EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW

1. What is your understanding of the Concept of EP of the laws

guaranteed to us under the Const.?
Equal Protection (EP) of the laws is a constitutional guaranty of legal equality,
that is, equality of all persons before the law.
EP is part of the due process concept of justice and fair play.
Notably, EP clause together with due process of law clause are provided in Art.
III, Sec. 1, which states: No
person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

2. If the govt. commits acts which are arbitrary, despotic or unreasonable,

how do you challenge this? Or, if the govt. acts being assailed involve
undue favoritism or prejudice or hostility to a person or a group of
persons, what legal weapon will you use to strike this down?

If the govt. commits arbitrary acts, this may be challenged based on the due
process clause of the constitution. However, if the govt. acts being assailed
involve undue favoritism or prejudice or hostility, the better weapon to use
against it is the EQUAL PROTECTION Clause.

3. What is the PURPOSE of the Equal Protection Clause of the

Constitution?
EP prohibits undue favour to anyone, or special privilege for any individual or
class.
EP prohibits hostile discrimination against any person or party.
EP guarantees the equality of all persons before the law, or reduce existing
inequalities

4. What is the often used meaning of EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS based

on a long line of decisions reiterated by the Supreme Court? Explain

The guaranty of equal protection of laws, like due process, is dynamic.

Thus, no exact definition is given to it. But a long line of decisions
consistently reiterated the meaning to be that: all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. (Case Report: Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil.
1155)

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5. Equal protection of the laws is available to all persons, whether natural
or artificial. But there is also a difference in the manner by which they
may enjoy or avail of the EP clause in the Const. Can you tell us the
difference bet. a natural and artificial or juridical person as to how the
EP clause will be applied/used as a remedy; as to the manner of its
protection?

a. NATURAL vs. ARTIFICIAL or JURIDICAL?

Both Natural and Juridical persons are entitled to the EP guarantee.
Artificial or juridical persons are protected only in so far as their
properties or economic rights & interests are concerned.
But natural persons enjoy the EP guarantee to their civil, political and
social/economic rights and interests.
o Art. III, Sec. 1 [due process and equal protection to all persons)
o Art. III, Sec. 11 [free access to the courts],
o Art. II, Sec. 14 [equality of women & men]
Sec. 26 [equal access to opportunities for public service]
o Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5) [legal assistance to the poor]
o Art. IX C. Sec. 10 [protection of candidates for public office from
harassment and discrimination]
o Art. XII, Sec. 2, par. 2 [reservation of marine resources to Filipino
citizens], Sec. 10 [nationalization of business]
o Art. XIII, Secs. 1 & 2 [social justice], Sec. 3 [protection to labor]

6. The legislature may validly classify the subject of legislation provided

that the classification is reasonable. What are the REQUIREMENTS FOR
CLASSIFICATION to be deemed reasonable and valid?
EP Clause does not provide equality among all persons if they are not
similarly situated. It is enough that there is equality among equals.

Classification is deemed reasonable and valid if : [People v. Cayat, 68 Phil.

12, 1939]
1. It rests on substantial distinctions
2. It is germane or closely related to the purpose of the law
3. It is not limited to existing conditions only
4. It applies equally to all members of the same class

All classifications made by law are generally presumed to be valid, unless

shown otherwise.

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Discuss: WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR VALID & REASONABLE
CLASSIFICATION

1. SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTIONS ; Illustrate

The distinction, to be a valid ground for classification must be substantial, not
merely superficial.

a.) Citizens
Gen. rule: Statues cannot validly classify citizens of the State on the basis
of their origin, race or parentage.
But in times of great and imminent danger, such as threatened invasion or
war, such classification may be permitted by the Constitution when facts so
warrant. (Example: discriminatory legislation in the U.S.A against the
Japanese citizens during World War II where they were segregated and
made to live in one camp away from their original homes)

Also, certain differences among persons may be a basis for valid

classification. (e.g. persons with disabilities, senior citizens, tax exemption
of low income citizens)
Example:
Phil. Association of Service Exporters v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386,
1988 female domestic workers abroad is distinct from other female
local or overseas contract workers in general, because of the special risks
to which the formers class is exposed owing to the nature and conditions
of their employment. Official reports showed that a number of them have
been abused and maltreated by their foreign employers and found
themselves without recourse.

b.) Distinction between Phil. Citizens and Aliens.

EP clause is available to all persons, whether citizen or aliens when civil
rights are concerned.
But Statues may validly limit to citizens only, enjoyment of certain political
rights, or privileges relating to public domain, public works, natural
resources of the State. The interests of the State in these are both political
and proprietary in nature. Thus, citizens may lawfully be given preference
over aliens in their use and enjoyment.

Example:
(i.) 1987 Phil. Const. Art. XII, Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain.

Willem Beumer v.
Muller v. Muller, 500 SCRA 65, Aug. 29, 2006;
Avelina Amores, G.R. No. 195670, December 3, 2012 - Swiss
husband upon annulment of their marriage and liquidation of properties claim
for reimbursement of the value of purchased lands in Phils. from his Filipina
wife. SC denied this based on Constitutional prohibition (Art. XII, Sec. 7) for he

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 willingly, knowingly bought the land despite the constitutional prohibition
against foreign ownership of Phil. land.

(ii.) Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 nationalization of the retail

trade ; valid
(iii.) International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing, 333
SCRA 13 (2000) Complaint against the unequal treatment by IS of
the Filipino faculty from their foreign counterparts who enjoy 25%
higher salary, housing benefits, shipping costs, taxes, transportation
and home leave travel allowances.
-SC Ruled: IS must apply the time honoured principle in labor Equal
pay for equal work. Persons with subs. equal qualification, skill, effort
and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar
salaries.

c.) Others: Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433 (1982) PD 1086 is not
discriminatory; that its conviction cannot be appealed to the CA but to the
SC directly by certiorari does not violate equal protection of laws, as each
division of the SB constitute 3 justices who must vote unanimously unlike in
RTC.

2. GERMANE: RELEVANT TO THE PURPOSE OF THE LAW

Even if classification is based on substantial distinctions, the law is still not valid
if its not closely related to the purpose of the law.

Example:
Imported cars are taxed higher than locally assembled cars for the
purpose of protecting the national economy. Valid.

But the difference in origin of the cars does not justify a legal provision
imposing higher penalties for traffic violators driving imported cars.
There is substantial distinction but not germane to the purpose of the
law. Not Valid.

EP does not forbid discrimination as to persons and things that are different.
What EP forbids are distinctions based on impermissible criteria unrelated to a
proper legislative purpose.

3. DURATION: IT IS NOT LIMITED TO EXISTING CONDITIONS ONLY

Classification is reasonable if it is enforced not only for the present, but as long
the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist.
Example:
Facts: Ormoc Sugar Central v. Treasurer of Ormoc City, L-23794, 22
SCRA 603, Feb. 17, 1968 Ormoc City passed an ordinance imposing that:
on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Co.,

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 Inc., in Ormoc City, a municipal tax equivalent to 1% per export sale to the U.S.A
and other foreign countries.

Held: Not Valid. The city ordinance passed by Ormoc City excludes from
coverage of the tax subsequent sugar central of the same class as the
plaintiff. It is discriminatory against Ormoc Sugar Central which is singled
out in the ordinance. For classification to be reasonable, it should be in
terms applicable to future conditions as well, and not limited to existing
conditions only.

4. APPLICABILITY TO ALL: IT APPLIES EQUALLY TO ALL MEMBERS

OF THE SAME CLASS
This classification requires that - all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. Otherwise, if members of the same class are not similarly treated,
then classification will be deemed invalid.

Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on all

or any persons, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding
them

EP guarantees equality before the law, but not identity of rights. (Tiu v. CA,
GR No. 127410, Jan. 20, 1999 business/inveStors in subic free port privileges)
Being a member of the same class does not require one to be in equal or
identical degree of characteristics; substantial similarity will suffice to be
treated equally under the law.

What EP prohibits is class or discriminatory legislation, which discriminates

against some and favors others, despite being similarly situated. (see
International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing, GR No.
128845, June 1, 2000)

Example:
Phil. Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703 the Supreme
Court declared as invalid a provision (Sec. 35) in the law creating the
Philippine Postal Corp. which retained the franking privilege for the
Office of the President, and Congress but withdrew it from the Judiciary.

In lumping the Judiciary with other offices from which the franking
privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of
justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the
need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress
for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not

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recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the
Judiciary for such privilege.