DOCTRINES/DIGESTS

PEOPLE VS. MARIACOS

Law and jurisprudence have laid down the instances when a warrantless search is valid. These are:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12 [now Section 13], Rule 126
of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;

2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the
pursuit of their official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and;

(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.[14]

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain
exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in
cases of a moving vehicle, and the seizure of evidence in plain view.

Without probable cause, the articles seized cannot be admitted in evidence against the person
arrested.[18]

A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part
of the peace officers making the arrest.[20]

Time was of the essence in this case.

Valid: a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
provides:

SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense
without a search warrant.[23]

For this rule to apply, it is imperative that there be a prior valid arrest. Although, generally, a warrant is
necessary for a valid arrest, Sec. 113 of the Rules of Court provides the exceptions therefor, to wit:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with
section 7 of Rule 112.[24] - Inquest

Be that as it may, we have held that a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can
precede the arrest if the police has probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.[25]

ROAN VS GONZALES

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge
has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he niay produce and attach them to
the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine
the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it wifl
be found later that his declarations are false.

The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to have applicant Quillosa's deposition taken
considering that he was applying for a search warrant on the basis of the information provided by the
aforenamed witnesses whose depositions as aforementioned had already been taken by the undersigned."
12

In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis of mere
hearsay and not of information personally known to him, as required by settled jurisprudence." 13 The
rationale of the requirement, of course, is to provide a ground for a prosecution for perjury in case the
applicant's declarations are found to be false. His application, standing alone, was insufficient to justify the
issuance of the warrant sought. It was therefore necessary for the witnesses themselves, by their own
personal information, to establish the apphcant's claims. 14

Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was not because: 1)
there was no valid search warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the right thereto was not validly waived by
the petitioner. In short, the military officers who entered the petitioner's premises had no right to be there
and therefore had no right either to seize the pistol and bullets.
SPOUSES MARIMLA VS PP

Petitioners claim that the issuance of Search Warrant No. 02-2677 was defective considering the
application was not personally endorsed by [Dir.] Wycoco, and that the latters signature in the authorization
letter is different from that as appearing in the identification card, and therefore it is not the true and
genuine signature of [Dir.] Wycoco.[13]

City Prosecutor, Angeles City claims that the questioned search warrant does not fall within the coverage of
Sec. 2 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, but under A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC,[15]
which authorizes the Executive Judges and Vice Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City
to act on all applications for search warrants involving dangerous drugs, among others, filed by the NBI,
and provides that said warrants may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTCs of
Manila and Quezon City.

In the interest of an effective administration of justice and pursuant to the powers vested in the Supreme
Court by the Constitution, the following are authorized to act on all applications for search warrants
involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal possession of firearms.

The Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of Regional Trial Courts, Manila and Quezon City filed by
the Philippine National Police (PNP), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Presidential Anti-
Organized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF) and the Reaction Against Crime Task Force (REACT-TF) with the
Regional Trial Courts of Manila and Quezon City.

Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure

Rule 126

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. An application for search warrant shall be
filed with the following:

(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the
crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial
region where the warrant shall be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where
the criminal action is pending.

Nothing in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC prohibits the heads of the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF and REACT-TF from
delegating their ministerial duty of endorsing the application for search warrant to their assistant heads.
Under Section 31, Chapter 6, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, an assistant head or other
subordinate in every bureau may perform such duties as may be specified by their superior or head, as
long as it is not inconsistent with law.
The guidelines in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC are reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC entitled Guidelines On The
Selection And Designation Of Executive Judges And Defining Their Powers, Prerogatives And Duties,
which explicitly stated that the guidelines in the issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the
RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

BURGOS VS. CHIEF OF STAFF

Facts:
On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Pao, Executive Judge of the then CFI Rizal [Quezon City],
issued 2 search warrants where the premises at 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D,
RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the Metropolitan Mail and We
Forum newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said
newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in
the possession and control of Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the We Forum newspaper, were seized.
A petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction
was filed after 6 months following the raid to question the validity of said search warrants, and to enjoin the
Judge Advocate General of the AFP, the city fiscal of Quezon City, et.al. from using the articles seized as
evidence in Criminal Case Q-022782 of the RTC Quezon City (People v. Burgos).

Issue:
Whether allegations of possession and printing of subversive materials may be the basis of the issuance of
search warrants.

Held:
Section 3 provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Probable cause for a search is defined as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched. In mandating that no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce; the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his
witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. Herein, a statement in
the effect that Burgos is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia,
news publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means
of committing the offense of subversion punishable under PD 885, as amended is a mere conclusion of
law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a
finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a
search warrant. Further, when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or
editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, the application and/or its supporting
affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has
published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice.

The search warrants are also void for lack of particularity.

UY VS. BIR

Facts:
On September 30, 1993, Rodrigo Abos, a former employee of Unifish PackagingCorporation (UPC)
reported to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that UPC and Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy, manager of
UPC, were engaged in activities constituting violations of the NationalInternal Revenue Code (NIRC). On
October 1, 1993, the BIR requested and successfully secured,before the RTC of Cebu, a search warrant.
On the same day, a second warrant was issued withcontents almost identical to that of the first warrant but
consisted of only one page. These warrants were issued for the alleged violation by Uy of Section 253. A
third warrant, however, was issued onthat same day for Uys alleged violation of Section 238 in relation to
Section 263. On the strength ofthese warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of the PNP
searched the premises of the UPC on October 2, 1993. They seized the items as listed on the said warrant.
A return of saidsearch was duly made by Labaria with the RTC of Cebu. Uy and UPC filed a motion to
quash thewarrants before the RTC. Said motion was denied. A petition for certiorari filed before the Court of
Appeals was likewise dismissed as it is not the proper remedy.

ISSUE:
Whether the search warrant issued was valid.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. It sustained the validity of the search warrantand
comprehensively discussed each and every defect alleged by petitioners.

A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional andstatutory provisions.
One of which is that, the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized. Although it noted inconsistencies in the descriptionof the place to be searched as
indicated on said warrants, the Court ruled that the description of theplace to be searched is sufficient if the
officers enforcing the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and
distinguish it from other places in the community. Itwas not established that the enforcing officers had any
difficulty in locating the premises ofpetitioner corporation, hence, inconsistency in identifying the city
where the premises to be searched is not a defect that would spell the warrants invalidation in this
case.
The warrants were also inconsistent as to who should be searchedone warrant was directed only
against Uy while the other was against Uy and UPC. The Court, however, ruled that where the warrant
was issued not for search of the persons occupying the premises, but only a search of the
premises occupied by them, the search could not be declared unlawful or in violation of the constitutional
rights of the owner or occupants of the premises, because of the inconsistencies in stating their name.
Furthermore, the Court said that where the apparent intent in issuing another warrant was to supersede an
earlier warrant, the latter should be deemed revoked by the former. Also the thing to be seized was not
clearly defined by the judge as she used generic terms. As a rule, the use of a generic term or a generic
description in a warrant is acceptable only when a more specific description of the things to be
seized is unavailable. But where, however, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description
must rather be general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean
no warrant could issue. As regards the terms unregistered delivery receipts and
unregistered purchase and sales invoices, the Solicitor General correctly argued that these documents
need not be specified as it is not possible to do soprecisely because they are unregistered. Lastly, general
description of most of the documents listed in the warrants does not render the entire warrant void the
search warrant is severable, and those items not particularly described may be cut off without destroying
the whole warrant. Hence, insofar as the warrants authorize the search and seizure of unregistered
delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, the warrants remain valid.

PP vs. BOLASA

FACTS:
An anonymous caller tipped off PO3 Dante Salonga and PO3 Albert Carizon in the early evening of 11
September 1995that a man and a woman were repacking prohibited drugs at a certain house in Sta.
Brigida St., Karuhatan, Valenzuela, MetroManila. PO3 Salonga and PO3 Carizon together with SPO1
Fernando Arenas immediately proceeded to the house of thesuspects and parked their car some three
hundred (300) meters away. They walked towards their quarry's lair accompanied thistime by their
unnamed informer. When they reached the house they "peeped (inside) through a small window and x x x
sawone man and a woman repacking suspected marijuana." They entered the house and introduced
themselves as police officersto the occupants and thereupon confiscated the tea bags and some drug
paraphernalia. They arrested the two (2) who turnedout to be the accused Zenaida Bolasa y Nakoboan and
Roberto delos Reyes. Subsequent examination of the tea bags by NBIForensic Chemist Rubie Calalo
confirmed the suspicion that the tea bags contained marijuana. Both the accused howeverdenied on the
witness stand ownership over the confiscated tea bags and drug implements.

ISSUE: WoN the seizure and subsequent arrest were valid?

HELD
NO. The Court held that the tea bags containing marijuana were not seized in plain view or
inadvertentlydiscovered. There was no valid intrusion and the accused were illegally arrested. The
police officers intentionally peeped first through the window before they saw and ascertained the activities
of accused inside the room. Further, the Court contended that the apprehending officers should have
conducted first a surveillance considering that the identities andaddress of the suspected culprits were
already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of probable causefor
arresting accused, they should have secured a search warrant prior to effecting a valid arrest and seizure.
The Court stated that the arrest being illegal ab initio, the accompanying search was likewise illegal. Every
evidence thusobtained during the illegal search cannot be used against accused. The Court held that the
State cannot in a cavalier fashionintrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into their houses, papers
and effects. The constitutional provision protectsthe privacy and sanctity of the person himself against
unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint.

Obiter Dictum

The Court enumerated the exceptions as follows:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. Search of evidence in plain view. The elements of the plain view doctrine are: (a) a prior valid intrusion
based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the policeare legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who havethe right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence
without further search.
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable causethat the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.Citing the Rules of Criminal Procedure on lawful warrantless
arrest, the Court stated that an arrest is lawful even in the absence of a warrant: (a) when the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence;(b) when
an offense has in fact been committed and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be
arrested hascommitted it; and,(c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement toanother. (A person charged with
an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of the offense).

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS MONTILLA

In appellant's case, it should be noted that the information relayed by the civilian informant to the law
enforcers was that there would be delivery of marijuana at Barangay Salitran by a courier coming from
Baguio City in the "early morning" of June 20, 1994. Even assuming that the policemen were not pressed
for time, this would be beside the point for, under these circumstances, the information relayed was too
sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the corresponding arrest or search warrant. While
there is an indication that the informant knew the courier, the records do not reveal that he knew him by
name.

While it is not required that the authorities should know the exact name of the subject of the warrant applied
for, there is the additional problem that the informant did not know to whom the drugs would be delivered
and at which particular part of the barangay there would be such delivery. Neither did this asset know the
precise time of the suspect's arrival, or his means of transportation, the container or contrivance wherein
the drugs were concealed and whether the same were arriving together with, or were being brought by
someone separately from, the courier.

On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly applied for a warrant, assuming
that they could readily have access to a judge or a court that was still open by the time they could make
preparations for applying therefor, and on which there is no evidence presented by the defense. In
determining the opportunity for obtaining warrants, not only the intervening time is controlling but all the
coincident and ambient circumstances should be considered, especially in rural areas.

1985 amendment of the Rules of Court which provides in Rule 112 thereof that the quantum of evidence
required in preliminary investigation is such evidence as suffices to "engender a well founded belief" as to
the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof.[25] It has the same
meaning as the related phraseology used in other parts of the same Rule, that is, that the investigating
fiscal "finds cause to hold the respondent for trial," or where "a probable cause exists."[26] It should,
therefore, be in that sense, wherein the right to effect a warrantless arrest should be considered as legally
authorized.

When an individual voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have the same conducted upon his
person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof.

After all, the right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like other rights, be waived either expressly
or impliedly.[27] Thus, while it has been held that the silence of the accused during a warrantless search
should not be taken to mean consent to the search but as a demonstration of that person's regard for the
supremacy of the law,[28] the case of herein appellant is evidently different for, here, he spontaneously
performed affirmative acts of volition by himself opening the bag without being forced or intimidated to do
so, which acts should properly be construed as a clear waiver of his right.[29]