tried to persuade
her to introduce to me that man and she
promised that in due time, she will bring to me
the man, and together with her, we will try to
convince him to act as a state witness and help
us in the solution of the case.
xxxx
Q. Atty. Sacaguing, were you able to interview
this alleged witness?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. No, sir.
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. Why not?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. Because Jessica Alfaro was never able to
comply with her promise to bring the man to me.
She told me later that she could not and the man
does not like to testify.
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. All right, and what happened after that?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. She told me, "easy lang kayo, Sir," if I may
quote, "easy lang Sir, huwag kayong"
COURT:
How was that?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. "Easy lang, Sir. Sir, relax lang, Sir, papapelan
ko, papapelan ko na lang yan."
xxxx
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. All right, and what was your reaction when
Ms. Alfaro stated that "papapelan ko na lang
yan?"
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. I said, "hindi puwede yan, kasi hindi ka
naman eye witness."
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. And what was the reply of Ms. Alfaro?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. Hindi siya nakakibo, until she went away.
(TSN, May 28, 1996, pp. 49-50, 58, 77-79)
Quite significantly, Alfaro never refuted Sacaguings
above testimony.
2. The suspicious details
But was it possible for Alfaro to lie with such abundant
details some of which even tallied with the physical
evidence at the scene of the crime? No doubt, yes.
Firstly, the Vizconde massacre had been reported in the
media with dizzying details. Everybody was talking
about what the police found at the crime scene and there
were lots of speculations about them.
Secondly, the police had arrested some "akyat-bahay"
group in Paraaque and charged them with the crime.
The police prepared the confessions of the men they
apprehended and filled these up with details that the
evidence of the crime scene provided. Alfaros NBI
handlers who were doing their own investigation knew
of these details as well. Since Alfaro hanged out at the
NBI offices and practically lived there, it was not too
difficult for her to hear of these evidentiary details and
gain access to the documents.
Not surprisingly, the confessions of some members of
the Barroso "akyat bahay" gang, condemned by the
Makati RTC as fabricated by the police to pin the crime
on them, shows how crime investigators could make a
confession ring true by matching some of its details with
the physical evidence at the crime scene. Consider the
following:
a. The Barroso gang members said that they got into
Carmelas house by breaking the glass panel of the front
door using a stone wrapped in cloth to deaden the noise.
Alfaro could not use this line since the core of her story
was that Webb was Carmelas boyfriend. Webb had no
reason to smash her front door to get to see her.
Consequently, to explain the smashed door, Alfaro had to
settle for claiming that, on the way out of the house,
Webb picked up some stone and, out of the blue, hurled
it at the glass-paneled front door of the Vizconde
residence. His action really made no sense. From
Alfaros narration, Webb appeared rational in his
decisions. It was past midnight, the house was dark, and
they wanted to get away quickly to avoid detection.
Hurling a stone at that glass door and causing a
tremendous noise was bizarre, like inviting the neighbors
to come.
b. The crime scene showed that the house had been
ransacked. The rejected confessions of the Barroso
"akyat-bahay" gang members said that they tried to rob
the house. To explain this physical evidence, Alfaro
claimed that at one point Ventura was pulling a kitchen
drawer, and at another point, going through a handbag
on the dining table. He said he was looking for the front-
door key and the car key.
Again, this portion of Alfaros story appears tortured to
accommodate the physical evidence of the ransacked
house. She never mentioned Ventura having taken some
valuables with him when they left Carmelas house. And
why would Ventura rummage a bag on the table for the
front-door key, spilling the contents, when they had
already gotten into the house. It is a story made to fit in
with the crime scene although robbery was supposedly
not the reason Webb and his companions entered that
house.
c. It is the same thing with the garage light. The police
investigators found that the bulb had been loosened to
turn off the light. The confessions of the Barroso gang
claimed that one of them climbed the parked cars hood
to reach up and darken that light. This made sense since
they were going to rob the place and they needed time to
work in the dark trying to open the front door. Some
passersby might look in and see what they were doing.
Alfaro had to adjust her testimony to take into account
that darkened garage light. So she claimed that Ventura
climbed the cars hood, using a chair, to turn the light
off. But, unlike the Barroso "akyat-bahay" gang, Webb
and his friends did not have anything to do in a darkened
garage. They supposedly knew in advance that Carmela
left the doors to the kitchen open for them. It did not
make sense for Ventura to risk standing on the cars hood
and be seen in such an awkward position instead of
going straight into the house.
And, thirdly, Alfaro was the NBIs star witness, their
badge of excellent investigative work.lavvphil After
claiming that they had solved the crime of the decade,
the NBI people had a stake in making her sound credible
and, obviously, they gave her all the preparations she
needed for the job of becoming a fairly good substitute
witness. She was their "darling" of an asset. And this is
not pure speculation. As pointed out above, Sacaguing of
the NBI, a lawyer and a ranking official, confirmed this
to be a cold fact. Why the trial court and the Court of
Appeals failed to see this is mystifying.
At any rate, did Alfaro at least have a fine memory for
faces that had a strong effect on her, given the
circumstances? Not likely. She named Miguel "Ging"
Rodriguez as one of the culprits in the Vizconde killings.
But when the NBI found a certain Michael Rodriguez, a
drug dependent from the Bicutan Rehabilitation Center,
initially suspected to be Alfaros Miguel Rodriguez and
showed him to Alfaro at the NBI office, she ran berserk,
slapping and kicking Michael, exclaiming: "How can I
forget your face. We just saw each other in a disco one
month ago and you told me then that you will kill me."
As it turned out, he was not Miguel Rodriguez, the
accused in this case.13
Two possibilities exist: Michael was really the one
Alfaro wanted to implicate to settle some score with him
but it was too late to change the name she already gave
or she had myopic vision, tagging the wrong people for
what they did not do.
3. The quality of the testimony
There is another thing about a lying witness: her story
lacks sense or suffers from inherent inconsistencies. An
understanding of the nature of things and the common
behavior of people will help expose a lie. And it has an
abundant presence in this case.
One. In her desire to implicate Gatchalian, Fernandez,
Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart, who were supposed to be
Webbs co-principals in the crime, Alfaro made it a point
to testify that Webb proposed twice to his friends the
gang-rape of Carmela who had hurt him. And twice, they
(including, if one believes Alfaro, her own boyfriend
Estrada) agreed in a chorus to his proposal. But when
they got to Carmelas house, only Webb, Lejano,
Ventura, and Alfaro entered the house.
Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez
supposedly stayed around Alfaros car, which was
parked on the street between Carmelas house and the
next. Some of these men sat on top of the cars lid while
others milled on the sidewalk, visible under the street
light to anyone who cared to watch them, particularly to
the people who were having a drinking party in a nearby
house. Obviously, the behavior of Webbs companions
out on the street did not figure in a planned gang-rape of
Carmela.
Two. Ventura, Alfaros dope supplier, introduced her for
the first time in her life to Webb and his friends in a
parking lot by a mall. So why would she agree to act as
Webbs messenger, using her gas, to bring his message to
Carmela at her home. More inexplicably, what motivated
Alfaro to stick it out the whole night with Webb and his
friends?
They were practically strangers to her and her boyfriend
Estrada. When it came to a point that Webb decided with
his friends to gang-rape Carmela, clearly, there was
nothing in it for Alfaro. Yet, she stuck it out with them,
as a police asset would, hanging in there until she had a
crime to report, only she was not yet an "asset" then. If,
on the other hand, Alfaro had been too soaked in drugs
to think clearly and just followed along where the group
took her, how could she remember so much details that
only a drug-free mind can?
Three. When Alfaro went to see Carmela at her house for
the second time, Carmella told her that she still had to go
out and that Webb and his friends should come back
around midnight. Alfaro returned to her car and waited
for Carmela to drive out in her own car. And she trailed
her up to Aguirre Avenue where she supposedly dropped
off a man whom she thought was Carmelas boyfriend.
Alfaros trailing Carmela to spy on her unfaithfulness to
Webb did not make sense since she was on limited
errand. But, as a critical witness, Alfaro had to provide a
reason for Webb to freak out and decide to come with his
friends and harm Carmela.
Four. According to Alfaro, when they returned to
Carmelas house the third time around midnight, she led
Webb, Lejano, and Ventura through the pedestrian gate
that Carmela had left open. Now, this is weird. Webb
was the gang leader who decided what they were going
to do. He decided and his friends agreed with him to go
to Carmelas house and gang-rape her. Why would
Alfaro, a woman, a stranger to Webb before that night,
and obviously with no role to play in the gang-rape of
Carmela, lead him and the others into her house? It made
no sense. It would only make sense if Alfaro wanted to
feign being a witness to something she did not see.
Five. Alfaro went out of the house to smoke at the
garden. After about twenty minutes, a woman exclaimed,
"Sino yan?" On hearing this, Alfaro immediately walked
out of the garden and went to her car. Apparently, she did
this because she knew they came on a sly. Someone
other than Carmela became conscious of the presence of
Webb and others in the house. Alfaro walked away
because, obviously, she did not want to get involved in a
potential confrontation. This was supposedly her frame
of mind: fear of getting involved in what was not her
business.
But if that were the case, how could she testify based on
personal knowledge of what went on in the house?
Alfaro had to change that frame of mind to one of
boldness and reckless curiosity. So that is what she next
claimed. She went back into the house to watch as Webb
raped Carmela on the floor of the masters bedroom. He
had apparently stabbed to death Carmelas mom and her
young sister whose bloodied bodies were sprawled on
the bed. Now, Alfaro testified that she got scared
(another shift to fear) for she hurriedly got out of the
house after Webb supposedly gave her a meaningful
look.
Alfaro quickly went to her car, not minding Gatchalian,
Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart who sat on the
car or milled on the sidewalk. She did not speak to them,
even to Estrada, her boyfriend. She entered her car and
turned on the engine but she testified that she did not
know where to go. This woman who a few minutes back
led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the house, knowing
that they were decided to rape and harm Carmela, was
suddenly too shocked to know where to go! This
emotional pendulum swing indicates a witness who was
confused with her own lies.
4. The supposed corroborations
Intending to provide corroboration to Alfaros testimony,
the prosecution presented six additional witnesses:
Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan, the NBI Medico-Legal
Officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, testified
on the stab wounds they sustained14 and the presence of
semen in Carmelas genitalia,15 indicating that she had
been raped.
Normal E. White, Jr., was the security guard on duty at
Pitong Daan Subdivision from 7 p.m. of June 29 to 7
a.m. of June 30, 1991. He got a report on the morning of
June 30 that something untoward happened at the
Vizconde residence. He went there and saw the dead
bodies in the masters bedroom, the bag on the dining
table, as well as the loud noise emanating from a
television set.16
White claimed that he noticed Gatchalian and his
companions, none of whom he could identify, go in and
out of Pitong Daan Subdivision. He also saw them along
Vinzons Street. Later, they entered Pitong Daan
Subdivision in a three-car convoy. White could not,
however, describe the kind of vehicles they used or
recall the time when he saw the group in those two
instances. And he did not notice anything suspicious
about their coming and going.
But Whites testimony cannot be relied on. His initial
claim turned out to be inaccurate. He actually saw
Gatchalian and his group enter the Pitong Daan
Subdivision only once. They were not going in and out.
Furthermore, Alfaro testified that when the convoy of
cars went back the second time in the direction of
Carmelas house, she alone entered the subdivision and
passed the guardhouse without stopping. Yet, White who
supposedly manned that guardhouse did not notice her.
Surprisingly, White failed to note Biong, a police officer,
entering or exiting the subdivision on the early morning
of June 30 when he supposedly "cleaned up" Vizconde
residence on Webbs orders. What is more, White did not
notice Carmela arrive with her mom before Alfaros first
visit that night. Carmela supposedly left with a male
companion in her car at around 10:30 p.m. but White did
not notice it. He also did not notice Carmela reenter the
subdivision. White actually discredited Alfaros
testimony about the movements of the persons involved.
Further, while Alfaro testified that it was the Mazda
pick-up driven by Filart that led the three-vehicle
convoy,17 White claimed it was the Nissan Patrol with
Gatchalian on it that led the convoy since he would not
have let the convoy in without ascertaining that
Gatchalian, a resident, was in it. Security guard White
did not, therefore, provide corroboration to Alfaros
testimony.1avvphi1
Justo Cabanacan, the security supervisor at Pitong
Daan Subdivision testified that he saw Webb around the
last week of May or the first week of June 1991 to prove
his presence in the Philippines when he claimed to be in
the United States. He was manning the guard house at
the entrance of the subdivision of Pitong Daan when he
flagged down a car driven by Webb. Webb said that he
would see Lilet Sy. Cabanacan asked him for an ID but
he pointed to his United BF Homes sticker and said that
he resided there. Cabanacan replied, however, that
Pitong Daan had a local sticker.
Cabanacan testified that, at this point, Webb introduced
himself as the son of Congressman Webb. Still, the
supervisor insisted on seeing his ID. Webb grudgingly
gave it and after seeing the picture and the name on it,
Cabanacan returned the same and allowed Webb to pass
without being logged in as their Standard Operating
Procedure required.18
But Cabanacan's testimony could not be relied on.
Although it was not common for a security guard to
challenge a Congressmans son with such vehemence,
Cabanacan did not log the incident on the guardhouse
book. Nor did he, contrary to prescribed procedure,
record the visitors entry into the subdivision. It did not
make sense that Cabanacan was strict in the matter of
seeing Webbs ID but not in recording the visit.
Mila Gaviola used to work as laundry woman for the
Webbs at their house at BF Homes Executive Village.
She testified that she saw Webb at his parents house on
the morning of June 30, 1991 when she got the dirty
clothes from the room that he and two brothers occupied
at about 4.a.m. She saw him again pacing the floor at 9
a.m. At about 1 p.m., Webb left the house in t-shirt and
shorts, passing through a secret door near the maids
quarters on the way out. Finally, she saw Webb at 4 p.m.
of the same day.19
On cross-examination, however, Gaviola could not say
what distinguished June 30, 1991 from the other days
she was on service at the Webb household as to enable
her to distinctly remember, four years later, what one of
the Webb boys did and at what time. She could not
remember any of the details that happened in the
household on the other days. She proved to have a
selective photographic memory and this only damaged
her testimony.
Gaviola tried to corroborate Alfaro's testimony by
claiming that on June 30, 1991 she noticed bloodstains
on Webb's t-shirt.20 She did not call the attention of
anybody in the household about it when it would have
been a point of concern that Webb may have been hurt,
hence the blood.
Besides, Victoria Ventoso, the Webbs' housemaid from
March 1989 to May 1992, and Sgt. Miguel Muoz, the
Webbs' security aide in 1991, testified that Gaviola
worked for the Webbs only from January 1991 to April
1991. Ventoso further testified that it was not Gaviola's
duty to collect the clothes from the 2nd floor bedrooms,
this being the work of the housemaid charged with
cleaning the rooms.
What is more, it was most unlikely for a laundrywoman
who had been there for only four months to collect, as
she claimed, the laundry from the rooms of her
employers and their grown up children at four in the
morning while they were asleep.
And it did not make sense, if Alfaros testimony were to
be believed that Webb, who was so careful and clever
that he called Biong to go to the Vizconde residence at 2
a.m. to clean up the evidence against him and his group,
would bring his bloodied shirt home and put it in the
hamper for laundrywoman Gaviola to collect and wash
at 4 a.m. as was her supposed habit.
Lolita De Birrer was accused Biongs girlfriend around
the time the Vizconde massacre took place. Birrer
testified that she was with Biong playing mahjong from
the evening of June 29, 1991 to the early morning of
June 30, when Biong got a call at around 2 a.m. This
prompted him, according to De Birrer, to leave and go to
BF. Someone sitting at the backseat of a taxi picked him
up. When Biong returned at 7 a.m. he washed off what
looked like dried blood from his fingernails. And he
threw away a foul-smelling handkerchief. She also saw
Biong take out a knife with aluminum cover from his
drawer and hid it in his steel cabinet.21
The security guard at Pitong Daan did not notice any
police investigator flashing a badge to get into the
village although Biong supposedly came in at the unholy
hour of two in the morning. His departure before 7 a.m.
also remained unnoticed by the subdivision guards.
Besides, if he had cleaned up the crime scene shortly
after midnight, what was the point of his returning there
on the following morning to dispose of some of the
evidence in the presence of other police investigators
and on-lookers? In fact, why would he steal valuable
items from the Vizconde residence on his return there
hours later if he had the opportunity to do it earlier?
At most, Birrers testimony only established Biongs
theft of certain items from the Vizconde residence and
gross neglect for failing to maintain the sanctity of the
crime scene by moving around and altering the effects of
the crime. Birrers testimony failed to connect Biong's
acts to Webb and the other accused.
Lauro Vizconde testified about how deeply he was
affected by the loss of her wife and two daughters.
Carmella spoke to him of a rejected suitor she called
"Bagyo," because he was a Paraaque politicians son.
Unfortunately, Lauro did not appear curious enough to
insist on finding out who the rejected fellow was.
Besides, his testimony contradicts that of Alfaro who
testified that Carmela and Webb had an on-going
relation. Indeed, if Alfaro were to be believed, Carmela
wanted Webb to come to her house around midnight. She
even left the kitchen door open so he could enter the
house.
5. The missing corroboration
There is something truly remarkable about this case: the
prosecutions core theory that Carmela and Webb had
been sweethearts, that she had been unfaithful to him,
and that it was for this reason that Webb brought his
friends to her house to gang-rape her is totally
uncorroborated!
For instance, normally, if Webb, a Congressmans son,
courted the young Carmela, that would be news among
her circle of friends if not around town. But, here, none
of her friends or even those who knew either of them
came forward to affirm this. And if Webb hanged around
with her, trying to win her favors, he would surely be
seen with her. And this would all the more be so if they
had become sweethearts, a relation that Alfaro tried to
project with her testimony.
But, except for Alfaro, the NBI asset, no one among
Carmelas friends or her friends friends would testify
ever hearing of such relationship or ever seeing them
together in some popular hangouts in Paraaque or
Makati. Alfaros claim of a five-hour drama is like an
alien page, rudely and unconnectedly inserted into Webb
and Carmelas life stories or like a piece of jigsaw puzzle
trimmed to fit into the shape on the board but does not
belong because it clashes with the surrounding pieces. It
has neither antecedent nor concomitant support in the
verifiable facts of their personal histories. It is quite
unreal.
What is more, Alfaro testified that she saw Carmela
drive out of her house with a male passenger, Mr. X,
whom Alfaro thought the way it looked was also
Carmelas lover. This was the all-important reason Webb
supposedly had for wanting to harm her. Again, none of
Carmelas relatives, friends, or people who knew her
ever testified about the existence of Mr.X in her life.
Nobody has come forward to testify having ever seen
him with Carmela. And despite the gruesome news about
her death and how Mr. X had played a role in it, he never
presented himself like anyone who had lost a special
friend normally would. Obviously, Mr. X did not exist, a
mere ghost of the imagination of Alfaro, the woman who
made a living informing on criminals.
Webbs U.S. Alibi
Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi.
a. The travel preparations
Webb claims that in 1991 his parents, Senator Freddie
Webb and his wife, Elizabeth, sent their son to the
United States (U.S.) to learn the value of independence,
hard work, and money.22 Gloria Webb, his aunt,
accompanied him. Rajah Tours booked their flight to San
Francisco via United Airlines. Josefina Nolasco of Rajah
Tours confirmed that Webb and his aunt used their plane
tickets.
Webb told his friends, including his neighbor, Jennifer
Claire Cabrera, and his basketball buddy, Joselito
Orendain Escobar, of his travel plans. He even invited
them to his despedida party on March 8, 1991 at Faces
Disco along Makati Ave.23 On March 8,1991, the eve of
his departure, he took girlfriend Milagros Castillo to a
dinner at Bunchums at the Makati Cinema Square. His
basketball buddy Rafael Jose with Tina Calma, a blind
date arranged by Webb, joined them. They afterwards
went to Faces Disco for Webb's despedida party. Among
those present were his friends Paulo Santos and Jay
Ortega.24
b. The two immigration checks
The following day, March 9, 1991, Webb left for San
Francisco, California, with his Aunt Gloria on board
United Airlines Flight 808.25 Before boarding his plane,
Webb passed through the Philippine Immigration booth
at the airport to have his passport cleared and stamped.
Immigration Officer, Ferdinand Sampol checked Webbs
visa, stamped, and initialed his passport, and let him pass
through.26 He was listed on the United Airlines Flights
Passenger Manifest.27
On arrival at San Francisco, Webb went through the U.S.
Immigration where his entry into that country was
recorded. Thus, the U.S. Immigration Naturalization
Service, checking with its Non-immigrant Information
System, confirmed Webb's entry into the U.S. on March
9, 1991. Webb presented at the trial the INS Certification
issued by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service,28 the computer-generated print-out of the US-
INS indicating Webb's entry on March 9, 1991, 29 and the
US-INS Certification dated August 31, 1995,
authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign
Affairs, correcting an earlier August 10, 1995
Certification.30
c. Details of U.S. sojourn
In San Francisco, Webb and his aunt Gloria were met by
the latters daughter, Maria Teresa Keame, who brought
them to Glorias house in Daly City, California. During
his stay with his aunt, Webb met Christopher Paul
Legaspi Esguerra, Glorias grandson. In April 1991,
Webb, Christopher, and a certain Daphne Domingo
watched the concert of Deelite Band in San
Francisco.31 In the same month, Dorothy Wheelock and
her family invited Webb to Lake Tahoe to return the
Webbs hospitality when she was in the Philippines.32
In May 1991, on invitation of another aunt, Susan
Brottman, Webb moved to Anaheim Hills,
California.33 During his stay there, he occupied himself
with playing basketball once or twice a week with
Steven Keeler34 and working at his cousin-in-laws pest
control company.35 Webb presented the companys
logbook showing the tasks he performed, 36 his
paycheck,37 his ID, and other employment papers. On
June 14, 1991 he applied for a driver's license 38 and
wrote three letters to his friend Jennifer Cabrera. 39
On June 28, 1991, Webbs parents visited him at
Anaheim and stayed with the Brottmans. On the same
day, his father introduced Honesto Aragon to his son
when he came to visit. 40 On the following day, June 29,
Webb, in the company of his father and Aragon went to
Riverside, California, to look for a car. They bought an
MR2 Toyota car.41 Later that day, a visitor at the
Brottmans, Louis Whittacker, saw Webb looking at the
plates of his new car.42 To prove the purchase, Webb
presented the Public Records of California Department
of Motor Vehicle43 and a car plate "LEW WEBB." 44 In
using the car in the U.S., Webb even received traffic
citations.45
On June 30, 1991 Webb, again accompanied by his
father and Aragon,46 bought a bicycle at Orange Cycle
Center.47 The Center issued Webb a receipt dated June
30, 1991.48 On July 4, 1991, Independence Day, the
Webbs, the Brottmans, and the Vaca family had a
lakeside picnic.49
Webb stayed with the Brottmans until mid July and
rented a place for less than a month. On August 4, 1991
he left for Longwood, Florida, to stay with the spouses
Jack and Sonja Rodriguez.50 There, he met Armando
Rodriguez with whom he spent time, playing basketball
on weekends, watching movies, and playing
billiards.51 In November 1991, Webb met performing
artist Gary Valenciano, a friend of Jack Rodriguez, who
was invited for a dinner at the Rodriguezs house. 52 He
left the Rodriguezs home in August 1992, returned to
Anaheim and stayed with his aunt Imelda Pagaspas. He
stayed there until he left for the Philippines on October
26, 1992.
d. The second immigration checks
As with his trip going to the U.S., Webb also went
through both the U.S. and Philippine immigrations on
his return trip. Thus, his departure from the U.S. was
confirmed by the same certifications that confirmed his
entry.53 Furthermore, a Diplomatic Note of the U.S.
Department of State with enclosed letter from Acting
Director Debora A. Farmer of the Records Operations,
Office of Records of the US-INS stated that the
Certification dated August 31, 1995 is a true and
accurate statement. And when he boarded his plane, the
Passenger Manifest of Philippine Airlines Flight No.
103,54 certified by Agnes Tabuena55 confirmed his return
trip.
When he arrived in Manila, Webb again went through
the Philippine Immigration. In fact, the arrival stamp and
initial on his passport indicated his return to Manila on
October 27, 1992. This was authenticated by Carmelita
Alipio, the immigration officer who processed Webbs
reentry.56 Upon his return, in October 1992, Paolo
Santos, Joselito Erondain Escobar, and Rafael Jose once
again saw Webb playing basketball at the BF's Phase III
basketball court.
e. Alibi versus positive identification
The trial court and the Court of Appeals are one in
rejecting as weak Webbs alibi. Their reason is uniform:
Webbs alibi cannot stand against Alfaros positive
identification of him as the rapist and killer of Carmela
and, apparently, the killer as well of her mother and
younger sister. Because of this, to the lower courts,
Webbs denial and alibi were fabricated.
But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as
fabricated. Indeed, if the accused is truly innocent, he
can have no other defense but denial and alibi. So how
can such accused penetrate a mind that has been made
cynical by the rule drilled into his head that a defense of
alibi is a hangmans noose in the face of a witness
positively swearing, "I saw him do it."? Most judges
believe that such assertion automatically dooms an alibi
which is so easy to fabricate. This quick stereotype
thinking, however, is distressing. For how else can the
truth that the accused is really innocent have any chance
of prevailing over such a stone-cast tenet?
There is only one way. A judge must keep an open mind.
He must guard against slipping into hasty conclusion,
often arising from a desire to quickly finish the job of
deciding a case. A positive declaration from a witness
that he saw the accused commit the crime should not
automatically cancel out the accuseds claim that he did
not do it. A lying witness can make as positive an
identification as a truthful witness can. The lying witness
can also say as forthrightly and unequivocally, "He did
it!" without blinking an eye.
Rather, to be acceptable, the positive identification must
meet at least two criteria:
First, the positive identification of the offender must
come from a credible witness. She is credible who can
be trusted to tell the truth, usually based on past
experiences with her. Her word has, to one who knows
her, its weight in gold.
And second, the witness story of what she personally
saw must be believable, not inherently contrived. A
witness who testifies about something she never saw
runs into inconsistencies and makes bewildering claims.
Here, as already fully discussed above, Alfaro and her
testimony fail to meet the above criteria.
She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness
bothered by her conscience. She had been hanging
around that agency for sometime as a stool pigeon, one
paid for mixing up with criminals and squealing on
them. Police assets are often criminals themselves. She
was the prosecutions worst possible choice for a
witness. Indeed, her superior testified that she
volunteered to play the role of a witness in the Vizconde
killings when she could not produce a man she promised
to the NBI.
And, although her testimony included details, Alfaro had
prior access to the details that the investigators knew of
the case. She took advantage of her familiarity with
these details to include in her testimony the clearly
incompatible act of Webb hurling a stone at the front
door glass frames even when they were trying to slip
away quietlyjust so she can accommodate this crime
scene feature. She also had Ventura rummaging a bag on
the dining table for a front door key that nobody needed
just to explain the physical evidence of that bag and its
scattered contents. And she had Ventura climbing the
cars hood, risking being seen in such an awkward
position, when they did not need to darken the garage to
force open the front doorjust so to explain the
darkened light and foot prints on the car hood.
Further, her testimony was inherently incredible. Her
story that Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez,
and Filart agreed to take their turns raping Carmela is
incongruent with their indifference, exemplified by
remaining outside the house, milling under a street light,
visible to neighbors and passersby, and showing no
interest in the developments inside the house, like if it
was their turn to rape Carmela. Alfaros story that she
agreed to serve as Webbs messenger to Carmela, using
up her gas, and staying with him till the bizarre end
when they were practically strangers, also taxes
incredulity.
To provide basis for Webbs outrage, Alfaro said that she
followed Carmela to the main road to watch her let off a
lover on Aguirre Avenue. And, inexplicably, although
Alfaro had only played the role of messenger, she
claimed leading Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the
house to gang-rape Carmella, as if Alfaro was
establishing a reason for later on testifying on personal
knowledge. Her swing from an emotion of fear when a
woman woke up to their presence in the house and of
absolute courage when she nonetheless returned to
become the lone witness to a grim scene is also quite
inexplicable.
Ultimately, Alfaros quality as a witness and her
inconsistent, if not inherently unbelievable, testimony
cannot be the positive identification that jurisprudence
acknowledges as sufficient to jettison a denial and an
alibi.
f. A documented alibi
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive,
clear, and satisfactory evidence57 that (a) he was present
at another place at the time of the perpetration of the
crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him
to be at the scene of the crime.58
The courts below held that, despite his evidence, Webb
was actually in Paraaque when the Vizconde killings
took place; he was not in the U.S. from March 9, 1991 to
October 27, 1992; and if he did leave on March 9, 1991,
he actually returned before June 29, 1991, committed the
crime, erased the fact of his return to the Philippines
from the records of the U.S. and Philippine
Immigrations, smuggled himself out of the Philippines
and into the U.S., and returned the normal way on
October 27, 1992. But this ruling practically makes the
death of Webb and his passage into the next life the only
acceptable alibi in the Philippines. Courts must abandon
this unjust and inhuman paradigm.
If one is cynical about the Philippine system, he could
probably claim that Webb, with his fathers connections,
can arrange for the local immigration to put a March 9,
1991 departure stamp on his passport and an October 27,
1992 arrival stamp on the same. But this is pure
speculation since there had been no indication that such
arrangement was made. Besides, how could Webb fix a
foreign airlines passenger manifest, officially filed in
the Philippines and at the airport in the U.S. that had his
name on them? How could Webb fix with the U.S.
Immigrations record system those two dates in its
record of his travels as well as the dates when he
supposedly departed in secret from the U.S. to commit
the crime in the Philippines and then return there? No
one has come up with a logical and plausible answer to
these questions.
The Court of Appeals rejected the evidence of Webbs
passport since he did not leave the original to be attached
to the record. But, while the best evidence of a document
is the original, this means that the same is exhibited in
court for the adverse party to examine and for the judge
to see. As Court of Appeals Justice Tagle said in his
dissent,59the practice when a party does not want to leave
an important document with the trial court is to have a
photocopy of it marked as exhibit and stipulated among
the parties as a faithful reproduction of the original.
Stipulations in the course of trial are binding on the
parties and on the court.
The U.S. Immigration certification and the computer
print-out of Webbs arrival in and departure from that
country were authenticated by no less than the Office of
the U.S. Attorney General and the State Department.
Still the Court of Appeals refused to accept these
documents for the reason that Webb failed to present in
court the immigration official who prepared the same.
But this was unnecessary. Webbs passport is a document
issued by the Philippine government, which under
international practice, is the official record of travels of
the citizen to whom it is issued. The entries in that
passport are presumed true.60
The U.S. Immigration certification and computer print-
out, the official certifications of which have been
authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign
Affairs, merely validated the arrival and departure
stamps of the U.S. Immigration office on Webbs
passport. They have the same evidentiary value. The
officers who issued these certifications need not be
presented in court to testify on them. Their
trustworthiness arises from the sense of official duty and
the penalty attached to a breached duty, in the routine
and disinterested origin of such statement and in the
publicity of the record.61
The Court of Appeals of course makes capital of the fact
that an earlier certification from the U.S. Immigration
office said that it had no record of Webb entering the
U.S. But that erroneous first certification was amply
explained by the U.S. Government and Court of Appeals
Justice Tagle stated it in his dissenting opinion, thus:
While it is true that an earlier Certification was issued by
the U.S. INS on August 16, 1995 finding "no evidence of
lawful admission of Webb," this was already clarified
and deemed erroneous by no less than the US INS
Officials. As explained by witness Leo Herrera-Lim,
Consul and Second Secretary of the Philippine Embassy
in Washington D.C., said Certification did not pass
through proper diplomatic channels and was obtained in
violation of the rules on protocol and standard procedure
governing such request.
The initial request was merely initiated by BID
Commissioner Verceles who directly communicated with
the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco, USA,
bypassing the Secretary of Foreign Affairs which is the
proper protocol procedure. Mr. Steven Bucher, the acting
Chief of the Records Services Board of US-INS
Washington D.C. in his letter addressed to Philip
Antweiler, Philippine Desk Officer, State Department,
declared the earlier Certification as incorrect and
erroneous as it was "not exhaustive and did not reflect all
available information." Also, Richard L. Huff, Co-
Director of the Office of Information and privacy, US
Department of Justice, in response to the appeal raised
by Consul General Teresita V. Marzan, explained that
"the INS normally does not maintain records on
individuals who are entering the country as visitors
rather than as immigrants: and that a notation concerning
the entry of a visitor may be made at the Nonimmigrant
Information system. Since appellant Webb entered the
U.S. on a mere tourist visa, obviously, the initial search
could not have produced the desired result inasmuch as
the data base that was looked into contained entries of
the names of IMMIGRANTS and not that of NON-
IMMIGRANT visitors of the U.S..62
The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed
marked cynicism over the accuracy of travel documents
like the passport as well as the domestic and foreign
records of departures and arrivals from airports. They
claim that it would not have been impossible for Webb to
secretly return to the Philippines after he supposedly left
it on March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back to the
U.S., and openly return to the Philippines again on
October 26, 1992. Travel between the U.S. and the
Philippines, said the lower courts took only about twelve
to fourteen hours.
If the Court were to subscribe to this extremely skeptical
view, it might as well tear the rules of evidence out of
the law books and regard suspicions, surmises, or
speculations as reasons for impeaching evidence. It is
not that official records, which carry the presumption of
truth of what they state, are immune to attack. They are
not. That presumption can be overcome by evidence.
Here, however, the prosecution did not bother to present
evidence to impeach the entries in Webbs passport and
the certifications of the Philippine and U.S. immigration
services regarding his travel to the U.S. and back. The
prosecutions rebuttal evidence is the fear of the
unknown that it planted in the lower courts minds.
7. Effect of Webbs alibi to others
Webbs documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's
testimony, not only with respect to him, but also with
respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian,
Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court accepts the
proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the crime
took place, Alfaros testimony will not hold together.
Webbs participation is the anchor of Alfaros story.
Without it, the evidence against the others must
necessarily fall.
CONCLUSION
In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not
whether the court entertains doubts about the innocence
of the accused since an open mind is willing to explore
all possibilities, but whether it entertains a reasonable,
lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious
mistake to send an innocent man to jail where such kind
of doubt hangs on to ones inner being, like a piece of
meat lodged immovable between teeth.
Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their
lives in prison on the testimony of an NBI asset who
proposed to her handlers that she take the role of the
witness to the Vizconde massacre that she could not
produce?
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the Decision dated December 15, 2005 and
Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336 and ACQUITS
accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio
Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez,
Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of
the crimes of which they were charged for failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
They are ordered immediately RELEASED from
detention unless they are confined for another lawful
cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director,
Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate
implementation. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is DIRECTED to report the action he has
taken to this Court within five days from receipt of this
Decision.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines front of his house. Masnayon chased him but to no avail,
Supreme Court
Manila because he and his men were not familiar with the
entrances and exits of the place.
THIRD DIVISION

RUBEN DEL CASTILLO @ BOY G.R. No.They all went back to the residence of the petitioner and
185128
CASTILLO, [Formerlyclosely
UDK No. 13980]the place where the subject ran for
guarded
Petitioner,
cover. SPO3 Masnayon requested his men to get
Present:
a barangay tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men
VELASCO, JR., with two barangay tanods.
returned
- versus - PERALTA,
MENDOZA,
REYES, In the presence of the barangay tanod, Nelson
PERLAS-BERNABE,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Gonzalado, and the elder sister of petitioner named
Respondent. Promulgated:
Dolly del Castillo, searched the house of petitioner
January 30, 2012
including the nipa hut where the petitioner allegedly ran
x-------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------x for cover. His men who searched the residence of the
petitioner found nothing, but one of the barangay
DECISION tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut several
articles, including four (4) plastic packs containing white
crystalline substance. Consequently, the articles that
PERALTA, J.:
were confiscated were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory

For this Court's consideration is the Petition for for examination. The contents of the four (4) heat- sealed

Review[1] on Certiorari under Rule 45 of Ruben del transparent plastic packs were subjected to laboratory

Castillo assailing the Decision[2] dated July 31, 2006 and examination, the result of which proved positive for the

Resolution[3] dated December 13, 2007 of the Court of presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.

Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CRNo. 27819, which affirmed

the Decision[4] dated March 14, 2003 of the Regional Thus, an Information was filed before the RTC against

Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Cebu, in Criminal Case petitioner, charging him with violation of Section 16,

No. CBU-46291, finding petitioner guilty beyond Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended. The
[5]
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III of Information reads:

Republic Act (R.A.) 6425. That on or about the 13th day of

The facts, as culled from the records, are the September 1997, at about 3:00 p.m. in
the City of Cebu, Philippines and
following: within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, with
Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner was deliberate intent, did then and there
have in his possession and control four
engaged in selling shabu, police officers headed by
(4) packs of white crystalline powder,
SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting having a total weight of 0.31 gram,
surveillance and test-buy operation at the house of locally known as shabu, all containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
petitioner, secured a search warrant from the RTC and regulated drug, without license or
around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of September 13, 1997, prescription from any competent
authority.
the same police operatives went to Gil Tudtud St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City to serve the search warrant to CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
petitioner.
Upon arrival, somebody shouted raid, which prompted
During arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of his
them to immediately disembark from the jeep they were
counsel, pleaded not guilty.[7] Subsequently, trial on the
riding and went directly to petitioner's house and
merits ensued.
cordoned it. The structure of the petitioner's residence is
a two-storey house and the petitioner was staying in the
To prove the earlier mentioned incident, the prosecution
second floor. When they went upstairs, they met
presented the testimonies of SPO3 Bienvenido
petitioner's wife and informed her that they will
Masnayon, PO2 Milo Arriola, and Forensic Analyst,
implement the search warrant. But before they can
Police Inspector Mutchit Salinas.
search the area, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he saw
petitioner run towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in
The defense, on the other hand, presented the After the motion for reconsideration of petitioner was
testimonies of petitioner, Jesusa del Castillo, Dalisay del denied by the CA, petitioner filed with this Court the
Castillo and Herbert Aclan, which can be summarized as present petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
follows: of Court with the following arguments raised:

On September 13, 1997, around 3 o'clock in the 1. THE COURT OF

APPEALS ERRED IN ITS
afternoon, petitioner was installing the electrical wirings APPLICATION OF THE
and airconditioning units of the Four Seasons Canteen PROVISIONS OF THE
CONSTITUTION, THE RULES OF
and Beauty Parlor at Wacky Bldg., COURT AND ESTABLISHED
Cabancalan, Cebu. He was able to finish his job JURISPRUDENCE VIS-A-VIS VALIDI
TY OF SEARCH WARRANT NO.
around 6 o'clock in the evening, but he was engaged by
570-9-1197-24;
the owner of the establishment in a conversation. He
was able to go home around 8:30-9 o'clock in the 2. THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
evening. It was then that he learned from his wife that THE FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE
police operatives searched his house and found CRYSTALLINE POWDER
ALLEGEDLY FOUND ON THE
nothing. According to him, the small structure, 20 FLOOR OF THE NIPA HUT OR
meters away from his house where they found the STRUCTURE ARE ADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE AGAINST THE
confiscated items, was owned by his older brother and
PETITIONER, NOT ONLY
was used as a storage place by his father. BECAUSE THE SAID COURT
SIMPLY PRESUMED THAT IT WAS
USED BY THE PETITIONER OR
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond THAT THE PETITIONER RAN TO IT
reasonable of the charge against him in the FOR COVER WHEN THE
SEARCHING TEAM ARRIVED AT
Information. The dispositive portion of the Decision HIS RESIDENCE, BUT ALSO,
reads: PRESUMING THAT THE SAID NIPA
HUT OR STRUCTURE WAS
WHEREFORE, premises considered, INDEED USED BY THE
this Court finds the accused Ruben del PETITIONER AND THE FOUR (4)
Castillo alyas Boy Castillo, GUILTY of PACKS OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE
violating Section 16, Article III, POWDER WERE FOUND
Republic Act No. 6425, as THEREAT. THE SUBJECT FOUR (4)
amended. There being no mitigating nor PACKS OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE
aggravating circumstances proven POWDER ARE FRUITS OF THE
before this Court, and applying the POISONOUS TREE; and
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Six (6) 3. THE COURT OF
Months and One (1) Day as Minimum APPEALS ERRED IN ITS
and Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months APPLICATION OF THE ELEMENT
as Maximum of Prision Correccional. OF POSSESSION AS AGAINST THE
PETITIONER, AS IT WAS IN
The four (4) small plastic packets of VIOLATION OF THE
white crystalline substance having a ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE
total weight of 0.31 gram, positive for ON THE MATTER. HAD THE SAID
the presence of methamphetamine COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE
hydrochloride, are ordered confiscated ELEMENT IN QUESTION, IT
and shall be destroyed in accordance COULD HAVE BEEN ASSAYED
with the law. THAT THE SAME HAD NOT BEEN
PROVEN.[10]
SO ORDERED.[8]

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed his case with the CA, but Comment dated February 10, 2009, enumerated the
the latter affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus: following counter-arguments:

WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision I

is AFFIRMED in toto and the appeal is SEARCH WARRANT No. 570-9-11-
DISMISSED, with costs against 97-24 issued by Executive Judge
accused-appellant. Priscilla S. Agana of Branch 24,
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City is
SO ORDERED.[9] valid.

II
 The four (4) packs of shabu seized inside
the shop of petitioner are admissible in
evidence against him.
III
The Court of Appeals did not err in
finding him guilty of illegal possession
of prohibited drugs.[11]
Petitioner insists that there was no probable cause to
issue the search warrant, considering that SPO1
Reynaldo Matillano, the police officer who applied for
it, had no personal knowledge of the alleged illegal sale
of drugs during a test-buy operation conducted prior to
the application of the same search warrant. The OSG,
however, maintains that the petitioner, aside from failing
to file the necessary motion to quash the search warrant
pursuant to Section 14, Rule 127 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure, did not introduce clear and
convincing evidence to show that Masnayon was
conscious of the falsity of his assertion
representation.
Anent the second argument, petitioner asserts that the
nipa hut located about 20 meters away from his house is
no longer within the permissible area that may be
searched by the police officers due to the distance and
that the search warrant did not include the same nipa hut
as one of the places to be searched. The OSG, on the
other hand, argues that the constitutional guaranty
against unreasonable searches and seizure is applicable
only against government authorities and not to private
individuals such as the barangay tanod who found the
folded paper containing packs of shabu inside the nipa
hut.
As to the third argument raised, petitioner claims that
the CA erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal possession of prohibited drugs, because
he could not be presumed to be in possession of the
same just because they were found inside the nipa
hut. Nevertheless, the OSG dismissed the argument of
the petitioner, stating that, when prohibited and
regulated drugs are found in a house or other building
belonging to and occupied by a particular person, the
presumption arises that such person is in possession of
such drugs in violation of law, and the fact of finding
the same is sufficient to convict.
This Court finds no merit on the first argument of
petitioner.
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are:
(1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause
must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the
judge must examine, in writing and under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she
may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify
on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the
warrant specifically describes the place to be searched
and the things to be seized.[12] According to petitioner,
there was no probable cause. Probable cause for
a search warrant is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be searched. [13] A
finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
or committed and that it was committed by the
accused. Probable cause demands more than bare
suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would
justify conviction.[14] The judge, in determining probable
cause, is to consider the totality of the circumstances
made known to him and not by a fixed and rigid
formula,[15] and must employ a flexible, totality of the
circumstances standard.[16] The existence depends to a
large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge
conducting the examination. This Court, therefore, is in
no position to disturb the factual findings of the judge
which led to the issuance of the search warrant. A
magistrate's determination of probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a
reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis
for that determination.[17] Substantial basis means that the
questions of the examining judge brought out such facts
and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and the objects in connection with the
offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be
searched.[18] A review of the records shows that in the
present case, a substantial basis exists.
With regard to the second argument of petitioner, it must
be remembered that the warrant issued must particularly
describe the place to be searched and persons or things
to be seized in order for it to be valid. A designation or
description that points out the place to be searched to the
exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads
the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional
requirement of definiteness.[19] In the present case,
Search Warrant No. 570-9-1197-24[20] specifically
designates or describes the residence of the petitioner as
the place to be searched. Incidentally, the items were
seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters
away from the residence of the petitioner. The
confiscated items, having been found in a place other
than the one described in the search warrant, can be
considered as fruits of an invalid warrantless search, the
presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of
petitioner's constitutional guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seizure. The OSG argues that, assuming
that the items seized were found in another place not
designated in the search warrant, the same items should
still be admissible as evidence because the one who
discovered them was a barangay tanod who is a private
individual, the constitutional guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizure being applicable only
against government authorities. The contention is devoid
of merit.
It was testified to during trial by the police officers who
effected the search warrant that they asked the assistance
of the barangay tanods, thus, in the testimony of SPO3
Masnayon:
Fiscal Centino:
Q For how long did the chase take
place?
A Just a very few moments.
Q After that, what did you [do] when
you were not able to reach him?
A I watched his shop and then I
requested my men to get a barangay
tanod.
Q Were you able to get a barangay
tanod?
A Yes.
Q Can you tell us what is the name of
the barangay tanod?
A Nelson Gonzalado.
Q For point of clarification, how many
barangay tanod [did] your driver get?
A Two.
Q What happened after that?
A We searched the house, but we found
negative.
Q Who proceeded to the second floor
of the house?
A SPO1 Cirilo Pogoso and Milo Areola
went upstairs and found nothing.
Q What about you, where were you?
A I [was] watching his shop and I was
with Matillano.
Q What about the barangay tanod?
A Together with Milo and Pogoso.
Q When the search at the second
floor of the house yielded negative
what did you do?
A They went downstairs because I
was suspicious of his shop because he
ran from his shop, so we searched his
shop.
Q Who were with you when you
searched the shop?
A The barangay tanod Nilo
Gonzalado, the elder sister of Ruben
del Castillo named Dolly del Castillo.
Q You mean to say, that when (sic)
SPO1 Reynaldo Matillano, Barangay
Tanod Nilo Gonzalado and the elder
sister of Ruben del Castillo were
together in the shop?
A Yes.
Q What happened at the shop?
A One of the barangay tanods was
able to pick up white folded paper.
Q What [were] the contents of that
white folded paper?
A A plastic pack containing white
crystalline.
Q Was that the only item?
A There are others like the foil, scissor.
Q Were you present when those
persons found those tin foil and others
inside the electric shop?
A Yes.[21]
The fact that no items were seized in the residence of
petitioner and that the items that were actually seized
were found in another structure by a barangay
tanod, was corroborated by PO2 Arriola, thus:
FISCAL:
Q So, upon arriving at the house of
Ruben del Castillo alias Boy, can you
still recall what took place?
A We cordoned the area.
Q And after you cordoned the area, did
anything happen?
A We waited for the barangay tanod.
Q And did the barangay tanod
eventually appear?
A Yes. And then we started our search
in the presence of Ruben del Castillo's
wife.
Q What is the name of the wife of
Ruben del Castillo?
A I cannot recall her name, but if I see
her I can recall [her] face.
Q What about Ruben del Castillo, was
she around when [you] conducted the
search?
A No. Ruben was not in the house. But
our team leader, team mate Bienvenido
Masnayon saw that Ruben ran away
 from his adjacent electronic shop near
his house, in front of his house.
Q Did you find anything during the
search in the house of Ruben del
Castillo?
A After our search in the house, we did
not see anything. The house was clean.
Q What did you do afterwards, if any?
A We left (sic) out of the house and
proceeded to his electronic shop.
Q Do you know the reason why you
proceeded to his electronic shop?
A Yes. Because our team leader
Bienvenido Masnayon saw that (sic)
Ruben run from that store and
furthermore the door was open.
Q How far is the electronic shop from
the house of Ruben del Castillo?
A More or less, 5 to 6 meters in front of
his house.
xxxx
Q So, who entered inside the electronic
shop?
A The one who first entered the
electronic shop is our team leader
Bienvenido Masnayon.
Q You mentioned that Masnayon
entered first. Do you mean to say that
there were other persons or other
person that followed after Masnayon?
A Then we followed suit.
Q All of your police officers and the
barangay tanod followed suit?
A I led Otadoy and the barangay tanod.
Q What about you?
A I also followed suit.
Q And did anything happen inside
the shop of Ruben del Castillo?
A It was the barangay tanod who
saw the folded paper and I saw him
open the folded paper which
contained four shabu deck.
Q How far were you when you saw the
folded paper and the tanod open the
folded paper?
A We were side by side because the
shop was very small.[22]
SPO1 Pogoso also testified on the same matter, thus:
FISCAL CENTINO:
Q And where did you conduct the
search, Mr. Witness?
A At his residence, the two-storey
house.
Q Among the three policemen, who
were with you in conducting the search
at the residence of the accused?
A I, Bienvenido Masnayon.
Q And what transpired after you
searched the house of Ruben del
Castillo?
A Negative, no shabu.
Q And what happened afterwards, if
any?
A We went downstairs and proceeded
to the small house.
Q Can you please describe to this
Honorable Court, what was that small
house which you proceeded to?
A It is a nipa hut.
Q And more or less, how far or near
was it from the house of Ruben del
Castillo?
A 5 to 10 meters.
Q And could you tell Mr. Witness, what
was that nipa hut supposed to be?
A That was the electronic shop of
Ruben del Castillo.
Q And what happened when your
team proceeded to the nipa hut?
A I was just outside the nipa hut.
Q And who among the team went
inside?
A PO2 Milo Areola and the
Barangay Tanod.[23]
Having been established that the assistance of
the barangay tanods was sought by the police authorities
who effected the searched warrant, the same barangay
tanods therefore acted as agents of persons in
authority. Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code defines
persons in authority and agents of persons in authority
as:
x x x any person directly vested with
jurisdiction, whether as an individual or
as a member of some court or
governmental corporation, board or
commission, shall be deemed a person in
authority. A barangay captain and a
barangay chairman shall also be deemed
a person in authority.
A person who, by direct provision of law
or by election or by appointment by
competent authority, is charged with
the maintenance of public order and
the protection and security of life and
property, such as barrio councilman,
barrio policeman and barangay
leader, and any person who comes to
the aid of persons in authority, shall
be deemed an agent of a person in
authority.
The Local Government Code also contains a provision
which describes the function of a barangay tanod as an
agent of persons in authority. Section 388 of the Local
Government Code reads:
SEC. 388. Persons in Authority. - For
purposes of the Revised Penal Code,
the punong barangay, sangguniang
barangay members, and members of the
lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay
shall be deemed as persons in authority
in their jurisdictions, while other
barangay officials and members who
may be designated by law or
ordinance and charged with the
maintenance of public order,
protection and security of life and
property, or the maintenance of a
desirable and balanced environment,
and any barangay member who
comes to the aid of persons in
authority, shall be deemed agents of
persons in authority.
By virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as
well as the barangay tanods were acting as agents of a
person in authority during the conduct of the
search. Thus, the search conducted was unreasonable
and the confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence.
Assuming ex gratia argumenti that the barangay
tanod who found the confiscated items is considered a
private individual, thus, making the same items
admissible in evidence, petitioner's third argument that
the prosecution failed to establish constructive
possession of the regulated drugs seized, would still be
meritorious.
Appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual
findings of the trial court since the latter has the unique
opportunity to weigh conflicting testimonies, having
heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
[24]
deportment and manner of testifying, unless attended
with arbitrariness or plain disregard of pertinent facts or
circumstances, the factual findings are accorded the
highest degree of respect on appeal [25] as in the present
case.
It must be put into emphasis that this present case is
about the violation of Section 16 of R.A. 6425. In every
prosecution for the illegal possession of shabu, the
following essential elements must be established: (a) the
accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b)
the person is not authorized by law or by duly
constituted authorities; and (c) the accused has
knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug.[26]
In People v. Tira,[27] this Court explained the concept of
possession of regulated drugs, to wit:
This crime is mala prohibita, and, as
such, criminal intent is not an essential
element. However, the prosecution must
prove that the accused had the intent to
possess (animus posidendi) the drugs.
Possession, under the law, includes not
only actual possession, but also
constructive possession. Actual
possession exists when the drug is in the
immediate physical possession or
control of the accused. On the other
hand, constructive possession exists
when the drug is under the dominion and
control of the accused or when he has
the right to exercise dominion and
control over the place where it is found.
Exclusive possession or control is not
necessary. The accused cannot avoid
conviction if his right to exercise control
and dominion over the place where the
contraband is located, is shared with
another.[28]
While it is not necessary that the property to be searched
or seized should be owned by the person against whom
the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient
showing that the property is under appellants control or
possession.[29] The CA, in its Decision, referred to the
possession of regulated drugs by the petitioner as a
constructive one. Constructive possession exists when
the drug is under the dominion and control of the
accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion
and control over the place where it is found. [30] The
records are void of any evidence to show that petitioner
owns the nipa hut in question nor was it established that
he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as
the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the said
structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the
petitioner being an electrician by profession. The CA, in
its Decision, noted a resolution by the investigating
prosecutor, thus:
x x x As admitted by respondent's wife,
her husband is an electrician by
occupation. As such, conclusion could
be arrived at that the structure, which
housed the electrical equipments is
actually used by the respondent. Being
the case, he has control of the things
found in said structure.[31]
In addition, the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution do not also provide proof as to the
ownership of the structure where the seized articles were
found. During their direct testimonies, they just said,
without stating their basis, that the same structure was
the shop of petitioner.[32] During the direct testimony of
SPO1 Pogoso, he even outrightly concluded that the judgment, is indispensable to overcome the
electrical shop/nipa hut was owned by petitioner, thus: constitutional presumption of innocence.[37]

FISCAL CENTINO:
Q Can you please describe to this
Honorable Court, what was that small
house which you proceeded to?
A It is a nipa hut.
Q And more or less, how far or near
was it from the house of Ruben del
Castillo?
A 5 to 10 meters.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 27819, which
affirmed the Decision dated March 14, 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Cebu, in Criminal Case
No. CBU-46291 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Ruben del
Castillo is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.

Q And could you tell Mr. Witness, SO ORDERED.

what was that nipa hut supposed to
be?
A That was the electronic shop of
Ruben del Castillo.

Q And what happened when your team

proceeded to the nipa hut?
A I was just outside the nipa hut.[33]

However, during cross-examination, SPO3 Masnayon

admitted that there was an electrical shop but denied
what he said in his earlier testimony that it was owned
by petitioner, thus:

ATTY. DAYANDAYAN:
Q You testified that Ruben del
Castillo has an electrical shop, is that
correct?
A He came out of an electrical shop. I
did not say that he owns the shop.

Q Now, this shop is within a structure?

A Yes.

Q How big is the structure?

A It is quite a big structure, because at
the other side is a mahjong den and at
the other side is a structure rented by a
couple.[34]

The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had

knowledge of the existence and presence of the drugs in
the place under his control and dominion and the
character of the drugs. [35] With the prosecution's failure
to prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner's control
and dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt as to his
guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start
with the law's own starting perspective on the status of
the accused - in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed
innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
[36]
Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of
proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would
convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in
Republic of the Philippines Meanwhile, Elvira arrived home at 7:00 p.m.
Supreme Court and found that her son was not there. She searched for
Manila
him in the places he frequented, but to no avail. As her
continued search for the child proved futile, she reported
SECOND DIVISION
him missing to the nearest police detachment.[5]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

The following day, December 28, 1998,
Appellee,
Enriquez and Siongco took Nikko to Bicutan, Taguig,
- versus - Metro Manila.[6] On December 29, 1998, Elvira received
ANTONIO SIONGCO y DELA CRUZ, ERIBERTO a phone call from a man, later identified as appellant
ENRIQUEZ y GEMSON, GEORGE Siongco, who claimed to have custody of Nikko and
HAYCO y CULLERA, and ALLAN
BONSOL y PAZ, asked for P400,000.00 in exchange for his liberty. Elvira
Accused, haggled with her sons captor until the latter agreed to
reduce the ransom money to P300,000.00. Elvira was
ANTONIO SIONGCO y DELA CRUZ and ALLAN
BONSOL y PAZ, also able to talk to her son who was only able to
Appellants. utter Hello Ma as Siongco immediately grabbed the
x-----------------------------------------------------------------x
phone from him. Siongco warned Elvira to refrain from
DECISION reporting the matter to the police. He also threatened
that Nikko would be killed if she fails to give the ransom
NACHURA, J.:
money at 6:00 p.m. of the next day at Genesis Bus
Station in Pasay City.[7] That night, Elvira telephoned the
Before the Court for review is the September 20, Office of the Chief of Police of Balanga, Bataan and
[1]
2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming reported that Nikko was kidnapped.[8]
the guilty verdict rendered by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 166, Pasig City,[2] promulgated on On December 30, 1998, Enriquez and Siongco
November 6, 2000, against appellants Antonio Siongco moved Nikko to Pateros and cautioned him not to tell
(Siongco) and Allan Bonsol (Bonsol), with modification anybody that he was kidnapped. They stayed at the
on the penalty imposed and the amount of damages to be house of Heracleo San Jose (Heracleo), a relative of
paid to their victim, Nikko Satimbre (Nikko). This [3]
Enriquez. They again called Elvira who failed to keep
review is made, pursuant to the pertinent provisions of her appointment with them in Pasay City. She explained
Sections 3 and 10 of Rule 122 and Section 13 of Rule that she was still gathering funds for the ransom money.
124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as The captors reiterated their threats and, at midnight, they
amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC. called and instructed her to proceed to Avenida with
whatever available money she had, subject to a
The factual findings of both courts show that subsequent agreement as to the balance. Elvira refused
between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. of December 27, 1998, 11- and insisted that she preferred to give the amount in full.
[9]
year-old Nikko, a resident of Balanga, Bataan, was
induced by Siongco to board a bus bound for Pilar,
Bataan, together with the latters friends, Marion Boton In the morning of December 31, 1998, Siongco
(Boton) and Eriberto Enriquez (Enriquez). Nikko was called Elvira several times with the same threats and
told that the two would accompany him in getting the demands. Elvira agreed to meet them that afternoon at
Gameboy that Siongco promised. Siongco was no the Genesis Bus Station in Pasay City. Nikko was
stranger to Nikko as he used to be a security guard at allowed to speak with his mother and he assured her that
Footlockers shoe store where Nikkos mother, Elvira he was not being maltreated. After the call, Enriquez
Satimbre (Elvira), works as a cashier. After a short stop informed Nikko that his mother wanted a kaliwaan (face
in Pilar, Bataan, the three proceeded to to face exchange) deal. Soon thereafter, Enriquez and
Mariveles, Bataan, where they met with George Hayco Siongco left to meet Elvira, while Nikko stayed behind.
[10]
(Hayco). The boy was then brought to
Dinalupihan, Bataan, where he was kept for the night.[4]
On the same day, Police Senior Inspector
Rodolfo Azurin, Jr. (Police Senior Inspector Azurin, Jr.)
was on duty at Crimes Operation Division of the
Philippine Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF)
office in Camp Crame, Quezon City. At 11:00 a.m.,
Elvira arrived and requested for assistance for the
recovery of her kidnapped son. The PAOCTF team then
instructed her to bring to the pay-off site a brown
envelope with a letter asking for extension of
payment. After briefing, Azurin and other police
operatives proceeded to Genesis Bus Station
in Pasay City. While waiting for Elvira, they noticed two
(2) male persons, later identified as Enriquez and
Siongco, restlessly moving around the place. At around
2:30 p.m., Elvira arrived carrying the brown envelope.
As instructed by the kidnappers, she positioned herself
near a tree and tied a white kerchief around her neck.
Shortly thereafter, Enriquez approached Elvira and took
the brown envelope from her. As he was walking away,
the PAOCTF team arrested him. Thereafter, they
followed Siongco, who hurriedly hailed a taxicab and
sped away. Siongco was arrested at the residence of
Heracleo in Pateros where Nikko was also rescued.
Thereafter, Siongco and Enriquez were brought
to Camp Crame.[11]
The investigations of Nikko and the two
detainees, coupled with the follow-up operations of the
PAOCTF, led to the arrest of appellant Bonsol, and the
other cohorts, Hayco and Boton.[12]
On January 4, 1999, an Information [13] was filed
in court, charging herein appellants Siongco and Bonsol,
together with Enriquez, Hayco, Boton, and a John Doe,
with KIDNAPPING and SERIOUS ILLEGAL
DETENTION under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Arraigned on February 24, 1999, the five
accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
[14]
Trial then ensued; in the course of which, the
prosecution presented in evidence the oral testimonies of
its witnesses: 1) the victim himself, 11-year-old Nikko;
2) his mother, Elvira; 3) Heracleo, relative of accused
Enriquez; 4) Police Senior Inspector Azurin, Jr. of the
PAOCTF; and 5) Police Superintendent Paul Tucay, the
one who arrested Bonsol, Hayco and Boton.[15]
With the exception of Boton, all of the accused
took the witness stand. Hayco and Bonsol denied
knowledge of and participation in the crime. Siongco
testified that, on December 27, 1998, he saw Nikko at
a peryahan in Balanga, Bataan but he did not mind the
boy as he was busy conversing with Enriquez about their
business of selling toys. He went to Manila and stayed at
the house of Heracleo on December 28 and 29, 1998 to
collect installment payments from customers.
On December 31, 1998, he went to his brothers house
in San Juan, Metro Manila and when he came back to
Pateros on the same day, he was arrested by PAOCTF
agents.
Enriquez declared that Nikko voluntarily went
with them. He affirmed that he travelled with Nikko and
Siongco to Manila. They stayed in Bicutan and then
moved to Pateros. He alleged that they called Nikkos
mother because the boy kept asking for a Gameboy. He
went to the Genesis Bus Station to meet Nikkos mother,
who, according to Siongco, would have something tied
around her neck.[16]
The RTC rejected the denials and alibis raised
by the accused and held that they conspired and
mutually helped one another in kidnapping and illegally
detaining Nikko by taking him through a circuitous
journey from Balanga, Bataan to Manilawhere ransom
demands for his liberty were made.
In a decision dated November 6, 2000, the RTC
convicted Siongco, Bonsol, Enriquez and Hayco of the
offense charged in the Information and meted upon them
the extreme penalty of death. Boton was ACQUITTED
on the ground of reasonable doubt. The pertinent portion
of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court
finds accused Antonio Siongco y Dela
Cruz, Eriberto Enriquez y Gemson,
George Hayco y Cullera and Allan
Bonsol y Paz GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention for the purpose of extorting
ransom, as defined and penalized under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Section 8 of R.A. 7659,
and are hereby sentenced to suffer
the Supreme penalty of Death and
indemnify the victim, Nikko Satimbre,
and his mother, Elvira Satimbre, each, in
the amount of P50,000.00, as moral
damages, plus the costs of suit.
On the ground of reasonable
doubt, the Court finds accused Marion
Boton y Cereza NOT GUILTY of the
crime charged in the Information.
SO ORDERED.[17]
From the RTC, the case went directly to this
Court for automatic review.[18] The parties were then
required to file, as they did file, their respective
appellants[19] and appellees[20] briefs. Consistent with this
Courts ruling in People v. Mateo,[21]the case was
transferred to the CA[22] for intermediate review and
disposition.
Upon review, the CA concurred with the factual
findings and conclusions of the trial court and affirmed
the judgment of conviction but modified the penalty
imposed to reclusion perpetua. The CA increased the
amount of moral damages to P100,000.00
awarded P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, to be paid
jointly and solidarily by the accused to
victim, Nikko. The fallo of the CA Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the Judgment
dated November 6, 2000 of the RTC
Branch 166, Pasig City, in Criminal
Case No. 115317-H,
is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that accused-
appellants are sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole and ordered to
jointly and solidarily pay private
complainant Nikko Satimbre the
amounts of P100,000.00 as moral
damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
SO ORDERED.[23]
Only herein appellants Siongco and Bonsol were
able to perfect an appeal[24] of the CA Decision.
Consequently, in its September 29, 2008 Resolution,
[25]
the CA declared the conviction of accused Enriquez
and Hayco as final and executory, and a Partial Entry of
Judgment was made against them. [26] In a Resolution
dated April 13, 2009,[27] this Court accepted the appeal
interposed by Siongco and Bonsol.
We deny the appeal.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, defines and
penalizes kidnapping and serious illegal detention as
follows:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and
serious illegal detention. - Any private
individual who shall kidnap or detain
another, or in any other manner deprive
him of his liberty, shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or
detention shall have
lasted more than three
days.
2. If it shall have been
committed simulating
public authority.
3. If any serious
physical injuries shall
have been inflicted
upon the person
kidnapped or detained,
or if threats to kill him
shall have been made.
4. If the person
and kidnapped or detained
shall be a minor, except
when the accused is any
their of the parents, female,
or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the
kidnapping or detention was committed
for the purpose of extorting ransom
from the victim or any other person,
even if none of the circumstances
above-mentioned were present in the
commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a
consequence of the detention or is raped,
or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed.
In the recent People of the Philippines v.
Christopher Bringas y Garcia, Bryan Bringas y Garcia,
John Robert Navarro y Cruz, Erickson Pajarillo y Baser
(deceased), and Eden Sy Chung, [28] we reiterated the
following elements that must be established by the
prosecution to obtain a conviction for kidnapping, viz.:
(a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or
detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of
his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be
illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense, any of
the following circumstances is present: (1)
the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three
days; (2) it is committed by simulating public authority;
(3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained, or threats to kill him are
made; or (4) the person kidnapped or detained, is a
minor, a female, or a public officer. If the victim is a
minor, or is kidnapped or detained for the purpose of
extorting ransom, the duration of detention becomes
immaterial.
The essence of kidnapping is the actual
deprivation of the victims liberty, coupled with
indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect
such deprivation.[29]
As correctly held by the RTC and the CA, the
prosecution indubitably proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the elements of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention obtain in the case at bar. Accused-appellants
are private individuals who, together with their cohorts,
took 11-year-old Nikko out of his hometown
Balanga, Bataan on December 27, 1998. They brought
him to Manila on December 28, 1998, where demands
for a P400,000.00 ransom were made to his mother.
Appellants contend that the essential element of
detention or deprivation of liberty was
because Nikko voluntarily went with them and that he
was free to move around and play with other children.
We disagree.
The deprivation required by Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code means not only the imprisonment of
a person, but also the deprivation of his liberty in
whatever form and for whatever length of time. It
includes a situation where the victim cannot go out of
the place of confinement or detention or is restricted or
impeded in his liberty to move. [30] In
case, although Nikko was free to move around, he was at
all times under the alternate watch of appellants and
their cohorts. He was in their physical custody and
complete control as he was kept in places strange and
unfamiliar to him. While he was allowed to play in the
houses where he was kept, the fact remains that he was
under the control of his captors who left him there, as he
could not leave the house until they shall have returned
for him. Because of his tender age and the fact that he
did not know the way back home, he was then and there
deprived of his liberty.
As to the contention of appellant Siongco that
there was no force or intimidation involved in the taking,
this Court held in People of the Philippines v. Ernesto
Cruz, Jr. y Concepcion and Reynaldo Agustin y
Ramos[31] that the fact that the victim voluntarily went
with the accused did not remove the element of
deprivation of liberty, because the victim went with the
accused on a false inducement, without which the victim
would not have done so. In the present case,
when Nikko boarded the bus bound for Pilar, Bataan, he
was under the impression that Bonsol and Enriquez were
to be trusted as he was assured by Siongco that the two
would accompany him to get his much desired
Gameboy. Without such assurance, Nikko would not
have boarded the said vehicle. In kidnapping, the victim
need not be taken by the accused forcibly or against his
will. What is controlling is the act of the accused in
detaining the victim against his or her will after the
offender is able to take the victim in his custody. In
short, the carrying away of the victim in the crime
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention can either be
made forcibly or, as in the instant case, fraudulently.[32]
in
Equally significant is the fact that, in
kidnapping, the victims lack of consent is also a
fundamental element.[33] The general rule is that the
prosecution is burdened to prove lack of consent on the
part of the victim. However, where the victim is a minor,
absent lack of consent is presumed. In this case, Nikko was
only 11 years old when he was kidnapped; thus
incapable of giving consent, and incompetent to assent
to his seizure and illegal detention. The consent of the
boy could place appellants in no better position than if
the act had been done against his will. A kidnapper
should not be rewarded with an acquittal simply because
he is ingenious enough to conceal his true motive from
his victim until he is able to transport the latter to
another place.[34]
this The identical factual findings of both the trial
and appellate courts likewise show that the actuations
and roles played by appellants Siongco and Bonsol
undoubtedly demonstrate that they conspired with Hayco
and Enriquez in kidnapping and illegally
detaining Nikko. Being sufficiently supported by
evidence on record, we find no reason to disturb the
same.
Siongco was the one who promised Nikko a
Gameboy. He told the boy to go with Bonsol and
Enriquez and get the toy in Pilar, Bataan. On December
28, 1998, he arrived in Dinalupihan, Bataan to
fetch Nikko. From there, he, Enriquez and Nikko left for
Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila in a bus. The following
day, Siongco, Nikko, Enriquez, and the latters friend
went to the marketplace and called Nikkos mother.
Siongco demanded from her payment of P400,000.00 as
a condition for the boys release. Siongco repeatedly
telephoned Elvira with the same demand and threats
over the next couple of days. On December 31, 1998, he
instructed Enriquez to meet Elvira at the Genesis Bus
Station to get the ransom money.
It is immaterial whether appellant Bonsol acted
as a principal or as an accomplice because the
conspiracy and his participation therein have been
established. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all
and the conspirators shall be held equally liable for the
crime.[35] On the pretext of getting Nikkos much desired
Gameboy, Bonsol and Enriquez were able to
conveniently whisk Nikko out of Balanga and bring him
to Pilar, then to Mariveles, and eventually to
Dinalupihan, where Siongco fetched him. Thus, The CA correctly modified the penalty imposed
Enriquez and Siongcos plan of bringing Nikko to Metro by the RTC to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
Manila, a terrain unfamiliar to the boy and where the parole. The penalty for kidnapping for the purpose of
two could enjoy anonymity to carry out their ultimate extorting ransom from the victim or any other person
goal of extorting ransom money from Nikkos mother, under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code[40] is death.
was accomplished. As shown by the evidence, without However, R.A. No. 9346[41] has banned the imposition of
the participation of appellant Bonsol, the commission of death penalty and reduced all death sentences
the offense would not have come to fruition. to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.[42] In
line with prevailing jurisprudence, [43] an award
Finally, appellants bewail that they were of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity is proper. The award
deprived of their right to an independent and competent of P100,000.00 moral damages is increased
counsel when the RTC appointed Atty. Michael Moralde to P200,000.00 considering the minority of Nikko.[44] As
(Atty. Moralde) as their counsel de oficio during the pre- the crime was attended by a demand for ransom, and by
trial conference, direct examination and cross- way of example or correction, Nikko is entitled
examination of the prosecutions principal to P100,000.00 exemplary damages as correctly awarded
witness, Nikko. This was so, despite Atty. Moraldes by the CA.[45]
manifestation during Nikkos cross-examination that the
defense of his actual client, accused Boton, conflicts
WHEREFORE, the September 20, 2007
with that of the other accused.[36]
Decision..of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.

A scrutiny of the records shows that Atty. No. 00774, finding appellants Antonio Siongco y dela

Moralde was appointed as appellants counsel de oficio in Cruz and Allan Bonsol y Paz guilty beyond reasonable

six (6) hearings, because their regular counsel de oficio, doubt of KIDNAPPING and SERIOUS ILLEGAL

Atty. Antoniano from the Public Attorneys Office P AO), DETENTION, is AFFIRMED with

was inexplicably absent. There is no denial of the right the MODIFICATION that a P50,000.00 civil indemnity

to counsel where a counsel de oficio is appointed during is awarded and the amount of moral damages is

the absence of the accused's counsel de parte, or in this increased to P200, 000.00.

case the regular counsel de oficio, pursuant to the court's

desire to finish the case as early as practicable under the Costs against appellants.

continuous trial system.[37] The choice of counsel by the

accused in a criminal prosecution is not a plenary one. If
the chosen counsel deliberately makes himself scarce,
the court is not precluded from appointing SO ORDERED.
a de oficio counsel, which it considers competent and
independent, to enable the trial to proceed until the
counsel of choice enters his appearance. Otherwise, the
pace of a criminal prosecution will be entirely dictated
by the accused, to the detriment of the eventual
resolution of the case.[38]

The fact that Botons defense conflicts with that

of appellants is immaterial because, as borne out by
records, Atty. Moralde expressly declared that the
questions he propounded to Nikko were only for his
client Boton. Thereafter, Atty. Antoniano was furnished
with copies of the transcript of stenographic notes of the
proceedings she missed and was given ample
opportunity to conduct her own cross-examination
during the subsequent hearings. Eventually, she adopted
the cross-examination conducted by the other defense
counsels.[39]

Republic of
Supreme
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
CRESENCIO C. MILLA,
Petitioner,
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
MARKET PURSUITS, INC. represented by
CARLO V. LOPEZ,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------
- - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari assailing the 22
April 2009 Decision[1] and 8 July 2009 Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals, affirming the Decision of the trial
court finding petitioner Cresencio C. Milla (Milla) guilty
of two counts of estafa through falsification of public
documents.
Respondent Carlo Lopez (Lopez) was the Financial
Officer of private respondent, Market Pursuits, Inc.
(MPI). In March 2003, Milla represented himself as a
real estate developer from Ines Anderson Development
Corporation, which was engaged in selling business
properties in Makati, and offered to sell MPI a property
therein located. For this purpose, he
showed Lopez a photocopy of Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 216445 registered in the name of
spouses Farley and Jocelyn Handog (Sps. Handog), as
well as a Special Power of Attorney purportedly
executed by the spouses in favor of Milla. [3]Lopez
verified with the Registry of Deeds of Makati and
confirmed that the property was indeed registered under
the names of Sps. Handog. Since Lopez was convinced
by Millas authority, MPI purchased the property for P2
million, issuing Security Bank and Trust Co. (SBTC)
Check No. 154670 in the amount of P1.6 million. After
receiving the check, Milla gave Lopez (1) a notarized
Deed of Absolute Sale dated 25 March 2003 executed by
Sps. Handog in favor of MPI and (2) an original Owners
Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 216445.[4]
Milla then gave Regino Acosta (Acosta), Lopezs
partner, a copy of the new Certificate of Title to the
property, TCT No. 218777, registered in the name of
MPI. Thereafter, it tendered in favor of Milla SBTC
Check No. 15467111 in the amount of P400,000 as
the Philippines
payment for the balance.[5] Court
Milla turned over TCT No. 218777 to Acosta,
but did not furnish the latter with the receipts for the
transfer taxes and other costs incurred in the transfer of
the property. This failure to turn over the receipts
G.R. No.
prompted Lopez to check with the Register of Deeds,
Present: where he discovered that (1) the Certificate of Title
given to them by Milla could not be found therein; (2)
CARPIO,
there was no transfer of the property from Sps. Handog
Chairperson,
PEREZ, to MPI; and (3) TCT No. 218777 was registered in the
SERENO, name of a certain Matilde M. Tolentino.[6]
REYES,
PERLAS-BERNABE,
Consequently, Lopez demanded the return of the
Promulgated:
amount of P2 million from Milla, who then issued
January 25,Equitable
2012 PCI Check Nos. 188954 and 188955 dated 20
and 23 May 2003, respectively, in the amount of P1
million each. However, these checks were dishonored
for having been drawn against insufficient funds. When
Milla ignored the demand letter sent by Lopez, the latter,
by virtue of the authority vested in him by the MPI
Board of Directors, filed a Complaint against the former
on 4 August 2003. On 27 and 29 October 2003, two
Informations for Estafa Thru Falsification of Public
Documents were filed against Milla and were raffled to
the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, Makati City, Branch 146 (RTC Br. 146). [7]Milla
was accused of having committed estafa through the
falsification of the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale and
TCT No. 218777 purportedly issued by the Register of
Deeds of Makati, viz:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 034167
That on or about the 25th day of
March 2003, in the City of Makati,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, a private individual, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify a document
denomindated as Deed of Absolute Sale,
duly notarized by Atty. Lope M.
Velasco, a Notary Public for and in the
City of Makati, denominated as Doc.
No. 297, Page No. 61, Book No. 69,
Series of 2003 in his Notarial Register,
hence, a public document, by causing it
to appear that the registered owners of
the property covered by TCT No.
216445 have sold their land to
complainant Market Pursuits, Inc. when
in truth and in fact the said Deed of
Absolute Sale was not executed by the
owners thereof and after the document
was falsified, accused, with intent to
defraud complainant Market Pursuits,
Inc. presented the falsified Deed of Sale
to complainant, herein represented by
Carlo V. Lopez, and complainant
believing in the genuineness of the Deed
of Absolute Sale paid accused the
amount of P1,600,000.00 as partial
 payment for the property, to the damage
and prejudice of complainant in the
aforementioned amount of
P1,600,000.00
CONTRARY TO LAW.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 034168
That on or about the 3rd day of April
2003, in the City of Makati, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, a private individual, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify a document
denominated as Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 218777 purportedly issued by
the Register of Deeds of Makati City,
hence, a public document, by causing it
to appear that the lot covered by TCT
No. 218777 was already registered in
the name of complainant Market
Pursuits, Inc., herein represented by
Carlo V. Lopez, when in truth and in
fact, as said accused well knew that the
Register of Deeds of Makati did not
issue TCT No. 218777 in the name of
Market Pursuits Inc., and after the
document was falsified, accused with
intent to defraud complainant and
complainant believing in the
genuineness of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 218777 paid accused the
amount of P400,000.00, to the damage
and prejudice of complainant in the
aforementioned amount of
P4000,000.00 (sic).
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
After the prosecution rested its case, Milla filed,
with leave of court, his Demurrer to Evidence. [9] In its
Order dated 26 January 2006, RTC Br. 146 denied the
demurrer and ordered him to present evidence, but he
failed to do so despite having been granted ample
opportunity.[10] Though the court considered his right to
present evidence to have been consequently waived, it
nevertheless allowed him to file a memorandum. [11]
In its Joint Decision dated 28 November 2006,
[12]
RTC Br. 146 found Milla guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two counts of estafa through falsification of
public documents, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is
rendered finding the accused Cresencio
Milla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
two (2) counts of estafa through
falsification of public documents.
Applying the indeterminate sentence
law and considering that the amount
involved is more than P22,000,00 this
Court should apply the provision that an
additional one (1) year should be
imposed for every ten thousand
(P10,000.00) pesos in excess of
P22,000.00, thus, this Court is
constrained to impose the Indeterminate
(sic) penalty of four (4) years, two (2)
months one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal as maximum
for each count.
Accused is adjudged to be
civilly liable to the private complainant
and is ordered pay (sic) complainant the
total amount of TWO MILLION
(P2,000,000.00) PESOS with legal rate
of interest from the filing of the
Information until the same is fully paid
and to pay the costs. He is further
ordered to pay attorneys fees equivalent
to ten (10%) of the total amount due as
and for attorneys fees. A lien on the
monetary award is constituted in favor
of the government, the private
complainant not having paid the
required docket fee prior to the filing of
the Information.
SO ORDERED.[13]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in the assailed
Decision dated 22 April 2009, affirmed the findings of
the trial court.[14] In its assailed Resolution dated 8 July
2009, it also denied Millas subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration.[15]
In the instant Petition, Milla alleges that the
Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals
were not in accordance with law and jurisprudence. He
raises the following issues:
I. Whether the case should be
reopened on the ground of negligence of
counsel;
II. Whether the principle of novation is
applicable;
III. Whether the principle of simple loan
is applicable;
IV. Whether the Secretarys Certificate
presented by the prosecution is
admissible in evidence;
V. Whether the supposed inconsistent
statements of prosecution witnesses cast
a doubt on the guilt of petitioner.[16]
In its Comment, MPI argues that (1) Milla was not
deprived of due process on the ground of gross
negligence of counsel; (2) under the Revised Penal
Code, novation is not one of the grounds for the
extinction of criminal liability for estafa; and (3) factual
findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are final and conclusive.[17]
On the other hand, in its Comment, the Office of the
Solicitor General contends that (1) Milla was accorded
due process of law; (2) the elements of the crime
charged against him were established during trial; (3)
novation is not a ground for extinction of criminal
liability for estafa; (4) the money received by Milla from
Lopez was not in the nature of a simple loan or cash
advance; and (5) Lopez was duly authorized by MPI to
institute the action.[18]
In his Consolidated Reply, Milla reiterates that the
negligence of his former counsel warrants a reopening of
the case, wherein he can present evidence to prove that
his transaction with MPI was in the nature of a simple
loan.[19]
In the disposition of this case, the following issues must
be resolved:
I. Whether the negligence of counsel
deprived Milla of due process of law
II. Whether the principle of novation
can exculpate Milla from criminal
liability
III. Whether the factual findings of the
trial court, as affirmed by the appellate
court, should be reviewed on appeal
We resolve to deny the Petition.
Milla
was not
deprive
d of
due
process
. purely civil one. This argument does not persuade.
Milla argues that the negligence of his former counsel,
Atty. Manuel V. Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), deprived
him of due process. Specifically, he states that after the
prosecution had rested its case, Atty. Mendoza filed a
Demurrer to Evidence, and that the former was never
advised by the latter of the demurrer. Thus, Milla was
purportedly surprised to discover that RTC Br. 146 had
already rendered judgment finding him guilty, and that it
had issued a warrant for his arrest. Atty. Mendoza filed
an Omnibus Motion for Leave to File Motion for New
Trial, which Milla claims to have been denied by the
trial court for being an inappropriate remedy, thus,
demonstrating his counsels negligence. These
contentions cannot be given any merit.
The general rule is that the mistake of a counsel binds
the client, and it is only in instances wherein the
negligence is so gross or palpable that courts must step
in to grant relief to the aggrieved client. [20] In this case,
Milla was able to file a Demurrer to Evidence, and upon
the trial courts denial thereof, was allowed to present
evidence.[21] Because of his failure to do so, RTC Br. 146
was justified in considering that he had waived his right
thereto. Nevertheless, the trial court still allowed him to
submit a memorandum in the interest of justice. Further,
contrary to his assertion that RTC Br. 146 denied the
Motion to Recall Warrant of Arrest thereafter filed by his
former counsel, a reading of the 2 August 2007 Order of
RTC Br. 146 reveals that it partially denied the Omnibus
Motion for New Trial and Recall of Warrant of Arrest,
but granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Avail of
Remedies under the Rules of Court, allowing him to file
an appeal and lifting his warrant of arrest. [22]
It can be gleaned from the foregoing circumstances that
Milla was given opportunities to defend his case and was
granted concomitant reliefs. Thus, it cannot be said that
the mistake and negligence of his former counsel were
so gross and palpable to have deprived him of due
process.
The
princip
le of
novatio
n
cannot
be
applied
to the
case at
bar.
Milla contends that his issuance of Equitable PCI Check
Nos. 188954 and 188955 before the institution of the
criminal complaint against him novated his obligation to
MPI, thereby enabling him to avoid any incipient
criminal liability and converting his obligation into a
The principles of novation cannot apply to the present
case as to extinguish his criminal liability. Milla
cites People v. Nery[23] to support his
contention that his issuance of the Equitable PCI checks
prior to the filing of the criminal complaint averted his
incipient criminal liability. However, it must be clarified
that mere payment of an obligation before the institution
of a criminal complaint does not, on its own, constitute
novation that may prevent criminal liability. This Courts
ruling in Nery in fact warned:
It may be observed in this
regard that novation is not one of the
means recognized by the Penal Code
whereby criminal liability can be
extinguished; hence, the role of novation
may only be to either prevent the rise of
criminal liability or to cast doubt on the
true nature of the original petition,
whether or not it was such that its
breach would not give rise to penal
responsibility, as when money loaned is
made to appear as a deposit, or other
similar disguise is resorted to (cf. Abeto
vs. People, 90 Phil. 581; Villareal, 27
Phil. 481).
 Even in Civil Law the that breed incompatibility must be
acceptance of partial payments, essential in nature and not merely
without further change in the original accidental. The incompatibility must
relation between the complainant and take place in any of the essential
the accused, can not produce elements of the obligation, such as its
novation. For the latter to exist, there object, cause or principal conditions
must be proof of intent to extinguish thereof; otherwise, the change would
the original relationship, and such be merely modificatory in nature and
intent can not be inferred from the insufficient to extinguish the original
mere acceptance of payments on obligation.
account of what is totally due. Much
less can it be said that the acceptance of The changes alluded to by
partial satisfaction can effect the petitioner consists only in the manner
nullification of a criminal liability that is of payment. There was really no
fully matured, and already in the process substitution of debtors since private
of enforcement. Thus, this Court has complainant merely acquiesced to the
ruled that the offended partys payment but did not give her consent to
acceptance of a promissory note for enter into a new contract. The appellate
all or part of the amount misapplied court observed:
does not obliterate the criminal xxx xxx xxx
offense (Camus vs. Court of Appeals, 48
Off. Gaz. 3898).[24] (Emphasis supplied.) The
acceptance by
complainant of partial
Further, in Quinto v. People,[25] this Court exhaustively payment tendered by
the buyer, Leonor
explained the concept of novation in relation to incipient
Camacho, does not
criminal liability, viz: evince the intention of
the complainant to
Novation is never have their agreement
presumed, and the animus novandi, novated. It was simply
whether totally or partially, must appear necessitated by the
by express agreement of the parties, or fact that, at that time,
by their acts that are too clear and Camacho had
unequivocal to be mistaken. substantial accounts
payable to
The extinguishment of the old complainant, and
obligation by the new one is a necessary because of the fact
element of novation which may be that appellant made
effected either expressly or herself scarce to
impliedly. The term expressly means complainant. (TSN,
that the contracting parties April 15, 1981, 31-32)
incontrovertibly disclose that their Thus, to obviate the
object in executing the new contract is situation where
to extinguish the old one. Upon the complainant would
other hand, no specific form is required end up with nothing,
for an implied novation, and all that is she was forced to
prescribed by law would be an receive the tender of
incompatibility between the two Camacho. Moreover, it
contracts. While there is really no hard is to be noted that the
and fast rule to determine what might aforesaid payment was
constitute to be a sufficient change for the purchase, not of
that can bring about novation, the the jewelry subject of
touchstone for contrariety, however, this case, but of some
would be an irreconcilable other jewelry subject of
incompatibility between the old and a previous transaction.
the new obligations. (Ibid. June 8, 1981, 10-
11)
There are two ways which could
indicate, in fine, the presence of xxx xxx xxx
novation and thereby produce the effect
of extinguishing an obligation by Art. 315 of the Revised Penal
another which substitutes the same. The Code defines estafa and penalizes any
first is when novation has been person who shall defraud another by
explicitly stated and declared in misappropriating or converting, to the
unequivocal terms. The second is when prejudice of another, money, goods, or
the old and the new obligations are any other personal property received by
incompatible on every point. The test of the offender in trust or on commission,
incompatibility is whether or not the or for administration, or under any other
two obligations can stand together, obligation involving the duty to make
each one having its independent delivery of or to return the same, even
existence. If they cannot, they are though such obligation be totally or
incompatible and the latter obligation partially guaranteed by a bond; or by
novates the first. Corollarily, changes
 denying having received such money,
goods, or other property. It is axiomatic
that the gravamen of the offense is the
appropriation or conversion of money or
property received to the prejudice of the
owner. The terms convert and
misappropriate have been held to
connote an act of using or disposing of
anothers property as if it were ones own
or devoting it to a purpose or use
different from that agreed upon. The
phrase, to misappropriate to ones own
use has been said to include not only
conversion to ones personal advantage,
but also every attempt to dispose of the
property of another without right. Verily,
the sale of the pieces of jewelry on
installments (sic) in contravention of the
explicit terms of the authority granted to
her in Exhibit A (supra) is deemed to be
one of conversion. Thus, neither the
theory of delay in the fulfillment of
commission nor that of novation posed
by petitioner, can avoid the incipient
criminal liability. In People vs.
Nery, this Court held:
xxx xxx xxx
The criminal liability for
estafa already committed is then not
affected by the subsequent novation
of contract, for it is a public offense
which must be prosecuted and
punished by the State in its own
conation. (Emphasis supplied.)[26]
In the case at bar, the acceptance by MPI of the
Equitable PCI checks tendered by Milla could not have
novated the original transaction, as the checks were only
intended to secure the return of the P2 million the former
had already given him. Even then, these checks bounced
and were thus unable to satisfy his liability. Moreover,
the estafa involved here was not for simple
misappropriation or conversion, but was committed
through Millas falsification of public documents, the
liability for which cannot be extinguished by mere
novation.
The
Court
of
Appeal
s was
correct
in
affirmi
ng the
trial
courts
finding
of
guilt.
Finally, Milla assails the factual findings of the trial court.
Suffice it to say that factual findings of the trial court,
especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are
binding on and accorded great respect by this Court.[27]
There was no reversible error on the part of the Court of
Appeals when it affirmed the finding of the trial court that
Milla was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
of estafa through falsification of public documents. The
prosecution was able to prove the existence of all the
elements of the crime charged. The relevant provisions of
the Revised Penal Code read:
Art. 172. Falsification by private
individual and use of falsified
documents. The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine of not more
than 5,000 shall be imposed upon:
1. Any private
individual who shall commit any of the
falsification enumerated in the next
preceding article in any public or official
document or letter of exchange or any
other kind of commercial document
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 315. Swindling
(estafa). Any person who shall defraud
another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By means of any of the
following false pretenses or fraudulent
acts executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using a fictitious name, or
falsely pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business or imaginary
transactions; or by means of other similar
deceits.
xxx xxx xxx
It was proven during trial that Milla misrepresented
himself to have the authority to sell the subject property,
and it was precisely this misrepresentation that prompted
MPI to purchase it. Because of its reliance on his
authority and on the falsified Deed of Absolute Sale and
TCT No. 218777, MPI parted with its money in the
amount of P2 million, which has not been returned until
now despite Millas allegation of novation. Clearly, he is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa through
falsification of public documents.
WHEREFORE, we resolve to DENY the
Petition. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 199877 August 13, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ARTURO LARA y ORBISTA, Accused-Appellant.
VILLARAMA, JR.,*
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is an automatic appeal from the Decision 1 dated
July 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR HC No. 03685. The CA affirmed the Decision2 dated
October 1, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Pasig City, Branch 268, finding Arturo Lara (Lara) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.
On June 14, 2001, an Information 3 charging Lara with
robbery with homicide was filed with the RTC:
On or about May 31, 2001, in Pasig City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, armed
with a gun, conspiring and confederating together with
one unidentified person who is still at-large, and both of
them mutually helping and aiding one another, with
intent to gain, and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and divest from Joselito M.
Bautista cash money amounting to P 230,000.00 more or
less and belonging to San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc.
represented by Enrique Sumulong; that on the occasion
of said robbery, the said accused, with intent to kill, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, and shoot said Joselito M. Bautista with
the said gun, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal
wounds which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.4
Following Laras plea of not guilty, trial ensued. The
prosecution presented three (3) witnesses: Enrique
Sumulong (Sumulong), SPO1 Bernard Cruz (SPO1
Cruz) and PO3 Efren Calix (PO3 Calix).
Sumulong testified that: (a) he was an accounting staff of
San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc. (San Sebastian); (b)
on May 31, 2001 and at around 9:00 in the morning, he
withdrew the amount of P 230,000.00 from the
Metrobank-Mabini Branch, Pasig City to defray the
salaries of the employees of San Sebastian; (c) in going
to the bank, he rode a pick-up and was accompanied by
Virgilio Manacob (Manacob), Jeff Atie (Atie) and
Joselito Bautista (Bautista); (d) he placed the amount
withdrawn in a black bag and immediately left the bank;
(e) at around 10:30 in the morning, while they were at
the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig
City, Lara suddenly appeared at the front passenger side
of the pick-up and pointed a gun at him stating, "Akin na
ang pera, iyong bag, nasaan?"; (f) Bautista, who was
seated at the back, shouted, "Wag mong ibigay"; (g)
heeding Bautistas advice, he threw the bag in Bautistas
direction; (h) after getting hold of the bag, Bautista
alighted from the pick-up and ran; (i) seein Bautista,
Lara ran after him while firing his gun; (j) when he had
the chance to get out of the pick-up, he ran towards
Mercedes Plaza and called up the office of San Sebastian
to relay the incident; (k) when he went back to where the
pick-up was parked, he went to the rear portion of the
vehicle and saw blood on the ground; (l) he was
informed by one bystander that Bautista was shot and
the bag was taken away from him; (m) when barangay
officials and the police arrived, he and his two (2) other
companions were brought to the police station for
investigation; (n) on June 7, 2001, while on his way to
Barangay Maybunga, Pasig City, he saw Lara walking
along Dr. Pilapil Street, Barangay San Miguel, Pasig
City; (o) he alerted the police and Lara was thereafter
arrested; and (p) at the police station, he, Atie and
Manacob identified Lara as the one who shot and robbed
them of San Sebastians money.5
SPO1 Cruz testified that: (a) he was assigned at the
Follow-Up Unit of the Pasig City Police Station; (b) at
around 7:55 in the evening of June 7, 2001, Sumulong
went to the police station and informed him that he saw
Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street; (c) four (4) police
officers and Sumulong went to Dr. Pilapil Street where
they saw Lara, who Sumulong identified; (d) they then
approached Lara and invited him for questioning; (e) at
the police station, Lara was placed in a line-up where he
was positively identified by Sumulong, Manacob and
Atie; and (f) after being identified, Lara was informed of
his rights and subsequently detained.6
PO3 Calix testified that: (a) he was a member of the
Criminal Investigation Unit of the Pasig City Police
Station; (b) on May 31, 2001, he was informed of a
robbery that took place at the corner of Mercedes and
Market Avenues, Pasig City; (c) he, together with three
(3) other police officers, proceeded to the crime scene;
(d) upon arriving thereat, one of the police officers who
were able to respond ahead of them, handed to him
eleven (11) pieces of empty shells and six (6) deformed
slugs of a 9mm pistol; (e) as part of his investigation, he
interviewed Sumulong, Atie, Manacob at the police
station; and (f) before Bautista died, he was able to
interview Bautista at the hospital where the latter was
brought after the incident.7
In his defense, Lara testified that: (a) he was a plumber
who resided at Dr. Pilapil Street, San Miguel, Pasig City;
(b) on May 31, 2001, he was at his house, digging a
sewer trench while his brother, Wilfredo, was
constructing a comfort room; (c) they were working
from 8:00 in the morning until 3:00 in the afternoon; (d)
on June 7, 2001 and at around 7:00 in the evening, while
he was at the house of one of his cousins, police officers
arrived and asked him if he was Arturo Lara; (e) after
confirming that he was Arturo Lara, the police officers
asked him to go with them to the Barangay Hall; (f) he
voluntarily went with them and while inside the patrol
car, one of the policemen said, "You are lucky, we were
able to caught you in your house, if in another place we
will kill you" (sic); (g) he was brought to the police
station and not the barangay hall as he was earlier told
where he was investigated for robbery with homicide;
(h) when he told the police that he was at home when the
subject incident took place, the police challenged him to
produce witnesses; (i) when his witnesses arrived at the
station, one of the police officers told them to come back
the following day; (j) while he was at the police line-up
holding a name plate, a police officer told Sumulong and
Atie, "Ituru nyo na yan at uuwi na tayo"; and (k) when
his witnesses arrived the following day, they were told
that he will be subjected to an inquest.8
To corroborate his testimony, Lara presented one of his
neighbors, Simplicia Delos Reyes. She testified that on
May 31, 2001, while she was manning her store, she saw
Lara working on a sewer trench from 9:00 in the
morning to 5:00 in the afternoon. 9 Lara also presented
his sister, Edjosa Manalo, who testified that he was
working on a sewer line the whole day of May 31,
2001.10
On October 1, 2008, the RTC convicted Lara of robbery
with homicide in a Decision, 11 the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds
the accused ARTURO LARA Y Orbista GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 294 (1)
as amended by Republic Act 7659, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties
prescribed by law.
Accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased the sum of Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and Php230,000.00 representing the money carted by the
said accused.
12
SO ORDERED.
The RTC rejected Laras defense of alibi as follows:
The prosecutions witness Enrique Sumulong positively
identified accused Arturo Lara as the person who carted
away the payroll money of San Sebastian Allied
Services, Inc., on May 31, 2001 at around 10:30 oclock
in the morning along the corner of Mercedez and Market
Ave., Pasig City and the one who shot Joselito Bautista
which caused his instantaneous death on the same day.
As repeatedly held by the Supreme Court, "For alibi to
prosper, an accused must show he was at some other
place for such a period of time that it was impossible for
him to have been at the crime scene at the time of the
commission of the crime" (People versus Bano, 419
SCRA 697). Considering the proximity of the distance
between the place of the incident and the residence of
the accused where he allegedly stayed the whole day of
May 31, 2001, it is not physically impossible for him to
be at the crime scene within the same barangay. The
positive identification of the accused which were
categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill
motive on the part of the eyewitnesses, should prevail
over the alibi and denial of the accused whose testimony
was not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence
(People versus Aves 420 SCRA 259).13 (Emphasis
supplied)
On appeal, Lara pointed out several errors that
supposedly attended his conviction. First, that he was
arrested without a warrant under circumstances that do
not justify a warrantless arrest rendered void all
proceedings including those that led to his conviction.
Second, he was not assisted by counsel when the police
placed him in a line-up to be identified by the witnesses
for the prosecution in violation of Section 12, Article III
of the Constitution. The police line-up is part of
custodial investigation and his right to counsel had
already attached. Third, the prosecution failed to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the
prosecution failed to present a witness who actually saw
him commit the alleged acts. Sumulong merely
presumed that he was the one who shot Bautista and who
took the bag of money from him. The physical
description of Lara that Sumulong gave to the police was
different from the one he gave during the trial, indicating
that he did not have a fair glimpse of the perpetrator.
Moreover, this gives rise to the possibility that it was his
unidentified companion who shot Bautista and took
possession of the money. Hence, it cannot be reasonably
claimed that his conviction was attended with moral
certainty. Fourth, the trial court erred in discounting the
testimony of his witnesses. Without any showing that
they were impelled by improper motives in testifying in
his favor, their testimonies should have been given the
credence they deserve. While his two (2) witnesses were
his sister and neighbor, this does not by itself suggest the
existence of bias or impair their credibility.
The CA affirmed Laras conviction. That Lara was
supposedly arrested without a warrant may not serve as a
ground to invalidate the proceedings leading to his
conviction considering its belated invocation. Any
objections to the legality of the warrantless arrest should
have been raised in a motion to quash duly filed before
the accused enters his plea; otherwise, it is deemed
waived. Further, that the accused was illegally arrested is
not a ground to set aside conviction duly arrived at and
based on evidence that sufficiently establishes
culpability:
Appellants avowal could hardly wash.
It is a shopworn doctrine that any objection involving a
warrant of arrest or the acquisition of jurisdiction over
the person of an accused must be made before he enters
his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. In
voluntarily submitting himself to the court by entering a
plea, instead of filing a motion to quash the information
for lack of jurisdiction over his person, accused-
appellant is deemed to have waived his right to assail the
legality of his arrest. Applying the foregoing
jurisprudential touchstone, appellant is estopped from
questioning the validity of his arrest since he never
raised this issue before arraignment or moved to quash
the Information.
What is more, the illegal arrest of an accused is not
sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from
error. The warrantless arrest, even if illegal, cannot
render void all other proceedings including those leading
to the conviction of the appellants and his co-accused,
nor can the state be deprived of its right to convict the
guilty when all the facts on record point to their
culpability.14 (Citations omitted)
As to whether the identification of Lara during the police
line-up is inadmissible as his right to counsel was
violated, the CA ruled that there was no legal
compulsion to afford him a counsel during a police line-
up since the latter is not part of custodial investigation.
Appellants assertion that he was under custodial
investigation at the time he was identified in a police
line-up and therefore had the right to counsel does not
hold water. Ingrained in our jurisdiction is the rule that
an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in
a police line-up considering that such is usually not a
part of custodial investigation. An exception to this rule
is when the accused had been the focus of police
attention at the start of the investigation. In the case at
bench, appellant was identified in a police line-up by
prosecution witnesses from a group of persons gathered
for the purpose. However, there was no proof that
appellant was interrogated at all or that a statement or
confession was extracted from him. A priori, We refuse
to hearken to appellants hollow cry that he was deprived
of his constitutional right to counsel given the hard fact Q Who was firing the gun?
that during the police line-up, the accusatory process had
not yet commenced. A The one who held-up us, sir.

Assuming ex hypothesi that appellant was subjected to Q By how, do you know his name?
interrogation sans counsel during the police line-up, it
does not in any way affect his culpability. Any allegation A No, sir.
of violation of rights during custodial investigation is
relevant and material only to cases in which an Q But if you can see him again, (were) you be
extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the able to recognize him?
accused becomes the basis of their conviction. Here,
appellant was convicted based on the testimony of a A Yes, sir.
prosecution witness and not on his alleged uncounseled
confession or admission.15 (Citations omitted)
Q If he is in the courtroom, will you be able to
recognize him?
The CA addressed Laras claim that the prosecutions
failure to present a witness who actually saw him
A Yes, sir.
commit the crime charged as follows:
Q Please look around and please tell this
Third. Appellant takes umbrage at the alleged failure of
Honorable Court whether indeed the person you
the prosecution to present an eyewitness to prove that he
saw holding you up at that time is in court?
shot the victim and took the money.
A Yes, sir.
Such posture is unpersuasive.
Q Will you please stand up and tap his shoulder
Contrary to appellants assertion, prosecution witness
to identify him?
Sumulong actually saw him shoot Bautista, the victim.
Sumulong vividly recounted, viz:
Interpreter:
"Q When you said that "tinutukan ka", aside
from this act was there any other words spoken The witness tap the shoulder of a person sitting
by this person? on the first bench of the courtroom wearing
yellow t-shirt and black pants who when ask
identify himself as Arturo Lara (sic).
A There was, sir.
Q And when as you said Joey got the bag.
Q What did he say?
Alighted from the vehicle and ran away with it,
what did the accused do? (sic)
A "Nasaan ang bag ilabas mo yung pera", sir.
A He shot Joey while running around our
Q Where were you looking when this person vehicle, sir.
approached you?
Q Around how many shots according to your
A I was looking at his face, sir. recollection were fired?
Q And upon hearing those words, what did you A There were several shots, more or less nine (9)
do? shots, sir.
A I put out the money, sir, because I got afraid at x x x x x x"
that time.
"Q So, you did not personally notice what had
Q Did you hand over the black bag containing transpired or happened after you stepped down
the money to him? from the Nissan pick-up, that is correct?
A No, sir, because one of my companion(s) A There was, sir, my companion Joselito
shouted not to give the money or the bag so I Bautista was shot.
immediately threw away the bag at the back
seat, sir.
Q When you heard the gunfire, you were already
proceeding towards that store to call your office
Q And how long approximately was that person by phone, that is correct?
standing by your car window?
A Not yet, sir, we were still inside the vehicle.
A Five (5) to ten (10) minutes, sir.
Q And was Joselito Bautista at the rear of the
Q And after you have thrown the black bag Nissan Sentra when you heard this gunfire?
containing money to the back of the vehicle,
what did that person do?
A Yes, sir.
A I saw Joey alight(ed) from the vehicle
Q And so he was at the back, so the shooter was
carrying the bag and ran away, sir, and I also
also at the back of the vehicle, that is correct?
saw somebody shoot a gun?
 A Yes, sir, he went towards the rear portion of
the vehicle, he followed Joselito Bautista and
shot him.
Q So, to be clear, when Joselito Bautista ran to
the rear, this alleged holdup(p)er followed him?
A Yes, sir.
Q And that was the time(,) you heard this
gunfire? A Yes, sir.
Q So, you did not personally see who fired that
firearm?
A Because at that time he was the one holding
the gun, sir.
Q So, you are presuming that he was the one
who fired the gun because he was holding the
gun, am I correct?
A Yes, sir."
xxxx
Under Section 4, Rule 133, of the Rules of Court,
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the
following requisites concur:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Here, the following circumstantial evidence are tellingly
sufficient to prove that the guilt of appellant is beyond
reasonable doubt, viz:
1. While the vehicle was at the intersection of Mercedes
and Market Avenues, Pasig City, appellant suddenly
emerged and pointed a gun at prosecution witness
Sumulong, demanding from him to produce the bag
containing the money.
2. Prosecution witness Sumulong threw the bag to the
victim who was then seated at the backseat of the
vehicle.
3. The victim alighted from vehicle carrying the bag.
4. Appellant chased and fired several shots at the victim.
5. The victim sustained several gunshot wounds.
6. The police officers recovered from the scene of the
crime six deformed empty shells.16 (Citations omitted
and emphasis supplied)
Finally, the CA found that Laras alibi failed to convince.
Specifically:
Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that
positive identification of the accused, where categorical
and consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the
part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the
alibi and denial of appellants, whose testimonies are not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
All the more, to establish alibi the accused must prove
(a) that he was present at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
Physical impossibility "refers to the distance between the
place where the accused was when the crime transpired
and the place where it was committed, as well as the
facility of access between the two places. Appellant
miserably failed to prove the physical impossibility of
his presence at the locus criminis at the time of the
perpetration of the felonious act. He himself admitted
that his house was just a stones throw (about three
minutes away) from the crime scene.17 (Citations
omitted)
In a Resolution18 dated February 1, 2012, this Court
accepted the appeal as the penalty imposed was
reclusion perpetua and the parties were afforded an
opportunity to file their supplemental briefs. Both parties
waived their right to do so, stating that they would adopt
the allegations in their respective briefs that they filed
with the CA.
Issues
The present review of Laras conviction for robbery with
homicide gives rise to the following issues:
a. whether the identification made by Sumulong,
Atie and Manacob in the police line-up is
inadmissible because Lara stood therein without
the assistance of counsel;
b. whether Laras supposedly illegal arrest may
be raised for the first time on appeal for the
purpose of nullifying his conviction;
c. whether there is sufficient evidence to convict
Lara; and
d. whether Laras alibi can be given credence so
as to exonerate him from the crime charged.
Our Ruling
This Court resolves to deny the appeal.
I
Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be
acquired through compulsory process such as a warrant
of arrest or through his voluntary appearance, such as
when he surrenders to the police or to the court. 19 Any
objection to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over
the person of the accused must be made before he enters
his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. An
accused submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court upon
entering a plea and participating actively in the trial and
this precludes him invoking any irregularities that may
have attended his arrest.20
Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a
sufficient ground to reverse and set aside a conviction
that was arrived upon a complaint duly filed and a trial
conducted without error.21 As Section 9, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground
therefor. The failure of the accused to assert any
ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the
complaint or information, either because he did not file a
motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said
motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections
except those based on the grounds provided for in
paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule.
II
Contrary to Laras claim, that he was not provided with
counsel when he was placed in a police line-up did not
invalidate the proceedings leading to his conviction.
That he stood at the police line-up without the assistance
of counsel did not render Sumulongs identification of
Lara inadmissible. The right to counsel is deemed to
have arisen at the precise moment custodial investigation
begins and being made to stand in a police line-up is not
the starting point or a part of custodial investigation. As
this Court previously ruled in People v. Amestuzo:22
The contention is not meritorious. The guarantees of
Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-
called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person
while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial
investigation starts when the police investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody
by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds
questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements.
Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation;
hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage. This
was settled in the case of People vs. Lamsing and in the
more recent case of People vs. Salvatierra. The right to
be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial
investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused
during identification in a police line-up because it is not
part of the custodial investigation process. This is
because during a police line-up, the process has not yet
shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory and it is
usually the witness or the complainant who is
interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of
the line-up.23(Citations omitted)
III
It is apparent from the assailed decision of the CA that
the finding of guilt against Lara is based on
circumstantial evidence. The CA allegedly erred in this
wise considering that only direct and not circumstantial
evidence can overcome the presumption of innocence.
However, well-settled is the rule that direct evidence of
the commission of the crime is not the only matrix
wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and
finding of guilt. Even in the absence of direct evidence,
conviction can be had if the established circumstances
constitute an unbroken chain, consistent with each other
and to the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, to the
exclusion of all other hypothesis that he is not. 24
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, circumstantial evidence sufficed to
convict upon the concurrence of the following requisites:
(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
It is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be
convicted of the crime for which he is charged. Resort to
circumstantial evidence is essential since to insist on
direct testimony would, in many cases, result in setting
felons free and denying proper protection to the
community.25
As the CA correctly ruled, the following circumstances
established by the evidence for the prosecution strongly
indicate Laras guilt: (a) while the vehicle Sumulong,
Atie, Manacob and Bautista were riding was at the
intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, he
appeared at the front passenger side thereof armed with a
gun; (b) while pointing the gun at Sumulong who was at
the front passenger seat, Lara demanded that Sumulong
give him the bag containing the money; (c) instead of
giving the bag to Lara, Sumulong gave it to Bautista
who was seated at the back of the pick-up; (d) when
Bautista got hold of the bag, he alighted and ran towards
the back of the pick-up; (e) Lara ran after Bautista and
while doing so, fired his gun at Bautistas direction; (f)
Bautista sustained several gunshot wounds; and (g)
Bautistas blood was on the crime scene and empty
shells were recovered therefrom.
Indeed, in cases of robbery with homicide, the taking of
personal property with intent to gain must itself be
established beyond reasonable doubt. Conclusive
evidence proving the physical act of asportation by the
accused must be presented by the prosecution. It must be
shown that the original criminal design of the culprit was
robbery and the homicide was perpetrated with a view to
the consummation of the robbery by reason or on the
occasion of the robbery.26 The mere presence of the
accused at the crime scene is not enough to implicate
him. It is essential to prove the intent to rob and the use
of violence was necessary to realize such intent.
In this case, Laras intent to gain is proven by
Sumulongs positive narration that it was Lara who
pointed the gun at him and demanded that the bag
containing the money be turned over to him. That Lara
resorted to violence in order to actualize his intent to
gain is proven by Sumulongs testimony that he saw
Lara fire the gun at the direction of Bautista, who was
running away from the pick-up in order to prevent Lara
from taking possession of the money.
Notably, the incident took place in broad daylight and in
the middle of a street. Thus, where considerations of
visibility are favorable and the witness does not appear
to be biased against the accused, his or her assertions as
to the identity of the malefactor should be normally
accepted.27
Lara did not allege, much less, convincingly demonstrate
that Sumulong was impelled by improper or malicious
motives to impute upon him, however perjurious, such a
serious charge. Thus, his testimony, which the trial court
found to be forthright and credible, is worthy of full faith
and credit and should not be disturbed. If an accused had
nothing to do with the crime, it is against the natural
order of events and of human nature and against the
presumption of good faith that a prosecution witness
would falsely testify against the former.28
IV
In view of Sumulongs positive identification of Lara,
the CA was correct in denying Laras alibi outright. It is
well-settled that positive identification prevails over
alibi, which is inherently a weak defense. Such is the
rule, for as a defense, alibi is easy to concoct, and
difficult to disapprove.29
Moreover, in order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it
is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere
else when the offense was committed, but it must
likewise be demonstrated that he was so far away that it
was not possible for him to have been physically present
at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the
time of its commission. Due to its doubtful nature, alibi
must be supported by clear and convincing proof.

In this case, the proximity of Laras house at the scene of

the crime wholly negates his alibi. Assuming as true
Laras claim and that of his witnesses that he was
digging a sewer trench on the day of the incident, it is
possible that his witnesses may not have noticed him
leaving and returning given that the distance between his
house and the place where the subject incident took
place can be negotiated, even by walking, in just a
matter of minutes. Simply put, Lara and his witnesses
failed to prove that it is well-nigh impossible for him to
be at the scene of the crime.

In fine, the assailed decision of the CA is affirmed in all

respects.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision

dated July 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR HC No. 03685 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 90294 September 24, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RlCARDO RIO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ray Anthony F. Fajarito for accused-appellant.
PADILLA, J.:p
Convicted of rape and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
CXLVI * of Makati, Metro Manila, in Criminal Case No.
12042, accused-appellant Ricardo Rio interposed his
appeal and as a consequence, the clerk of court of said
regional trial court branch forwarded the records of the
case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court,
however, forwarded the records of the case to the
Supreme Court in view of the penalty imposed upon the
accused.
On 29 December 1989, the accused-appellant Ricardo
Rio, in two (2) letters dated 14 December 1989,
addressed to Division Clerk of Court Fermin J. Garma
and to Assistant Clerk of Court Tomasita M. Dris,
manifested his intention to withdraw the appeal due to
his poverty. 1
The Court resolved in a resolution dated 22 June 1990 to
require the Solicitor General to comment on the
appellant's manifestation to withdraw the appeal.
In the Comment filed by the Solicitor General, the action
recommended was for the Court to ascertain from the
accused-appellant, through the clerk of court of the trial
court, whether he desired the appointment of a
counsel de oficio on appeal, in view of the reasons stated
by him for the withdrawal of his appeal, and inasmuch
as poverty should not preclude anyone from pursuing a
cause. It was also recommended that the clerk of court of
the trial court be required by the Court to submit the
response of the accused-appellant along with a
certificate of compliance with the duty imposed on
him 2 by Section 13, of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:
Sec. 13. Appointment of counsel de
oficio for accused on appeal. It shall
be the duty of the clerk of the trial court
upon the presentation of a notice of
appeal in a criminal case, to ascertain
from the appellant, if he is confined in
prison, whether he desires the
Intermediate Appellate Court or the
Supreme Court to appoint a counsel to
defend him de oficio and to transmit
with the record, upon a form to be
prepared by the clerk of the appellate
court, a certificate of compliance with
this duty and of the response of the
appellant to his inquiry.
The branch clerk of the trial court, in a letter addressed
to the Assistant Clerk of Court of the Second Division,
this Court, in compliance with the resolution of this
Court, dated 16 April 1990, adopting the suggestions of
the Solicitor General, which required him to comply
with his duty mandated in Section 13, Rule 122 of the
Rules of Court, submitted the reply of the accused-
appellant informing the Court that he was no longer
interested in pursuing his appeal and had, in fact,
withdrawn his appeal. 3
Upon recommendation of the Solicitor General,
however, the Court in a resolution dated 1 October 1990,
denied the appellant's motion withdrawing the appeal
and appointed a counsel de oficio for the accused-
appellant for, as correctly observed by the Solicitor
General, all the letters of the accused-appellant reveal
that the only reason offered by him for the withdrawal of
his appeal is his inability to retain the services of a
counsel de parte on account of his poverty, a reason
which should not preclude anyone from seeking justice
in any forum. 4
It seems that the accused-appellant was unaware that this
Court can appoint a counsel de oficio to prosecute his
appeal pursuant to Section 13 of Rule 122 of the Rules
of Court and the constitutional mandate provided in
Section 11 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution which
reads as follows:
Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and
quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal
assistance shall not be denied to any
person by reason of poverty.
This constitutional provision imposes a duty on the
judicial branch of the government which can cannot be
taken lightly. "The Constitution", as aptly stated in one
case, "is a law for rulers and for people equally in war
and in peace and covers with the shield of its protection
all classes of men at all times and under all
circumstances." 5
Paraphrasing Mr. Justice Malcolm, "Two (2) of the basic
privileges of the accused in a criminal prosecution are
the right to the assistance of counsel and the right to a
preliminary examination. President Mckinley made the
first a part of the Organic Law in his Instructions to the
Commission by imposing the inviolable rule that in all
criminal prosecutions the accused 'shall enjoy the
right ... to have assistance of counsel for the defense'
". 6 Today said right is enshrined in the 1987
Constitution for, as Judge Cooley says, this is "perhaps
the privilege most important to the person accused of
crime." 7
"In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the
accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel.
The right to be heard would be of little meaning if it
does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even
the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill
in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of
procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted
not because he is guilty but because he does not know
how to establish his innocence. And this can happen
more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated.
It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by
counsel is deemed so important that it has become a
constitutional right and it is so implemented that under
our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to
apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is
not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an
attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign
one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor, or
grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own." 8
This right to a counsel de oficio does not cease upon the
conviction of an accused by a trial court. It continues,
even during appeal, such that the duty of the court to
assign a counsel de oficio persists where an accused
interposes an intent to appeal. Even in a case, such as the
one at bar, where the accused had signified his intent to
withdraw his appeal, the court is required to inquire into
the reason for the withdrawal. Where it finds the sole
reason for the withdrawal to be poverty, as in this case,
the court must assign a counsel de oficio, for despite
such withdrawal, the duty to protect the rights of the
accused subsists and perhaps, with greater reason. After
all, "those who have less in life must have more in
law." 9 Justice should never be limited to those who have
the means. It is for everyone, whether rich or poor. Its
scales should always be balanced and should never
equivocate or cogitate in order to favor one party over
another.
It is with this thought in mind that we charge clerks of
court of trial courts to be more circumspect with the duty
imposed on them by law (Section 13, Rule 122 of the
Rules of Court) so that courts will be above reproach and
that never (if possible) will an innocent person be
sentenced for a crime he has not committed nor the
guilty allowed to go scot-free.
In this spirit, the Court ordered the appointment of a
counsel de oficio for the accused-appellant and for said
counsel and the Solicitor General to file their respective
briefs, upon submission of which the case would be
deemed submitted for decision.
From the records of the case, it is established that the
accused-appellant was charged with the crime of rape in
a verified complaint filed by complainant Wilma Phua
Rio, duly subscribed before 3rd Assistant Fiscal Rodolfo
M. Alejandro of the province of Rizal, which reads as
follows:
That on or about the 24th day of March,
1984, in the Municipality of
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Philippines,
a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of force and
intimidation did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the undersigned Wilma
Phua against her will. 10
On 26 June 1985, at the arraignment, the accused-
appellant, assisted by Atty. Leonido Manalo of the
Makati CLAO office, as counsel de oficio, entered a plea
of not guilty to the offense charged. 11 The evidence for
the prosecution adduced at the trial established the
following facts:
During the months of February and March 1984,
complainant Wilma Phua, then only 13 years of age, was
living with her mother and three (3) sisters in a house in
Barangay Bayanan, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila. At a distance of about three (3) meters from this
house is another house with a toilet and bath also owned
by complainant's mother but which was uninhabited at
that time. The accused, complainant's uncle, being the
younger brother of complainant's mother, was staying in
their house, free of board and lodging, although he
helped in the household chores. The children used the
bathroom in the uninhabited house because the amenities
in the inhabited house were used only by the adults. 12
At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 24 March 1984,
classes having closed for vacation and while Maria Zena
Phua Rio was in the house occupied by her family, her
daughter Wilma (complainant) asked her for the key to
the comfort room of the uninhabited house because she
had to answer a call of nature. After having delivered the
key to Wilma, the latter proceeded to the other house,
entered the comfort room, and seeing that nobody was
around and that her uncle was washing dishes in their
house, proceeded to answer nature's call without taking
the precaution of locking the comfort room from
inside. 13
After relieving herself but before she could raise her
panty, the accused entered the bathroom with his body
already exposed, held Wilma's hands, and ordered her in
a loud voice to lie down and when she resisted, the
accused got mad and ordered her to lie down. After she
lay down on her back, the accused put himself on top of
her and tried to insert his private organ into her private
part. Wilma kept pushing the accused away and calling
for her mother; however, since the accused was heavier
than she, the accused succeeded in overpowering her,
inserting his penis into her vagina and having sexual
intercourse with her. After satisfying his lust, the accused
released Wilma and allowed her to leave the bathroom. 14
Outside the bathroom door, complainant met her mother
Maria Zena who, meanwhile, had proceeded to the said
other house after sensing that an inordinate length of
time had passed and her daughter, complainant herein,
had not returned from the bathroom. Maria Zena, upon
noticing that Wilma was speechless, trembling and
looking fearful, suspected something remiss so she tried
to open the door of the bathroom. Unable to open it the
first time because it was locked from inside, Maria Zena
waited a few minutes before pushing the door again.
This time she was successful in finding her brother, the
herein accused-appellant in the process of raising his
pants. Maria Zena was ignored by her brother when she
asked him the reason for his presence inside the
bathroom. 15
Still suspecting that the accused has done something to
her daughter, Maria Zena continued her inquisition of
her brother for several days but to no avail. Finally, on 9
April 1984, the accused was asked to leave the house
and move out by his sister Maria Zena. 16
Only after the departure of the accused did Wilma report
to her mother the fact that she had been raped by the
accused four (4) times between the months of February
and March of that year (1984). After receiving such
information, Maria Zena wanted her daughter to
immediately undergo physical examination; however,
Wilma, apparently traumatized by her experience, was
too weak to go with her for such examination and
frequently suffered from fainting spells. It was only on
30 April 1984 that Maria Zena was able to bring Wilma
to the police to report the matter and to file the
complaint. After the report to the police, they were
referred to the P.C. Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame
where Wilma underwent physical examination. 17
Dr. Dario Gajardo, the physician who conducted the
internal examination of Wilma, submitted a report of his
examination dated 6 May 1984. The medical report
showed, among others, the following findings:
 There is a scanty growth of pubic hair.
Labia majora are full, convex and
gaping which pale brown, slightly
hypertrophied labia minora presenting in
between. On separating the same is
disclosed an elastic, fleshly-type hymen
with deep lacerations at 3, 8 and 9
o'clock. ... 18
The medical report also showed that "there was (sic) no
external signs of recent application of any form of
trauma." 19 All these findings led him to conclude that
Wilma is "in a non-virgin state physicially." 20 Later, on
the witness stand, Dr. Gajardo would further testify that
Wilma, on inquiry, revealed that the first rape happened
in the month of February 1984, but that he could not tell
the approximate period or age of the lacerations. 21
Armed with this medical report, Maria Zena and Wilma
went back to the police where a sworn statement of
Wilma was taken and the complaint for rape against the
accused was filed before Third Assistant Fiscal Rodolfo
M. Alejandro on 12 May 1984. 22
The evidence for the defense consisted of the testimony
of the accused himself and his brother, Amado Rio. The
accused's defense was anchored on alibi and he
substantially testified as follows: that contrary to the
statements made by the witnesses for the prosecution, he
was not asked to leave their house in April 1984, the
truth being that he left in the month of January 1984 or
about a month before the alleged first rape on Wilma
was committed because, contrary to an alleged
employment agreement between brother and sister, his
sister, Maria Zena, had not paid him any salary as helper
in their house; that from the month of January 1984, up
to 24 March 1984 when the rape charged in the
complaint was allegedly committed, he was in their
hometown in Kambalo, Cahidiocan, province of
Romblon; that at the time of his arrest, he was informed
of the criminal charge of rape on his niece filed against
him in court; that from January 1984 up to the time of
his arrest on 6 May 1984, he had stayed in the house of
his uncle, Francisco Rio, and had never left the place
during the whole period.
The accused vehemently denied the rape and conjectured
that his sister could have fabricated the charge because
he left her house due to her non-payment of his salary as
helper. The brother of the accused in the person of
Amado Rio corroborated the defense of alibi of the
accused. 23
On rebuttal, the prosecution presented Nemesia B.
Merca, the Election Registrar of the Municipality of
Muntinlupa, who brought with her a Voter's Affidavit
which was executed on 31 March 1984 by one Ricardo
Rio and was subscribed and sworn to on 31 March 1984
before Tessie Balbas, Chairman of Voting Center No. 37-
A of Bayanan, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. On cross-
examination, Registrar Merca admitted that she does not
know the accused personally but that the xerox copy of
the Voter's Affidavit that she brought to court was copied
from a book containing about 60 voter's affidavits of
said precinct. 24
After comparing the signature appealing in the Voter's
Affidavit with the penmanship appearing on a
letter 25 dated 12 December 1985 written by the accused
to his brother, Amado Rio and on the envelope of said
letter, 26 the trial court ruled that the writing
characteristics on the presented documents are the same,
especially the rounded dot over the letter "i" appearing in
the afore-mentioned mentioned documents. It was,
therefore, satisfied that the Voter's Affidavit was indeed
prepared by the accused in Bayanan, Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila, on 31 March 1984, before Tessie Balbas and that
this piece of evidence completely belies the defense of
the accused as corroborated by his brother, Amado, that
he was in Romblon continuously from the month of
January 1984 up to the time that he was arrested on 6
May 1984. 27
Thus, the trial court found the accused-appellant guilty
of the crime of rape. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the above-
named accused guilty of the crime
charged in the information beyond
reasonable doubt the Court hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, with the accessory
penalties of the law, to indemnify Wilma
Phua in the sum of P15,000.00,
Philippine currency, and to pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.
The theory of the defense at the trial level was grounded
on alibi. The accused claimed that at the time of the
alleged commission of the crime of rape he was in
Romblon. This claim was corroborated by the accused's
brother, Amado Rio. However, this claim was, as
aforestated, rebutted by the prosecution's submission of
the voter's affidavit executed by the accused in
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila on 31 March 1984 when
appellant claimed he was in Romblon.
Upon careful examination of the voter's affidavit, the
Court is convinced, as the trial court, that the affidavit
was indeed executed by the accused himself and the date
appearing therein must be presumed correct and genuine.
Alibi is inherently a weak defense, easy of fabrication
especially between parents and children, husband and
wife, and other relatives and even among those not
related to each other. For such defense to prosper, the
accused must prove that it was not possible for him to
have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission. 28
In the present case, where nothing supports the alibi
except the testimony of a relative, in this case the
accused's brother Amado, it deserves but scant
consideration. 29 Moreover, the Court notes the fact that
while the accused-appellant had another brother and
sister living in Manila besides the complainant's mother,
those two never came to his aid. Were the accused the
innocent man he claims to be, these siblings would have
readily helped in his defense. The testimony of his other
brother Amado alone cannot raise the necessary doubt to
acquit him as against the evidence presented by the
prosecution.
Furthermore, it would be hard to believe that a female,
especially a twelve-year old child, would undergo the
expense, trouble and inconvenience of a public trial, not
to mention suffer the scandal, embarrassment and
humiliation such action inevitably invites, as wen as
allow an examination of her private parts if her motive
were not to bring to justice the person who had abused
her. A victim of rape will not come out in the open if her
motive were not to obtain justice. 30
It is harder still to believe that the mother of a child of in the discharge of his duty to his client and for his
twelve will abuse her child and make her undergo the professional guidance as will not make him, who is
trauma of a public trial only to punish someone, let alone sworn to uphold the law, a transgressor of its precepts. 37
a brother, for leaving her without the services of an
unpaid helper were it not with the aim to seek justice for The fact that he merely volunteered his services or the
her child. Nobody in his right mind could possibly wish circumstance that he was a counsel de oficio neither
to stamp his child falsely with the stigma that follows a diminishes nor alters the degree of professional
rape. responsibility owed to his client. 38 The ethics of the
profession require that counsel display warm zeal and
On appeal, appellant's counsel de oficio changed the great dedication to duty irrespective of the client's
theory of the defense. The new theory presented by capacity to pay him his fees. 39 Any attempted
counsel de oficio is that Wilma Phua consented when presentation of a case without adequate preparation
accused-appellant had sexual intercourse with her on 24 distracts the administration of justice and discredits the
March 1984. It was stressed by counsel de oficio that the Bar. 40
rape occurred on 24 March 1984 and that, allegedly, it
was the fourth time accused had abused complainant. Returning to the case at bar, even if we consider the
This allegation as well as the fact that complainant failed sudden shift of defense theory as warranted (which we
to lock the door to the bathroom could only have been do not), the Court is just as convinced, beyond
due to the fact that there was consent. The charge was reasonable doubt, that the accused-appellant is guilty of
filed, according to defense counsel de oficio, only the crime as charged. His conviction must be sustained.
because the complainant's mother caught them. 31
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding the
This theory of the defense on appeal that there had been accused-appellant Ricardo Rio guilty beyond reasonable
consent from the complainant, fails to generate doubt as doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to the
to the accused's guilt, for it would be an incredulous penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory
situation indeed to believe that one, so young and as yet penalties of the law, is hereby AFFIRMED. The Court,
uninitiated to the ways of the world, would permit the however, increases the amount of indemnity to be paid
occurrence of an incestuous relationship with an uncle, a by the accused-appellant to Wilma Phua to thirty
brother of her very own mother. thousand pesos (P30,000.00) in line with prevailing
jurisprudence on this matter. Costs against accused-
The Court notes the sudden swift in the theory of the appellant.
defense from one of total denial of the incident in
question, by way of alibi, to one of participation, that is, SO ORDERED.
with the alleged consent of the complainant. This new
version could only be attributed by the Court to the fact
that counsel on appeal is different from the counsel in
the trial court. Although the Solicitor General has
suggested that this sudden shift be interpreted as an
afterthought by the accused or a desperate effort to get
himself acquitted, 32 the Court deems it more likely that
this shift was caused by counsel de oficio's preparation
of the appellant's brief without examining the entire
records of the case. If the appointed counsel for the
accused, on appeal, had read the records and transcripts
of the case thoroughly, he would not have changed the
theory of the defense for such a shift can never speak
well of the credibility of the defense. Moreover, the rule
in civil procedure, which applies equally in criminal
cases, is that a party may not shift his theory on appeal.
If the counsel de oficio had been more conscientious, he
would have known that the sudden shift would be
violative of aforementioned procedural rule and
detrimental to the cause of the accused-appellant (his
client).

The Court hereby admonishes members of the Bar to be

more conscious of their duties as advocates of their
clients' causes, whether acting de parte or de oficio, for
"public interest requires that an attorney exert his best
efforts and ability in the prosecution or defense of his
client's cause." 33 Lawyers are an indispensable part of
the whole system of administering justice in this
jurisdiction. 34 And a lawyer who performs that duty
with diligence and candor not only protects the interests
of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does
honor to the Bar and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession. This is so because the
entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the
court, to the bar and to the public. 35

While a lawyer is not supposed to know all the

laws, 36 he is expected to take such reasonable precaution
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132852. May 31, 2000]
TEOFILO MARTINEZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
erroneously filed as a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45. But this procedural
infirmity notwithstanding, we have decided to give it
due course to resolve the question whether the Court of
Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying
petitioner's motion to appeal as a pauper litigant. [1]
The antecedents: Petitioner was accused of homicide in
Crim. Case No. 5753 before the Regional Trial Court of
Butuan City.[2] During the hearing on 23 June 1994
petitioner represented by Atty. Jesus G. Chavez of the
Public Attorney's Office of Butuan City objected to
petitioner's motion to be allowed to litigate as pauper
and moved instead to strike out the entire testimony of
the first witness for the prosecution on the ground that it
was inadmissible for being violative of the testimonial
privilege afforded to children in cases involving their
parents. The Presiding Judge[3] deferred his ruling on the
objection and allowed the testimony to be continued.
[4]
On 21 July 1994 the trial court issued an order
overruling the objection. On 8 August 1994 the court
denied the motion for reconsideration.[5]This prompted
petitioner to go to the Court of Appeals by way of a
petition for certiorari alleging that the trial court acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it issued the assailed orders. [6]
On 23 August 1994 petitioner filed before the Court of
Appeals a Motion to Litigate as Pauper attaching thereto
supporting affidavits executed by petitioner himself and
by two (2) ostensibly disinterested persons attesting to
petitioner's eligibility to avail himself of this privilege.
[7]
The appellate court subsequently issued its resolution
dated 21 March 1997 denying the motion and directing
petitioner to remit the docketing fees in the total amount
of P420.00 within five (5) days from notice. [8] On 7 April
1997 petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
order denying his motion to litigate as a pauper, but this
was similarly denied in the resolution of 8 October 1997.
[9]
Petitioner then filed a Manifestation on 28 October
1997 wherein he stated through counsel that he was
transmitting the docket fees required of his client "under
protest" and that the money remitted was advanced by
his counsel, Atty. Jesus G. Chavez himself. [10] The
transmittal of the amount was evidenced by two (2)
postal money orders attached to the Motion to Litigate
as Pauper.[11]
In the assailed Resolution of 10 November 1997 the
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, citing
petitioners failure to pay the required docket fee.
[12]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration citing his
compliance with the docket fee requirement as alleged in
his Manifestation adverted to above.[13] However, the
Court of Appeals in the second assailed Resolution of 21
January 1998 denied this latest motion on the ground
that, per verification by the Judicial Records Division,
the amount remitted by petitioner as docket fee was
short of 150.00.[14] Msesm
The only issue expressly raised by petitioner is whether
a motion to litigate as pauper can be entertained by an
appellate court. When petitioner filed on 23 August 1994
his original motion to appeal as pauper before the
appellate court the applicable rule was the second
paragraph of Sec. 16, rule 41, of the 1964 Revised Rules
of Court, which provides-
Sec. 16. Appeal by pauper Where a
party desiring to appeal shall establish to
the satisfaction of the trial court that he
is a pauper and unable to pay the
expenses of prosecuting the appeal, and
that the case is of such importance, by
reason of the amount involved, or the
nature of the question raised, that it
ought to be reviewed by the appellate
court, the trial judge may enter an order
entitling the party to appeal as pauper.
The clerk shall transmit to the appellate
court the entire record of the case,
including the evidence taken on trial and
the record on appeal, and the case shall
be heard in the appellate court upon the
original record so transmitted without
printing the same. Esmso
A petition to be allowed to appeal as
pauper shall not be entertained by the
appellate court.
Even prior to the adoption of the 1964 Revised Rules of
Court, the Court had uniformly frowned upon appellate
courts entertaining petitions to litigate as pauper, holding
that the question of whether a party-litigant is so poor as
to qualify him to litigate as pauper is a question of fact
which is best determined by the trial court. The trial
court is the court which may properly decide or pass
upon the question of fact which may require presentation
of evidence whether the appellant is an indigent and may
appeal as such, and whether the case is of such
importance that, by reason not only of the amount
involved but of the nature of the question raised in the
court below, it ought to be reviewed by the appellate
court.[15]
When the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure came into effect
on 1 July 1997 the provision abovequoted was not
reenacted. Section 21 of Rule 3, as now worded, outlines
the procedure for, as well as the effects of, the grant of a
motion to litigate as pauper -
Sec. 21. Indigent party. - A party may be
authorized to litigate his action, claim or
defense as an indigent if the court, upon
an ex parte application and hearing, is
satisfied that the party is one who has no
money or property sufficient and
available for food, shelter and basic
necessities for himself and his family.
Such authority shall include an
exemption from payment of docket and
other lawful fees, and of transcripts of
stenographic notes which the court may
order to be furnished him. The amount
of the docket and other lawful fees
which the indigent was exempted from
paying shall be a lien on any judgment
rendered in the case favorable to the
indigent, unless the court otherwise
provides. Esmmis
 Any adverse party may contest the grant
of such authority at any time before
judgment is rendered by the trial court.
If the court should determine after
hearing that the party declared as an
indigent is in fact a person with
sufficient income or property, the proper
docket and other lawful fees shall be
assessed and collected by the clerk of
court. If payment is not made within the
time fixed by the court, execution shall
issue or the payment thereof, without
prejudice to such other sanctions as the
court may impose.
On the other hand, Sec. 18 of Rule 141 prescribes the
evidentiary requirements for the exemption of pauper
litigants from payment of legal fees -
Sec. 18. Pauper-litigants exempt from
payment of legal fees. - Pauper-litigants
(a) whose gross income and that of their
immediate family do not exceed four
thousand (P4,000.00) pesos a month if
residing in Metro Manila, and three
thousand (P3,000.00) pesos a month if
residing outside Metro Manila, and (b)
who do not own real property with an
assessed value of more than fifty
thousand (P50,000.00) pesos shall be
exempt from the payment of legal
fees. Esmsc
The legal fees shall be a lien on any
judgment rendered in the case favorably
to the pauper-litigant, unless the court
otherwise provides.
To be entitled to the exemption herein
provided, the litigant shall execute an
affidavit that he and his immediate
family do not earn the gross income
abovementioned, nor do they own any
real property with the assessed value
aforementioned, supported by an
affidavit of a disinterested person
attesting to the truth of the litigant's
affidavit.
Any falsity in the affidavit of a litigant
or disinterested person shall be
sufficient cause to strike out the
pleading of that party, without prejudice
to whatever criminal liability may have
been incurred. Esm
It cannot be inferred from any of the aforementioned
provisions that the restrictive policy enunciated by Sec.
16, Rule 41, of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court was
carried over to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Nowhere can we find a provision to the effect that "(a)
petition to be allowed to appeal as pauper shall not be
entertained by the appellate court."
We resolve to apply the present rules on petitioner
retrospectively. Statutes regulating the procedure of the
courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage. In that
sense and to that extent procedural laws are retroactive.
[16]
We therefore hold that a motion to litigate as an
indigent can be made even before the appellate courts,
either for the prosecution of appeals, in petitions for
review or in special civil actions. Jksm
We believe that this interpretation of the present rules is
more in keeping with our Bill of Rights, which decrees
that, "(f)ree access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies
and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any
person by reason of poverty." [17] Our espousal of the
democratization of appellate remedies is shared by the
United States Supreme Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Hugo L. Black -
There is no meaningful distinction
between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a
trial court and one which effectively
denies the poor an adequate appellate
review accorded to all who have money
enough to pay the costs in advance x x x
x Such a denial is a misfit in a country
dedicated to affording equal justice to
all and special privileges to none in the
administration of its criminal law. There
can be no equal justice where the kind
of trial a man gets depends on the
amount of money he has.[18]
A perusal of the records shows that petitioner has
complied with all the evidentiary requirements for
prosecuting a motion to appear in court as a pauper. He
has executed an affidavit attesting to the fact that he and
his immediate family do not earn a gross income of more
than P3,000.00 a month, and that their only real property,
a hut, cannot be worth more than P10,000.00.[19] He has
also submitted a joint affidavit executed by Florencia L.
Ongtico and Helen Maur, both residents of Butuan City,
who generally attested to the same allegations contained
in petitioner's own affidavit.[20] Based on this evidence,
the Court finds that petitioner is qualified to litigate as an
indigent. Chief
WHEREFORE, the questioned Resolution of the Court
of Appeals dated 10 November 1997 dismissing the
petition for certiorari of petitioner Teofilo Martinez and
its Resolution dated 21 January 1998 denying
reconsideration are SET ASIDE for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, this case is
REMANDED for appropriate action to the Court of
Appeals which is further ordered to allow petitioner to
litigate as pauper and to return to him the amount of
P420.00 representing the docket fees he paid.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION That on or about August 24,
2002 at around 9:15 oclock in the
evening
at Ebora Road, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba,
Batangas City, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, while armed
with a caliber .45 pistol, a deadly
PEOPLE OF G.R. No. 182192
weapon, with intent to kill and with the
THE PHILIPPINES, qualifying circumstance of treachery,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully
Plaintiff-Appellee, and feloniously attack, assault and
Present: repeatedly shot with said firearm
suddenly and without warning one
P/Chief Inspector Marcos Barte y Paz
YNARES-SANTIAGO,while the latter was unarmed and
completely defenseless, thereby hitting
Chairperson, him on different parts of his body which
directly caused the victims death.
CARPIO,*
- versus AZCUNA,** That the special aggravating
CHICO-NAZARIO, andcircumstance of the use of an unlicensed
NACHURA, firearm is attendant in the commission
of the offense.
Promulgated:

October 29, 2008 When arraigned on 12 November 2002,

appellant, assisted by his counsel de oficio, pleaded Not
AGRIPINO GUEVARRA y guilty to the charge.[4] Trial on the merits thereafter
MULINGTAPANG alias BOY followed.
DUNGGOL,

Accused- Appellant. The prosecution presented as

x--------------------------------------
- - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For review is the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02367, dated 16
October 2007,[1] affirming with modification
Decision, dated 4 July 2006, of the Batangas City
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch IV, in Criminal
Case No. 12486,[2] finding accused-
appellant Agripino Guevarra y Mulingtapang,
Boy Dunggol, guilty of murder, and imposing upon him
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The facts gathered from the records of the case
are as follows:
On 30 August 2002, an Information[3] was filed
with the RTC charging appellant with murder. The
accusatory portion of the information reads:
witnesses Anacleto Gonzales (Anacleto),
Maria Antonette Gonzales (Antonette), Senior Police
Officer 1 Felixberto Cabungcal (SPO1 Cabungcal),
SPO1 Florentino Buenafe (SPO1 Buenafe), Dr. Edwin
Castillo (Dr. Castillo), Dr. Antonio
S. Vertido (Dr. Vertido), and Marita Gonzales Vda.
de Barte (Mrs. Barte). Their testimonies are summarized
as follows:
Anacleto, cousin of herein deceased victim
the
Police Chief Inspector Marcos P. Barte (Inspector Barte)
of the Batangas City Police Station, testified that on 24
August 2002, at around 3:30 p.m., Inspector Barte,
accompanied by a certain Roberto Godoy (Godoy) and
alias
Ronnie Valiente (Valiente), arrived at his house located
at Barangay Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City. He,
Inspector Barte, Godoy, Valiente, and Anacletos father-
in-law, Nicasio Resurreccion (Nicasio), talked and drank
gin inside the house. Subsequently, the group, with the
exception of Godoy, left the house and went to
a videoke bar owned by a certain Sergeant Emilio Vidal
(Sgt. Vidal) located
at Ebora Road, Barangay Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas Ci
ty. They arrived at the videoke bar at about 8:30 p.m. He
drank one bottle of beer while Inspector Barte consumed
two bottles of beer. Thereafter, at about 9:15 p.m., the
group went out of the videoke bar. He
wife, Antonette,
the videoke bar. Antonetteapproached
him. He also saw Godoy seated in the drivers seat of an
owner-type jeep parked near the videoke bar, and a
certain Imelda Shin (Imelda) sitting at the back portion
of the jeep. Valiente boarded the jeep and sat beside
Imelda. Inspector Barte also boarded the jeep and sat in
the front passengers
beside Godoy. When Anacleto was about to board the
jeep, appellant suddenly appeared and approached
Inspector Barte. Appellant asked Inspector Barte if he
was Major Barte. Thereupon, he saw appellant shoot
Inspector Barte several times with a short firearm. He
was then one arms length from Inspector Barte and one
meter away from appellant. Inspector Barte slumped on
his seat bloodied while Godoy shouted that he was also
hit. Appellant immediately fled the scene.
Subsequently, Anacleto drove
brought
the Batangas Regional Hospital. Inspector Barte was
pronounced dead on arrival. Godoy was also brought to
the said hospital for treatment of his wounds. Later, the
police arrived at the hospital and interviewed him about
the incident. He executed a sworn statement regarding
the incident.[6]
by Godoy. When Anacleto was about to board the jeep,
she heard a gunshot. Upon turning her head towards the
saw his direction of the gunshot, she saw appellant shoot
outside Inspector Barte with a short firearm. Thereafter, she
and talked to heard Godoy shouting that Inspector Barte was shot and
told her to call the police. She immediately proceeded to
a nearby drug store where she used a telephone in
contacting the police. She saw Anacleto driving the jeep
with Inspector Barte on board. Later, she proceeded to
the Batangas Regional Hospital where she saw the
seat lifeless body of Inspector Barte in a stretcher. She also
saw therein Godoy being treated for wounds.[7]
SPO2 Cabungcal, a member of
the Batangas City Police Station, Intelligence Division,
testified that he was on duty at the said station on the
night of 24 August 2002. On that same night, the station
received a report about a shooting incident
at Ebora Road, Barangay Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas Ci
[5]
ty. He and several police officers immediately proceeded
to the crime scene. Upon arriving thereat, they searched
the jeep and the crime scene and recovered four caliber .45 empty
Inspector Barte to shells, one live caliber .45 ammunition and one
deformed caliber .45 slug. Thereafter, they went to
the Batangas Regional Hospital where they were
informed that Inspector Barte was already dead. He
turned over to SPO1 Buenafe, the investigator of the
case, the evidence they recovered from the crime scene.
[8]

Antonette narrated that on 24 August 2002, at SPO1 Buenafe, a member of the Batangas City
about 8:40 p.m., she, together with Godoy and Imelda, Police Station, Investigation Section, averred that he
went to a videoke bar owned by Sgt. Vidal conducted an investigation in the instant case; that after
at Ebora Road, Barangay Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas Ci the incident, he went to the Batangas Regional Hospital
ty, to fetch her husband, Anacleto. She and Imelda where he was informed that Inspector Barte was already
boarded an owner-type jeep driven by Godoy in going to dead and Godoy was injured; and that
the videoke bar. Upon arriving thereat, she proceeded to SPO1 Cabungcal turned over to him object evidence
the videoke bar, peeped in its window, and recovered from the crime scene.[9]
saw Anacleto, Inspector Barte, her father,
and Valiente therein. She signaled to Anacleto that she Dr. Castillo, a surgeon assigned at
would wait for them on the jeep outside the Batangas Regional Hospital, recounted that he
the videoke bar. Afterwards, Anacleto, attended to Inspector Barte when the latter was brought
Inspector Barte, Nicasio, and Valiente went out of to the hospital on the night of 24 August 2002. During
the videoke bar. Nicasio boarded a tricycle and the initial examination, he observed that
proceeded home while Valiente and Inspector Barte sustained gunshot wounds and had no
Inspector Barte boarded the jeep. Valiente sat beside blood pressure, cardiac and respiratory rate. He and
Imelda at the backseat of the jeep while some medical staff tried to resuscitate
Inspector Barte sat beside the drivers seat then occupied Inspector Barte but to no avail. The gunshot wounds

were located on the left temporal area, left anterior chest,
right nipple, and left arm of Inspector Barte. He
considered the gunshot wounds in the left temporal area
and left anterior chest of Inspector Barte fatal. He issued
a medico-legal certificate pertaining to
Inspector Barte and an anatomical chart showing the
location of gunshot wounds sustained by
Inspector Barte.[10] His findings, as stated in the medico-
legal certificate of Inspector Barte, are as follows:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that Marcos
P. Barte, 46 years of age, male, Filipino
of Soro-soro 2, Batangas City, at
about 9:30 p.m., August 24, 2002 with
the following injuries sustained by him:
Multiple gunshot wounds
anterior chest left, Right nipple
left temporal area, left arm
NOTE: DEAD ON ARRIVAL.[11]
Dr. Vertido, Medico-Legal Officer of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
Southern Tagalog, Region 4, declared that he conducted
an autopsy on the corpse of Inspector Barte; that
Inspector Barte sustained three gunshot wounds; that the
first gunshot wound was located on the left portion of
the head which fractured the skull; that the second
gunshot wound was situated on the right portion of the
chest which perforated the heart and the upper lobe of
the left lung exiting at the left side of the back; that the
third wound was on the left portion of the chest which
penetrated the upper lobe of the left lung and exited at
the posterior side of the left arm; and that these wounds
[12]
caused the death of Inspector Barte. He issued a
Certificate of Post-Mortem Examination on
Inspector Barte in support of his foregoing findings, viz:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Pallor, lips and nailbed.
Contusion; anterior chest wall, midline,
2 x 3 cm.
GUNSHOT WOUNDS:
1. ENTRANCE 1.3 x 1.0 cm. ovaloid,
edges inverted, with a contusion collar
widest at its upper border, surrounded
by an area of tattoing, 8 x 6 cms. at the
left temple 6 cms. infront and 5 cms.
above the left external auditory meatus,
directed backwards, downwards and
medially, involving the skin and
underlying soft tissue, fracturing left
temporal bone, lacerating corresponding
lobe, fracturing and penetrating
left midcranial fossa, into the soft tissue
of the left posterior neck, 12 cms, below
and 10 cm behind the left external
auditory meatus where
a semideformed slug was recovered.
2. ENTRANCE 1.3 x. 1.0 cm. ovaloid,
edges inverted, with a contusion collar
widest at its lower border located at the
right anterior chest wall, 10 cms. from
the anterior median line, 125 cms. above
the right heel, directed, backward,
upward and from right to left involving
the skin and underlying soft tissue
perforating the heart, and upper lobe of
the left lung, then making
an EXIT wound, 1.0 x 1.1. cm., ovaloid,
edges everted, located at the back left
side, (scapular area) 20 cm. from the
posterior median line, 137 cm. above the
left heel.
3. ENTRANCE 1.2 x 1.0 cm. ovaloid,
edges inverted with a contusion collar
widest at its lower border, located at the
left anterior chest wall, 2 cm. from the
anterior median line 131 cm. above the
left heel, directed backward, upward and
laterally, involving the skin and
underlying soft tissues, perforating
upper lobe of the left lung then making
an EXIT wound, 1 x 1.1 cm. ovaloid,
edges everted located at the left arm,
posterior aspect, upper 3rd 28 cms. above
the left elbow.
CAUSE OF DEATH: GUNSHOT
WOUNDS, HEAD AND CHEST.[13]
Mrs. Barte, wife of Inspector Barte, testified on
the civil aspect of the case. She presented a list of
expenses incurred for the wake and burial of
Inspector Barte which amounted to P183,425.00. She
also submitted official receipts pertaining to the funeral
expenses (P46,250.00), burial lot (P53,000.00), and
interment fee (P10,000.00). She claimed that at the time
of Inspector Bartes death, the latter was receiving a
monthly income of P30,982.00.[14]
The prosecution also adduced documentary and
object evidence to buttress the testimonies of its
witnesses, to wit: (1) sworn statement of
Mrs. Barte (Exhibit A);[15] (2) sworn statement
of Anacleto (Exhibit B);[16] (3) sworn statement
of Antonette (Exhibit C);[17] (4) sworn statement of
SPO1 Buenafe (Exhibit D);[18] (5) death certificate of
Inspector Barte (Exhibit E);[19] (6) certification from the
PNP, Firearms and Explosives Division,
Camp Crame, Quezon City, that appellant is not a
licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and
caliber (Exhibit F);[20] (7) four empty bullet shells, one
deformed slug and one live ammunition (Exhibit G);
[21]
(8) list of wake and burial expenses (Exhibit H); Ravino narrated that he has known appellant
[22]
(9) official receipt covering the funeral expenses since 1991 because they were co-workers in Toyota
[23]
(Exhibit I); (10) official receipt for the burial lot Motors, Batangas City. On 24 August 2002, at
[24]
(Exhibit J); (11) anatomical chart showing the location around 12:00 in the afternoon, Africa came to his auto
of gunshot wounds sustained by Inspector Barte (Exhibit mechanic shop in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro and talked
K);[25] (12) medico-legal certificate of to him. Africa requested him to go to his house
Inspector Barte signed by Dr. Castillo (Exhibit L); at Barangay Malad, Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro, to
[26]
(13) pay slip of Inspector Barte for August 2002 fix Africas car and thereafter to drink liquor with
(Exhibit M);[27] (14) list of expenses incurred for the food him. Subsequently, he went to Africas house arriving
served during the wake and burial of therein at 5:30 p.m. of the same day. He saw Africa,
[28]
Inspector Barte (Exhibit N); (15) request for autopsy appellant and one helper of Africa inside the
of Inspector Bartesigned by Mrs. Barte (Exhibit O); house. Africa told him that appellant was taking a
[29]
(16) certificate of identification signed by vacation at his house. After fixing Africas car,
Dr. Vertido (Exhibit P);[30] (17) certificate of post- he, Africa and appellant had a drinking spree until 11:00
mortem examination on Inspector Barte (Exhibit Q); p.m. of the same day. Thereupon, he left Africas
[31]
(18) autopsy report on Inspector Barte signed by house. Later, he and appellant met at the city jail
Dr. Vertido (Exhibit R);[32] and (19) anatomical sketch of of Batangas City. He was detained for a criminal charge
the location of the gunshot wounds sustained by while appellant was detained on the charge of killing
[33]
Inspector Barte prepared by Dr. Vertido. Inspector Barte. During their detention, appellant
requested him to testify in his favor to which he
For its part, the defense presented the acceded. He was still a detainee at the time he testified in
testimonies of appellant and Ferdinand Ravino (Ravino) the RTC as regards the instant case.[35]
to refute the foregoing accusation. No documentary
evidence was presented. Appellant denied any liability After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision on 4
and interposed the defense of alibi. July 2006 convicting appellant of murder.[36] Appellant
was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He was also
Appellant testified that at the time of the ordered to pay the heirs of Inspector Barte the amounts
incident (9:15 p.m., 24 August 2002), he was of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages, P109,250.00
at Barangay Malad, Calapan City, as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary
Oriental Mindoro vacationing at the house of a certain damages, P4,212,312.72 for loss of earning capacity, and
Hector Africa (Africa). He arrived therein on the cost of suit. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision
afternoon of 23 August 2002 and left on the morning reads:
of 26 August 2002. He was not acquainted with
In view of all the foregoing and
Inspector Barte and came to know that he was accused
upon evidence established by the
of killing Inspector Barte when he arrived Prosecution,
accused Agripino Guevarra y Mulingtap
at Batangas City from Oriental Mindoro on the afternoon ang alias Boy Dunggol is hereby found
of 26 August 2002. He was informed that he would be Guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
committing the crime of Murder under
salvaged for killing Inspector Barte. Hence, he became Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
afraid and hid in his house for two weeks. Thereafter, he as amended by Republic Act No.
7659. The proper penalty would have
surrendered to the mayor of Batangas City who turned been death by lethal injection but with
him over to the Batangas Citypolice. He alleged the repeal of the death penalty pursuant
to Republic Act No. 9346 which was
that Anacleto and Antonette testified against him recently signed into law by the President
because he did not support the candidacy on June 22, 2006, imposition thereof is
no longer possible. Consequently, herein
of Antonette during the previous election accused is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
for barangay captain where Antonette lost. He supported
the costs. Further, he shall pay the
then the candidacy of the incumbent barangay captain.[34] private offended party P50,000.00 for
the death of Major Barte as
compensatory damages; P109,250.00 as
actual damages sustained which were
 reflected in the official receipts
submitted in evidence; P50,000.00 as
moral and exemplary
damages; P4,212,312.72 loss of earnings
computed on the basis of the pay slip of
Major Barte for the month of August,
2002 showing that at the time of his
death his full compensation amounted
to P30,982.00.
may affect the result of the case; (2) the findings of the
trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to
great respect and even finality, as it had the opportunity
to examine their demeanor when they testified on the
witness stand; and (3) a witness who testifies in a clear,
positive and convincing manner is a credible witness. [41]

The accused maybe credited with his

preventive imprisonment if he is entitled After carefully reviewing the evidence on record
to any and directed to be immediately
committed to the National Penitentiary and applying the foregoing guidelines to this case, we
in Muntinlupa City.[37] found no cogent reason to overturn the RTCs ruling
finding the testimonies
Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals. of Anacleto and Antonette credible. As an eyewitness to
On 16 October 2007, the appellate court promulgated its the incident, Anacleto positively identified appellant as
Decision affirming with modification the RTC Decision. the one who shot Inspector Barte with a short
[38]
It held that an additional amount of P25,000.00 as firearm. He was merely one arms length from
exemplary damages should also imposed on appellant Inspector Barte and one meter away from appellant
because the qualifying circumstance of treachery during the incident. In addition, the crime scene was
attended the killing of Inspector Barte. Thus: well-lighted by a nearby lamp post and lights coming
from the videoke bar which enabled him to recognize
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the July 4, 2006 Decision of appellant. Further, he was familiar with the face of
the Regional Trial Court of Batangas Cit
appellant because the latter was
y, Branch IV, is
hereby AFFIRMED with his barriomate. Anacletos direct account of how
the MODIFICATION that exemplary
damages in the amount appellant shot Inspector Barte is candid and convincing,
of P25,000.00 should also be awarded. thus:
[39]

Q: Now, while you were outside the

[videoke] restaurant at
Appellant elevated the instant case before us around 9:15 in the evening
assigning a single error, to wit: of August 24, 2002, do you
remember any untoward
incident that happened thereat?
THE TRIAL COURT
GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING A: Yes, sir.
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF
THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE Q: What was that particular incident?
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION
TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND A: The shooting of
REASONABLE DOUBT.[40] Major Barte (Inspector Barte),
sir.

Q: Who shot Major Barte?

Appellant maintains in his lone assigned error
that his testimony and that of his corroborating A: Agripino Guevarra y Mulingtapang a
lias Boy Dunggol.
witness, Ravino, were more credible than the testimonies
of Anacleto and Antonette; that his denial and alibi were Q: How did it happen that accused was
there at that time and said
meritorious; and that the mitigating circumstance of place?
voluntary surrender should be appreciated in his favor.
A: I did not notice where he came from,
he suddenly appeared.
In resolving issues pertaining to the credibility
Q: After he suddenly appeared, what did
of the witnesses, this Court is guided by the following the accused do?
well-settled principles: (1) the reviewing court will not
A: He approached Major Barte and
disturb the findings of the lower court, unless there is a asked are you Major Barte? and
afterwards he fired shots at
showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
Major Barte.
some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that
Q: Was Major Barte able to answer that
question of the accused to him?
A: No maam.
Q: What happened to Major Barte after
having (sic) shot by the
accused?
A: I saw him slumped on his seat on the
car, bloodied.
Q: How far were you
Major Barte at that time?
A: About one arm[s] length, maam.
xxxx
Q: Now, you said Agripino Guevarra is
the one who shot to death
Major Barte, if he is in Court
this morning, would you be able
to identify him?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Would you please point to him?
A: (Note: Witness is pointing to the man
wearing a yellow shirt seated in
the front row of the Courtroom
who answers by the name
of Agripino Guevarra when he
was asked by the Court). [42]
xxxx
Q: You stated that while you were
talking with Major Barte when
the latter was sitted (sic) in the
front seat, the accused suddenly
appeared?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where did he suddenly appear, from
your right or left?
A: From my right side, sir.
Q: Where was he at that time in relation
to the jeep?
A: On the right side of the jeep, sir.
Q: You are also on the right side of the
jeep?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You are also 1 meters from the jeep?
A: No sir.
Q: How far were you from the jeep?
A: More or less one (1) arm length, sir.
Q: How far was the accused in this case
when you first saw him?
A: We were both on the same distance
from the jeep, sir.
Q: After you saw the accused suddenly
appeared on your right side you
also saw him put up his gun?
A: No sir.
Court:
Q: How about you, how far are you
from from the accused when you first
saw him?
A: Almost one (1) meter, sir.[43]
xxxx
Q: You stated last time that when the
accused asked if he is
Major Barte the accused
immediately shot Major Barte,
is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You also stated that the accused shot
him five (5) times?
A: No, sir.
Q: How many times did the accused
shoot Major Barte?
A: I heard four (4) shots, sir.
Q: When you say you heard four (4)
shots you mean to say you did
not see him fired (sic) his gun?
A: I saw it, sir.[44]
Antonettes testimony, corroborating the
foregoing testimony of Anacleto, was also clear and
reliable. Being an eyewitness to the incident, she pointed
to appellant as the one who shot Inspector Barte. Her
narration of the incident is truthful, to wit:
Q: After Major Barte occupied the front
seat at the right [side] of the
driver and your husband was
about to board the jeep, what
happened next, if any?
A: I heard that gunshot, maam.
Q: Upon hearing that gunshot, what did
you do?
A: I turned my head where the gunshot
came from, maam.
Q: And what did you find out?
A: I saw a man shooting a man riding at
the right side of the vehicle,
maam.
 Q: Who was being shot by that person? present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the
A: Major Barte, maam. time of its commission.[48]

Q: Did you recognize who [shot]

Major Barte?

A: Yes, maam. Appellant testified that he was vacationing

in Africas house at Barangay Malad, Calapan City,
Q: Who is that person?
Oriental Mindoro at the time (9:15 p.m.) and date (24
A: Mr. Agripino Guevarra, maam. August 2002) of the incident. Ravino claimed that, upon

xxxx arriving at Africas house

in Calapan Oriental, Mindoro at about 5:30 p.m. of the
Q: You said that you
day of the incident, he saw appellant there. Ravino then
saw Agripino Guevarra shooting
Major Barte, do you know proceeded to fix Africas car. After fixing Africas car,
this Agripino Guevarra? he, Africa and appellant had a drinking spree until 11:00
A: Yes, maam. p.m. of the same day. Be that as it may, Ravino neither
categorically stated nor confirmed that appellant was
Q: Even before this date?
present in Africas house from the time he was
A: Yes, maam. Being a native of fixing Africas car at past 5:30 p.m. up to the time he was
this barangay and I have been done with it which was before 11:00 p.m. As mentioned
a barangay councilwoman and
he became also earlier, Ravino merely claimed that he saw appellant
a barangay tanod. in Africas house at about 5:30 p.m. and after

Q: If he [is] present in Court this
afternoon, would you able to
identify him?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Would you please point to him?
A: (Witness is pointing to a man
wearing a yellow shirt who
answers by the name
of Agripino Guevarra when he
was asked by the Court). [45]
Further, the foregoing testimonies are consistent
fixing Africas car, he, Africa and appellant had a
drinking spree until 11:00 p.m. Thus, it was highly
possible that since Ravinos sight was directed or focused
on Africas car as he was fixing it, he did not notice
appellants departure from Africas house at past 5:30 p.m.
Appellant then proceeded to the videoke bar of Sgt.
Vidal in Barangay Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City,
where he killed Inspector Barte at around 9:15 p.m. It
was also probable that Ravino did not notice appellants
subsequent arrival in Africas house, which was
before 11:00 p.m., from the crime scene because he was
still busy fixing Africas car. The foregoing view is

with documentary and object evidence submitted by the
prosecution. The RTC and the Court of Appeals found
the testimonies of Anacleto and Antonette to be clear
and credible.
Denial is inherently a weak defense as it is
negative and self-serving. Corollarily, alibi is the
weakest of all defenses for it is easy to contrive and
difficult to prove.[46] Denial and alibi must be proved by
the accused with clear and convincing evidence
otherwise they cannot prevail over the positive
testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.[47] For alibi to prosper, it is not
enough for the accused to prove that he was somewhere
else when the crime was committed. He must likewise
prove that it was physically impossible for him to be
bolstered by appellants admission that it would only take
him 45 minutes to reach Calapan City,
Oriental Mindoro from
the Batangas pier via a Supercat boat.[49] There was,
therefore, a great possibility that appellant was present at
the scene of the crime when it was committed at
about 9:15 p.m. of 24 August 2002. Thus, the defense
failed to prove that it was physically impossible for
appellant to be at or near the crime scene when the
incident occurred. Besides, we have held that an alibi
becomes less plausible as a defense when it is
corroborated only by relatives or friends of the accused.
[50]
We agree with the RTC and the Court of Appeals
that the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the
special aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed
firearm attended the killing of Inspector Barte.
It is settled that aggravating/qualifying
circumstances must be alleged in the information and
proven during the trial before they can be appreciated. [51]
There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from any defensive or retaliatory
act which the victim might make. [52] The essence of
treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack that renders
the victim unable and unprepared to defend himself by
reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack. Two
essential elements are required in order that treachery
can be appreciated: (1) The employment of means,
methods or manner of execution that would ensure the
offenders safety from any retaliatory act on the part of
the offended party who has, thus, no opportunity for self-
defense or retaliation; and (2) deliberate or conscious
choice of means, methods or manner of execution.
In the case at bar, treachery was alleged in the
information and all its elements were duly established by
the prosecution.
Inspector Barte was sitting inside the jeep when
appellant suddenly appeared and approached
him. Appellant asked Inspector Barte if
Major Barte. However, before Inspector Barte could
respond or utter a word, appellant quickly shot him
several times in the head and chest with a caliber .45
pistol. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the
appellants attack rendered Inspector Barte defenseless
and without means of escape. There is no doubt that
appellants use of a caliber .45 pistol, as well as his act of
waiting for Inspector Barte to be seated first in the jeep
before approaching him and of
Inspector Barte several times on the head and chest, was
adopted by him to prevent Inspector Barte from
retaliating or escaping. Considering
Inspector Barte was tipsy or drunk and he was seated
inside the jeep where the space is narrow, there was
absolutely no way for him to defend himself or escape.
Pertinent provision of Presidential Decree No.
1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294,[54] states
that if homicide or murder is committed with the use of
an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm
shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance. Appellants use of an unlicensed firearm in
killing Inspector Barte was alleged in the information as
a special aggravating circumstance. Such circumstance
was also duly proven by the prosecution during the
trial. The prosecution presented a certification from the
PNP Firearms and Explosives Division which attests that
appellant was not a licensed/registered firearm holder.[55]
Appellants assertion that he was entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is
meritorious. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as
a mitigating circumstance, the following requisites must
concur: (1) that the offender had not been actually
arrested; (2) that the offender surrendered himself to a
[53]
person in authority; and (3) that the surrender was
voluntary.[56]
All of the foregoing requisites are present in the
case at bar. Appellant had not been actually arrested by
the police or other law enforcers. He surrendered
unconditionally to the mayor of Batangas City, a person
in authority, thereby saving the police trouble and
expenses which it would otherwise incur in his search
and capture. The fact that appellant surrendered two
he was
weeks after the incident is immaterial. We have held that
for voluntary surrender to mitigate an offense, it is not
required that the accused surrender at the first
opportunity.[57] As long as the aforementioned requisites
are met, voluntary surrender can be appreciated. [58]
We shall now determine the propriety of the
shooting penalties imposed on appellant.
that
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code states that
murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
Article 63(4) of the same Code provides that if the
penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties, as in penalties of the Revised Penal
Code.
this case, and both mitigating and aggravating
circumstances attended the commission of the crime, the
courts shall reasonably allow them to offset one another
in consideration of their number and importance. As
earlier determined, the mitigating circumstance of Notwithstanding the reduction of the penalty
voluntary surrender and the aggravating circumstances imposed on appellant, he is not eligible for parole
of treachery and use of an unlicensed firearm were following Section 3 of said law which provides:
present in the instant case. Nonetheless, the aggravating
circumstance of treachery in this case cannot be applied
for offsetting because it was already considered as a
SECTION 3. Persons convicted
qualifying circumstance.[59] Thus, only the aggravating of offenses punished
circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm may be with reclusion perpetua, or whose
sentences will be reduced
utilized in offsetting the mitigating circumstance of to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this
voluntary surrender. Act, shall not be eligible for parole
under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as
amended.

We stated earlier that the use of an unlicensed

firearm in murder is a special aggravating circumstance
and not merely a generic aggravating circumstance. As
such, it cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating Hence, the RTC and the Court of Appeals were
circumstance such as voluntary surrender.[60] Thus, the correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua on
only modifying circumstance remaining in the present appellant.
case is the special aggravating circumstance of use of an
unlicensed firearm. Article 63(1) of the Code provides
that if the penalty is composed of two indivisible
penalties, as in this case, and there is present only one As to damages, both courts acted accordingly in

aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be awarding civil indemnity[61] to the heirs of

applied. Consequently, the penalty imposable on Inspector Barte since the award of this damage is

appellant is death. However, with the effectivity of mandatory in murder cases. [62] Nevertheless, the amount

Republic Act No. 9346 entitled, An Act Prohibiting the of P50,000.00 imposed as civil indemnity should be

Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the increased to P75,000.00 based on prevailing

imposition of the capital punishment of death has been jurisprudence.[63] In People v. Quiachon,[64] we explained

prohibited. Pursuant to Section 2 thereof, the penalty to that even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on

be meted to appellant shall be reclusion perpetua. Said accused because of the prohibition in Republic Act No.

section reads: 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is still proper as

SECTION 2. In lieu of the death
penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, when the
law violated makes use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of
the Revised Penal Code; or
the said award is not dependent on the actual imposition
of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death
penalty attended the commission of the offense. In the
instant case, the qualifying circumstance of treachery
and the special aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearm attended the killing of
Inspector Barte. These circumstances were duly alleged
in the information and proven during the trial.

The award of moral damages in the amount

(b) the penalty of life
imprisonment, when the law of P50,000.00 is proper in view of the violent death of
violated does not make use of Inspector Barte and the resultant grief to his family.
the nomenclature of the [65]
Likewise, the award of exemplary damages in the
amount of P25,000.00 is in order because the killing of
Inspector Barte was committed with the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and use of an unlicensed In addition to the damages awarded, we also

firearm.[66] Also, the award of P109,250.00 as actual impose on all the amounts of damages an interest at the

damages is appropriate since these were supported by legal rate of 6% from this date until fully paid. [72]

official receipts attached on records.[67]

WHEREFORE, after due deliberation, the

The heirs of Inspector Barte should also be Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR H.C.

indemnified for loss of earning capacity pursuant to No. 02367, dated 16 October 2007, is

Article 2206 of the New Civil Code. [68] Consistent with hereby AFFIRMED with the

our previous decisions,[69] the formula for the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the civil indemnity

indemnification of loss of earning capacity is: of appellant is increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00;
(2) the indemnity for Inspector Bartes loss of earning
capacity is increased from P4,212,312.72
to P4,213,551.00; and (3) an interest on all the damages
Net Earning Capacity = Life Expectancy
x awarded at the legal rate of 6% from this date until fully
paid is imposed.
[Gross Annual Income (GAI) Living
Expenses]

= 2/3 (80 age of deceased) x

(GAI - 50% of GAI). SO ORDERED.

Inspector Bartes death certificate states that he

was 46 years old at the time of his demise. [70] The pay
slip issued by the PNP, Camp Crame, Quezon City, to
Inspector Barte for August 2002 shows that the latter
was earning an annual gross income of P371,784.00.[71]

Applying the above-stated formula, the

indemnity for the loss of earning capacity of
Inspector Barte is P4,213,551.00, computed as follows:

Net Earning Capacity = 2/3 (34) x

(P371,784.00 P185,892.00)

= 2/3 (34) x P185,892.00.

= P4,213,551.00.

Hence, the amount of P4,212,312.72 awarded to

the heirs of Inspector Barte as indemnity for the latters
loss of earning capacity should be increased
to P4,213,551.00.
THIRD DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,
- versus -
RUSTICO BARTOLINI y AMPIS,
Appellant.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
We review the May 31, 2007 Decision [1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) which affirmed the guilty verdict rendered
by Branch 29 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bislig City[2] in Criminal Case Nos. 99-1-2083-H, 99-1-
2084-H and 99-1-2085-H, finding appellant Rustico
Bartolini y Ampis guilty of three (3) counts of
incestuous rape against his two (2) daughters, AAA and
BBB.[3]
The facts are culled from the findings of both the trial
and appellate courts.
Appellant Bartolini was charged with three (3) counts of
rape before the RTC, Branch 29, of Bislig City, Surigao
del Sur. The informations filed against him read:
Criminal Case No. 99-1-2083-H:
That on or about 7:00 oclock in the
morning sometime in the month of
March 1995, at Sitio [ABC], Barangay
[123], Municipality of Hinatuan,
Province of Surigao del Sur, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with lewd and unchaste designs,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously rape [his] daughter,
[AAA], by means of force and
intimidation, and against his daughters
will, to the damage and prejudice of the
said [AAA], who was then 14 years old.
CONTRARY TO LAW: In violation of
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
as amended by Section 11 of Republic
Act No. 7659.
Bislig, Surigao del Sur, November 23,
1998.[4]
Criminal Case No. 99-1-2084-H:
That on or about March 2, 1998, at 8:00
oclock in the morning, more or less, at
G.R. No. 179498 Sitio [ABC], Barangay [123],
Municipality of Hinatuan, Province of
Present: Surigao del Sur, Philippines, and within
CARPIO MORALES, the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
Chairperson the above-named accused, with lewd
BRION, and unchaste designs and by means of
BERSAMIN, force and intimidation, did then and
ABAD,* there wilfully, unlawfully and
VILLARAMA, JR., feloniously [have] carnal knowledge or
rape his own daughter, [BBB], against
Promulgated: the latters will, to the damage and
prejudice of said [BBB].
August 3, 2010
CONTRARY TO LAW: In violation of
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Section 11 of Republic
Act No. 7659.
Bislig, Surigao del Sur, November 27,
1998.[5]
Criminal Case No. 99-1-2085-H:
That on or about 3:00 oclock in the
afternoon sometime in the month of
March 1994, at Sitio [ABC], Barangay
[123], Municipality of Hinatuan,
Province of Surigao del Sur, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with lewd and unchaste designs
and by means of force and intimidation,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously rape [his] daughter
[BBB], 16 years old, against the latters
will, to the damage and prejudice of the
said [BBB].
CONTRARY TO LAW: In violation of
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
as amended by Section 11 of Republic
Act No. 7659.
Bislig, Surigao del Sur, November 27,
1998.[6]
Upon arraignment on May 4, 1999, Bartolini pleaded not
guilty to all the three (3) charges filed against him. [7] The
three (3) criminal cases were thereafter tried jointly.
In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented four
(4) witnesses: AAA; BBB; CCC, appellants wife and
mother of both victims; and Dr. Emelie S. Viola, the
Municipal Health Officer of Hinatuan District Hospital
who conducted the physical examination of both victims.
Below are the facts established by their testimonies.
Bartolini is married to CCC. [8] They begot six (6)
children, the eldest being BBB who was born on January
14, 1978,[9] followed by AAA who was born on June 16,
1980.[10]
Sometime in March 1994, at around 3:00 in the
afternoon, while BBB was weeding the grass on their
vegetable garden with her father, the latter suddenly
pulled her to the ground and forced her to lie down.
Bartolini then lifted BBBs skirt, removed her panty and
proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her. As BBB
struggled, appellant punched her and hit her at her back.
Afterwards, appellant put back his clothes and left.
When BBB went inside their house, appellant, who was
waiting for her, warned her not to tell CCC about the
incident. Despite the warning, BBB reported the incident
to her mother, but the latter told her to just keep quiet. [11]
After the said incident, appellant repeatedly had sexual
intercourse with BBB, the last of which happened
on March 2, 1998 at about 8:00 in the morning inside
their house while her mother was away selling fish and
while all her siblings were attending school. That
morning, appellant ordered BBB to get his clothes for
him. Appellant then followed BBB to the room, took off
[12]
her clothes and raped her.
It also appears that sometime in March 1995, at
about 6:30 in the morning, while having breakfast,
appellant instructed his second eldest daughter, AAA, to
burn the dried leaves in their garden. Dutifully, AAA
went to the garden at around 7:00 that morning and met
her father there. To her surprise, appellant immediately
pulled her and brought her near a big fallen tree while
threatening to kill her and all the members of their
family if she would not acquiesce to his demands.
Appellant told her to remove her panties, but since AAA
was crying and pushing her father away, appellant
himself took off AAAs panties, laid her on the ground
and placed one (1) of her feet on top of the fallen tree.
Afterwards, appellant removed his pants and raped her.
After having sexual intercourse with AAA, appellant put
back his pants and went to the barangay hall to report for
duty as appellant was a barangay kagawad at that time.
Like her sister, AAA also told the incident to their
mother, but the latter told her to keep silent for fear that
appellant would fulfill his threats. Consequently, AAA
was repeatedly raped by appellant until sometime in
October 1998, a month before she gave birth to
[13]
appellants child.
When CCC discovered that AAA was pregnant, she
confided the matter to her sister-in-law, DDD, who, in
turn, reported the incident to the barangay captain and to
a representative of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) in Butuan City. On November
19, 1998, while under the custody of the DSWD, AAA
gave birth to her child.[14]
During the trial, CCC testified that sometime in March
1994, her daughter BBB confided to her that she was
raped by appellant. She just kept silent about the incident
for fear that her husband will maul her when confronted.
AAA also reported to her that she was raped by her
father sometime in 1995. In one (1) instance, CCC even
saw appellant touching AAAs vagina while the two (2)
were inside their kitchen. She got angry and told her
parents-in-law about the incident, but the latter replied
that she has no other evidence to prove her accusation.
CCC also testified that appellant, despite being an
elected barangay kagawad, was a drunkard, violent and
an irresponsible individual. She added that she had
received a letter from appellant threatening to kill them.
Dr. Emelie S. Viola, Municipal Health Officer
of Hinatuan District Hospital, testified that sometime in
October 1998, BBB and AAA were brought to her clinic
for physical examination. Although there were no visible
signs of physical trauma, Dr. Viola found that BBB had
deep healed hymenal lacerations at the 6 and 7
oclock positions, as well as superficial healed hymenal
laceration at the 10 oclock position, which indicate that
there was a penetration of an object or a male
reproductive organ at BBBs female genitalia.[15]
Dr. Viola also examined AAA and found that the latter
had deep healed lacerations at the 12 oclock position and
superficial healed hymenal lacerations at the 3, 9 and 10
oclock positions, also indicating penetration of an object
or a male reproductive organ at AAAs vagina. AAA was
also pregnant.[16]
The defense, on the other hand, presented its lone
witness, appellant Bartolini, who interposed the defense
of denial and alibi. According to him, he could not have
raped BBB in the morning of March 2, 1998 because he
has been out of their house from 4:00 a.m. that day to
deliver shrimps, prawns, and crabs to a certain Benjamin
Castaas who resides in Hinatuan, Surigao del Sur.
Appellant claims that he arrived at Castaass house at
around 4:20 a.m. and stayed there for breakfast upon the
latters invitation. After getting paid, he left for home at
around 10:00 a.m. and reached his house fifteen (15)
minutes later.[17]
On September 4, 2000, a subpoena was issued for
Benjamin Castaas to appear as witness for the defense.
[18]
Castaas, however, failed to appear before the trial
court. A warrant of arrest was thereafter issued against
him,[19] but to no avail. Thus, on July 24, 2002, the trial
[20]
court issued another subpoena to Castaas. When
Castaas still failed to appear, the trial court issued an
[21]
order declaring the case submitted for decision.
On September 18, 2002, the RTC promulgated its
decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of three (3) counts of rape committed against AAA
and BBB. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused
RUSTICO BARTOLINI Y AMPIS,
forty-four (44) years of age, a fisherman
and a resident of [ABC, 123,] Hinatuan,
Surigao del Sur, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE
pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Section 11,
Republic Act No. 7659, paragraph (1),
this Court hereby sentences him:
1. In Criminal Case No. [99-1-]2083-
H, to suffer the penalty of Death by
Lethal Injection. To pay Seventy-
Five Thousand (P75,000.00) pesos
as civil indemnity and Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as
moral damages and to pay the costs;
2. In Criminal Case No. [99-1-]2084-
H, to suffer the penalty of Death by
Lethal Injection. To pay Seventy-
Five Thousand (P75,000.00) pesos
as civil indemnity and Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as
moral damages and to pay the costs;
[and]
3. In Criminal Case No. [99-1-]2085-
H, to suffer the penalty of Death by
Lethal Injection. To pay Seventy-
Five Thousand (P75,000.00) pesos
as civil indemnity and Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as
moral damages and to pay the costs.
Let the entire records of this case be
forwarded to the Supreme Court for
automatic review pursuant to Section 22
of Republic Act No. 7659.
[22]
SO ORDERED.
At the CA, Bartolini argued that he should not have been
convicted of the crime of qualified rape since the
information in Criminal Case No. 99-1-2085-H was
defective because it failed to allege that the act was
committed by force or intimidation as required by law,
while there was no allegation of minority of the victim in
the information for Criminal Case No. 99-1-2084-H.
Bartolini also argued that the prosecution failed to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[23]
After an extensive discussion on the issues raised by
Bartolini, the appellate court found no compelling reason
to deviate from the findings of the trial court.
Nevertheless, the CA modified the penalties by reducing
the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua following the
abolition of the death penalty and by modifying the
monetary award in favor of the victims. The dispositive
portion of the appellate courts decision reads,
WHEREFORE, the Decision
dated September 18, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial
Region, Branch 29, Bislig City, in
Criminal Case Nos. [99-1-]2083-H, [99-
1-]2084-H and [99-1-]2085-H finding
appellant Rustico Bartolini y Ampis
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for three
counts of rape is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
(a) in Criminal Case Nos. [99-
1-]2083-H and [99-1-]2085-H, the
penalty of death is reduced to reclusion
perpetua; and to pay the amount of
seventy-five thousand pesos
(P75,000.00) as civil indemnity,
seventy-five thousand pesos
(P75,000.00) as moral damages and
twenty-five thousand pesos
(P25,000.00) as exemplary damages for
each count; and
(b) in Criminal Case No. [99-
1-]2084-H, the accused is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
and to pay the amount of fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity,
the amount of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages, and
twenty-five thousand pesos
(P25,000.00) as exemplary damages;
(c) with costs.
SO ORDERED.[24]
On August 30, 2007, the records of the case were
forwarded to this Court for automatic review.[25] The
Court accepted the appeal and directed the parties to file
their respective supplemental briefs if they so desire.
However, both the Office of the Solicitor General, for
the appellee, and the appellant submitted
manifestations[26] stating that they replead and adopt the
arguments raised in their respective briefs [27] before the
CA.
Appellant raises the following issues:
I. Whether the trial court erred in
convicting the appellant;
II. Whether the trial court erred in
convicting the appellant in Criminal
 Case No. 99-1-2085-H despite the fact
that the information therein was
allegedly defective; and
III. Whether the trial court erred in
imposing the death penalty upon the
appellant after finding him guilty in
Criminal Case No. 99-1-2084-H
considering the failure of the
information to allege minority.[28]
We shall first discuss the second and third issues raised
by the appellant, i.e., whether the element of force and
intimidation was correctly alleged in the information in
Criminal Case No. 99-1-2085-H and whether the penalty
of death was properly imposed upon the appellant in
Criminal Case No. 99-1-2084-H.
The appellants arguments are partially meritorious.
Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances: (1)
when force or intimidation is used; (2) when the woman
is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; and
(3) when she is under 12 years of age.[29]
A perusal of the information used as basis for Criminal
Case No. 99-1-2085-H readily reveals the allegation that
appellant employed force and intimidation in raping
BBB. We reproduce the contents of the information
below:
Criminal Case No. 99-1-2085-H:
That on or about 3:00 oclock in the
afternoon sometime in the month of
March 1994, at Sitio [ABC], Barangay
[123], Municipality of Hinatuan,
Province of Surigao del Sur, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with lewd and unchaste designs
and by means of force and intimidation,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously rape [his] daughter
[BBB], 16 years old, against the latters
will, to the damage and prejudice of the
said [BBB].
CONTRARY TO LAW: In violation of
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
as amended by Section 11 of Republic
Act No. 7659.
Bislig, Surigao del Sur, November 27,
1998.[30]
The same allegation was proven during the trial. We
quote BBBs testimony during her direct examination:
Q: Do you recall of any unusual incident
that happened on March 1994,
while you were still residing at
[Sitio ABC], [123], Lingig,
Surigao del Sur, together with
your parents?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that unusual incident all
about?
A: We were weeding grasses, sir.
Q: Where were you [weeding] grasses?
A: We were weeding grasses near to our
house, sir.
Q: Were you alone while you were
weeding grasses at [Sitio ABC],
[123], Lingig, Surigao del Sur?
A: We were two, me and my father, sir.
Q: What time was that?
A: Afternoon, sir.
Q: Now, while you were weeding
grasses near your house in the
afternoon of March 1994, with
your father, what happened if
any?
A: He pulled me, sir.
Q: Where did he bring you?
A: At the place where we were weeding
grasses, sir.
Q: What happened next after you[r]
father brought you near the
place where you were weeding
grasses?
A: He made me lie down, sir.
Q: What did you do when your father
made you lie down?
A: He lift[ed] my skirt and took up my
panty, sir.
Q: What did you do when your father
pulled you[r] panty?
A: I pushed aside his hands, sir.
Q: What did your father do next?
A: He made me lie down, sir.
Q: Afterward[s], what happened next?
A: He also took [off] his brief and his
pant[s], sir.
Q: You want to tell this Honorable Court
that you were already [lying]
down when your father removed
his brief and his pant[s]?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In relation to you[,] where was your
father situated when he removed
his brief and pant[s]?
A: [Just by] my side[,] just near me, sir.
Q: What happened after your father
removed his pant[s] and brief?
A: He inserted his penis in my vagina,
sir.
xxxx
 Q: While his penis was inside your
vagina, what happened?
A: He boxed me, sir.
Q: Were you hit by the blow?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where?
A: [O]n my back, sir.
xxxx
Q: When you reached to your house,
what did [he] do?
A: He scolded me, sir.
Q: Who scolded you?
A: My father, sir.
Q: Why did he scold you?
A: He was afraid I might tell my mother,
sir.
Q: Did you tell your mother about the
incident?
[31]
A: Yes, sir.
We are adequately convinced that the prosecution proved
that appellant employed force and intimidation upon his
victim. This being so, we find no cogent reason to
disturb the ruling of both the RTC and the appellate
court on this matter.
However, we disagree with the trial courts ruling
convicting appellant Bartolini for qualified rape under
Criminal Case No. 99-1-2084-H. The appellate court
was correct in sustaining appellants argument that the
special qualifying circumstance cannot be appreciated in
Criminal Case No. 99-1-2084-H since the age of the
victim was not specifically alleged in the information. [32]
[33]
Our disquisition in People v. Tagud, Sr. succinctly
explains the matter. There, we said:
To justify the imposition of the death
penalty in this case, the single special
qualifying circumstance of the minority
of the victim and her relationship to the
offender must be specifically alleged in
the Information and proven during the
trial. x x x
xxxx
Even under the old Rules of Criminal
Procedure, jurisprudence already
required that qualifying circumstances
must be specifically alleged in the
Information to be appreciated as such.
xxxx
Notably, the amended Information
merely stated that appellant had carnal
knowledge of his minor daughter
without stating Arwins actual age. In a
rape case where the very life of the
accused is at stake, such an inexact
allegation of the age of the victim is
insufficient to qualify the rape and raise
the penalty to death. The sufficiency of
the Information is held to a higher
standard when the only imposable
penalty is death. The constitutional
right of the accused to be properly
informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him assumes
the greatest importance when the only
imposable penalty in case of
conviction is death.[34]
Similar to Tagud, the qualifying circumstance of
relationship of BBB to appellant was specifically alleged
and proven during the trial. Notably absent in the
information, however, is a specific averment of the
victims age at the time the offense against her was
committed. Such an omission committed by the
prosecutor is fatal in the imposition of the supreme
penalty of death against the offender. It must be borne in
mind that the requirement for complete allegations on
the particulars of the indictment is based on the right of
the accused to be fully informed of the nature of the
charges against him so that he may adequately prepare
for his defense pursuant to the constitutional requirement
on due process,[35] specially so if the case involves the
imposition of the death penalty in case the accused is
convicted. Thus, even if the victim is below eighteen
(18) years of age and the offender is her parent, but these
facts are not alleged in the information, or if only one (1)
is so alleged such as what happened in the instant case,
their proof as such by evidence offered during trial
cannot sanction the imposition of the death penalty.[36]
Appellant also argues that both the trial court and the CA
committed reversible errors when he was found guilty
for the three (3) counts of rape even if his guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. In particular, appellant
attacks AAAs credibility by arguing that it would have
been physically impossible for him to rape said victim
on top of a log as claimed by AAA in her testimony.
Appellant also questions the motive of both victims
saying that it is unnatural for both to report the abuses
made on them only after the lapse of several years.
We cannot subscribe to appellants desperate attempt to
save himself from the consequences of his dastardly
acts.
Settled is the rule that when the issue is one (1) of
credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally
not disturb the findings of the trial courts considering
that the latter are in a better position to decide the
question as they have heard the witnesses and observed
their deportment and manner of testifying during the
trial. It is for this reason that the findings of the trial
court are given the highest degree of respect. These
findings will not ordinarily be disturbed by an appellate
court absent any clear showing that the trial court has
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight or substance which could very
well affect the outcome of the case.[37]
Moreover, AAAs testimony was vivid and precise. She
said:
Q: What was your position at that time
when you said your father
spread your legs apart?
A: When I spread my legs, I was laying
(sic), and he put my one leg on
top of the fallen tree.[38]
We note with approval the CAs observation that such
revelation is plausible and consistent with human
experience. Indeed, if there is any incongruity in the
manner of intercourse as portrayed by the appellant, the
same would be trivial and will not smother AAAs
revelation of sexual abuse.[39]
How the victims managed to endure the bestial treatment
of their father to them for four (4) long years, with one
(1) even having to live with the shame of siring an
offspring from her very own father, should not be taken
against them. Children of tender age have natural respect
and reverence for their loved ones. More often than not,
they would try to keep to themselves if anything
unnatural was committed against them, especially if the
offender is one (1) of their relatives. A father is known to
have a strong natural, cultural and psychological hold
upon his child. Hence, it would be too assuming for us to
ask the victims why they have kept these facts of abuse
to themselves, when their very own mother decided to be
mum on the matter as well.
Anent the award of damages, we find modifications to
be in order. We increase the award of civil indemnity and
moral damages in Criminal Case No. 99-1-2084-H
from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 each. In People v.
Catubig,[40] we explained that the commission of an
offense has a two (2)-pronged effect, one (1) on the
public as it breaches the social order and the other upon
the private victim as it causes personal sufferings. Each
effect is respectively addressed by the prescription of
heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of
additional damages to the victim. The increase of the
penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the
exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of
aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or
qualifying, in its commission. But unlike the criminal
liability which is basically the States concern, the award
of damages is in general intended for the offended party
who suffers thereby. Hence, although it is essential to
observe the requirements imposed by Sections 8 [41] and
9[42] of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, the requirements should affect
only the criminal liability of the accused, which is the
States concern, and should not affect the civil liability of
the accused, which is for the benefit of the injured
party. Where the special qualifying circumstances of age
and relationship, although not alleged in the information,
are nonetheless established during the trial, the award of
civil indemnity and moral damages in a conviction for
simple rape should equal the award of civil indemnity
and moral damages in convictions for qualified
rape. Truly, BBBs moral suffering is just as great as
when her father who raped her is convicted for qualified
rape as when he is convicted only for simple rape due to
a technicality.
Likewise, we modify the award for exemplary
damages. Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, the
award of exemplary damages for the two (2) counts of
qualified rape under Criminal Case Nos. 99-1-2083-H
and 99-1-2085-H and for the crime of simple rape in
Criminal Case No. 99-1-2084-H is increased
to P30,000.00 for each count of rape.[43]
WHEREFORE, the judgment on review
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
In Criminal Case Nos. 99-1-2083-H and 99-1-2085-H,
appellant Rustico Bartolini y Ampis is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
counts of QUALIFIED RAPE and is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, in lieu of
death, without the possibility of parole. He
is ORDERED to pay each of his two (2) victims, AAA
and BBB, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as
moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case No. 99-1-2084-H, appellant is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of RAPE and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. He is ORDERED to pay the
victim, BBB, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00
as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
Costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
BaguioCity
FIRST DIVISION
ANNA LERIMA PATULA, G.R. No. 164457 in the information. At pre-trial, no stipulation of
Petitioner,
Present:
-versus-
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In the trial of everycriminal case, a judge must
rigidlytest the States evidence of guilt in order to ensure
that such evidenceadheres to the basic rules of
admissibility before pronouncing an accused guilty of
the crime charged upon such evidence. Nothing less is
demanded of the judge; otherwise, the guarantee of due
process of law is nullified.The accused
notadduceanythingto rebut evidence that is discredited
for failing the test.Acquittal should then follow.
Antecedents
Petitioner was charged withestafaunder
informationfiled in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in DumagueteCitythat averred:
That on or about and during the period
from March 16 to 20, 1997 and for
sometime prior thereto, in the City of
Dumaguete, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, being then a saleswoman
of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc.,
Dumaguete City, having collected and
received the total sum of P131,286.97
from several customers of said company
under the express obligation to account
for the proceeds of the sales and deliver
the collection to the said company, but
far from complying with her obligation
and after a reasonable period of time
despite repeated demands therefore, and
with intent to defraud the said company,
did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously fail to deliver the said
collection to the said company but
instead, did, then and there willfully
unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate, misapply and convert
the proceeds of the sale to her own use
and benefit, to the damage and prejudice
of the said company in the aforesaid
amount of P131,286.97.
Contrary to Art. 315, par 1 (b) of the
Revised Penal Code.[1]
Petitioner pled not guiltyto the offense charged
factswas had, and petitioner did not avail herself of plea
bargaining. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
CORONA,C.J.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN, The Prosecutions first witness was Lamberto
DEL CASTILLO,Go,and
who testified that he was the branch manager of
VILLARAMA, JR.,
Promulgated: Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc. (Footluckers) in
Dumaguete City since October 8, 1994; that petitioner
April 11, 2012 was an employee of Footluckers, starting as a saleslady
in 1996 until she became a sales representative; that as a
sales representative she was authorized to take orders
from wholesale customers coming from different towns
(like Bacong, Zamboanguita, Valencia, Lumbangan and
Mabinay in Negros Oriental, and Siquijor), and to collect
payments from them; that she could issue and sign
official receipts of Footluckers for the payments, which
she would then remit; that she would then submit the
receipts for the payments for tallying and reconciliation;
that at first her volume of sales was quite high, but later
on dropped, leading him to confront her; that she
need
responded that business was slow; that he summoned the
accounting clerk to verify; that the accounting clerk
discovered erasures on some collection receipts; that he
decided to subject her to an audit by company auditor
Karen Guivencan; that he learned from a customer of
an petitioners that the customers outstanding balance had
already been fully paid although that balance appeared
unpaid in Footluckers records; and that one night later
on, petitioner and her parents went to his house to deny
having misappropriated any money of Footluckers and
to plead for him not to push through with a case against
her, promising to settle her account on a monthly basis;
and that she did not settle after that, but stopped
reporting to work.[2]
On March 7, 2002, Gos cross examination, re-
direct examination and re-crossexamination were
completed.
The only other witness for the Prosecution was
Karen Guivencan, whomFootluckers employed as its
store auditor since November 16, 1995 until her
resignation on March 31, 2001. She declared that Go had
requested her to audit petitioner after some customers
had told him that they had already paid their accounts
but the office ledger had still reflected
outstandingbalances for them; that she first conducted
her audit by going to the customers in places from
Mabinay to Zamboanguitain Negros Oriental, and then
in Siquijor; thatshe discovered in the course of her audit
that the amounts appearing on the original copies of
receipts in the possession of around 50 customers varied
from the amounts written on the duplicate copies of the
receipts petitioner submitted to the office; that upon
completing her audit, she submittedto Go a written
report denominated as List of Customers Covered by
Saleswoman LERIMA PATULA w/ Differences in
Records as per Audit Duly Verified March 16-20, 1997
marked as Exhibit A; and that based on the report,
petitioner had misappropriated the total amount
ofP131,286.92.[3]
During Guivencans stint as a witness, the
Prosecution marked the ledgers of petitioners various
customers allegedly with discrepancies as Exhibits B to
YYand their derivatives, inclusive. Each of the ledgers
had a first column that contained the dates of the entries,
a second that identified the invoices by the number, a
third that statedthe debit, a fourth that noted the credit
(or the amounts paid), and a fifth that summed the
balances (debit minus credit).Only 49 of theledgerswere
formally offered and admitted by the RTC because the
50thledger could no longer be found.
In the course of Guivencansdirect-
examination,petitioners counsel interposed a continuing
objection on the ground that the figuresentered in
Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives, inclusive, were
hearsay because the persons who had made the entries
were not themselves presented in court. [4]With that,
petitioners counsel did not anymore cross-examine
Guivencan, apparently regarding her testimony to be
irrelevant because she thereby tended to prove
falsification, an offense not alleged in the information.
TheProsecution thenformally offered
documentary exhibits, including Exhibits B to YYand
their derivatives (like the originals and duplicates of the
receipts supposedly executed and issued by petitioner),
inclusive, the confirmation sheets used by Guivencan in
auditing the accounts served by petitioner, and
Guivencans so-called Summary (Final Report)
Discrepancies.[5]
After the Prosecution rested its case, the Defense
decided not to file a demurrer to evidence although it
had manifested the intention to do so, and instead rested
itscase.The Prosecution and Defense submitted their
respective memoranda, and submitted the case for
decision.[6]
On January 28, 2004, the RTC, stating that
inasmuch as petitioner had opted not to present evidence
for her defense the Prosecutions evidence remained
unrefuted and uncontroverted,[7]rendered its decision
finding petitioner guilty of estafa, to wit:
Wherefore, in the light of the
foregoing facts and circumstances, the
Court finds ANNA LERIMA
PATULA guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Estafa under Art.
315 par (1b) of the Revised Penal Code
and accordingly, she is hereby sentenced
to suffer an INDETERMINATE
PENALTY of imprisonment of 8 years
and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum
to 18 years and 4 months of reclusion
temporal as maximum with all the
accessory penalties provided by law and
to indemnify private complainant the
amount of P131,286.92 with interest at
12% per annum until fully paid and to
pay the costs.
Pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the cash bail put up by the accused shall
be effective only until the promulgation
of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
butthe RTC denied the motion on May 7, 2004.[9]
Issues
Insisting that the RTCs judgment grossly
violated [her] Constitutional and statutory right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against her because, while the charge against her is
estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal
Code, the evidence presented against her and upon
its
which her conviction was based, was falsification, an
offense not alleged or included in the Information under
which she was arraigned and pleaded not guilty, and that
said judgment likewise blatantly ignored and manifestly
disregarded the rules on admission of evidence in that
the documentary evidence admitted by the trial court
of
were all private documents, the due execution and
authenticity of which were not proved in accordance
with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, petitioner has directly appealed to the
Court via petition for review on certiorari, positing the
following issues, to wit:
 1. WHETHER THE ACCUSED EXAMINING KAREN GUIVENCAN
OR ANY ACCUSED FOR THAT FOR THE REASON THAT HER
MATTER , CHARGED TESTIMONY IS IMMATERIAL AND
OF ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 IRRELEVANT AS IT TENDED TO
(B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE PROVE AN OFFENSE NOT
CAN BE CONVICTED UPON OR BY CHARGED IN INFORMATION
EVIDENCE OF FALSIFICATION RESULTED IN THE ADMISSION OF
WHICH IS EVEN (SIC) NOT SAID TESTIMONY AS BEING
ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION. UNREFUTED AND
UNCONTROVERTED, AND
2. WHETHER THE WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENSES
ACCUSEDS CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTION WOULD NOT BE
AND STATUTORY RIGHT TO BE CONSIDERED WAIVED IF THE
INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND DEFENSE CROSS-EXAMINED SAID
CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION WITNESS.
AGAINST HER WAS VIOLATED 7. WHETHER OR NOT THE
WHEN SHE WAS CONVICTED TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING
UPON OR BY EVIDENCE OF THAT EXHIBIT A, WHICH IS THE
FALSIFICATION CONSIDERING LIST OF CUSTOMERS COVERED
THAT THE CHARGE AGAINST HER BY SALESWOMAN LERIMA
IS ESTAFA THROUGH PATULA WITH DIFFERENCE IN
MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER ART. RECORD IS NOT HEARSAY AND
315, PAR. 1 (B) OF THE REVISED SELF-SERVING.[10]
PENAL CODE.

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE The foregoing issues are now restatedas follows:
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE, 1. Whether or not the failure of the
EXHIBITS B TO YY-YY-2, ALL information for estafa to allege the
PRIVATE DOCUMENTS, THE DUE falsification of the duplicate receipts
EXECUTION AND AUTHENTICITY issued by petitioner to her
OF WHICH WERE NOT PROVED IN customersviolated petitioners right
ACCORDANCE WITH SEC. 20, to be informed of the nature and
RULE 132 OF THE SAID REVISED cause of the accusation;
RULES ON EVIDENCE ASIDE FROM
THE FACT THAT SAID EXHIBITS 2. Whether or not the RTC gravely
TEND TO PROVE FALSIFICATION erred in admitting evidence of the
BY THE ACCUSED, A CRIME falsification of the duplicate
NEITHER CHARGED NOR receiptsdespite the information not
ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION. alleging the falsification;
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE 3. Whether or not the ledgers and
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their
ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF derivatives, inclusive) were
KAREN GUIVENCAN DESPITE THE admissible as evidence of petitioners
OBJECTION THAT SAID guilt for estafaas charged despite
TESTIMONY WHICH TRIED TO their not being duly
PROVE THAT THE ACCUSED authenticated;and
FALSIFIED EXHIBITS B TO YY-YY- 4. Whether or not
2INCLUSIVE VIOLATED THE Guivencanstestimony onthe ledgers
ACCUSEDS CONSTITUTIONAL and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and
RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE their derivatives, inclusive) to prove
NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE petitioners misappropriation or
ACCUSATION AGAINST HER, FOR conversion wasinadmissible for
BEING IRRELEVANT AND being hearsay.
IMMATERIAL SINCE THE CHARGE
AGAINST THE ACCUSED
IS ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 Ruling
(B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.

5. WHETHER OR NOT THE The petition is meritorious.

TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE
I
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION
Failure of information to allege falsification
REMAINS UNREFUTED AND
did not violate petitioners right to be informed
UNCONTROVERTED DESPITE
of thenatureand cause of the accusation
ACCUSEDS OBJECTION THAT SAID
EVIDENCE IS IMMATERIAL AND
IRRELEVANT TO THE CRIME
CHARGED. Petitioner contends that the RTC grossly
6. WHETHER OR NOT THE violated her Constitutional right to be informed of the
DEFENSES NOT CROSS- nature and cause of the accusation when: (a) it held that
the information did not have to allege her falsification of
the duplicate receipts, and (b) when it convicted her
of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of
the Revised Penal Codeby relying on the evidence on
falsification.
The contentionof petitioner cannot be sustained.
The Bill of Rights guaranteessome rightsto every
person accused of a crime, among them the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, viz:
Section 14. (1) No person shall
be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of
the accused provided that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, the rule
then in effect when the information was filed in the RTC,
contained the following provisions on the proper manner
of alleging the nature and cause of the accusation in the
information, to wit:
Section 8.Designation of the
offense. Whenever possible, a complaint
or information should state the
designation given to the offense by the
statute, besides the statement of the acts
or omissions constituting the same, and
if there is no such designation, reference
should be made to the section or
subsection of the statute punishing it. (7)
Section 9.Cause of accusation.
The acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense must be stated
in ordinary and concise language
without repetition, not necessarily in the
terms of the statute defining the offense,
but in such form as is sufficient to
enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enable the
court to pronounce proper judgment. (8)
The importance of the proper manner of
alleging the nature and cause of the accusation in the
informationshould never be taken for granted by the
State. An accused cannot be convicted of an offense that
is not clearly charged in the complaint or information.
To convict him of an offense other than that charged in
the complaint or information would be violative of the
Constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation. [11] Indeed, the accused cannot be
convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless the
crime is alleged or necessarily included in the
information filed against him.
The crime of estafacharged against petitioner
was defined and penalized by Article 315, paragraph 1
(b), Revised Penal Code, viz:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa).
Any person who shall defraud another
by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum period,
if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000
pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos,
and if such amount exceeds the latter
sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for
each additional 10,000 pesos; but the
total penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such
cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be
imposed under the provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be.
2nd. The penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum and
medium periods, if the amount of the
fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not
exceed 12,000 pesos;
3rd. The penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period if
such amount is over 200 pesos but does
not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4th. By arresto mayor in its
maximum period, if such amount does
not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in
the four cases mentioned, the fraud be
committed by any of the following
means:
xxx
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse
of confidence, namely:
xxx
(b) By misappropriating or
converting, to the prejudice of
another, money, goods, or any other
 personal property received by the
offender in trust or on commission, or
for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of or to return the
same, even though such obligation be
totally or partially guaranteed by a
bond; or by denying having received
such money, goods, or other property.
xxx
The elements of the offense charged were as
follows:
(a) That the offender received money,
goods or other personal property in
trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of, or to return, the
same;
(b) That the offender misappropriated or
converted such money, goods or
other personal property, or denied
his part in its receipt;
(c) That the misappropriation or
conversion or denial was to the
prejudice of another; and
(d) That the offended party made a
demand on the offender for the
delivery or return of such money,
goods or other personal property.[12]
According to the theory and proof of the Prosecution,
petitioner misappropriated or converted the sums paid by
her customers, and later falsified the duplicates of the
receipts before turning such duplicates to her employer
to show that the customers had paid less than the
amounts actually reflected on the original receipts.
Obviously, she committed the falsification in order to
conceal her misappropriation or conversion. Considering
that the falsificationwas not an offense separate and
distinct from the estafacharged against her,
Prosecution could legitimately prove her acts of
falsification as its means of establishing
misappropriation or conversion as an essential ingredient
of the crime duly alleged in the information. In that
manner, her right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against her was not infringed or denied
to her.
We consider it inevitable to conclude that the
information herein completely pleaded the estafa defined
and penalized under Article 315, paragraph
(b), Revised Penal Codewithin the context of the
substantive lawand the rules. Verily, there was no
necessity for the information to allege the acts of
falsification by petitioner because falsification was not
an element of the estafacharged.
Not surprisingly,the RTC correctly dealt in its
decision with petitioners concern thuswise:
In her Memorandum, it is the
contention of [the] accused that [the]
prosecutions evidence utterly fails to
prove the crime charged. According to
the defense, the essence of Karen
Guivencans testimony is that the
accused falsified the receipts issued to
the customers served by her by changing
or altering the amounts in the duplicates
of the receipts and therefore, her
testimony is immaterial and irrelevant as
the charge is misappropriation under
Art. 315, paragraph (1b) of the Revised
Penal Code and there is no allegation
whatsoever of any falsification or
alteration of amounts in the
[i]nformation under which the accused
was arraigned and pleaded NOT
GUILTY. Accused, thus, maintains that
the testimony of Karen Guivencan
should therefore not be considered at all
as it tended to prove an offense not
charged or included in the [i]nformation
and would violate [the] accuseds
constitutional and statutory right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against her. The Court is not
in accord with such posture of the
accused.
It would seem that the accused
is of the idea that because the crime
charged in the [i]nformation is merely
[e]stafa and not [e]stafa [t]hru
[f]alsification of documents, the
prosecution could not prove
falsification. Such argumentation is
not correct. Since the information
charges accused only of
misappropriation pursuant to Art.
315, par. (1b) of the Revised [P]enal
Code, the Court holds that there is no
necessity of alleging the falsification
in the Information as it is not an
the element of the crime charged.
Distinction should be made as to
her when the crimes of Estafa and
Falsification will constitute as one
complex crime and when they are
considered as two separate offenses.
The complex crime of Estafa Through
Falsification of Documents is
committed when one has to falsify
certain documents to be able to obtain
money or goods from another person.
In other words, the falsification is a
necessary means of committing estafa.
However, if the falsification is
committed to conceal the
1 misappropriation, two separate
offenses of estafa and falsification are
committed. In the instant case, when
accused collected payments from the
customers, said collection which was
 in her possession was at her disposal.
The falsified or erroneous entries
which she made on the duplicate On his part, Go essentially described for the trial
copies of the receipts were contrived court the various duties of petitioner as Footluckers sales
to conceal some amount of her
collection which she did not remit to representative. On her part, Guivencan conceded having
the company xxx.[13] no personal knowledge of the amounts actually received
by petitioner from the customersor remitted by petitioner
II
to Footluckers.This means that persons other than
Testimonial and documentary evidence,being
hearsay, Guivencan prepared Exhibits B to YY and their
did not prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable derivatives, inclusive,and that Guivencan based her
doubt
testimony on the entries found in the receipts supposedly
issued by petitioner and in the ledgers held by
Footluckers corresponding to each customer, as well as
Nonetheless, in all criminal prosecutions, the
on the unsworn statements of some of the customers.
Prosecution bears the burden to establish the guilt of the
Accordingly, her being the only witness who testified on
accused beyond reasonable doubt. In discharging this
the entries effectively deprived the RTC of the
burden, the Prosecutions duty is to prove each and every
reasonable opportunity to validate and test the veracity
element of the crime charged in the information to
and reliability of the entries as evidence of petitioners
warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for any other
misappropriation or conversion through cross-
crime necessarily included therein.[14] The Prosecution
examination by petitioner. The denial of that
must further prove the participation of the accused in the
opportunity rendered theentire proof of misappropriation
commission of the offense.[15]In doing all these, the
or conversion hearsay, and thus unreliable and
Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own
untrustworthy for purposes of determining the guilt or
evidence, and not anchor its success upon the weakness
innocence of the accused.
of the evidence of the accused. The burden of proof
placed on the Prosecution arises from the presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused that no less than the
To elucidate why the Prosecutions hearsay
Constitution has guaranteed.[16]Conversely, as to his
evidence was unreliable and untrustworthy, and thus
innocence, the accused has no burden of proof, [17]that he
devoid of probative value, reference is made toSection
must then be acquitted and set free should the
36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that
Prosecution not overcome the presumption of innocence
a witness can testify only to those facts that she knows
in his favor.In other words, the weakness of the defense
of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived
put up by the accused is inconsequential in the
from her own perception, except as otherwise provided
proceedings for as long as the Prosecution has not
in the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a
discharged its burden of proof in establishing the
witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting
commission of the crime charged and in identifying the
testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a
accused as the malefactor responsible for it.
disputed fact. A witness bereft ofpersonal knowledge of
the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose
Did the Prosecution adduce evidence that proved
because her testimony derives its value not from the
beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner for
credit accorded to her as a witness presently testifying
the estafa charged in the information?
but from the veracity and competency of the
extrajudicial source of her information.
To establish the elements of estafaearlier
mentioned, the Prosecution presented the testimonies of
In case a witness is permitted to testify based on
Go and Guivencan, and various documentsconsisting of:
what she has heard another person say about the facts in
(a) the receipts allegedly issued by petitioner to each of
dispute, the person from whom the witness derived the
her customers upon their payment, (b) the ledgers listing
information on the facts in dispute is not in
the accounts pertaining to each customer with the
court and under oath to be examined and cross-
corresponding notations of the receipt numbers for each
examined. The weight of such testimony thendepends not
of the payments, and (c) the confirmation sheets
upon theveracity of the witness but upon the veracity of
accomplished by Guivencan herself. [18]The ledgers and
the other person giving the information to the witness
receipts were marked and formally offered as Exhibits B
without oath. The information cannot be tested because
to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive.
the declarant is not standing in court as a witness
andcannot, therefore, be cross-examined.
It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a
hearsay is not obliged to enter into any particular, to
answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to
reconcile any contradictions, to explain any obscurities,
to remove any ambiguities; and that she entrenches
herself in the simple assertion that she was told so, and
leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or absent author.
[19]
Thus, the rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly
on the ground that there was no opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant.[20] The testimony may have been
given under oath and before a court of justice, but if it is
offered against a party who is afforded no opportunity to
cross-examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same. [21]
Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that
when a human utterance is offered as evidence of the
truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor
becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore, the
assertion can be received as evidence only when made on
the witness stand, subject to the test of cross-
examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is
offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted
but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted,
the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a slander
case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard the
accused say that the complainant was a thief, this
testimony is admissible not to prove that the complainant
was really a thief, but merely to show that the accused
uttered those words.[22] This kind of utterance ishearsay in
character but is not legal hearsay.[23]The distinction is,
therefore, between (a) the fact that the statement was
made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b)
the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which
the hearsay rule applies.[24]
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is
understandably not the only rule that explains why
testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from
consideration. Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve
the right of the opposing party to cross-examine
the originaldeclarant claiming to have a direct
[25]
knowledge of the transaction or occurrence. If hearsay
is allowed, the right stands to be denied because the
declarant is not in court.[26]It is then to be stressed that
the right to cross-examine the adverse partys witness,
being the only means of testing the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies, is essential to the
administration of justice.
To address the problem of controlling
inadmissible hearsay as evidence to establish the truth in
a dispute while also safeguardinga partys right to cross-
examine her adversarys witness,the Rules of Court offers
two solutions. The firstsolution is to require that allthe
witnesses in a judicial trial or hearing be examined
only in courtunder oath or affirmation. Section 1, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court formalizes this solution,viz:
Section 1. Examination to be done
in open court. - The examination of
witnesses presented in a trial or hearing
shall be done in open court, and under
oath or affirmation. Unless the witness
is incapacitated to speak, or the question
calls for a different mode of answer, the
answers of the witness shall be given
orally. (1a)
The secondsolution is to require that all witnesses
besubject to the cross-examination by the adverse party.
Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Courtensuresthis
solutionthusly:
Section 6. Cross-examination; its
purpose and extent. Upon the
termination of the direct examination,
the witness may be cross-examined by
the adverse party as to any matters
stated in the direct examination, or
connected therewith, with sufficient
fullness and freedom to test his accuracy
and truthfulness and freedom from
interest or bias, or the reverse, and to
elicit all important facts bearing upon
the issue. (8a)
Although the second solution traces its existence to a
Constitutional precept relevant to criminal cases, i.e.,
Section 14, (2), Article III, of the
1987 Constitution,which guarantees that: In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall xxx enjoy the right xxx to
meet the witnesses face to face xxx, the rule requiring the
cross-examination by the adverse party equally applies to
non-criminal proceedings.

We thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay
as evidence is based upon serious concerns about the
trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence
due to its not being given under oath or solemn
affirmation and due to its not being subjected to
cross-examination by the opposing counsel to test the
perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of
the out-of-court declarant or actor upon
whose reliability the worth of the out-of-court
statement depends.[27]
Based on the foregoing considerations,
Guivencans testimony as well as Exhibits B to YY, and
their derivatives, inclusive, must be entirely rejected as
proof of petitioners misappropriation or conversion.
III
Lack of their proper authentication rendered
Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives
inadmissible as judicial evidence
Petitioner also contends that the RTC grossly
erred in admitting as evidence Exhibits B to YY, and
their derivatives, inclusive, despite their being private
documents that were not duly authenticated as required
by Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules
Courtdistinguishes between a public document and a
private document for the purpose of their presentation in
evidence, viz:
Section 19. Classes of
documents. For the purpose of their
presentation in evidence, documents
are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or
records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of
the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged
before a notary public except last wills
and testaments, and
(c) Public records, kept in the
Philippines, of private documents
required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private.
The nature of documents as either public or
private determines how the documents may be presented
as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its
official or sovereign character, or because it has been
acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial
will) or a competent public official with the formalities
required by law, or because it is a public record of a
private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating
and requires no further authentication in order to be
presented as evidence in court.In contrast, a private
document is any other writing, deed, or instrument
executed by a private person without the intervention of
a notary or other person legally authorized by which
some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth.
Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public
document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private
document requires authentication in the manner allowed
by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as
evidence in court. The requirement of authentication of a
private document is excused only in four instances,
specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one
within the context of Section 21,[28] Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court; (b) when the genuineness and
authenticity of an actionable document have not been
specifically denied under oath by the adverse party; [29](c)
when thegenuineness and authenticity of the document
have been admitted;[30] or (d) when the document is not
being offered as genuine.[31]
of There is no question that Exhibits B to YY and
their derivatives were private documents because private
individuals executed or generated them for private or
business purposes or uses. Considering that none of the
exhibits came under any of the four exceptions, they
could not be presented and admitted as evidence against
petitioner without the Prosecution dutifully seeing to
their authentication in the manner provided in Section20
of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,viz:
Section 20. Proof of private
documents. Before any private
document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution
and authenticity must be
proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the
document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the
genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need
only be identified as that which it is
claimed to be.

The Prosecutionattempted to have
authenticate the signature of petitioner in various
receipts, to wit:
ATTY. ABIERA:
Q. Now, these receipts which you
mentioned which do not
tally with the original
receipts, do you have copies
of these receipts?
A. Yes, I have a copy of these receipts,
but its not now in my
possession.
Q. But when asked to present those
receipts before this
Honorable Court, can you
assure this
(Next Page)
ATTY ABIERA (continuing):
Honorable Court that you will be able to
present those receipts?
A. Yes.
Q. You are also familiar with the
signature of the accused in
this case, Anna Lerima
Patula?
A. Yes.
Q. Why are you familiar with the
signature of the accused in
this case?
A. I used to see her signatures in the
payroll and in the receipts
also.
Q. Okay, I have here a machine copy
of a receipt which we
would present this,or offer
the same as soon as the
original receipts can be
presented, but for purposes
only of your testimony, Im
going to point to you a
certain signature over this
receipt number FLDT96
20441, a receipt from Cirila
Askin, kindly go over the
signature and tell the
Honorable Court whether
you are familiar with the
signature?
A. Yes, that is her signature.
INTERPRETER:
Go Witness is pointing to a signature above
the printed word collector.
(Next Page)
ATTY. ABIERA:
Q. Is this the only receipt wherein the
name, the signature
rather, of the accused in
this case appears?
A. That is not the only one, there are
many receipts.
ATTY. ABIERA:
In order to save time, Your Honor, we
will just be presenting the
original receipts Your
Honor, because its quite
voluminous, so we will just
forego with the testimony of
the witness but we will just
present the same using the
testimony of another
witness, for purposes of
identifying the signature
of the accused. We will
request that this signature
which has been identified to
by the witness in this case
be marked, Your Honor,
with the reservation to
present the original copy
and present the same to
offer as our exhibits but for
the meantime, this is only
for the purposes of
recording, Your Honor,
which we request the same,
the receipt which has just
been identified awhile ago
be marked as our Exhibit A
You Honor.
COURT:
Mark the receipt as Exhibit A.
ATTY. ABIERA:
And the signature be bracketed and be
marked as Exhibit A-1.
(Next Page)
COURT:
Bracket the signature &mark it as Exh.
A-1. What is the number of
that receipt?
 w/difference in Records as per Audit duly verified
March 16-20, 1997.

In her case, Guivencans identification of

petitioners signature on two receipts based alone on the
fact that the signatures contained the legible family name
of Patula was ineffectual, and exposed yet another deep
ATTY. ABIERA: flaw infecting the documentary evidence against
petitioner. Apparently, Guivencan could not honestly
Receipt No. 20441 dated August 4,
1996 the statement that: identify petitioners signature on the receipts either
received from Cirila Askin. because she lacked familiarity with such signature, or
[32]
because she had not seen petitioner affix her signature on
xxx the receipts, as the following excerpts from her
testimony bear out:

As the excerpts indicate, Gos attempt at authentication ATTY. ZERNA to witness:

Q. There are two (2) receipts
of the signature of petitioner on the receipt with serial attached here in the
number FLDT96 No. 20441 (a document that was confirmation sheet, will you
go over these Miss witness?
marked as Exhibit A, while the purported signature of A. This was the last payment
petitioner thereon was marked as Exhibit A-1) which is fully paid by the
customer. The other receipt
immediately fizzled out after the Prosecution admitted
is the one showing her
that the document was a meremachinecopy, not the payment prior to the last
original. Thereafter, as if to soften its failed attempt, the payment.
COURT:
Prosecution expressly promised to produce at a later date Q. Where did you get those two (2)
the originalsof the receipt with serial number FLDT96 receipts?
A. From the customer.
No. 20441 and other receipts. But that promise was not Q. And who issued those receipts?
even true, because almost in the same breath the A. The saleswoman, Miss Patula.
ATTY. ZERNA:
Prosecution offered to authenticate the signature of
We pray, Your Honor, that this receipt
petitioner on the receiptsthrougha different identified be marked as
witness (though then still unnamed). As matters turned Exhibit B-3, receipt number
20441.
out in the end, the effort to have Go authenticate both
themachinecopy of the receiptwith serial number (Next Page)
FLDT96 No. 20441 and the signature of petitioner on
COURT:
that receipt was wasteful because the machine copy was Mark it.
inexplicablyforgotten and was no longer evenincluded in ATTY. ZERNA:
The signature of the collector be marked
the Prosecutions Offer of Documentary Evidence. as
Q. By the way, there is a signature
above the name of the
It is true that the original of the receipt bearing collector, are your familiar
serial number FLDT96 No. 20441was with that
signature? (shown to
subsequentlypresented as Exhibit Bthrough Guivencan.
witness)
However,the Prosecution did not establishthat the A. Yes.
signature appearing on Exhibit B was the same signature Q. Whose signature is that?
A. Miss Patula.
that Go had earliersought to identify to be the signature Q. How do you know?
of petitioner (Exhibit A-1) on the machine copy (Exhibit A. It can be recognized because of the
word Patula.
A). This is borne out by the fact that the Prosecution Q. Are you familiar with her
abandoned Exhibit A as the marking nomenclature for signature?
A. Yes.
the machine copyof the receipt bearing serial number
ATTY. ZERNA:
FLDT96 No. 20441 for all intents and purposes of this We pray that the signature be bracketed
case, and used the same nomenclature to referinstead and marked as Exhibit B-3-
a
toan entirely differentdocument entitled List of COURT:
Customers covered by ANA LERIMA PATULA Mark it.
ATTY. ZERNA:
 The other receipt number 20045 be ATTY. ZERNA to witness:
marked as Exhibit B-4 and Q. Do you have a-whats the basis of
the signature as Exhibit B- saying that the balance of
4-a. this customer is
COURT: still P10,971.75
Mark it.[33]
(Next Page)
xxx
ATTY. ZERNA (continuing):
ATTY. ZERNA: [i]n your office?
Q. Ms. Witness, here is a receipt colored COURT:
white, number 26603 issued That was already answered paero, the
to one Divina Cadilig. Will office has a ledger.
you please identify this Q. Now, did you bring the ledger with
receipt if this is the receipt you?
of your office? A. No, Maam.[35]
A.Yes.
Q.There is a signature over the portion (Continuation of the Direct Examination
for the collector. Whose of
signature is this? Karen Guivencan on August 13, 2002)
A.Ms. Patula.
Q.How do you know that this is her ATTY. ZERNA to witness:
signature? Q. Okay, You said there are
A.Because we can read the Patula.[34] discrepancies between the
original and the
duplicate, will you please
We also have similar impressions of lack of proper enlighten the Honorable
authentication as to the ledgers the Prosecution Court on that discrepancy
which you said?
presented to prove the discrepancies between the A. Like in this case of Cirila Askin, she
amountspetitioner hadallegedly received from the has already fully paid. Her
ledger shows a zero
customers and the amounts she had actually remitted to
balance she has fully
Footluckers. Guivencanexclusively relied on the entries paid while in the original
of the unauthenticated ledgersto support her audit report
(Next page)
on petitioners supposed misappropriation or conversion,
revealing her lack of independent knowledge of the WITNESS (continuing):
[r]eceipt she has a balance of Ten
veracity of the entries, as the following excerpts of her Thousand Seven hundred
testimony show: Ninety-one Pesos and
ATTY. ZERNA to witness: Seventy-five Centavos
Q. What is your basis of saying that (10,791.75).
your office records showed COURT:
that this Cecilia Askin has Q. What about the duplicate receipt,
an account of P10,791.75? how much is indicated
ATTY. DIEZ: there?
The question answers itself, You Honor, A. The customer has no duplicate copy
what is the basis, office because it was already
record. forwarded to the Manila
COURT: Office.
Let the witness answer. Q. What then is your basis in the entries
WITNESS: in the ledger showing that it
A. I made the basis on our ledger in has already a zero balance?
the office. I just copied that A. This is the copy of the customer
and showed it to the while in the office, in the
customers for confirmation. original receipt she has still
a balance.
ATTY. ZERNA to witness: xxx
Q. What about the receipts? ATTY. ZERNA:
COURT: The confirmation sheet ---
Make a follow-up question and what
was the result when you
copied that amount in the COURT:
ledger and you had it The confirmation sheet was the one
confirmed by the customers, you referred to as the
what was the result when receipt in your earlier
you had it confirmed by the testimony? Is that what you
customers? referred to as the receipts,
WITNESS: the original receipts?
A. She has no more balance but in our A. This is what I copied from the
office she has still a balance ledger.
of P10,971.75.
 Q. So where was that(sic) original
receipt which you said
showed that that particular
customer still has a balance
of Ten Thousand
something?
A. The receipt is no longer here.
Q. You mean the entry of that receipt
was already entered in the
ledger?
A. Yes.[36]
In the face of the palpable flaws infecting the
Prosecutions evidence, it should come as no surprise that
petitioners counsel interposed timely objections. Yet, the
RTC mysteriously overruled the objections
allowedthe Prosecutionto present the unauthenticated
ledgers, as follows:
(Continuation of the Direct Examination of
Witness Karen Guivencan on September 11, 2002)
ATTY. ZERNA:
CONTINUATION OF DIRECT-
EXAMINATION
Q Ms. Witness, last time around you
were showing us several
ledgers. Where is it now?
A It is here.
Q Here is a ledger of one Divina
Cadilig. This Divina
Cadilig, how much is her
account in your office?
ATTY. DIEZ:
Your Honor please before the witness
will proceed to answer the
question, let me interpose
our objection on the
ground that this ledger
has not been duly
identified to by the person
who made the same. This
witness will be testifying
on hearsay matters
because the supposed
ledger was not identified
to by the person who
made the same.
COURT:
Those ledgers were already presented in
the last hearing. I think they
were already duly identified
by this witness. As a matter
of fact, it was she who
brought them to court
(Next Page)
COURT (cont.):
because these were the ledgers on file in
their office.
ATTY. DIEZ
That is correct, Your Honor, but the
person who made the
entries is not this witness,
Your Honor. How do we
know that the entries
there is (sic) correct on the
receipts submitted to their
office.
COURT:
Precisely, she brought along the receipts
also to support that. Let the
witness answer.
WITNESS:
A Its the office clerk in-charge.
COURT:
The one who prepared the ledger is
the office clerk.
ATTY. ZERNA:
She is an auditor, Your Honor. She has
been qualified and she is the
auditor of Footluckers.
COURT:
I think, I remember in the last setting
also, she testified where
and those entries were taken. So,
you answer the query of
counsel.
xxx
ATTY. DIEZ:
Your Honor please, to avoid delay, may
I interpose a continuing
objection to the questions
profounded(sic) on those
ledgers on the ground
that, as I have said, it is
hearsay.
COURT:
Okey(sic). Let the continuing objection
be noted.
Q (To Witness) The clerk who
allegedly was the one who
prepared the entries on
those ledgers, is she still
connected with
Footluckers?
A She is no longer connected now, Your
Honor,
COURT:
Alright proceed.
(Next Page)
ATTY. ZERNA:
Your Honor, these are entries in the
normal course of business.
So, exempt from the
hearsay rule.
COURT:
Okey(sic), proceed.[37]
The mystery shrouding the RTCs soft treatment
of the Prosecutions flawed presentation was avoidable
simply by the RTC adhering to the instructions of the
rules earlier quoted, as well as withSection 22 of Rule
132 of the Rules of Court,which contains instructions on
how to prove the genuineness of a handwriting in a
judicial proceeding, as follows:
 Section 22. How genuineness of
handwriting proved. The handwriting of
a person may be proved by any witness
who believes it to be the handwriting of
such person because he has seen the
person write, or has seen writing
purporting to be his upon which the
witness has acted or been
charged, and has thus acquired
knowledge of the handwriting of such
person. Evidence respecting the
handwriting may also be given by a
comparison, made by the witness or
the court, with writings admitted or
treated as genuine by the party against
whom the evidence is offered, or
proved to be genuine to the satisfaction
of the judge. (Emphases supplied)
If it is already clear that Go and Guivencan had
not themselves seen the execution or signing of the
documents,the Prosecution surely did not
authenticate Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives
conformably with the aforequoted rules. Hence, Exhibits
B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, were
inescapably bereft of probative value as evidence. That
was the onlyfair and just result, as the Court held
in Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Philippine Nails and
Wires Corporation:[38]
On the first issue, petitioner
Malayan Insurance Co., Inc.,
contends that Jeanne Kings testimony
was hearsay because she had no
personal knowledge of the execution
of the documents supporting
respondents cause of action, such as
the sales contract, invoice, packing list,
bill of lading, SGS Report, and the
Marine Cargo Policy. Petitioner avers
that even though King was personally
assigned to handle and monitor the
importation of Philippine Nails and
Wires Corporation, herein respondent,
this cannot be equated with personal
knowledge of the facts which gave rise
to respondents cause of action. Further,
petitioner asserts, even though she
personally prepared the summary of
weight of steel billets received by
respondent, she did not have personal
knowledge of the weight of steel billets
actually shipped and delivered.
At the outset, we must stress that
respondents cause of action is founded
on breach of insurance contract covering
cargo consisting of imported steel
billets. To hold petitioner liable,
respondent has to prove, first, its
importation of 10,053.400 metric tons of
steel billets valued at P67,156,300.00,
and second, the actual steel billets
delivered to and received by the
importer, namely the respondent.
Witness Jeanne King, who was assigned
to handle respondents importations,
including their insurance coverage, has
personal knowledge of the volume of
steel billets being imported, and
therefore competent to testify
thereon. Her testimony is not hearsay, as
this doctrine is defined in Section 36,
Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.However, she is not qualified to
testify on the shortage in the delivery
of the imported steel billets. She did
not have personal knowledge of the
actual steel billets received. Even
though she prepared the summary of
the received steel billets, she based the
summary only on the receipts
prepared by other persons. Her
testimony on steel billets received was
hearsay. It has no probative value
even if not objected to at the trial.
On the second issue, petitioner
avers that King failed to properly
authenticate respondents documentary
evidence. Under Section 20, Rule 132,
Rules of Court, before a private
document is admitted in evidence, it
must be authenticated either by the
person who executed it, the person
before whom its execution was
acknowledged, any person who was
present and saw it executed, or who
after its execution, saw it and
recognized the signatures, or the
person to whom the parties to the
instruments had previously confessed
execution thereof. In this
case, respondent admits that King was
none of the aforementioned
persons. She merely made the
summary of the weight of steel billets
based on the unauthenticated bill of
lading and the SGS report. Thus, the
summary of steel billets actually
received had no proven real basis, and
Kings testimony on this point could
not be taken at face value.
xxx Under the rules on evidence,
documents are either public or private.
Private documents are those that do not
fall under any of the enumerations in
Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court.Section 20of the same law, in
turn, provides that before any private
document is received in evidence, its
due execution and authenticity must be
proved either by anyone who saw the
document executed or written, or
by evidence of the genuineness of the
signature or handwriting of the
maker. Here, respondents
documentary exhibits are private
documents. They are not among those
enumerated in Section 19, thus, their
due execution and authenticity need
to be proved before they can be
admitted in evidence.With the
exception concerning the summary of
the weight of the steel billets
imported, respondent presented no
supporting evidence concerning their
authenticity. Consequently, they
cannot be utilized to prove less of the
insured cargo and/or the short
delivery of the imported steel billets.
In sum, we find no sufficient
 competent evidence to prove
petitioners liability. (e) The entries were made in the
ordinary or regular course of
business or duty.[41]
That the Prosecutions evidence was left
uncontested because petitioner decided not to subject
Guivencan to cross-examination, and did not tender her
The Court has to acquit petitioner for failure of
contrary evidencewas inconsequential. Although the trial
the State to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
court had overruled the seasonable objections to
The Court reiterates that in the trial of every criminal
Guivencans testimony bypetitioners counsel due to the
case, a judge must rigidly test the States evidence of
hearsay character, it could not be denied thathearsay
guilt in order to ensure that such evidence adhered to the
evidence, whether objected to or not, had no probative
basic rules of admissibility before pronouncing an
value.[39]Verily, the flaws of the Prosecutions evidence
accused guilty of the crime charged upon such evidence.
were fundamental and substantive, not merely technical
The failure of the judge to do so herein nullified the
and procedural, and were defects that the adverse partys
guarantee of due of process of law in favor of the
waiver of her cross-examination or failure to rebutcould
accused, who had no obligation to prove her innocence.
not set right or cure. Nor did the trial courts overruling
Heracquittal should follow.
of petitioners objections imbue the flawed evidence with
any virtue and value. IV
No reliable evidence on damage

Curiously, the RTC excepted the entries in the

Conformably with finding the evidence of guilt
ledgers from the application of the hearsay rule by also
unreliable, the Court declares that the disposition by the
terselystating that the ledgers were prepared in the
RTC ordering petitioner to indemnify Footluckers in the
regular course of business.[40]Seemingly, the RTC applied
amount of P131,286.92 with interest of 12% per
Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
annum until fully paid was not yet shown to be factually
founded. Yet, she cannot now be absolved of civil
Section 43. Entries in the course liability on that basis. Heracquittal has to bedeclared as
of business. Entries made at, or near the
time of the transactions to which they without prejudice to the filing of a civil action against
refer, by a person deceased, or unable to her for the recovery of any amount that she may still
testify, who was in a position to know
owe to Footluckers.
the facts therein stated, may be received
as prima facie evidence, if such person
made the entries in his professional WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE
capacity or in the performance of duty
and in the ordinary or regular course of ANDREVERSESthe decision convicting ANNA
business or duty. LERIMA PATULAof estafa as charged,
and ACQUITS her for failure of the Prosecution to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, without
This was another grave error of the RTC.The
prejudice to a civil action brought against her for
terse yet sweeping mannerof justifying the application of
Section 43 was unacceptable due to the need to show the
the recoveryof any amount still owing in favor of
concurrence of the several requisites before entries in the
Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc.
course of business could be excepted from the hearsay
rule. The requisites are as follows:
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
(a) The person who made the entry must
be dead or unable to testify; SO ORDERED.
(b) The entries were made at or near the
time of the transactions to which
they refer;

(c) The entrant was in a position to

know the facts stated in the entries;

(d) The entries were made in his

professional capacity or in the
performance of a duty, whether
legal, contractual, moral, or
religious;
Republic of the Philippines assignment from 18 private firms [4] registered with the
Board of Investments (BOI). The TCCs were issued by
Supreme Court
the One Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit & Duty
Manila Drawback Center (OSS), an office under the Department
of Finance (DOF), created by virtue of Administrative
Order No. 266 dated February 7, 1992. Petron used the
FIRST DIVISION assigned TCCs to pay its excise tax liabilities.

MONICO V. JACOB and CELSO L. The practice was for the BOI-registered firms to
G.R. No. 162206
LEGARDA, sign the Deeds of Assignment upon delivery of the TCCs
Petitioners, Present:
to Petron. Petron then forwarded said documents to the
CORONA,
Chairperson,
OSS, with a request for authorization to use said TCCs
VELASCO, JR.,
- versus - to pay for itsCASTRO,
LEONARDO-DE excise tax liabilities. DOF Undersecretary
PERALTA,
Antonio P. Belicena (Belicena) approved the request of
PEREZ,
Petron through the issuance of Tax Debit Memoranda
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN FOURTH (TDM) addressed to the Collection Program Division of
Promulgated:
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). The BIR
DIVISION and THE OFFICE OF THE
Collection
November Program Division accepted the TCCs as
17, 2010
OMBUDSMAN, payment for the excise tax liabilities of Petron by issuing

Respondents. its own TDM.[5] The control numbers of the BIR-TDM

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - were indicated on the back of the TCCs, marking the
- - - - - - - - - - - - -x
final utilization of the tax credits.[6]

DECISION However, the Fact Finding and Intelligence

Bureau (FFIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: eventually found that the aforementioned transactions
involving the TCCs were irregular and violative of the

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of Memorandum of Agreement dated August 29, 1989

the Rules of Court for the nullification of the between the BOI and the DOF, which implemented

Resolutions dated February 4, 2002[1] of the Article 21 of Executive Order No. 226, otherwise known

Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division and December as the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.[7]

12, 2003[2] of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division. In its

Resolution dated February 4, 2002, the Sandiganbayan After the termination of the requisite preliminary

Special Fourth Division set aside the order to dismiss investigation, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a

Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939, among other cases, Resolution dated March 27, 2000 finding probable cause

verbally issued by Associate Justice Narciso S. Nario against several public officers and private individuals,

(Justice Nario), Chairman of the Sandiganbayan Fourth including petitioners Monico V. Jacob (Jacob), President,

Division, during the court session held on August 20, and Celso L. Legarda (Legarda), Vice-President and

2001;[3] while in its Resolution dated December 12, General Manager for Marketing, both of Petron, for

2003, the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division denied the perpetrating the so-called tax credit scam. On April 10,

motions for reconsideration of the petitioners and other 2010, the Office of the Ombudsman filed a total of 62

accused. Informations, 18 of which, docketed as Criminal Case

Nos. 25922-25939, were against DOF Undersecretary

The following facts are duly established from Belicena, OSS Deputy Executive Director Uldarico P.

the pleadings of the parties: Andutan, Jr., petitioners and other Petron officials, and
officers of the BOI-registered firms which assigned the

From 1993 to 1997, Petron Corporation TCCs to Petron, charging them with violation of Section

(Petron), a corporation engaged in the business of 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the

refining, marketing and distribution of petroleum Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

products, received Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs) by

 Petitioners provided an undisputed account of
the events that subsequently took place before the
Sandiganbayan:
On April 14, 2000, petitioners
and the four other Petron officers who
were similarly charged filed a Motion
for Reinvestigation [with the Office of
the Ombudsman].
On 17 April 2000, the
[Sandiganbayan Fourth Division] issued
an Order giving the prosecution a period
of sixty (60) days within which
to re-assess its
evidence in these cases
and to take appropriate
action on the said
motion for
reconsideration of
accused movants and to
inform the Court within
the same period as to its
findings and
recommendations
including the action
thereon of the
Honorable
Ombudsman.
Sixty (60) days passed but the
Office of the Ombudsman did not even
bother to submit a report on the status of
the motions for reconsideration. Months
passed, and then, AN ENTIRE YEAR
PASSED. There was still nothing from
the respondent Office of the
Ombudsman.
In the meantime, petitioner
Jacob was arraigned on 1 June 2000
while petitioner Legarda was arraigned
on 18 May 2001.
On March 20, 2001, in view of a
significant development in the Shell
cases (then pending with the 5 th Division
of [the Sandiganbayan]), petitioners and
other accused Petron officials filed a
Motion to Resolve with the Office of the
Ombudsman. In the said motion,
petitioners cited the Memorandum dated
30 January 2001 issued by Special
Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo
upholding the dropping of the charges
against Shell official Pacifico Cruz on
the ground that there was no sufficient
evidence to prove that he was part of the
conspiracy.Petitioners asserted that since
their situation/alleged participation is
similar to that of Mr. Pacifico Cruz, they
should similarly be dropped from the
criminal cases. Despite this, the
respondent Office of the Ombudsman
took no action.
Considering the time that had
lapsed, the [Sandiganbayan Fourth
Division], at the hearing on 1 June 2001,
expressly warned the prosecution that
should it fail to resolve the
reconsideration/investigation, it would
order the dismissal of the cases or
require the prosecution to show cause
why it should not be cited for contempt.
In its Resolution dated 26 June
2001, the [Sandiganbayan Fourth
Division] in fact denied the motion of
the prosecution for the resetting of the
scheduled arraignment and pre-trial on 2
July 2001 it appearing that the
Reinvestigation of these cases has been
pending for more than one (1) year now
and the court cannot countenance the
unreasonable delay attributable to the
plaintiff.
In spite of the denial of their
motion, the prosecution still failed to
submit its report to the [Sandiganbayan
Fourth Division] during the 2 July 2001
hearing. Instead they asked for a period
of seven (7) more days to resolve the
motions for reconsideration. The
arraignment (of the other accused) and
pre-trial therefore had to be reset again
to 17 July 2001.
One day before the schedule
hearing, the prosecution filed a
Manifestation requesting the
cancellation of the arraignment and pre-
trial scheduled the next day on the
ground that the motions for
reconsideration/reinvestigation were still
pending resolution.
Once again, [the Sandiganbayan
Fourth Division] gave the prosecution
another chance. During the hearing on
17 July 2001, the [Sandiganbayan
4th Division] directed the prosecution,
through Prosecutor Orlando Ines, to
terminate the reinvestigation within a
period of one (1) more month. The
arraignment and pre-trial were then reset
to 20 August 2001.
At the scheduled hearing on
August 20, 2001, Prosecutor Orlando
Ines, however, again requested for the
deferment of the arraignment and pre-
trial on the ground that the resolution on
the various motions for
reconsideration/reinvestigation were still
pending approval by the Office of the
Ombudsman.
In all the hearings conducted in
the cases the defense verbally and
consistently invoked their right to
speedy trial and moved for the dismissal
of the cases. In the course of more than
one year, however, the [Sandiganbayan
4th Division] kept affording the
prosecution one chance after
another. The sixty days granted to the
prosecution became more than four
hundred days still, there was no
resolution in sight.
Thus on 20 August 2001,
compelled by its duty to uphold the
 fundamental law, the [Sandiganbayan
Fourth Division, through its Chairman,
Justice Nario] issued a verbal order
dismissing the cases. The dismissal was
duly recorded in the minutes of the
hearing of the said date which was
attested to by the Clerk of Court and
signed by the parties.
On 24 August 2001, the
prosecution filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with the following
prayer: WHEREFORE, the undersigned
Ombudsman Prosecutors prayed (sic)
that the Order issued by the Honorable
Court for the summary dismissal of all
the graft and estafa charges aforecited
be SET ASIDE.
On August 31, 2001, the
[Sandiganbayan Fourth Division] issued
an Order taking cognizance of the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
prosecution and requiring the accused to
file their respective comments thereon
within five (5) days.
On 4 February 2002, OR SIX
(6) MONTHS after [Justice Nario]
issued the verbal order of dismissal, the
[Sandiganbayan Special Fourth
Division] issued an Order setting aside
said verbal order.
reactions of the defense counsel in those
hearings everytime the prosecution
requested for postponement than
anything else as said defense counsel
did not seriously pursue the dismissal of
these cases, such as by reducing their
request in a formal written motion to
dismiss and/or insisting that the court
formally rule on their request for
dismissal and go on certiorari if denied;
and (4) considering the nature and
importance of the cases, if there is any
prejudice that may have resulted as a
consequence of the series of
postponements, it would be more
against the government than against any
of the accused; however, be that as it
may, none of the herein accused has
come out to claim having been thus
prejudiced.[9]
On February 26, 2002, petitioners, together with
four other co-accused Petron officials, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[10] of the February 4, 2002 Resolution of
the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division. Other
accused also filed their motions for reconsideration and
motions to quash/dismiss. The prosecution expectedly
opposed all such motions of the accused.

xxxx In an Omnibus Resolution dated December 12,

2003, the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division ruled in the
In the 4 February 2002
Resolution, this time a Division of five prosecutions favor and denied all the motions filed by
justices (two of whom dissented) the accused, to wit:
rendered a Resolution stating:
Wherefore, premises considered,
WHEREFORE,
this court issues an Omnibus
the dismissal of these
Resolution denying all the above-
cases orally ordered in
described Motion to Quash for lack of
open court by the
merit.
Chairman of the Fourth
Division during its court
session held on August
20, 2001, and reiterated Hence, petitioners come before us via the instant
in his subsequent Petition for Certiorari averring grave abuse of discretion
ponencia, is hereby set
aside.[8] (Citations on the part of the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth
omitted.) Division, specifically:

The Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division I

THE RESPONDENT COURT
gave the following reasons for overruling Justice Narios COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
verbal order dismissing the criminal cases against the DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF
accused in the alleged tax credit scam: JURISDICTION IN DENYING
PETITIONERS RIGHT TO SPEEDY
In the present case, (1) there is TRIAL.
already a delay of the trial for more than
one year now; (2) but it is not shown II
that the delay is vexatious, capricious
and oppressive; (3) it may be that, as THE RESPONDENT COURT
stated in the herein dissented COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
Resolution, at the hearings conducted in DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
these cases, the defense orally, openly LACK OR EXCESS OF
and consistently asked for the dismissal JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT
of these cases; however, these oral PETITIONERS HAVE NOT BEEN
manifestations were more of knee-jerk PUT IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
 l terminated;
III postponements. Trial,
once commenced, shall
continue from day to
THE RESPONDENT COURT day as far as practicable
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF until terminated. It may
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO be postponed for a
LACK OR EXCESS OF reasonable period of
JURISDICTION IN NOT time for good cause.
CONSIDERING THE GLARING
LACK OF EVIDENCE AGAINST The court shall,
PETITIONERS.[11] after consultation with
the prosecutor and
defense counsel, set the
case for continuous trial
on a weekly or other
To recall, Justice Nario, as the Chairman of the short-term trial calendar
Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, ordered the dismissal of at the earliest possible
time so as to ensure
all criminal cases arising from the purported tax credit
speedy trial. In no case
scam on the ground that the accused, including shall the entire trial
petitioners, had already been deprived of their right to a period exceed one
hundred eighty (180)
speedy trial and disposition of the cases against days from the first day
them. Petitioners assert that the Sandiganbayan gravely of trial, except as
otherwise authorized by
abused its discretion in reversing Justice Narios order of the Supreme Court.
dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939 because
The time
such reversal violated petitioners constitutional right
limitations provided
against double jeopardy. under this section and
the preceding section
shall not apply where
An accuseds right to have a speedy, impartial, special laws or circulars
and public trial is guaranteed in criminal cases by of the Supreme Court
provide for a shorter
Section 14(2), Article III[12] of the Constitution. This
period of trial.
right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free from
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its salutary However, any period of delay
resulting from a continuance granted by
objective being to assure that an innocent person may be the court motu proprio, or on motion of
free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, either the accused or his counsel, or the
prosecution, if the court granted the
if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the continuance on the basis of its findings
shortest possible time compatible with the presentation set forth in the order that the ends of
justice is served by taking such action
and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he
outweigh the best interest of the public
may interpose. Intimating historical perspective on the and the accused on a speedy trial, shall
evolution of the right to speedy trial, we reiterate the old be deducted.

legal maxim, justice delayed is justice denied. This oft- The trial court may grant
repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of continuance, taking into account the
following factors:
disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an
accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a (a) Whether or
[13] not the failure to grant a
speedy trial.
continuance in the
proceeding would likely
Hence, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure make a continuation of
such proceeding
also include provisions that ensure the protection of such impossible or result in a
right. As we presented in Uy v. Hon. Adriano[14]: miscarriage of justice;
and
Section 1(h), Rule 115 of the (b) Whether or
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure not the case taken as a
provides that the accused is entitled to a whole is so novel,
speedy, impartial and public trial. unusual and complex,
Section 2, Rule 119 of the said Rules due to the number of
provides that trial, once commenced, accused or the nature of
shall be continuous until terminated: the prosecution, or that
it is unreasonable to
Sec. expect adequate
2. Continuous trial unti
 preparation within the
periods of time
established therein.
In addition, no
continuance under
section 3(f) of this Rule
shall be granted because
of congestion of the
courts calendar or lack
of diligent preparation
or failure to obtain
available witnesses on
the part of the
prosecutor.[15]
We further emphasized in Uy that speedy trial is
a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept. In
determining whether the right of the accused to a speedy
trial was violated, the delay should be considered, in
view of the entirety of the proceedings. Indeed, mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not
suffice as the realities of everyday life must be regarded
in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a
vacuum.[16]
Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan[17] is a case originating
from exactly the same factual background as the case at
bar. Therein petitioners Marialen C. Corpuz and Antonio
H. Roman, Sr. were officers of FILSYN Corporation,
one of the BOI-registered firms that assigned TCCs to
Petron; and were among the accused in Criminal Case
No. 25922. They filed a separate Petition
for Certiorari before us assailing the Resolutions dated
February 4, 2002 of the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth
Division and December 12, 2003 of the Sandiganbayan
Fourth Division.
We expounded more extensively in Corpuz on
the right of the accused to a speedy trial and disposition
of the case against him, thus:
The right of the accused to a
speedy trial and to a speedy disposition
of the case against him was designed to
prevent the oppression of the citizen by
holding criminal prosecution suspended
over him for an indefinite time, and to
prevent delays in the administration of
justice by mandating the courts to
proceed with reasonable dispatch in the
trial of criminal cases. Such right to a
speedy trial and a speedy disposition of
a case is violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays. The
inquiry as to whether or not an accused
has been denied such right is not
susceptible by precise qualification.
The concept of a speedy disposition is a
relative term and must necessarily be a
flexible concept.
While justice is administered
with dispatch, the essential ingredient
is orderly, expeditious and not mere
speed. It cannot be definitely said how
long is too long in a system where
justice is supposed to be swift, but
deliberate. It is consistent with delays
and depends upon circumstances. It
secures rights to the accused, but it
does not preclude the rights of public
justice. Also, it must be borne in mind
that the rights given to the accused by
the Constitution and the Rules of Court
are shields, not weapons; hence, courts
are to give meaning to that intent.
[18]
(Emphases ours.)
We went on to lay down in Corpuz the test for
determining whether an accused was indeed deprived of
his right to a speedy trial and disposition of the case
against him:
In determining whether the
accused has been deprived of his right to
a speedy disposition of the case and to a
speedy trial, four factors must be
considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the
reason for the delay; (c) the defendants
assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice
to the defendant. Prejudice should be
assessed in the light of the interest of the
defendant that the speedy trial was
designed to protect, namely: to prevent
oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to
minimize anxiety and concerns of the
accused to trial; and to limit the
possibility that his defense will be
impaired. Of these, the most serious is
the last, because the inability of a
defendant adequately to prepare his case
skews the fairness of the entire system.
There is also prejudice if the defense
witnesses are unable to recall accurately
the events of the distant past. Even if
the accused is not imprisoned prior to
trial, he is still disadvantaged by
restraints on his liberty and by living
under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and
often, hostility. His financial resources
may be drained, his association is
curtailed, and he is subjected to public
obloquy.
Delay is a two-edge sword. It is
the government that bears the burden of
proving its case beyond reasonable
doubt. The passage of time may make it
difficult or impossible for the
government to carry its burden. The
Constitution and the Rules do not
require impossibilities or extraordinary
efforts, diligence or exertion from courts
or the prosecutor, nor contemplate that
such right shall deprive the State of a
reasonable opportunity of fairly
prosecuting criminals. As held
in Williams v. United States, for the
 government to sustain its right to try the
accused despite a delay, it must show
two things: (a) that the accused suffered
no serious prejudice beyond that which
ensued from the ordinary and inevitable
delay; and (b) that there was no more
delay than is reasonably attributable to
the ordinary processes of justice.
Closely related to the length of
delay is the reason or justification of the
State for such delay. Different weights
should be assigned to different reasons
or justifications invoked by the State.
For instance, a deliberate attempt to
delay the trial in order to hamper or
prejudice the defense should be
weighted heavily against the State.
Also, it is improper for the prosecutor to
intentionally delay to gain some tactical
advantage over the defendant or to
harass or prejudice him. On the other
hand, the heavy case load of the
prosecution or a missing witness should
be weighted less heavily against the
State. Corollarily, Section 4, Rule 119
of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure enumerates the factors for
granting a continuance.[19]
In the Petition at bar, Criminal Case Nos. 25922-
25939 were filed on April 10, 2000. Petitioner Jacob was
arraigned on June 1, 2000, while petitioner Legarda was
arraigned on May 18, 2001; with both petitioners
pleading not guilty. Since then, there had been no other
significant development in the cases since
prosecution repeatedly requested for deferment or
postponement of the scheduled hearings as it awaits the
result of the reinvestigation of the Office of the
Ombudsman. Judge Nario verbally ordered the dismissal
of said cases during the hearing on August 20,
2001. Thus, the criminal cases had been pending for
about a year and four months by the time they were
dismissed by Justice Nario.
The accused, including petitioners,
consistently asked in open court that the criminal cases
be dismissed every time the prosecution moved for a
deferment or postponement of the hearings.
The prosecution attributed the delay in the
criminal proceedings to: 1) the 23 motions for
reinvestigation or reconsideration filed by the accused,
which was granted by the Sandiganbayan in its April 17,
2000 Order; and 2) the failure of the Office of the
Ombudsman to terminate its reinvestigation and submit
its report within the 60-day period fixed by the said graft
court.
Irrefragably, there had been an undue and
inordinate delay in the reinvestigation of the cases by the
Office of the Ombudsman, which failed to submit its
reinvestigation report despite the lapse of the 60-day
period set by the Sandiganbayan, and even more than a
year thereafter. That there were 23 Motions for
Reinvestigation filed is insignificant. It should be
stressed that reinvestigation, as the word itself implies, is
merely a repeat investigation of the case. It is simply a
chance for the Office of the Ombudsman to review and
re-evaluate its findings based on the evidence previously
submitted by the parties. The Office of the Ombudsman
should have expedited the reinvestigation, not only
because it was ordered by the Sandiganbayan to submit a
report within a period of 60 days, but also because said
Office is bound by the Constitution [20] and Republic Act
No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of
1989,[21] to act promptly on complaints and cases
pending before it.
Nevertheless, while the re-investigation by the
Office of the Ombudsman delayed the proceedings in
Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939, the said process could
not have been dispensed with as it was undertaken for
the protection of the rights of petitioners themselves (and
their co-accused) and their rights should not be
compromised at the expense of expediency.
the
In Corpuz, we warned against the overzealous or
precipitate dismissal of a case that may enable the
defendant, who may be guilty, to go free without having
been tried, thereby infringing the societal interest in
trying people accused of crimes rather than granting
them immunization because of legal error.[22] Earlier,
in People v. Leviste,[23] we already stressed that:
[T]he State, like any other litigant, is
entitled to its day in court, and to a
had
reasonable opportunity to present its
case. A hasty dismissal such as the one
in question, instead of unclogging
dockets, has actually increased the
workload of the justice system as a
whole and caused uncalled-for delays in
the final resolution of this and other
cases. Unwittingly, the precipitate
action of the respondent court, instead of
easing the burden of the accused, merely
prolonged the litigation and ironically
enough, unnecessarily delayed the case
in the process, causing the very evil it
apparently sought to avoid. Such action
does not inspire public confidence in the
administration of justice.[24]
 Thus, even though we acknowledge the delay in
the criminal proceedings, as well as the prejudice In the unanimous Resolution of
December 12, 2003, the Sandiganbayan
suffered by petitioners and their co-accused by reason ruled as follows:
thereof, the weighing of interests militate against a
In the cases at
finding that petitioners right to speedy trial and bar, the dismissal made
disposition of the cases involving them would have in open court by the
Chairman, which was
justified the dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 25922-
not reduced in writing,
25939. We agree with the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth is not a valid dismissal
Division that Justice Narios dismissal of the criminal or termination of the
cases. This is because
cases was unwarranted under the circumstances, since the Chairman cannot
the State should not be prejudiced and deprived of its unilaterally dismiss the
same without the
right to prosecute the criminal cases simply because of approval or consent of
the ineptitude or nonchalance of the Office of the the other members of
the
Ombudsman. We reiterate our observations
Division. The Sandigan
in Corpuz that: bayan is a collegiate
court and under its
There can be no denying the internal rules prevailing
fact that the petitioners, as well as the at the time (Rule XVIII,
other accused, was prejudiced by the Section 1(b) of the
delay in the reinvestigation of the cases 1984 Revised Rules of
and the submission by the the Sandiganbayan,
Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor of his which is now Section
report thereon. So was the State. We 1(b), Rule VIII of the
have balanced the societal interest 2002 Revised Internal
involved in the cases and the need to Rules of the
give substance to the petitioners Sandiganbayan), an
constitutional rights and their quest for order, resolution or
justice, and we are convinced that the judgment, in order to be
dismissal of the cases is too drastic a valid - that is to say, in
remedy to be accorded to the order to be considered
petitioners. The cloud of suspicion may as an official action of
still linger over the heads of the the Court itself - must
petitioners by the precipitate dismissal bear the unanimous
of the cases. We repeat -- the cases approval of the
involve the so-called tax credit members of the
certificates scam and hundreds of division, or in case of
millions of pesos allegedly perpetrated lack thereof, by the
by government officials in connivance majority vote of the
with private individuals. The People has members of a special
yet to prove the guilt of the petitioners division of five.
of the crimes charged beyond reasonable
doubt. We agree with the ruling of the We agree with the foregoing
Sandiganbayan that before resorting to ratiocination. Section 1, Rule 120 of the
the extreme sanction of depriving the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
petitioner a chance to prove its case by mandates that a judgment must be
dismissing the cases, the written in the official language,
Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor should personally and directly prepared by
be ordered by the Sandiganbayan under the judge and signed by him and shall
pain of contempt, to explain the delay in contain clearly and distinctly a
the submission of his report on his statement of the facts and the law
reinvestigation.[25] upon which it is based. The rule
applies to a final order dismissing a
criminal case grounded on the
violation of the rights of the accused
Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth to a speedy trial. A verbal judgment
Division did not abuse its discretion in setting aside or order of dismissal is a violation of
the provision; hence, such order is, in
Justice Narios verbal order, which dismissed Criminal contemplation of law, not
Case Nos. 25922-25939, for not only was such order in esse, therefore, ineffective. Justice
Nario failed to issue a written resolution
baseless, as we had previously discussed herein; but
dismissing the criminal cases for failure
more importantly, because it is an utter nullity, as we had of the prosecution to submit its report on
ruled in Corpuz. the reinvestigation of the cases within
the sixty-day period fixed by the graft
court. Moreover, the verbal order was
We held in Corpuz that: rejected by majority vote of the
members of the Sandiganbayan Special
 Division. In fine, there has been no valid
and effective order of dismissal of the
cases. The Sandiganbayan cannot then
be faulted for issuing the assailed
resolutions.
Neither are the petitioners
entitled to a writ of mandamus to
compel the Sandiganbayan to reinstate
the cases, considering that the verbal
order of Justice Nario as aforestated
does not exist at all in contemplation
of law.[26] (Emphases ours.)
probable cause, therefore, does not
require an inquiry as to whether there is
sufficient evidence to secure a
conviction. It is enough that the
prosecutor believes that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged. A trial is intended
precisely for the reception of
prosecution evidence in support of the
charge. It is the court that is tasked to
determine guilt beyond reasonable doubt
based on the evidence presented by the
parties at the trial on the merits.[29]

Given that Justice Narios verbal order
dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939 is null and
void, and does not exist at all in contemplation of law, it
follows that petitioners cannot invoke the constitutional
right against double jeopardy.
To substantiate a claim for double jeopardy, the
following must be demonstrated:
(1) [A] first jeopardy must have attached
prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy
must have been validly terminated; (3)
the second jeopardy must be for the
same offense, or the second offense
includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the first information,
or is an attempt to commit the same or is
a frustration thereof.
Here, there has been no trial yet. Therefore,
there has been no occasion yet for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties evidence. The presence
or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in
nature that shall be passed upon after a full-blown trial
on the merits.
WHEREFORE, there being no showing that
the impugned Resolutions dated February 4, 2002 of the
Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division and December
12, 2003 of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division in
Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939 are tainted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the instant Petition
for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

And legal jeopardy attaches SO ORDERED.

only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b)
before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea
[has] been entered; and (e) the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the
accused.[27]

In the instant Petition, legal jeopardy has not yet

attached since there is so far no valid dismissal or
termination of the criminal cases against petitioners.

Finally, the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth

Division did not commit grave abuse of discretion nor
erred in not considering the glaring lack of evidence
against petitioners.

As we pointed out in Rizon v. Desierto[28]:

Time and again, we have held

that a prosecutor does not decide
whether there is evidence beyond
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
person charged. He merely determines
whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof, and
should be held for trial. A finding of
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
CHURCHILLE V. MARI and the PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioners,
- versus -
HON. ROLANDO L. GONZALES, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Sogod, Southern Leyte.[3] The Prosecutor's Office issued a
Promulgated
Southern Leyte, and PO1 RUDYARD Resolution dated May 26, 2008, finding probable cause
PALOMA y TORRES, September 12, 2011
Respondents. against private respondent and, accordingly, an
x-------------------------------------- Information for Rape was filed on June 11, 2008. A
- - - - - - - - - - - - -x
warrant of arrest was immediately issued against private
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
[1]
of the Rules of Court, praying that the Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Sogod, Southern Leyte (RTC),
dated January 16, 2009, dismissing the criminal case for
rape against PO1 Rudyard Paloma y Torres (private
[2]
respondent), and the Resolution dated March 16, 2009,
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration, be
annulled and set aside.
The records reveal the following antecedent facts.
On October 25, 2004, petitioner AAA, private
complainant below, executed a sworn statement before
an Investigator of the 8th Regional Office, Philippine
National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (PNP-CIDG) in Tacloban City, where she stated
that she was raped by herein private respondent on
October 10, 2004 at her boarding house at Sogod,
Southern Leyte. A preliminary investigation of the case
was commenced on November 4, 2004 before the
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Sogod. A warrant of arrest was issued
against private respondent, so he voluntarily surrendered
to the Chief of Police of Sogod on November 18, 2004
and was then incarcerated at the Sogod Municipal Jail.
On November 20, 2004, private respondent filed a
Motion for Bail. Hearings on the motion commenced on
December 7, 2004, but petitioner failed to appear. Only
private respondent presented evidence. Thus, on March
16, 2005, the MCTC of Sogod issued an Order allowing
private respondent to post bail set at P200,000.00. After
posting a surety bond, private respondent was released
from confinement.
G.R. No. 187728
PresentPursuant to the issuance of A.M. No. 05-8-26, divesting
VELASCO, JR., courts of authority to conduct preliminary
first-level
PERALTA,
investigation of criminal complaints cognizable by
ABAD,
Regional
MENDOZA, andTrial Courts, records of the subject case were
SERENO,
transmitted to the Provincial Prosecutor's Office of
respondent.
On June 27, 2008, private respondent was committed to
detention[4] and, on June 30, 2008, the RTC issued an
Order[5] stating that accused had voluntarily surrendered
to the Office of the Clerk of Court and arraignment was
set for July 31, 2008. In the meantime, on July 3, 2008,
private respondent filed a Motion to Admit Cash Bond in
Lieu of Surety Bond; thus, in an Order dated July 10,
2008, the RTC cancelled the July 31, 2008 schedule for
arraignment and reset the arraignment and hearing on
said motion for August 20, 2008. At said scheduled date
for arraignment and hearing on the motion, nobody
appeared for the prosecution. Hence, the RTC issued the
Order[6] dated August 20, 2008 resetting the arraignment
for October 31, 2008 and stating that:
x x x this Court hereby orders the public
prosecutor x x x and/or his assistant
prosecutor x x x to appear and prosecute
this case on the next scheduled hearing
from arraignment up to the termination
of the trial of this case otherwise this
Court will order the dismissal of this
case for failure to prosecute or nolle
prosequi.[7]
On October 28, 2008, petitioner AAA, private
complainant below, filed through her private counsel, a
Motion for Cancellation of Hearing, [8] manifesting that
Atty. Pedro Felicen, Jr. had been granted the authority to
prosecute by the Provincial Prosecutor and praying that
the scheduled arraignment on October 31, 2008 be
cancelled due to the pendency of private complainant's
petition for transfer of venue before this Court. The
authorized private prosecutor did not appear on said
hearing date.The hearing on October 31, 2008 proceeded
as the RTC ruled, in its Order[9] issued on the same day,
that unless restrained by a higher court, the mere
pendency of a petition for transfer of venue is not
sufficient reason to suspend the proceedings.Moreover,
counsel for accused invoked the accused's right to a
speedy trial and, thus, private respondent was arraigned
in the presence of the Provincial Prosecutor who was
designated by the RTC to represent the prosecution for
the purpose of arraignment. Pre-trial was set for
November 13, 2008. Nevertheless, said schedule for pre-
trial was cancelled (per Order [10] dated November 4,
2008) as the Presiding Judge of the RTC had to attend a
PHILJA Seminar, and pre-trial was reset to November
24, 2008. On November 24, 2008, the day of the pre-trial
itself, the private prosecutor again filed a Motion for
Cancellation of Hearing, again using as justification the
pendency of the petition for transfer of venue. The RTC
issued an Order on even date, reading as follows:
During the scheduled pre-trial
conference of this case, the public
prosecutors of Leyte, the private
prosecutor and the private complainant
failed to appear despite proper notices
sent [to] them. A motion for cancellation
of hearing was filed by the authorized
private prosecutor, Pedro Felicen, Jr. for
reasons stated therein to which this
Court finds to be not meritorious, hence,
the same is denied. x x x the public
prosecutor as well as the counsel for the
accused were directed to make their oral
comments on the first endorsement of
the Hon. Deputy Court Administrator,
regarding the motion to transfer venue
of this case to any of the RTC, at
Tacloban City, x x x.
x x x Thereafter, the pre trial proceeded
by discussing matters concerning the
amicable settlement, plea bargaining
agreement, stipulation of facts, pre-
marking of documentary exhibits,
number of witnesses, trial dates and
nature of the defense. There being no
other matters to discuss on pre-trial in
order to expedite the early disposition of
this case, the pre-trial proper is now
deemed terminated.[11]
The said Order also scheduled the initial hearing for trial
on the merits for December 12, 2008. On December 12,
2008, no one appeared for the prosecution, prompting
counsel for accused private respondent to move for
dismissal of the case on the ground of failure to
prosecute. Private respondent's motion to dismiss was
denied per Order[12] dated December 12, 2008, and
hearing was reset to January 16, 2009.
Again, on the very day of the January 16, 2009 hearing,
the private prosecutor filed an Urgent Motion for
Cancellation of Hearing, stating that it
was only on January 14, 2009 that he was furnished a
copy of the notice of the January 16, 2009 hearing and
he had to attend a previously scheduled hearing for
another case he was handling, set for the very same
date. Thus, in the Order dated January 16, 2009, the RTC
disposed, thus:
x x x Again notably absent are the
private prosecutor, the two public
prosecutors designated by the
Department of Justice to prosecute this
case as well as the private complainant
herself.
A last minute urgent motion to reset was
filed by the private prosecutor, but the
same is denied being in violation of the
three (3) day rule in filing written
postponements. After hearing the
arguments coming from both the public
prosecutor assigned to this Court and
counsel for the defense, the Court deems
it proper to act on the urgency of the
matter prayed for by the said
counsel. Considering that the accused
has been languishing in jail since June,
2008 up to the present and to allow him
to stay in jail for a single minute, it is
quite unreasonable and would violate his
right to speedy trial.
WHEREFORE, finding the motion of
the counsel for the accused to be based
on grounds that are meritorious, this
Court pursuant to x x x the rule on
speedy trial (RA 8433) [should be 8493]
hereby orders this case dismissed for
failure of the prosecution to prosecute
or nolle prosequi.[13]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the
RTC denied the same per Resolution dated March 16,
2009.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari, alleging that
public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rashly and
precipitately dismissing the rape case against private
respondent. Respondents counter that there was no grave
abuse committed by the trial court and setting aside the
dismissal of the rape case would put private respondent
in double jeopardy.
The Court finds the petition bereft of merit.
Firstly, petitioners failed to observe the doctrine on
hierarchy of courts. In Garcia v. Miro,[14] the Court,
quoting Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto,[15] ruled thus:
The Supreme Court is a court of last
resort, and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions
 assigned to it by the fundamental
charter and immemorial tradition. It
cannot and should not be burdened with
the task of dealing with causes in the
first instance. Its original jurisdiction
to issue the so-called extraordinary
writs should be exercised only where
absolutely necessary or where serious
and important reasons exist therefor.
Hence, that jurisdiction should generally
be exercised relative to actions or
proceedings before the Court of
Appeals, or before constitutional or
other tribunals, bodies or agencies
whose acts for some reason or another
are not controllable by the Court of
Appeals. Where the issuance of an
extraordinary writ is also within the
competence of the Court of Appeals
or a Regional Trial Court, it is in
either of these courts that the specific
action for the writ's procurement
must be presented. This is, and
should continue, to be the policy in
this regard, a policy that courts and
lawyers must strictly observe.[16]
(Emphasis supplied.)
On this point alone, the petition is already
dismissible. However, on several occasions, this Court
found compelling reasons to relax the rule on observance
on hierarchy of courts. In Pacoy v. Cajigal,[17] the Court
opted not to strictly apply said doctrine, since the issue
involved is double jeopardy, considered to be one of the
most fundamental constitutional rights of an
accused. Hence, the Court also finds sufficient reason to
relax the rule in this case as it also involves the issue of
double jeopardy, necessitating a look into the merits of
the petition.
Petitioners insist that the RTC dismissed the criminal
case against private respondent too hurriedly, despite the
provision in Section 10 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998
(Republic Act No. 8493), now incorporated in Section 3,
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 3. Exclusions. - The following
periods of delay shall be excluded in
computing the time within which trial
must commence:
(a) Any period of delay
resulting from other
proceedings
concerning
the accused, including
but not limited to the
following:
xxxx
(5) Delay resulting from
orders of inhibition, or proceedings
relating to change of venue of cases or
transfer from other courts;
x x x x[18]
A careful reading of the above rule would show that the
only delays that may be excluded from the time limit
within which trial must commence are those resulting
from proceedings concerning the accused. The time
involved in the proceedings in a petition for transfer of
venue can only be excluded from said time limit if it was
the accused who instituted the same. Hence, in this case,
the time during which the petition for transfer of venue
filed by the private complainant is pending, cannot be
excluded from the time limit of thirty (30) days from
receipt of the pre-trial order imposed in Section 1, Rule
119 of the Rules of Court.
The records reveal that the 30-day time limit set by
Section 1, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court had, in fact,
already been breached. The private prosecutor received
the Pre-trial Order[19] dated November 24, 2008 on
December 3, 2008, while the Provincial Prosecutor
received the same on December 2, 2008. [20] This means
that at the latest, trial should have commenced by
January 2, 2009, or if said date was a Sunday or holiday,
then on the very next business day. Yet, because of the
prosecution's failure to appear at the December 12, 2008
hearing for the initial presentation of the prosecution's
evidence, the RTC was constrained to reset the hearing
to January 16, 2009, which is already beyond the 30-day
time limit. Nevertheless, the prosecution again failed to
appear at the January 16, 2009 hearing. Indeed, as aptly
observed by the RTC, petitioners showed recalcitrant
behavior by obstinately refusing to comply with the
RTC's directives to commence presentation of their
evidence. Petitioners did not even show proper courtesy
to the court, by filing motions for cancellation of the
hearings on the very day of the hearing and not even
bothering to appear on the date they set for hearing on
their motion. As set forth in the narration of facts above,
the prosecution appeared to be intentionally delaying
and trifling with court processes.
Petitioners are likewise mistaken in their notion that
mere pendency of their petition for transfer of venue
should interrupt proceedings before the trial court. Such
situation is akin to having a pending petition
for certiorari with the higher courts. In People v.
Hernandez,[21] the Court held that delay resulting from
extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders must
be read in harmony with Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court which provides that the [p]etition [under Rule
65] shall not interrupt the course of the principal
case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued against the to proceed with
reasonable dispatch in
public respondent from further proceeding in the the trial of criminal
case.[22] The trial court was then correct and acting well cases. Such right to a
speedy trial and a
within its discretion when it refused to grant petitioners' speedy disposition of a
motions for postponement mainly because of the case is violated only
when the proceeding is
pendency of their petition for transfer of venue.
attended by vexatious,
capricious and
The trial court cannot be faulted for refusing to oppressive delays. The
inquiry as to whether or
countenance delays in the prosecution of the case. The not an accused has
Court's ruling in Tan v. People[23] is quite instructive, to been denied such right
is not susceptible by
wit: precise qualification.
The concept of a speedy
An accused's right to "have a disposition is a relative
speedy, impartial, and public trial" is term and must
guaranteed in criminal cases by Section necessarily be a flexible
14 (2) of Article III of the Constitution. concept.
This right to a speedy trial may be
defined as one free from vexatious, While justice is
capricious and oppressive delays, its administered with
"salutary objective" being to assure that dispatch, the essential
an innocent person may be free from the ingredient is orderly,
anxiety and expense of a court litigation expeditious and not
or, if otherwise, of having his guilt mere speed. It cannot be
determined within the shortest possible definitely said how long
time compatible with the presentation is too long in a system
and consideration of whatsoever where justice is
legitimate defense he may supposed to be swift,
interpose. Intimating historical but deliberate. It is
perspective on the evolution of the right consistent with delays
to speedy trial, we reiterate the old legal and depends upon
maxim, "justice delayed is justice circumstances. It
denied." This oft-repeated adage secures rights to the
requires the expeditious resolution of accused, but it does not
disputes, much more so in criminal preclude the rights of
cases where an accused is public justice. Also, it
constitutionally guaranteed the right to a must be borne in mind
speedy trial. that the rights given to
the accused by the
Following the policies incorporated Constitution and the
under the 1987 Constitution, Republic Rules of Court are
Act No. 8493, otherwise known as "The shields, not weapons;
Speedy Trial Act of 1998," was enacted, hence, courts are to give
with Section 6 of said act limiting the meaning to that intent.
trial period to 180 days from the first
day of trial. Aware of problems resulting The Court emphasized in the same case
in the clogging of court dockets, the that:
Court implemented the law by issuing
Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98, A balancing test of
which has been incorporated in the 2000 applying societal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, Section 2 interests and the rights
of Rule 119. of the accused
necessarily compels the
In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, the Court court to approach
had occasion to state - speedy trial cases on
an ad hoc basis.
The right of the accused
to a speedy trial and to a In determining whether
speedy disposition of the accused has been
the case against him deprived of his right to
was designed to prevent a speedy disposition of
the oppression of the the case and to a speedy
citizen by holding trial, four factors must
criminal prosecution be considered: (a)
suspended over him for length of delay; (b) the
an indefinite time, and reason for the delay; (c)
to prevent delays in the the defendant's assertion
administration of justice of his right; and (d)
by mandating the courts prejudice to the
 defendant. x x x.

Closely related to the
length of delay is the
reason or justification of
the State for such delay.
Different weights
Hence, the Court does not find any grave abuse of
discretion committed by the trial court in dismissing the
case against private respondent for violation of his
constitutional right to speedy trial.

should be assigned to WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

different reasons or
justifications invoked SO ORDERED.
by the State. x x x.

Exhaustively explained in Corpuz v.

Sandiganbayan, an accused's right to
speedy trial is deemed violated only
when the proceeding is attended
by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays. In determining whether
petitioner was deprived of this right,
the factors to consider and balance
are the following: (a) duration of the
delay; (b) reason therefor; (c)
assertion of the right or failure to
assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by
such delay.

xxxx

We emphasize that in determining the

right of an accused to speedy trial,
courts are required to do more than a
mathematical computation of the
number of postponements of the
scheduled hearings of the case. A
mere mathematical reckoning of the
time involved is clearly insufficient,
and particular regard must be given
to the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case.[24]

Here, it must be emphasized that private respondent had

already been deprived of his liberty on two occasions.
First, during the preliminary investigation before the
MCTC, when he was incarcerated from November 18,
2004 to March 16, 2005, or a period of almost four
months; then again, when an Information had already
been issued and since rape is a non-bailable offense, he
was imprisoned beginning June 27, 2008 until the case
was dismissed on January 16, 2009, or a period of over 6
months.Verily, there can be no cavil that deprivation of
liberty for any duration of time is quite
oppressive. Because of private respondent's continued
incarceration, any delay in trying the case would cause
him great prejudice. Thus, it was absolutely vexatious
and oppressive to delay the trial in the subject criminal
case to await the outcome of petitioners' petition for
transfer of venue, especially in this case where there is
no temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction issued by a higher court against herein public
respondent from further proceeding in the case.
Republic of the Philippines S
SUPREME COURT C
Manila O
,
J
EN BANC R
.,
LE
ON
PHILIPPINE COCONUT G.R. Nos. 177857-58 AR
, PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. DO
(COCOFED), MANUEL V. DEL -
ROSARIO, DOMINGO P. ESPINA, DE
SALVADOR P. BALLARES, CA
JOSELITO A. MORALEDA, ST
PAZ M. YASON, RO
VICENTE A. CADIZ, ,*
CESARIA DE LUNA TITULAR, and B
RAYMUNDO C. DE VILLA, R
Petitioners, I
O
- versus - N
,*
*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent, P
E
WIGBERTO E. TAADA, R
OSCAR F. SANTOS, A
SURIGAO DEL SUR FEDERATION L
OF AGRICULTURAL T
COOPERATIVES (SUFAC) and A
MORO FARMERS ASSOCIATION ,*
OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR B
(MOFAZS), represented by E
ROMEO C. ROYANDOYAN, R
Intervenors. S
x------------------------------------------------x A
DANILO S. URSUA, G.R. No. 178193 M
Petitioner, I
N
- versus - ,
D
E
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, L
Respondent, C
x------------------------------------------------x A
S
T
I
L
Present: L
O
C ,
O A
R B
O A
N D
A ,
, V
C I
.J L
., L
C A
A R
R A
P M
I A
O ,
,* J
V R
E .,
L P
A E
 R Cast against a similar backdrop, these
E
Z consolidated petitions for review under Rule 45 of the
, Rules of Court assail and seek to annul certain issuances
M
E of the Sandiganbayan in its Civil Case No. 0033-
N A entitled, Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff, v.
D
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., et al., Defendants,
O
Z COCOFED, et al., BALLARES, et al., Class Action
A Movants, and Civil Case No. 0033-F entitled, Republic
,
S of the Philippines, Plaintiff, v. Eduardo M. Cojuangco,
E Jr., et al., Defendants. Civil Case (CC) Nos. 0033-A and
R
E 0033-F are the results of the splitting into eight (8)
N amended complaints of CC No. 0033 entitled, Republic
O
of the Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al., a suit
,
R for recovery of ill-gotten wealth commenced by the
E Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
Y
E for the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), against
S, Ferdinand E. Marcos and several individuals, among
a
n them, Ma. Clara Lobregat (Lobregat) and petitioner
d Danilo S. Ursua (Ursua). Lobregat and Ursua occupied,
P
at one time or another, directorial or top management
E
R positions in either the Philippine Coconut Producers
L Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) or the Philippine Coconut
A
S Authority (PCA), or both.[1] Each of the eight (8)
- subdivided complaints correspondingly impleaded as
B
E defendants only the alleged participants in the
R transaction/s subject of the suit, or who are averred as
N owner/s of the assets involved.
A
B
E The original complaint, CC No. 0033, as later
,
J amended to make the allegations more specific, is
J. described in Republic v. Sandiganbayan[2] (one of several
ill-gotten suits of the same title disposed of by the
Promulgated: Court) as revolving around the provisional take over by
the PCGG of COCOFED, Cocomark, and Coconut
J
a Investment Company and their assets and the
n sequestration of shares of stock in United Coconut
u
ar Planters Bank (UCPB) allegedly owned by, among
y others, over a million coconut farmers, and the six (6)
2
Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF) corporations,
4,
[3]
2 referred to in some pleadings as CIIF oil mills and the
0 fourteen (14) CIIF holding companies[4] (hereafter
1
2 collectively called CIIF companies), so-called for having
x------------------------------------------------------------------- been either organized, acquired and/or funded as UCPB
----------------------x
subsidiaries with the use of the CIIF levy. The basic
complaint also contained allegations about the alleged
DECISION
misuse of the coconut levy funds to buy out the majority
VELASCO, JR., J.: of the outstanding shares of stock of San Miguel
Corporation (SMC).
The Case
More particularly, in G.R. Nos. 177857-58, class
action petitioners COCOFED and a group of purported
coconut farmers and COCOFED members
(hereinafter COCOFED et al. collectively)[5] seek the
reversal of the following judgments and resolutions of
the anti-graft court insofar as these issuances are adverse
to their interests:
1) Partial Summary
Judgment[6] dated July 11, 2003, as
reiterated in a resolution[7] of December
28, 2004, denying COCOFEDs motion
for reconsideration, and the May 11,
2007 resolution denying COCOFEDs
motion to set case for trial and declaring
the partial summary judgment final and
appealable,[8] all issued in Civil Case
No. 0033-A; and
2) Partial Summary
[9]
Judgment dated May 7, 2004, as also
reiterated in a resolution[10] of December
28, 2004, and the May 11,
2007 resolution[11] issued in Civil Case
No. 0033-F. The December 28,
2004 resolution denied COCOFEDs
Class Action Omnibus Motion therein
praying to dismiss CC Case No. 0033-F
on jurisdictional ground and
alternatively, reconsideration and to set
case for trial. The May 11,
2007 resolution declared the judgment
final and appealable.
For convenience, the partial summary judgment
(PSJ) rendered on July 11, 2003 in CC No. 0033-A shall
hereinafter be referred to as PSJ-A, and that issued on
May 7, 2004 in CC 0033-F, as PSJ-F. PSJ-A and PSJ-F
basically granted the Republics separate motions for
summary judgment.
On June 5, 2007, the court a quo issued a
Resolution in CC No. 0033-A, which modified PSJ-A by
ruling that no further trial is needed on the issue of
ownership of the subject properties. Likewise, on May
11, 2007, the said court issued a Resolution in CC No.
0033-F amending PSJ-F in like manner.
On the other hand, petitioner Ursua, in G.R. No.
178193, limits his petition for review on PSJ-A to the
extent that it negates his claims over shares of stock in
UCPB.
[12]
Taada, et al. have intervened in G.R. Nos.
177857-58 in support of the governments case.
Another petition was filed and docketed as G.R.
No. 180705. It involves questions relating to Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr.s (Cojuangco, Jr.s) ownership of the
UCPB shares, which he allegedly received as option
shares, and which is one of the issues raised in PSJ-A.
[13]
G.R. No. 180705 was consolidated with G.R. Nos.
177857-58 and 178193. On September 28, 2011,
respondent Republic filed a Motion to Resolve G.R.
Nos. 177857-58 and 178193.[14] On January 17, 2012,
the Court issued a Resolution deconsolidating G.R. Nos.
177857-58 and 178193 from G.R. No. 180705. This
Decision is therefore separate and distinct from the
decision to be rendered in G.R. No. 180705.
The Facts
The relevant facts, as culled from the
records and as gathered from Decisions of the Court
in a batch of coco levy and illegal wealth cases, are:
In 1971, Republic Act No. (R.A.) 6260 was
enacted creating the Coconut Investment Company
(CIC) to administer the Coconut Investment
[15]
Fund (CIF), which, under Section 8 thereof, was to be
sourced from a PhP 0.55 levy on the sale of every 100
kg. of copra. Of the PhP 0.55 levy of which the copra
seller was, or ought to be, issued COCOFUND receipts,
PhP 0.02 was placed at the disposition of COCOFED,
the national association of coconut producers declared
by the Philippine Coconut Administration (PHILCOA,
now PCA[16]) as having the largest membership.[17]
The declaration of martial law in September
1972 saw the issuance of several presidential decrees
(P.Ds.) purportedly designed to improve the coconut
industry through the collection and use of the coconut
levy fund. While coming generally from impositions on
the first sale of copra, the coconut levy fund came under
various names, the different establishing laws and the
stated ostensible purpose for the exaction explaining the
differing denominations. Charged with the duty of
collecting and administering the Fund was PCA. [18] Like
COCOFED with which it had a legal linkage, [19] the
PCA, by statutory provisions scattered in different coco
levy decrees, had its share of the coco levy.[20]
The following were some of the issuances on the
coco levy, its collection and utilization, how the
proceeds of the levy will be managed and by whom, and
the purpose it was supposed to serve:
1. P.D. No. 276 established the Coconut
Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF) and declared the
proceeds of the CCSF levy as trust fund, [21] to be utilized
to subsidize the sale of coconut-based products, thus
stabilizing the price of edible oil.[22]
 2. P.D. No. 582 created the Coconut Industry
Development Fund (CIDF) to finance the operation of a
hybrid coconut seed farm.
3. Then came P.D. No. 755 providing under its
Section 1 the following:
It is hereby declared that the
policy of the State is to provide readily
available credit facilities to the coconut
farmers at a preferential rates; that this
policy can be expeditiously and
efficiently realized by the
implementation of the Agreement for the
Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for
the benefit of Coconut Farmers executed
by the [PCA]; and that the [PCA] is
hereby authorized to distribute, for free,
the shares of stock of the bank it
acquired to the coconut farmers.
Towards achieving the policy thus declared, P.D.
No. 755, under its Section 2, authorized PCA to utilize
the CCSF and the CIDF collections to acquire a
commercial bank and deposit the CCSF levy
collections in said bank, interest free, the deposit
withdrawable only when the bank has attained a certain
level of sufficiency in its equity capital. The same
section also decreed that all levies PCA is authorized to
collect shall not be considered as special and/or fiduciary
funds or form part of the general funds of the
government within the contemplation of P.D. No. 711.[23]
4. P.D. No. 961 codified the various laws
relating to the development of coconut/palm oil
industries.
5. The relevant provisions of P.D. No. 961, as
later amended by P.D. No. 1468 (Revised Coconut
Industry Code), read:
ARTICLE III
Levies
Section 1. Coconut Consumers
Stabilization Fund Levy. The [PCA] is
hereby empowered to impose and
collect the Coconut Consumers
Stabilization Fund Levy .
. the formers FUB controlling interests. Emerging from
Section 5. Exemption.
The [CCSF] and the [CIDF] as well as
all disbursements as herein authorized,
shall not be construed as special and/or
fiduciary funds, or as part of the
general funds of the national
government within the contemplation of
PD 711; the intention being that said
Fund and the disbursements thereof
as herein authorized for the benefit of
the coconut farmers shall be owned by
them in their private capacities: .
(Emphasis supplied.)
6. Letter of Instructions No. (LOI) 926, Series
of 1979, made reference to the creation, out of other
coco levy funds, of the Coconut Industry Investment
Fund (CIIF) in P.D. No. 1468 and entrusted a portion of
the CIIF levy to UCPB for investment, on behalf of
coconut farmers, in oil mills and other private
corporations, with the following equity ownership
structure:[24]
Section 2. Organization of the
Cooperative Endeavor. The [UCPB], in
its capacity as the investment arm of the
coconut farmers thru the [CIIF] is
hereby directed to invest, on behalf of
the coconut farmers, such portion of the
CIIF in private corporations under the
following guidelines:
a) The coconut farmers shall
own or control at least (50%) of the
outstanding voting capital stock of the
private corporation [acquired] thru the
CIIF and/or corporation owned or
controlled by the farmers thru the CIIF .
(Words in bracket added.)
Through the years, a part of the coconut levy
funds went directly or indirectly to various projects
and/or was converted into different assets or
investments.[25] Of particular relevance to this case was
their use to acquire the First United Bank (FUB), later
renamed UCPB, and the acquisition by UCPB, through
the CIIF companies, of a large block of SMC shares. [26]
Apropos the intended acquisition of a
commercial bank for the purpose stated earlier, it would
appear that FUB was the bank of choice which the Pedro
Cojuangco group (collectively, Pedro Cojuangco) had
control of. The plan, then, was for PCA to buy all of
Pedro Cojuangcos shares in FUB. However, as later
events unfolded, a simple direct sale from the seller
(Pedro) to PCA did not ensue as it was made to appear
that Cojuangco, Jr. had the exclusive option to acquire
this elaborate, circuitous arrangement were two deeds;
the first, simply denominated as Agreement,[27] dated
May 1975,[28] entered into by and between Cojuangco,
Jr., for and in his behalf and in behalf of certain other
buyers, and Pedro Cojuangco, purportedly accorded
Cojuangco, Jr. the option to buy 72.2% of FUBs
outstanding capital stock, or 137,866 shares (the option
shares, for brevity), at PhP 200 per share.
The second but related contract, dated May 25,
1975, was denominated as Agreement for the Acquisition
of a Commercial Bank for the Benefit of the Coconut
Farmers of the Philippines.[29] It had PCA,[30] for itself
and for the benefit of the coconut farmers, purchase from
Cojuangco, Jr. the shares of stock subject of the First
Agreement for PhP 200 per share. As additional
consideration for PCAs buy-out of what Cojuangco, Jr.
would later claim to be his exclusive and personal
option,[31]it was stipulated that, from PCA, Cojuangco, Jr.
shall receive equity in FUB amounting to 10%,
or 7.22%, of the 72.2%, or fully paid shares.
Apart from the aforementioned 72.2%, PCA
purchased from other FUB shareholders 6,534 shares.
While the 64.98% portion of the option shares
(72.2% 7.22% = 64.98%) ostensibly pertained to the
farmers, the corresponding stock certificates supposedly
representing the farmers equity were in the name of and
[32]
delivered to PCA. There were, however, shares
forming part of the aforesaid 64.98% portion, which
ended up in the hands of non-farmers. [33] The remaining
27.8% of the FUB capital stock were not covered by any
of the agreements.
Under paragraph 8 of the second agreement,
PCA agreed to expeditiously distribute the FUB shares
purchased to such coconut farmers holding registered
COCOFUND receipts on equitable basis.
As found by the Sandiganbayan, the PCA
appropriated, out of its own fund, an amount for the
purchase of the said 72.2% equity, albeit it would later
reimburse itself from the coconut levy fund.[34]
As of June 30, 1975, the list of FUB
stockholders shows PCA with 129,955 shares.[35]
Shortly after the execution of the PCA
Cojuangco, Jr. Agreement, President Marcos issued, on
July 29, 1975, P.D. No. 755 directing, as earlier narrated,
PCA to use the CCSF and CIDF to acquire a commercial
bank to provide coco farmers with readily available
credit facilities at preferential rate, and PCA to
distribute, for free, the bank shares to coconut farmers.
Then came the 1986 EDSA event. One of the
priorities of then President Corazon C. Aquinos
revolutionary government was the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth reportedly amassed by the Marcos family and
close relatives, their nominees and associates. Apropos
thereto, she issued Executive Order Nos. (E.Os.) 1, 2 and
14, as amended by E.O. 14-A, all Series of 1986. E.O. 1
created the PCGG and provided it with the tools and
processes it may avail of in the recovery efforts; [36] E.O.
No. 2 asserted that the ill-gotten assets and properties
come in the form of shares of stocks, etc.; while E.O.
No. 14 conferred on the Sandiganbayan exclusive and
original jurisdiction over ill-gotten wealth cases, with the
proviso that technical rules of procedure and evidence
shall not be applied strictly to the civil cases filed under
the E.O. Pursuant to these issuances, the PCGG issued
numerous orders of sequestration, among which were
those handed out, as earlier mentioned, against shares of
stock in UCPB purportedly owned by or registered in the
names of (a) more than a million coconut farmers and
(b) the CIIF companies, including the SMC shares held
by the CIIF companies. On July 31, 1987, the PCGG
instituted before the Sandiganbayan a recovery suit
docketed thereat as CC No. 0033.
After the filing and subsequent amendments of
the complaint in CC 0033, Lobregat, COCOFED et al.,
and Ballares et al., purportedly representing over a
million coconut farmers, sought and were allowed to
intervene.[37] Meanwhile, the following incidents/events
transpired:
1. On the postulate, inter alia,
that its coco-farmer members own at
least 51% of the outstanding capital
stock of UCPB, the CIIF companies,
etc., COCOFED et al., on November 29,
1989, filed Class Action Omnibus
Motion praying for the lifting of the
orders of sequestration referred to above
and for a chance to present evidence to
prove the coconut farmers ownership of
the UCPB and CIIF shares. The plea to
present evidence was denied;
2. Later, the Republic moved for
and secured approval of a motion for
separate trial which paved the way for
the subdivision of the causes of action in
CC 0033, each detailing how the assets
subject thereof were acquired and the
key roles the principal played;
3. Civil Case 0033, pursuant to
an order of the Sandiganbayan would be
subdivided into eight complaints,
docketed as CC 0033-A to CC 0033-H.
[38]
 Lobregat, Ballares et al.,
COCOFED, et al., on the strength of
their authority to intervene in CC 0033,
continued to participate in CC 0033-A
where one of the issues raised was the
misuse of the names/identities of the
over a million coconut farmers;[39]
4. On February 23, 2001,
Lobregat, COCOFED, Ballares et
al., filed a Class Action Omnibus
Motion to enjoin the PCGG from voting
the sequestered UCPB shares and the
SMC shares registered in the names of
the CIIF companies. The
Sandiganbayan, by Order of February
28, 2001, granted the motion, sending
the Republic to come to this Court on
certiorari, docketed as G.R. Nos.
147062-64, to annul said order; and
5. By Decision of December 14,
2001, in G.R. Nos. 147062-64 (Republic
v. COCOFED), [40] the Court declared the
coco levy funds as prima facie public
funds. And purchased as the sequestered
UCPB shares were by such funds,
beneficial ownership thereon and the
corollary voting rights prima
facie pertain, according to the Court, to
the government.
The instant proceedings revolve around CC
0033-A (Re: Anomalous Purchase and Use of [FUB]
now [UCPB])[41] and CC 0033-F (Re: Acquisition of San
Miguel Corporation Shares of Stock), the first case
pivoting mainly on the series of transactions culminating
in the alleged anomalous purchase of 72.2% of FUBs
outstanding capital stock and the transfer by PCA of a
portion thereof to private individuals. COCOFED, et al.
and Ballares, et al. participated in CC No. 0033-A as
class action movants.
Petitioners COCOFED et al.[42] and
Ursua[43] narrate in their petitions how the farmers UCPB
shares in question ended up in the possession of those as
hereunder indicated:
1) The farmers UCPB shares
were originally registered in the name of
PCA for the eventual free distribution
thereof to and registration in the
individual names of the coconut farmers
in accordance with PD 755 and the IRR
that PCA shall issue;
2) Pursuant to the stock
distribution procedures set out in PCA
Administrative Order No. 1, s. of 1975,
(PCA AO 1),[44] farmers who had paid to
the CIF under RA 6260 and registered
their COCOFUND (CIF) receipts with
PCA were given their corresponding
UCPB stock certificates. As of June
1976, the cut-off date for the extended
registration, only 16 million worth of
COCOFUND receipts were registered,
leaving over 50 million shares
undistributed;
3) PCA would later pass Res.
074-78, s. of 1978, to allocate the 50
million undistributed shares to (a)
farmers who were already recipients
thereof and (b) qualified farmers to be
identified by COCOFED after a national
census.
4) As of May 1981, some 15.6
million shares were still held by and
registered in the name of COCOFED in
behalf of coconut farmers for
distribution immediately after the
completion of the national census, to all
those determined by the PCA to
be bonafide coconut farmers, but who
have not received the bank shares;[45] and
5) Prior to June 1986, a large
number of coconut farmers opted to sell
all/part of their UCPB shares below their
par value. This prompted the UCPB
Board to authorize the CIIF companies
to buy these shares. Some 40.34 million
common voting shares of UCPB ended
up with these CIIF companies albeit
initially registered in the name of UCPB.
On the other hand, the subject of CC 0033-F are
two (2) blocks of SMC shares of stock, the first referring
to shares purchased through and registered in the name
of the CIIF holding companies. The purported ownership
of the second block of SMC shares is for the nonce
irrelevant to the disposition of this case. During the time
material, the CIIF block of SMC shares represented 27%
of the outstanding capital stock of SMC.
Civil Case No. 0033-A
After the pre-trial, but before the Republic, as
plaintiff a quo, could present, as it committed to, a list of
UCPB stockholders as of February 25, 1986,[46] among
other evidence, COCOFED, et al., on the premise that
the sequestered farmers UCPB shares are not unlawfully
acquired assets, filed in April 2001 their Class Action
Motion for a Separate Summary Judgment. In it, they
prayed for a judgment dismissing the complaint in CC
0033-A, for the reason that the over than a million
unimpleaded coconut farmers own the UCPB shares. In
March 2002, they filed Class Action Motion for Partial
Separate Trial on the issue of whether said UCPB shares
have legitimately become the private property of the
million coconut farmers.
 2. On January 17, 1973, [he] issued
Correlatively, the Republic, on the strength of Proclamation No. 1102 announcing the
the December 14, 2001 ruling in Republic v. ratification of the 1973 Constitution.
COCOFED[47] and on the argument, among others, that 3. From January 17, 1973 to April 7,
the claim of COCOFED and Ballares et al. over the 1981, [he] . . .exercised the powers and
prerogative of President under the 1935
subject UCPB shares is based solely on the supposed
Constitution and the powers and
COCOFUND receipts issued for payment of the R.A. prerogative of President . . . the 1973
6260 CIF levy, filed a Motion for Partial Summary Constitution.

Judgment [RE: COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al.] [He] promulgated various [P.D.s],
dated April 22, 2002, praying that a summary judgment among which were P.D. No. 232, P.D.
No. 276, P.D. No. 414, P.D. No. 755,
be rendered declaring: P.D. No. 961 and P.D. No. 1468.

a. That Section 2 of [PD] 755, 4. On April 17, 1981, amendments to the

Section 5, Article III of P.D. 961 and
Section 5, Article III of P.D. No.
1468 are unconstitutional;
b. That (CIF) payments under (R.A.)
No. 6260 are not valid and legal
bases for ownership claims over
UCPB shares; and
1973 Constitution were effected and, on
June 30, 1981, [he], after being elected
President, reassumed the title and
exercised the powers of the President
until 25 February 1986.
5. Defendants Maria Clara Lobregat and
Jose R. Eleazar, Jr. were [PCA]
Directors during the period 1970 to
1986.

6. Plaintiff admits the existence of the

c. That COCOFED, et al., and following agreements which are
Ballares, et al. have not legally and attached as Annexes A and B to the
validly obtained title over the Opposition dated October 10, 2002 of
subject UCPB shares. defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. to
the above-cited Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment:
After an exchange of pleadings, the Republic a) Agreement made and
filed its sur-rejoinder praying that it be conclusively held entered into this ______
day of May, 1975 at
to be the true and absolute owner of the coconut levy
Makati, Rizal,
funds and the UCPB shares acquired therefrom. [48] Philippines, by and
A joint hearing on the separate motions for between:

summary judgment to determine what material facts PEDRO

exist with or without controversy followed. [49]
By COJUANGCO, Filipino,
[50]
x x x, for and in his own
Order of March 11, 2003, the Sandiganbayan detailed, behalf and in behalf of
based on this Courts ruling in related cases, the parties certain other
stockholders of First
manifestations made in open court and the pleadings and
United Bank listed in
evidence on record, the facts it found to be without Annex A attached hereto
substantial controversy, together with the admissions (hereinafter collectively
called the SELLERS);
and/or extent of the admission made by the parties
respecting relevant facts, as follows: and

EDUARDO
As culled from the exhaustive COJUANGCO, JR.,
discussions and manifestations of the Filipino, x x x,
parties in open court of their respective represented in this act by
pleadings and evidence on record, the his duly authorized
facts which exist without any substantial attorney-in-fact,
controversy are set forth hereunder, EDGARDO J.
together with the admissions and/or the ANGARA, for and in
extent or scope of the admissions made his own behalf and in
by the parties relating to the relevant behalf of certain other
facts: buyers, (hereinafter
collectively called the
1. The late President Ferdinand E. BUYERS);
Marcos was President for two terms . . .
and, during the second term, declared WITNESSETH: That
Martial Law through Proclamation No.
1081 dated September 21, 1972.
 WHEREAS, the Contract Shares, free
SELLERS own of and clear of all liens,
record and beneficially a encumbrances,
total of 137,866 shares obligations, liabilities
of stock, with a par and other burdens in
value of P100.00 each, favor of the Bank or
of the common stock of third parties, duly
the First United Bank endorsed in blank or
(the Bank), a with stock powers
commercial banking sufficient to transfer
corporation existing the shares to bearer;
under the laws of and (ii) BUYERS shall
the Philippines; deliver to the
SELLERS
WHEREAS, the P27,511,295.50
BUYERS desire to representing the
purchase, and the Contract Price less the
SELLERS are willing to amount of stock
sell, the aforementioned transfer taxes payable
shares of stock totaling by the SELLERS,
137,866 shares which the BUYERS
(hereinafter called the undertake to remit to
Contract Shares) owned the appropriate
by the SELLERS due to authorities. (Emphasis
their special relationship added.)
to EDUARDO
COJUANGCO, JR.; 4. Representation and
Warranties of Sellers
NOW,
THEREFORE, for and The SELLERS
in consideration of the respectively and
premises and the mutual independently of each
covenants herein other represent and
contained, the parties warrant that:
agree as follows:
(a) The
1. Sale and Purchase of SELLERS are the
Contract Shares lawful owners of, with
good marketable title to,
Subject to the the Contract Shares and
terms and conditions of that (i) the certificates to
this Agreement, the be delivered pursuant
SELLERS hereby sell, thereto have been
assign, transfer and validly issued and are
convey unto the fully paid and no-
BUYERS, and the assessable; (ii) the
BUYERS hereby Contract Shares are free
purchase and acquire, and clear of all liens,
the Contract Shares free encumbrances,
and clear of all liens and obligations, liabilities
encumbrances thereon. and other burdens in
favor of the Bank or
2. Contract Price third parties

The purchase This

price per share of the representation shall
Contract Shares payable survive the execution
by the BUYERS is and delivery of this
P200.00 or an aggregate Agreement and the
price of P27,573,200.00 consummation or
(the Contract Price). transfer hereby
contemplated.
3. Delivery of, and
payment for, stock (b) The
certificates execution, delivery and
performance of this
Upon the Agreement by the
execution of this SELLERS does not
Agreement, (i) the conflict with or
SELLERS shall deliver constitute any breach of
to the BUYERS the any provision in any
stock certificates agreement to which they
representing the
are a party or by which and
they may be bound.
PHILIPPINE
(c) They have COCONUT
complied with the AUTHORITY, a public
condition set forth in corporation created by
Article X of the Presidential Decree No.
Amended Articles of 232, as amended, for
Incorporation of the itself and for the benefit
Bank. of the coconut farmers
of the Philippines,
5. Representation of (hereinafter called the
BUYERS . BUYER)

6. Implementation WITNESSETH: That

The parties WHEREAS, on

hereto hereby agree to May 17, 1975, the
execute or cause to be Philippine Coconut
executed such Producers Federation
documents and (PCPF), through its
instruments as may be Board of Directors,
required in order to expressed the desire of
carry out the intent and the coconut farmers to
purpose of this own a commercial bank
Agreement. which will be an
effective instrument to
7. Notices . solve the perennial
credit problems and, for
IN WITNESS that purpose, passed a
WHEREOF, the parties resolution requesting the
hereto have hereunto set PCA to negotiate with
their hands at the place the SELLER for the
and on the date first transfer to the coconut
above written. farmers of the SELLERs
option to buy the First
United Bank (the Bank)
under such terms and
PEDRO conditions as BUYER
COJUANGCO EDUAR may deem to be in the
DO COJUANGCO, JR. best interest of the
(on his own behalf and coconut farmers and
in (on his own behalf instructed Mrs. Maria
and in behalf Clara Lobregat to
behalf of the other convey such request to
Sellers of the other the BUYER;
Buyers)
listed in Annex A WHEREAS, the
hereof) (BUYERS) PCPF further instructed
(SELLERS) Mrs. Maria Clara
By: Lobregat to make
representations with the
EDGARDO J. BUYER to utilize its
ANGARA funds to finance the
Attorney-in-Fact purchase of the Bank;

WHEREAS, the
b) Agreement for the SELLER has the
Acquisition of a exclusive and personal
Commercial Bank for option to buy 144,400
the Benefit of the shares (the Option
Coconut Farmers of the Shares) of the Bank,
Philippines, made and constituting 72.2% of
entered into this 25th day the present outstanding
of May 1975 at Makati, shares of stock of the
Rizal, Philippines, by Bank, at the price of
and between: P200.00 per share,
which option only the
EDUARDO M. SELLER can validly
COJUANGCO, JR., x x exercise;
x, hereinafter referred to
as the SELLER; WHEREAS, in
response to the
representations made by that the coconut farmers
the coconut farmers, the own at least 60% of the
BUYER has requested outstanding capital stock
the SELLER to exercise of the Bank; and (2) that
his personal option for the SELLER shall
the benefit of the receive compensation
coconut farmers; for exercising his
personal and exclusive
WHEREAS, the option to acquire the
SELLER is willing to Option Shares, for
transfer the Option transferring such shares
Shares to the BUYER at to the coconut farmers at
a price equal to his the option price of P200
option price of P200 per per share, and for
share; performing the
management services
WHEREAS, required of him
recognizing that hereunder.
ownership by the
coconut farmers of a 1. To ensure that
commercial bank is a the transfer to the
permanent solution to coconut farmers of the
their perennial credit Option Shares is
problems, that it will effected with the least
accelerate the growth possible delay and to
and development of the provide for the faithful
coconut industry and performance of the
that the policy of the obligations of the parties
state which the BUYER hereunder, the parties
is required to implement hereby appoint the
is to achieve vertical Philippine National
integration thereof so Bank as their escrow
that coconut farmers will agent (the Escrow
become participants in, Agent).
and beneficiaries of, the
request of PCPF that it Upon execution
acquire a commercial of this Agreement, the
bank to be owned by the BUYER shall deposit
coconut farmers and, with the Escrow Agent
appropriated, for that such amount as may be
purpose, the sum of necessary to implement
P150 Million to enable the terms of this
the farmers to buy the Agreement.
Bank and capitalize the
Bank to such an 2. As promptly
extension as to be in a as practicable after
position to adopt a credit execution of this
policy for the coconut Agreement, the
farmers at preferential SELLER shall exercise
rates; his option to acquire the
WHEREAS, x x Option Share and
x the BUYER is willing SELLER shall
to subscribe to immediately thereafter
additional shares deliver and turn over to
(Subscribed Shares) and the Escrow Agent such
place the Bank in a more stock certificates as are
favorable financial herein provided to be
position to extend loans received from the
and credit facilities to existing stockholders of
coconut farmers at the Bank by virtue of the
preferential rates; exercise on the
aforementioned option.
NOW,
THEREFORE, for and 3. To ensure the
in consideration of the stability of the Bank and
foregoing premises and continuity of
the other terms and management and credit
conditions hereinafter policies to be adopted
contained, the parties for the benefit of the
hereby declare and coconut farmers, the
affirm that their parties undertake to
principal contractual cause the stockholders
intent is (1) to ensure and the Board of
Directors of the Bank to function and
authorize and approve a duties as
management contract President,
between the Bank and provided and
the SELLER under the
following terms: (f) The
management
(a) The contract may be
management assigned to a
contract shall be management
for a period of company owned
five (5) years, and controlled
renewable for by the SELLER.
another five (5)
years by mutual 4. As
agreement of the compensation for
SELLER and the exercising his personal
Bank; and exclusive option to
acquire the Option
(b) The Shares and for
SELLER shall transferring such shares
be elected to the coconut farmers,
President and as well as for
shall hold office performing the
at the pleasure management services
of the Board of required of him,
Directors. While SELLER shall receive
serving in such equity in the Bank
capacity, he amounting, in the
shall be entitled aggregate, to 95,304
to such salaries fully paid shares in
and emoluments accordance with the
as the Board of procedure set forth in
Directors may paragraph 6 below;
determine;
5. In order to
(c) The SELLER comply with the Central
shall recruit and Bank program for
develop a increased capitalization
professional of banks and to ensure
management that the Bank will be in a
team to manage more favorable financial
and operate the position to attain its
Bank under the objective to extend to
control and the coconut farmers
supervision of loans and credit
the Board of facilities, the BUYER
Directors of the undertakes to subscribe
Bank; to shares with an
aggregate par value of
(d) The BUYER P80,864,000 (the
undertakes to Subscribed Shares). The
cause three (3) obligation of the
persons BUYER with respect to
designated by the Subscribed Shares
the SELLER to shall be as follows:
be elected to the
Board of (a) The BUYER
Directors of the undertakes to
Bank; subscribe, for
the benefit of the
(e) The SELLER coconut farmers,
shall receive no to shares with an
compensation aggregate par
for managing value of
the Bank, other P15,884,000
than such from the present
salaries or authorized but
emoluments to unissued shares
which he may be of the Bank; and
entitled by
virtue of the (b) The BUYER
discharge of his undertakes to
 subscribe, for interest to the coconut
the benefit of the farmers .
coconut farmers,
to shares with an 8. The BUYER
aggregate par shall expeditiously
value of distribute from time to
P64,980,000 time the shares of the
from the Bank, that shall be held
increased capital by it for the benefit of
stock of the the coconut farmers of
Bank, which the Philippines under the
subscriptions provisions of this
shall be deemed Agreement, to such,
made upon the coconut farmers holding
approval by the registered COCOFUND
stockholders of receipts on such
the increase of equitable basis as may
the authorized be determine by the
capital stock of BUYER in its sound
the Bank from discretion.
P50 Million to
P140 Million. 9. .

The parties 10. To ensure

undertake to declare that not only existing but
stock dividends of P8 future coconut farmers
Million out of the shall be participants in
present authorized but and beneficiaries of the
unissued capital stock of credit policies, and shall
P30 Million. be entitled to the benefit
of loans and credit
6. To carry into facilities to be extended
effect the agreement of by the Bank to coconut
the parties that the farmers at preferential
SELLER shall receive as rates, the shares held by
his compensation 95,304 the coconut farmers
shares: shall not be entitled to
pre-emptive rights with
(a) . respect to the unissued
portion of the authorized
(b) With respect capital stock or any
to the increase thereof.
Subscribed
Shares, the 11. After the
BUYER parties shall have
undertakes, in acquired two-thirds (2/3)
order to prevent of the outstanding shares
the dilution of of the Bank, the parties
SELLERs equity shall call a special
position, that it stockholders meeting of
shall cede over the Bank:
to the SELLER
64,980 fully- (a) To classify
paid shares out the present
of the authorized
Subscribed capital stock of
Shares. Such P50,000,000
undertaking divided into
shall be 500,000 shares,
complied with in with a par value
the following of P100.00 per
manner: . share into:
361,000 Class A
shares, with an
7. The parties aggregate par
further undertake that value of
the Board of Directors P36,100,000 and
and management of the 139,000 Class B
Bank shall establish and shares, with an
implement a loan policy aggregate par
for the Bank of making value of
available for loans at P13,900,000. Al
preferential rates of l of the Option
Shares entitled
constituting to pre-
72.2% of the emptive
outstanding rights
shares, shall be with
classified as respect
Class A shares to the
and the balance unissued
of the portion
outstanding of the
shares, authoriz
constituting ed
27.8% of the capital
outstanding stock or
shares, as Class any
B shares; increase
thereof;
(b) To amend and
the articles of
incorporation of (iv) prov
the Bank to ide that
effect the the
following holders
changes: of Class
B shares
(i) chang shall be
e of absolutel
corporat y
e name entitled
to First to pre-
United emptive
Coconut rights,
Bank; with
respect
(ii) to the
replace unissued
the portion
present of Class
provisio B shares
n comprisi
restrictin ng part
g the of the
transfera authoriz
bility of ed
the capital
shares stock or
with a any
limitatio increase
n on thereof,
ownersh to
ip by subscrib
any e to
individu Class B
al or shares in
entity to proporti
not more on t the
than subscript
10% of ions of
the Class A
outstand shares,
ing and to
shares of pay for
the their
Bank; subscript
ions to
(iii) prov Class B
ide that shares
the within a
holders period
of Class of five
A shares (5) years
shall not from the
be call of
 the purpose of this
Board of Agreement.
Director
s.
IN WITNESS
(c) To increase WHEREOF,
the authorized
capital stock of PHILIPPINE
the Bank from COCONUT
P50 Million to AUTHORITY
P140 Million.; (BUYER)

(d) To declare a By:

stock dividend
of P8 Million EDUARDO
payable to the COJUANGCO,
SELLER, the JR. MARIA CLARA L.
BUYER and LOBREGAT
other (SELLER)
stockholders of
the Bank out of 7. Defendants Lobregat, et al. and
the present COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al.
authorized but admit that the (PCA) was the other
unissued capital buyers represented by . Cojuangco, Jr. in
stock of P30 the May 1975 Agreement entered into
Million; between Pedro Cojuangco (on his own
behalf and in behalf of other sellers
(e) To amend the listed in Annex A of the agreement) and
by-laws of the Cojuangco, Jr. (on his own behalf and in
Bank behalf of the other buyers). Defendant
accordingly; and Cojuangco insists he was the only buyer
under the aforesaid Agreement.
(f) To authorize and
approve the management
contract provided in 8. ..
paragraph 2 above.

The parties 9. Defendants Lobregat, et al., and

agree that they shall vote
their shares and take all
the necessary corporate
action in order to carry
into effect the foregoing
provisions of this
paragraph 11 .
12. It is the
contemplation of the
parties that the Bank
shall achieve a financial
and equity position to be
able to lend to the
coconut farmers at
preferential rates.
In order to achieve such
objective, the parties
shall cause the Bank to
adopt a policy of
reinvestment, by way of
stock dividends, of such
percentage of the profits
of the Bank as may be
necessary.
13. The parties
agree to execute or cause
to be executed such
documents and
instruments as may be
required in order to
carry out the intent and
COCOFED, et al., and Ballares, et al.
admit that in addition to the 137,866
FUB shares of Pedro Cojuangco, et al.
covered by the Agreement, other FUB
stockholders sold their shares to PCA
such that the total number of FUB
shares purchased by PCA increased
from 137,866 shares to 144,400 shares,
the OPTION SHARES referred to in the
Agreement of May 25, 1975. Defendant
Cojuangco did not make said admission
as to the said 6,534 shares in excess of
the 137,866 shares covered by the
Agreement with Pedro Cojuangco.
10. Defendants Lobregat, et al. and
COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et
al. admit that the Agreement, described
in Section 1 of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 755 dated July 29, 1975 as
the Agreement for the Acquisition of a
Commercial Bank for the Benefit of
Coconut Farmers executed by the
Philippine Coconut Authority and
incorporated in Section 1 of P.D. No.
755 by reference, refers to the
AGREEMENT FOR THE
ACQUISITION OF A COMMERCIAL
BANK FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE
COCONUT FARMERS OF THE
PHILIPPINES dated May 25, 1975
between defendant Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr. and the [PCA] (Annex B
for defendant Cojuangcos
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY b. in the sale thereof, they
JUDGMENT [RE: EDUARDO M. received COCOFUND
COJUANGCO, JR.] dated September receipts pursuant to
18, 2002). R.A. No. 6260;
c. they registered the said COCOFUND
Plaintiff refused to make the same receipts; and
admission. d. by virtue thereof, and under R
.A. No. 6260, P.D. Nos.
11. the Court takes judicial notice that 755, 961 and 1468, they
P.D. No. 755 was published [in] volume are allegedly entitled to
71 of the Official Gazette but the text of the subject UCPB
the agreement was not so published with shares.
P.D. No. 755.
but subject to the following
12. Defendants Lobregat, et al. and qualifications:
COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et
al. admit that the PCA used public a. there were other coconut
funds, in the total amount of P150 farmers who received
million, to purchase the FUB shares UCPB shares although
amounting to 72.2% of the authorized they did not present said
capital stock of the FUB, although COCOFUND receipt
the PCA was later reimbursed from because the PCA
the coconut levy funds and that the distributed the
PCA subscription in the increased unclaimed UCPB shares
capitalization of the FUB, which was not only to those who
later renamed the (UCPB), came from already received their
the said coconut levy funds. UCPB shares in
exchange for their
COCOFUND receipts
13. Pursuant to the May 25, 1975 but also to the coconut
Agreement, out of the 72.2% shares of farmers determined by a
the authorized and the increased capital national census
stock of the FUB (later UCPB), entirely conducted pursuant to
paid for by PCA, 64.98% of the shares PCA administrative
were placed in the name of the PCA for issuances;
the benefit of the coconut farmers and
7,22% were given to defendant b. [t]here were other affidavits
Cojuangco. The remaining 27.8% shares executed by Lobregat,
of stock in the FUB which later became Eleazar, Ballares and
the UCPB were not covered by the two Aldeguer relative to the
(2) agreements referred to in item no. 6, said distribution of the
par. (a) and (b) above. unclaimed UCPB
shares; and
There were shares forming part of the
aforementioned 64.98% which were c. the coconut farmers claim the
later sold or transferred to non-coconut UCPB shares by virtue
farmers. of their compliance not
only with the laws
14. Under the May 27, 1975 Agreement, mentioned in item (d)
defendant Cojuangcos equity in the FUB above but also with the
(now UCPB) was ten percent (10%) of relevant issuances of the
the shares of stock acquired by the PCA PCA such as, PCA
for the benefit of the coconut farmers. Administrative Order
No. 1, dated August 20,
15. That the fully paid 95.304 shares of 1975 (Exh. 298-
the FUB, later the UCPB, acquired by Farmer); PCA
defendant Cojuangco, Jr. pursuant to the Resolution No. 033-78
May 25, 1975 Agreement were paid for dated February 16,
by the PCA in accordance with the terms 1978.
and conditions provided in the said
Agreement. The plaintiff did not make any
admission as to the foregoing
16. Defendants Lobregat, et al. and qualifications.
COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et
al. admit that the affidavits of the 17. Defendants Lobregat, et al. and
coconut farmers (specifically, Exhibit 1- COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et
Farmer to 70-Farmer) uniformly state al. claim that the UCPB shares in
that: question have legitimately become the
private properties of the 1,405,366
coconut farmers solely on the basis of
a. they are coconut farmers who sold their having acquired said shares in
coconut products; compliance with R.A. No. 6260, P.D.
Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 and the
 administrative issuances of the PCA
cited above.
18. ..
On July 11, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed
PSJ-A finding for the Republic, the judgment
accentuated by (a) the observation that COCOFED has
all along manifested as representing over a million
coconut farmers and (b) a declaration on the issue of
ownership of UCPB shares and the unconstitutionality of
certain provisions of P.D. No. 755 and its implementing
regulations. On the matter of ownership in particular, the
anti-graft court declared that the 64.98% sequestered
Farmers UCPB shares, plus other shares paid by PCA
are conclusively owned by the Republic. In its pertinent
parts, PSJ-A, resolving the separate motions for
summary judgment in seriatim with separate dispositive
portions for each, reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, we rule as follows:
A. Re: CLASS ACTION MOTION
FOR A SEPARATE SUMMARY
JUDGMENT dated April 11,
2001 filed by Defendant Maria
Clara L. Lobregat, COCOFED, et
al., and Ballares, et al.
The Class Action Motion for
Separate Summary Judgment
dated April 11, 2001 filed by defendant
Maria Clara L. Lobregat, COCOFED, et
al. and Ballares, et al., is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.
B. Re: MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (RE:
COCOFED, ET AL. AND
BALLARES, ET AL.) dated April
22, 2002 filed by Plaintiff.
1. a. Section 1 of P.D. No.
755, taken in relation to
Section 2 of the same P.D.,
is unconstitutional: (i) for
having allowed the use of
the CCSF to benefit directly
private interest by the
outright and unconditional
grant of absolute ownership
of the FUB/UCPB shares
paid for by PCA entirely
with the CCSF to the
undefined coconut farmers,
which negated or
circumvented the national
policy or public purpose
declared by P.D. No. 755 to
accelerate the growth and
development of the coconut
industry and achieve its
vertical integration; and (ii)
for having unduly delegated
legislative power to the
PCA.
b. The implementing regulations
issued by PCA, namely,
Administrative Order No. 1,
Series of 1975 and
Resolution No. 074-78 are
likewise invalid for their
failure to see to it that the
distribution of shares serve
exclusively or at least
primarily or directly the
aforementioned public
purpose or national policy
declared by P.D. No. 755.
2. Section 2 of P.D. No. 755
which mandated that the
coconut levy funds shall not be
considered special and/or
fiduciary funds nor part of the
general funds of the national
government and similar
provisions of Sec. 5, Art. III,
P.D. No. 961 and Sec. 5, Art. III,
P.D. No. 1468 contravene the
provisions of the Constitution,
particularly, Art. IX (D), Sec. 2;
and Article VI, Sec. 29 (3).
3. Lobregat, COCOFED, et
al. and Ballares, et al. have not
legally and validly obtained title
of ownership over the subject
UCPB shares by virtue of P.D.
No. 755, the Agreement
dated May 25, 1975 between the
PCA and defendant Cojuangco,
and PCA implementing rules,
namely, Adm. Order No. 1, s.
1975 and Resolution No. 074-
78.
4. The so-called Farmers UCPB
shares covered by 64.98% of the
UCPB shares of stock, which
formed part of the 72.2% of the
shares of stock of the former
FUB and now of the UCPB, the
entire consideration of which
was charged by PCA to the
CCSF, are hereby declared
conclusively owned by, the
Plaintiff Republic of the
Philippines.
C. Re: MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT (RE: EDUARDO M.
COJUANGCO, JR.)
dated September 18, 2002 filed by
Plaintiff.
1. Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 755 did not
validate the Agreement between
PCA and defendant Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr. dated May 25,
1975 nor did it give the
Agreement the binding force of
a law because of the non-
 publication of the said
Agreement.
2. Regarding the questioned
transfer of the shares of stock of
FUB (later UCPB) by PCA to
defendant Cojuangco or the so-
called Cojuangco UCPB shares
which cost the PCA more than
Ten Million Pesos in CCSF in
1975, we declare, that the
transfer of the following
FUB/UCPB shares to defendant
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. was
not supported by valuable
consideration, and therefore null
and void:
a. The 14,400 shares from
the Option Shares;
b. Additional Bank Shares
Subscribed and Paid by
PCA, consisting of:
1. Fifteen Thousand
Eight Hundred
Eighty-Four (15,884)
shares out of the
authorized but
unissued shares of the
bank, subscribed and
paid by PCA;
2. Sixty Four
Thousand Nine
Hundred Eighty
(64,980) shares of the
increased capital
stock subscribed and
paid by PCA; and
3. Stock dividends
declared pursuant to
paragraph 5 and
paragraph 11 (iv) (d)
of the Agreement.
3. The above-mentioned shares
of stock of the FUB/UCPB
transferred to defendant
Cojuangco are hereby declared
conclusively owned by the
Republic of the Philippines.
4. The UCPB shares of stock of
the alleged fronts, nominees and
dummies of defendant Eduardo
M. Cojuangco, Jr. which form
part of the 72.2% shares of the
FUB/UCPB paid for by the
PCA with public funds later
charged to the coconut levy
funds, particularly the CCSF,
belong to the plaintiff Republic
of the Philippines as their true
and beneficial owner.
Let trial of this Civil Case
proceed with respect to the
issues which have not been
disposed of in this Partial
Summary Judgment. For this
purpose, the plaintiffs Motion
Ad Cautelam to Present
Additional Evidence
dated March 28, 2001 is hereby
GRANTED.
From PSJ-A, Lobregat moved for
reconsideration which COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et
al. adopted. All these motions were denied in the
extended assailed Resolution[51] of December 28, 2004.
Civil Case No. 0033-F
Here, the Republic, after filing its pre-trial brief,
interposed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
and/or for [PSJ] (Re: Defendants CIIF Companies, 14
Holding Companies and COCOFED, et al.) praying that,
in light of the parties submissions and the supervening
ruling in Republic v. COCOFED[52] which left certain
facts beyond question, a judgment issue:
1) Declaring Section 5 of Article III
of P.D. No. 961 (Coconut Industry
Code) and Section 5 of Article III of
P.D. No. 1468 (Revised Coconut
Industry Code) to be
unconstitutional;
2) Declaring that CIF payments
under RA No. 6260 are not valid
and legal bases for ownership
claims over the CIIF companies and,
ultimately, the CIIF block of SMC
shares; and
3) Ordering the reconveyance of the
CIIF companies, the 14 holding
companies, and the 27% CIIF block
of San Miguel Corporation shares of
stocks in favor of the government
and declaring the ownership thereof
to belong to the government in trust
for all the coconut farmers.
At this juncture, it may be stated that, vis--
vis CC 0033-F, Gabay Foundation, Inc. sought but was
denied leave to intervene. But petitioners COCOFED, et
al. moved and were allowed to intervene [53] on the basis
of their claim that COCOFED members beneficially
own the block of SMC shares held by the CIIF
companies, at least 51% of whose capitol stock such
members own. The claim, as the OSG explained, arose
from the interplay of the following: (a) COCOFED et
al.s alleged majority ownership of the CIIF companies
under Sections 9[54] and 10[55] of P.D. No. 1468, and (b)
their alleged entitlement to shares in the CIIF companies
by virtue of their supposed registration of COCOFUND FOR ALL THE COCONUT
FARMERS GOVERNMENT AND
receipts allegedly issued to COCOFED members upon ORDERDED RECONVEYED TO THE
payment of the R.A. 6260 CIF levy.[56] GOVERNMENT.[58] (Emphasis and
capitalization in the original;
underscoring added.)
Just as in CC No. 0033-A, the Sandiganbayan
Let the trial of this Civil Case proceed
also conducted a hearing in CC No. 0033-F to determine
with respect to the issues which have not
facts that appeared without substantial controversy as been disposed of in this Partial
culled from the records and, by Order [57] of February 23, Summary Judgment, including the
determination of whether the CIIF Block
2004, outlined those facts. of SMC Shares adjudged to be owned
On May 7, 2004, the Sandiganbayan, in light of by the Government represents 27% of
the issued and outstanding capital stock
its ruling in CC No. 0033-A and disposing of the issue of SMC according to plaintiff or to
on ownership of the CIIF oil and holding companies and 31.3% of said capital stock according to
COCOFED, et al and Ballares, et al.
their entire block of subject SMC shares, issued the
assailed PSJ-F also finding for the Republic, the fallo of SO ORDERED.
which pertinently reading:

Expressly covered by the declaration and the

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we
reconveyance directive are all dividends declared, paid
hold that:
and issued thereon as well as any increments thereto

The Motion for Partial arising from, but not limited to, exercise of pre-emptive
Summary Judgment (Re: Defendants rights.
CIIF Companies, 14 Holding
Companies and Cocofed et al.) filed by
Plaintiff is hereby GRANTED. On May 26, 2004, COCOFED et al., filed an
ACCORDINGLY, THE CIIF omnibus motion (to dismiss for lack of subject matter
COMPANIES, namely:
jurisdiction or alternatively for reconsideration and to set
1. Southern Luzon Coconut Oil case for trial), but this motion was denied per the
Mills (SOLCOM);
2. Cagayan de Oro Oil Co., Inc. Sandiganbayans Resolution[59] of December 28, 2004.
(CAGOIL);
3. Iligan Coconut Industries, Inc.
On May 11, 2007, in CC 0033-A, the
(ILICOCO);
[60]
4. San Pablo Manufacturing Corp. Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying Lobregats
(SPMC); and COCOFEDs separate motions to set the case for
5. Granexport Manufacturing
Corp. (GRANEX); and trial/hearing, noting that there is no longer any point in
6. Legaspi Oil Co., Inc. proceeding to trial when the issue of their claim of
(LEGOIL),
ownership of the sequestered UCPB shares and related
AS WELL AS THE 14 HOLDING sub-issues have already been resolved in PSJ-A.
COMPANIES, NAMELY:

1. Soriano Shares, Inc.; For ease of reference, PSJ-A and PSJ-F each
2. ACS Investors, Inc.; originally decreed trial or further hearing on issues yet to
3. Roxas Shares, Inc.;
4. Arc Investors, Inc.; be disposed of. However, the Resolution[61] issued
5. Toda Holdings, Inc.; on June 5, 2007 in CC 0033-A and the
6. AP Holdings, Inc.;
Resolution[62] of May 11, 2007 rendered in CC 0033-F
7. Fernandez Holdings, Inc.;
8. SMC Officers Corps, Inc.; effectively modified the underlying partial summary
9. Te Deum Resources, Inc.; judgments by deleting that portions on the necessity of
10. Anglo Ventures, Inc.;
11. Randy Allied Ventures, Inc.; further trial on the issue of ownership of (1) the
12. Rock Steel Resources, Inc.; sequestered UCPB shares, (2) the CIIF block of SMC
13. Valhalla Properties Ltd., Inc.; and
14. First Meridian Development, Inc. shares and (3) the CIIF companies. As the anti-graft
court stressed in both resolutions, the said issue of
ownership has been finally resolved in the corresponding
AND THE CIIF BLOCK OF SAN
MIGUEL CORPORATION PSJs.[63]
(SMC) SHARES OF STOCK
TOTALLING 33,133,266 SHARES AS
OF 1983 ARE DECLARED OWNED Hence, the instant petitions.
BY THE GOVERNMENT IN TRUST
The Issues
COCOFED et al., in G.R. Nos. 177857-58, impute
reversible error on the Sandiganbayan for (a) assuming
jurisdiction over CC Nos. 0033-A and 0033-F despite
the Republics failure to establish below the jurisdictional
facts, i.e., that the sequestered assets sought to be
recovered are ill-gotten in the context of E.O. Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A; (b) declaring certain provisions of coco
levy issuances unconstitutional; and (c) denying the
petitioners plea to prove that the sequestered assets
belong to coconut farmers. Specifically, petitioners aver:
I. The Sandiganbayan gravely erred
when it refused to acknowledge that it
did not have subject matter jurisdiction
over the ill-gotten wealth cases because
the respondent Republic failed to prove,
and did not even attempt to prove, the
jurisdictional fact that the sequestered
assets constitute ill-gotten wealth of
former President Marcos and
Cojuangco. Being without subject
matter jurisdiction over the ill-gotten
wealth cases, a defect previously
pointed out and repeatedly assailed by
COCOFED, et al., the assailed PSJs and
the assailed Resolutions are all null and
void.
A. Insofar as the ill-gotten
wealth cases are concerned, the
Sandiganbayans subject matter
jurisdiction is limited to the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth as
defined in Eos 1, 2, 14 and 14-
A. Consistent with that
jurisdiction, the subdivided
complaints in the ill-gotten
wealth cases expressly alleged
that the sequestered assets
constitutes ill-gotten wealth of
former President Marcos and
Cojuangco, having been filed
pursuant to, and in connection
with, Eos 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, the
Sandiganbayan gravely erred, if
not exceeded its jurisdiction,
when it refused to require the
respondent Republic to prove
the aforesaid jurisdictional fact.
B. . Having no evidence on
record to prove the said
jurisdictional fact, the
Sandiganbayan gravely erred, if
not grossly exceeded its
statutory jurisdiction, when it
rendered the assailed PSJs
instead of dismissing the ill-
gotten wealth cases.
C. Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of
the Rules of Court, lack of
jurisdiction over the subject
matter may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings. In any
event, in pursuing its
intervention in the ill-gotten
wealth cases, COCOFED, et al
precisely questioned the
Sandiganbayans subject matter
jurisdiction, asserted that the
jurisdictional fact does not exist,
moved to dismiss the ill-gotten
wealth cases and even prayed
that the writs of sequestration
over the sequestered assets be
lifted. In concluding that those
actions constitute an invocation
of its jurisdiction, the
Sandiganbayan clearly acted
whimsically, capriciously and in
grave abuse of its discretion.
II. Through the assailed PSJs and the
assailed Resolutions, the Sandiganbayan
declared certain provisions of the
coconut levy laws as well as certain
administrative issuances of the PCA as
unconstitutional. In doing so, the
Sandiganbayan erroneously employed,
if not grossly abused, its power of
judicial review.
A. the Sandiganbayan gravely
erred, if not brazenly exceeded
its statutory jurisdiction and
abused the judicial powers,
when it concluded that the
public purpose of certain
coconut levy laws was not
evident, when it thereupon
formulated its own public
policies and purposes for the
coconut levy laws and at the
same time disregarded the
national policies specifically
prescribed therein.
B. In ruling that it is not clear or
evident how the means
employed by the [coconut levy]
laws would serve the avowed
purpose of the law or can serve
a public purpose, the
Sandiganbayan erroneously
examined, determined and
evaluated the wisdom of such
laws, a constitutional power
within the exclusive province of
the legislative department.
C. The Sandiganbayan gravely
erred in declaring Section 1 of
PD 755, PCA [AO] 1 and PCA
Resolution No. 074-78
constitutionally infirm by reason
of alleged but unproven and
unsubstantiated flaws in their
implementation.
 D. The Sandiganbayan gravely
erred in concluding that Section
1 of PD 755 constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative
power insofar as it authorizes
the PCA to promulgate rules and
regulations governing the
distribution of the UCPB shares
to the coconut farmers. Rather,
taken in their proper context,
Section 1 of PD 755 was
complete in itself, [and]
prescribed sufficient standards
that circumscribed the discretion
of the PCA.
More importantly, this
Honorable Court has, on three
(3) separate occasions,
rejected respondent Republics
motion to declare the coconut
levy laws unconstitutional.
The Sandiganbayan gravely
erred, if not acted in excess of
its jurisdiction, when it ignored
the settled doctrines of law of
the case and/or stare decisis and
granted respondent Republics
fourth attempt to declare the
coconut levy laws
unconstitutional, despite fact
that such declaration of
unconstitutionality was not
necessary to resolve the ultimate
issue of ownership involved in
the ill-gotten wealth cases.
III. In rendering the assailed PSJs and
thereafter refusing to proceed to trial on
the merits, on the mere say-so of the
respondent Republic, the Sandiganbayan
committed gross and irreversible error,
gravely abused its judicial discretion and
flagrantly exceeded its jurisdiction as it
effectively sanctioned the taking of
COCOFED, et al.s property by the
respondent Republic without due
process of law and through retroactive
application of the declaration of
unconstitutionality of the coconut levy
laws, an act that is not only illegal and
violative of the settled Operative Fact
Doctrine but, more importantly,
inequitable to the coconut farmers
whose only possible mistake, offense or
misfortune was to follow the law.
A. .
1. In the course of the
almost twenty (20) years
that the ill-gotten wealth
cases were pending,
COCOFED, et
al. repeatedly asked to be
allowed to present evidence
to prove that the true, actual
and beneficial owners of the
sequestered assets are the
coconut farmers and
not Cojuangco, an alleged
crony of former President
Marcos. The Sandiganbayan
grievously erred and clearly
abused its judicial discretion
when it repeatedly and
continuously denied
COCOFED, et al. the
opportunity to present their
evidence to disprove the
baseless allegations of the
Ill-Gotten Wealth Cases that
the sequestered assets
constitute ill-gotten wealth
of Cojuangco and of former
President Marcos, an error
that undeniably and illegally
deprived COCOFED, et al
of their constitutional right
to be heard.
2. The Sandiganbayan
erroneously concluded that
the Assailed PSJs and
Assailed Resolutions settled
the ultimate issue of
ownership of the
Sequestered Assets and,
more importantly, resolved
all factual and legal issues
involved in the ill-gotten
wealth cases. Rather, as
there are triable issues still
to be resolved, it was
incumbent upon the
Sandiganbayan to receive
evidence thereon and
conduct trial on the merits.
3. Having expressly ordered
the parties to proceed to
trial and thereafter
decreeing that trial is
unnecessary as the Assailed
PSJs were final and
appealable judgments, the
Sandiganbayan acted
whimsically, capriciously
and contrary to the Rules of
Court, treated the parties in
the ill-gotten wealth cases
unfairly, disobeyed the
dictate of this Honorable
Court and, worse, violated
COCOFED, et als right to
due process and equal
protection of the laws.
B. The Sandiganbayan gravely
erred if not grossly abused its
discretion when it repeatedly
disregarded, and outrightly
refused to recognize, the
operative facts that existed as
well as the rights that vested
from the time the coconut levy
laws were enacted until their
declaration of
unconstitutionality in the
assailed PSJs. As a result, the
assailed PSJs constitute a
proscribed retroactive
application of the declaration of
unconstitutionality, a taking of
private property, and an
impairment of vested rights of
 ownership, all without due evidence instead of
process of law.[64] Otherwise ruling against the
stated, the assailed PSJs and the constitutionality of
assailed Resolutions effectively some coconut levy laws
penalized the coconut farmers and PCA issuances
whose only possible mistake, because it could decide
offense or misfortune was to on other grounds
follow the laws that were then available to it.
legal, valid and constitutional.

IV. The voluminous records of these ill-

gotten wealth cases readily reveal the II
various dilatory tactics respondent
Republic resorted to. As a result, despite
the lapse of almost twenty (20) years of
litigation, the respondent Republic has The Sandiganbayan gravely erred when
not been required to, and has not even it declared PD. 755, Section 1 and 2,
attempted to prove, the bases of its Section 5, Article 1 of PD 961, and
perjurious claim that the sequestered Section 5 of Art. III of PD 1468 as well
assets constitute ill-gotten wealth of as administrative issuances of the PCA
former President Marcos and his crony, as unconstitutional in effect, it abused it
Cojuangco. In tolerating respondent power of judicial review.
Republics antics for almost twenty (20)
years, the Sandiganbayan so glaringly
departed from procedure and thereby
flagrantly violated COCOFED, et al.s
right to speedy trial. A. The Sandiganbayan
gravely erred in
concluding that the
purpose of PD 755
Section 1 and 2, Section
5, Article 1 of PD 961,
In G.R. No. 178193, petitioner Ursua virtually and Section 5 of Art. III
imputes to the Sandiganbayan the same errors attributed of PD 1468 is not
evident. It then
to it by petitioners in G.R. Nos. 177857-58. [65] He proceeded to formulated
replicates as follows: its own purpose thereby
intruding into the
wisdom of the
legislature in enacting
I [t]he law.

The Sandiganbayan decided in a manner B. The Sandiganbayan

not in accord with the Rules of Court gravely erred in
and settled jurisprudence in rendering declaring Section 1 of
the questioned PSJ as final and PD 755, PCA [AO] No.
appealable thereafter taking the 1 and PCA Resolution
sequestered assets from their owners or No. 074-78
record without presentation of any unconstitutional due to
evidence, thus, the questioned PSJ and alleged flaws in their
the questioned Resolutions are all null implementation.
and void.

C. The Sandiganbayan
A. The Sandiganbayans gravely erred in
jurisdiction insofar as concluding that Section
the ill-gotten wealth 1 of PD No. 755
cases are concerned, is constitutes an undue
limited to the recovery delegation of legislative
of ill-gotten wealth as power insofar as it
defined in Executive authorizes the PCA to
Orders No. 1, 2, 14 and promulgate rules and
14-A. regulations governing
the distribution of the
UCPB shares to the
coconut
farmers. Section 1 of
B. The Sandiganbayan PD 755 was complete in
should have decided to itself, prescribed
dismiss the case or sufficient standards that
continue to receive
 circumscribed the
discretion of the PCA
and merely authorized
the PCA to fill matters
of detail an execution
through promulgated
rules and regulations.
III
The coconut levy laws, insofar as they
allowed the PCA to promulgate rules
and regulations governing the
distribution of the UCPB to the coconut
farmers, do not constitute an undue
delegation of legislative power as they
were complete in themselves and
prescribed sufficient standards that
circumscribed the discretion of the PCA.
IV
Assuming ex-gratia argumenti that the
coconut levy laws are unconstitutional,
still, the owners thereof cannot be
deprived of their property without due
process of law considering that they
have in good faith acquired vested rights
over the sequestered assets.
In sum, the instant petitions seek to question the
decisions of the Sandiganbayan in both CC Nos. 0033-A
and 0033-F, along with the preliminary issues of
objection. We shall address at the outset, (1) the common
preliminary questions, including jurisdictional issue,
followed by (2) the common primary contentious issues
(i.e. constitutional questions), and (3) the issues
particular to each case.
The Courts Ruling
I
The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject
matter ofthe subdivided amended complaints.
The primary issue, as petitioners COCOFED, et al. and
Ursua put forward, boils down to the Sandiganbayans
alleged lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
amended complaints. Petitioners maintain that the
jurisdictional facts necessary to acquire jurisdiction over
the subject matter in CC No. 0033-A have yet to be
established. In fine, the Republic, so petitioners claim,
has failed to prove the ill-gotten nature of the
sequestered coconut farmers UCPB shares. Accordingly,
the controversy is removed from the subject matter
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and necessarily any
decision rendered on the merits, such as PSJ-A and PSJ-
F, is void.
To petitioners, it behooves the Republic to prove
the jurisdictional facts warranting the Sandiganbayans
continued exercise of jurisdiction over ill-gotten wealth
cases. Citing Manila Electric Company [Meralco] v.
Ortaez,[66] petitioners argue that the jurisdiction of an
adjudicatory tribunal exercising limited jurisdiction, like
the Sandiganbayan, depends upon the facts of the case as
proved at the trial and not merely upon the allegation in
the complaint.[67] Cited too is PCGG v. Nepumuceno,
[68]
where the Court held:
The determinations made by the
PCGG at the time of issuing
sequestration orders cannot be
considered as final determinations; that
the properties or entities sequestered or
taken-over in fact constitute ill-gotten
wealth according to [E.O.] No. 1 is a
question which can be finally
determined only by a court the
Sandiganbayan. The PCGG has the
burden of proving before the
Sandiganbayan that the assets it has
sequestered or business entity it has
provisionally taken-over constitutes ill-
gotten wealth within the meaning of
[E.O.] No. 1 and Article No. XVIII (26)
of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioners above posture is without merit.
Justice Florenz D. Regalado explicates subject matter
jurisdiction:
16. Basic is the doctrine that the
jurisdiction of a court over the subject-
matter of an action is conferred only by
the Constitution or the law and that the
 Rules of Court yield to substantive law, determined by the cause or causes of
in this case, the Judiciary Act and B.P. action as alleged in the complaint.
Blg. 129, both as amended, and of
which jurisdiction is only a part.
The material averments in subdivided CC No. 0033-A
Jurisdiction cannot be acquired through,
or waived, enlarged or diminished by, and CC No. 0033-F included the following:
any act or omission of the parties;
neither can it be conferred by the
acquiescence of the court. Jurisdiction
must exist as a matter of law.
Consequently, questions of jurisdiction 12. Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr
may be raised for the first time on served as a public officer during the
appeal even if such issue was not raised Marcos administration.
in the lower court.

13. Defendant Eduardo

17. Nevertheless, in some case, the
principle of estoppel by laches has been
availed to bar attacks on jurisdiction.[69]
It is, therefore, clear that jurisdiction over the subject
matter is conferred by law. In turn, the question on
whether a given suit comes within the pale of a statutory
conferment is determined by the allegations in the
complaint, regardless of whether or not the plaintiff will
be entitled at the end to recover upon all or some of the
claims asserted therein.[70] We said as much in Magay v.
Estiandan:[71]
[J]urisdiction over the subject matter is
determined by the allegations of the
complaint, irrespective of whether or not
the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon
all or some of the claims asserted
therein-a matter that can be resolved
only after and as a result of the trial. Nor
may the jurisdiction of the court be made
to depend upon the defenses set up in the
answer or upon the motion to dismiss,
for, were we to be governed by such
rule, the question of jurisdiction could
depend almost entirely upon the
defendant.
Cojuangco, Jr., taking advantage of his
association, influence and connection,
acting in unlawful concert with the
[Marcoses] and the individual
defendants, embarked upon devices,
schemes and stratagems, including the
use of defendant corporations as fronts,
to unjustly enrich themselves as the
expense of the Plaintiff and the Filipino
people, such as when he
a) manipulated, beginning the
year 1975 with the active collaboration
of Defendants , Marai Clara Lobregat,
Danilo Ursua [etc.], the purchase by the
(PCA) of 72.2% of the outstanding
capital stock of the (FUB) which was
subsequently converted into a universal
bank named (UCPB) through the use
of (CCSF) in a manner contrary to law
and to the specific purposes for which
said coconut levy funds were imposed
and collected under P.D. 276 and under
anomalous and sinister designs and
circumstances, to wit:
(i) Defendant Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr. coveted the
coconut levy funds as a
cheap, lucrative and risk-
free source of funds with
which to exercise his private
option to buy the controlling
interest in FUB.

Of the same tenor was what the Court wrote (ii) to legitimize a
posteriori his highly
in Allied Domecq Philippines, Inc. v. Villon:[72] anomalous and irregular use
and diversion of
government funds to
advance his own private and
Jurisdiction over the subject commercial interests
matter is the power to hear and Defendant Eduardo
determine the general class to which the Cojuangco, Jr. caused the
proceedings in question belong. issuance of PD 755 (a)
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is declaring that the coconut
conferred by law and not by the consent levy funds shall not be
or acquiescence of any or all of the considered special and
parties or by erroneous belief of the fiduciary and trust funds
court that it exists. Basic is the rule that conveniently repealing for
jurisdiction over the subject matter is that purpose a series of
previous decrees
 establishing the character of
the coconut levy funds as
special, fiduciary, trust and
governments; (b)
confirming the agreement
between Cojuangco and
PCA on the purchase of
FUB by incorporating by
reference said private
commercial agreement in
PD 755;
(iii) . the Chief Executive Officer.
(iv) To perpetuate his
opportunity to build his
economic empire,
Cojuangco caused the
issuance of an
unconstitutional decree (PD
1468) requiring the deposit
of all coconut levy funds
with UCPB interest free to
the prejudice of the
government and finally
(v) Having fully established
himself as the undisputed
coconut king with unlimited
powers to deal with the
coconut levy funds, the
stage was now set for
Defendant Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr. to launch his
predatory forays into almost
all aspects of Philippine
activity namely . oil mills.
(vi) In gross violation of their
fiduciary positions and in
contravention of the goal to
create a bank for coconut
farmers of the country, the
capital stock of UCPB as of
February 25, 1986 was
actually held by the
defendants, their lawyers,
factotum and business
associates, thereby finally
gaining control of the
UCPB by misusing the
names and identities of the
so-called more than one
million coconut farmers.
(b) created and/or funded with
the use of coconut levy funds various
corporations, such as (COCOFED) with
the active collaboration and
participation of Defendants Juan Ponce
Enrile, Maria Clara Lobregat most of
whom comprised the interlocking
officers and directors of said companies;
dissipated, misused and/or
misappropriated a substantial part of
said coco levy funds FINALLY GAIN
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF
THE UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS
BANK BY MISUSING THE NAMES
AND/OR IDENTIFIES OF THE SO-
CALLLED MORE THAN ONE
MILLION COCONUT FARNMERS;
(c) misappropriated, misused
and dissipated P840 million of the
(CIDF) levy funds deposited with the
National Development Corporation
(NIDC) as administrator trustee of said
funds and later with UCPB, of which
Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. was
(d) established and caused to be
funded with coconut levy fundfs, with
the active collaboration of Defendants
Ferdinand E. Marcos through the
issuance of LOI 926 and of [other]
defendants the United Coconut Oil
Mills, Inc., a corporation controlled by
Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and
bought sixteen (16) certain competing
oil mills at exorbitant prices then
mothballed them.
(i) misused coconut levy funds
to buy majority of the outstanding
shares of stock of San Miguel
Corporation.
14. Defendants Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr. of the Angara
Concepcion Cruz Regala and Abello law
offices (ACCRA) plotted, devised,
schemed, conspired and confederated
with each other in setting up, through
the use of the coconut levy funds the
financial and corporate structures that
led to the establishment of UCPB
UNICOM [etc.] and more than twenty
other coconut levy funded corporations
including the acquisition of [SMC]
shares and its institutionalization
through presidential directives of the
coconut monopoly.
16. The acts of Defendants,
singly or collectively, and /or in
unlawful concert with one another,
constitute gross abuse of official
position and authority, flagrant breach of
public trust and fiduciary obligations,
brazen abuse of right and power, unjust
enrichment, violation of the Constitution
and laws to the grave and irreparable
damage of the Plaintiff and the Filipino
people.
 of the SMC through the 14
holding companies

CC No. 0033-F

3.1. The same fourteen

companies were in turn
owned by the six (6) so-
12. Defendant Eduardo called CIIF Companies.
Cojuangco, Jr., served as a public officer
during the Marcos administration.

(h) Defendant Corporations are

but shell corporations
13. Having fully established owned by interlocking
himself as the undisputed coconut king shareholders who have
with unlimited powers to deal with the previously admitted that
coconut levy funds, the stage was now they are just nominee
set for Cojuangco, Jr. to launch his stockholders who do not
predatory forays into almost all aspects have any proprietary
of Philippine economic activity namely interest over the shares in
oil mills . their names. [L]awyers of
the Angara Abello
Concepcion Regala & Cruz
(ACCRA) Law offices, the
14. Defendant Eduardo previous counsel who
Cojuangco, Jr., taking undue advantage incorporated said
of his association, influence, and corporations, prove that
connection, acting in unlawful concert they were merely nominee
with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos stockholders thereof.
and Imelda R. Marcos, and the
individual defendants, embarked upon
devices, schemes and stratagems,
including the use of defendant (l) These companies, which
corporations as fronts, to unjustly enrich ACCRA Law Offices
themselves at the expense of Plaintiff organized for Defendant
and the Filipino people. Cojuangco to be able to
control more than 60% of
SMC shares, were funded
by institutions which
(a) Having control over the depended upon the coconut
coconut levy, Defendant levy such as the UCPB,
Eduardo M. Cojuangco UNICOM, (COCOLIFE),
invested the funds in diverse among others. Cojuangco
activities, such as the and his ACCRA lawyers
various businesses SMC used the funds from 6 large
was engaged in.; coconut oil mills and 10
copra trading companies to
borrow money from
the UCPB and purchase
these holding companies
and the SMC
stocks. Cojuangco used $
(c) Later that year [1983], 150 million from the
Cojuangco also acquired the coconut levy, broken down
Soriano stocks through a as follows:
series of complicated and
secret agreements, a key
feature of which was a
voting trust agreement that
Amount Source Purpose
stipulated that Andres, Jr. or
his heir would proxy over
the vote of the shares owned (in million)
by Soriano and Cojuangco.

$ 22.26 Oil Mills equity

in holding

(g) All together, Cojuangco Companies

purchased 33 million shares
 gotten wealth suits. Both deal with the recovery of
$ 65.6 Oil Mills loan to sequestered shares, property or business enterprises
holding claimed, as alleged in the corresponding basic
complaints, to be ill-gotten assets of President Marcos,
Companies
his cronies and nominees and acquired by taking undue
advantage of relationships or influence and/or through or
as a result of improper use, conversion or diversion of
$ 61.2 UCPB loan to
holding government funds or property. Recovery of these
assetsdetermined as shall hereinafter be discussed
Companies [164]
as prima facie ill-gottenfalls within the unquestionable
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[74]

The entire amount,

therefore, came from the
coconut levy, some passing
through the Unicom Oil P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. 7975 and
mills, others directly from E.O. No. 14, Series of 1986, vests the Sandiganbayan
the UCPB.
with, among others, original jurisdiction over civil and
criminal cases instituted pursuant to and in connection
with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. Correlatively, the
(m) With his entry into the said
Company, it began to get PCGG Rules and Regulations defines the term Ill-Gotten
favors from the Marcos Wealth as any asset, property, business enterprise or
government, significantly
the lowering of the excise material possession of persons within the purview of
taxes on beer, one of the [E.O.] Nos. 1 and 2, acquired by them directly, or
main products of SMC.
indirectly thrudummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any of the
following means or similar schemes:
15. Defendants plotted, devised,
schemed, conspired and confederated
with each other in setting up, through
the use of coconut levy funds, the (1) Through
financial and corporate framework and misappropriation, conversion,
structures that led to the establishment misuse or malversation of
of UCPB, [etc.], and more than twenty public funds or raids on the
other coconut levy-funded corporations, public treasury;
including the acquisition of [SMC]
shares and its institutionalization
through presidential directives of the
coconut monopoly.
(2) .;

16. The acts of Defendants,

singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful (3) By the illegal or
concert with one another, constitute fraudulent conveyance or
gross abuse of official position and disposition of assets belonging
authority, flagrant breach of public trust to the government or any of its
and fiduciary obligations, brazen abuse subdivisions, agencies or
of right and power, unjust enrichment, instrumentalities or
violation of the constitution and laws of government-owned or
the Republic of the Philippines, to the controlled corporations;
grave and irreparable damage of
Plaintiff and the Filipino people.[73] (4) By obtaining, receiving
or accepting directly or
indirectly any shares of stock,
equity or any other form of
interest or participation in any
business enterprise or
undertaking;
Judging from the allegations of the defendants
illegal acts thereat made, it is fairly obvious that both CC
Nos. 0033-A and CC 0033-F partake, in the context of (5) Through the
EO Nos. 1, 2 and 14, series of 1986, the nature of ill- establishment of agricultural,
 industrial or commercial This contention is incorrect.
monopolies or other
combination and/or by the
issuance, promulgation and/or
implementation of decrees and
orders intended to benefit
There was no actual need for Republic, as
particular persons or special
interests; and plaintiff a quo, to adduce evidence to show that the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the complaints as it leaned on the averments in the
(6) By taking undue initiatory pleadings to make visible the jurisdiction of
advantage of official position, the Sandiganbayan over the ill-gotten wealth
authority, relationship or
influence for personal gain or complaints. As previously discussed, a perusal of the
benefit.[75] (Emphasis supplied) allegations easily reveals the sufficiency of the statement
of matters disclosing the claim of the government
against the coco levy funds and the assets acquired
directly or indirectly through said funds as ill-gotten
Section 2(a) of E.O. No. 1 charged the PCGG with the
wealth. Moreover, the Court finds no rule that directs the
task of assisting the President in [T]he recovery of all
plaintiff to first prove the subject matter jurisdiction of
ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former [President]
the court before which the complaint is filed. Rather,
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates
such burden falls on the shoulders of defendant in the
and close associates including the takeover or
hearing of a motion to dismiss anchored on said ground
sequestration of all business enterprises and entities
or a preliminary hearing thereon when such ground is
owned or controlled by them, during his administration,
alleged in the answer.
directly or through nominees, by taking undue
advantage of their public office and/or using their
powers, authority, influence, connections or
relationship. Complementing the aforesaid Section 2(a) COCOFED et al. and Ursuas reliance on Manila
is Section 1 of E.O. No. 2 decreeing the freezing of all Electric Company [Meralco] v. Ortanez [76] is misplaced,
assets in which the [Marcoses] their close relatives, there being a total factual dissimilarity between that and
subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents or the case at bar. Meralco involved a labor dispute before
nominees have any interest or participation. the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) requiring the
interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement to
determine which between a regular court and CIR has
jurisdiction. There, it was held that in case of doubt, the
The Republics averments in the amended complaints,
case may not be dismissed for failure to state a cause of
particularly those detailing the alleged wrongful acts of
action as jurisdiction of CIR is not merely based on the
the defendants, sufficiently reveal that the subject matter
allegations of the complaint but must be proved during
thereof comprises the recovery by the Government of ill-
the trial of the case. The factual milieu
gotten wealth acquired by then President Marcos, his
of Meralco shows that the said procedural holding is
cronies or their associates and dummies through the
peculiar to the CIR. Thus, it is not and could not be a
unlawful, improper utilization or diversion of coconut
precedent to the cases at bar.
levy funds aided by P.D. No. 755 and other sister
decrees. President Marcos himself issued these decrees
in a brazen bid to legalize what amounts to private
taking of the said public funds. Even PCGG v. Nepomuceno[77] is not on all fours with
the cases at bench, the issue therein being whether the
regional trial court has jurisdiction over the PCGG and
sequestered properties, vis--vis the present cases, which
Petitioners COCOFED et al. and Ursua, however, would
involve an issue concerning the Sandiganbayans
insist that the Republic has failed to prove the
jurisdiction. Like in Meralco, the holding
jurisdiction facts: that the sequestered assets indeed
in Nepomuceno is not determinative of the outcome of
constitute ill-gotten wealth as averred in the amended
the cases at bar.
subdivided complaints.
While the 1964 Meralco and the Nepomuceno cases are
inapplicable, the Courts ruling in Tijam
Sibonhonoy [78]
is the leading case on estoppel relating to
jurisdiction. In Tijam, the Court expressed displeasure on
the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case
for decision and then accepting judgment, only if
favorable, and then attacking it for lack of jurisdiction,
when adverse.
Considering the antecedents of CC Nos. 0033-A and
0033-F, COCOFED, Lobregat, Ballares, et al. and Ursua
are already precluded from assailing the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. Remember that the COCOFED and
the Lobregat group were not originally impleaded as
defendants in CC No. 0033. They later asked and were
allowed by the Sandiganbayan to intervene. If they
really believe then that the Sandiganbayan is without
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint in
question, then why intervene in the first place? They
could have sat idly by and let the proceedings continue
and would not have been affected by the outcome of the
case as they can challenge the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan when the time for implementation of the
flawed decision comes. More importantly, the decision
in the case will have no effect on them since they were
not impleaded as indispensable parties. After all, the
joinder of all indispensable parties to a suit is not only
mandatory, but jurisdictional as well. [79] By their
intervention, which the Sandiganbayan allowed per its
resolution dated September 30, 1991, COCOFED and
Ursua have clearly manifested their desire to submit to
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and seek relief
from said court. Thereafter, they filed numerous
pleadings in the subdivided complaints seeking relief
and actively participated in numerous
proceedings. Among the pleadings thus filed are
the Oppositions to the Motion for Interventioninterposed
by the Pambansang Koalisyon ng mga Samahang
Magsasaka at Manggagawa sa Niyogan and Gabay ng
Mundo sa Kaunlaran Foundation, Inc., a Class Action
Omnibus Motion to enjoin the PCGG from voting the
SMC shares dated February 23, 2001 (granted by
Sandiganbayan) and the Class Action Motion for a
Separate Summary Judgment dated April 11, 2001. By
these acts, COCOFED et al. are now legally estopped
from asserting the Sandiganbayns want of jurisdiction, if
that be the case, over the subject matter of the complaint
as they have voluntarily yielded to the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Estoppel has now barred the challenge
on Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.
v.
The ensuing excerpts from Macahilig v. Heirs of
Magalit[80] are instructive:
We cannot allow her to attack its
jurisdiction simply because it rendered a
Decision prejudicial to her
position. Participation in all stages of a
case before a trial court effectively
estops a party from challenging its
jurisdiction. One cannot belatedly reject
or repudiate its decision after voluntarily
submitting to its jurisdiction, just to
secure affirmative relief against ones
opponent or after failing to obtain such
relief. If, by deed or conduct, a party has
induced another to act in a particular
manner, estoppel effectively bars the
former from adopting an inconsistent
position, attitude or course of conduct
that thereby causes loss or injury to the
latter.
Lest it be overlooked, this Court has already
decided that the sequestered shares are prima facie ill-
gotten wealth rendering the issue of the validity of their
sequestration and of the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over the case beyond doubt. In the case
of COCOFED v. PCGG,[81] We stated that:
It is of course not for this Court
to pass upon the factual issues thus
raised. That function pertains to the
Sandiganbayan in the first instance. For
purposes of this proceeding, all that the
Court needs to determine is whether or
not there is prima facie justification for
the sequestration ordered by the PCGG.
The Court is satisfied that there is. The
cited incidents, given the public
character of the coconut levy funds,
place petitioners COCOFED and its
leaders and officials, at least prima
facie, squarely within the purview of
Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14, as
construed and applied in BASECO, to
wit:
1. that ill-gotten properties
(were) amassed by the leaders and
supporters of the previous regime;
a. more particularly, that (i)ll-
gotten wealth was accumulated by
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates, .
 (and) business enterprises and entities
(came to be) owned or controlled by
them, during (the Marcos)
administration, directly or through
nominees, by taking undue advantage of
their public office and using their
powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationships;
b. otherwise stated, that there
are assets and properties purportedly
pertaining to [the Marcoses], their close
relatives, subordinates, business
associates, dummies, agents or
nominees which had been or were
acquired by them directly or indirectly,
through or as a result of the improper or
illegal use of funds or properties owned
by the Government or any of its
branches, instrumentalities, enterprises,
banks or financial institutions, or by
taking undue advantage of their office,
authority, influence, connections or
relationship, resulting in their unjust
enrichment .;
2. The petitioners claim that the
assets acquired with the coconut levy
funds are privately owned by the
coconut farmers is founded on certain
provisions of law, to wit [Sec. 7, RA
6260 and Sec. 5, Art. III, PD 1468]
(Words in bracket added; italics in the
original).
In their attempt to dismiss the amended
complaints in question, petitioners asseverate that (1) the
coconut farmers cannot be considered as subordinates,
close and/or business associates, dummies, agents and
nominees of Cojuangco, Jr. or the Marcoses, and (2) the
sequestered shares were not illegally acquired nor
acquired through or as result of improper or illegal use
or conversion of funds belonging to the Government.
While not saying so explicitly, petitioners are doubtless
conveying the idea that wealth, however acquired, would
not be considered ill-gotten in the context of EO 1, 2 and
14, s. of 1986, absent proof that the recipient or end
possessor thereof is outside the Marcos circle of friends,
associates, cronies or nominees.
We are not convinced.
As may be noted, E.O. 1 and 2 advert to
President Marcos, or his associates nominees. In its most
common signification, the term nominee refers to one
who is designated to act for another usually in a limited
way; [82] a person in whose name a stock or bond
certificate is registered but who is not the actual owner
thereof is considered a nominee.[83] Corpus Juris
Secundum describes a nominee as one:
designated to act for another as
his representative in a rather limited
sense. It has no connotation, however,
other than that of acting for another, in
representation of another or as the
grantee of another. In its commonly
accepted meaning the term connoted the
delegation of authority to the nominee in
a representative or nominal capacity
only, and does not connote the transfer
or assignment to the nominee of any
property in, or ownership of, the rights
of the person nominating him.[84]
So, the next question that comes to the fore is:
would the term nominee include the more than one
million coconut farmers alleged to be the recipients of
the UCPB shares?
Guided by the foregoing definitions, the query
must be answered in the affirmative if only to give life to
those executive issuances aimed at ensuring the recovery
of ill-gotten wealth. It is basic, almost elementary, that:
Laws must receive a sensible
interpretation to promote the ends for
which they are enacted. They should be
so given reasonable and practical
construction as will give life to them, if
it can be done without doing violence to
reason. Conversely, a law should not be
so construed as to allow the doing of an
act which is prohibited by law, not so
interpreted as to afford an opportunity to
defeat compliance with its terms, create
an inconsistency, or contravene the plain
words of the law. Interpretatio fienda
est ut res magis valeat quam pereat or
that interpretation as will give the thing
efficacy is to be adopted.[85]
E.O. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, it bears to stress, were
issued precisely to effect the recovery of ill-gotten assets
amassed by the Marcoses, their associates, subordinates
and cronies, or through their nominees. Be that as it may,
it stands to reason that persons listed as associated with From the foregoing, the challenge on the
the Marcoses[86] refer to those in possession of such ill- Sandiganbayans subject matter jurisdiction at bar must
gotten wealth but holding the same in behalf of the fail.
actual, albeit undisclosed owner, to prevent discovery
and consequently recovery. Certainly, it is well-nigh
inconceivable that ill-gotten assets would be distributed
II
to and left in the hands of individuals or entities with
obvious traceable connections to Mr. Marcos and his
cronies. The Court can take, as it has in fact taken,
Petitioners COCOFED et al. were not
judicial notice of schemes and machinations that have
been put in place to keep ill-gotten assets under wraps. deprived of their right to be heard.
These would include the setting up of layers after layers
of shell or dummy, but controlled, corporations [87] or
manipulated instruments calculated to confuse if not
altogether mislead would-be investigators from
recovering wealth deceitfully amassed at the expense of As a procedural issue, COCOFED, et al. and Ursua next
the people or simply the fruits thereof. Transferring the contend that in the course of almost 20 years that the
illegal assets to third parties not readily perceived as cases have been with the anti-graft court, they have
Marcos cronies would be another. So it was that repeatedly sought leave to adduce evidence (prior to
in PCGG v. Pena, the Court, describing the rule of respondents complete presentation of evidence) to prove
Marcos as a well entrenched plundering regime of the coco farmers actual and beneficial ownership of the
twenty years, noted the magnitude of the past regimes sequestered shares. The Sandiganbayan, however, had
organized pillage and the ingenuity of the plunderers and repeatedly and continuously disallowed such requests,
pillagers with the assistance of experts and the best legal thus depriving them of their constitutional right to be
[88]
minds in the market. heard.

Hence, to give full effect to E.O. 1, 2 and 14, s.

This contention is untenable, their demand to adduce
of 1986, the term nominee, as used in the above
evidence being disallowable on the ground of
issuances, must be taken to mean to include any person
prematurity.
or group of persons, natural or juridical, in whose name
government funds or assets were transferred to by Pres.
Marcos, his cronies or his associates. To this
characterization must include what the Sandiganbayan The records reveal that the Republic, after adducing its
considered the unidentified coconut farmers, more than a evidence in CC No. 0033-A, subsequently filed a
million of faceless and nameless coconut farmers, the Motion Ad Cautelam for Leave to Present Additional
alleged beneficiaries of the distributed UCPB shares, Evidence dated March 28, 2001. This motion
who, under the terms of Sec. 10 of PCA A.O. No. 1, s. remained unresolved at the time the Republic interposed
of 1975, were required, upon the delivery of their its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The
respective stock certificates, to execute an irrevocable Sandiganbayan granted the later motion and accordingly
proxy in favor of the Banks manager. There is thus rendered the Partial Summary Judgment, effectively
ample truth to the observations - [That] the PCA preempting the presentation of evidence by the
provided this condition only indicates that the PCA had defendants in said case (herein petitioners COCOFED
no intention to constitute the coconut farmer UCPB and Ursua).
stockholder as a bona fide stockholder; that the 1.5
million registered farmer-stockholders were mere
nominal stockholders.[89]
Section 5, Rule 30 the Rules of Court clearly sets out the
order of presenting evidence:
 SEC. 5. Order of trial.Subject to
the provisions of section 2 of Rule 31,
and unless the court for special reasons
otherwise directs, the trial shall be
limited to the issues stated in the pre-
trial order and shall proceed as follows:
(a) The plaintiff shall
adduce evidence in support of
his complaint;
(b) The defendant
shall then adduce evidence in
support of his defense,
counterclaim, cross-claim and
third-party complaint;
(g) Upon admission of
the evidence, the case shall be
deemed submitted for decision,
unless the court directs the
parties to argue or to submit
their respective memoranda or
any further pleadings.
If several defendants or third-
party defendants, and so forth. having
separate defenses appear by different
counsel, the court shall determine the
relative order of presentation of their
evidence. (Emphasis supplied.)
Evidently, for the orderly administration of justice, the
plaintiff shall first adduce evidence in support of his
complaint and after the formal offer of evidence and the
ruling thereon, then comes the turn of defendant under
Section 3 (b) to adduce evidence in support of his
defense, counterclaim, cross-claim and third party
complaint, if any. Deviation from such order of trial is
purely discretionary upon the trial court, in this case, the
Sandiganbayan, which cannot be questioned by the
parties unless the vitiating element of grave abuse of
discretion supervenes. Thus, the right of COCOFED to
present evidence on the main case had not yet ripened.
And the rendition of the partial summary judgments
overtook their right to present evidence on their
defenses.
It cannot be stressed enough that the Republic as
well as herein petitioners were well within their rights to
move, as they in fact separately did, for a partial
summary judgment. Summary judgment may be allowed
where, save for the amount of damages, there is, as
shown by affidavits and like evidentiary documents, no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
genuine issue, as distinguished from one that is
fictitious, contrived and set up in bad faith, means an
issue of fact that calls for the presentation of evidence.
[90]
Summary or accelerated judgment, therefore, is a
procedural technique aimed at weeding out sham claims
or defenses at an early stage of the litigation. [91]Sections
1, 2 and 4 of Rule 35 of the Rules of Court on Summary
Judgment, respectively provide:
SECTION 1. Summary
judgment for claimant.A party seeking
to recover upon a claim, counterclaim,
or cross-claim may, at any time after the
pleading in answer thereto has been
served, move with supporting affidavits,
depositions or admissions for a
summary judgment in his favor upon all
or any part thereof.
SEC. 2. Summary judgment for
defending party.A party against whom a
claim, counterclaim or cross-claim is
asserted is sought may, at any time,
move with supporting affidavits,
depositions or admissions for a
summary judgment in his favor as to all
or any part thereof.
SEC. 4. Case not fully
adjudicated on motion.If on motion
under this Rule, judgment is not
rendered upon the whole case or for all
the reliefs sought and a trial is
necessary, the court at the hearing of the
motion, by examining the pleadings and
the evidence before it and by
interrogating counsel shall ascertain
what material facts exist without
substantial controversy and what are
actually and in good faith controverted.
It shall thereupon make an order
specifying the facts that appear without
substantial controversy, including the
extent to which the amount of damages
or other relief is not in controversy, and
directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. The facts so specified
shall be deemed established, and the
trial shall be conducted on the
controverted facts accordingly.
Clearly, petitioner COCOFEDs right to be heard had not
been violated by the mere issuance of PSJ-A and PSJ-F
before they can adduce their evidence.
As it were, petitioners COCOFED et al. were able to
present documentary evidence in conjunction with its
Class Action Omnibus Motion dated February 23,
2001 where they appended around four hundred (400)
documents including affidavits of alleged farmers. These
petitioners manifested that said documents comprise
their evidence to prove the farmers ownership of the
UCPB shares, which were distributed in accordance with
valid and existing laws.[92]
Lastly, COCOFED et al. even filed their own Motion for
Separate Summary Judgment, an event reflective of their
admission that there are no more factual issues left to be
determined at the level of the Sandiganbayan. This act of
filing a motion for summary judgment is a judicial
admission against COCOFED under Section 26, Rule
130 which declares that the act, declaration or omission
of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence
against him.
Viewed in this light, the Court has to reject petitioners
self-serving allegations about being deprived the right to
adduce evidence.
III
The right to speedy trial was not violated.
This brings to the fore the alleged violation of petitioners
right to a speedy trial and speedy disposition of the case.
In support of their contention, petitioners cite Licaros v.
Sandiganbayan,[93] where the Court dismissed the case
pending before the Sandiganbayan for violation of the
accuseds right to a speedy trial.
It must be clarified right off that the right to a
speedy disposition of case and the accuseds right to a
speedy trial are distinct, albeit kindred, guarantees, the
most obvious difference being that a speedy disposition
of cases, as provided in Article III, Section 16 of the
Constitution, obtains regardless of the nature of the case:
Section 16. All persons shall
have the right to a speedy disposition of
their cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial, or administrative bodies.
In fine, the right to a speedy trial is available only to an
accused and is a peculiarly criminal law concept, while
the broader right to a speedy disposition of cases may be
tapped in any proceedings conducted by state agencies.
Thus, in Licaros the Court dismissed the criminal case
against the accused due to the palpable transgression of
his right to a speedy trial.
In the instant case, the appropriate right involved is the
right to a speedy disposition of cases, the recovery of ill-
gotten wealth being a civil suit.
Nonetheless, the Court has had the occasion to
dismiss several cases owing to the infringement of a
partys right to a speedy disposition of cases. [94] Dismissal
of the case for violation of this right is the general
rule. Bernat v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan
th [95]
(5 Division) expounds on the extent of the right to a
speedy disposition of cases as follows:
Section 16 of Article III of the
Constitution guarantees the right of all
persons to a speedy disposition of their
cases. Nevertheless, this right is deemed
violated only when the proceedings are
attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays. Moreover, the
determination of whether the delays are
of said nature is relative and cannot be
based on a mere mathematical reckoning
of time. Particular regard must be taken
of the facts and circumstances peculiar
to each case. As a guideline, the Court in
Dela Pea v. Sandiganbayan mentioned
certain factors that should be considered
and balanced, namely: 1) length of
delay; 2) reasons for the delay; 3)
assertion or failure to assert such right
by the accused; and 4) prejudice caused
by the delay.
While this Court recognizes the
right to speedy disposition quite
distinctly from the right to a speedy
trial, and although this Court has always
zealously espoused protection from
 oppressive and vexatious delays not instant case cannot be dismissed for the alleged violation
attributable to the party involved, at the
same time, we hold that a partys of petitioners right to a speedy disposition of the case.
individual rights should not work
against and preclude the peoples equally
important right to public justice. In the
instant case, three people died as a result IV
of the crash of the airplane that the
accused was flying. It appears to us that Sections 1 and 2 of P.D. No. 755, Article III, Section 5
the delay in the disposition of the case of P.D. No. 961 and Article III, Section 5 of P.D. No.
prejudiced not just the accused but the 1468, are unconstitutional.
people as well. Since the accused has
completely failed to assert his right
seasonably and inasmuch as the
respondent judge was not in a position
to dispose of the case on the merits we The Court may
hold it proper and equitable to give the pass upon the
parties fair opportunity to obtain constitutionalit
substantial justice in the premises. y of P.D. Nos.
755, 961 and
1468.

The more recent case of Tello v. People[96] laid stress to

the restrictive dimension to the right to speedy Petitioners COCOFED et al. and Ursua
disposition of cases, i.e., it is lost unless seasonably uniformly scored the Sandiganbayan for abusing its
invoked: power of judicial review and wrongly encroaching into
the exclusive domain of Congress when it declared
certain provisions of the coconut levy laws and PCA
In Bernat , the Court denied
administrative issuances as unconstitutional.
petitioners claim of denial of his right to
a speedy disposition of cases
considering that [he] chose to remain
silent for eight years before complaining
of the delay in the disposition of his
We are not persuaded.
case. The Court ruled that petitioner
failed to seasonably assert his right and
he merely sat and waited from the time
his case was submitted for resolution. In
this case, petitioner similarly failed to
assert his right to a speedy disposition of It is basic that courts will not delve into matters
his case. He only invoked his right to a of constitutionality unless unavoidable, when the
speedy disposition of cases after [his
question of constitutionality is the very lis mota of the
conviction]. Petitioners silence may be
considered as a waiver of his right. case, meaning, that the case cannot be legally resolved
unless the constitutional issue raised is determined. This
rule finds anchorage on the presumptive constitutionality
of every enactment. Withal, to justify the nullification of
An examination of the petitioners arguments and the
a statute, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach
cited indicia of delay would reveal the absence of any
of the Constitution. A doubtful or speculative
allegation that petitioners moved before the
infringement would simply not suffice.[98]
Sandiganbayan for the dismissal of the case on account
of vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays that
attended the proceedings. Following Tello, petitioners
are deemed to have waived their right to a speedy Just as basic is the precept that lower courts are not
disposition of the case. Moreover, delays, if any, precluded from resolving, whenever warranted,
prejudiced the Republic as well. What is more, the constitutional questions, subject only to review by this
alleged breach of the right in question was not raised Court.
below. As a matter of settled jurisprudence, but subject
to equally settled exception, an issue not raised before
the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on
To Us, the present controversy cannot be peremptorily
appeal.[97] The sporting idea forbidding one from pulling
resolved without going into the constitutionality of P.D.
surprises underpins this rule. For these reasons, the
Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 in particular. For petitioners
COCOFED et al. and Ballares et al. predicate their claim
over the sequestered shares and necessarily their cause
on laws and martial law issuances assailed by the A similar provision can also be found in Article III,

Republic on constitutional grounds. Indeed, as aptly Section 5 of P.D. No. 961 and Article III, Section 5 of

observed by the Solicitor General, this case is for the P.D. No. 1468, which We shall later discuss in turn:

recovery of shares grounded on the invalidity of certain

enactments, which in turn is rooted in the shares being
public in character, purchased as they were by funds
raised by the taxing and/or a mix of taxing and police
powers of the state.[99] As may be recalled, P.D. No. 755,
under the policy-declaring provision, authorized the
distribution of UCPB shares of stock free to coconut P.D. No. 961
farmers. On the other hand, Section 2 of P.D. No.
755, hereunder quoted below, effectively authorized the
PCA to utilize portions of the CCSF to pay the financial Section 5. Exemptions. The Coconut
Consumers Stabilization Fund and the
commitment of the farmers to acquire UCPB and to Coconut Industry Development Fund
deposit portions of the CCSF levies with UCPB interest as well as all disbursements of said
funds for the benefit of the coconut
free. And as there also provided, the CCSF, CIDF and
farmers as herein authorized shall not
like levies that PCA is authorized to collect shall be be construed or interpreted, under
considered as non-special or fiduciary funds to be any law or regulation, as special
and/or fiduciary funds, or as part of
transferred to the general fund of the Government, the general funds of the national
meaning they shall be deemed private funds. government within the contemplation of
P.D. No. 711; nor as a subsidy, donation,
levy, government funded investment, or
government share within the
contemplation of P.D. 898, the intention
Section 2 of P.D. No. 755 reads: being that said Fund and the
disbursements thereof as herein
authorized for the benefit of the
coconut farmers shall be owned by
them in their own private capacities.
Section 2. Financial Assistance. [100]
(Emphasis Ours)
To enable the coconut farmers to
comply with their contractual
obligations under the aforesaid
Agreement, the [PCA] is hereby P.D. No. 1468
directed to draw and utilize the
collections under the [CCSF]
authorized to be levied by [PD] No.
232, as amended, to pay for the
Section 5. Exemptions. The [CCSF] and
financial commitments of the coconut
the [CIDF] as well as all disbursement
farmers under the said
as herein authorized, shall not be
agreement and, except for
construed or interpreted, under nay
[PCAs] budgetary requirements , all
law or regulation, as special and/or
collections under the [CCSF] Levy and
fiduciary funds, or as part of the
(50%) of the collections under the
general funds of the national
[CIDF] shall be deposited, interest free,
governmentwithin the contemplation of
with the said bank of the coconut
PD 711; nor as subsidy, donation, levy
farmers and such deposits shall not be
government funded investment, or
withdrawn until the the bank has
government share within the
sufficient equity capital ; and since the
contemplation of PD 898, the intention
operations, and activities of the [PCA]
being that said Fund and the
are all in accord with the present social
disbursements thereof as herein
economic plans and programs of the
authorized for the benefit of the
Government, all collections and levies
coconut farmers shall be owned by
which the [PCA] is authorized to levy
them in their private capacities.
and collect such as but not limited to [101]
(Emphasis Ours.)
the [CCS Levy] and the [CIDF] shall
not be considered or construed, under
any law or regulation, special and/or
fiduciary funds and do not form part
of the general funds of the national
government within the contemplation
of [P.D.] No. 711. (Emphasis supplied)
 In other words, the relevant provisions of P.D. modesty in examining
constitutional questions,
Nos. 755, as well as those of P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468, but that they are
could have been the only plausible means by which nonetheless not
prevented from
close to a purported million and a half coconut farmers resolving the same
could have acquired the said shares of stock. It has, whenever warranted,
subject only to review
therefore, become necessary to determine the validity of
by the highest tribunal
the authorizing law, which made the stock transfer and (Ynot v. Intermediate
acquisitions possible. Appellate Court).

To reiterate, it is of crucial importance to determine the

It is true that, as a general rule,
validity of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 in light of the
the question of constitutionality must be
constitutional proscription against the use of special raised at the earliest opportunity. The
funds save for the purpose it was established. Otherwise, Honorable Supreme Court has clearly
stated that the general rule admits of
petitioners claim of legitimateprivate ownership over exceptions, thus:
UCPB shares and indirectly over SMC shares held
by UCPBs subsidiaries will have no leg to stand on, P.D.
No. 755 being the only law authorizing the distribution
of the SMC and UCPB shares of stock to coconut
For courts will pass
farmers, and with the aforementioned provisions actually upon a constitutional
stating and holding that the coco levy fund shall not be question only when
presented before it in
considered as a special not even general fund, but shall
bona fide cases for
be owned by the farmers in their private capacities. [102] determination, and the
fact that the question
has not been raised
before is not a valid
reason for refusing to
The Sandiganbayans ensuing ratiocination on the need to allow it to be raised
pass upon constitutional issues the Republic raised later. It has been held
that the determination
below commends itself for concurrence: of a constitutional
question is necessary
whenever it is essential
to the decision of the
This Court is convinced of the case as where the right
imperative need to pass upon the issues of a party is founded
of constitutionality raised by solely on a statute, the
Plaintiff. The issue of constitutionality validity of which is
of the provisions of P.D. No. 755 and attacked.
the laws related thereto goes to the
very core of Plaintiffs causes of action
and defenses thereto. It will serve the
best interest of justice to define this In the case now before us, the
early the legal framework within which allegations of the Subdivided Complaint
this case shall be heard and tried, taking are consistent with those in the subject
into account the admission of the parties Motion, and they sufficiently raise the
and the established facts, particularly issue of constitutionality of the
those relating to the main substance provisions of laws in question. The
of the defense of Lobregat, Third Amended Complaint (Subdivided)
COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al., states:
which is anchored on the laws being
assailed by Plaintiff on constitutional
grounds.
(ii) to legitimize
a posteriori his highly
anomalous and irregular
use and diversion of
government funds to
The Court is also advance his own private
mindful that lower and commercial
courts are admonished interests, Cojuangco, Jr.
to observe a becoming caused the issuance of
 PD 755 (a) declaring order to legitimize the
that the coconut levy diversion of funds,
funds shall not be defendant Ferdinand E.
considered special and Marcos issued the
fiduciary and trusts Presidential Decrees
funds and do not form referred to by the
part of the general funds movants. This is then
of the National the core of Plaintiffs
Government, complaint: that,
conveniently repealing insofar as the coconut
for that purpose a series levy is concerned,
of coconut levy funds as these decrees had been
special, fiduciary, trust enacted as tools for the
and government funds. acquisition of ill-
gotten wealth for
specific favored
individuals.

(iv) To perpetuate his

opportunity to deal with Even if Plaintiff may
and make use the not have said so
coconut levy funds to effectively, the
build his economic complaint in fact
empire, Cojuangco, Jr. disputes the legitimacy,
caused the issuance by and, if one pleases, the
Defendant Ferdinand E. constitutionality of such
Marcos of an enactments.
unconstitutional decree
(PD 1468) requiring the
deposit of all coconut
levy funds with UCPB, The issue is validly
interest free, to the raised on the face of the
prejudice of the complaint and
government. defendants must
respond to it.

The above-quoted allegations in the

Third Amended Complaint (Subdivided) Since the question of constitutionality
already question the legitimacy of the may be raised even on appeal if the
exercise by former President Marcos of determination of such a question is
his legislative authority when he issued essential to the decision of the case, we
P.D. Nos. 755 and 1468. The provision find more reason to resolve this
of Sec. 5, Art. III of P.D. 961 is constitutional question at this stage of
substantially similar to the provisions of the proceedings, where the defense is
the aforesaid two [PDs]. P.D. No. 755 grounded solely on the very laws the
allegedly legitimized the highly constitutionality of which are being
anomalous and irregular use and questioned and where the evidence of
diversion of government funds to the defendants would seek mainly to
advance his [defendant Cojuangcos] prove their faithful and good faith
own private and commercial compliance with the said laws and their
interest. The issuance of the said [PD] implementing rules and regulations.
which has the force and effect of a law [103]
(Emphasis added.)
can only be assailed on constitutional
grounds. The merits of the grounds
adverted to in the allegations of the
Third Amended Complaint (Subdivided)
can only be resolved by this Court by
testing the questioned [PDs], which are
considered part of the laws of the land. The Courts
rulings in
COCOFED v.
PCGG and
As early as June 20, 1989, this Court in Republic v.
its Resolution expressed this Courts Sandiganbayan
understanding of the import of the , as law of the
allegations of the complaint, as follows: case, are
speciously
invoked.

It is likewise alleged in
the Complaint that in

To thwart the ruling on the constitutionality of P.D. Nos.
755, 961 and 1468, petitioners would sneak in the
argument that the Court has, in three separate instances,
upheld the validity, and thumbed down the Republics
challenge to the constitutionality, of said laws imposing
the different coconut levies and prescribing the uses of
the fund collected. The separate actions of the Court,
petitioners add, would conclude the Sandiganbayan on
the issue of constitutionality of said issuances, following
the law-of-the-case principle. Petitioners allege:
Otherwise stated, the decision of this
Honorable Court in the COCOFED Case
overruling the strict public fund theory
espoused by the Respondent Republic,
upholding the propriety of the laws
imposing the collections of the different
Coconut Levies and expressly allowing
COCOFED, et al., to prove that the
Sequestered Assets have legitimately
become their private properties had
become final and immutable.[104]
Petitioners are mistaken.
Yu v. Yu,[105] as effectively reiterated in Vios v. Pantangco,
[106]
defines and explains the ramifications of the law of
the case principle as follows:
Law of the case has been
defined as the opinion delivered on a
former appeal. It is a term applied to an
established rule that when an appellate
court passes on a question and remands
the case to the lower court for further
proceedings, the question there settled
becomes the law of the case upon
subsequent appeal. It means that
whatever is once irrevocably established
as the controlling legal rule or decision
between the same parties in the same
case continues to be the law of the case,
so long as the facts on which such
decision was predicated continue to be
the facts of the case before the court.
Otherwise put, the principle means that questions of law
that have been previously raised and disposed of in the
proceedings shall be controlling in succeeding instances
where the same legal question is raised, provided that the
facts on which the legal issue was predicated continue to
be the facts of the case before the court. Guided by this
definition, the law of the case principle cannot provide
petitioners any comfort. We shall explain why.
In the first instance, petitioners cite COCOFED v.
PCGG.[107] There, respondent PCGG questioned the
validity of the coconut levy laws based on the limits of
the states taxing and police power, as may be deduced
from the ensuing observations of the Court:
. Indeed, the Solicitor General
suggests quite strongly that the laws
operating or purporting to convert the
coconut levy funds into private funds,
are a transgression of the basic
limitations for the licit exercise of the
state's taxing and police powers, and
that certain provisions of said laws are
merely clever stratagems to keep away
government audit in order to facilitate
misappropriation of the funds in
question.
The utilization and proper
management of the coconut levy funds,
[to acquire shares of stocks for coconut
farmers and workers] raised as they
were by the States police and taxing
power are certainly the concern of the
Government. The coconut levy funds
are clearly affected with public interest.
Until it is demonstrated satisfactorily
that they have legitimately become
private funds, they must prima facie be
accounted subject to measures
prescribed in EO Nos. 1, 2, and 14 to
prevent their concealment, dissipation,
etc.[108] [Words in bracket added.]
The issue, therefore, in COCOFED v. PCGG turns on
the legality of the transfer of the shares of stock bought
with the coconut levy funds to coconut farmers. This
must be distinguished with the issues in the instant case
of whether P.D. No. 755 violated Section 29, paragraph
3 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as well as to
whether P.D. No. 755 constitutes undue delegation of
legislative power. Clearly, the issues in both sets of cases
are so different as to preclude the application of the law
of the case rule.
The second and third instances that petitioners draw
attention to refer to the rulings in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan, where the Court by Resolution of
December 13, 1994, as reiterated in another resolution
dated March 26, 1996, resolved to deny the separate
motions of the Republic to resolve legal questions on the
character of the coconut levy funds, more particularly to
declare as unconstitutional (a) coconut levies collected
pursuant to various issuances as public funds and
(b) Article III, Section 5 of P.D. No. 1468.
Based on its definition, a tax has three
elements, namely: a) it is an enforced
proportional contribution from persons
and properties; b) it is imposed by the
State by virtue of its sovereignty; and c)
it is levied for the support of the
government. The coconut levy funds fall
squarely into these elements for the
following reasons:

(a) They were generated by virtue of

statutory enactments imposed on the
Prescinding from the foregoing considerations, coconut farmers requiring the payment
petitioners would state: Having filed at least three (3) of prescribed amounts. Thus, PD No.
276, which created the Coconut
motions seeking, among others, to declare certain Consumer[s] Stabilization Fund (CCSF),
provisions of the Coconut Levy Laws unconstitutional mandated the following:
and having been rebuffed all three times by this Court,
the Republic - and necessarily Sandiganbayan should
have followed as [they were] legally bound by this a. A levy,
initially, of P15.00 per
Courts prior determination on that above issue of
100 kilograms of copra
constitutionality under the doctrine of Law of the Case. resecada or its
equivalent in other
coconut products, shall
be imposed on every
first sale, in accordance
Petitioners are wrong. The Court merely with the mechanics
established under RA
declined to pass upon the constitutionality of the coconut
6260, effective at the
levy laws or some of their provisions. It did not declare start of business hours
that the UCPB shares acquired with the use of coconut on August 10, 1973.
levy funds have legitimately become private.

The proceeds
from the levy shall be
The coconut deposited with the
levy funds are Philippine National
in the nature of Bank or any other
taxes and can government bank to the
only be used for account of the Coconut
public Consumers Stabilization
purpose. Conse Fund, as a separate trust
quently, they fund which shall not
cannot be used form part of the general
to purchase fund of the government.
shares of stocks
to be given for
free to private
individuals. The coco levies were further
clarified in amendatory laws,
specifically PD No. 961 and PD No.
Indeed, We have hitherto discussed, the coconut levy
1468 in this wise:
was imposed in the exercise of the States inherent power
of taxation. As We wrote in Republic v. COCOFED:[109]

The Authority
(PCA) is hereby
empowered to impose
Indeed, coconut levy funds partake of and collect a levy, to be
the nature of taxes, which, in general, known as the Coconut
are enforced proportional contributions Consumers Stabilization
from persons and properties, exacted by Fund Levy, on every one
the State by virtue of its sovereignty for hundred kilos of copra
the support of government and for all resecada, or its
public needs. equivalent delivered to,
and/or purchased by,
copra exporters, oil
 millers, desiccators and
other end-users of copra
or its equivalent in other
coconut products. The
levy shall be paid by
such copra exporters,
oil millers, desiccators
and other end-users of
copra or its equivalent
in other coconut
products under such
rules and regulations as
the Authority may
prescribe. Until
otherwise prescribed by
the Authority, the current
levy being collected
shall be continued.
Like other tax measures, they
were not voluntary payments or
donations by the people. They were
enforced contributions exacted on pain
of penal sanctions, as provided under PD
No. 276:
3. Any person or
firm who violates any
provision of this Decree
or the rules and
regulations promulgated
thereunder, shall, in
addition to penalties
already prescribed under
existing administrative
and special law, pay a
fine of not less than
P2,500 or more than
P10,000, or suffer
cancellation of licenses
to operate, or both, at the
discretion of the Court.
Such penalties were later
amended thus: .
(b) The coconut levies were
imposed pursuant to the laws enacted by
the proper legislative authorities of the
State. Indeed, the CCSF was collected
under PD No. 276.
(c) They were clearly imposed
for a public purpose. There is
absolutely no question that they were
collected to advance the governments
avowed policy of protecting
the coconut industry. This Court takes
judicial notice of the fact that
the coconut industry is one of the great
economic pillars of our nation, and
coconuts and their byproducts occupy a
leading position among the countrys
export products.
Taxation is done not merely to
raise revenues to support the
government, but also to provide means
for the rehabilitation and the
stabilization of a threatened industry,
which is so affected with public
interest as to be within the police power
of the State.
Even if the money is allocated
for a special purpose and raised by
special means, it is still public in
character. In Cocofed v. PCGG, the
Court observed that certain agencies or
enterprises were organized and financed
with revenues derived from coconut
levies imposed under a succession of
law of the late dictatorship with deposed
Ferdinand Marcos and his cronies as the
suspected authors and chief beneficiaries
of the resulting coconut industry
monopoly. The Court continued: . It
cannot be denied that the coconut
industry is one of the major industries
supporting the national economy. It is,
therefore, the States concern to make it a
strong and secure source not only of the
livelihood of a significant segment of the
population, but also of export earnings
the sustained growth of which is one
of the imperatives of economic
stability.[110] (Emphasis Ours)
We have ruled time and again that taxes are
imposed only for a public purpose.[111] They cannot be
used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive
benefit of private persons.[112] When a law imposes taxes
or levies from the public, with the intent to give undue
benefit or advantage to private persons, or the promotion
of private enterprises, that law cannot be said to satisfy
the requirement of public purpose.[113] In Gaston v.
Republic Planters Bank, the petitioning sugar producers,
sugarcane planters and millers sought the distribution of
the shares of stock of the Republic Planters Bank,
alleging that they are the true beneficial owners thereof.
[114]
In that case, the investment, i.e., the purchase of the
said bank, was funded by the deduction of PhP 1.00 per
picul from the sugar proceeds of the sugar producers
pursuant to P.D. No. 388.[115] In ruling against the
petitioners, the Court held that to rule in their favor
would contravene the general principle that revenues
received from the imposition of taxes or levies cannot be
used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive
benefit of private persons.[116] The Court amply reasoned
that the Stabilization Fund must be utilized for the
benefit of the entire sugar industry, and all its
components, stabilization of the domestic market
including foreign market, the industry being of vital
importance to the countrys economy and to national
interest.[117]
Similarly in this case, the coconut levy funds
were sourced from forced exactions decreed under P.D.
Nos. 232, 276 and 582, among others, [118] with the end-
goal of developing the entire coconut industry.
[119]
Clearly, to hold therefore, even by law, that the
revenues received from the imposition of the coconut
levies be used purely for private purposes to be owned
by private individuals in their private capacity and for
their benefit, would contravene the rationale behind the
imposition of taxes or levies.
Needless to stress, courts do not, as they cannot,
allow by judicial fiat the conversion of special funds into
a private fund for the benefit of private individuals. In
the same vein, We cannot subscribe to the idea of what
appears to be an indirect if not exactly direct conversion
of special funds into private funds, i.e., by using special
funds to purchase shares of stocks, which in turn would
be distributed for free to private individuals. Even if
these private individuals belong to, or are a part of the
coconut industry, the free distribution of shares of stocks
purchased with special public funds to them,
nevertheless cannot be justified. The ratio in Gaston,
[120]
as expressed below, applies mutatis mutandis to this
case:
The stabilization fees in question
are levied by the State for a special
purpose that of financing the growth and
development of the sugar industry and
all its components, stabilization of the
domestic market including the foreign
market. The fact that the State has
taken possession of moneys pursuant
to law is sufficient to constitute them
as state funds even though they are
held for a special purpose.
That the fees were collected
from sugar producers,[etc.], and that
the funds were channeled to the
purchase of shares of stock in
respondent Bank do not convert the
funds into a trust fund for their benefit
nor make them the beneficial owners of
the shares so purchased. It is but
rational that the fees be collected from
them since it is also they who are
benefited from the expenditure of the
funds derived from it. .[121] (Emphasis
Ours.)
In this case, the coconut levy funds were being
exacted from copra exporters, oil millers, desiccators
and other end-users of copra or its equivalent in other
coconut products.[122] Likewise so, the funds here were
channeled to the purchase of the shares of stock in
UCPB. Drawing a clear parallelism between Gaston and
this case, the fact that the coconut levy funds were
collected from the persons or entities in the coconut
industry, among others, does not and cannot entitle them
to be beneficial owners of the subject funds or more
bluntly, owners thereof in their private
capacity. Parenthetically, the said private individuals
cannot own the UCPB shares of stocks so purchased
using the said special funds of the government. [123]
Coconut levy
funds are
special public
funds of the
government.
Plainly enough, the coconut levy funds are
public funds. We have ruled in Republic v.
COCOFED that the coconut levy funds are not only
affected with public interest; they are prima facie public
funds.[124] In fact, this pronouncement that the levies are
government funds was admitted and recognized by
respondents, COCOFED, et al., in G.R. No. 147062-64.
[125]
And more importantly, in the same decision, We
clearly explained exactly what kind of government fund
the coconut levies are.We were categorical in saying that
coconut levies are treated as special funds by the very
laws which created them:
Finally and tellingly, the very
laws governing the coconut levies
 recognize their public character. Thus, other government bank under the account of the
the third Whereas clause of PD No.
276 treats them as special funds for a CCSF, as a separate trust fund, which shall not form
specific public part of the governments general fund. [129] And even
purpose. Furthermore, PD No. 711
transferred to the general funds of the assuming arguendo that the coconut levy funds were
State all existing special and fiduciary transferred to the general fund pursuant to P.D. No.
funds including the CCSF. On the
1234, it was with the specific directive that the same be
other hand, PD No. 1234 specifically
declared the CCSF as a special fund treated as special accounts in the general fund.[130]
for a special purpose, which should be
treated as a special account in the
National Treasury.[126] (Emphasis
Ours.)

The coconut
If only to stress the point, P.D. No. 1234 levy funds can
only be used for
expressly stated that coconut levies are special funds to
the special
be remitted to the Treasury in the General Fund of the purpose and
State, but treated as Special Accounts: the balance
thereof should
revert back to
the general
fund.
Section 1. All income and Consequently,
collections for Special or Fiduciary their
Funds authorized by law shall be subsequent
remitted to the Treasury and treated as reclassification
Special Accounts in the General as a private
Fund, including the following: fund to be
owned by
private
individuals in
(a) [PCA] Development Fund, their private
including all income derived therefrom capacities
under Sections 13 and 14 of [RA] No. under P.D. Nos.
1145; Coconut Investments Fund under 755, 961 and
Section 8 of [RA] No. 6260, including 1468 are
earnings, profits, proceeds and interests unconstitutiona
derived therefrom; Coconut Consumers l.
Stabilization Funds under Section 3-A of
PD No. 232, as inserted by Section 3 of
P.D. No. 232, as inserted by Section 2 of
P.D. No. 583; and all other fees
accruing to the [PCA] under the
provisions of Section 19 of [RA] No.
To recapitulate, Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the
1365, in accordance with Section 2 of
P.D. No. 755 and all other income 1987 Constitution, restating a general principle on
accruing to the [PCA] under existing taxation, enjoins the disbursement of a special fund in
laws.[127] (Emphasis Ours)
accordance with the special purpose for which it was
collected, the balance, if there be any, after the purpose
has been fulfilled or is no longer forthcoming, to be
transferred to the general funds of the government, thus:
Moreover, the Court, in Gaston, stated the observation
that the character of a stabilization fund as a special fund
is emphasized by the fact that the funds are deposited in
Section 29(3).
the Philippine National Bank [PNB] and not in the
Philippine Treasury, moneys from which may be paid
out only in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
[128] (3) All money collected on any tax
Similarly in this case, Sec.1 (a) of P.D. No. 276 states
levied for a special purpose shall be
that the proceeds from the coconut levy shall be treated as a special fund and paid out
deposited with the PNB, then a government bank, or any for such purpose only. If the purpose
for which a special fund was created has
 been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, WHEREAS, an escalating crisis
if any, shall be transferred to the general brought about by an abnormal situation
funds of the Government. (Emphasis in the world market for fats and oils has
Ours) resulted in supply and price
dislocations in the domestic market for
coconut-based goods, and has created
hardships for consumers thereof;

Correlatively, Section 2 of P.D. No. 755 clearly states

that:
WHEREAS,
the representatives of the coconut
industry have proposed the
implementation of an industry-financed
Section 2. Financial stabilization scheme which will permit
Assistance. To enable the coconut socialized pricing of coconut-based
farmers to comply with their contractual commodities;
obligations under the aforesaid
Agreement, the [PCA] is hereby
directed to draw and utilize the
collections under the Coconut WHEREAS, it is the policy of
Consumers Stabilization Fund the State to promote the welfare and
[CCSF]authorized to be levied by [P.D.] economic well-being of the consuming
232, as amended, to pay for the financial public;
commitments of the coconut farmers
under the said agreement. and the
Coconut Industry Development Fund as
prescribed by Presidential Decree No.
.
582 shall not be considered or
construed, under any law or
regulation, special and/or fiduciary
funds and do not form part of the
general funds of the national 1. In addition to its powers
government within the contemplation granted under [P.D.] No. 232, the [PCA]
of Presidential Decree No. 711. is hereby authorized to formulate and
(Emphasis Ours) immediately implement a stabilization
scheme for coconut-based consumer
goods, along the following general
guidelines:

Likewise, as discussed supra, Article III, Section 5 of (a) .The proceeds of the
levy shall be deposited with the
both P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 provides that the CCSF Philippine National Bank or any
shall not be construed by any law as a special and/or other government bank to the
account of the CCSF as a
trust fund, the stated intention being that actual
separate trust fund.
ownership of the said fund shall pertain to coconut
farmers in their private capacities. [131] Thus, in order to
determine whether the relevant provisions of P.D. Nos.
(b) The Fund shall
755, 961 and 1468 complied with Article VI, Section 29 be utilized to subsidize the sale
(3) of the 1987 Constitution, a look at the public policy of coconut-based products at
prices set by the Price Control
or the purpose for which the CCSF levy was imposed is Council.:
necessary.

The CCSF was established by virtue of P.D. No. 276

wherein it is stated that:
As couched, P.D. No. 276 created and exacted
the CCSF to advance the governments avowed policy of
protecting the coconut industry.[132] Evidently, the CCSF
was originally set up as a special fund to support
consumer purchases of coconut products. To put it a bit
differently, the protection of the entire coconut industry,
and even more importantly, for the consuming public
provides the rationale for the creation of the coconut
levy fund. There can be no quibbling then that
It is now settled, in view of the ruling
the foregoing provisions of P.D. No. 276 intended the in Republic v. COCOFED, et al., supra,
fund created and set up therein not especially for the that Coconut levy funds are raised with
the use of the police and taxing powers
coconut farmers but for the entire coconut industry, of the State; that they are levies imposed
albeit the improvement of the industry would by the State for the benefit of the
doubtless redound to the benefit of the farmers. Upon the coconut industry and its farmers and that
they were clearly imposed for a public
foregoing perspective, the following provisions of P.D. purpose. This public purpose is
Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 insofar as they declared, as the explained in the said case, as follows:
case may be, that: [the coconut levy] fund and the
disbursements thereof [shall be] authorized for the
benefit of the coconut farmers and shall be owned by . c) They were clearly
imposed for a public
them in their private capacities; [133] or the coconut levy purpose. There is
fund shall not be construed by any law to be a special absolutely no question
that they were colleted
and/or fiduciary fund, and do not therefore form part of to advance the
the general fund of the national government later on; governments avowed
[134] policy of protecting the
or the UCPB shares acquired using the coconut levy
coconut industry.
fund shall be distributed to the coconut farmers for free,
[135]
violated the special public purpose for which the
CCSF was established.
Taxation is done not
merely to raise revenues
to support the
government, but also to
provide means for the
In sum, not only were the challenged
rehabilitation and the
presidential issuances unconstitutional for decreeing stabilization of a
the distribution of the shares of stock for free to the threatened industry,
which is so affected
coconut farmers and, therefore, negating the public with public interest as
purpose declared by P.D. No. 276, i.e., to stabilize the to be within the police
power of the State, as
price of edible oil[136] and to protect the coconut industry. held in
[137]
They likewise reclassified, nay treated, the coconut Caltex Philippines v. C
OA and Osmea v.
levy fund as private fund to be disbursed and/or invested
Orbos.
for the benefit of private individuals in their private
capacities, contrary to the original purpose for which the
fund was created. To compound the situation, the
offending provisions effectively removed the coconut
levy fund away from the cavil of public funds which The avowed public purpose for the
disbursement of the CCSF is contained
normally can be paid out only pursuant to an in the perambulatory clauses and
appropriation made by law.[138] The conversion of public Section 1 of P.D. No. 755. The
imperativeness of enunciating the public
funds into private assets was illegally allowed, in fact purpose of the expenditure of funds
mandated, by these provisions. Clearly therefore, the raised through taxation is underscored in
pertinent provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 are the case of Pascual v. The Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, et
unconstitutional for violating Article VI, Section 29 (3) al, supra, which held:
of the Constitution. In this context, the distribution by
PCA of the UCPB shares purchased by means of the
coconut levy fund a special fund of the government to
the coconut farmers, is therefore void. As regards the legal
feasibility of
appropriating public
funds for a private
purpose the principle
We quote with approval the Sandiganbayans reasons for according to Ruling
Case Law, is this:
declaring the provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468
as unconstitutional:
It is a general rule that
the legislature is
without power to Needless to say, this
appropriate public Court is fully in accord
revenue for anything with the foregoing
but a public purpose it views. Besides,
is the essential character reflecting as they do,
of the direct object of the established
the expenditure which jurisprudence in
must determine its the United States, after
validity as justifying a whose constitutional
tax, and not the system ours has been
magnitude of the patterned, said views
interests to be affected and jurisprudence are,
nor the degree to which likewise, part and parcel
the general advantage of of our own
the community, and constitutional law.
thus the public welfare
may be ultimately
benefited by their
promotion. Incidental The gift of funds raised by the exercise
advantage to the public of the taxing powers of the State which
or to the state, which were converted into shares of stock in a
results from the private corporation, slated for free
promotion of private distribution to the coconut farmers, can
interests and the only be accorded constitutional sanction
prosperity of private if it will directly serve the public
enterprises or business, purpose declared by law.[139]
does not justify their aid
by the use of public
money. 25 R.L.C. pp.
398-400)

Section 1 of
The rule is set forth in P.D. No. 755, as
Corpus Juris Secundum well as PCA
in the following Administrative
language: Order No. 1,
Series of 1975
(PCA AO 1),
and Resolution
No. 074-75, are
invalid
delegations of
The test of
legislative
the
power.
constitutionali
ty of a statute
requiring the
use of public
funds is
whether the Petitioners argue that the anti-graft court erred in
statute is declaring Section 1 of PD 755, PCA Administrative
designed to Order No. 1 and PCA Resolution No. 074-78
promote the
public constitutionally infirm by reason of alleged but unproven
interests, as and unsubstantiated flaws in their
opposed to
the implementation. Additionally, they explain that said
furtherance of court erred in concluding that Section 1 of PD No. 755
the advantage
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
of
individuals, insofar as it authorizes the PCA to promulgate rules and
although each regulations governing the distribution of the UCPB
advantage to
individuals shares to the farmers.
might
incidentally
serve the
public. (81
C.J.S. p. These propositions are meritless.
1147)
The assailed PSJ-A noted the operational distribution problem of distribution of
the bank shares.:
nightmare faced by PCA and the mode of distribution of
UCPB shares set in motion by that agency left much
room for diversion. Wrote the Sandiganbayan:

Thus, when 51,200,806 shares

in the bank remained undistributed, the
The actual distribution of the bank PCA deemed it proper to give a bonanza
shares was admittedly an enormous to coconut farmers who already got their
operational problem which resulted in bank shares, by giving them an
the failure of the intended beneficiaries additional share for each share owned
to receive their shares of stocks in the by them and by converting their
bank, as shown by the rules and fractional shares into full shares. The
regulations, issued by the PCA, without rest of the shares were then transferred
adequate guidelines being provided to it to a private organization, the
by P.D. No. 755. PCA Administrative COCOFED, for distribution to those
Order No. 1, Series of 1975 (August 20, determined to be bona fide coconut
1975), Rules and Regulations Governing farmers who had not received shares of
the Distribution of Shares of Stock of stock of the Bank. .
the Bank Authorized to be Acquired
Pursuant to PCA Board Resolution No.
246-75, quoted hereunder discloses how
the undistributed shares of stocks due to The PCA thus assumed, due to
anonymous coconut farmers or payors lack of adequate guidelines set by P.D.
of the coconut levy fees were authorized No. 755, that it had complete
to be distributed to existing shareholders authority to define who are the
of the Bank: coconut farmers and to decide as to
who among the coconut farmers shall
be given the gift of bank shares; how
many shares shall be given to them, and
Section what basis it shall use to determine the
9. Fractional amount of shares to be distributed for
and free to the coconut farmers. In other
Undistributed words, P.D. No. 755 fails the
Shares completeness test which renders it
Fractional constitutionally infirm.
shares and
shares which
remain
undistributed Regarding the second requisite of
shall be standard, it is settled that legislative
distributed to standard need not be expressed.
all the coconut
farmers who
have qualified
and received We observed, however, that the PCA
equity in the [AO] No. 1, Series of 1975 and PCA
Bank and shall Rules and Regulations 074-78, did not
be apportioned take into consideration the
among them, as accomplishment of the public purpose or
far as the national standard/policy of P.D. No.
practicable, in 755 which is directly to accelerate the
proportion to development and growth of the coconut
their equity in industry and as a consequence thereof,
relation to the to make the coconut farmers participants
number of in and beneficiaries of such growth and
undistributed development. The said PCA issuances
equity and such did nothing more than provide
further rules guidelines as to whom the UCPB shares
and regulations were to be distributed and how many
as may bank shares shall be allotted to the
hereafter be beneficiaries. There was no mention of
promulgated. how the distributed shares shall be used
to achieve exclusively or at least directly
or primarily the aim or public purpose
enunciated by P.D. No. 755. The
The foregoing PCA numerical or quantitative distribution of
issuance was further shares contemplated by the PCA
amended by Resolution No. regulations which is a condition for the
074-78, still citing the same validly of said administrative
issuances. There was a reversal of
 priorities. The narrow private
interests prevailed over the laudable
objectives of the law. However, under
the May 25, 1975 agreement
implemented by the PCA issuances, the
PCA acquired only 64.98% of the shares
of the bank and even the shares covering
the said 64.98% were later on
transferred to non-coconut farmers.
The distribution for free of the
shares of stock of the CIIF Companies is
tainted with the above-mentioned
constitutional infirmities of the PCA
administrative issuances. In view of the
foregoing, we cannot consider the
provision of P.D. No. 961 and P.D. No.
1468 and the implementing regulations
issued by the PCA as valid legal basis to
hold that assets acquired with public
funds have legitimately become private
properties. [140] (Emphasis added.)
P.D. No. 755 involves an invalid delegation of
legislative power, a concept discussed in Soriano v.
Laguardia,[141] citing the following excerpts from Edu v.
Ericta:
It is a fundamental that
Congress may not delegate its legislative
power. What cannot be delegated is the
authority to make laws and to alter and
repeal them; the test is the completeness
of the statute in all its term and
provisions when it leaves the hands of
the legislature. To determine whether or
not there is an undue delegation of
legislative power, the inquiry must be
directed to the scope and definiteness of
the measure enacted. The legislature
does not abdicate its functions when it
describes what job must be done, who
is to do it, and what is the scope of his
authority.
To avoid the taint of unlawful
delegation, there must be a standard,
which implies at the very least that the
legislature itself determines matters of
principle and lays down fundamental
policy. Otherwise, the charge of
complete abdication may be hard to
repel. A standard thus defines
legislative policy, marks its limits,
maps out its boundaries and specifies
the public agency to apply it. It
indicates the circumstances under
which the legislative command is to be
effected. It is the criterion by which
legislative purpose may be carried out.
Thereafter, the executive or
administrative office designated may in
pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and
regulations.[142] (Emphasis supplied)
Jurisprudence is consistent as regards the two tests,
which must be complied with to determine the existence
of a valid delegation of legislative power. In Abakada
Guro Party List, et al. v. Purisima,[143] We reiterated the
discussion, to wit:
Two tests determine the validity
of delegation of legislative power: (1)
the completeness test and (2) the
sufficient standard test. A law is
complete when it sets forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate. It lays
down a sufficient standard when it
provides adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegates authority
and prevent the delegation from
running riot. To be sufficient, the
standard must specify the limits of the
delegates authority, announce the
legislative policy and identify the
conditions under which it is to be
implemented.
In the instant case, the requisite standards or
criteria are absent in P.D. No. 755. As may be noted, the
decree authorizes the PCA to distribute to coconut
farmers, for free, the shares of stocks of UCPB and to
pay from the CCSF levy the financial commitments of
the coconut farmers under the Agreement for the
acquisition of such bank. Yet, the decree does not even
state who are to be considered as coconut farmers.
Would, say, one who plants a single coconut tree be
already considered a coconut farmer and, therefore,
entitled to own UCPB shares? If so, how many shares
shall be given to him? The definition of a coconut farmer
and the basis as to the number of shares a farmer is
entitled to receive for free are important variables to be
determined by law and cannot be left to the discretion of
the implementing agency.
Moreover, P.D. No. 755 did not identify or
delineate any clear condition as to how the disposition of
the UCPB shares or their conversion into private
ownership will redound to the advancement of the
national policy declared under it. To recall, P.D. No. 755
seeks to accelerate the growth and development of the
coconut industry and achieve a vertical integration
thereof so that coconut farmers will become participants
in, and beneficiaries of, such growth and development.
[144]
The Sandiganbayan is correct in its observation and
ruling that the said law gratuitously gave away public
funds to private individuals, and converted them
exclusively into private property without any restriction
as to its use that would reflect the avowed national
policy or public purpose. Conversely, the private
individuals to whom the UCPB shares were transferred
are free to dispose of them by sale or any other mode
from the moment of their acquisition. In fact and true
enough, the Sandiganbayan categorically stated in its
Order dated March 11, 2003,[145] that out of the 72.2%
shares and increased capital stock of the FUB
(later UCPB) allegedly covered by the May 25, 1975
Agreement,[146] entirely paid for by PCA, 7.22% were
given to Cojuangco and the remaining 64.98%, which
were originally held by PCA for the benefit of the
coconut farmers, were later sold or transferred to non-
coconut farmers.[147] Even the proposed rewording of the
factual allegations of Lobregat, COCOFED, et al. and
Ballares, et al., reveals that indeed, P.D. No. 755 did not
provide for any guideline, standard, condition or
restriction by which the said shares shall be distributed
to the coconut farmers that would ensure that the same
will be undertaken to accelerate the growth and
development of the coconut industry pursuant to its
national policy. The proposed rewording of admissions
reads:
There were shares forming part
of the aforementioned 64.98% which
were, after their distribution, for free, to
the coconut farmers as required by P.D.
No. 755, sold or transferred respectively
by individual coconut farmers who were
then the registered stockholders of those
UCPB shares to non-coconut farmers.[148]
Clearly, P.D. No. 755, insofar as it grants PCA a
veritable carte blanche to distribute to coconut farmers
UCPB shares at the level it may determine, as well as the
full disposition of such shares to private individuals in
their private capacity without any conditions or
restrictions that would advance the laws national policy
or public purpose, present a case of undue delegation of
legislative power. As such, there is even no need to
discuss the validity of the administrative orders and
resolutions of PCA implementing P.D. No. 755. Water
cannot rise higher than its source.
Even so, PCA AO 1 and PCA Resolution No.
078-74, are in themselves, infirm under the undue
delegation of legislative powers. Particularly, Section 9
of PCA AO I provides:
SECTION 9. Fractional and
Undistributed Shares Fractional shares
and shares which remain undistributed
as a consequence of the failure of the
coconut farmers to register their
COCOFUND receipts or the destruction
of the COCOFUND receipts or the
registration of COCOFUND receipts in
the name of an unqualified individual,
after the final distribution is made on the
basis of the
consolidated IBM registration Report as
of March 31, 1976 shall be distributed to
all the coconut farmers who have
qualified and received equity in the
Bank and shall be appointed among
them, as far as practicable, in proportion
to their equity in relation to the number
of undistributed equity and such further
rules and regulations as may hereafter be
promulgated.
The foregoing provision directs and authorizes
the distribution of fractional and undistributed shares as
a consequence of the failure of the coconut farmers with
Coco Fund receipts to register them, even without a clear
mandate or instruction on the same in any pertinent
existing law. PCA Resolution No. 078-74 had a similar
provision, albeit providing more detailed
information. The said Resolution identified 51,200,806
shares of the bank that remained undistributed and PCA
devised its own rules as to how these undistributed and
fractional shares shall be disposed of, notwithstanding
the dearth as to the standards or parameters in the laws
which it sought to implement.
Eventually, what happened was that, as correctly
pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, the PCA gave a
bonanza to supposed coconut farmers who already got
their bank shares, by giving them extra shares according
to the rules established on its own by the PCA under
PCA AO 1 and Resolution No. 078-74. Because of the
lack of adequate guidelines under P.D. No. 755 as to
how the shares were supposed to be distributed to the
coconut farmers, the PCA thus assumed that it could
decide for itself how these shares will be
distributed. This obviously paved the way to playing
favorites, if not allowing outright shenanigans. In this
regard, this poser raised in the Courts February 16, 1993
Resolution in G.R. No. 96073 is as relevant then as it is
now: How is it that shares of stocks in such entities
which was organized and financed by revenues derived
from coconut levy funds which were imbued with public
interest ended up in private hands who are not farmers
or beneficiaries; and whether or not the holders of said
stock, who in one way or another had had some part in
the collection, administration, disbursement or other
disposition of the coconut levy funds were qualified to
acquire stock in the corporations formed and operated
from these funds. [149]
Likewise, the said PCA issuances did not take
note of the national policy or public purpose for which
the coconut levy funds were imposed under P.D. No.
755, i.e. the acceleration of the growth and development
of the entire coconut industry, and the achievement of a
vertical integration thereof that could make the coconut
farmers participants in, and beneficiaries of, such growth
and development.[150] Instead, the PCA prioritized the
coconut farmers themselves by fully disposing of the
bank shares, totally disregarding the national policy for
which the funds were created. This is clearly an undue
delegation of legislative powers.
With this pronouncement, there is hardly any need to
establish that the sequestered assets are ill-gotten wealth.
The documentary evidence, the P.D.s and Agreements,
prove that the transfer of the shares to the more than one
million of supposed coconut farmers was tainted with
illegality.
Article III,
Section 5 of
P.D. No. 961
and Article III,
Section 5 of
P.D. No. 1468
violate Article
IX (D) (2) of
the 1987
Constitution.
Article III, Section 5 of P.D. No. 961 explicitly takes
away the coconut levy funds from the coffer of the
public funds, or, to be precise, privatized revenues
derived from the coco levy. Particularly, the aforesaid
Section 5 provides:
Section 5. Exemptions. The
Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund
and the Coconut Industry Development
fund as well as all disbursements of said
funds for the benefit of the coconut
farmers as herein authorized shall not be
construed or interpreted, under any law
or regulation, as special and/or
fiduciary funds, or as part of the
general funds of the national
government within the contemplation
of P.D. No. 711; nor as a subsidy,
donation, levy, government funded
investment, or government share within
the contemplation of P.D. 898 the
intention being that said Fund and the
disbursements thereof as herein
authorized for the benefit of the
coconut farmers shall be owned in their
own private capacity.[151] (Emphasis
Ours)
The same provision is carried over in Article III,
Section 5 of P.D. No. 1468, the Revised Coconut
Industry Code:
These identical provisions of P.D. Nos. 961 and
1468 likewise violate Article IX (D), Section 2(1) of the
Constitution, defining the powers and functions of the
Commission on Audit (COA) as a constitutional
commission:
Sec. 2. (1) The Commission on
Audit shall have the power, authority,
and duty to examine, audit, and settle
all accounts pertaining to the revenue
and receipts of, and expenditures or
uses of funds and property, owned or
held in trust by, or pertaining to, the
Government, or any of its subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities,
including government-owned and
controlled corporations with original
charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a)
constitutional bodies, commissions and
offices that have been granted fiscal
autonomy under this Constitution; (b)
autonomous state colleges and
universities; (c) other government-
owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries;.[152] (Emphasis Ours)
A similar provision was likewise previously found in
Article XII (D), Section 2 (1) of the 1973 Constitution,
thus:
Section 2. The Commission on Audit
shall have the following powers and
functions:
(1) Examine, audit, and settle,
in accordance with law and
regulations, all accounts
pertaining to the revenues and
receipts of, and expenditures or
uses of funds and property,
owned or held in trust by, or
pertaining to, the Government,
or any of its subdivisions,
agencies, or
instrumentalities, including
government-owned and
controlled corporations; keep
the general accounts of the
government and, for such period
as may be provided by law,
preserve the vouchers pertaining
thereto; and promulgate
accounting and auditing rules
and regulations including those
for the prevention of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, or
extravagant expenditures or use
of funds and property.
[153]
(Emphasis Ours)
The Constitution, by express provision,
the COA with the responsibility for State audit. [154] As an
independent supreme State auditor, its audit jurisdiction
cannot be undermined by any law. Indeed, under Article
IX (D), Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution, [n]o law
shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government
or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any
investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the
Commission on Audit.[155] Following the mandate of the
COA and the parameters set forth by the foregoing
provisions, it is clear that it has jurisdiction over the
coconut levy funds, being special
funds. Conversely, the COA has the power, authority and
duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining
to the coconut levy funds and, consequently, to the
UCPB shares purchased using the said funds. However,
declaring the said funds as partaking the nature of
private funds, ergo subject to private appropriation,
removes them from the coffer of the public funds of the
government, and consequently renders them impervious
to the COA audit jurisdiction. Clearly, the pertinent
provisions of P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 divest the COA of
its constitutionally-mandated function and undermine its
constitutional independence.
The assailed purchase of UCPB shares of stocks using
the coconut levy funds presents a classic example of an
investment of public funds. The conversion of these
special public funds into private funds by allowing
private individuals to own them in their private
capacities is something else. It effectively deprives
the COA of its constitutionally-invested power to audit
and settle such accounts. The conversion of the said
shares purchased using special public funds into pure
and exclusive private ownership has taken, or will
completely take away the said funds from the boundaries
with which the COA has jurisdiction. Obviously,
the COA is without audit jurisdiction over the receipt or
disbursement of private property. Accordingly, Article
III, Section 5 of both P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 must be
struck down for being unconstitutional, be they assayed
against Section 2(1), Article XII (D) of the 1973
Constitution or its counterpart provision in the 1987
Constitution.
The Court, however, takes note of the
[156]
dispositive portion of PSJ-A, which states that:
vests
2. Section 2 of P.D. No. 755 which
mandated that the coconut levy funds
shall not be considered special and/or
fiduciary funds nor part of the general
funds of the national government and
similar provisions of Sec. 3, Art. III,
P.D. 961 and Sec. 5, Art. III, P.D.
1468 contravene the provisions of the
Constitution, particularly, Art. IX (D),
Sec. 2; and Article VI, Sec. 29 (3).
(Emphasis Ours)
public
However, a careful reading of the discussion in
PSJ-A reveals that it is Section 5 of Article III of P.D.
No. 961 and not Section 3 of said decree, which is at
issue, and which was therefore held to be contrary to the
Constitution. The dispositive portion of the said PSJ
should therefore be corrected to reflect the proper
provision that was declared as unconstitutional, which is
Section 5 of Article III of P.D. No. 961 and not Section 3
thereof.
V advances from the CIIF companies and from UCPB
The CIIF Companies and the CIIF Block
of SMC shares are public funds/assets
From the foregoing discussions, it is fairly
established that the coconut levy funds are special public
funds. Consequently, any property purchased by means
of the coconut levy funds should likewise be treated as
public funds or public property, subject to burdens and
restrictions attached by law to such property.
In this case, the 6 CIIF Oil Mills were acquired
by the UCPB using coconut levy funds.[157] On the other
hand, the 14 CIIF holding companies are wholly owned
subsidiaries of the CIIF Oil Mills. [158] Conversely, these
companies were acquired using or whose capitalization
comes from the coconut levy funds. However, as in the
case of UCPB, UCPB itself distributed a part of its
investments in the CIIF oil mills to coconut farmers, and
retained a part thereof as administrator.[159] The portion
distributed to the supposed coconut farmers followed the
procedure outlined in PCA Resolution No. 033-78.
[160]
And as the administrator of the CIIF holding
companies, the UCPB authorized the acquisition of the
SMC shares.[161] In fact, these companies were formed or
organized solely for the purpose of holding the SMC
shares.[162] As found by the Sandiganbayan, the 14 CIIF
holding companies used borrowed funds from the UCPB
to acquire the SMC shares in the aggregate amount of
P1.656 Billion.[163]
Since the CIIF companies and the CIIF block of
SMC shares were acquired using coconut levy funds
funds, which have been established to be public in
character it goes without saying that these acquired
corporations and assets ought to be regarded and treated
as government assets. Being government properties, they
are accordingly owned by the Government, for the
coconut industry pursuant to currently existing laws. [164]
It may be conceded hypothetically, as
COCOFED et al. urge, that the 14 CIIF holding
companies acquired the SMC shares in question using
loans. But there can be no gainsaying that the same
advances and UCPB loans are public in character,
constituting as they do assets of the 14 holding
companies, which in turn are wholly-owned subsidiaries
of the 6 CIIF Oil Mills. And these oil mills were
organized, capitalized and/or financed using coconut
levy funds. In net effect, the CIIF block of SMC shares
are simply the fruits of the coconut levy funds acquired
at the expense of the coconut industry. In Republic v.
COCOFED,[165] the en banc Court, speaking through
Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban,
stated: Because the subject UCPB shares were acquired
with government funds, the government becomes their
prima facie beneficial and true owner. By parity of
reasoning, the adverted block of SMC shares, acquired
as they were with government funds, belong to the
government as, at the very least, their beneficial and true
owner.
We thus affirm the decision of the
Sandiganbayan on this point. But as We have earlier
discussed, reiterating our holding in Republic v.
COCOFED, the States avowed policy or purpose in
creating the coconut levy fund is for the development of
the entire coconut industry, which is one of the major
industries that promotes sustained economic stability,
and not merely the livelihood of a significant segment of
the population.[166] Accordingly, We sustain the ruling of
the Sandiganbayan in CC No. 0033-F that the CIIF
companies and the CIIF block of SMC shares are public
funds necessary owned by the Government. We,
however, modify the same in the following wise: These
shares shall belong to the Government, which shall be
used only for the benefit of the coconut farmers and for
the development of the coconut industry.
Sandiganbayan did not err in ruling that
PCA (AO) No. 1, Series of 1975 and
PCA rules and regulations 074-78 did
not comply with the national standard
or policy of P.D. No. 755.
According to the petitioners, the Sandiganbayan
has identified the national policy sought to be enhanced
by and expressed under Section 1 in relation to Section 2
of P.D. No. 755. Yet, so petitioners argue, that court,
with grave abuse of discretion, disregarded such policy
and thereafter, ruled that Section 1 in relation to Section
2 of P.D. No. 755 is unconstitutional as the decree failed
to promote the purpose for which it was enacted in the
first place.
We are not persuaded. The relevant assailed
portion of PSJ-A states:
We observe, however, that the PCA
[AO] No. 1, Series of 1975 and PCA
Rules and Regulations 074-78, did not
take into consideration the
accomplishment of the public purpose or
the national standard/policy of P.D. No.
755 which is directly to accelerate the
development and growth of the coconut
industry and as a consequence thereof,
to make the coconut farmers participants
in and beneficiaries of such growth and
development.
It is a basic legal precept that courts do not look
into the wisdom of the laws passed. The principle of
separation of powers demands this hands-off attitude
[167]
from the judiciary. Saguiguit v. People teaches why:
[W]hat the petitioner asks is for
the Court to delve into the policy behind
or wisdom of a statute, which, under the
doctrine of separation of powers, it
cannot do,. Even with the best of
motives, the Court can only interpret
and apply the law and cannot, despite
doubts about its wisdom, amend or
repeal it. Courts of justice have no right
to encroach on the prerogatives of
lawmakers, as long as it has not been
shown that they have acted with grave
abuse of discretion. And while the
judiciary may interpret laws and
evaluate them for constitutional
soundness and to strike them down if
they are proven to be infirm, this solemn
power and duty do not include the
discretion to correct by reading into the
law what is not written therein.
We reproduce the policy-declaring provision of
P.D. No. 755, thus:
Section 1. Declaration of
National Policy. It is hereby declared
that the policy of the State is to provide
readily available credit facilities to the
coconut farmers at preferential rates;
that this policy can be efficiently
realized by the implementation of
the Agreement for the Acquisition of a
Commercial Bank for the benefit of
the Coconut Farmers executed by the
[PCA], the terms of which Agreement
are hereby incorporated by reference;
and that the [PCA] is hereby authorized
to distribute, for free, the shares of stock
of the bank it acquired to the coconut
farmers under such rules and regulations
it may promulgate.
P.D. No. 755 having stated in no uncertain terms that the
national policy of providing cheap credit facilities to
coconut farmers shall be achieved with the acquisition of
a commercial bank, the Court is without discretion to
rule on the wisdom of such an undertaking. It is
abundantly clear, however, that the Sandiganbayan did
not look into the policy behind, or the wisdom of, P.D.
No. 755. In context, it did no more than to inquire
whether the purpose defined in P.D. No. 755 and for
which the coco levy fund was established would be
carried out, obviously having in mind the (a) dictum that
the power to tax should only be exercised for a public
purpose and (b) command of Section 29, paragraph 3 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that:
(3) All money collected on any
tax levied for a special purpose shall be
treated as a special fund and paid out
for such purpose only. If the purpose
for which a special fund was created has
been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance,
if any, shall be transferred to the general
funds of the Government. (Emphasis
supplied)
 For the above reason, the above-assailed action In Yap v. Thenamaris Ships Management,[170] the
of the Sandiganbayan was well within the scope of its Operative Fact Doctrine was discussed in that:
sound discretion and mandate.

Moreover, petitioners impute on the anti-graft court the

As a general rule, an
commission of grave abuse of discretion for going into unconstitutional act is not a law; it
the validity of and in declaring the coco levy laws as confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office;
unconstitutional, when there were still factual issues to it is inoperative as if it has not been
be resolved in a full blown trial as directed by this Court. passed at all. The general rule is
[168] supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code,
which provides:

Art. 7. Laws are repealed

only by subsequent ones,
Petitioners COCOFED and the farmer representatives
and their violation or
miss the point. They acknowledged that their alleged non-observance shall not
ownership of the sequestered shares in UCPB and SMC be excused by disuse or
custom or practice to the
is predicated on the coco levy decrees. Thus, the legality contrary.
and propriety of their ownership of these valuable assets
are directly related to and must be assayed against the The doctrine of operative fact
constitutionality of those presidential decrees. This is a serves as an exception to the
aforementioned general rule. In Planters
primordial issue, which must be determined to address
Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation,
the validity of the rest of petitioners claims of we held:
ownership. Verily, the Sandiganbayan did not commit
grave abuse of discretion, a phrase which, in the abstract, The doctrine of
denotes the idea of capricious or whimsical exercise of operative fact, as an
exception to the general
judgment or the exercise of power in an arbitrary or rule, only applies as a
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal matter of equity and fair
hostility as to be equivalent to having acted without play. It nullifies the
effects of an
jurisdiction.[169] unconstitutional law by
recognizing that the
existence of a statute
prior to a determination
of unconstitutionality is
The Operative
an operative fact and
Fact Doctrine
may have consequences
does not apply
which cannot always be
ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a
new judicial declaration.

The doctrine is
Petitioners assert that the Sandiganbayans refusal to applicable when a
recognize the vested rights purportedly created under the declaration of
unconstitutionality will
coconut levy laws constitutes taking of private property
impose an undue burden
without due process of law. They reason out that to on those who have relied
accord retroactive application to a declaration of on the invalid law. Thus,
it was applied to a
unconstitutionality would be unfair inasmuch as such criminal case when a
approach would penalize the farmers who merely declaration of
unconstitutionality would
obeyed then valid laws. put the accused in double
jeopardy or would put in
limbo the acts done by a
municipality in reliance
upon a law creating it.[171]
This contention is specious.
In that case, this Court further held that the Operative executive act was in
operation and presumed
Fact Doctrine will not be applied as an exception when to be valid in all
to rule otherwise would be iniquitous and would send a respects. It is now
accepted as a doctrine
wrong signal that an act may be justified when based on that prior to its being
an unconstitutional provision of law.[172] nullified, its existence
as a fact must be
reckoned with. This is
merely to reflect
awareness that precisely
The Court had the following disquisition on the because the judiciary is
the governmental organ
concept of the Operative Fact Doctrine in the case which has the final say
of Chavez v. National Housing Authority:[173] on whether or not a
legislative or executive
measure is valid, a
The operative fact doctrine is embodied
period of time may have
in De Agbayani v. Court of Appeals,
elapsed before it can
wherein it is stated that a legislative or
exercise the power of
executive act, prior to its being declared
judicial review that may
as unconstitutional by the courts, is valid
lead to a declaration of
and must be complied with, thus:
nullity. It would be to
deprive the law of its
As the new Civil Code
quality of fairness and
puts it: When the courts
justice then, if there be
declare a law to be
no recognition of what
inconsistent with the
had transpired prior to
Constitution, the former
such adjudication.
shall be void and the
latter shall govern.
In the language of an
Administrative or
American Supreme
executive acts, orders
Court decision: The
and regulations shall be
actual existence of a
valid only when they
statute, prior to such a
are not contrary to the
determination [of
laws of the
unconstitutionality], is
Constitution. It is
an operative fact and
understandable why it
may have consequences
should be so, the
which cannot justly be
Constitution being
ignored. The past
supreme and
cannot always be erased
paramount. Any
by a new judicial
legislative or executive
declaration. The effect
act contrary to its terms
of the subsequent ruling
cannot survive.
as to invalidity may
have to be considered in
Such a view has support
various aspects, with
in logic and possesses
respect to particular
the merit of
relations, individual and
simplicity. It may not
corporate, and particular
however be sufficiently
conduct, private and
realistic. It does not
official. This language
admit of doubt that
has been quoted with
prior to the declaration
approval in a resolution
of nullity such
in Araneta v. Hill and
challenged legislative or
the decision in Manila
executive act must have
Motor Co., Inc.
been in force and had to
v. Flores. An even more
be complied with. This
recent instance is the
is so as until after the
opinion of Justice
judiciary, in an
Zaldivar speaking for
appropriate case,
the Court in Fernandez
declares its invalidity, it
v. Cuerva and Co.
is entitled to obedience
(Emphasis supplied.)
and respect. Parties may
have acted under it and
may have changed their
The principle was further explicated in
positions. What could
the case of Rieta v. People of
be more fitting than that
the Philippines, thus:
in a subsequent
litigation regard be had
In similar
to what has been done
situations in the past
while such legislative or
this Court had taken the existen
pragmatic and realistic ce of a
course set forth statute,
in Chicot County prior to
Drainage District vs. [the
Baxter Bank to wit: determi
nation
The of its
courts invalidi
below ty], is
have an
proceed operati
ed on ve fact
the and
theory may
that the have
Act of conseq
Congre uences
ss, which
having cannot
been justly
found be
to be ignored
unconst . The
itutiona past
l, was cannot
not a always
law; be
that it erased
was by a
inopera new
tive, judicial
conferri declarat
ng no ion. Th
rights e effect
and of the
imposin subsequ
g no ent
duties, ruling
and as to
hence invalidi
affordin ty may
g no have to
basis be
for the conside
challen red in
ged various
decree. aspects
It is with
quite respect
clear, to
howeve particul
r, that ar
such conduct
broad ,
stateme private
nts as and
to the official.
effect Questio
of a ns of
determi rights
nation claimed
of to have
unconst become
itutiona vested,
lity of
must be status,
taken of prior
with determi
qualific nations
ations. deemed
The to have
actual finality
 and between the NHA and RBI. The
acted respondents had no reason to think that
upon their agreements were unconstitutional
accordi or even questionable, as in fact, the
ngly, of concurrent acts of the executive
public department lent validity to the
policy implementation of the Project. The
in the SMDRP agreements have produced
light of vested rights in favor of the slum
the dwellers, the buyers of reclaimed land
nature who were issued titles over said land,
both of and the agencies and investors who
the made investments in the project or who
statute bought SMPPCs. These properties and
and of rights cannot be disturbed or questioned
its after the passage of around ten (10)
previou years from the start of the SMDRP
s implementation. Evidently, the operative
applicat fact principle has set in. The titles to the
ion, lands in the hands of the buyers can no
demand longer be invalidated.[174]
examin
ation. T
hese
questio
ns are In the case at bar, the Court rules that the dictates of
among
justice, fairness and equity do not support the claim of
the
most the alleged farmer-owners that their ownership of the
difficult UCPB shares should be respected. Our reasons:
of those
which
have
engage
d the 1. Said farmers or alleged claimants do not have any
attentio
n of legal right to own the UCPB shares distributed to
courts, them. It was not successfully refuted that said claimants
state
and were issued receipts under R.A. 6260 for the payment of
federal, the levy that went into the Coconut Investment Fund
and it is
(CIF) upon which shares in the Coconut Investment
manifes
t from Company will be issued. The Court upholds the finding
numero of the Sandiganbayan that said investment company is a
us
decisio different corporate entity from the United Coconut
ns that Planters Bank.This was in fact admitted by petitioners
an all-
inclusiv during the April 17, 2001 oral arguments in G.R. Nos.
e 147062-64.[175]
stateme
nt of a
principl
e of
absolut The payments under R.A. 6260 cannot be equated with
e
the payments under P.D. No. 276, the first having been
retroact
ive made as contributions to the Coconut Investment Fund
invalidi while the payments under P.D. No. 276 constituted the
ty
cannot Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF). R.A.
be 6260 reads:
justifie
d.

Moreover, the Court ruled in Chavez that: Section 2. Declaration of Policy. It is

Furthermore, when petitioner filed the
instant case against respondents on
August 5, 2004, the JVAs were already
terminated by virtue of the MOA
hereby declared to be the national policy
to accelerate the development of the
coconut industry through the provision
of adequate medium and long-term
financing for capital investment in the
industry, by instituting a Coconut
 Investment fund capitalized and petitioners during the April 17, 2001
administered by coconut farmers oral arguments in G.R. Nos. 147062-64.
through a Coconut Investment Company.
[176]

In fact, while the CIF levy payments

claimed to have been paid by petitioners
were meant for the CIC, the distribution
of UCPB stock certificates to the
coconut farmers, if at all, were meant for
P.D. No. 276 provides: the payors of the CCSF in proportion to
the coconut farmers CCSF contributions
pursuant to PCA Resolution No. 045-75
dated May 21, 1975:
1. In addition to its powers granted
under Presidential Decree No. 232, the
Philippine Coconut Authority is hereby
authorized to formulate and immediately RESOLVED,
implement a stabilization scheme for FURTHER, That the
coconut-based consumer goods, along amount of ONE
the following general guidelines: HUNDRED FIFTY
MILLION
(P150,000,000.00)
PESOS be appropriated
and set aside from
available funds of the
PCA to be utilized in
(a) . payment for the shares
of stock of such existing
commercial bank and
that the Treasurer be
The proceeds from the levy shall instructed to disburse
be deposited with the Philippine the said amount
National Bank or any other accordingly.
government bank to the account
of the Coconut Consumers
Stabilization Fund, as a separate
trust fund which shall not form
part of the general fund of the
government. RESOLVED,
FINALLY, That be
directed to organize a
team which shall
(b) The Fund shall be utilized to prepare a list of coconut
subsidize the sale of coconut- farmers who have paid
based products at prices set by the levy and contributed
the Price Control Council, under to the [CCSF] and to
rules and regulations to be prepare a stock
promulgated by the Philippine distribution plan to the
Consumers Stabilization end that the aforesaid
Committee.[177] coconut farmers shall
receive certificates of
stock of such
commercial bank in
proportion to their
contributions to the
Fund.
The PCA, via Resolution No. 045-75 dated May 21,
1975, clarified the distinction between the CIF levy
payments under R.A. 6260 and the CCSF levy paid Unfortunately, the said resolution was
pursuant to P.D. 276, thusly: never complied with in the distribution
of the so-called farmers UCPB shares.

It must be remembered that the receipts

issued under R.A. No. 6260 were to be
registered in exchange for shares of
stock in the Coconut Investment
The payments therefore under R.A. 6260 are not the
Company (CIC), which obviously is a
different corporate entity same as those under P.D. No. 276. The amounts of CIF
from UCPB. This fact was admitted by contributions under R.A. 6260 which were collected
starting 1971 are undeniably different from the CCSF
levy under P.D. No. 276, which were collected starting
1973. The two (2) groups of claimants differ not only in
identity but also in the levy paid, the amount of produce
and the time the government started the collection.
farmers at 6 million in 1981). Indeed, petitioners
constitute only a small percentage of the coconut farmers
in the Philippines. Thus, the Sandiganbayan correctly
declared that the UCPB shares are government assets in
trust for the coconut farmers, which would be more
beneficial to all the coconut farmers instead of a very
few dubious claimants;

Thus, petitioners and the alleged farmers claiming them

pursuant to R.A. 6260 do not have any legal basis to
own the UCPB shares distributed to them, assuming for
a moment the legal feasibility of transferring these
shares paid from the R.A. 6260 levy to private
individuals.
3. The Sandiganbayan made the finding that due to
enormous operational problems and administrative
complications, the intended beneficiaries of the UCPB
shares were not able to receive the shares due to
them. To reiterate what the anti-graft court said:

The actual
distribution of the bank
2. To grant all the UCPB shares to petitioners and its
shares was admittedly
alleged members would be iniquitous and prejudicial to an enormous
the remaining 4.6 million farmers who have not received operational problem
which resulted in the
any UCPB shares when in fact they also made payments failure of the intended
to either the CIF or the CCSF but did not receive any beneficiaries to receive
their shares of stocks in
receipt or who was not able to register their receipts or the bank, as shown by
misplaced them. the rules and
regulations, issued by
the PCA, without
adequate guidelines
being provided to it by
Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 which was declared P.D. No. 755. PCA
Administrative Order
unconstitutional cannot be considered to be the legal
No. 1, Series of 1975
basis for the transfer of the supposed private ownership (August 20, 1975),
of the UCPB shares to petitioners who allegedly paid the Rules and Regulations
Governing the
same under R.A. 6260. The Solicitor General is correct Distribution of Shares
in concluding that such unauthorized grant to petitioners of Stock of the Bank
Authorized to be
constitutes illegal deprivation of property without due Acquired Pursuant to
process of law. Due process of law would mean that the PCA Board Resolution
No. 246-75, quoted
distribution of the UCPB shares should be made only to
hereunder discloses
farmers who have paid the contribution to the CCSF how the undistributed
pursuant to P.D. No. 276, and not to those who paid shares of stocks due to
anonymous coconut
pursuant to R.A. 6260. What would have been the farmers or payors of the
appropriate distribution scheme was violated by Section coconut levy fees were
authorized to be
1 of P.D. No. 755 when it required that the UCPB shares distributed to existing
should be distributed to coconut farmers without shareholders of the
Bank:
distinction in fact, giving the PCA limitless power and
free hand, to determine who these farmers are, or would
be.
Section
9. Fractional
and
Undistributed
We cannot sanction the award of the UCPB shares to Shares
Fractional
petitioners who appear to represent only 1.4 million shares and
members without any legal basis to the extreme shares which
prejudice of the other 4.6 million coconut farmers remain
undistributed
(Executive Order No. 747 fixed the number of coconut as a
 consequence AMENDMENT OF
of the failure ADMINISTRATIVE
of the coconut ORDER
farmers to
register their NO. 1, SERIES OF
COCOFUND 1975, GOVERNING
receipts or the THE
destruction of
the DISTRIBUTION OF
COCOFUND SHARES
receipts or the
registration of
the
COCOFUND WHEREAS, pursuant to
receipts in the PCA Board Resolution
name of an No. 246-75, the total
unqualified par value of the shares
individual, of stock of the Bank
after the final purchased by the PCA
distribution is for the benefit of the
made on the coconut farmers is
basis of the P85,773,600.00 with a
consolidated I par value of P1.00 per
BM registrati share or equivalent to
on Report as 85,773.600 shares;
of March 31,
1976 shall be
distributed to
all the
coconut WHEREAS, out of the
farmers who 85,773,600 shares, a
have qualified total of 34,572,794
and received shares have already
equity in the been distributed in
Bank and accordance with
shall be Administrative Order
apportioned No. 1, Series of 1975, to
among them, wit:
as far as
practicable, in
proportion to
their equity in First
relation to the Distribution - 12,573,05
number of 9
undistributed
equity and Second
such further Distribution - 10,841,40
rules and 9
regulations as
may hereafter Third
be Distribution - 11,158,32
promulgated. 6

34,572,794

The foregoing PCA

issuance was further
amended by Resolution WHEREAS, there is,
No. 074-78, still citing therefore, a total of
the same problem of 51,200,806 shares still
distribution of the bank available for
shares. This latter distribution among the
Resolution is quoted as coconut farmers;
follows:

WHEREAS, it was
RESOLUTION NO. determined by the
074-78 PCA Board, in
consonance with the
policy of the state on
the integration of the
coconut industry, that
the Bank shares must be be distributed in
widely distributed as accordance with (1)
possible among the and (2) above, shall
coconut farmers, for be transferred to
which purpose a COCOFED for
national census of distribution,
coconut farmers was immediately after
made through the completion of the
Philippine Coconut national census of
Producers Federation coconut farmers
(COCOFED); prescribed under
Resolution No. 033-
78 of the PCA
Board, to all those
WHEREAS, to who are determined
implement such by the PCA Board
determination of the to be bona fide
PCA Board, there is a coconut farmers and
need to accordingly have not received
amend Administrative shares of stock of
Order No. 1, Series of the Bank. The
1975; shares shall be
equally determined
among them on the
basis of per capita.
NOW, THEREFORE,
BE IT RESOLVED, AS
IT IS HEREBY
RESOLVED, that the RESOLVED,
remaining 51,200,806 FURTHER, That the
shares of stock of the rules and regulations
Bank authorized to be under Administrative
acquired pursuant to the Order No. 1, Series of
PCA Board Resolution 1975, which are
No. 246-75 dated July inconsistent with this
25, 1975 be distributed Administrative Order
as follows: be, as they are hereby,
repealed and/or
amended accordingly.

(1) All the coconut

farmers who have
received their Thus, when 51,200,806 shares
shares in the equity in the bank remained undistributed, the
of the Bank on the PCA deemed it proper to give a bonanza
basis of Section 8 of to coconut farmers who already got their
Administrative bank shares, by giving them an
Order No. 1, Series additional share for each share owned
of 1975, shall by them and by converting their
receive additional fractional shares into full shares. The
share for each share rest of the shares were then transferred
presently owned by to a private organization, the
them; COCOFED, for distribution to those
determined to be bona fide coconut
farmers who had not received shares of
stock of the Bank. The distribution to
(2) Fractional the latter was made on the basis of per
shares shall be capita, meaning without regard to
completed into full the COCOFUND receipts. The PCA
shares, and such full considered itself free to disregard the
shares shall be said receipts in the distribution of the
distributed among shares although they were considered by
the coconut farmers the May 25, 1975 Agreement between
who qualified for the PCA and defendant Cojuangco (par.
the corresponding [8] of said Agreement) and by Sections
fractional shares; 1, 3, 4, 6 and 9, PCA Administrative
Order No. 1, Series of 1975 as the basis
for the distribution of shares.

(3) The balance of

the shares, after
deducting those to The PCA thus assumed, due to
lack of adequate guidelines set by P.D.
 No. 755, that it had complete authority
to define who are the coconut farmers
and to decide as to who among the
coconut farmers shall be given the gift
of bank shares; how many shares shall
be given to them, and what basis it shall
use to determine the amount of shares to
be distributed for free to the coconut
farmers. In other words, P.D. No. 755
fails the completeness test which renders
it constitutionally infirm.
shares may not actually be the intended beneficiaries of
said benefit. Clearly, applying the Operative Fact
Doctrine would not only be iniquitous but would also
serve injustice to the Government, to the coconut
industry, and to the people, who, whether willingly or
unwillingly, contributed to the public funds, and
therefore expect that their Government would take
utmost care of them and that they would be used no less,
than for public purpose.

We clarify that PSJ-A is subject of another petition for

review interposed by Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., in G.R.
Due to numerous flaws in the distribution of the UCPB
No. 180705 entitled, Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. v.
shares by PCA, it would be best for the interest of all
Republic of the Philippines, which shall be decided
coconut farmers to revert the ownership of the UCBP
separately by this Court. Said petition should
shares to the government for the entire coconut industry,
accordingly not be affected by this Decision save for
which includes the farmers;
determinatively legal issues directly addressed herein.

4. The Court also takes judicial cognizance of the fact

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos.
that a number, if not all, of the coconut farmers who sold
177857-58 and 178793 are hereby DENIED. The Partial
copra did not get the receipts for the payment of the
Summary Judgment dated July 11, 2003 in Civil Case
coconut levy for the reason that the copra they produced
No. 0033-A as reiterated with modification in Resolution
were bought by traders or middlemen who in turn sold
dated June 5, 2007, as well as the Partial Summary
the same to the coconut mills. The reality on the ground
Judgment dated May 7, 2004 in Civil Case No. 0033-F,
is that it was these traders who got the receipts and the
which was effectively amended in Resolution dated May
corresponding UCPB shares. In addition, some
11, 2007, are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION,
uninformed coconut farmers who actually got the
only with respect to those issues subject of the petitions
COCOFUNDreceipts, not appreciating the importance
in G.R. Nos. 177857-58 and 178193. However, the
and value of said receipts, have already sold said receipts
issues raised in G.R. No. 180705 in relation to Partial
to non-coconut farmers, thereby depriving them of the
Summary Judgment dated July 11, 2003 and Resolution
benefits under the coconut levy laws. Ergo, the coconut
dated June 5, 2007 in Civil Case No. 0033-A, shall be
farmers are the ones who will not be benefited by the
decided by this Court in a separate decision.
distribution of the UCPB shares contrary to the policy
behind the coconut levy laws. The nullification of the
distribution of the UCPB shares and their transfer to the
government for the coconut industry will, therefore, The Partial Summary Judgment in Civil Case
ensure that the benefits to be deprived from the UCPB No. 0033-A dated July 11, 2003, is
shares will actually accrue to the intended beneficiaries hereby MODIFIED, and shall read as follows:
the genuine coconut farmers.

WHEREFORE, in view of the

foregoing, We rule as follows:
From the foregoing, it is highly inappropriate to apply
the operative fact doctrine to the UCPB shares. Public
funds, which were supposedly given utmost safeguard,
were haphazardly distributed to private individuals based SUMMARY OF THE COURTS
on statutory provisions that are found to be RULING.
constitutionally infirm on not only one but on a variety
of grounds. Worse still, the recipients of the UCPB
A. Re: CLASS ACTION MOTION shares paid for by PCA entirely
FOR A SEPARATE SUMMARY with the CCSF to the undefined
JUDGMENT dated April 11, 2001 coconut farmers, which negated
filed by Defendant Maria Clara L. or circumvented the national
Lobregat, COCOFED, et al., and policy or public purpose
Ballares, et al. declared by P.D. No. 755 to
accelerate the growth and
development of the coconut
industry and achieve its vertical
The Class Action Motion for
integration; and (ii) for having
Separate Summary Judgment dated
unduly delegated legislative
April 11, 2001 filed by defendant Maria
power to the PCA.
Clara L. Lobregat, COCOFED, et al.
and Ballares, et al., is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit.
b. The implementing regulations
issued by PCA, namely,
Administrative Order No. 1,
B. Re: MOTION FOR PARTIAL
Series of 1975 and
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (RE:
Resolution No. 074-78 are
COCOFED, ET AL. AND
likewise invalid for their
BALLARES, ET AL.) dated April
failure to see to it that the
22, 2002 filed by Plaintiff.
distribution of shares serve
exclusively or at least
primarily or directly the
1. a. The portion of Section 1 of aforementioned public
P.D. No. 755, which reads: purpose or national policy
declared by P.D. No. 755.

and that the

Philippine
Coconut 2. Section 2 of P.D. No. 755
Authority is which mandated that the
hereby
coconut levy funds shall not be
authorized to
distribute, for considered special and/or
free, the shares fiduciary funds nor part of the
of stock of the
bank it acquired general funds of the national
to the coconut government and similar
farmers under
such rules and provisions of Sec. 5, Art. III,
regulations it P.D. No. 961 and Sec. 5, Art. III,
may
P.D. No. 1468 contravene the
promulgate.
provisions of the Constitution,
particularly, Art. IX (D), Sec. 2;
and Article VI, Sec. 29 (3).
taken in relation to Section 2 of
the same P.D., is
unconstitutional: (i) for having
3. Lobregat, COCOFED, et
allowed the use of the CCSF to
al. and Ballares, et al. have not
benefit directly private interest
legally and validly obtained title
by the outright and
of ownership over the subject
unconditional grant of absolute
UCPB shares by virtue of P.D.
ownership of the FUB/UCPB
No. 755, the Agreement dated
 May 25, 1975 between the PCA deleting the last paragraph of the
and defendant Cojuangco, and dispositive portion, which will now
PCA implementing rules, read, as follows:
namely, Adm. Order No. 1, s.
1975 and Resolution No. 074-
78.
WHEREFOR
E, in view of the
foregoing, we hold
4. The so-called Farmers UCPB that:
shares covered by 64.98% of the
UCPB shares of stock, which
formed part of the 72.2% of the
shares of stock of the former The Motion for
FUB and now of the UCPB, the Partial Summary
entire consideration of which Judgment (Re:
was charged by PCA to the Defendants CIIF
CCSF, are hereby declared Companies, 14 Holding
conclusively owned by, the Companies and
Plaintiff Republic of the Cocofed, et al) filed by
Philippines. Plaintiff is
hereby GRANTED. A
CCORDINGLY, THE
CIIF COMPANIES,
NAMELY:

SO ORDERED.

1. Southern
Luzon Coc
onut Oil
The Partial Summary Judgment in Civil Case
Mills
No. 0033-F dated May 7, 2004, is (SOLCOM)
hereby MODIFIED, and shall read as follows: ;

2. Cagayan
de Oro Oil
Co., Inc.
WHEREFORE, the MOTION (CAGOIL);

FOR EXECUTION OF PARTIAL 3. Iligan

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (RE: CIIF Coconut
Industries,
BLOCK OF SMC SHARES OF
Inc.
STOCK) dated August 8, 2005 of the (ILICOCO)
plaintiff is hereby denied for lack of ;

merit. However, this Court orders the 4. San Pablo

severance of this particular claim of Manufactur
ing Corp.
Plaintiff. The Partial Summary
(SPMC);
Judgment dated May 7, 2004 is now
considered a separate final and 5. Granexpo
rt
appealable judgment with respect to the Manufactur
said CIIF Block of SMC shares of stock. ing Corp.
(GRANEX)
; and

6. Legaspi
The Partial Summary Judgment Oil Co.,
Inc.
rendered on May 7, 2004 is modified by
(LEGOIL),
 AS WELL AS AND THE CIIF
THE 14 HOLDING BLOCK OF SAN
COMPANIES, MIGUEL
NAMELY: CORPORATION
(SMC) SHARES OF
STOCK TOTALING

1. Soriano 33,133,266 SHARES

Shares, AS OF 1983
Inc.;
TOGETHER WITH
2. ACS ALL DIVIDENDS
Investors, DECLARED, PAID
Inc.;
AND ISSUED
3. Roxas THEREON AS WELL
Shares, AS
Inc.;
ANY INCREMENTS
4. Arc THERETO ARISING
Investors;
FROM, BUT NOT
Inc.;
LIMITED TO,
5. Toda EXERCISE OF PRE-
Holdings,
Inc.; EMPTIVE RIGHTS
ARE DECLARED
6. AP
OWNED BY THE
Holdings,
Inc.; GOVERNMENT TO
BE USED ONLY FOR
7. Fernande
z Holdings, THE BENEFIT OF
Inc.; ALL COCONUT
FARMERS AND FOR
8. SMC
Officers THE
Corps, Inc.; DEVELOPMENT OF
THE COCONUT
9. Te Deum
Resources, INDUSTRY, AND
Inc.; ORDERED

10. Anglo RECONVEYED TO

Ventures, THE
Inc.;
GOVERNMENT.
11. Randy
Allied
Ventures,
Inc.;
THE COURT
12. Rock AFFIRMS THE
Steel RESOLUTIONS
Resources,
Inc.; ISSUED BY THE
SANDIGANBAYAN
13. Valhalla ON JUNE 5, 2007 IN
Properties
Ltd., Inc.; CIVIL CASE NO.
and 0033-A AND ON MAY
11, 2007 IN CIVIL
14. First
Meridian CASE NO. 0033-F,
Developme THAT THERE IS NO
nt, Inc.
MORE NECESSITY
 OF FURTHER
TRIAL WITH
RESPECT TO THE
ISSUE OF
OWNERSHIP OF (1)
THE SEQUESTERED
UCPB SHARES, (2)
THE CIIF BLOCK
OF SMC SHARES,
AND (3) THE CIIF
COMPANIES. AS
THEY HAVE
FINALLY BEEN
ADJUDICATED IN
THE
AFOREMENTIONED
PARTIAL
SUMMARY
JUDGMENTS
DATED JULY 11,
2003 AND MAY 7,
2004.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines SERENO, J.:
Supreme Court
Manila The public outrage over the death of Leonardo Lenny
Villa the victim in this case on 10 February 1991 led to a
SECOND DIVISION
very strong clamor to put an end to hazing.[1] Due in
large part to the brave efforts of his mother, petitioner
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Gerarda
G.R. No. 151258Villa, groups were organized, condemning his
Petitioner, senseless and tragic death. This widespread
condemnation prompted Congress to enact a special law,
- versus - which became effective in 1995, that would criminalize
hazing.[2] The intent of the law was to discourage
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, members from making hazing a requirement for joining
Respondent. their sorority, fraternity, organization, or association.
x-------------------------x [3]
Moreover, the law was meant to counteract the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 154954 implications of consent and initial innocent
exculpatory
Petitioner,
act in the conduct of initiation rites by making the mere
- versus - act of hazing punishable or mala prohibita.[4]

Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, activities in the country.[5] Within a year of his death, six
ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, more cases of hazing-related deaths emerged those of
DALMACIO LIM, JR., JUNEL ANTHONY Frederick Cahiyang of the University of Visayas in
AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO,
VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO GENERAL, Cebu; Raul Camaligan of San Beda College; Felipe
SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON Narne of Pamantasan ng Araullo in Cabanatuan City;
VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II, Dennis Cenedoza of the Cavite Naval Training Center;
ZOSIMO MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI, Joselito Mangga of the Philippine Merchant Marine
VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE Institute; and Joselito Hernandez of the University of the
GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE
Philippines in Baguio City.[6]
PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN,
PERCIVAL BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO
SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO Although courts must not remain indifferent to
BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH public sentiments, in this case the general condemnation
LLEDO, and RONAN DE GUZMAN, of a hazing-related death, they are still bound to observe
Respondents. a fundamental principle in our criminal justice system
x-------------------------x [N]o act constitutes a crime unless it is made so by law.
[7]
FIDELITO DIZON, Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Even if an act is
Petitioner, viewed by a large section of the populace as immoral or
injurious, it cannot be considered a crime, absent any
law prohibiting its commission. As interpreters of the
- versus - G.R. No.
law,155101
judges are called upon to set aside emotion, to resist
being swayed by strong public sentiments, and to rule
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, strictly based on the elements of the offense and the facts
Respondent. allowed in evidence.
x-------------------------x
Before the Court are the consolidated cases
GERARDA H. VILLA, docketed as G.R. No. 151258 (Villareal v. People), G.R.
Petitioner, No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), G.R. No.
155101 (Dizon v. People), and G.R. Nos. 178057 and
- versus - 178080
G.R. Nos. (Villa
178057 & v.178080
Escalona).

Present:FACTS
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II,
MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CARPIO, The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court
CRISANTO CRUZ SARUCA, BRION,of Appeals (CA)[8] and the trial court,[9] are as follows:
JR., and ANSELMO ADRIANO, PEREZ,
Respondents. SERENO, and In February 1991, seven freshmen law students
REYES,
of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law
signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris
Promulgated:
Fraternity
February 1, 2012 (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar Bogs
Asuncion, Samuel Sam Belleza, Bienvenido Bien
Marquez III, Roberto Francis Bert Navera, Geronimo
x--------------------------------------
Randy Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo Lenny Villa
------------x
(neophytes).

DECISION
 On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes breathing. After their last session of physical beatings,
were met by some members of the Aquila Fraternity Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the
(Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day
all proceeded to Rufos Restaurant to have dinner. was officially ended, and the neophytes started eating
Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, dinner. They then slept at the carport.
also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to
expect during the initiation rites. The latter were After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were
informed that there would be physical beatings, and that suddenly roused by Lennys shivering and incoherent
they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed
scheduled to last for three days. After their briefing, they these rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting.
were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City When they realized, though, that Lenny was really
for the commencement of their initiation. feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him.
They removed his clothes and helped him through a
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition
had already received threats and insults from the worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital.
Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.
van and walked towards the pelota court of the Almeda
compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was
blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to filed against the following 35 Aquilans:
traditional forms of Aquilan initiation rites. These rites
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
included the Indian Run, which required the neophytes
1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each 2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
row delivering blows to the neophytes; the Bicol 3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
Express, which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor 4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
with their backs against the wall and their legs 5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran 6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
over their legs; the Rounds, in which the neophytes were 8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
held at the back of their pants by the auxiliaries (the 9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to 10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were 11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee 12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the Auxies
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
Privilege Round, in which the auxiliaries were given the 15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. 16. Antonio General (General)
During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated 17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
with the fraternity principles. They survived their first 18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
day of initiation.
20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
On the morning of their second day 9 February 22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
1991 the neophytes were made to present comic plays 23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
and to play rough basketball. They were also required to 24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternitys principles. 25. Adel Abas (Abas)
Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would
be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the
26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)
Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and
proceeded to torment them physically and
psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the
same manner of hazing that they endured on the first day In Criminal Case No. C-38340
of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day 1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
officially ended.
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni 5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
fraternity members[10] Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and 6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be 7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino 8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
(Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of 9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation
rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal
Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to paddling and Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried.[11] On the other
to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in
several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance due to
him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him certain matters that had to be resolved first. [12]
complaining of intense pain and difficulty in
 On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered
judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), holding
the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion
temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
[13]
A few weeks after the trial court rendered its
judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No.
C-38340 against the remaining nine accused commenced
anew.[14]
On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520)
[15]
set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial
court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified
the criminal liability of each of the accused according
to individual participation. Accused De Leon had by
then passed away, so the following Decision applied
only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
1. Nineteen of the accused-
appellants Victorino, Sabban, Lledo,
Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De Guzman,
Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo,
Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima,
Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola
(Victorino et al.) were acquitted, as their
individual guilt was not established by
proof beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Four of the accused-
appellants Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony
Ama, Antonio Mariano Almeda, and
Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) were
found guilty of the crime of slight
physical injuries and sentenced to 20
days of arresto menor. They were also
ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the
victim the sum of 30,000 as indemnity.
3. Two of the accused-
appellants Fidelito Dizon and Artemio
Villareal were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime
of homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. Having found no
mitigating or aggravating circumstance,
the CA sentenced them to an
indeterminate sentence of 10 years
of prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion
temporal. They were also ordered to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs
of Lenny Villa in the sum of 50,000 and
to pay the additional amount of
1,000,000 by way of moral damages.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal
Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against accused
Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to
speedy trial.[16] Meanwhile, on different dates between
the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the
respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.[17] On 25 October 2006, the
CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153[18] reversed the
trial courts Orders and dismissed the criminal case
against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the
basis of violation of their right to speedy trial. [19]
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5)
consolidated Petitions were individually brought before
this Court.
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People
The instant case refers to accused Villareals
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. The
Petition raises two reversible errors allegedly committed
by the CA in its Decision dated 10 January 2002 in CA-
G.R. No. 15520 first, denial of due process; and, second,
conviction absent proof beyond reasonable doubt.[20]
While the Petition was pending before this
Court, counsel for petitioner Villareal filed a Notice of
Death of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the
Notice, petitioner Villareal died on 13 March 2011.
Counsel thus asserts that the subject matter of the
Petition previously filed by petitioner does not survive
the death of the accused.
G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People
Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for
Review on Certiorari, questioning the CAs Decision
dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August
2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520. [21] Petitioner sets forth two
main issues first, that he was denied due process when
the CA sustained the trial courts forfeiture of his right to
present evidence; and, second, that he was deprived of
due process when the CA did not apply to him the
same ratio decidendi that served as basis of acquittal of
the other accused.[22]
As regards the first issue, the trial court made a
ruling, which forfeited Dizons right to present evidence
during trial. The trial court expected Dizon to present
evidence on an earlier date since a co-accused, Antonio
General, no longer presented separate evidence during
trial. According to Dizon, his right should not have been
considered as waived because he was justified in asking
for a postponement. He argues that he did not ask for a
resetting of any of the hearing dates and in fact insisted
that he was ready to present
evidence on the original pre-assigned schedule, and not
on an earlier hearing date.
Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends
that he should have likewise been acquitted, like the
other accused, since his acts were also part of the
traditional initiation rites and were not tainted by evil
motives.[23] He claims that the additional paddling
session was part of the official activity of the fraternity.
He also points out that one of the neophytes admitted
that the chairperson of the initiation rites decided
that [Lenny] was fit enough to undergo the initiation so
Mr. Villareal proceeded to do the paddling. [24] Further,
petitioner echoes the argument of the Solicitor General
that the individual blows inflicted by Dizon and Villareal
could not have resulted in Lennys death. [25] The Solicitor
General purportedly averred that, on the contrary, Dr.
Arizala testified that the injuries suffered by Lenny
could not be considered fatal if taken individually, but if
taken collectively, the result is the violent death of the
victim.[26]
Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA
that he was motivated by ill will. He claims that Lennys
father could not have stolen the parking space of Dizons
father, since the latter did not have a car, and their
fathers did not work in the same place or office. Revenge
for the loss of the parking space was the alleged ill
motive of Dizon. According to petitioner, his utterances
regarding a stolen parking space were only part of the
psychological initiation. He then cites the testimony of
Lennys co-neophyte witness Marquez who admitted
knowing it was not true and that he was just making it
up.[27]
Further, petitioner argues that his alleged
motivation of ill will was negated by his show of
concern for Villa after the initiation rites. Dizon alludes
to the testimony of one of the neophytes, who mentioned
that the former had kicked the leg of the neophyte and
told him to switch places with Lenny to prevent the
latters chills. When the chills did not stop, Dizon,
together with Victorino, helped Lenny through a
sleeping bag and made him sit on a chair. According to
petitioner, his alleged ill motivation is contradicted by
his manifestation of compassion and concern for the
victims well-being.
G.R. No. 154954 People v. Court of Appeals
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the
reversal of the CAs Decision dated 10 January 2002 and
Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No.
15520, insofar as it acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.) and
convicted 4 (Tecson et al.) of the accused Aquilans of
the lesser crime of slight physical injuries. [28] According
to the Solicitor General, the CA erred in holding that
there could have been no conspiracy to commit hazing,
as hazing or fraternity initiation had not yet been
criminalized at the time Lenny died.
In the alternative, petitioner claims that the
ruling of the trial court should have been upheld,
inasmuch as it found that there was conspiracy to inflict
physical injuries on Lenny. Since the injuries led to the
victims death, petitioner posits that the accused Aquilans
are criminally liable for the resulting crime of homicide,
pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. [29] The
said article provides: Criminal liability shall be incurred
[b]y any person committing a felony (delito) although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.
Petitioner also argues that the rule on double
jeopardy is inapplicable. According to the Solicitor
General, the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in setting
aside the trial courts finding of conspiracy and in ruling
that the criminal liability of
all the accused must be based on their individual
participation in the commission of the crime.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 Villa v. Escalona
Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari, praying for the reversal of the
CAs Decision dated 25 October 2006 and Resolution
dated 17 May 2007 in CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 and
90153.[30] The Petition involves the dismissal of the
criminal charge filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca,
and Adriano.
Due to several pending incidents, the trial court
ordered a separate trial for accused Escalona, Saruca,
Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De Vera, S.
Fernandez, and Cabangon (Criminal Case No. C-38340)
to commence after proceedings against the 26 other
accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) shall have
terminated. On 8 November 1993, the trial court found
the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. As a
result, the proceedings in Criminal Case No. C-38340
involving the nine other co-accused recommenced on 29
November 1993. For various reasons, the initial trial of
the case did not commence until 28 March 2005, or
almost 12 years after the arraignment of the nine
accused.
Petitioner Villa assails the CAs dismissal of the criminal
case involving 4 of the 9 accused, namely, Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the accused
failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a
reasonable period of time. She also points out that the
prosecution cannot be faulted for the delay, as the
original records and the required evidence were not at its
disposal, but were still in the appellate court.
We resolve herein the various issues that we group into
five.
ISSUES
1. Whether the forfeiture of petitioner Dizons right to
present evidence constitutes denial of due process;
2. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it dismissed the case
against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for
violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial;
3. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
 jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding of
conspiracy by the trial court and adjudicated the
liability of each accused according to individual
participation;
4. Whether accused Dizon is guilty of homicide; and
5. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion when it pronounced Tecson, Ama,
Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight physical
injuries.
DISCUSSION
Resolution on Preliminary Matters
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People
In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while
the Petition was pending resolution, this Court took note
of counsel for petitioners Notice of Death of Party.
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal
Code, criminal liability for personal penalties is totally
extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast,
criminal liability for pecuniary penalties is extinguished
if the offender dies prior to final judgment. The term
personal penalties refers to the service of personal or
imprisonment penalties,[31] while the term pecuniary
penalties (las pecuniarias) refers to fines and costs,
[32]
including civil liability predicated on the criminal
offense complained of (i.e., civil liability ex delicto).
[33]
However, civil liability based on a source of
obligation other than the delict survives the death of the
accused and is recoverable through a separate civil
action.[34]
Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner
Villareal extinguished his criminal liability for both
personal and pecuniary penalties, including his civil
liability directly arising from the delict complained of.
Consequently, his Petition is hereby dismissed, and the
criminal case against him deemed closed and terminated.
G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)
In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court
set the dates for the reception of evidence for accused-
petitioner Dizon on the 8th, 15th, and 22nd of September;
and the 5th and 12 of October 1993.[35] The Order
likewise stated that it will not entertain any
postponement and that all the accused who have not yet
presented their respective evidence should be ready at all
times down the line, with their evidence on all said
dates. Failure on their part to present evidence when
required shall therefore be construed as waiver to present
evidence.[36]
However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for
another accused manifested in open court that his client
Antonio General would no longer present separate
evidence. Instead, the counsel would adopt the
testimonial evidence of the other accused who had
already testified.[37] Because of this development and
pursuant to the trial courts Order that the parties should
be ready at all times down the line, the trial court
expected Dizon to present evidence on the next trial date
25 August 1993 instead of his originally assigned dates.
The original dates were supposed to start two weeks
later, or on 8 September 1993.[38] Counsel for accused
Dizon was not able to present evidence on the
accelerated date. To address the situation, counsel filed
a Constancia on 25 August 1993, alleging that he had to
appear in a previously scheduled case, and that he would
be ready to present evidence on the dates originally
assigned to his clients.[39] The trial court denied the
Manifestation on the same date and treated
the Constancia as a motion for postponement, in
violation of the three-day-notice rule under the Rules of
Court.[40] Consequently, the trial court ruled that the
failure of Dizon to present evidence amounted to a
waiver of that right.[41]
Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he
was deprived of due process of law when the trial court
forfeited his right to present evidence. According to him,
the postponement of the 25 August 1993 hearing should
have been considered justified, since his original pre-
assigned trial dates were not supposed to start until 8
September 1993, when he was scheduled to present
evidence. He posits that he was ready to present
evidence on the dates assigned to him. He also points out
that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the said
hearing dates; that he in fact insisted on being allowed to
present evidence on the dates fixed by the trial court.
Thus, he contends that the trial court erred in
accelerating the schedule of presentation of evidence,
thereby invalidating the finding of his guilt.
The right of the accused to present evidence is
guaranteed by no less than the Constitution itself.
[42]
Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel This
constitutional right includes the right to present evidence
in ones defense,[43] as well as the right to be present and
defend oneself in person at every stage of the
proceedings.[44]
In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,[45] the
Sandiganbayan set the hearing of the defenses
presentation of evidence for 21, 22 and 23 June 1995.
The 21 June 1995 hearing was cancelled due to lack of
quorum in the regular membership of the
Sandiganbayans Second Division and upon the
agreement of the parties. The hearing was reset for the
next day, 22 June 1995, but Crisostomo and his counsel
failed to attend. The Sandiganbayan, on the very same
day, issued an Order directing the issuance of a warrant
for the arrest of Crisostomo and the confiscation of his
surety bond. The Order further declared that he had
waived his right to present evidence because of his
nonappearance at yesterdays and todays scheduled
hearings. In ruling against the Order, we held thus:
Under Section 2(c), Rule 114
and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules
 of Court, Crisostomos non-appearance
during the 22 June 1995 trial was
merely a waiver of his right to be
present for trial on such date only and
not for the succeeding trial dates
xxxxxxxxx
Moreover,
Crisostomos absence on the 22 June
1995 hearing should not have been
deemed as a waiver of his right to
present evidence. While constitutional
rights may be waived, such waiver
must be clear and must be coupled
with an actual intention to relinquish
the right. Crisostomo did not
voluntarily waive in person or even
through his counsel the right to present
evidence. The Sandiganbayan imposed
the waiver due to the agreement of the
prosecution, Calingayan, and
Calingayan's counsel.
In criminal cases where the
imposable penalty may be death, as in
the present case, the court is called
upon to see to it that the accused is
personally made aware of the
consequences of a waiver of the right
to present evidence. In fact, it is not
enough that the accused is simply
warned of the consequences of
another failure to attend the
succeeding hearings. The court must
first explain to the accused personally in
clear terms the exact nature and
consequences of a waiver. Crisostomo
was not even forewarned. The
Sandiganbayan simply went ahead to
deprive Crisostomo of his right to
present evidence without even allowing
Crisostomo to explain his absence on
the 22 June 1995 hearing.
Clearly, the waiver of the right
to present evidence in a criminal case
involving a grave penalty is not
assumed and taken lightly. The
presence of the accused and his counsel
is indispensable so that the court could
personally conduct a searching inquiry
into the waiver x x x.[46] (Emphasis
supplied)
The trial court should not have deemed the
failure of petitioner to present evidence on 25 August
1993 as a waiver of his right to present evidence. On the
contrary, it should have considered the excuse of counsel
justified, especially since counsel for another accused
General had made a last-minute adoption of testimonial
evidence that freed up the succeeding trial dates; and
since Dizon was not scheduled to testify until two weeks
later. At any rate, the trial court pre-assigned five hearing
dates for the reception of evidence. If it really wanted to
impose its Order strictly, the most it could have done
was to forfeit one out of the five days set for Dizons
testimonial evidence. Stripping the accused of all his
pre-assigned trial dates constitutes a patent denial of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.
Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident
guilty plea, an invalid waiver of the right to present
evidence and be heard does not per se work to vacate a
finding of guilt in the criminal case or to enforce an
automatic remand of the case to the trial court.
[47]
In People v. Bodoso, we ruled that where facts have
adequately been represented in a criminal case, and no
procedural unfairness or irregularity has prejudiced
either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the
invalid waiver, the rule is that a guilty verdict may
nevertheless be upheld if the judgment is supported
beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record. [48]
We do not see any material inadequacy in the
relevant facts on record to resolve the case at bar.
Neither can we see any procedural unfairness or
irregularity that would substantially prejudice either the
prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid
waiver. In fact, the arguments set forth by accused Dizon
in his Petition corroborate the material facts relevant to
decide the matter. Instead, what he is really contesting in
his Petition is the application of the law to the facts by
the trial court and the CA. Petitioner Dizon admits direct
participation in the hazing of Lenny Villa by alleging in
his Petition that all actions of the petitioner were part of
the traditional rites, and that the alleged extension of the
initiation rites was not outside the official activity of the
fraternity.[49] He even argues that Dizon did not request
for the extension and he participated only after the
activity was sanctioned.[50]
For one reason or another, the case has been
passed or turned over from one judge or justice to
another at the trial court, at the CA, and even at the
Supreme Court. Remanding the case for the reception of
the evidence of petitioner Dizon would only inflict
further injustice on the parties. This case has been going
on for almost two decades. Its resolution is long
overdue. Since the key facts necessary to decide the case
have already been determined, we shall proceed to
decide it.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)
Petitioner Villa argues that the case against Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano should not have been
dismissed, since they failed to assert their right to speedy
trial within a reasonable period of time. She points out
that the accused failed to raise a protest during the
dormancy of the criminal case against them, and that
they asserted their right only after the trial court had
dismissed the case against their co-accused Concepcion.
Petitioner also emphasizes that the trial court denied the
respective Motions to Dismiss filed by Saruca, Escalona,
Ramos, and Adriano, because it found that the
prosecution could not be faulted for the delay in the
movement of this case when the original records and the
evidence it may require were not at its disposal as these
were in the Court of Appeals.[51]
 The right of the accused to a speedy trial has
been enshrined in Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution.[52] This right requires that there be
a trial free from vexatious, capricious or oppressive
delays.[53] The right is deemed violated when the
proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements of
trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the case being tried and for no cause or
justifiable motive.[54] In determining the right of the
accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a
mathematical computation of the number
postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.
[55]
The conduct of both the prosecution and the defense
must be weighed.[56] Also to be considered are factors
such as the length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion
of the right, and the prejudice wrought upon the
defendant.[57]
We have consistently ruled in a long line of
cases that a dismissal of the case pursuant to the right of
the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal.
[58]
As a consequence, an appeal or a reconsideration of
the dismissal would amount to a violation of the
principle of double jeopardy.[59] As we have previously
discussed, however, where the dismissal of the case is
capricious, certiorari lies.[60] The rule on double
jeopardy is not triggered when a petition challenges the
validity of the order of dismissal instead of the
correctness thereof.[61] Rather, grave abuse of discretion
amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction
prevents double jeopardy from attaching.[62]
We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the
CAs dismissal of the case against accused Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation
of their right to speedy trial. The court held thus:
An examination of the
procedural history of this case would
reveal that the following factors
contributed to the slow progress of the
proceedings in the case below:
xxxxxxxxx
5) The fact that the records of
the case were elevated to
the Court of Appeals and
the prosecutions failure to
comply with the order of the
court a quo requiring them
to secure certified true
copies of the same.
xxxxxxxxx
While we are prepared to
concede that some of the foregoing
factors that contributed to the delay of
the trial of the petitioners are justifiable,
We nonetheless hold that their right to
speedy trial has been utterly violated in
this case x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
[T]he absence of the records in the
trial court [was] due to the fact that the
records of the case were elevated to the
Court of Appeals, and the prosecutions
failure to comply with the order of the
court a quo requiring it to secure
certified true copies of the same. What
is glaring from the records is the fact
that as early as September 21, 1995, the
of court a quo already issued an Order
requiring the prosecution, through the
Department of Justice, to secure the
complete records of the case from the
Court of Appeals. The prosecution did
not comply with the said Order as in
fact, the same directive was repeated by
the court a quo in an Order dated
December 27, 1995. Still, there was no
compliance on the part of the
prosecution. It is not stated when such
order was complied with. It appears,
however, that even until August 5,
2002, the said records were still not at
the disposal of the trial court because
the lack of it was made the basis of the
said court in granting the motion to
dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion
x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
It is likewise noticeable that
from December 27, 1995, until August
5, 2002, or for a period of almost
seven years, there was no action at all
on the part of the court a quo. Except
for the pleadings filed by both the
prosecution and the petitioners, the
latest of which was on January 29, 1996,
followed by petitioner Sarucas motion to
set case for trial on August 17, 1998
which the court did not act upon, the
case remained dormant for a
considerable length of time. This
prolonged inactivity whatsoever is
precisely the kind of delay that the
constitution frowns upon x x x.
[63]
(Emphasis supplied)
This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final
amended Information was filed against Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano,
Cabangon, Concepcion, and De Vera.[64] On 29
November 1993, they were all arraigned.
[65]
Unfortunately, the initial trial of the case did not
commence until 28 March 2005 or almost 12 years after
arraignment.[66]
As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan,
the unexplained interval or inactivity of the
Sandiganbayan for close to five years since the
arraignment of the accused amounts to an unreasonable
delay in the disposition of cases a clear violation of the
right of the accused to a speedy disposition of cases.
[67]
Thus, we held:
The delay in this case measures
up to the unreasonableness of the delay
in the disposition of cases
in Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman,
where the Court found the delay of six
years by the Ombudsman in resolving
the criminal complaints to be violative
of the constitutionally guaranteed
right to a speedy disposition of cases;
similarly, in Roque vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, where the Court held that
the delay of almost six years
disregarded the Ombudsman's duty
to act promptly on complaints before
him; and in Cervantes vs.
Sandiganbayan, where the Court held
that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused
its discretion in not quashing the
information which was filed six years
after the initiatory complaint was
filed and thereby depriving petitioner
of his right to a speedy disposition of
the case. So it must be in the instant
case, where the reinvestigation by the
Ombudsman has dragged on for a
decade already.[68] (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing principles, we affirm the
ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89060 that accused
Escalona et al.s right to speedy trial was violated. Since
there is nothing in the records that would show that the
subject of this Petition includes accused Ampil, S.
Fernandez, Cabangon, and De Vera, the effects of this
ruling shall be limited to accused Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano.
G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)
The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our
criminal justice system. It dictates that when a person is
charged with an offense, and the case is terminated either
by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner
without the consent of the accused the accused cannot
again be charged with the same or an identical offense.
[69]
This principle is founded upon the law of reason,
justice and conscience.[70] It is embodied in the civil law
maxim non bis in idem found in the common law of
England and undoubtedly in every system of
jurisprudence.[71] It found expression in the Spanish Law,
in the Constitution of the United States, and in our own
Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the
citizen,[72] viz:
Article III Bill of Rights
Section 21. No person shall be twice put
in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law
and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act.
Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which
implements this particular constitutional right, provides
as follows:[73]
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal;
double jeopardy. When an accused has
been convicted or acquitted, or the case
against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent
by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon a valid complaint or information or
other formal charge sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction
and after the accused had pleaded to the
charge, the conviction or acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the case shall
be a bar to another prosecution for the
offense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof,
or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint
or information.
The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the
state from appealing the judgment in order to reverse the
acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either
through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court or through an appeal by certiorari on pure
questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules. [74] The
requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the
following: (a) there is a valid complaint or information;
(b) it is filed before a competent court; (c) the defendant
pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was
acquitted or convicted, or the case against him or her
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
defendants express consent.[75]
As we have reiterated in People v. Court of
Appeals and Galicia, [a] verdict of acquittal is
immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of
such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the
accused in jeopardy for the same offense. The finality-
of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes.
Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal
processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the
accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials.
It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the
State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying
the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And
finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from
retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a
greater penalty.[76] We further stressed that an acquitted
defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct
consequence of the finality of his acquittal. [77]
This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The
state may challenge the lower courts acquittal of the
accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter
in the following recognized exceptions: (1) where the
prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute
and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due
process;[78] (2) where there is a finding of mistrial; [79] or
[80]
(3) where there has been a grave abuse of discretion.
The third instance refers to this Courts judicial
power under Rule 65 to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. [81] Here, the party
asking for the review must show the presence of a
whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction; a patent and gross abuse of
discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or
to act in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
and hostility;[82] or a blatant abuse of authority to a point
so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very
power to dispense justice.[83] In such an event, the
accused cannot be considered to be at risk of double
jeopardy.[84]
The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition
for Certiorari, which seeks the reversal of (1) the
acquittal of Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of
Tecson et al. for the lesser crime of slight physical
injuries, both on the basis of a misappreciation of facts
and evidence. According to the Petition, the decision of
the Court of Appeals is not in accordance with law
because private complainant and petitioner were denied
due process of law when the public respondent
completely ignored the a) Position Paper x x x b) the
Motion for Partial Reconsideration x x x and c) the
petitioners Comment x x x.[85] Allegedly, the CA ignored
evidence when it adopted the theory of individual
responsibility; set aside the finding of conspiracy by the
trial court; and failed to apply Article 4 of the Revised
Penal Code.[86] The Solicitor General also assails the
finding that the physical blows were inflicted only by
Dizon and Villareal, as well as the appreciation of Lenny
Villas consent to hazing.[87]
In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we
reexamine, reassess, and reweigh the probative value of
the evidence presented by the parties. [88] In People v.
Maquiling, we held that grave abuse of discretion cannot
be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly
misappreciated the facts and the evidence. [89] Mere errors
of judgment are correctible by an appeal or a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and not by
an application for a writ of certiorari.[90] Therefore,
pursuant to the rule on double jeopardy, we are
constrained to deny the Petition contra Victorino et
al. the 19 acquitted fraternity members.
We, however, modify the assailed judgment as
regards Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug the four
fraternity members convicted of slight physical injuries.
Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the
rule on double jeopardy similarly applies when the state
seeks the imposition of a higher penalty against the
accused.[91] We have also recognized, however,
that certiorari may be used to correct an abusive
judgment upon a clear demonstration that the lower
court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as
to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. [92] The
present case is one of those instances of grave abuse of
discretion.
In imposing the penalty of slight physical
injuries on Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug, the CA
reasoned thus:
Based on the medical findings,
it would appear that with the exclusion
of the fatal wounds inflicted by the
accused Dizon and Villareal,
the injuries sustained by the victim as
a result of the physical punishment
heaped on him were serious in nature.
However,by reason of the death of the
victim, there can be no precise means
to determine the duration of the
incapacity or the medical attendance
required. To do so, at this stage would
be merely speculative. In a prosecution
for this crime where the category of the
offense and the severity of the penalty
depend on the period of illness or
incapacity for labor, the length of this
period must likewise be proved beyond
reasonable doubt in much the same
manner as the same act charged [People
v. Codilla, CA-G.R. No. 4079-R, June
26, 1950]. And when proof of the said
period is absent, the crime committed
should be deemed only as slight
physical injuries [People v. De los
Santos, CA, 59 O.G. 4393, citing People
v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398]. As such, this
Court is constrained to rule that the
injuries inflicted by the appellants,
Tecson, Ama, Almeda and Bantug, Jr.,
are only slight and not serious, in nature.
[93]
(Emphasis supplied and citations
included)
The appellate court relied on our ruling
in People v. Penesa[94] in finding that the four accused
should be held guilty only of slight physical injuries.
According to the CA, because of the death of the victim,
there can be no precise means to determine the duration
of the incapacity or medical attendance required. [95] The
reliance on Penesa was utterly misplaced. A review of
that case would reveal that the accused therein was
guilty merely of slight physical injuries, because the
victims injuries neither caused incapacity for labor nor
required medical attendance.[96] Furthermore, he did not
[97]
die. His injuries were not even serious.
[98]
Since Penesa involved a case in which the victim
allegedly suffered physical injuries and not death, the
ruling cited by the CA was patently inapplicable.
On the contrary, the CAs ultimate conclusion
that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug were liable
merely for slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its
own findings of fact. According to the court, the four
accused were found to have inflicted more than the
usual punishment undertaken during such initiation
rites on the person of Villa. [99] It then adopted the NBI
medico-legal officers findings that the antecedent cause
of Lenny Villas death was the multiple traumatic injuries
he suffered from the initiation rites. [100] Considering that
the CA found that the physical punishment heaped
on [Lenny Villa was] serious in nature,[101] it was
patently erroneous for the court to limit the criminal
liability to slight physical injuries, which is a light
felony.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates
that the perpetrator shall be liable for the consequences
of an act, even if its result is different from that intended.
Thus, once a person is found to have committed an
initial felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of
physical injuries that results in the death of the victim,
courts are required to automatically apply the legal
framework governing the destruction of life. This rule is
mandatory, and not subject to discretion.
The CAs application of the legal framework
governing physical injuries punished under Articles 262
to 266 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for
culpable felonies is therefore tantamount to a whimsical,
capricious, and abusive exercise of judgment amounting
to lack of jurisdiction. According to the Revised Penal
Code, the mandatory and legally imposable penalty in
case the victim dies should be based on the framework
governing the destruction of the life of a person,
punished under Articles 246 to 261 for intentional
felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies, and not
under the aforementioned provisions. We emphasize that
these two types of felonies are distinct from and legally
inconsistent with each other, in that the accused cannot
be held criminally liable for physical injuries when
actual death occurs.[102]
Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal
and Dizon as if only their acts, in and of themselves,
caused the death of Lenny Villa is contrary to the CAs
own findings. From proof that the death of the victim
was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he
suffered,[103] the only logical conclusion is that criminal
responsibility should redound to all those who have been
proven to have directly participated in the infliction of
physical injuries on Lenny. The accumulation of bruising
on his body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest.
Accordingly, we find that the CA committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally
liable for slight physical injuries. As an allowable
exception to the rule on double jeopardy, we therefore
give due course to the Petition in G.R. No. 154954.
Resolution on Ultimate Findings
According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at
the time) punishable as a crime, the intentional infliction
of physical injuries on Villa was nonetheless a felonious
act under Articles 263 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, in ruling against the accused, the court a
quo found that pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised
Penal Code, the accused fraternity members were guilty
of homicide, as it was the direct, natural and logical
consequence of the physical injuries they had
intentionally inflicted.[104]
The CA modified the trial courts finding of
criminal liability. It ruled that there could have been no
conspiracy since the neophytes, including Lenny Villa,
had knowingly consented to the conduct of hazing
during their initiation rites. The accused fraternity
members, therefore, were liable only for the
consequences of their individual acts. Accordingly, 19 of
the accused Victorino et al. were acquitted; 4 of them
Tecson et al. were found guilty of slight physical
injuries; and the remaining 2 Dizon and Villareal were
found guilty of homicide.
The issue at hand does not concern a typical
criminal case wherein the perpetrator clearly commits a
felony in order to take revenge upon, to gain advantage
over, to harm maliciously, or to get even with, the
victim. Rather, the case involves an ex ante situation in
which a man driven by his own desire to join a society of
men pledged to go through physically and
psychologically strenuous admission rituals, just so he
could enter the fraternity. Thus, in order to understand
how our criminal laws apply to such situation absent the
Anti-Hazing Law, we deem it necessary to make a brief
exposition on the underlying concepts shaping
intentional felonies, as well as on the nature of physical
and psychological initiations widely known as hazing.
Intentional Felony and Conspiracy
 Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical
school of thought.[105] The classical theory posits that a
human person is essentially a moral creature with an
absolute free will to choose between good and evil. [106] It
asserts that one should only be adjudged or held
accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will
appears unimpaired.[107] The basic postulate of the
classical penal system is that humans are rational and
calculating beings who guide their actions with reference
to the principles of pleasure and pain. [108] They refrain
from criminal acts if threatened with punishment
sufficient to cancel the hope of possible gain or
advantage in committing the crime. [109] Here, criminal
liability is thus based on the free will and moral blame of
the actor.[110] The identity of mens rea defined as a guilty
mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent is
the predominant consideration.[111] Thus, it is not enough
to do what the law prohibits.[112] In order for an
intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be
committed by means of dolo or malice.[113]
The term dolo or malice is a complex idea
involving the elements of freedom, intelligence,
[114]
and intent. The first element, freedom, refers to an act
done with deliberation and with power to choose
between two things.[115] The second
element, intelligence, concerns the ability to determine
the morality of human acts, as well as the capacity to
distinguish between a licit and an illicit act. [116] The last
element, intent, involves an aim or a determination to do
a certain act.[117]
The element of intent on which this Court shall
focus is described as the state of mind accompanying an
act, especially a forbidden act. [118] It refers to the purpose
of the mind and the resolve with which a person
proceeds.[119] It does not refer to mere will, for the latter
pertains to the act, while intent concerns the result of the
act.[120] While motive is the moving power that impels
one to action for a definite result, intent is the purpose of
using a particular means to produce the result. [121] On the
other hand, the term felonious means, inter alia,
malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil
heart or purpose.[122] With these elements taken together,
the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer
to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent
state of mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated
otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence
of dolus malus that the act or omission be done willfully,
maliciously, with deliberate evil intent, and with malice
aforethought.[123] The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi
mens sit rea a crime is not committed if the mind of the
person performing the act complained of is innocent.
[124]
As is required of the other elements of a felony, the
existence of malicious intent must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt.[125]
In turn, the existence of malicious intent is
necessary in order for conspiracy to attach. Article 8 of
the Revised Penal Code which provides that conspiracy
exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it is to be interpreted to refer only to
felonies committed by means of dolo or malice. The
phrase coming to an agreement connotes the existence of
a prefaced intent to cause injury to another, an element
present only in intentional felonies. In culpable felonies
or criminal negligence, the injury inflicted on another is
unintentional, the wrong done being simply the result of
an act performed without malice or criminal design.
[126]
Here, a person performs an initial lawful deed;
however, due to negligence, imprudence, lack of
foresight, or lack of skill, the deed results in a wrongful
act.[127] Verily, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act,
which is a requisite in conspiracy, is inconsistent with
the idea of a felony committed by means of culpa.[128]
The presence of an initial malicious intent to
commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in establishing
the commission of the intentional felony of homicide.
[129]
Being mala in se, the felony of homicide requires the
existence of malice or dolo[130] immediately before or
simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. [131] Intent
to kill or animus interficendi cannot and should not be
inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt
of such intent.[132] Furthermore, the victims death must
not have been the product of accident, natural cause, or
suicide.[133] If death resulted from an act executed
without malice or criminal intent but with lack of
foresight, carelessness, or negligence the act must be
qualified as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence
resulting in homicide.[134]
Hazing and other forms of initiation rites
The notion of hazing is not a recent development
in our society.[135] It is said that, throughout history,
hazing in some form or another has been associated with
organizations ranging from military groups to
indigenous tribes.[136] Some say that elements
of hazing can be traced back to the Middle Ages, during
which new students who enrolled in European
universities worked as servants for upperclassmen. [137] It
is believed that the concept of hazing is rooted in ancient
Greece,[138] where young men recruited into the military
were tested with pain or challenged to demonstrate the
limits of their loyalty and to prepare the recruits for
battle.[139] Modern fraternities and sororities espouse
some connection to these values of ancient Greek
civilization.[140] According to a scholar, this concept
lends historical legitimacy to a tradition or ritual
whereby prospective members are asked to prove their
worthiness and loyalty to the organization in which they
seek to attain membership through hazing.[141]
Thus, it is said that in the Greek fraternity
system, custom requires a student wishing to join an
organization to receive an invitation in order to be a
neophyte for a particular chapter.[142] The neophyte
period is usually one to two semesters long. [143] During
the program, neophytes are required to interview and to
get to know the active members of the chapter; to learn
chapter history; to understand the principles of the
organization; to maintain a specified grade point
average; to participate in the organizations activities; and
to show dignity and respect for their fellow neophytes,
the organization, and its active and alumni members.
[144]
Some chapters require the initiation activities for a
recruit to involve hazing acts during the entire neophyte
stage.[145]
Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an
initiation rite or ritual that serves as prerequisite for
admission to an organization.[146] In hazing, the recruit,
pledge, neophyte, initiate, applicant or any other term by
which the organization may refer to such a person is
generally placed in embarrassing or humiliating
situations, like being forced to do menial, silly, foolish,
or other similar tasks or activities. [147] It encompasses
different forms of conduct that humiliate, degrade,
abuse, or physically endanger those who desire
membership in the organization.[148] These acts usually
involve physical or psychological suffering or injury.[149]
The concept of initiation rites in the country is
nothing new. In fact, more than a century ago, our
national hero Andres Bonifacio organized a secret
society named Kataastaasan Kagalanggalangang
Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (The Highest and
Most Venerable Association of the Sons and Daughters
of the Nation).[150] The Katipunan, or KKK, started as a
small confraternity believed to be inspired by European
Freemasonry, as well as by confraternities or sodalities
approved by the Catholic Church. [151] The Katipunans
ideology was brought home to each member through the
societys initiation ritual.[152] It is said that initiates were
brought to a dark room, lit by a single point of
illumination, and were asked a series of
questions to determine their fitness, loyalty, courage, and
resolve.[153] They were made to go through vigorous
trials such as pagsuot sa isang lungga or [pagtalon] sa
balon.[154] It would seem that they were also made to
withstand the blow of pangherong bakal sa pisngi and to
endure a matalas na punyal.[155] As a final step in the
ritual, the neophyte Katipunero was made to sign
membership papers with the his own blood.[156]
It is believed that the Greek fraternity system
was transported by the Americans to the Philippines in
the late 19th century. As can be seen in the following
instances, the manner of hazing in the United States was
jarringly similar to that inflicted by the Aquila Fraternity
on Lenny Villa.
Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point
Academy forced the fourth classmen to do exhausting
physical exercises that sometimes resulted in permanent
physical damage; to eat or drink unpalatable foods; and
in various ways to humiliate themselves.[157] In 1901,
General Douglas MacArthur got involved in a
congressional investigation of hazing at the academy
during his second year at West Point.[158]
In Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, decided
in 1985, the candidate-victim was injured during the
shriners hazing event, which was part of the initiation
ceremonies for Hejaz membership.[159] The ritual
involved what was known as the mattress-rotating barrel
trick.[160] It required each candidate to slide down an
eight to nine-foot-high metal board onto connected
mattresses leading to a barrel, over which the candidate
was required to climb. [161] Members of Hejaz would
stand on each side of the mattresses and barrel and fun-
paddle candidates en route to the barrel.[162]
In a video footage taken in 1991, U.S. Marine
paratroopers in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, were
seen performing a ceremony in which they pinned
paratrooper jump wings directly onto the neophyte
paratroopers chests.[163] The victims were shown writhing
and crying out in pain as others pounded the spiked
medals through the shirts and into the chests of the
victims.[164]
In State v. Allen, decided in 1995, the Southeast
Missouri State University chapter of Kappa Alpha Psi
invited male students to enter into a pledgeship program.
[165]
The fraternity members subjected the pledges to
repeated physical abuse including repeated, open-hand
strikes at the nape, the chest, and the back; caning of the
bare soles of the feet and buttocks; blows to the back
with the use of a heavy book and a cookie sheet while
the pledges were on their hands and knees; various kicks
and punches to the body; and body slamming, an activity
in which active members of the fraternity lifted pledges
up in the air and dropped them to the ground. [166] The
fraternity members then put the pledges through a seven-
station circle of physical abuse.[167]
In Ex Parte Barran, decided in 1998, the pledge-
victim went through hazing by fraternity members of
the Kappa Alpha Order at the Auburn University in
Alabama.[168] The hazing included the following: (1)
having to dig a ditch and jump into it after it had been
filled with water, urine, feces, dinner leftovers, and
vomit; (2) receiving paddlings on the buttocks; (3) being
pushed and kicked, often onto walls or into pits and trash
cans; (4) eating foods like peppers, hot sauce, butter, and
yerks (a mixture of hot sauce, mayonnaise, butter, beans,
and other items); (5) doing chores for the fraternity and
its members, such as cleaning the fraternity house and
yard, being designated as driver, and running errands; (6)
appearing regularly at 2 a.m. meetings, during which the
pledges would be hazed for a couple of hours; and (7)
running the gauntlet, during which the pledges were
pushed, kicked, and hit as they ran down a hallway and
descended down a flight of stairs.[169]
In Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, decided
in 1999, the victim Sylvester Lloyd was accepted to
pledge at the Cornell University chapter of the Alpha Phi
Alpha Fraternity.[170] He participated in initiation
activities, which included various forms of physical
beatings and torture, psychological coercion and
embarrassment.[171]
In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity,
decided in 2002, the initiate-victim suffered injuries
from hazing activities during the fraternitys initiation
rites.[172] Kenner and the other initiates went through
psychological and physical hazing, including being
paddled on the buttocks for more than 200 times.[173]
In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones a university
student in Florida sought initiation into the campus
chapter of the Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity during the
2005-06 academic year.[174] The pledges efforts to join
the fraternity culminated in a series of initiation rituals
conducted in four nights. Jones, together with other
candidates, was blindfolded, verbally harassed, and
caned on his face and buttocks. [175] In these rituals
described as preliminaries, which lasted for two
evenings, he received approximately 60 canings on his
buttocks.[176] During the last two days of the hazing, the
rituals intensified.[177] The pledges sustained roughly 210
cane strikes during the four-night initiation. [178] Jones and
several other candidates passed out.[179]
The purported raison dtre behind hazing
practices is the proverbial birth by fire, through which
the pledge who has successfully withstood the hazing
proves his or her worth.[180] Some organizations even
believe that hazing is the path to enlightenment. It is said
that this process enables the organization to establish
unity among the pledges and, hence, reinforces and
ensures the future of the organization.[181] Alleged
benefits of joining include leadership opportunities;
improved academic performance; higher self-esteem;
professional networking opportunities; and the esprit
dcorp associated with close, almost filial, friendship and
common cause.[182]
Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.
The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in
1874 in response to hazing in the military.[183] The
hazing of recruits and plebes in the armed services was
so prevalent that Congress prohibited all forms of
military hazing, harmful or not.[184] It was not until 1901
that Illinois passed the first state anti-hazing law,
criminalizing conduct whereby any one sustains an
injury to his [or her] person therefrom. [185]
However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s,
due in large part to the efforts of the Committee to Halt
Useless College Killings and other similar
organizations, that states increasingly began to enact
legislation prohibiting and/or criminalizing hazing.
[186]
As of 2008, all but six states had enacted criminal or
civil statutes proscribing hazing.[187] Most anti-hazing
laws in the U.S. treat hazing as a misdemeanor and carry
relatively light consequences for even the most severe
situations.[188]Only a few states with anti-hazing laws
consider hazing as a felony in case death or great bodily
harm occurs.[189]
Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A
misdemeanor, except hazing that results in death or great
bodily harm, which is a Class 4 felony.[190] In a Class 4
felony, a sentence of imprisonment shall be for a term of
not less than one year and not more than three years.
[191]
Indiana criminal law provides that a person who
recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally
performs hazing that results in serious bodily injury to a
person commits criminal recklessness, a Class D felony.
[192]
The offense becomes a Class C felony if
committed by means of a deadly weapon. [193] As an
element of a Class C felony criminal recklessness
resulting in serious bodily injury, death falls under the
category of serious bodily injury.[194] A person who
commits a Class C felony is imprisoned for a fixed term
of between two (2) and eight (8) years, with the advisory
sentence being four (4) years. [195] Pursuant to Missouri
law, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, unless the act
creates a substantial risk to the life of the student or
prospective member, in which case it becomes a Class C
felony.[196] A Class C felony provides for an
imprisonment term not to exceed seven years.[197]
In Texas, hazing that causes the death of another
is a state jail felony.[198] An individual adjudged guilty of
a state jail felony is punished by confinement in a state
jail for any term of not more than two years or not less
than 180 days.[199] Under Utah law, if hazing results in
serious bodily injury, the hazer is guilty of a third-degree
felony.[200] A person who has been convicted of a third-
degree felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for a
term not to exceed five years.[201] West Virginia law
provides that if the act of hazing would otherwise be
deemed a felony, the hazer may be found guilty thereof
and subject to penalties provided therefor.[202] In
Wisconsin, a person is guilty of a Class G felony if We cannot subscribe to this conclusion.
hazing results in the death of another.[203] A
Class G felony carries a fine not to exceed $25,000 or The appellate court relied mainly on the
imprisonment not to exceed 10 years, or both.[204] testimony of Bienvenido Marquez to determine the
existence of animus interficendi. For a full appreciation
In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing of the context in which the supposed utterances were
made, the Court deems it necessary to reproduce the
were left with limited remedies, as there was no hazing
relevant portions of witness Marquezs testimony:
statute.[205] This situation was exemplified in Ballou v.
Sigma Nu General Fraternity, wherein Barry Ballous Witness We were brought up into
[Michael Musngis]
family resorted to a civil action for wrongful death, since room and we were
there was no anti-hazing statute in South Carolina until briefed as to what to
expect during the
1994.[206]
next three days and
The existence we were told the
of animus members of the
interficendi or fraternity and their
intent to batch and we were
kill not proven also told about the
beyond fraternity song, sir.
reasonable
doubt xxxxxxxxx

Witness We were escorted out of

The presence of an ex ante situation in this case, [Michael Musngis]
house and we were
fraternity initiation rites does not automatically amount
made to ride a van
to the absence of malicious intent or dolus malus. If it is and we were
proven beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators brought to another
were equipped with a guilty mind whether or not there is place in Kalookan
City which I later
a contextual background or factual premise they are still found to be the
criminally liable for intentional felony. place of Mariano
Almeda, sir.
The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General
xxxxxxxxx
are all in agreement that with the exception of Villareal
and Dizon accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug Witness Upon arrival, we were
did not have the animus interficendi or intent to kill instructed to bow
Lenny Villa or the other neophytes. We shall no longer our head down and
to link our arms and
disturb this finding. then the driver of
the van and other
As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified members of the
the Decision of the trial court and found that the two Aquilans who were
inside left us inside
accused had the animus interficendi or intent to kill the van, sir.
Lenny Villa, not merely to inflict physical injuries on
him. It justified its finding of homicide against Dizon by xxxxxxxxx
holding that he had apparently been motivated by ill will
Witness We heard voices shouted
while beating up Villa. Dizon kept repeating that his outside the van to
fathers parking space had been stolen by the victims the effect, Villa
father.[207] As to Villareal, the court said that the accused akin ka, Asuncion
Patay ka and the
suspected the family of Bienvenido Marquez, one of the people outside
neophytes, to have had a hand in the death of Villareals pound the van,
brother.[208] The CA then ruled as follows: rock the van, sir.

The two had their own axes to grind Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall in
against Villa and Marquez. It was very what tone of voice
clear that they acted with evil and and how strong a
criminal intent. The evidence on this voice these remarks
matter is unrebutted and so for the death uttered upon your
of arrival?
Villa, appellants Dizon and Villareal
must and should face the consequence Witness Some were almost shouting,
of their acts, that is, to be held liable you could feel the
for the crime of homicide. sense of excitement
[209]
(Emphasis supplied) in their voices, sir.
xxxxxxxxx simultaneously, I
could not really pin
Atty. Tadiar During all these times that point who uttered
the van was being those words, sir.
rocked through and
through, what were xxxxxxxxx
the voices or
utterances that you Atty. Tadiar Were there any utterances
heard? that you heard
during the conduct
Witness Villa akin ka, Asuncion patay of this Bicol
ka, Recinto patay Express?
ka sa amin, etc.,
sir. Witness Yes, sir I heard utterances.

Atty. Tadiar And those utterances and Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall to
threats, how long this Honorable
did they continue Court what were the
during the rocking utterances that you
of the van which remember?
lasted for 5
minutes? Witness For example, one person
particularly Boyet
xxxxxxxxx Dizon stepped on
my thigh, he would
Witness Even after they rocked the say that and I
van, we still kept quote ito, yung
on hearing voices, pamilya nito ay
sir. pinapatay yung
kapatid ko, so that
xxxxxxxxx would in turn sort
of justifying him in
Atty. Tadiar During the time that this inflicting more
rounds [of physical serious pain on me.
beating] were being So instead of just
inflicted, was there walking, he would
any utterances by jump on my thighs
anybody? and then after on
was Lenny Villa.
Witness Yes sir. Some were piercing, He was saying to
some were the effect that this
discouraging, and guy, his father
some were stole the parking
encouraging space of my
others who were father, sir. So, thats
pounding and why he inflicted
beating us, it was more pain on Villa
just like a fiesta and that went on,
atmosphere, sir.
actually some of
them enjoyed Atty. Tadiar And you were referring to
looking us being which particular
pounded, sir. accused?

Atty. Tadiar Do you recall what were Witness Boyet Dizon, sir.
those voices that
you heard? Atty. Tadiar When Boyet Dizon at that
particular time was
Witness One particular utterance always accusing you of
said was, they asked having your family
us whether matigas have his brother
pa yan, kayang- killed, what was
kaya pa niyan. your response?

Atty. Tadiar Do you know who in Witness Of course, I knew sir that it
particular uttered was not true and
those particular that he was just
words that you making it up sir.
quote? So he said that I
knew nothing of
Witness I cannot particularly point to that incident.
because there were However, he just in
utterances fact after the Bicol
 Express, he kept on his thighs and
uttering those sometimes jumped
words/statements so at it, sir.
that it would in turn
justify him and to xxxxxxxxx
give me harder
blows, sir. Atty. Tadiar We would go on to the
second day but not
xxxxxxxxx right now. You
mentioned also
Atty. Tadiar You mentioned that accusations
about Dizon in made
particular by Dizon you or
mentioning that your family had
Lenny Villas his brother killed,
father stole the can you inform
parking space this Honorable
allotted for his Court what exactly
father, do you were the
recall who were accusations that
within hearing were charged
distance when that against you while
utterance was inflicting blows
made? upon you in
particular?
Witness Yes, sir. All of the neophytes
heard that utterance, Witness While he was inflicting blows
sir. upon me, he told
me in particular if I
xxxxxxxxx knew that his
family who had his
Witness There were different times brother killed, and
made this he said that his
accusation so there brother was an
were different NPA, sir so I knew
people who heard that it was just a
from time to time, story that he made
sir. up and I said that
I knew nothing
xxxxxxxxx about it and he
continued
Atty. Tadiar Can you tell the Honorable inflicting blows on
Court when was the me, sir. And
next accusation another incident
against Lenny was when a talk
Villas father was was being given,
made? Dizon was on
another part of the
Witness When we were line up against pelota court and I
the wall, Boyet was sort of looking
Dizon came near and we saw that he
to us and when was drinking beer,
Lenny Villas turn, and he said and I
I heard him quote: Marquez,
uttered those Marquez, ano ang
statements, sir. tinitingin-tingin
mo diyan, ikaw
Atty. Tadiar What happened after he yung pamilya mo
made this ang nagpapatay sa
accusation to Lenny aking kapatid, yari
Villas father? ka sa akin, sir.

Witness He continued to inflict blows on Atty. Tadiar What else?

Lenny Villa.
Witness Thats all, sir.
Atty. Tadiar How were those blows
inflicted? Atty. Tadiar And on that first night of
February 8, 1991,
Witness There were slaps and he knelt did ever a doctor or
on Lenny Villas a physician came
thighs and around as promised
sometime he stand to you earlier?
up and he kicked
 Witness No, sir.[210] (Emphasis supplied) on your body but
that will be
covered?
On cross-examination, witness Bienvenido
Marquez testified thus: Witness Yes, sir.

Judge Purisima When you testified on JudgePurisima So, what kind of physical
direct examination contact or
Mr. Marquez, have implements that you
you stated that there expect that would
was a briefing that create bruises to
was conducted your body?
immediately before
your initiation as Witness At that point I am already sure
regards to what to that there would be
expect during the hitting by a
initiation, did I hear paddling or paddle,
you right? sir.

Witness Yes, sir. xxxxxxxxx

Judge Purisima Who did the briefing? Judge Purisima Now, will you
admit Mr. Marquez
Witness Mr. Michael Musngi, sir and that much of
Nelson Victorino. the initiation
procedures is
Judge Purisima Will you kindly tell the psychological in
Honorable Court nature?
what they told you
to expect during the Witness Combination, sir.
initiation? [211]
(Emphasis
supplied)
Witness They told us at the time we
would be brought to xxxxxxxxx
a particular
place, we would be Atty. Jimenez The initiation that was
mocked at, sir. conducted did not
consist only of
Judge Purisima So, you expected to be physical initiation,
mocked at, meaning body
ridiculed, contact, is that
humiliated etc., correct?
and the likes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Part of the initiation was
Judge Purisima You were also told the so-called
beforehand that psychological
there would be initiation, correct?
physical contact?
Witness Yes, sir.
Witness Yes, sir at the briefing.
Atty. Jimenez And this consisted of
xxxxxxxxx making you
believe of things
Witness Yes, sir, because they informed calculated to
that we could terrify you, scare
immediately go you, correct?
back to school. All
the bruises would Witness Yes, sir.
be limited to our
arms and legs, sir. Atty. Jimenez In other words,
So, if we wear the the initiating
regular school masters made
uniforms like long belief situation
sleeves, it would be intended to, I
covered actually so repeat, terrify you,
we have no thinking frighten you, scare
that our face would you into perhaps
be slapped, sir. quitting the
initiation, is this
Judge Purisima So, you mean to say that correct?
beforehand that you
would have bruises
Witness Sometimes sir, yes. jumped on you or
kicked you said
Atty. Jimenez You said on direct that something similar
while Mr. Dizon as was told to you
was initiating you, by Mr. Dizon?
he said or he was
supposed to have Witness No, sir.
said according to
you that your Atty. Jimenez But the fact remains that
family were in the Bicol Express
responsible for the for instance, the
killing of his masters would run
brother who was an on your thighs,
NPA, do you right?
remember saying
that? Witness Yes, sir.

Witness Yes, sir. Atty. Jimenez This was the regular

procedure that was
Atty. Jimenez You also said in followed by the
connection with that initiating masters
statement said to not only on you but
you by Dizon also on the other
that you did not neophytes?
believe him
because that is not Witness Yes, sir.
true, correct?
Atty. Jimenez In other words, it is fair
Witness Yes, sir. to say that
whatever forms of
Atty. Jimenez In other words, he was initiation was
only administered by
psychologizing you one master, was
perhaps, the also administered
purpose as I have by one master on a
mentioned before, neophyte, was also
terrifying you, administered by
scaring you or another master on
frightening you the other
into quitting the neophyte, this is
initiation, this is correct?
correct?
Witness Yes, sir.[212] (Emphasis supplied)
Witness No, sir, perhaps it is one but
the main reason, I
think, why he was According to the Solicitor General himself, the
saying those things ill motives attributed by the CA to Dizon and Villareal
was because he
were baseless,[213] since the statements of the accused
wanted to inflict
injury. were just part of the psychological initiation calculated
to instill fear on the part of the neophytes; that [t]here is
Atty. Jimenez He did not tell that to you. no element of truth in it as testified by Bienvenido
That is your only Marquez; and that the harsh words uttered by Petitioner
perception, correct? and Villareal are part of tradition concurred and accepted
Witness No, sir, because at one point, by all the fraternity members during their initiation rites.
[214]
while he was telling
this to Villareal, he
was hitting me. We agree with the Solicitor General.

Atty. Jimenez But did you not say The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez
earlier that you reveals a glaring mistake of substantial proportion on the
[were] subjected to part of the CA it mistook the utterances of Dizon for
the same forms of
initiation by all the those of Villareal. Such inaccuracy cannot be tolerated,
initiating masters? especially because it was the CAs primary basis for
You said that finding that Villarreal had the intent to kill Lenny Villa,
earlier, right? thereby making Villareal guilty of the intentional felony
of homicide. To repeat, according to Bienvenido
Witness Yes, sir.
Marquezs testimony, as reproduced above, it was Dizon
Atty. Jimenez Are you saying also that who uttered both accusations against Villa and Marquez;
the others who Villareal had no participation whatsoever in the specific
threats referred to by the CA. It was Boyet Dizon [who]
stepped on [Marquezs] thigh; and who told witness
Marquez, [I]to, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung
kapatid ko. It was also Dizon who jumped on Villas
thighs while saying, [T]his guy, his father stole the
parking space of my father. With the testimony clarified,
we find that the CA had no basis for concluding the
existence of intent to kill based solely thereon.
As to the existence of animus interficendi on the
part of Dizon, we refer to the entire factual milieu and
contextual premise of the incident to fully appreciate and
understand the testimony of witness Marquez. At the
outset, the neophytes were briefed that they would be
subjected to psychological pressure in order to scare
them. They knew that they would be mocked, ridiculed,
and intimidated. They heard fraternity members
shout, Patay ka, Recinto, Yari ka, Recinto, Villa, akin ka,
Asuncion, gulpi ka, Putang ina mo, Asuncion, Putang
ina nyo, patay kayo sa amin, or some other words to that
effect.[215] While beating the neophytes, Dizon accused
Marquez of the death of the formers purported NPA
brother, and then blamed Lenny Villas father for stealing
the parking space of Dizons father. According to the
Solicitor General, these statements, including those of
the accused Dizon, were all part of the psychological
initiation employed by the Aquila Fraternity.[216]
Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizons way
of inflicting psychological pressure was through hurling
make-believe accusations at the initiates. He concocted
the fictitious stories, so that he could justify giving the
neophytes harder blows, all in the context of fraternity
initiation and role playing. Even one of the neophytes
admitted that the accusations were untrue and made-up.
The infliction of psychological pressure is not
unusual in the conduct of hazing. In fact, during the
Senate deliberations on the then proposed Anti-Hazing
Law, former Senator Lina spoke as follows:
Senator Lina. -- so as to capture the
intent that we conveyed during the
period of interpellations on why we
included the phrase or psychological
pain and suffering.
xxxxxxxxx
So that if no direct physical harm is
inflicted upon the neophyte or the
recruit but the recruit or neophyte is
made to undergo certain acts which I
already described yesterday, like playing
the Russian roulette extensively to test
the readiness and the willingness of
the neophyte or recruit to continue his
desire to be a member of the
fraternity, sorority or similar
organization or playing and putting a
noose on the neck of the neophyte or
recruit, making the recruit or neophyte
stand on the ledge of the fourth floor of
the building facing outside, asking him
to jump outside after making him turn
around several times but the reality is
that he will be made to jump towards the
inside portion of the building these are
the mental or psychological tests that
are resorted to by these organizations,
sororities or fraternities. The doctors
who appeared during the public hearing
testified that such acts can result in some
mental aberration, that they can even
lead to psychosis, neurosis or insanity.
This is what we want to prevent.
[217]
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt,
Dizons behavior must not be automatically viewed as
evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny
Villa. Rather, it must be taken within the context of the
fraternitys psychological initiation. This Court points out
that it was not even established whether the fathers of
Dizon and Villa really had any familiarity with each
other as would lend credence to the veracity of Dizons
threats. The testimony of Lennys co-neophyte, Marquez,
only confirmed this view. According to Marquez, he
knew it was not true and that [Dizon] was just making it
up.[218] Even the trial court did not give weight to the
utterances of Dizon as constituting intent to kill: [T]he
cumulative acts of all the accused were not directed
toward killing Villa, but merely to inflict physical harm
as part of the fraternity initiation rites x x x. [219] The
Solicitor General shares the same view.
Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the
accused Dizon guilty of homicide under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code on the basis of the existence of
intent to kill. Animus interficendi cannot and should not
be inferred unless there is proof beyond reasonable
doubt of such intent.[220] Instead, we adopt and reinstate
the finding of the trial court in part, insofar as it
ruled that none of the fraternity members had the
specific intent to kill Lenny Villa.[221]
The existence
of animus
iniuriandi or
malicious
intent to injure
not proven
beyond
reasonable
doubt
The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there
was an intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa.
Echoing the Decision of the trial court, the Solicitor
General then posits that since all of the accused
fraternity members conspired to inflict physical injuries
on Lenny Villa and death ensued, all of them should be
liable for the crime of homicide pursuant to Article 4(1)
of the Revised Penal Code.
In order to be found guilty of any of the
felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised
Penal Code,[222] the employment of physical injuries
must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala
in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental,
since injury arises from the mental state of the
wrongdoer iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there
is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty
of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical
injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there must be a
specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do
wrong against the physical integrity or well-being of a
person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of
certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the
overt act of inflicting physical injuries per se merely
satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an
intentional felony. The commission of the act does not,
in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are. [223]
Thus, we have ruled in a number of
instances[224] that the mere infliction of physical injuries,
absent malicious intent, does not make a person
automatically liable for an intentional felony. In Bagajo
v. People,[225] the accused teacher, using a bamboo stick,
whipped one of her students behind her legs and thighs
as a form of discipline. The student suffered lesions and
bruises from the corporal punishment. In reversing the
trial courts finding of criminal liability for slight
physical injuries, this Court stated thus: Independently of
any civil or administrative responsibility [w]e are
persuaded that she did not do what she had done with
criminal intent the means she actually used was
moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will,
hatred or any malevolent intent. Considering the
applicable laws, we then ruled that as a matter of law,
petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for her act
of whipping her pupil. In People v. Carmen,[226] the
accused members of the religious group known as the
Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima under the guise of a
ritual or treatment plunged the head of the victim into a
barrel of water, banged his head against a bench,
pounded his chest with fists, and stabbed him on the side
with a kitchen knife, in order to cure him of nervous
breakdown by expelling through those means the bad
spirits possessing him. The collective acts of the group
caused the death of the victim. Since malicious intent
was not proven, we reversed the trial courts finding of
liability for murder under Article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code and instead ruled that the accused should be held
criminally liable for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide under Article 365 thereof.
Indeed, the threshold question is whether the
accuseds initial acts of inflicting physical pain on the
neophytes were attended by animus
iniuriandi amounting to a felonious act punishable under
the Revised Penal Code, thereby making it subject to
Article 4(1) thereof. In People v. Regato, we ruled that
malicious intent must be judged by the action, conduct,
and external acts of the accused. [227] What persons do is
the best index of their intention.[228] We have also ruled
that the method employed, the kind of weapon used, and
the parts of the body on which the injury was inflicted
may be determinative of the intent of the perpetrator.
[229]
The Court shall thus examine the whole contextual
background surrounding the death of Lenny Villa.
Lenny died during Aquilas fraternity initiation
rites. The night before the commencement of the rites,
they were briefed on what to expect. They were told that
there would be physical beatings, that the whole event
would last for three days, and that they could quit
anytime. On their first night, they were subjected to
traditional initiation rites, including the Indian Run,
Bicol Express, Rounds, and the Auxies Privilege Round.
The beatings were predominantly directed at the
neophytes arms and legs.
In the morning of their second day of initiation,
they were made to present comic plays and to play rough
basketball. They were also required to memorize and
recite the Aquila Fraternitys principles. Late in the
afternoon, they were once again subjected to traditional
initiation rituals. When the rituals were officially
reopened on the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, the
neophytes were subjected to another traditional ritual
paddling by the fraternity.
During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries
were assigned to the neophytes. The auxiliaries protected
the neophytes by functioning as human barriers and
shielding them from those who were designated to inflict
physical and psychological pain on the initiates. [230] It
was their regular duty to stop foul or excessive physical
blows; to help the neophytes to pump their legs in order
that their blood would circulate; to facilitate a rest
interval after every physical activity or round; to serve
food and water; to tell jokes; to coach the initiates; and
to give them whatever they needed.
These rituals were performed with Lennys
consent.[231] A few days before the rites, he asked both
his parents for permission to join the Aquila Fraternity.
[232]
His father knew that Lenny would go through an
initiation process and would be gone for three days.
[233]
The CA found as follows:
It is worth pointing out that
the neophytes willingly and
voluntarily consented to undergo
physical initiation and hazing. As can
be gleaned from the narration of facts,
they voluntarily agreed to join the
initiation rites to become members of
the Aquila Legis Fraternity. Prior to the
initiation, they were given briefings on
what to expect. It is of common
knowledge that before admission in a
fraternity, the neophytes will undergo a
rite of passage. Thus, they were made
aware that traditional methods such
as mocking, psychological tests and
physical punishment would take
place. They knew that the initiation
would involve beatings and other
forms of hazing. They were also told of
their right and opportunity to quit at
any time they wanted to. In fact,
prosecution witness Navera testified that
accused Tecson told him that after a
week, you can already play basketball.
Prosecution witness Marquez for his
part, admitted that he knew that the
 initiates would be hit in the arms and
legs, that a wooden paddle would be
used to hit them and that he expected
bruises on his arms and legs.
Indeed, there can be no fraternity
initiation without consenting
neophytes.[234] (Emphasis supplied)
Even after going through Aquilas grueling
traditional rituals during the first day, Lenny continued
his participation and finished the second day of
initiation.
Based on the foregoing contextual background, and
absent further proof showing clear malicious intent, we
are constrained to rule that the specific animus
iniuriandi was not present in this case. Even if the
specific acts of punching, kicking, paddling, and other
modes of inflicting physical pain were done voluntarily,
freely, and with intelligence, thereby satisfying the
elements of freedom and intelligence in the felony of
physical injuries, the fundamental ingredient of
criminal intent was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
On the contrary, all that was proven was that the acts
were done pursuant to tradition. Although the additional
rounds on the second night were held upon the insistence
of Villareal and Dizon, the initiations were officially
reopened with the consent of the head of the initiation
rites; and the accused fraternity members still
participated in the rituals, including the paddling, which
were performed pursuant to tradition. Other than the
paddle, no other weapon was used to inflict injuries on
Lenny. The targeted body parts were predominantly the
legs and the arms. The designation of roles, including the
role of auxiliaries, which were assigned for the specific
purpose of lending assistance to and taking care of the
neophytes during the initiation rites, further belied the
presence of malicious intent. All those who wished to
join the fraternity went through the same process of
traditional initiation; there is no proof that Lenny Villa
was specifically targeted or given a different treatment.
We stress that Congress itself recognized that hazing is
uniquely different from common crimes. [235] The totality
of the circumstances must therefore be taken into
consideration.
The underlying context and motive in which the
infliction of physical injuries was rooted may also be
determined by Lennys continued participation in the
initiation and consent to the method used even after the
first day. The following discussion of the framers of the
1995 Anti-Hazing Law is enlightening:
SENATOR GUINGONA. Most
of these acts, if not all, are already
punished under the Revised Penal Code.
SENATOR LINA. That is
correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If
hazing is done at present and it results in
death, the charge would be murder or
homicide.
SENATOR LINA. That is
correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If it
does not result in death, it may be
frustrated homicide or serious physical
injuries.
SENATOR LINA. That is
correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if
the person who commits sexual abuse
does so it can be penalized under rape or
acts of lasciviousness.
SENATOR LINA. That is
correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. So,
what is the rationale for making a new
offense under this definition of the
crime of hazing?
SENATOR LINA. To
discourage persons or group of persons
either composing a sorority, fraternity or
any association from making this
requirement of initiation that has already
resulted in these specific acts or results,
Mr. President.
That is the main rationale. We
want to send a strong signal across the
land that no group or association can
require the act of physical initiation
before a person can become a member
without being held criminally liable.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes,
but what would be the rationale for that
imposition? Because the distinguished
Sponsor has said that he is not punishing
a mere organization, he is not seeking
the punishment of an initiation into a
club or organization, he is seeking the
punishment of certain acts that resulted
in death, et cetera as a result of hazing
which are already covered crimes.
The penalty is increased in one,
because we would like to discourage
hazing, abusive hazing, but it may be a
legitimate defense for invoking two or
more charges or offenses, because these
very same acts are already punishable
under the Revised Penal Code.
That is my difficulty, Mr.
President.
SENATOR LINA. x x x
Another point, Mr. President, is
this, and this is a very telling
difference: When a person or group of
persons resort to hazing as a
requirement for gaining entry into an
organization, the intent to commit a
wrong is not visible or is not present,
Mr. President. Whereas, in these specific
crimes, Mr. President, let us say there is
death or there is homicide, mutilation, if
one files a case, then the intention to
commit a wrong has to be proven. But
if the crime of hazing is the basis,
what is important is the result from
the act of hazing.
To me, that is the basic
difference and that is what will prevent
or deter the sororities or fraternities; that
they should really shun this activity
called hazing. Because, initially, these
fraternities or sororities do not even
consider having a neophyte killed or
maimed or that acts of lasciviousness
are even committed initially, Mr.
President.
So, what we want to discourage
is the so-called initial innocent
act. That is why there is need to institute
this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang
nangyari. Ang fraternity o ang sorority
ay magre-recruit. Wala talaga silang
intensiyong makamatay. Hindi ko na
babanggitin at buhay pa iyong kaso.
Pero dito sa anim o pito na namatay
nitong nakaraang taon, walang
intensiyong patayin talaga iyong
neophyte. So, kung maghihintay pa
tayo, na saka lamang natin isasakdal ng
murder kung namatay na, ay after the
fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin natin
sa mga kabataan na: Huwag ninyong
gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay
kasalanan at kung mamatay diyan,
mataas ang penalty sa inyo.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. I join
the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the
distinguished Sponsor. But I am again
disturbed by his statement that the
prosecution does not have to prove the
intent that resulted in the death, that
resulted in the serious physical
injuries, that resulted in the acts of
lasciviousness or deranged mind. We
do not have to prove the willful intent of
the accused in proving or establishing
the crime of hazing. This seems, to me,
a novel situation where we create the
special crime without having to go
into the intent, which is one of the
basic elements of any crime.
If there is no intent, there is no
crime. If the intent were merely to
initiate, then there is no offense. And
even the distinguished Sponsor admits
that the organization, the intent to
initiate, the intent to have a new
society or a new club is, per se, not
punishable at all. What are
punishable are the acts that lead to
the result. But if these results are not
going to be proven by intent, but just
because there was hazing, I am afraid
that it will disturb the basic concepts
of the Revised Penal Code, Mr.
President.
SENATOR LINA. Mr.
President, the act of hazing, precisely,
is being criminalized because in the
context of what is happening in the
sororities and fraternities, when they
conduct hazing, no one will admit that
their intention is to maim or to
kill. So, we are already criminalizing the
fact of inflicting physical pain. Mr.
President, it is a criminal act and we
want it stopped, deterred, discouraged.
If that occurs, under this law,
there is no necessity to prove that the
masters intended to kill or the masters
intended to maim. What is important is
the result of the act of hazing.
Otherwise, the masters or those who
inflict the physical pain can easily
escape responsibility and say, We did
not have the intention to kill. This is
part of our initiation rites. This is
normal. We do not have any intention
to kill or maim.
This is the lusot, Mr.
President. They might as well have
been charged therefore with the
ordinary crime of homicide,
mutilation, et cetera, where the
prosecution will have a difficulty
proving the elements if they are
separate offenses.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. Mr.
President, assuming there was a group
that initiated and a person died. The
charge is murder. My question is: Under
this bill if it becomes a law, would the
prosecution have to prove conspiracy or
not anymore?
SENATOR LINA. Mr.
President, if the person is present during
hazing x x x
SENATOR GUINGONA. The
persons are present. First, would the
prosecution have to prove conspiracy?
Second, would the prosecution have to
prove intent to kill or not?
SENATOR LINA. No more. As
to the second question, Mr. President, if
that occurs, there is no need to prove
intent to kill.
SENATOR GUINGONA. But
the charge is murder.
SENATOR LINA. That is why I
said that it should not be murder. It
should be hazing, Mr.
President. [236] (Emphasis supplied)

During a discussion between Senator Biazon and
Senator Lina on the issue of whether to include sodomy
as a punishable act under the Anti-Hazing Law, Senator
Lina further clarified thus:
SENATOR BIAZON. Mr.
President, this Representation has no
objection to the inclusion of sodomy as
one of the conditions resulting from
hazing as necessary to be punished.
However, the act of sodomy can be
committed by two persons with or
without consent.
To make it clearer, what is being
punished here is the commission of
sodomy forced into another individual
by another individual. I move, Mr.
President, that sodomy be modified by
the phrase without consent for purposes
of this section.
SENATOR LINA. I am afraid,
Mr. President, that if we qualify sodomy
with the concept that it is only going to
aggravate the crime of hazing if it is
done without consent will change a lot
of concepts here. Because the results
from hazing aggravate the offense
with or without consent. In fact, when
a person joins a fraternity, sorority, or
any association for that matter, it can
be with or without the consent of the
intended victim. The fact that a
person joins a sorority or fraternity
with his consent does not negate the
crime of hazing.
This is a proposed law intended
to protect the citizens from the
malpractices that attend initiation which
may have been announced with or
without physical infliction of pain or
injury, Mr. President. Regardless of
whether there is announcement that
there will be physical hazing or
whether there is none, and therefore,
the neophyte is duped into joining a
fraternity is of no moment. What is
important is that there is an infliction
of physical pain.
The bottom line of this law is
that a citizen even has to be protected
from himself if he joins a fraternity, so
that at a certain point in time, the State,
the individual, or the parents of the
victim can run after the perpetrators
of the crime, regardless of whether or
not there was consent on the part of
the victim.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR LINA. Mr.
President, I understand the position
taken by the distinguished Gentleman
from Cavite and Metro Manila. It is
correct that society sometimes adopts
new mores, traditions, and practices.
In this bill, we are not going to
encroach into the private proclivities of
some individuals when they do their acts
in private as we do not take a peek into
the private rooms of couples. They can
do their thing if they want to make love
in ways that are not considered
acceptable by the mainstream of society.
That is not something that the State
should prohibit.
But sodomy in this case is
connected with hazing, Mr. President.
Such that the act may even be entered
into with consent. It is not only
sodomy. The infliction of pain may be
done with the consent of the
neophyte. If the law is passed, that
does not make the act of hazing not
punishable because the neophyte
accepted the infliction of pain upon
himself.
If the victim suffers from
serious physical injuries, but the
initiator said, Well, he allowed it upon
himself. He consented to it. So, if we
allow that reasoning that sodomy was
done with the consent of the victim,
then we would not have passed any
law at all. There will be no
significance if we pass this bill,
because it will always be a defense
that the victim allowed the infliction
of pain or suffering. He accepted it as
part of the initiation rites.
But precisely, Mr.
President that is one thing that we
would want to prohibit. That the
defense of consent will not apply
because the very act of inflicting
physical pain or psychological
suffering is, by itself, a punishable
act. The result of the act of hazing, like
death or physical injuries merely
aggravates the act with higher penalties.
But the defense of consent is not going
to nullify the criminal nature of the
act.
So, if we accept the amendment
that sodomy can only aggravate the
offense if it is committed without
consent of the victim, then the whole
foundation of this proposed law will
collapse.
SENATOR BIAZON. Thank
you, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Thank you
very much.
THE PRESIDENT. Is there any
objection to the committee amendment?
(Silence.) The Chair hears none; the
same is approved.[237]
(Emphasis supplied)
 Realizing the implication of removing the states
burden to prove intent, Senator Lina, the principal author
of the Senate Bill, said:
I am very happy that the
distinguished Minority Leader brought
out the idea of intent or whether there it
is mala in se or mala prohibita. There
can be a radical amendment if that is the
point that he wants to go to.
If we agree on the concept,
then, maybe, we can just make this a
special law on hazing. We will not
include this anymore under the
Revised Penal Code. That is a
possibility. I will not foreclose that
suggestion, Mr. President.[238]
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, having in mind the potential conflict
between the proposed law and the core principle of mala
in se adhered to under the Revised Penal Code, Congress
did not simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it
created a special law on hazing, founded upon the
principle of mala prohibita. This dilemma faced by
Congress is further proof of how the nature of hazing
unique as against typical crimes cast a cloud of doubt on
whether society considered the act as an inherently
wrong conduct or mala in se at the time. It is safe to
presume that Lennys parents would not have
consented[239] to his participation in Aquila Fraternitys
initiation rites if the practice of hazing were considered
by them as mala in se.
Furthermore, in Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we
noted through Associate Justice (now retired Chief
Justice) Hilario Davide that in our nations very recent
history, the people have spoken, through Congress, to
deem conduct constitutive of hazing, [an] act[]
previously considered harmless by custom, as
criminal.[240] Although it may be regarded as a
simple obiter dictum, the statement nonetheless shows
recognition that hazing or the conduct of initiation rites
through physical and/or psychological suffering has not
been traditionally criminalized. Prior to the 1995 Anti-
Hazing Law, there was to some extent a lacuna in the
law; hazing was not clearly considered an intentional
felony. And when there is doubt on the interpretation of
criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the
accused. In dubio pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of
law, the Court is constrained to rule against the trial
courts finding of malicious intent to inflict physical
injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent to
inflict physical injuries or animus iniuriandi as required
in mala in se cases, considering the contextual
background of his death, the unique nature of hazing,
and absent a law prohibiting hazing.
The accused
fraternity
members
guilty of
reckless
imprudence
resulting in
homicide
The absence of malicious intent does not
automatically mean, however, that the accused fraternity
members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The
Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that are
committed by means of fault (culpa). According to
Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act
results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight,
or lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a
voluntary act done without malice, from which an
immediate personal harm, injury or material damage
results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution or
advertence on the part of the person committing it. [241] In
this case, the danger is visible and consciously
appreciated by the actor.[242] In contrast, simple
imprudence or negligence comprises an act done without
grave fault, from which an injury or material damage
ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight or skill.
[243]
Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the
danger is not openly visible. [244]
The test[245] for determining whether or not a
person is negligent in doing an act is as follows: Would a
prudent man in the position of the person to whom
negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person
injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about
to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer the
duty to take precaution against the mischievous results
of the act. Failure to do so constitutes negligence. [246]
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to
avoid being charged with recklessness, the degree of
precaution and diligence required varies with the degree
of the danger involved.[247] If, on account of a certain line
of conduct, the danger of causing harm to another person
is great, the individual who chooses to follow that
particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful,
in order to prevent or avoid damage or injury.[248] In
contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is
required.[249] It is thus possible that there are countless
degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required
of an individual, from a transitory glance of care to the
most vigilant effort.[250] The duty of the person to employ body of the
more or less degree of care will depend upon the deceased Lenny
Villa previously
circumstances of each particular case. [251]
marked as Exhibit
G-1 to G-14
There was patent recklessness in the hazing of individually by
Lenny Villa. themselves would
not cause the death
According to the NBI medico-legal officer, of the victim. The
Lenny died of cardiac failure secondary to multiple question I am going
traumatic injuries.[252] The officer explained that cardiac to propound to you
is what is the
failure refers to the failure of the heart to work as a cumulative effect of
pump and as part of the circulatory system due to the all of these injuries
lack of blood.[253] In the present case, the victims heart marked from
could no longer work as a pumping organ, because it Exhibit G-1 to G-
was deprived of its requisite blood and oxygen. [254] The 14?
deprivation was due to the channeling of the blood
Witness All together nothing in concert
supply from the entire circulatory system including the to cause to the
heart, arteries, veins, venules, and capillaries to the demise of the
thigh, leg, and arm areas of Lenny, thus causing the victim. So, it is not
formation of multiple hematomas or blood clots. [255] The fair for us to isolate
multiple hematomas were wide, thick, and deep, such injuries here
[256]
because we are
indicating that these could have resulted mainly from talking of the whole
injuries sustained by the victim from fist blows, knee body. At the same
blows, paddles, or the like. [257] Repeated blows to those manner that as a car
areas caused the blood to gradually ooze out of the would not run
capillaries until the circulating blood became so minus one (1)
wheel. No, the more
markedly diminished as to produce death. [258] The officer
humane in human
also found that the brain, liver, kidney, pancreas, approach is to
intestines, and all other organs seen in the abdominals, as interpret all those
well as the thoracic organ in the lungs, were pale due to injuries in whole
the lack of blood, which was redirected to the thighs and and not in part.[267]
forearms.[259] It was concluded that there was nothing in
the heart that would indicate that the victim suffered There is also evidence to show that some of the
from a previous cardiac arrest or disease. [260] accused fraternity members were drinking during the
initiation rites.[268]
The multiple hematomas or bruises found in
Lenny Villas arms and thighs, resulting from repeated Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity
blows to those areas, caused the loss of blood from his members were tantamount to recklessness, which made
vital organs and led to his eventual death. These the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be
hematomas must be taken in the light of the hazing remembered that organizations owe to their initiates a
activities performed on him by the Aquila Fraternity. duty of care not to cause them injury in the process.
According to the testimonies of the co-neophytes of [269]
With the foregoing facts, we rule that the accused are
Lenny, they were punched, kicked, elbowed, kneed, guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
stamped on; and hit with different objects on their arms, Since the NBI medico-legal officer found that the
legs, and thighs.[261]They were also paddled at the back victims death was the cumulative effect of the injuries
of their thighs or legs;[262] and slapped on their faces. suffered, criminal responsibility redounds to all those
[263]
They were made to play rough basketball. who directly participated in and contributed to the
[264]
Witness Marquez testified on Lenny, infliction of physical injuries.
[265]
saying: [T]inamaan daw sya sa spine. The NBI
medico-legal officer explained that the death of the It appears from the aforementioned facts that the
victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries incident may have been prevented, or at least mitigated,
suffered by the latter.[266] The relevant portion of the had the alumni of Aquila Fraternity accused Dizon and
testimony is as follows: Villareal restrained themselves from insisting on
reopening the initiation rites. Although this point did not
Atty. Tadiar Doctor, there was, rather, it
matter in the end,
was your testimony
on various cross as records would show that the other fraternity members
examinations of participated in the reopened initiation rites having in
defense counsels mind the concept of seniority in fraternities the
that the injuries that
you have implication of the presence of alumni should be seen as a
enumerated on the point of review in future legislation. We further note that
some of the fraternity members were intoxicated during
Lennys initiation rites. In this light, the Court submits to
Congress, for legislative consideration, the amendment
of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of
intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni
fraternity members during hazing as aggravating
circumstances that would increase the applicable
penalties.
It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly
or unwittingly impose the misery of hazing and employ
appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood. There must
be a better way to establish kinship. A neophyte admitted
that he joined the fraternity to have more friends and to
avail himself of the benefits it offered, such as tips
during bar examinations.[270] Another initiate did not give
up, because he feared being looked down upon as a
quitter, and because he felt he did not have a choice.
[271]
Thus, for Lenny Villa and the other neophytes,
joining the Aquila Fraternity entailed a leap in the dark.
By giving consent under the circumstances, they left
their fates in the hands of the fraternity members.
Unfortunately, the hands to which lives were entrusted
were barbaric as they were reckless.
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall cover
only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon.
Had the Anti-Hazing Law been in effect then, these five
accused fraternity members would have all been
convicted of the crime of hazing punishable by reclusion
perpetua (life imprisonment).[272] Since there was no law
prohibiting the act of hazing when Lenny died, we are
constrained to rule according to existing laws at the time
of his death. The CA found that the prosecution failed to
prove, beyond reasonable doubt,
Victorino et al.s individual participation in the infliction
of physical injuries upon Lenny Villa.[273] As to accused
Villareal, his criminal liability was totally extinguished
by the fact of his death, pursuant to Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be
interpreted without prejudice to the applicability of the
Anti-Hazing Law to subsequent cases. Furthermore, the
modification of criminal liability from slight physical
injuries to reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide shall apply only with respect to accused
Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
The accused
liable to pay
damages
The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs
of Lenny Villa in the amounts of 50,000 as civil
indemnity ex delicto and 1,000,000 as moral damages,
to be jointly and severally paid by accused Dizon and
Villareal. It also awarded the amount of 30,000 as
indemnity to be jointly and severally paid by
accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
Civil indemnity ex delicto is automatically
awarded for the sole fact of death of the victim. [274] In
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, [275] we sustain
the CAs award of indemnity in the amount of 50,000.
The heirs of the victim are entitled to actual or
compensatory damages, including expenses incurred in
connection with the death of the victim, so long as the
claim is supported by tangible documents. [276] Though
we are prepared to award actual damages, the Court is
prevented from granting them, since the records are
bereft of any evidence to show that actual expenses were
incurred or proven during trial. Furthermore, in the
appeal, the Solicitor General does not interpose any
claim for actual damages.[277]
The heirs of the deceased may recover moral
damages for the grief suffered on account of the victims
death.[278] This penalty is pursuant to Article 2206(3) of
the Civil Code, which provides that the spouse,
legitimate and illegitimate descendants and the
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages
for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased.[279] Thus, we hereby we affirm the CAs award
of moral damages in the amount of 1,000,000.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R.
No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of
homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN
PART. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954
finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony
Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of
the crime of slight physical injuries is
also MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead,
Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony
Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide defined and penalized
under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one
(1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED jointly
and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil
indemnity ex delicto in the amount of 50,000, and
moral damages in the amount of 1,000,000, plus legal
interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from
the date of the finality of this Decision until satisfaction.
[280]
Costs de oficio.
 The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954,
acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby AFFIRMED. The
appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080,
dismissing the criminal case filed against Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise AFFIRMED.
Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal
Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby
dismissed, and the criminal case against Artemio
Villareal deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the

Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives for possible consideration of the
amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact
of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or
alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating
circumstances that would increase the applicable
penalties.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30104 July 25, 1973
HON. GREGORIO. N. GARCIA, Judge of the City
Court of Manila, and FRANCISCO
LORENZANA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FELIX DOMINGO, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, EDGARDO CALO and
SIMEON CARBONNEL, respondents.
Andres R. Narvasa, Manuel V. Chico and Felipe B.
Pagkanlungan for petitioners.
Rafael S. Consengco for respondent Calo, et al.
Respondent Judge in his own behalf.
FERNANDO, J.:
The pivotal question in this petition for certiorari and
prohibition, one which thus far has remained unresolved,
is the meaning to be accorded the constitutional right to
public trial. 1 More specifically, did respondent Judge
commit a grave abuse of discretion in stigmatizing as
violative of such a guarantee the holding of the trial of
the other respondents 2 inside the chambers of city court
Judge Gregorio Garcia named as the petitioner. 3 That
was done in the order now impugned in this suit,
although such a procedure had been agreed to
beforehand by the other respondents as defendants, the
hearings have been thus conducted on fourteen separate
occasions without objection on their part, and without an
iota of evidence to substantiate any claim as to any other
person so minded being excluded from the premises. It is
thus evident that what took place in the chambers of the
city court judge was devoid of haste or intentional
secrecy. For reasons to be more fully explained in the
light of the facts ascertained the unique aspect of this
case having arisen from what turned out to be an
unseemly altercation, force likewise being employed,
due to the mode in which the arrest of private petitioner
for a traffic violation was sought to be effected by the
two respondent policemen thus resulting in charges and
counter-charges with eight criminal cases being tried
jointly by city court Judge in the above manner we
rule that there was no transgression of the right to a
public trial, and grant the petition.
It was alleged and admitted in the petition: "In Branch I
the City Court of Manila presided over by petitioner
Judge, there were commenced, by appropriate
informations all dated January 16, 1968, eight (8)
criminal actions against respondent Edgardo Calo, and
Simeon Carbonnel and Petitioner Francisco Lorenzana,
as follows: a. Against Edgardo Calo (on complaint of
Francisco Lorenzana) (1) Criminal Case No. F-109192,
also for slight physical injuries; (2) Criminal Case No. F-
109192, alsofor slight physical injuries; and (3) Criminal
Case No. F-109193, for maltreatment; b. Against Simeon
Carbonnel (id.) (1)Criminal Case No. F-109197, for
maltreatment; (2) Criminal Case No. F-109196, for
slight physical injuries; and (3) Criminal Case No. F-
109198, for light threats; (c) Against Francisco
Lorenzana (on complaint of Calo and Carbonnel) (1)
Criminal Case No. F-109201, for violation of Sec. 887
of the Revised Ordinances of Manila (resisting an
officer); and (2) Criminal Case No. F-109200, for
slander." 4The above was followed by this recital: "The
trial of the aforementioned cases was jointly held on
March 4, 1968, March 18, 1968, March 23, 1968, March
30, 1968, April 17, 1968, April 20, 1968, May 4,1968,
May 11, 1968, June 1, 1968, June 15, 1968, June 22,
1968, June 29, 1968, August 3, 1968 and August 10,
1968. All the fourteen (14) trial dates except March 4
and 18, and April 17, 1968 fell on a Saturday. This
was arranged by the parties and the Court upon the
insistence of respondents Calo and Carbonnel who, as
police officers under suspension because of the cases,
desired the same to be terminated as soon as possible
and as there were many cases scheduled for trial on the
usual criminal trial days (Monday, Wednesday and
Friday), Saturday was agreed upon as the invariable trial
day for said eight (8) criminal cases." 5 Also this: "The
trial of the cases in question was held, with the
conformity of the accused and their counsel, in the
chambers of Judge Garcia." 6 Then came these
allegations in the petition: "During all the fourteen (14)
days of trial, spanning a period of several months (from
March to August, 1968), the accused were at all times
represented by their respective counsel, who acted not
only in defense of their clients, but as prosecutors of the
accusations filed at their clients' instance. There was
only one (1) day when Atty. Consengco, representing
respondent Calo and Carbonnel, was absent. This was on
April 20, 1968. But at the insistence of Pat. Carbonnel,
the trial proceeded, and said respondent cross-examined
one of the witnesses presented by the adverse party. In
any case, no pretense has been made by the respondents
that this constituted an irregularity correctible
on certiorari. At the conclusion of the hearings the
accused, thru counsel, asked for and were granted time
to submit memoranda. Respondents Calo and Carbonnel,
thru counsel, Atty. Rafael Consengco, submitted a 14-
page memorandum with not less than 35 citations of
relevant portions of the transcript of stenographic notes
in support of their prayer for exoneration, and conviction
of petitioner Lorenzana in respect of their
countercharges against the latter. It is worthy of note
that up to this late date, said respondents Calo and
Carbonnel had not objected to or pointed out any
supposed irregularity in the proceedings thus far; the
memorandum submitted in their behalf is confined to a
discussion of the evidence adduced in, and the merits of
the cases." 7 It was stated in the next petition:
"The promulgation of judgment was first scheduled on
September 23, 1968. This was postponed to September
28, 1968 at the instance of Atty. Rafael Consengco, as
counsel respondents Calo and Carbonnel, and again to
October 1, 1968 at 11 o'clock in the morning, this time at
the instance of Atty. Consengco and Atty. Francisco Koh
who had, in the meantime, also entered his appearance
as counsel for respondents Calo and Carbonnel. The
applications for postponement were not grounded upon
any supposed defect or irregularity of the proceedings." 8
Mention was then made of when a petition
for certiorari was filed with respondent Judge: "Early in
the morning of October 1, 1968, Edgardo Calo and
Simeon Carbonnel, thru their counsel, Atty. Rafael S.
Consengco, filed with the Court of First Instance a
petition for certiorari and prohibition, with application
for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction ...
[alleging jurisdictional defects]." 9 Respondent Judge
acting on such petition forthwith issued a restraining
order thus causing the deferment of the promulgation of
the judgment. After proceedings duly had, there was an
order from him "declaring that 'the constitutional and
statutory rights of the accused' had been violated,
adversely affecting their 'right to a free and impartial
trial' [noting] 'that the trial of these cases lasting several
weeks held exclusively in chambers and not in the court
room open the public';" and ordering the city court
Judge, now petitioner, "to desist from reading or causing
to be read or promulgated the decisions he may have
rendered already in the criminal cases (in question) ...
pending in his Court, until further orders of this
Court.'" 10
A motion for reconsideration proving unavailing,
petition on January 28, 1969, elevated the matter to this
Tribunal by means of the present suit for certiorari and
prohibition. In its resolution of February 3, 1969,
respondents were required to answer, with a preliminary
injunction likewise being issued. As was to be expected
the answer filed by respondent Judge on March 11, 1969
and that by the other respondents on March 19, 1969 did
attempt to justify the validity of the finding that there
was a failure to respect the right to a public trial of
accused persons. Neither in such pleadings nor in the
memorandum filed, although the diligence displayed by
counsel was quite evident, was there any persuasive
showing of a violation of constitutional guarantee of a
public trial, the basic issue to be resolved. Rather it was
the mode of approach followed by counsel Andres R.
Narvasa for petitioners that did manifest a deeper
understanding of its implications and ramifications.
Accordingly, as previously stated, it is for us to grant the
merits prayed for.
1. The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time
of the antecedents of this petition, as set forth at the
outset, explicitly enumerated the right to a public trial to
which an accused was entitled. So it is, as likewise made
clear, under present dispensation. As a matter of fact,
that was one constitutional provision that needed only a
single, terse summation from the Chairman of the
Committee on the Bill of Rights, Delegate, later Justice,
Jose P. Laurel, to gain acceptance. As was stressed by
him: "Trial should also be public in order to offset any
danger of conducting it in an illegal and unjust
manner." 11 It would have been surprising if its proposed
inclusion in the Bill of Rights had provoked any
discussion, much less a debate. It was merely a
reiteration what appeared in the Philippine Autonomy
Act of 1916, popularly known as the Jones
Law. 12 Earlier, such a right found expression in the
Philippine Bill of 1902, likewise an organic act of the
then government of this country as an unincorporated
territory of the United States. 13 Historically as was
pointed out by Justice Black, speaking for the United
States Supreme Court in the leading case of In re
Oliver: 14 "This nation's accepted practice of
guaranteeing a public trial to an accused has its roots in
[the] English common law heritage. 15 He then observed
that the exact date of its origin is obscure, "but it likely
evolved long before the settlement of the [United States]
as an accompaniment of the ancient institution of jury
trial." 16 It was then noted by him that there, "the
guarantee to an accused of the right to a public trial
appeared in a state constitution in 1776." 17 Later it was
embodied in the Sixth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution ratified in 1791. 18 He could conclude his
historical survey "Today almost without exception every
state by constitution, statute, or judicial decision,
requires that all criminal trials be open to the
public." 19 Such is the venerable, historical lineage of the
right to a public trial.
2. The crucial question of the meaning to be attached this
provision remains. The Constitution guarantees an
accused the right to a public trial. What does it signify?
Offhand it does seem fairly obvious that here is an
instance where language is to be given a literal
application. There is no ambiguity in the words
employed. The trial must be public. It possesses that
character when anyone interested in observing the
manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his
courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such
attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no
moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown.
The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief
that thereby the accused is afforded further protection,
that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and
not tainted with any impropriety. It is not amiss to recall
that Delegate Laurel in his terse summation the
importance of this right singled out its being a deterrence
to arbitrariness. It is thus understandable why such a
right is deemed embraced in procedural due
process. 20 Where a trial takes place, as is quite usual, in
the courtroom and a calendar of what cases are to be
heard is posted, no problem arises. It the usual course of
events that individuals desirous of being present are free
to do so. There is the well recognized exception though
that warrants the exclusion of the public where the
evidence may be characterized as "offensive to decency
or public morals." 21
What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the
convenience of the parties, and of the city court Judge, it
was in the latter's air-conditioned chambers that the trial
was held. Did that suffice to investigate the proceedings
as violative of this right? The answer must be in the
negative. There is no showing that the public was
thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that the size of the
room allotted the Judge would reduce the number of
those who could be our present. Such a fact though is not
indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms
are not of uniform dimensions. Some are smaller than
others. Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black in his
masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the
requirement of a trial being public if the accused could
"have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no
matter with what offense he may be charged." 22
Then, too, reference may also be made to the undisputed
fact at least fourteen hearings had been held in chambers
of the city court Judge, without objection on the part of
respondent policemen. What was said by former Chief
Justice Moran should erase any doubt as to the weight to
be accorded, more appropriately the lack of weight, to
any such objection raised. Thus: "In one case, the trial of
the accused was held in Bilibid prison. The accused,
invoking his right to a public trial, assigned the
procedure thus taken as error. The Supreme Court held
that as it affirmatively appears on the record that the
accused offered no objection to the trial of his case in the
place where it was held, his right is deemed
waived." 23 The decision referred to, United States v.
Mercado, 24 was handed down sixty-eight years ago in
1905.
It does seem that the challenged order of respondent is
far from being invulnerable.
3. That is all that need be said as to the obvious merit of
this petition. One other objection to the conduct of the
proceedings by the city court Judge may be briefly
disposed of. Respondent Judge would seek to lend
support to an order at war with obvious meaning of a
constitutional provision by harping on the alleged
abdication by an assistant fiscal of his control over the
prosecution. Again here there was a failure to abide by
settled law. If any party could complain at all, it is the
People of the Philippines for whom the fiscal speaks and
acts. The accused cannot in law be termed an offended
party for such an alleged failure to comply with official
duty. Moreover, even assuming that respondent
policemen could be heard to raise such a grievance,
respondent Judge ought to have been aware that thereby
no jurisdictional defect was incurred by the city court
Judge. As was so emphatically declared by Justice J.B.L.
Reyes in Cariaga v. Justo-Guerrero: 25 "The case below
was commenced and prosecuted without the
intervention, mediation or participation of the fiscal or
any of his deputies. This, notwithstanding, the
jurisdiction of the court was not affected ... but the court
should have cited the public prosecutor to
intervene ... ." 26

4. There is much to be said of course for the concern

displayed by respondent Judge to assure the reality as
against the mere possibility of a trial being truly public.
If it were otherwise, such a right could be reduced to a
barren form of words. To the extent then that the
conclusion reached by him was motivated by an
apprehension that there was an evasion of a
constitutional command, he certainly lived up to what is
expected of a man of the robe. Further reflection ought
to have convinced him though that such a fear was
unjustified. An objective appraisal of conditions in
municipal or city courts would have gone far in
dispelling such misgivings. The crowded daily calendar,
the nature of the cases handled, civil as well as criminal,
the relaxed attitude on procedural rules not being strictly
adhered to all make for a less tense atmosphere. As a
result the attendance of the general public is much more
in evidence; nor is its presence unwelcome. When it is
remembered further that the occupants of such courts are
not chosen primarily for their legal acumen, but taken
from that portion of the bar more considerably attuned to
the pulse of public life, it is not to be rationally expected
that an accused would be denied whatever solace and
comfort may come from the knowledge that a judge,
with the eyes of the alert court alert to his demeanor and
his rulings, would run the risk of being unjust, unfair, or
arbitrary. Nor does it change matters, just because, as did
happen here, it was in the air-conditioned chambers of a
city court judge rather than in the usual place that the
trial took place.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is

granted nullifying, setting aside, and declaring bereft of
any legal force or effect the order of respondent Judge
Felix Domingo November 29, 1968 for being issued
with grave abuse of discretion. The writ of prohibition
sought by petitioner is likewise granted, commanding
respondent Judge or any one acting in his place to desist
from any further action in Criminal Case No. 74830 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila other than that of
dismissing the same. The preliminary writ of injunction
issued by this Court in its resolution of February 3, 1969
against the actuation of respondent Judge is made
permanent. With costs against respondent policemen
Edgardo Calo and Simeon Carbonnel.
EN BANC
[A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC. June 29, 2001]
RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE
TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF
THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE
FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E.
ESTRADA, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG
MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS,
CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO
and ATTY. RICARDO
ROMULO, petitioners, vs. JOSEPH E.
ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES, oppositors.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The travails of a deposed President continue. The
Sandiganbayan reels to start hearing the criminal charges
against Mr. Joseph E. Estrada. Media seeks to cover the
event via live television and live radio broadcast and
endeavors this Court to allow it that kind of access to the
proceedings.
On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga
Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association
representing duly franchised and authorized television
and radio networks throughout the country, sent a
letter[1] requesting this Court to allow live media
coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other
criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E.
Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the
public of full ransparency in the proceedings of an
unprecedented case in our history."[2] The request was
seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 05 April
2001 to the Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator
Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo.
On 17 April 2001, the Honorable Secretary of
Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the instant
petition,[3] submitting the following exegesis:
"3. The foregoing criminal cases involve the previous
acts of the former highest official of the land, members
of his family, his cohorts and, therefore, it cannot be over
emphasized that the prosecution thereof, definitely
involves a matter of public concern and interest, or a
matter over which the entire citizenry has the right to
know, be informed and made aware of.
" 4. There is no gainsaying that the constitutional right of
the people to be informed on matters of public concern,
as in the instant cases, can best be recognized, served
and satisfied by allowing the live radio and television
coverage of the concomitant court proceedings.
"5. Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of
the proceedings will also serve the dual purpose of
ensuring the desired transparency in the administration
of justice in order to disabuse the minds of the
supporters of the past regime of any and all unfounded
notions, or ill-perceived attempts on the part of the
present dispensation, to 'railroad' the instant criminal
cases against the Former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada."[4]
Public interest, the petition further averred, should be
evident bearing in mind the right of the public to vital
information affecting the nation.
In effect, the petition seeks a re-examination of the
23rd October 1991 resolution of this Court in a case for
libel filed by then President Corazon C. Aquino. The
resolution read:
"The records of the Constitutional Commission are
bereft of discussion regarding the subject of cameras in
the courtroom. Similarly, Philippine courts have not had
the opportunity to rule on the question squarely.
While we take notice of the September 1990 report of
the United States Judicial Conference Ad Hoc
Committee on Cameras in the Courtroom, still the
current rule obtaining in the Federal Courts of the United
States prohibit the presence of television cameras in
criminal trials. Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure forbids the taking of photographs during the
progress of judicial proceedings or radio broadcasting of
such proceedings from the courtroom. A trial of any kind
or in any court is a matter of serious importance to all
concerned and should not be treated as a means of
entertainment. To so treat it deprives the court of the
dignity which pertains to it and departs from the orderly
and serious quest for truth for which our judicial
proceedings are formulated.
"Courts do not discriminate against radio and television
media by forbidding the broadcasting or televising of a
trial while permitting the newspaper reporter access to
the courtroom, since a television or news reporter has the
same privilege, as the news reporter is not permitted to
bring his typewriter or printing press into the courtroom.
"In Estes vs. Texas, the United States Supreme Court
held that television coverage of judicial proceedings
involves an inherent denial of the due process rights of a
criminal defendant. Voting 5-4, the Court through 'Mr.
Justice Clark, identified four (4) areas of potential
prejudice which might arise from the impact of the
cameras on the jury, witnesses, the trial judge and the
defendant. The decision in part pertinently stated:
"'Experience likewise has established the prejudicial
effect of telecasting on witnesses. Witnesses might be
frightened, play to the camera, or become nervous. They
are subject to extraordinary out-of-court influences
which might affect their testimony. Also, telecasting not
only increases the trial judge's responsibility to avoid
actual prejudice to the defendant, it may as well affect
his own performance. Judges are human beings also and
are subject to the same psychologjcal reactions as
laymen. For the defendant, telecasting is a form of
mental harassment and subjects him to excessive public
exposure and distracts him from the effective
presentation of his defense.
'The television camera is a powerful weapon which
intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an accused and
his case in the eyes of the public.'
"Representatives of the press have no special standing to
apply for a writ of mandate to compel a court to permit
them to attend a trial, since within the courtroom, a
reporter's constitutional rights are no greater than those
of any other member of the public. Massive intrusion of
representatives of the news media into the trial itself can
so alter or destroy the constitutionally necessary judicial
atmosphere and decorum that the requirements of
impartiality imposed by due process of law are denied
the defendant and a defendant in a criminal proceeding
should not be forced to run a gauntlet of reporters and
photographers each time he enters or leaves the
courtroom.
"Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's
right to due process as well as to the fair and orderly
administration of justice, and considering further that the
freedom of the press and the right of the people to
information may be served and satisfied by less
distracting, degrading and prejudicial means, live radio
and television coverage of court proceedings shall not be
allowed. Video footages of court hearings for news
purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the
courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and their
counsel taken prior to the commencement of official
proceedings. No video shots or photographs shall be
permitted during the trial proper.
"Accordingly, in order to protect the parties right to due
process, to prevent the distraction of the participants in
the proceedings and in the last analysis, to avoid
miscarriage of justice, the Court resolved to PROHIBIT
live radio and television coverage of court
proceedings. Video footages of court hearings for news
purposes shall be limited and restricted as above
indicated."
Admittedly, the press is a mighty catalyst in
awakening public consciousness, and it has become an
important instrument in the quest for truth. [5] Recent
history exemplifies media's invigorating presence, and
its contribution to society is quite impressive. The Court,
just recently, has taken judicial notice of the enormous
effect of media in stirring public sentience during the
impeachment trial, a partly judicial and partly political
exercise, indeed the most-watched program in the boob-
tubes during those times, that would soon culminate in
EDSA II.
The propriety of granting or denying the instant
petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public
information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights
of the accused, on the other hand, along with the
constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings
in ensuring a fair and impartial trial.[6]
When these rights race against one another,
jurisprudence[7] tells us that the right of the accused must
be preferred to win.
With the possibility of losing not only the precious
liberty but also the very life of an accused, it behooves
all to make absolutely certain that an accused receives a
verdict solely on the basis of a just and dispassionate
judgment, a verdict that would come only after the
presentation of credible evidence testified to by unbiased
witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure, whether
open or subtle, in proceedings that are devoid of
histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to ferret
veritable facts free from improper influence, [8] and
decreed by a judge with an unprejudiced mind, unbridled
by running emotions or passions.
Due process guarantees the accused a presumption
of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is
not lifted above its individual settings nor made an
object of public's attention[9] and where the conclusions
reached are induced not by any outside force or
influence[10] but only by evidence and argument given in
open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is
demanded.
Witnesses and judges may very well be men and
women of fortitude, able to thrive in hardy climate, with
every reason to presume firmness of mind and resolute
endurance, but it must also be conceded that "television
can work profound changes in the behavior of the people
it focuses on."[11] Even while it may be difficult to
quantify the influence, or pressure that media can bring
to bear on them directly and through the shaping of
public opinion, it is a fact, nonetheless, that, indeed, it
does so in so many ways and in varying degrees. The
conscious or unconscious effect that such coverage may
have on the testimony of witnesses and the decision of
judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it
is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to
yield to it.[12] It might be farcical to build around them an
impregnable armor against the influence of the most
powerful media of public opinion.[13]
To say that actual prejudice should first be present
would leave to near nirvana the subtle threats to justice
that a disturbance of the mind so indispensable to the
calm and deliberate dispensation of justice can create.
[14]
The effect of television may escape the ordinary
means of proof, but it is not far-fetched for it to
gradually erode our basal conception of a trial such as
we know it now.[15]
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a
right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where
his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A
public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and
would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are
not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A
public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it
only implies that the court doors must be open to those
who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct
themselves with decorum and observe the trial
process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should
have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the
public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to
render the openness negligible and not too large as to
distract the trial participants from their proper functions,
who shall then be totally free to report what they have
observed during the proceedings.[16]
The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied
freedom of the press and the right to public
information. It also approves of media's exalted power to
provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of
conveying the proceedings to the public and in
acquainting the public with the judicial process in action;
nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding
consideration is still the paramount right of the accused
to due process[17] which must never be allowed to suffer
diminution in its constitutional proportions. Justice Clark
thusly pronounced, "while a maximum freedom must be
allowed the press in carrying out the important function
of informing the public in a democratic society, its
exercise must necessarily be subject to the maintenance
of absolute fairness in the judicial process."[18]
This Court, in the instance[19] already mentioned,
citing Estes vs. Texas,[20] the United States Supreme
Court holding the television coverage of judicial
proceedings as an inherent denial of due process rights
of an accused, also identified the following as being
likely prejudices:
"1. The potential impact of television x x x is perhaps of
the greatest significance. x x x. From the moment the
trial judge announces that a case will be televised it
becomes a cause celebre. The whole community, x x x
becomes interested in all the morbid details surrounding
it. The approaching trial immediately assumes an
important status in the public press and the accused is
highly publicized along with the offense with which he
is charged. Every juror carries with him into the jury box
these solemn facts and thus increases the chance of
prejudice that is present in every criminal case. x x x
"2. The quality of the testimony in criminal trials will
often be impaired. The impact upon a witness of the
knowledge that he is being viewed by a vast audience is
simply incalculable. Some may be demoralized and
frightened, some cocky and given to overstatement;
memories may falter, as with anyone speaking publicly,
and accuracy of statement may be severely undermined.
x x x. Indeed, the mere fact that the trial is to be
televised might render witnesses reluctant to appear and
thereby impede the trial as well as the discovery of the
truth.
"3. A major aspect of the problem is the additional
responsibilities the presence of television places on the
trial judge. His job is to make certain that the accused
receives a fair trial. This most difficult task requires his
undivided attention. x x x
4. Finally, we cannot ignore the impact of courtroom
television on the defendant. Its presence is a form of
mental - if not physical-harassment, resembling a police
line-up or the third degree. The inevitable close-up of his
gestures and expressions during the ordeal of his trial
might well transgress his personal sensibilities, his
dignity, and his ability to concentrate on the proceedings
before him - sometimes the difference between life and
death - dispassionately, freely and without the distraction
of wide public surveillance. A defendant on trial for a
specific crime is entitled to his day in court, not in a
stadium, or a city or nationwide arena. The heightened
public clamor resulting from radio and television
coverage will inevitably result in prejudice."
In his concurring opinion in Estes, Mr. Justice
Harlan opined that live television and radio coverage
could have mischievous potentialities for intruding upon
the detached atmosphere that should always surround the
judicial process.[21]
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, in its
Resolution of 16 April 2001, expressed its own concern
on the live television and radio coverage of the criminal
trials of Mr. Estrada; to paraphrase: Live television and
radio coverage can negate the rule on exclusion of
witnesses during the hearings intended to assure a fair
trial; at stake in the criminal trial is not only the life and
liberty of the accused but the very credibility of the
Philippine criminal justice system, and live television
and radio coverage of the trial could allow the "hooting
throng" to arrogate unto themselves the task of judging
the guilt of the accused, such that the verdict of the court
will be acceptable only if popular; and live television
and radio coverage of the trial will not subserve the ends
of justice but will only pander to the desire for publicity
of a few grandstanding lawyers.
It may not be unlikely, if the minority position were
to be adopted, to see protracted delays in the prosecution
of cases before trial courts brought about by petitions
seeking a declaration of mistrial on account of undue
publicity and assailing a court a quo's action either
allowing or disallowing live media coverage of the court
proceedings because of supposed abuse of discretion on
the part of the judge.
En passant, the minority would view
the ponencia as having modified the case law on the
matter. Just to the contrary, the Court effectively
reiterated its standing resolution of 23 October
1991. Until 1991, the Court had yet to establish the case
law on the matter, and when it did in its 23 rdOctober
resolution, it confirmed, in disallowing live television
and radio coverage of court proceedings, that "the
records of the Constitutional Commission (were) bereft
of discussion regarding the subject of cameras in the
courtroom" and that "Philippine courts (had) not
(theretofore) had the opportunity to rule on the question
squarely."
But were the cases decided by the U.S. courts and
cited in the minority opinion really in point?
In Nebraska Press Association vs. Stewart,[22] the
Nebraska State trial judge issued an order restraining
news media from publishing accounts of confession or
admissions made by the accused or facts strongly
implicating him. The order was struck
down. In Richmond Newspaper, Inc., vs. Virginia,
[23]
the trial judge closed the courtroom to the public and
all participants except witnesses when they testify. The
judge was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court which
ruled that criminal trials were historically
open. In Globe Newspaper vs. Superior Court,[24] the
US Supreme Court voided a Massachusetts law that
required trial judges to exclude the press and the public
from the courtroom during the testimony of a minor
victim of certain sexual offenses.
Justice Stewart, in Chandler vs. Florida,[25] where
two police officers charged with burglary sought to
overturn their conviction before the US Supreme Court
upon the ground that the television coverage had
infringed their right to fair trial, explained that "the
constitutional violation perceived by the Estes Court did
not stem from the physical disruption that might one day
disappear with technological advances in the television
equipment but inhered, rather, in the hypothesis that the
mere presence of cameras and recording devices might
have an effect on the trial participants prejudicial to the
accused."[26]
Parenthetically, the United States Supreme Court
and other federal courts do not allow live television and
radio coverage of their proceedings.
The sad reality is that the criminal cases presently
involved are of great dimensions so involving as they do
a former President of the Republic. It is undeniable that
these cases have twice become the nation's focal points
in the two conflicting phenomena of EDSA II and EDSA
III where the magnitude of the events has left a still
divided nation. Must these events be invited anew and
risk the relative stability that has thus far been
achieved? The transcendental events in our midst do not
allow us to, turn a blind eye to yet another possible
extraordinary case of mass action being allowed to now
creep into even the business of the courts in the
dispensation of justice under a rule of law. At the very
least, a change in the standing rule of the court contained
in its resolution of 23 October 1991 may not appear to
be propitious.

Unlike other government offices, courts do not

express the popular will of the people in any sense
which, instead, are tasked to only adjudicate justiciable
controversies on the basis of what alone is submitted
before them.[27] A trial is not a free trade of ideas. Nor is
a competing market of thoughts the known test truth in a
courtroom.[28]

The Court is not all that unmindful of recent

technological and scientific advances but to chance
forthwith the life or liberty of any person in a hasty to
bid to use and apply them, even before ample safety nets
are provided and the concerns heretofore expressed are
aptly addressed, is a price too high to pay.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-54558 May 22, 1987
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER, OTHONIEL V.
JIMENEZ, ESTER MISA-JIMENEZ, CARLOS
LAZARO, REYNALDO MACLANG,
MAGDALENA DE LOS SANTOS-MACLANG,
TEODORICO N. DIESMOS, RENE J. MARCIANO,
DANILO R. DE OCAMPO, VICTORIANO C.
AMADO and MAC ACERON, petitioners,
vs.
MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 34, THE TRIAL
COUNSEL OF MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 34,
and THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, respondents.
No. L-69882 May 22, 1987
EDUARDO OLAGUER, OTHONIEL JIMENEZ,
REYNALDO MACLANG and ESTER MISA-
JIMENEZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, MILITARY
COMMISSION NO. 34, JUDGE ADVOCATE
GENERAL, AFP, MINISTER OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE and THE DIRECTOR OF
PRISONS, respondents.
Sabino Padilla, Jr. and Jose B. Puerto for petitioner
Othoniel Jimenez.
Fulgencio Factoran for petitioners Maclang and
Magdalena de los Santos-Maclang
Rene Saguisag for petitioner Mac Aceron.
Joaquin Misa for petitioner Ester Misa-Jimenez.
Jejomar Binay for petitioners Reynaldo Maclang and
Magdalena de los Santos-Maclang.
Jaime Villanueua for petitioner Danilo R. de Ocampo.
Joker P. Arroyo, Lorenzo M. Tanada and Rene
Sarmiento for petitioners Eduardo Olaguer and
Othoniel Jimenez.
Wigberto Tanada for petitioners Olaguer and Maclang
GANCAYCO, J.:
Filed with this Court are two Petitions wherein the
fundamental question is whether or not a military
tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the
civil courts are open and functioning. The two Petitions
have been consolidated inasmuch as the issues raised
therein are interrelated.
On December 24, 1979, the herein petitioners Eduardo
B. Olaguer, Othoniel V. Jimenez, Ester Misa-Jimenez,
Carlos Lazaro, Reynaldo Maclang, Magdalena De Los
Santos Maclang, Teodorico N. Diesmos, Rene J.
Marciano, Danilo R. De Ocampo and Victoriano C.
Amado were arrested by the military authorities. They
were all initially detained at Camp Crame in Quezon
City. They were subsequently transferred to the
detention center at Camp Bagong Diwa in Bicutan
except for petitioner Olaguer who remained in detention
at Camp Crame. Petitioner Mac Aceron voluntarily
surrendered to the authorities sometime in June, 1980
and was, thereafter, also incarcerated at Camp Bagong
Diwa. All of the petitioners are civilians.
On May 30, 1980, the petitioners were charged for
subversion 1 upon the recommendation of the
respondent Judge Advocate General and the approval of
the respondent Minister of National Defense. 2 The case
was designated as Criminal Case No. MC-34-1.
On June 13. 1980, the respondent Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines 3 created the respondent
Military Commission No 34 to try tile criminal case filed
against the petitioners. 4 On July 30, 1980, an amended
charge sheet was filed for seven (7) offenses, namely: (1)
unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary
devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate President, and
Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet
members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and
Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs.
Arturo Tangco, Jose Roo and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson
of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs.
Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo
Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and proposal
to commit rebellion, and inciting to
rebellion. 5 Sometime thereafter, trial ensued.
In the course of the proceedings, particularly on August
19, 1980, the petitioners went to this Court and filed the
instant Petition for prohibition and habeas
6
corpus." They sought to enjoin the respondent Military
Commission No. 34 from proceeding with the trial of
their case. They likewise sought their release from
detention by way of a writ of habeas corpus. The thrust
of their arguments is that military commissions have no
jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses alleged to have
been committed during the period of martial law. They
also maintain that the proceedings before the respondent
Military Commission No. 34 are in gross violation of
their constitutional right to due process of law.
On September 23, 1980, the respondents filed their
Answer to the Petition. 7 On November 20, 1980, the
petitioners submmitted their reply to the Answer. 8 In a
Motion filed with this Court on July 25, 1981, petitioner
Olaguer requested that the Petition be considered
withdrawn as far as he is concerned. 9 In the Resolution
of this Court dated July 30, 1981, the said prayer was
granted." 10 On August 31, 1984, the respondents filed a
Rejoinder to the Reply submitted by the petitioners. 11
On December 4, 1984, pending the resolution of the
Petition, the respondent Military Commission No. 34
passed sentence convicting the petitioners and imposed
upon them the penalty of death by electrocution. Thus,
on February 14, 1985, petitioners Olaguer, Maclang and
Othoniel and Ester Jimenez went to this Court and filed
the other instant Petition, this time for habeas corpus,
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. They also sought
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. 12 The
respondents named in the Petition are the Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Military
Commission No. 34, the Judge Advocate General, the
Minister of National Defense and the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons.
In sum, the second Petition seeks to enjoin the said
respondents from taking any further action on the case
against the petitioners, and from implementing the
judgment of conviction rendered by the respondent
Military Commission No. 34 for the reason that the same
is null and void. The petitioners also seek the return of
all property taken from them by the respondents
concerned. Their other arguments in the earlier Petition
are stressed anew.
On August 9, 1985, the respondents filed their Answer to
the Petition. 13 On September 12, 1985, this Court
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondents from executing the Decision of the
respondent Military Commission No. 34 14 On February
18, 1986, the petitioners submitted an extensive
Brief. 15 Thereafter, and in due time, the cases were
submitted for decision.
In resolving these two Petitions, We have taken into
account several supervening events which have occurred
hitherto, to wit
(1) On January 17, 1981, President
Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 2045 officially lifting
martial law in the Philippines. The same
Proclamation revoked General Order
No. 8 (creating military tribunals) and
directed that "the military tribunals
created pursuant thereto are hereby
dissolved upon final determination of
case's pending therein which may not be
transferred to the civil courts without
irreparable prejudice to the state in view
of the rules on double jeopardy, or other
circumstances which render prosecution
of the cases difficult, if not impossible.";
and
(2) Petitioner Ester Misa-Jimenez was
granted provisional liberty in January,
1981. On the other hand, petitioners
Eduardo Olaguer and Othoniel Jimenez
obtained provisional liberty on January
23, 1986. 16 The rest of the petitioners
have been released sometime before or
after President Corazon C. Aquino
assumed office in February, 1986.
The sole issue in habeas corpus proceedings is
detention. 17 When the release of the persons in whose
behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was
filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ
becomes moot and academic. 18 Inasmuch as the herein
petitioners have been released from their confinement in
military detention centers, the instant Petitions for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed
for having become moot and academic.
We come now to the other matters raised in the two
Petitions. The main issue raised by the petitioners is
whether or not military commissions or tribunals have
the jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses allegedly
committed during martial law when civil courts are open
and functioning.
The petitioners maintain that military commissions or
tribunals do not have such jurisdiction and that the
proceedings before the respondent Military Commission
No. 34 are in gross violation of their constitutional right
to due process of law. The respondents, however,
contend otherwise.
The issue on the jurisdiction of military commissions or
tribunals to try civilians for offenses allegedly
committed before, and more particularly during a period
of martial law, as well as the other issues raised by the
petitioners, have been ruled upon by a divided Supreme
Court in Aquino, Jr. v. Military Commission No.
2. 19 The pertinent portions of the main opinion of the
Court are as follows
We hold that the respondent Military Commission No. 2
has been lawfully constituted and validly vested with
jurisdiction to hear the cases against civilians, including
the petitioner.
l. The Court has previously declared that
the proclamation of Martial Law ... on
September 21, 1972, ... is valid and
constitutional and that its continuance is
justified by the danger posed to the
public safety. 20
2. To preserve the safety of the nation in
times of national peril, the President of
the Philippines necessarily possesses
broad authority compatible with the
imperative requirements of the
emergency. On the basis of this, he has
authorized in General Order No. 8 . . .
the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to create military tribunals
to try and decide cases "of military
personnel and such other cases as may
be referred to them." In General Order
No. 12 ... , the military tribunals were
vested with jurisdiction "exclusive of
the civil courts," among others, over
crimes against public order, violations of
the Anti-Subversion Act, violations of
the laws on firearms, and other crimes
which, in the face of the emergency, are
directly related to the quelling of the
rebellion and preservation of the safety
and security of the Republic. ... These
measures he had the authority to
promulgate, since this Court recognized
that the incumbent President (President
Marcos), under paragraphs 1 and 2 of
Section 3 of Article XVII of the new
(1973) Constitution, had the authority to
"promulgate proclamations, orders and
decrees during the period of martial law
essential to the security and preservation
of the Republic, to the defense of the
political and social liberties of the
people and to the institution of reforms
to prevent the resurgence of the
rebellion or insurrection or secession or
the threat thereof ... " 21
3. Petitioner nevertheless insists that he
being a civilian, his trial by military
commission deprives him of his right to
due process, since in his view the due
process guaranteed by the Constitution
to persons accused of "ordinary" crimes
means judicial process. This argument
ignores the reality of the rebellion and
the existence of martial law. It is, of
course, essential that in a martial law
situation, the martial law administrator
must have ample and sufficient means to
quell the rebellion and restore civil
order. Prompt and effective trial and
punishment of offenders have been
considered as necessary in a state of
 martial law, as a mere power of
detention may be wholly inadequate for
the exigency. 22 " ... martial law ...
creates an exception to the general rule
of exclusive subjection to the civil
jurisdiction, and renders offenses against
the law of war, as well as those of a civil
character, triable, ... by military
tribunals. 23 "Public danger warrants the
substitution of executive process for
judicial process." 24 . ... "The immunity
of civilians from military jurisdiction
must, however, give way in areas
governed by martial law. When it is
absolutely imperative for public safety,
legal processes can be superseded and
military tribunals authorized to exercise
the jurisdiction normally vested in
courts. 25 . ..."
xxx xxx xxx
5. ... The guarantee of due process is not
a guarantee of any particular form of
tribunal in criminal cases. A military
tribunal of competent jurisdiction,
accusation in due form, notice and
opportunity to defend and trial before an
impartial tribunal, adequately meet the
due process requirement. Due process of
law does not necessarily mean a judicial
proceeding in the regular courts. 26 ...
This ruling has been affirmed, although not
unanimously, in at least six other cases, to wit: Gumaua
v.Espino, 27Buscayno v. Enrile, 28 Sison v.
29
Enrile, Luneta v. Special Military Commission No.
1, 30 Ocampo v. Military Commission No.
25, 31 and Buscayno v. Military Commission Nos. 1, 2, 6
and 25. 32
These rulings notwithstanding, the petitioners anchor
their argument on their prayer that the ruling in Aquino,
Jr. be appraised anew and abandoned or modified
accordingly. After a thorough deliberation on the matter,
We find cogent basis for re-examining the same.
Some recent pronouncements of this Court could be
considered as attempts to either abandon or modify the
ruling in Aquino, Jr.
In De Guzman v. Hon. Leopando, et al., 33 an officer of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and several other
persons were charged with Serious Illegal Detention
before the Court of First Instance of Maguindanao
sometime in October, 1982. The military officer sought
to effect the transfer of the case against him to the
General Court Martial for trial pursuant to the provisions
of Presidential Decree No. 1850. The trial court
disallowed such transfer for the reason that the said
Decree is unconstitutional inasmuch as it violates the
due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution, as well as the constitutional provisions on
social justice, the speedy disposition of cases, the
republican form of government, the integrity and
independence of the judiciary, and the supremacy of
civilian authority over the military,
When the matter was elevated to this Court by way of a
Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, the
Court decided that a ruling on the constitutional issues
raised was not necessary. With the view that practical
and procedural difficulties will result from the transfer
sought, this Court resolved to dismiss the Petition for
lack of merit.
In Animas v. The Minister of National Defense, 34 a
military officer and several civilians were charged with
murder alleged to have been committed sometime in
November, 1971. All of the said accused were
recommended for prosecution before a military tribunal.
in the course of the proceedings, the said accused went
to this Court on a Petition for certiorari and challenged
the jurisdiction of the military tribunal over their case.
The petitioners contended that General Order No. 59
upon which the jurisdiction of the military tribunal is
anchored refers only to the crime of illegal possession of
firearms and explosives in relation to other crimes
committed with a political complexion. They stressed
that the alleged murder was devoid of any political
complexion.
This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Hugo E.
Gutierrez, Jr., ordered the transfer of the criminal
proceedings to the civil courts after noting that with
martial law having been lifted in the country in 1981, all
cases pending before the military tribunals should, as a
general rule, be transferred to the civil courts. The Court
was also of the view that the crime alleged to have been
committed did not have any political complexion. We
quote the pertinent portions of the Decision of the Court,
to wit
Inspite or because of the ambiguous
nature of ... civilian takeover of
jurisdiction was concerned and
notwithstanding the shilly-shallying and
vacillation characteristic of its
implementation, this Court relied on the
enunciated policy of normalization in
upholding the primacy of civil courts.
This policy meant that as many cases as
possible involving civilians being tried
by military tribunals as could be
transferred to civil courts should be
turned over immediately. In case of
doubt, the presumption was in favor of
civil courts always trying civilian
accused.
xxx xxx xxx
The crime for which the petitioners were
charged was committed ... long before
the proclamation of martial law. ... Now
that it is already late 1986, and martial
law is a thing of the past, hopefully
never more to return, there is no more
reason why a murder committed in 1971
should still be retained, at this time, by a
military tribunal.
We agree with the dissenting views of then Justice, now
Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee 35 and Madame Justice
Cecilia Munoz Palma 36 in Aquino, Jr. in so far as they
hold that military commissions or tribunals have no
jurisdiction to try civilians for alleged offenses when the
civil courts are open and functioning.
Due process of law demands that in all criminal
prosecutions (where the accused stands to lose either his
life or his liberty), the accused shall be entitled to,
among others, a trial. 37 The trial contemplated by the
due process clause of the Constitution, in relation to the
Charter as a whole, is a trial by judicial process, not by
executive or military process. Military commissions or
tribunals, by whatever name they are called, are not
courts within the Philippine judicial system. As
explained by Justice Teehankee in his separate dissenting
opinion-
... Civilians like (the) petitioner placed
on trial for civil offenses under general
law are entitled to trial by judicial
process, not by executive or military
process.
Judicial power is vested by the
Constitution exclusively in the Supreme
Court and in such inferior courts as are
duly established by law. Judicial power
exists only in the courts, which have
"exclusive power to hear and determine
those matters which affect the life or
liberty or property of a citizen. 38
Since we are not enemy-occupied
territory nor are we under a military
government and even on the premise
that martial law continues in force, the
military tribunals cannot try and
exercise jurisdiction over civilians for
civil offenses committed by them which
are properly cognizable by the civil
courts that have remained open and have
been regularly functioning. 39 ...
And in Toth v. Quarles, 40 the U.S.
Supreme Court furtherstressed that the
assertion of military authority over
civilians cannot rest on the President's
power as Commander-in-Chief or on
any theory of martial law.
xxx xxx xxx
The U.S. Supreme Court aptly pointed
out ... , in ruling that discharged army
veterans (estimated to number more than
22.5 million) could not be rendered
"helpless before some latter-day revival
of old military charges" and subjected to
military trials for offenses committed
while they were in the military service
prior to their discharge, that "the
presiding officer at a court martial is not
a judge whose objectivity and
independence are protected by tenure
and undiminished salary and nurtured by
the judicial tradition, but is a military
law officer. Substantially different rules
of evidence and procedure apply in
military trials. Apart from these
differences, the suggestion of the
possibility of influence on the actions of
the court martial by the officer who
convenes it, selects its members and the
counsel on both sides, and who usually
has direct command authority over its
members is a pervasive one in military
law, despite strenuous efforts to
eliminate the danger."
The late Justice Black ... added that (A)
Court-Martial is not yet an independent
instrument of justice but remains to a
significant degree a specialized part of
the over-all mechanism by which
military discipline is preserved," and
that ex-servicemen should be given "the
benefits of a civilian court trial when
they are actually civilians ... Free
countries of the world have tried to
restrict military tribunals to the
narrowest jurisdiction deemed
absolutely essential to maintaining
discipline among troops in active
service.
Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the Executive
Department of the Government and are simply
instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the
legislature for the President as Commander-in-Chief to
aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and
enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders
or those of his authorized military
representatives. 41 Following the principle of separation
of powers underlying the existing constitutional
organization of the Government of the Philippines, the
power and the duty of interpreting the laws as when an
individual should be considered to have violated the law)
is primarily a function of the judiciary. 42 It is not, and it
cannot be the function of the Executive Department,
through the military authorities. And as long as the civil
courts in the land remain open and are regularly
functioning, as they do so today and as they did during
the period of martial law in the country, military
tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over
civilians for offenses committed by them and which are
properly cognizable by the civil courts. 43 To have it
otherwise would be a violation of the constitutional right
to due process of the civilian concerned.
In addition to this pronouncement, We take note of the
observation made by the Solicitor General to the effect
that the death penalty imposed upon the petitioners by
the respondent Military Commission No. 34 appears to
have been rendered too hastily to the prejudice to the
petitioners, and in complete disregard of their
constitutional right to adduce evidence on their behalf.
We quote the pertinent portions of the Manifestation
submitted by the Solicitor General, to wit
Prior to the session of December 4,
1984, when the respondent Commission
rendered its sentence, petitioners have
requested the prosecution to provide
them with copies of the complete record
of trial, including the evidences
presented against them, but the
prosecution dillydallied and failed to
provide them with the document
requested. According to petitioners, they
needed the documents to adequately
prepare for their defense.
But a few days before December 4,
1984 the prosecution suddenly furnished
them with certain transcripts of the
proceedings which were not complete.
Petitioner Othoniel Jimenez was
scheduled to start with the presentation
of his evidence on said date and he
requested that his first witness be served
with subpoena. The other petitioners, as
agreed upon, were to present their
evidence after the first one, Othoniel
Jimenez, has finished presenting his
evidence. But on that fateful day,
December 4, 1984, the witness
requested to be served with subpoena
was not around, because as shown by
 the records, he was not even served with
the requested subpoena. But in spite of
that, respondent Military Commission
proceeded to ask each one of the
petitioners if they are ready to present
their evidence.
Despite their explanation that Othoniel
Jimenez cannot proceed because the
prosecution, which performs the duties
and functions of clerk of court, failed to
subpoena his witness, and that the other
petitioners were not ready because it
was not yet their turn to do so, the
Commission abruptly decided that
petitioners are deemed to have waived
the presentation of evidence in their
behalf, and considered the case
submitted for resolution.
After a recess of only twenty-five (25)
minutes, the session was resumed and
the Commission rendered its sentence
finding petitioners guilty of all the
charges against them and imposing upon
them the penalty of death by
electrocution. 44
Thus, even assuming arguendo that the respondent
Military Commission No. 34 does have the jurisdiction
to try the petitioners, the Commission should be deemed
ousted of its jurisdiction when, as observed by the
Solicitor General, the said tribunal acted in disregard of
the constitutional rights of the accused. Indeed, it is
well-settled that once a deprivation of a constitutional
right is shown to exist, the tribunal that rendered the
judgment in question is deemed ousted of jurisdiction. 45
Moreover, We find that Proclamation No. 2045 (dated
January 17, 1981) officially lifting martial law in the
Philippines and abolishing all military tribunals created
pursuant to the national emergency effectively divests
the respondent Military Commission No. 34 (and all
military tribunals for that matter) of its supposed
authority to try civilians, including the herein petitioners.
The main opinion in Aquino, Jr. is premised on the
theory that military tribunals have the jurisdiction to try
civilians as long as the period of national emergency
(brought about by public disorder and similar causes)
lasts. Undoubtedly, Proclamation No. 2045 is an
acknowledgment on the part of the Executive
Department of the Government that the national
emergency no longer exists. Thereafter, following the
theory relied upon in the main opinion, all military
tribunals should henceforth be considered functus
officio in their relationship with civilians.
By virtue of the proclamation itself, all cases against
civilians pending therein should eventually be
transferred to the civil courts for proper disposition. The
principle of double jeopardy would not be an obstacle to
such transfer because an indispensable element of
double jeopardy is that the first tribunal which tried the
case must be of competent jurisdiction. 46 As discussed
earlier, the military tribunals are devoid of the required
jurisdiction.
We take this opportunity to reiterate that as long as the
civil courts in the land are open and functioning, military
tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over
civilians for offenses committed by them. Whether or
not martial law has been proclaimed throughout the
country or over a part thereof is of no moment. The
imprimatur for this observation is found in Section 18,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, to wit
A state of martial law, does not suspend
the operation of the Constitution, nor
supplant the functioning of the civil
courts or legislative assemblies, nor
authorize the conferment of jurisdiction
on military courts and agencies over
civilians where civil courts are able to
function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ. (Emphasis
supplied.)
This provision in the fundamental law is just one of the
many steps taken by the Filipino people towards the
restoration of the vital role of the judiciary in a free
country-that of the guardian of the Constitution and the
dispenser of justice without fear or favor.
No longer should military tribunals or commissions
exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses allegedly
committed by them when the civil courts are open and
functioning. No longer may the exclusive judicial power
of the civil courts, beginning with the Supreme Court
down to the lower courts 47 be appropriate by any
military body or tribunal, or even diluted under the guise
of a state of martial law, national security and other
similar labels.
At this juncture, We find it appropriate to quote a few
paragraphs from the ponencia of Mr. Justice Gutierrez
in Animas v. The Minister of National Defense , 48 viz
The jurisdiction given to military
tribunals over common crimes and
civilian(s) accused at a time when all
civil courts were fully operational and
freely functioning constitutes one of the
saddest chapters in the history of the
Philippine judiciary.
The downgrading of judicial prestige
caused by the glorification of military
tribunals, the instability and insecurity
felt by many members of the judiciary
due to various causes both real and
imagined, and the many judicial
problems spawned by extended
authoritarian rule which effectively
eroded judicial independence and self-
respect will require plenty of time and
determined efforts to cure.
The immediate return to civil courts of
all cases which properly belong to them
is only a beginning.
And in his separate concurring opinion in Animas, Mr.
Chief Justice Teehankee had this to say
I only wish to add that the great
significance of our judgment in this case
is that we reestablish and reinstate the
fundamental principle based on civilian
supremacy over the military as urged in
vain in my dissent in the case
of Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. vs. Military
Commission No. 2, et al. that "Civilians
placed on trial for offenses under
general law are entitled to trial by
judicial process, not by executive or
military process. Judicial power is
vested by the Constitution exclusively in
the Supreme Court and in such inferior
courts as are duly established by law.
Military commissions, or tribunals, are
not courts and do not form part of the
judicial system. Since we are not
enemy-occupied territory nor are we
under a military government and even
on the premise that martial law
continues in force, the military tribunals
cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over
civilians for civil offenses committed by
them which are properly cognizable by
the civil courts that have remained open
and have been regularly functioning.
xxx xxx xxx
The terrible consequences of subjecting
civilians to trial by military process is
best exemplified in the sham military
trial of the martyred former Senator
Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., whereby he was
deprived (1) by the summary ex parte
investigation by the Chief prosecution
staff of the JAGO of his right to be
informed of the charges against him and
of his right to counsel as expressly
recognized by Section 20 of the Bill of
Rights of the 1973 Constitution; (2) of
his vested statutory right to a
preliminary investigation of the
subversion charges against him before
the proper court of first instance as
required under Section 5 of the Anti-
Subversion Act, R.A. 1700 and of the
other charges against him before the
proper civilian officials and to confront
and cross-examine the witnesses against
him under R.A. 5180; (3) of the right to
be tried by judicial process, by the
regular independent courts of justice,
with all the specific constitutional,
statutory and procedural safeguards
embodied in the judicial process and
presided over not by military officers;
and (4) of the right to appeal to the
regular appellate courts and to judicial
review by this Court in the event of
conviction and imposition of a sentence
of death or life imprisonment which the
charges carry and wherein a qualified
majority of ten (10) votes for affirmance
of the death penalty is required. In fine,
he was denied due process of law as
guaranteed under the Bill of Rights
which further ordains that "No person
shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of
law."Worse, his trial by a military
tribunal created by the then President
and composed of the said President's
own military subordinates without
tenure and of non-lawyers (except the
law member) and of whose decision the
President is the final reviewing authority
as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces deprived him of a basic
constitutional right to be heard by a fair
and impartial tribunal, considering that
the said President had publicly declared
the evidence against petitioner "not only
strong (but) overwhelming" and thereby
prejudged and predetermined his guilt,
and none of his military subordinates
could be expected to go against their
Commander-in-Chief's declaration.
Hopefully, an these aberrations now
belong to the dead and nightmarish past,
when time-tested doctrines, to borrow a
phrase from the then Chief Justice,
"shrivelled in the effulgence of the
overpowering rays of martial rule. 49
As stated earlier, We have been asked to re-examine a
previous ruling of the Court with a view towards
abandoning or modifying the same. We do so now but
not without careful reflection and deliberation on Our
part. Certainly, the rule of stare decisis is entitled to
respect because stability in jurisprudence is desirable.
Nonetheless, reverence for precedent, simply as
precedent, cannot prevail when constitutionalism and the
public interest demand otherwise. Thus, a doctrine which
should be abandoned or modified should be abandoned
or modified accordingly. After all, more important than
anything else is that this Court should be right. 50
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so
hold, that a military commission or tribunal cannot try
and exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of
martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly
committed by them as long as the civil courts are open
and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such
body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal
concerned. 51 For the same reasons, Our pronouncement
in Aquino, Jr. v. Military Commission No. 2 52 and all
decided cases affirming the same, in so far as they are
inconsistent with this pronouncement, should be deemed
abandoned.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petitions
for habeas corpus are DISMISSED for having become
moot and academic. The Petitions for certiorari and
prohibition are hereby GRANTED. The creation of the
respondent Military Commission No. 34 to try civilians
like the petitioners is hereby declared unconstitutional
and all its proceedings are deemed null and void. The
temporary restraining order issued against the
respondents enjoining them from executing the Decision
of the respondent Military Commission No. 34 is hereby
made permanent and the said respondents are
permanently prohibited from further pursuing Criminal
Case No. MC-34-1 against the petitioners. The sentence
rendered by the respondent Military Commission No. 34
imposing the death penalty on the petitioners is hereby
vacated for being null and void, and all the items or
properties taken from the petitioners in relation to the
said criminal case should be returned to them
immediately. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 75983 April 15, 1988
MANUEL R. CRUZ; PAULINO M. ARCEO;
ELPIDIO G. CACHO; ROGELIO P. GARCIA;
MANUEL M. DELA CRUZ; WILLIAM H.
LORENZANA; PABLO P. GARCIA; RODRIGO A.
HALASAN; ADRIANO B. CASTILLO;
LEONARDO L. PAQUINTO; NESTOR T.
LIWANAG; ALEXANDER P. ROXAS; PABLO M.
MERCADO; EDUARDO P. GARCIA; GERARDO
M. LUCAS; LEONIDES G. MAABO; BRAULIO
DEPUSOY; ALFREDO M. TILA; JEOFREY T.
METEORO; BENIGNO G. BANTOLINO;
ANTONIO P. DATUL; RENATO V. VENGCO;
EDGARDO TERRENAL; EDUARDO D. DELFIN;
CORNELIO C. TACDERAN; AMANCIO D.
LORIESTO; JOSE A. SELOTERIO; APOLONIO E.
ONIA; DOMINGO MARCO; ARTURO
VILLASANTA; ANTONIO OCCASIONES;
TEODORO C. CARANDANG; ROGELIO A.
GARCIA; ROMEO A. BASENSE; HARRY B.
BENLIRO; ROLANDO B. BENLIRO; JAMES A.
UMADHAY; VICENTE A. GENER; ERNESTO A.
CARPIO; MANUEL S. SALARDA; GETULIO B.
BRAGA, JR.; ARCADIO D. CELENDRO;
VIRGILIO P. GOMEZ; SERGIO R. PREYE;
CIRIACOM DELA GUARDIA; RODITO B.
SORIASO ANTONIO D. PUMAR; FEDERICO B.
VECINAL; CESARIO D. VECINAL; LORETO D.
VECINAL; ROGELIO D. VECINAL; MARCELO
B. DE MESA; JULIAN DE MESA; GAVINO B. DE
MESA; REMIGIO B. DE MESA; DANILO B. DE
MESA; ROLANDO P. TOLENTINO; ANASTACIO
P. DEL ROSARIO; REYNALDO C. REYES;
BENITO B. PANGANIBAN; ROMUALDO M.
MONTENEGRO; ROMULO C. OCAMPO;
DEMOCRITO M. SILVESTRE; SALLY B.
DIMAISIP; FILIPINO B. DE LEON; NARCISO G.
VIGO; TOMAS C. AMORTE; CATALINO S.
CRUZ; EDUARDO F. JAVIER; ROGELIO L.
CARICUNGAN; ERNESTO R. BARADI; RENE P.
CORTEZ; EDUARDO D. RAMIREZ; DONATO G.
CABONITALIA; CAMILO PATAO; JOSE
TORRES; ISABELO NARNE; ERIC F. PICHAY;
DELFIN PIANO; FRANCISCO PIANO; RUDY G.
ROMERO; MARIO G. MERCADO; JUANITO
PIANO; REYNOSO J. LAGMAY; PABLO S.
CALLEJO; FLORANTE SAGUN; RUSSEL A.
PAULINO; LAUREL LAMACA; RUFINO
GAMBOA; TIRSO F. BALA, JR.; ANTONIO
CRUZ; BENITO PUGAL; CASIMIRO PATAO;
ROGELIO PATAO; EULOGIO PUGAL; CARLITO
PUGAL; ANDRES PATAO; VICENTE ARCANO;
MARIANO YTURIAGA RODOLFO MANUEL;
EDUARDO ABIHAY; MANUEL CARREON;
CAMILO PIANO; LUCIO ARIMANDO PABLO
ACIERTO; EDUARDO PASCUAL; FERMIN
PUGAL; FLOR PIANO; RUDY PIANO; JUANITO
BAFUL; GODOFREDO RAQUEO; CALIXTO
SOMERA; HILARION PATAO; DELFIN B.
GUTIERREZ; TEODULO BUGARIN; JAIME A.
SABADO, JR.; ALMARIO VILLANUEVA;
APOLONIO SOMUDIO; OSCAR LITADA;
ROLANDO L. TOLENTINO; HERMINIO
BATONGBAKAL; ROGELIO TURION; NELSON
REMO; FERMIN CORREA; DOMINGO
SALAZAR; FELIPE PAREDES; DOMINGO
RECINTO; SILVANO BEATO; TOMAS GARCIA;
RODOLFO ABIHAY; MELCHOR CA-AMIK;
NELITO C. LONTOC; EDERLINO LACSINA;
DOMINGO R. REYES; RODOLFO D.
MANANSALA; ROSALINO R. DELOS SANTOS;
RONIE A. CELIZ; VIRGILIO M. MALGAPO;
DIONISIO C. CABRERA; ROGELIO V.
PORTILLO; JOSE D. PAMINTUAN; ROBERTO P.
GALVEZ; LINO B. DAPADAP; FERNANDO R.
ROMERO; LINO M. VILLARIN; EMILIANO P.
SICANGCO; PAULINO V. ZAMORA; LEONARDO
C. REYES; GUMAL A. SAMO; IMPERIAL D.
USMAN; GERUNDIO A. BOYLES; ELPIDIO L.
URBANO; ROMEO S. CANTADA; SOFRONIO B.
GALO; EUGENE D. BALANSAG; CIRILO P.
MARIANO; ROMEO C. CARIO EDGARDO L.
GOMEZ; EUGENIO CABAERO; AQUILINO
LEYRAN; ANTONIO A. HERMIDA; ALVARO P.
CABASAG; PRIMITIVO SULAYAD; TEODORO B.
PATANO; DOMINGO R. RODRIGUEZ; ROGER N.
MAGALLANES; SALVADOR 0. CALDERON;
LEOPOLDO B. ARCADIO; APLON M.
LINOGAMAN; JOSE E. ABRIA; JESUS N. ABRIA;
ANDRES P. PARADO; LARRY A. ARPON; JESSIE
CABAGUNAY; MANUEL A. BARQUILLIA;
DANIEL S. CINCO; TIMOTEO C. LLAMERA JR.;
ERNESTO D. DUMPA; ORLANDO G. ACSALAN;
BONIFACIO VALLETE; AGUSTIN VALLETE;
SAMSON ARANETA; ERNESTO DOCTOLERO;
AVELINO HABULAN; ROLANDO TUDIN;
CONRADO M. GLORIA; DANIEL G. CAMPOS;
JAIME F. CO; VIRGILIO ALEJANDRO;
SULPECIO L. REJUSO, JR.; MARCELO S.
GUESE; VICENTE PATAO; ROMEO IBAYAN;
DANILO MAGALLANES; RICARDO C. JARATA;
ERNESTO H. ABOLOC; DIOSDADO
RODRIGUEZ; ALFREDO P. PEREZ; FEDERICO
VILICINA; ROSENDO I. RAMOS; JOSE C.
SIOCHI; FEDERICO MARCELINO; BENJAMIN
V. TAN; DANILO CRUZ; CONSTANTE
CABANILIA; LEOPOLDO V. JOSE; PACIFICO
BATACAN; VICENTE SY; JOSE TORDESILLAS;
ANTONIO DEPUSOY; ARMANDO I. ULPINDO;
EDILBERTO LIBERATO; JIMMY C. REALIS;
SULPICIO C. REJUSO; GEDALTIE MARIN;
RENATO BALLESTEROS; and DEMOCRITO
LORAA petitioners,
vs.
MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GENERAL
FIDEL RAMOS, GENERAL (RET.) EMILIO N.
CEA, MINISTER NEPTALI GONZALES AND
BRIG. GENERAL SAMUEL SORIANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 79077 April 15, 1988
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS OF IMPERIAL D. USMAN
AND SAMU GUMAL, ACSARA GUMAL, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE,
THE PRESIDENT OF MILITARY COMMISSION
NO. 30, THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS AND THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondents.
G.R. Nos 79599-79600 April 15, 1988
CONRADO M. GLORIA AND DANILO V.
MAGALLANES, petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF (AFP), THE JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL (AFP), THE SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE, THE DIRECTOR OF
PRISONS, respondents.
G.R. No. 79862 April 15, 1988
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS IN BEHALF OF MANUEL DE
LA CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. MELITON GOYENA (RET.), IN HIS
CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF
PRISONS, respondents.
G.R. No. 80565 April 15, 1998
LEOPOLDO V. JOSE, petitioner,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, SECRETARY RAFAEL
IL ETO, GENERAL FIDEL RAMOS, SECRETARY
SEDFREY ORDOEZ AND BRIG. GEN. SAMUEL
SORIANO, respondents.
Leopoldo P. Dela Rosa for petitioners in 75983.
Anselmo M. Mabuti for petitioners D. Cruz and F.
Marcelino.
Lininding P. Pangandaman for petitioners in 79077.
Segundo M. Gloria, Jr. for petitioners in 79599-79600.
Jack L. Soriano for petitioner in 79862.
NARVASA, J.:
Habeas corpus proceedings were commenced in this
Court on October 1, 1986 1 to test the legality of the
continued detention of some 217 so-called "political
detainees 2 arrested in the nine-year span of official
martial rule and committed to the New Bilibid Prisons in
Muntinlupa. All had been made to stand trial for
common crimes 3 before various courts martial; 4 if any
of these offenses had any political color, this had neither
been pleaded nor proved.
Of the 217 prisoners, 157 are civilians, and only 26
confirmed as military personnel. 5 One hundred and
fifteen (115) accused had been condemned to die. Forty-
six (46) were sentenced to life imprisonment. To nine (9)
others were meted prison terms of from twenty to thirty
years; to forty-one (41), prison terms of ten to twenty
years; and to three (3), less than ten years.
The present status of their cases are disparate, as might
be expected. As of the date of filing of the petitions in
this Court, the sentences of sixty-eight (68) had become
final upon their approval by the Office of the
President, 6seventy-five (75) cases were pending review
in either that Office or before the Board of Military
Review, while the appeal or review of the remaining
seventy-three (73) cases either had been expressly
suspended pending the outcome of these petitions, or are
simply not dealt with in the records.
Presidential amnesty was granted to petitioner Virgilio
Alejandrino, 7 yet to this date he remains a prisoner at
the Penitentiary, as do Domingo Reyes, Antonio Pumar,
Teodoro Patano, Andres Parado and Daniel Campus,
although they were acquitted of the charges against
them, 8 and Reynaldo C. Reyes and Rosalino de los
Santos, who appear to have fully served the sentences
imposed on them by the military commissions which
convicted them. 9
The petitioners urge the Court to declare unconstitutional
the establishment of all military tribunals as well as
General Order No. 8 ordaining their creation, and the
nullity of all the proceedings had against them before
these bodies as a result of which they had been illegally
deprived of their liberty. Their plea is for the grant of a
retrial of their respective cases in the civil courts, where
their right to due process may be accorded
respect. 10 The writ of habeas corpus issued on July 31,
1987, two weeks after an amended petition 11 was filed
with leave of court, reiterating the arguments originally
pleaded, and setting forth the additional claim that the
pronouncement of this Court of the lack of jurisdiction
of military tribunals to try cases of civilians even during
martial rule, as declared in Olaquer, et al. vs. Military
Commission No. 34, et al., 12 entitled the petitioners to be
unconditionally freed from detention.
The Solicitor General's return of the writ in behalf of the
public respondents stated that the latter "offer no
objection or opposition to the release from detention of
petitioners-civilians ... (which) may be immediately
effected, unless there are other legal causes that may
warrant their detention ... (while) the other petitioners
who are military personnel x x should not be
released. 13 This return was shortly amended
14
however to urge that this Court take a "second look"
and undertake a "thorough re-examination of
the Olaquer decision," suggesting the inapplicability of
the ruling to "cases involving civilians charged with, and
convicted of common crimes and ... cases where the
detained accused have, in effect, fully served the
sentence by their continued detention for the duration of
the penalty imposed." Also suggested was the giving of
"limited retroactive" to the decision, considering the
consequences "of voiding earlier convictions, ... (such
as) The grant of immunity from prosecution as a result
of prescription or of the Statute of (L)imitations having
run, witnesses having been scattered and no longer
available, ... memories hav(ing) also been taxed beyond
permissible limits, ... and (the annulment) of acquittal
decisions, ... to the great prejudice of the rights of the
accused. 15
In Olaquer, this Court in no uncertain terms affed that
... a military jurisdiction or tribunal
cannot try and exercise jurisdiction,
even during the period of martial law,
over civilians for offenses allegedly
committed by them as long as the civil
courts are open and functioning, and that
any judgment rendered by such body
relating to a civilian is null and void for
lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
military tribunal concerned (People v.
Navarro, 63 SCRA 264, 274 [1975]).
For the same reasons, Our
pronouncement in Aquino, Jr. v. Military
Commission No. 2 (L-37364,63 SCRA
546) and all decided cases affirming the
same, in so far as they are inconsistent
with this pronouncement, should be
deemed abandoned. 16
Such is the statement of the doctrine squarely applicable
in these cases.
1. Clearly, no right to relief under Olaquer exists in
favor of the 26 petitioners who were admittedly in the
military service. 17 Over them the courts martial yardly
exercised jurisdiction. It need only be said that these
tribunals were created precisely to try and decide cases
of military personnel, and the validity of General Order
No. 8 ordaining their creation, although repeatedly
challenged on constitutional grounds, has as many times
been upheld by the Court, either expressly or
impliedly. 18 As to these petitioners, the writ is thus
unavailing.
2. Deference to the Olaquer decision impels on the other
hand the application thereof to all civilians, without
distinction, who were haled before military tribunals. To
be sure, due consideration was given to the submittal
that the doctrine is, or should be declared as, limited in
aplicability to "political of fenders," and not "ordinary
crimes" such as those of which the civilian petitioners
were convicted. 18a But distinction should not be set
where none were clearly intended. The issue in Olaquer,
as here, is the jurisdiction of courts martial over the
persons of civilians, and not merely over the crimes
imputed to them, regardless of which they are entitled to
trial by judicial, not executive or military process.
Conformably with this holding, the disposition of these
cases would necessarily have, as a premise, the
invalidity of any and all proceedings had before courts
martial against the civilian petitioners. There is all the
more reason to strike down the proceedings leading to
the conviction of these non-political detainees who
should have been brought before the courts of justice in
the first place, as their offenses are totally unrelated to
the insurgency avowedly sought to be controlled by
martial rule.
Due regard for consistency likewise dictates rejection of
the proposal to merely give "prospective effect"
to Olaquer. No distinction should be made, as the public
respondents propose, between cases still being tried and
those finally decided or already under review. All cases
must be treated alike, regardless of the stage they happen
to be in, and since according to Olaquer, all proceedings
before courts martial in cases involving civilians are null
and void, the court deems it proper to adhere to that
unequivocal pronouncement, perceiving no cogent
reason to deviate from the doctrine.
The fact cannot be ignored, however, that crimes appear
to have been committed, and there are accusations
against herein petitioners for those
offenses. Olaquer cannot and does not operate to absolve
the petitioners of these charges, or establish that the
same are baseless, so as to entitle them to immediate
release from detention. It is not to be forgotten that the
victims in offenses ascribed to the petitioners have as
much interest as the State has to prosecute the alleged
authors of the misdeeds. Justice will be better served if
the detention of such of the petitioners as are not hereby
ordered released or excepted, is continued until their
cases are transferred to the ordinary courts having
jurisdiction, and the necessary informations have been
filed against them therein, as has already been done in
the case of petitioners Imperial D. Usman and Samu
Gumal. 19 The State should be given a reasonable period
of time to accomplish this transfer, at which time the
petitioners may apply for bail for their temporary
release.
The Solicitor General not unreasonably anticipates
questions to arise as to the availability of certain
defenses to the petitioners upon their prosecution before
the civil courts. It seems evident, however, that no
breach of the constitutional prohibition against twice
putting an accused in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense 20 would result from the retrial of the
petitioners" cases, for the simple reason that the absence
of jurisdiction of the courts martial to try and convict the
petitioners prevented the first jeopardy from
attaching. 21 Valid previous proceedings are required in
order that the defense of double jeopardy can be raised
by the accused in the second prosecution. 22
Neither does the defense of prescription appear to be
available to the petitioners who, except for a handful,
were charged with offenses punishable by death
or reclusion perpetua, which prescribe in twenty
years. 23 Even the few not so charged cannot raise such
defense since the filing of the first indictments
suspended the running of the prescriptive period, and the
prosecutions under the informations to be filed should be
regarded as mere continuations of the previous
proceedings. 24 At the very least, the filing of the first
charges should be considered as having interrupted the
prescriptive period notwithstanding the lack of
jurisdiction of the military tribunal in which they were
filed, applying, by analogy, the ruling in People vs.
Olarte. 25
In fine, the Court holds that the merits of the indictments
against all these civilians are solely for the civil courts to
weigh and decide upon after due proceedings. Otherwise
stated, they are entitled to the retrial they have explicitly
requested of their respective cases in the civil courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted insofar as
petitioners Vergilio Alejandrino, 26 Domingo Reyes,
Antonio Pumar Teodoro Patono, Andres Parado, Del
Campus, 27 Reynaldo C. Reyes and Rosalino de los
Santos 28 are concerned. The Director of the Bureau of
Prisons is hereby ordered to effect the immediate release
of the above-mentioned petitioners, unless there are
other legal causes that may warrant their detention.
The petition is DISMISSED as to petitioners Elpidio
Cacho, William Lorenzana, Benigno Bantolino, Getulio
B. Braga, Jr., Tomas C. Amarte, Rogelio L. Caricungan,
Ernesto Baradiel, Isabelo Narne, Eric F. Pichay, Pablo
Callejo, Russel A. Paulino, Laurel Lamaca, Tirso F.
Bala, Calixto Somera, Edulino Lacsina (Draftee),
Ronnie A. Celiz, Elpidio Urbano, Sofronio Galo,
Aquilino Leyran, Leopoldo Arcadio, Rolando Tudin,
Rosendo I. Ramos, Pacifica Batacan, Edilberto Liberato,
Jimmy C. Realis, Democrito Loraa who are all military
personnel.
As to the other petitioners, the Department of Justice is
hereby DIRECTED TO FILE the necessary informations
against them in the courts having jurisdiction over the
offenses involved, within one hundred eighty (180) days
from notice of this decision, without prejudice to the
reproduction of the evidence submitted by the parties
and admitted by the Military Commission. If eventually
convicted, the period of the petitioners' detention shall
be credited in their favor.
The Courts wherein the necessary informations are filed
are DIRECTED TO CONDUCT with dispatch the
necessary proceedings inclusive of those for the grant of
bail which may be initiated by the accused.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines group leader Wong Kwok Wah (Sonny Wong) presented a
Supreme Court
Manila Baggage Declaration Form to Customs Examiner Gilda L.
Cinco (Cinco), who was then manning Lane 8 of the Express
FIRST DIVISION
Lane. Cinco examined the baggages of each of the 13
HO WAI PANG, G.R. No. passengers
176229 as their turn came up. From the first traveling bag,
Petitioner, she saw few personal belongings such as used clothing, shoes
and chocolate boxes which she pressed. When the second bag
Present:
was examined, she noticed chocolate boxes which were
almost of the same size as those in the first bag. Becoming
CORONA,
- versus - suspicious,
LEONARDO-DE she took out four of the chocolate boxes and
CASTRO,
opened one of them. Instead of chocolates, what she saw
BERSAMIN,
DEL inside was white crystalline substance contained in a white
VILLARAMA, JR.,
transparent plastic. Cinco thus immediately called the
attention of her immediate superiors Duty Collector Alalo and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
Respondent. Customs
October 19, 2011 Appraiser Nora Sancho who advised her to call the
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) and the police. Thereupon,
x------------------------------------------- she guided the tourists to the Intensive Counting Unit (ICU)
------------------------x while bringing with her the four chocolate boxes earlier
discovered.
DECISION
At the ICU, Cinco called the tourists one after the

DEL CASTILLO, J.: other using the passenger manifest and further examined their
bags. The bag of Law Ka Wang was first found to contain
Infraction of the rights of an accused during custodial three chocolate boxes. Next was petitioners bag which
investigation or the so-called Miranda Rights render contains nothing except for personal effects. Cinco, however,

inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission
made during such investigation.[1] The admissibility of other
evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not
otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if
obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation.[2]
recalled that two of the chocolate boxes earlier discovered at
the express lane belong to him. Wu Hing Sums bag followed
and same yielded three chocolate boxes while the baggages of
Ho Kin San, Chan Chit Yue and Tin San Mao each contained
two or three similar chocolate boxes. All in all, 18 chocolate
boxes were recovered from the baggages of the six accused.

Petitioner Ho Wai Pang (petitioner) in this present recourse
[3]
assails the June 16, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01459 affirming the April 6,
[4]
1995 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
118 of Pasay City in Criminal Case No. 91-1592, finding him
and his co-accused, namely, Law Ka Wang, Chan Chit Yue,
[5] [6] [7]
Wu Hing Sum, Tin San Mao and Kin San Ho guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 15, Article
III[8] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425 otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Also assailed is the January
16, 2007 CA Resolution[9] denying the motion
reconsideration thereto.
Factual Antecedents
On September 6, 1991, at around 11:30 in the evening, United
Arab Emirates Airlines Flight No. 068 from Hongkong
arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA). Among the passengers were 13 Hongkong nationals
who came to the Philippines as tourists.At the arrival area, the
NARCOM Agent Neowillie de Castro corroborated the
relevant testimony of Cinco pertaining to the presence of the
chocolate boxes. According to him, he conducted a test on the
white crystalline substance contained in said chocolate boxes
at the NAIA using the Mandelline Re-Agent Test.[10] The
result of his examination[11] of the white crystalline substance
yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu. Thereafter, the chocolate boxes were bundled
together with tape, placed inside a plastic bag and brought to
the Inbond Section.
for
The following day, September 7, 1991, the 13 tourists were
brought to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for
further questioning. The confiscated stuff were turned over to
the Forensic Chemist who weighed and examined
them. Findings show that its total weight is 31.1126 kilograms
and that the representative samples were positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.[12] Out of the 13 tourists, the
NBI found evidence for violation of R.A. No. 6425 only as
against petitioner and his five co-accused.

Accordingly, six separate Informations all dated September
19, 1991 were filed against petitioner and his co-
accused. These Informations were docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 91-1591 to 97. Subsequently, however, petitioner filed a
Motion for Reinvestigation[13] which the trial
granted. The reinvestigation conducted gave way to a finding
of conspiracy among the accused and this resulted to the filing
of a single Amended Information[14] under Criminal Case No.
91-1592 and to the withdrawal of the other Informations.
[15]
The Amended Information reads:
That on or about September 6, 1991 in
Pasay City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one
another, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously carry and
transport into the country without lawful
authority, 31.112 kilograms, more or less,
of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHL
ORIDE, also popularly known as SHABU,
a regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[16]
After pleading not guilty to the crime charged, [17] all the
accused testified almost identically, invoking denial as their
defense. They claimed that they have no knowledge about the
transportation of illegal substance (shabu) taken from their
traveling bags which were provided by the travel agency.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
[18]
On April 6, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision finding all
the accused guilty of violating Section 15, Article III of R.A.
No. 6425, as amended, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing
considered, the Court finds the accused
LAW KA WANG, CHAN CHIT YUE, HO
WAI PANG, WU HING SUM, TIN SUN
MAO, AND KIN SAN HO (HO KIN
SAN) GUILTY of Conspiracy in violating
Section 15, Article III, Republic Act No.
6425, as amended for having conspired to
transport into the Philippines 31.112
kilograms of methamp[h]etamine
hydrochloride, locally known as Shabu, and
they are hereby sentenced to suffer the
PENALTY OF IMPRISONMENT OF SIX
(6) [sic] RECLUSION PERPETUA AND
TO PAY EACH (SIC) THE AMOUNT OF
THIRTY (30) THOUSAND PESOS
(P30,000.00) each as FINE, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua is being imposed
pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659
considering its applicability to the accused
though retroactively for having a less stricter
penalty than that of life imprisonment
provided in Republic Act No. 6425. The
fine of P30,000.00 for each accused is
imposed pursuant to R.A. No. 6425 it being
more favorable to the accused [than] that
provided in R.A. No. 7659 WITH
IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION AFTER
SERVICE OF SENTENCE. The penalty of
death cannot be imposed since the offense
was committed prior to the effectivity of
court
R.A. No. 7659.
Let an alias warrant of arrest be
issued against accused WONG KOK WAH
@ SONNY WONG, CHAN TAK PIU, HO
WAI LING AND INOCENCIA CHENG.
SO ORDERED.[19]
From this judgment, all the accused appealed to this
Court where the case records were forwarded to per Order of
the RTC dated May 10, 1995.[20] Later, all the accused except
for petitioner, filed on separate dates their respective
withdrawal of appeal.[21] This Court, after being satisfied that
the withdrawing appellants were fully aware of the
consequences of their action, granted the withdrawal of their
respective appeals through a Resolution dated June 18, 1997.
[22]
Per Entry of Judgment, [23] said Resolution became final
and executory on July 7, 1997. Consequently, petitioner was
the only one left to pursue his appeal.
Petitioner filed his Brief[24] on April 6, 1998 while the
brief[25] for the respondent People of the Philippines was filed
on August 27, 1998 through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG). Per Resolution[26] dated August 30, 2004, this Court
referred the appeal to the CA for proper disposition and
determination pursuant to this Courts ruling in People v.
Mateo.[27]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On June 16, 2006, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the
Decision of the RTC. While conceding that petitioners
constitutional right to counsel during the custodial
investigation was indeed violated, it nevertheless went on to
hold that there were other evidence sufficient to warrant his
conviction. The CA also rebuked petitioners claim that he was
deprived of his constitutional and statutory right to confront
the witnesses against him. The CA gave credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and quoted with
favor the trial courts ratiocination regarding the existence of
conspiracy among the accused.
Undeterred, petitioner filed a Motion for
[28]
Reconsideration which the CA denied in its
Resolution [29]
dated January 16, 2007.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari anchored on the against
himself.
following grounds:

I Anent the error first assigned, petitioner takes issue on the fact
WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT
PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS that he was not assisted by a competent and independent
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY lawyer during the custodial investigation. He claimed that he
RIGHTS UNDER CUSTODIAL was not duly informed of his rights to remain silent and to
INVESTIGATION BOTH BY THE
CUSTOMS OFFICIALS AND BY THE have competent counsel of his choice. Hence, petitioner faults
NBI INVESTIGATORS, THE the CA in not excluding evidence taken during such
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING investigation.
EVIDENCE TAKEN DURING THE
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
While there is no dispute that petitioner was
II subjected to all the rituals of a custodial questioning by the
THE HONORABLE COURT OF customs authorities and the NBI in violation of his
APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER constitutional right under Section 12[31] of Article III of the
WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS Constitution, we must not, however, lose sight of the fact that
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
CONFRONT THE WITNESSES what said constitutional provision prohibits as evidence are
AGAINST HIM. only confessions and admissions of the accused as against
himself. Thus, in Aquino v. Paiste,[32] the Court categorically
ruled that the infractions of the so-called Miranda rights render
III inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING made during custodial investigation. The admissibility of
THAT THE PROSECUTIONS other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and
EVIDENCE FAILED TO ESTABLISH
THE EXISTENCE OF A CONSPIRACY. [are] not otherwise excluded by law or rules, [are] not affected
even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial
investigation.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING In the case at bench, petitioner did not make any confession or
THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO
PRESENT PROOF BEYOND admission during his custodial investigation. The prosecution
REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO did not present any extrajudicial confession extracted from
OVERTURN THE PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE ACCORDED TO him as evidence of his guilt. Moreover, no statement was
PETITIONER BY THE CONSTITUTION. taken from petitioner during his detention and subsequently
[30]
used in evidence against him. Verily, in determining the guilt
of the petitioner and his co-accused, the trial court based its
Decision on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and
OUR RULING
on the existence of the confiscated shabu. As the Court held
in People v. Buluran,[33] [a]ny allegation of violation of rights
The petition lacks merit. during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to
cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession
Section
extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their
12,
Article conviction. Hence, petitioners claim that the trial court erred in
III of the not excluding evidence taken during the custodial
Constitu
tion investigation deserves scant consideration.
prohibit
s as
evidenc Petitioner cannot take refuge in this Courts ruling in People v.
e only Wong Chuen Ming[34] to exculpate himself from the crime
confessi
charged. Though there are semblance in the facts, the case
ons and
admissi of Ming is not exactly on all fours with the present case. The
ons of disparity is clear from the evidence adduced upon which the
the
accused trial courts in each case relied on in rendering their respective
as decisions. Apparently in Ming, the trial court, in convicting
the accused, relied heavily on the signatures which they
affixed on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the plastic
bags. The Court construed the accuseds act of affixing their
signatures thereon as a tacit admission of the crime charged.
And, since the accused were not informed of their Miranda
rights when they affixed their signatures, the admission was
declared inadmissibleevidence for having been obtained in
violation of their constitutional rights. In ruling against the
accused, the trial court also gave credence to the sole
testimony of the customs examiner whom it presumed to have
performed his duties in regular manner. However, in reversing
the judgment of conviction, the Court noted that said
examiners testimony was not corroborated by other
prosecution witnesses.
On the other hand, petitioners conviction in the
present case was on the strength of his having been
caught in flagrante delicto transporting shabu into the
country and not on the basis of any confession or
admission. Moreover, the testimony of Cinco was found to be
direct, positive and credible by the trial court, hence it need not
be corroborated. Cinco witnessed the entire incident thus
providing direct evidence as eyewitness to the very act of the
commission of the crime. As the Court held in People v Dela
[35]
Cruz, [n]o rule exists which requires a testimony to be
corroborated to be adjudged credible. x x x Thus, it is not at all
uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the
testimony of a single witness despite the lack of corroboration,
where such testimony is found positive and credible by the
trial court. In such a case, the lone testimony is sufficient to
produce a conviction.
Indeed, a ruling in one case cannot simply be bodily lifted and
applied to another case when there are stark differences
between the two cases. Cases must be decided based on their
own unique facts and applicable law and jurisprudence.
Petition
er was
not
denied
of his
right to
confront
ation.
Turning now to the second assigned error, petitioner invokes
the pertinent provision of Section 14(2) of Article III of the
1987 Philippine Constitution providing for the right to
confrontation, viz:
Section 14. x x x
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right
to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance
of witnesses and the production of evidence
in his behalf. However, after arraignment,
trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused provided that he has
been duly notified and his failure to appear
is unjustifiable.
Petitioner asserts that he was deprived of his right to know and
understand what the witnesses testified to. According to him,
only a full understanding of what the witnesses would testify
to would enable an accused to comprehend the evidence being
offered against him and to refute it by cross-examination or by
his own countervailing evidence.
In refutation, the OSG countered that petitioner was given the
opportunity to confront his accusers and/or the witnesses of
the prosecution when his counsel cross-examined them. It is
petitioners call to hire an interpreter to understand the
proceedings before him and if he could not do so, he should
have manifested it before the court. At any rate, the OSG
contends that petitioner was nevertheless able to cross-
examine the prosecution witnesses and that such examination
suffices as compliance with petitioners right to confront the
witnesses against him.
We agree with the OSG.
As borne out by the records, petitioner did not register any
objection to the presentation of the prosecutions evidence
particularly on the testimony of Cinco despite the absence of
an interpreter. Moreover, it has not been shown that the lack of
an interpreter greatly prejudiced him. Still and all, the
important thing is that petitioner, through counsel, was able to
fully cross-examine Cinco and the other witnesses and test
their credibility. The right to confrontation is essentially a
guarantee that a defendant may cross-examine the witnesses
of the prosecution. In People v. Libo-on,[36] the Court held:
The right to confrontation is one of the
fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution to the person facing criminal
prosecution who should know, in fairness,
who his accusers are and must be given a
chance to cross-examine them on their
charges. The chief purpose of the right of
confrontation is to secure the opportunity for
cross-examination, so that if the opportunity
for cross-examination has been secured, the
function and test of confrontation has also
been accomplished, the confrontation being
merely the dramatic preliminary to cross-
examination.
Under the circumstances obtaining, petitioners constitutional
right to confront the witnesses against him was not impaired.
Conspir
acy
among
the
accused
was
duly
establis
hed.
Respecting the third assigned error, we uphold the
trial courts finding of conspiracy which was quoted by the
appellate court in its assailed Decision, and which we once
again herein reproduce with approval:
On the allegation of conspiracy, the Court
finds [no] direct evidence to conclude
conspiracy. However, just like in other cases
where conspiracy is not usually established
by direct evidence but by circumstantial
evidence, the Court finds that there are
enough circumstantial evidence which if
taken together sufficiently prove conspiracy.
First, it cannot be denied that the accused
somehow have known each other prior to
their [departure] in Hong Kong for Manila.
Although Law Ka Wang denied having
known any of the accused prior to the
incident in NAIA, accused Ho Wai Pang
identified him as the one who assisted him
in the supposed tour in the Philippines to the
extent of directly dealing with the travel
agency and [that] Law Ka Wang was the
one who received the personal things of Ho
Wai Pang allegedly to be place[d] in a bag
provided for by the travel agency. Accused
Wu Hing Sum has been known to accused
Ho Kin San for about two to three years as
they used to work as cooks in a restaurant
in Hong Kong. Accused Ho Wai Ling, who
is still at large, is know[n] to accused Chan
Chit Yue, Wu Hing Sum and Ho Kin San.
These relationships in a way can lead to the
presumption that they have the capability to
enter into a conspiracy. Second, all the
illegal substances confiscated from the six
accused were contained in chocolate boxes
of similar sizes and almost the same weight
all contained in their luggages. The Court
agrees with the finding of the trial
prosecutor that under the given
circumstances, the offense charged [c]ould
have been perpetrated only through an
elaborate and methodically planned
conspiracy with all the accused assiduously
cooperating and mutually helping each other
in order to ensure its success.[37]
We find no cogent reason to reverse such findings.
Conspiracy is [the] common design to commit a
felony.[38] [C]onspiracy which determines criminal culpability
need not entail a close personal association or at least an
acquaintance between or among the participants to a crime.
[39]
It need not be shown that the parties actually came together
and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a
common design.[40] The assent of the minds may be and, from
the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts
and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are
parts of some complete whole as we ruled in People v. Mateo,
Jr.[41] Here, it can be deduced from petitioner and his co-
accuseds collective conduct, viewed in its totality, that there
was a common design, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments in bringing about the crime committed.
Petition
ers guilt
was
proved
beyond
reasona
ble
doubt.
Finally, petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He makes capital on the
contention that no chocolate boxes were found in his traveling
bag when it was examined at the ICU. He claimed that it was
his co-accused Sonny Wong who took charge in ascribing
upon him the possession of the two chocolate boxes.
Petitioners contentions fail to persuade.
True, when principal prosecution witness Cinco first testified
on June 3, 1992, she declared that she did not see any
chocolate boxes but only personal effects in petitioners bag.
[42]
Nonetheless, she clarified in her succeeding testimony that
she recalls taking the two chocolate boxes from petitioners
bag when they were still at the counter. This sufficiently
explained why Cinco did not find any chocolate boxes from
petitioners bag when they were at the ICU.[43] To us, this slight
clash in Cincos statements neither dilute her credibility nor the
veracity of her testimony.
The trial courts words on this matter when it resolved
petitioners Demurrer to Evidence in its Order [44] of February
16, 1993 is quite enlightening. Thus
In claiming that the evidences [sic]
presented by the prosecution is insufficient
to command conviction, the Demurrer went
on to say that the testimony of Hilda Cinco
is either conjectural or hearsay and
definitely missed its mark in incriminating
accused, Ho Wai Pang, because she even
testified that she found nothing inside the
hand-carried luggage of Ho Wai Pang (pp.
48-49, TSN, June 3, 1992). But that was
when investigation was going on at the
Intensive Counting Unit (ICU). However,
 the same Hilda Cinco later on testified that
from the express lane in going to the ICU,
after the discovery of shabu, she was already All told, we are convinced that the courts below committed no
carrying with her four (4) chocolate boxes, error in adjudging petitioner guilty of transporting
two of [which] taken from the bag of Tin
Sun Mau and the other two retrieved from methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu into the country in
the luggage of herein movant, Ho Wai Pang. violation of Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as
Categorically, Cinco admitted it was the
amended.
reason that at the ICU, Ho Wai Pangs bag
was already empty (pp. 53-54, TSN, June 3,
1992), but she nonetheless recognized the Penalty
bag and could recall the owner thereof,
pointing to Ho Wai Pang. Such testimony is
not hearsay evidence. They are facts from As to the penalties imposed by the trial court and as
the personal perception of the witness and
out of her personal knowledge. Neither is it affirmed by the appellate court, we find the same in accord
conjectural.[45] with law and jurisprudence. It should be recalled that at the
time of the commission of the crime on September 6, 1991,
Section 15 of R.A. No. 6425 was already amended by
Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a
Presidential Decree No. 1683.[48] The decree provided that for
witness, his testimony must be considered in its entirety
violation of said Section 15, the penalty of life imprisonment
instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a
to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00
testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and anchor a
shall be imposed. Subsequently, however, R.A. No.
conclusion on the basis of said parts. In ascertaining the facts
7659[49]further introduced new amendments to Section 15,
established by a witness, everything stated by him on direct,
Article III and Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425, as
cross and redirect examinations must be calibrated and
amended. Under the new amendments, the penalty prescribed
considered.[46] Also, where there is nothing in the records
in Section 15 was changed from life imprisonment to death
which would show a motive or reason on the part of the
and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00
witnesses to falsely implicate the accused, identification
to reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
should be given full weight. Here, petitioner presented no
from P500,000.00 to P10 million. On the other hand, Section
evidence or anything to indicate that the principal witness for
17 of R.A. No. 7659 amended Section 20, Article IV of R.A.
the prosecution, Cinco, was moved by any improper motive,
No. 6425 in that the new penalty provided by the amendatory
hence her testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
law shall be applied depending on the quantity of the
dangerous drugs involved.
Verily, the evidence adduced against petitioner is so
overwhelming that this Court is convinced that his guilt has
The trial court, in this case, imposed on petitioner the penalty
been established beyond reasonable doubt. Nothing else can
of reclusion perpetua under R.A. No. 7659 rather than life
speak so eloquently of his culpability than the unassailable
imprisonment ratiocinating that R.A. No. 7659 could be given
fact that he was caught red-handed in the very act of
retroactive application, it being more favorable to the
transporting, along with his co-accused, shabu into the
petitioner in view of its having a less stricter punishment.
country. In stark contrast, the evidence for the defense consists
mainly of denials.
We agree. In People v. Doroja,[50] we held:

Petitioner tried to show that he was not aware of

the shabu inside his luggage considering that his bag was
provided by the travel agency. However, it bears stressing that
the act of transporting a prohibited drug is
a malum prohibitum because it is punished as an offense
under a special law. As such, the mere commission of the act
is what constitutes the offense punished and same suffices to
validly charge and convict an individual caught committing
the act so punished regardless of criminal intent. Moreover,
beyond his bare denials, petitioner has not presented any
plausible proof to successfully rebut the evidence for the
prosecution. It is basic that affirmative testimony of persons
who are eyewitnesses of the events or facts asserted easily
overrides negative testimony.[47]
In People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No. 93028,
29 July 1994) this Court ruled (a) that the
amendatory law, being more lenient and
favorable to the accused than the original
provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
should be accorded retroactive application, x
x x.
And, since reclusion perpetua is a lighter penalty than life
imprisonment, and considering the rule that criminal statutes
with a favorable effect to the accused, have, as to him, a
retroactive effect,[51] the penalty imposed by the trial court
upon petitioner is proper.Consequently, the Court sustains the
penalty of imprisonment, which is reclusion perpetua, as well
as the amount of fine imposed by the trial court upon
petitioner, the same being more favorable to him.

WHEREFORE premises considered, the petition is

DENIED and the assailed June 16, 2006 Decision
and January 16, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01459 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-37933 April 15, 1988
FISCAL CELSO M. GIMENEZ and FEDERICO B.
MERCADO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RAMON E. NAZARENO, Presiding Judge,
Court of First Instance of Cebu and TEODORO DE
LA VEGA, JR., respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
Victor de la Serna for respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Two basic issues are raised for Our resolution in this
petition for certiorari and mandamus. The first is
whether or not a court loses jurisdiction over an accused
who after being arraigned, escapes from the custody of
the law. The other issue is whether or not under Section
19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, an accused who
has been duly tried in absentia retains his right to present
evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-
examine witnesses who testified against him.
The following facts are not in dispute:
On August 3, 1973, Samson Suan, Alex Potot, Rogelio
Mula, Fernando Cargando, Rogelio Baguio and the
herein private respondent Teodoro de la Vega Jr., were
charged with the crime of murder.
On August 22, 1973 all the above-named. accused were
arraigned and each of them pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged. Following the arraignment, the
respondent judge, Hon. Ramon E. Nazareno, set the
hearing of the case for September 18, 1973 at 1:00
o'clock in the afternoon. All the acused including private
respondent, were duly informed of this.
Before the scheduled date of the first hearing the private
respondent escaped from his detention center and on the
said date, failed to appear in court. This prompted the
fiscals handling the case (the petitioners herein) to file a
motion with the lower court to proceed with the hearing
of the case against all the accused praying that private
respondent de la Vega, Jr. be tried in absentia invoking
the application of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution which provides:
SEC. 19. In all criminal prosecution, the
accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy, impartial,
and public trial, to meet the witnesses
face to face, and to have compulsory
process to the attendance of witnesses
and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment trial
may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused provided that he
has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustified. (Emphasis
supplied.) *
Pursuant to the above-written provision, the lower court
proceeded with the trial of the case but nevertheless gave
the private respondent the opportunity to take the
witness stand the moment he shows up in court. 1
After due trial, or on November 6,1973, the lower court
rendered a decision dismissing the case against the five
accused while holding in abeyance the proceedings
against the private respondent. The dispositive portion is
as follows:
WHEREFORE, insofar as the accused
Samson Suan Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula
Fernando Cargando and Rogelio Baguio
are concerned, this case is hereby
dismissed. The City Warden of Lapu-
Lapu City is hereby ordered to release
these accused if they are no longer
serving sentence of conviction involving
other crimes.
The proceedings in this case against the
accused Teodoro de la Vega, Jr. who has
escaped on August 30,1973 shall remain
pending, without prejudice on the part of
the said accused to cross-examine the
witnesses for the prosecution and to
present his defense whenever the court
acquires back the jurisdiction over his
person. 2
On November 16,1973 the petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration questioning the above-quoted
dispositive portion on the ground that it will render
nugatory the constitutional provision on "trial in
absentia" cited earlier. However, this was denied by the
lower court in an Order dated November 22, 1973.
Hence, this petition.
The respondent court, in its Order denying the Motion
for Reconsideration filed by the herein petitioners,
expressed the opinion that under Section 19, Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution, the private respondent, who
was tried in absentia, did not lose his right to cross-
examine the witnesses for the prosecution and present
his evidence. 3 The reasoning of the said court is that
under the same provision, all accused should be
presumed innocent. 4 Furthermore the lower court
maintains that jurisdiction over private respondent de la
Vega, Jr. was lost when he escaped and that his right to
cross-examine and present evidence must not be denied
him once jurisdiction over his person is reacquired. 5
We disagree.
First of all, it is not disputed that the lower court
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused-
private respondent when he appeared during the
arraignment on August 22,1973 and pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged. In cases criminal, jurisdiction over
the person of the accused is acquired either by his arrest
for voluntary appearance in court. Such voluntary
appearance is accomplished by appearing for
arraignment as what accused-private respondent did in
this case.
But the question is this was that jurisdiction lost when
the accused escaped from the custody of the law and
failed to appear during the trial? We answer this question
in the negative. As We have consistently ruled in several
earlier cases,6 jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon
the instance of parties but continues until the case is
terminated.
To capsulize the foregoing discussion, suffice it to say
that where the accused appears at the arraignment and
pleads not guilty to the crime charged, jurisdiction is
acquired by the court over his person and this continues
until the termination of the case, notwithstanding his
escape from the custody of the law.
Going to the second part of Section 19, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution aforecited a "trial in absentia"may be
had when the following requisites are present: (1) that
there has been an arraignment; (2) that the accused has
been notified; and (3) that he fails to appear and his
failure to do so is unjustified.
In this case, all the above conditions were attendant
calling for a trial in absentia. As the facts show, the
private respondent was arraigned on August 22, 1973
and in the said arraignment he pleaded not guilty. He
was also informed of the scheduled hearings set on
September 18 and 19, 1973 and this is evidenced by his
signature on the notice issued by the lower Court. 7 It
was also proved by a certified copy of the Police
Blotter 8 that private respondent escaped from his
detention center. No explanation for his failure to appear
in court in any of the scheduled hearings was given.
Even the trial court considered his absence unjustified.
The lower court in accordance with the aforestated
provisions of the 1973 Constitution, correctly proceeded
with the reception of the evidence of the prosecution and
the other accused in the absence of private respondent,
but it erred when it suspended the proceedings as to the
private respondent and rendered a decision as to the
other accused only.
Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has
the duty to rule upon the evidence presented in court.
The court need not wait for the time until the accused
who who escape from custody finally decides to appear
in court to present his evidence and moss e the witnesses
against him. To allow the delay of proceedings for this
purpose is to render ineffective the constitutional
provision on trial in absentia. As it has been aptly
explained:
. . . The Constitutional Convention felt
the need for such a provision as there
were quite a number of reported
instances where the proceedings against
a defendant had to be stayed indefinitely
because of his non- appearance. What
the Constitution guarantees him is a fair
trial, not continued enjoyment of his
freedom even if his guilt could be
proved. With the categorical statement
in the fundamental law that his absence
cannot justify a delay provided that he
has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustified, such an abuse
could be remedied. That is the way it
should be, for both society and the
offended party have a legitimate interest
in seeing to it that crime should not go
unpunished. 9
The contention of the respondent judge that the right of
the accused to be presumed innocent will be violated if a
judgment is rendered as to him is untenable. He is still
presumed innocent. A judgment of conviction must still
be based upon the evidence presented in court. Such
evidence must prove him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. Also, there can be no violation of due process
since the accused was given the opportunity to be heard.
Nor can it be said that an escapee who has been tried in
absentia retains his rights to cross-examine and to
present evidence on his behalf. By his failure to appear
during the trial of which he had notice, he virtually
waived these rights. This Court has consistently held that
the right of the accused to confrontation and cross-
examination of witnesses is a personal right and may be
waived. 10 In the same vein, his right to present evidence
on his behalf, a right given to him for his own benefit
and protection, may be waived by him.
Finally, at this point, We note that Our pronouncement in
this case is buttressed by the provisions of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 1 (c)
of Rule 115 which clearly reflects the intention of the
framers of our Constitution, to wit:
... The absence of the accused without
any justifiable cause at the trial on a
particular date of which he had notice
shall be considered a waiver of his right
to be present during that trial. When an
accused under custody had been notified
of the date of the trail and escapes, he
shall be deemed to have waived his right
to be present on said date and on all
subsequent trial dates until custody in
regained....
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so
hold, that an escapee who has been duly tried in
absentia waives his right to present evidence on his own
behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who
testified against him. 11
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the judgment
of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 112-L in so far as
it suspends the proceedings against the herein private
respondent Teodoro de la Vega, Jr. is reversed and set
aside. The respondent judge is hereby directed to render
judgment upon the innocence or guilt of the herein
private respondent Teodoro de la Vega, Jr. in accordance
with the evidence adduced and the applicable law.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ-96-1353. March 11, 1997]
DANILO B. PARADA, complainant, vs. JUDGE
LORENZO B. VENERACION, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 47,
MANILA, respondent.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
The case before us stems from a verified
complaint filed by Danilo B. Parada against respondent
Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion for gross ignorance of the
law, abuse of authority and rendering unjust and
erroneous interlocutory orders and judgment in
connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 93-121385 to 88,
entitled People vs. Danilo Parada, which led to
complainant Paradas premature incarceration at the
Makati City Jail and Muntinlupa National Penitentiary.
The undisputed facts of the case as found by the
Office of the Court Administrator are as follows :
Complainant herein is the accused in the
aforementioned case for four (4) counts
of estafa which were initially raffled to Branch
30, RTC, Manila presided by Judge Senecio
Ortile. Complainant is also duly bonded with
the Eastern Assurance and Surety Corporation
(EASCO). On October 23, 1993 complainant
notified said court formally thru counsel of his
change of address from 219 Cityland
Condominium, Buendia Extension, Makati,
Metro Manila to 2412 Nobel St., Bo. San
Isidro, Makati, Metro Manila. On October 27,
1993 he also notified the Manager of the
bonding company of his change of address. On
February 8, 1994, Judge Ortile inhibited
himself from trying the said case and thus, the
case was re-raffled to the sala of respondent
Judge Lorenzo Veneracion, and per order of
April 26, 1994, the hearing of the case was set
for June 3, 6, 7 and 8, 1994. Apparently, the
notice of hearing dated April 27, 1994 was sent
to complainants former address and that for
failure of accused-complainant to appear on
June 3, 1994, respondent ordered the arrest of
herein accused-complainant, ordering the
confiscation of the bond and a trial in
absentia was conducted. Respondent Judge
likewise assigned a counsel de officio, Atty.
Jesse Tiburan of the Public Attorneys Office
(PAO) as counsel for the accused.
xxx Furthermore, a warrant of arrest was
issued on June 3, 1994 with no bail
recommended.
On June 6, 7 and 8, 1994, respondent court
issued orders noting the failure of the
petitioner to appear and proceeded with the
trial in absentia. On the hearing of June 8,
1994, the motion of counsel de officio of
accused-complainant that defense be allowed
to present evidence upon petitioners arrest, was
denied and further held that the failure of the
accused to appear is a waiver of his right to
adduce evidence.
xxx. On November 25, 1994, a decision was
rendered convicting herein accused-appellant
of the crime and the decision was promulgated
despite his absence. Accused-complainant was
arrested and brought to the Makati City Jail.
Accused-complainant filed a Petition
for Habeas Corpus, Certiorari and Annulment
of Judgment with prayer for immediate relief
with the Court of Appeals and was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 37340 entitled Danilo
Parada vs. Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion, et.
al..
On August 18, 1995, the Court of Appeals
promulgated a decision declaring the decision
dated November 25, 1995 of respondent court
null and void and further ordering the case to
be remanded to respondent for further
proceeding in order to afford accused-
complainant the opportunity to rebut the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and
documentary evidence against him as well as
present his evidence.[1]
Subsequently, Parada filed with this Court the
instant complaint dated March 11, 1996 against the
respondent Judge Veneracion in connection with the
decision and interlocutory orders rendered by the latter
in Criminal Cases Nos. 93-121385 to 88. He
alleged, inter alia, that the respondent Judge is guilty of
ignorance of the law when he did not follow the legal
requirements of a valid trial in absentia which led to his
conviction and premature incarceration, that the order of
his arrest with no recommendation for bail was
erroneous, and that respondent Judge abused his
authority when he issued the June 8, 1994 order denying
the motion of Paradas counsel de oficio to allow him to
present his evidence upon his arrest. Parada thus prayed
for the dismissal from service of the respondent Judge
and that the latter be barred from railroading the subject
Criminal Cases Nos. 93-121385 to 88.
On June 4, 1996, the Office of the Court
Administrator received the respondent Judges comment
to Paradas complaint, the pertinent portion of which
reads:
xxx
1. That the herein complaint is purely and
plainly a harassment suit arising from the
Decision rendered in the case of People vs.
Danilo Parada for estafa;
2. That the charges therein are denied because
they are not based on the facts and of the
records of the case, the herein Judge merely
acted with compassion upon receipt of the
records of these cases from another sala, after
having been informed that the private
complainants merely borrowed from loan
sharks the money given to the accused Danilo
Parada and that they are only interested in
compelling said accused to return their money,
not in sending said accused to jail;
3. That the herein Judge acted in good faith in
the trial of the said cases.[2]
 Unfazed by the foregoing assertions of the
respondent Judge, the Office of the Court
Administrator on the contrary held that:
xxx
Respondents general denial of the allegations
imputed to him does not belie any of the facts
which lead to the incarceration of the
complainant. Thus, his failure to deny each and
every specific allegations can be construed as
admission on his part.
Moreover, trial in absentia may proceed only if
the accused failed to appear at the trial without
justification despite due notice. In this case,
complainant was never notified of any hearing
from the time he changed his address up to the
promulgation of the decision despite the fact
that he notified the court and his bonding
company.
xxx
Respondent issued a warrant for the arrest of
the accused-complainant with no bail
recommended despite the fact that the crime
charged was bailable and denied the motion of
his counsel for the accused to adduce evidence
upon accuseds arrest. Clearly, respondent
denied complainant his right to due process.[3]
On the basis of these observations, the Office of the
Court Administrator recommended that respondent
Judge Veneracion be fined in the amount of P10,000.00
with a warning that a commission of the same or similar
infraction shall be dealt with more severely.
We agree with the findings of the Office of the
Court Administrator.
Section 14 (2), Article 3 of the Constitution
provides, inter alia, that trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that
he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable. The requisites then of a valid trial in
absentia are: (1) the accused has already been arraigned;
(2) he has been duly notified of the trial; and (3) his
failure to appear is unjustifiable.[4]
In the subject criminal cases, requisite numbers two
(2) and three (3) of a valid trial in absentia are clearly
wanting. Parada had not been duly notified of the trial
because the notice of hearing dated April 27, 1994 was
sent to the former address of Paradas counsel despite the
fact that the latter formally notified the court of his
change of address. His failure to appear therefore in the
June 3, 6, 7 and 8, 1994 hearings is justified by the
absence of a valid service of notice of hearing to him.
As a rule, where a party appears by attorney in an
action or proceeding in a court of record, all notices
required to be given therein must be given to the
attorney of record.[5] Accordingly, notices to counsel
should be properly sent to his address of record and
unless the counsel files a notice of change of address, his
official address remains to be that of his address of
record.[6]
It is undisputed that Paradas counsel filed a notice
of change of address on October 23, 1993. As such, the
respondent judge should have already taken cognizance
of the new address when it sent the notice of hearing
dated April 27, 1994. It is thus unwarranted for the
respondent judge to still send the notice of hearing to the
old address of Paradas counsel because it is not his
official address nor his address of record. Concomitantly,
the sending of notice of hearing to his former address is
an invalid service and cannot in any way bind Parada.
It is worthy to stress that due process of law in
judicial proceedings requires that the accused must be
given an opportunity to be heard. He has the right to be
present and defend in person at every stage of the
proceedings. Incidentally, the right to a hearing carries
with it the right to be notified of every incident of the
proceedings in court. Notice to a party is essential to
enable him to adduce his own evidence and to meet and
refute the evidence submitted by the other party.[7] No
less than the Constitution provides that no person shall
be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law. A violation therefore of any of the rights
accorded the accused constitutes a denial of due process
of law. The circumstantial setting of the instant case as
weighed by the basic standards of fair play impels us to
so hold that the trial in absentia of Parada and his
subsequent conviction are tainted with the vice of nullity,
for evidently Parada was denied due process of law.
Judges, by the very delicate nature of their
functions in dispensing justice, should be more
circumspect in the performance of their duties. [8] In
resolving matters in litigation, they should endeavor
assiduously to ascertain the facts and the applicable
laws. Had respondent judge carefully and diligently
studied the records of the case, he would have surely
noticed the change of address, and his questioned orders,
which eventually led to Paradas unwarranted deprivation
of liberty, could not have been precipitately issued.
Likewise, the warrant of arrest with no
recommendation for bail that was issued by respondent
Judge on June 3, 1994 is a downright violation of
Paradas constitutional right to bail. The rule is clear that
unless charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua and the evidence of guilt is strong, all persons
detained, arrested or otherwise under the custody of the
law are entitled to bail as a matter of right. It should be
noted that the crime with which Parada was charged
is estafa[9] which is undoubtedly a bailable offense. This
circumstance could not have escaped the attention of the
respondent judge when he issued on June 3, 1994 the
order of arrest of Parada with no recommendation for his
bail. In so doing, respondent judge exhibited that degree
of ignorance so gross which the Court can not
countenance. Judges are required by Canon 3, Rule 3.01
of the Code of Judicial Conduct to be faithful to the law
and maintain professional competence. [10] They are
called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is
imperative that he be conversant with basic legal
principles.[11]
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Lorenzo B.
Veneracion is FINED P10,000.00 for disregarding
Paradas right to procedural due process and for showing
gross ignorance of the law, with a STERN WARNING
that a repetition of a similar act in the future will be dealt
with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 166980 April 4, 2007
CARMELO C. BERNARDO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and F.T. YLANG-
YLANG MARKETING
CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner Carmelo C. Bernardo assails the
Resolutions1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 30,
2004 and January 14, 2005 dismissing his petition and
denying reconsideration, respectively.
Petitioner was charged before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Manila with six counts of violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22), otherwise known
as the Bouncing Checks Law, for issuing on December
3, 1997 six postdated checks in equal amounts
of P22,500. Save for the check numbers and dates of
maturity, four Informations under Criminal Case Nos.
320977 to 320980 were similarly worded as follows:
That on or about December 3, 1997, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously make or draw and issue
to F.T. YLANG-YLANG MARKETING, CORP. rep. by
Dennis Tan to apply on account or for value
PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK check no. 0007806
[0007805, 0007804, 0007803] dated April 30, [March
30, February 28, January 30] 1998 payable to YLANG-
YLANG MFG. in the amount of P22,500.00 said
accused well knowing that at the time of issue she did
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check when presented for payment
within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for reason
"Account Closed" and despite receipt of notice of such
dishonor, said accused failed to pay said F.T. YLANG-
YLANG MARKETING CORP. the amount of the check
or to make arrangement for full payment of the same
within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
Contrary to law.2
The two Informations under Criminal Case Nos.
320975-76 averred that Check Nos. 0007808 and
0007807 respectively dated June 30, 1998 and May 30,
1998 "would be dishonored by the drawee bank for the
reason Account Closed if presented for payment as the
account against which it was drawn ha[d] already been
closed even before [their] said date[s]."3
Upon arraignment, petitioner, assisted by a counsel de
oficio, pleaded "not guilty" to the offenses charged. At
the pre-trial conference on August 25, 1999, petitioner
failed to appear despite notice, prompting Branch 24 of
the MeTC to issue a warrant of arrest against him and set
the cases for trial in absentia.
After the prosecution presented its first witness,
petitioner filed a Waiver of Appearance, a Motion to Lift
Warrant of Arrest, and a Motion to Quash on the ground
that the facts charged in the Informations under Criminal
Case Nos. 320975-76 do not constitute an offense.
By Order of April 5, 2000, the trial court lifted the
warrant of arrest in view of petitioners appearance but
denied the Motion to Quash for lack of merit.
At the following trial date, petitioner failed to appear
despite notice, drawing the trial court to proceed with his
trial in absentia and issue warrant of arrest4 against him.
By Decision5 of October 23, 2001 promulgated in
absentia on December 13, 2001, the trial court found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
B.P. 22 in all the cases. He was, in each case, sentenced
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of One (1) Year, to
pay a fine of Twenty-Two Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P22,500), and to indemnify private complainant in the
amount of Twenty-Two Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P22,500).
Ten months following the promulgation of the judgment,
petitioner posted a bond before another branch of the
court. Petitioner having been convicted and no motion
having been filed for his provisional liberty pending any
appeal from or motion for reconsideration of the
Decision, the trial court cancelled the bond and issued an
alias warrant of arrest.6
Petitioner thereupon filed an Urgent Motion for New
Trial and/or to Set Aside Trial and Judgment (Motion for
New Trial) which was, by Order 7 of January 10, 2003,
denied following his and his counsels failure to appear
at the hearing of the motion and comply with the rule on
proper service of a motion.8 Petitioners Urgent Motion
for Reconsideration was likewise denied, by Order 9 of
May 26, 2003.
Petitioner appealed the Orders dated January 10, 2003
and May 26, 2003 as well as the Decision dated October
23, 2001 to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 26 of which, by Decision of December 22, 2003,
affirmed10 the judgment with modification as to the
penalties imposed, thus:
WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, the
appealed decision is hereby affirmed with modification.
This Court finds accused/appellant Carmelo C. Bernardo
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 but set [sic] aside the penalty of
imprisonment and hereby sentences her [sic] to pay a
fine of P22,500.00 in each case, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency or non-payment not
to exceed six (6) months, and, to pay private
complainant F.T. YLANG-YLANG MARKETING
CORPORATION the total amount of P113,500.00 by
way of indemnity.
Meanwhile, the alias warrant of arrest issued against
accused x x x
is hereby ordered lifted and set aside.
No pronouncement as to costs. (Underscoring supplied)
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
the RTC decision but it was denied.
Unsatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the CA.
Petitioner filed with the appellate court a Motion for
Extension of Time to File Petition for Review within 30
days from June 1, 2004, the 15th day from his counsels
receipt of the RTC Order denying his Motion for Partial
Reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals, by Resolution of June 21, 2004,
granted petitioner an extension, but only 15 days
pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 42,12 to file his Petition.
Apparently unaware of the above-said Resolution of
June 21, 2004 under which his petition would be filed
not later than June 16, 2004, petitioner used up the 30-
day extension sought and filed his petition on July 1,
2004. Petitioner in fact received the June 21, 2004
Resolution only on July 9, 2004.13
By Resolution14 of July 30, 2004, the appellate court
denied petitioners petition due course for having been
filed 15 days late and for failure to attach the MeTC
Decision and other pertinent and material documents.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was likewise
denied by Resolution15 of January 14, 2005, the appellate
court noting that the MeTC Decision attached to the
Motion for Reconsideration was a mere photocopy and
uncertified.
Hence, the instant petition faulting the appellate court:
A. . . . IN RECKONING THE PERIOD OF 15 DAYS
EXTENSION FROM THE EXPIRY DATE OF THE
ORIGINAL PERIOD OF 15 DAYS FROM RECEIPT
OF THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OR FINAL ORDER APPEALED FROM,
INSTEAD OF FROM DATE OF THE RECEIPT OF
THE ORDER GRANTING EXTENSION;
B. . . . IN APPLYING THE RULES OF PROCEDURE
VERY STRICTLY AND IN UTTER DISREGARD OF
ITS INTERNAL RULES WHICH LIBERALLY
ALLOW COMPLETION OF PORTIONS OF
RECORDS IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULES
AND THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE APPLYING
LIBERALLY THE RULES OF PROCEDURE;
C. . . . [IN NOT] CONSIDER[ING] THE MERITS OF
THE PETITION FOR REVIEW.16 (Underscoring
supplied)
Petitioner argues that the 15-day extension granted to
him by the appellate court should be reckoned from his
date of receipt of its June 21, 2004 Resolution.
The argument fails. A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC 17 issued on
February 29, 2000 is clear. It provides that "[a]ny
extension of time to file the required pleading should . . .
be counted from the expiration of the period . . ." The
extension should thus be tacked to the original period, to
commence immediately after the expiration of such
period. The court has no discretion to reckon the
commencement of the extension from a date later than
the expiration of such original period, not even if the
expiry date is a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday.18
Petitioners reliance on the 1989 case of Vda. de
Capulong v. Workmens Insurance Co., Inc.19 on this
point does not thus lie. Parenthetically, the factual
milieus in Vda. de Capulong and the present case are
dissimilar. The respondent in Vda. de Capulong
specifically moved that it be given an additional period
"from receipt of the order" of the court allowing
extension, and the court granted an extension of time
without indicating when it would commence. In the
present case, petitioner prayed for a period of extension
to be counted from the expiration of the original period
or "from June 1, 2004," which date the appellate court
correctly used in reckoning the extension.20
Petitioner goes on to fault the appellate court in not
resolving his motion for extension before the expiration
of the 15-day extension so that he would have known
that his request for 30 days was not granted.
Petitioners position does not lie too.
Section 1 of Rule 42 is clear. The Court of Appeals may
grant an "additional period of 15 days only" within
which to file the petition for review. Albeit under the
same section, a "further extension" not to exceed 15 days
may be granted "for the most compelling reason,"
petitioner had no basis to assume that his request for a
30-day extension is meritorious and would be granted.21
Motions for extension are not granted as a matter of right
but in the sound discretion of the court, and lawyers
should never presume that their motions for extension or
postponement would be granted or that they would be
granted the length of time they pray for.22
Petitioner claims, however, that his motion for extension
presented a compelling reason for the grant of a further
extension. Justifying the 30-day period sought, petitioner
explains that he was implicitly seeking both a 15-day
extension and a further extension of 15 days.
The wording of the rule with respect to further extension
is couched in restrictive terms. Section 1 of Rule 42
provides that "[n]o further extension shall be granted
except for the most compelling reason and in no case to
exceed fifteen (15) days."
Petitioners motion for extension was anchored on a lone
ground, his counsels being "pre-occupied in the
preparation of petitions, memoranda, briefs, and other
lengthy pleadings in cases as important as this case" and
in "daily court appearance and personal commitments."
Sustaining petitioners lone ground would obliterate the
distinguishing essence of a further extension for it would
do away with the necessity of presenting compelling
grounds addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
But crediting arguendo petitioners "implicit"
justification, this Court sees no reason to disturb the
exercise by the appellate court of its discretion in
denying a "cumulative" extension and in effectively
ruling that heavy workload of counsel is not a most
compelling reason.
Respecting the second assigned error, the CA correctly
dismissed petitioners appeal for failure to comply with
Section 2 (d) of Rule 42, which specifically requires
that both lower courts judgments or final orders must be
attached to the petition in the required form clearly
legible duplicate originals or certified true copies.
Indeed, petitioner fell short in his compliance. He
attached to his petition only the RTC Decision of
December 22, 2003 and its Order of May 4, 2004. He
did not attach thereto the MeTC Orders dated January
10, 2003 and May 26, 2003, and the Decision dated
October 23, 2001 which were appealed 23 to the RTC and
which were likewise adverse to him. 24 While to his
Motion for Reconsideration, he attached the October 23,
2001 Decision, it was not in the required form, and while
he attached a duplicate original of the May 26, 2003
Order, he failed to submit the January 10, 2003 Order.
There is no cogent reason to deviate from such
requirement under Section 2(d) of Rule 42,
the mandatory tenor of which has been held to be
discernible and well settled.25
Petitioner having failed to perfect his appeal, the RTC
judgment had become final and executory.26 This leaves
it unnecessary to dwell on petitioners assertion that he
was denied due process of law and the right to counsel
before the trial court.
Suffice it to state that the requisites of a valid trial in
absentia, viz, (1) the accused has already been arraigned,
(2) he has been duly notified of the trial, and (3) his
failure to appear is unjustifiable, are, as reflected above,
present in the case.27
Estrada v. People28 should, under the facts and
circumstances attendant to the case, dispel any lingering
doubts of petitioner on the validity of the trial courts
proceedings.
The holding of trial in absentia is authorized under
Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that "after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that
he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable." x x x
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled
date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the
promulgation shall be made by recording the
judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a
copy thereof at his last known address or thru his
counsel.
x x x x (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
A word on the modified penalty imposed by the RTC.
Contrary to its reasoning, the penalty of imprisonment in
cases of violation of B.P. 22 was not deleted. As clarified
by Administrative Circular 13-2001, the clear tenor and
intention of Administrative Circular 12-2000 is not to
remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to
lay down a rule ofpreference in the application of the
penalties provided for in B.P. 22.30
Since the prosecution did not raise the matter as an issue
and, at any rate, there is no showing of repeated
violation or wanton bad faith on the part of petitioner,
the non-imposition of the penalty of imprisonment is in
order.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

x x x Conformably with our decision in People v.

Salas, [the] escape should have been considered a
waiver of their right to be present at their trial, and
the inability of the court to notify them of the
subsequent hearings did not prevent it from
continuing with their trial. They were deemed to have
received notice. The same fact of their escape made
their failure to appear unjustified because they have, by
escaping, placed themselves beyond the pale and
protection of the law. This being so, then pursuant
to Gimenez v. Nazareno, the trial against the fugitives,
just like those of the others, should have been brought to
its ultimate conclusion. Thereafter, the trial court had
the duty to rule on the evidence presented by the
prosecution against all the accused and to render its
judgment accordingly. It should not wait for the
fugitives re-appearance or re-arrest. They were
deemed to have waived their right to present evidence
on their own behalf and to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses who testified against
them.29 (Emphasis and italics in the original)

As for the promulgation of judgment in absentia, the

following pertinent provision of Section 6 of Rule 120
should likewise put to rest any doubts on its validity:

The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the

presence of the accused and any judge of the court in
which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for
a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the
presence of his counsel or representative. When the
judge is absent or outside the province or city, the
judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.

xxxx

The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused

personally or through his bondsman or warden and
counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation
of the decision. If the accused was tried in
absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from
prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last
known address.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-66469 July 29, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALFREDO
QUIJANO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BERNARDO SALAS (In his capacity as
Presiding Judge of RTC, Cebu, Branch VIII),
MARIO ABONG, ALFREDO DE LEON,
ERIWADWIN MONTEBON, ROMEO DE
GUZMAN, & EDUARDO MABUHAY, respondents.
Basilio E. Duaban for accused.
CRUZ, J.:
Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in
the Court of First Instance of Cebu but before he could
be arraigned the case was reinvestigated on motion of
the prosecution. 1 As a result of the reinvestigation, an
amended information was filed, with no bail
recommended, to which he pleaded not guilty. 2 Trial
commenced, but while it was in progress, the prisoner,
taking advantage of the first information for homicide,
succeeded in deceiving the city court of Cebu into
granting him bail and ordering his release; and so he
escaped. 3 The respondent judge, learning later of the
trickery, cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered
Abong's re-arrest. 4 But he was gone. Nonetheless, the
prosecution moved that the hearing continue in
accordance with the constitutional provision authorizing
trial in absentia under certain circumstances. 5 The
respondent judge denied the motion, however, and
suspended all proceedings until the return of the
accused. 6 The order of the trial court is now before us
on certiorari and mandamus. 7
The judge erred. He did not see the woods for the trees.
He mistakenly allowed himself to be tethered by the
literal reading of the rule when he should have viewed it
from the broader perspective of its intendment.
The rule is found in the last sentence of Article IV,
Section 19, of the 1973 Constitution, reading in full as
follows:
Section 19. In all criminal prosecution,
the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel, to he informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy, impartial,
and public trial, to meet the witnesses
face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the
accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is
unjustified.
The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition of
criminal cases, trial of which could in the past be
indefinitely deferred, and many times completely
abandoned, because of the defendant's escape. The old
case of People v. Avancea 8 required his presence at
certain stages of the trial which as a result, had to be
discontinued as long as the defendant had not re-
appeared or remained at large. As his right to be present
at these stages was then held not waivable even by his
escape, such escape thus operated to the fugitive's
advantage, and in mockery of the authorities, insofar as
the trial could not proceed as long as he had not been
recaptured.
The doctrine laid down in that case has been modified by
Section 19, which now allows trial in absentia, Now, the
prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued
prosecution and possibly eventual conviction provided
only that: a) he has been arraigned; b) he has been duly
notified of the trial; and c) his failure to appear is
unjustified.
The respondent judge was probably still thinking of the
old doctrine when he ruled that trial in absentia of the
escapee could not be held because he could not be duly
notified under Section 19. He forgets that the fugitive is
now deemed to have waived such notice precisely
because he has escaped, and it is also this escape that
makes his failure to appear at his trial unjustified. Escape
can never be a legal justification. In the past, his escape
"rewarded" him by postponing all further proceedings
against him and in effect ultimately absolving him of the
charge he was facing. Under the present rule, his escape
will, legally speaking, operate to Ms disadvantage by
preventing him from attending his trial, which will
continue even in his absence and most likely result in his
conviction.
The right to be present at one's trial may now be waived
except only at that stage where the prosecution intends
to present witnesses who will Identify the
accused. 9 Under Section 19, the defendant's escape will
be considered a waiver of this right and the inability of
the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will
not prevent it from continuing with his trial. He will be
deemed to have received due notice. The same fact of his
escape will make his failure to appear unjustified
because he has, by escaping, placed himself beyond the
pale, and protection, of the law.
Trial in absentia was not allowed in Borja v.
Mendoza 10 because it was held notwithstanding that the
accused had not been previously arraigned. His
subsequent conviction was properly set aside. But in the
instant case, since all the requisites are present, there is
absolutely no reason why the respondent judge should
refuse to try the accused, who had already been
arraigned at the time he was released on the illegal bail
bond. Abong should be prepared to bear the
consequences of his escape, including forfeiture of the
right to be notified of the subsequent proceedings and of
the right to adduce evidence on his behalf and refute the
evidence of the prosecution, not to mention a possible or
even probable conviction.
We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as
this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and
defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is
usually found not in "the letter that killeth but in the
spirit that vivifieth," which is not really that evanescent
or elusive. As judges, we must look beyond and not be
bound by the language of the law, seeking to discover,
by our own lights, the reason and the rhyme for its
enactment. That we may properly apply it according to
its ends, we need and must use not only learning but also
vision.
The trial judge is directed to investigate the lawyer who
assisted Mario Abong in securing bail from the city court
of Cebu on the basis of the withdrawn information for
homicide and to report to us the result of his
investigation within sixty days.
WHEREFORE, the order of the trial court dated
December 22, 1983, denying the motion for the trial in
absentia of the accused is set aside. The respondent
judge is directed to continue hearing the case against the
respondent Mario Abong in absentia as long as he has
not reappeared, until it is terminated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.