1.

Sy Joc Lieng v Sy Quija

Recit-Ready:
Action: Complaint for the recovery of inheritance.
Facts: Sy Quija, a native Chinaman, died in the Philippines, leaving behind a
large fortune, which passed on to his direct descendants (defendants) from his
marriage with Petronila Encarnacion in the Philippines. Long after his death, the
petitioners filed a complaint, alleging that they were the direct descendants of
an earlier marriage entered into by Sy Quija with one Yap Puan Niu in China.
After the trial court rendered judgment finding that all of the parties to the case
were heirs of Sy Quija, the petitioners argued before the Supreme Court that
they should be declared the only heirs of Sy Quijathe second marriage with
Encarnacion being a false and fraudulent marriageand that the estate be
distributed in accordance with the laws of China.
Issue: 1. WON the petitioners, to the exclusion of defendants, are the rightful
heirs to the estate of Sy Quija?
2. What laws should apply to Sy Quija as a native Chinaman residing in
the Philippines?
3. WON the estate should be distributed in accordance with the laws of
China?
Held: The SC held that the evidence on record did not establish the fact of Sy
Quijas alleged marriage with Yap Puan Niu in China. Even assuming that Sy
Quija was in fact married to Yap Puan Niu, the petitioners still would not be
entitled to the estate as Sy Quija would then have forfeited his share in the
conjugal property in favor of Encarnacion for having concealed the previous
marriage from his Encarnacion who entered into the subsequent marriage in
good faith.
The case was thus decided in accordance with Philippine laws as it was
establishing that Sy Quija had acquired the status of a domiciled
resident, subject to the laws of the Philippines.
(Topic-Relevant) SC held that Chinese laws would not apply as the
petitioners had failed to invoke the relevant foreign law and prove the
same in court. Petitioners produced absolutely no evidence as to the
existence of the Chinese Laws aside from pamphlets and books, which
allegedly contained compilations of Chinese laws. The SC found these to
be useless, however, as they were written in Chinese characters and
were not alleged to have even contained an exact reproduction of the
laws in question. Also, the petitioners failed to introduce expert
testimony in the manner and form prescribed by the Code of Civil
Procedure at the time, as there was no evidence that the four books or
pamphlets were:
1. Printed by authority of the Chinese Government; or
2. Duly authenticated by the certificate of competent authorities;
3. Properly sealed with the seal of the nation to which they belonged.
Facts:
1
 Vicente Romero Sy Quija (Sy Quija), a native Chinaman, was a foreigner.
He came to the Philippines in 1839 or 1840, when he was about 12 years
of age, and continued to reside in the Philippines for a period of over 53
years or until his death.
While in the Philippines, in 1853, Sy Quija married a member of a
wealthy family from Vigan, Petronila Encarnacion (Encarnacion), who
brought to the marriage a sum of P5,000, which, through their common
labor and industry, became the foundation of a P1,000,000 fortune.
o The fortune consisting of real and personal property in the
Philippines, later passed on to the defendants in this case, the
direct descendants of the spouses.
In 1908, long after the deah of Sy Quija, the petitioners filed a complaint,
claiming that they were the direct descendants of Sy Quija from an
earlier marriage celebrated in Amoy, China in the year 1847 between Sy
Quija and a certain Yap Puan Niu.
o They alleged that the marriage celebrated in the Philippines
between Sy Quija and Encarnacion was not a lawful marriage and
thus had no legal effect or validity.
o They prayed that they be declared the only legitimate
descendants and heirsand so the legitimate owners of the
fortuneand that the defendants be directed to render a
complete and detailed account of all the property to them.
At trial, the petitioners presented 7 witnsesseseither through
testimony or depositions taken before the Vice-Consul of the United
States in Chinawho said that they were present at the wedding
ceremony in China.
o According to them, Sy Quija was called to China by his father for
an arranged marriage.
o After the alleged wedding, the witnesses claimed that Sy Quija
continued to reside in China for a period of 3-4 years, during which
time the parents of the petitioners were born.
o The petitioners, however, were unable to produce the matrimonial
letters that were said to have been exchanged nor were they able
to produce copies of the relevant marriage or succession laws of
China.
In this regard, all that they were able to produce were
pamphlets and books written in Chinese characters that
allegedly contained a compilation of Chinese laws.
The witnesses for the defendants, on the other hand, testified that they
knew Sy Quia when he was an unmarried resident of the city of Vigan for
about 6-7 years, prior to his marriage with Encarnacion in 1853.
o They testified that during this period of time, Sy Quia continued to
be a resident of Vigan where he was employed as a clerk and a
dry goods salesman and was baptized and named Vicente Romero
Sy Quija before marrying Encarnacion.
o In support of their testimonies, the defendants were able to
produce the relevant working permits, licenses, and documents to
establish the fact of Sy Quias residence, employment, and
2
 marriage in Vigan as well as provide duly corroborated testimonies
by the concerned ecclesiastical and judicial officers such as the
parish priest and clerk of court, before whom the marriage
proceedings were conducted.
The Court of First Instance rendered a judgment, declaring all of the
parties involved in the case to be heirs of the deceased Sy Quia.
o The court ordered that half of Sy Quias estate was to go to Yap
Puan Nius descendants (petitioners), to be divided among them
appropriately, and that the other half was to go to Encarnacions
descendants (defendants), to be divided among them as well.
o Also, the court ordered that the defendants make an account of
the property received by them to ensure that the property they
had inherited did not exceed half of the estate.
Thus, the petitioners brought the case before the SC where they prayed
that they be declared the only heirs of the deceased Sy Quia and that
the property be distributed in accordance with the laws of China.
Issue:
1. WON the petitioners, to the exclusion of the defendants, are the rightful heirs
to the estate of Sy Quia?NO
2. What laws would apply to Sy Quia, seeing as how he was a native
Chinaman?Philippine
3. (Topic-Relevant Issue) WON the estate should be distributed in accordance
with Chinese laws?NO

Held:
1. NO. The Court held that the evidence on record did not prove the fact of the
first marriage celebrated in China. Even assuming that the first marriage
had actually been celebrated, the petitioners still would not have been
entitled to a share in the inheritance.
First, the Court found the testimonies of the petitioners witnesses to be
fraught with inconsistencies.
o They were unable to present any of the necessary matrimonial
letters to establish the fact of the marriage celebration nor were
they able to produce the passports or travel documents, which
would have tended to show that Sy Quia and Yap Buan Niu visited
each other during the time they were married.
Second, even assuming that Sy Quia had actually married Yap Puan Niu
before becoming a Christian and marrying Encarnacion, the petitioners,
as Yap Puan Nius descendants, still would not be entitled to the
inheritance they claim.
o Under the laws in force at the time (the Partidas and the Civil
Code), when a person would enter into a subsequent marriage in
bad faith through concealment of a previous marriage while the
3
 other party would enter into the marriage in absolute good faith,
the former would forfeit his share of the conjugal property in favor
of the innocent spouse.
Seeing as how the fortune involved was a product of the
combined efforts of Sy Quija and Encarnacion throughout
their marriagethe fortune thus belonging to the conjugal
partnershipno part of this fortune would have passed to
Yap Puan Niueven if it were to be assumed that she had
been a lawful wifeas Sy Quijas share of the conjugal
partnership would have been forfeited in favor of
Encarnacion.
2. Philippine Laws. Sy Quia had acquired the legal status of a domiciled
resident of the Philippines under the Novisima Recopilacion as it was a
proven and undeniable fact that Sy Quija had resided in the Philippines for
more than 50 years.
Thus, the questions raised by those who claim to be his descendants
should be decided in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippines.
o As most of the property left behind was real property, the same
were subject to the laws of the country in which they were
located.
3. NO. Whenever a foreign law is invoked in our tribunals, its existence must be
satisfactorily established as any other fact.
The petitioners invoke certain provisions of the Chinese laws as one of
the grounds of the action instituted by them and contended that the
estate of Sy Quija should have been distributed in accordance with the
laws of their country.
Even disregarding the fact that the plaintiffs should have, but did not,
allege in their complaint as one of the facts constituting their cause of
action the existence of a law passed and promulgated in China, the
existence of which law being foreign should have been alleged in the
complaint.
o However, the fact remains, that there is absolutely no evidence in
the record as to the existence of the Chinese Laws referred to by
the petitioners.
o The only pieces of evidence introduced by petitions in this regard
were the books and pamphlets written in Chinese characters,
which were allegedly compilations of the laws of China.
The SC held, however, that such evidence was useless and of no value
because the petitioners did not introduce expert testimony in the
manner and form prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure at the time,
as there was no evidence that the four books or pamphlets were:
1. Printed by authority of the Chinese Government; or
2. Duly authenticated by the certificate of competent authorities;
3. Properly sealed with the seal of the nation to which they belonged.

4
 Also, the two witnessesthe Chinese consul and the interpreterwhose
testimony was introduced for the purpose of establishing the
authenticity of the laws, which the books allegedly contained, could not
even say positively that the books present contained exact copies of the
original law.
o The Chinese consul, after stating that he had never made a
regular study of the laws of his country, admitted that he had
never read or seen the original copy of the alleged compilation.
o The interpreter did not even testify that he knew such laws or
that he was acquainted with the nature of the laws allegedly
contained in the books. He merely expressed his own opinion with
reference to the laws.
2. In re Estate of Johnson
Facts:
Emil H. Johnson, was born in Sweden in 1877. He migrated to the United
States and lived in Chicago, Illinois from 1893 to 1898.
In Chicago, he married to Rosalie Ackeson. He thereafter embarked for the
Philippines as a soldier in the United States Army.
Emil and Rosalie had a daughter named Ebba Ingeborg, the petitioner in this
case.
After Emil was discharged from the service, he continued to live in the
Philippines. On November 1902, Rosalie was granted a divorce decree in the
Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, on the ground of desertion.
A little later Emil appeared in the US on a visit and in 1903, procured a
certificate of naturalization in Chicago. From Chicago, he appears to have
gone to Sweden, to visit his parents and his daughter, Ebba. When this visit
was concluded, Emil returned to Manila, where he prospered in business and
continued to live there until his death.
He left a holographic will, dated September 9, 1915, with an estate in the
value of Php231,800. This will was written in his own handwriting, and
signed by himself and two witnesses only, instead of three witnesses as
required by the Code of Civil Procedure. This will therefore, was not
executed in conformity with the provisions of law.
In Manila, he appears to have married Alejandra Ibanez by whom he had
three children.
The other two children mentioned in the will were borne to the deceased by
Simeona Ibanez.
On February 9, 1916, however, a petition was presented in the CFI of Manila
for the probate of the will, on the ground that Emil was at the time of his
death, a citizen of the State of Illinois; that the will was duly executed in
accordance with the laws of Illinois and hence could be properly probated in
Manila pursuant to Section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure on Wills made
here by an alien.
The will was admitted to probate.
On June 12, 1916, or about three months after the will had been probated,
Ebba Ingeborg opposed the order admitting the will to probate. She filed a
5
 motion for the court to vacate the order. This motion was denied, hence she
appealed. Ebba wants the decree of probate annulled and put the estate
into intestate administration so she could establish her claim as the sole
legitimate heir of her father.
The following are the grounds on which Ebbas petition is based:
o Emil was a resident of Manila and not a resident of Illinois at the time
the will in question was executed;
o The will is invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal property
in the State of Illinois
o The order admitting the will to probate was made without notice to
her
o The order in question was beyond the jurisdiction of the court
Issues:
1. WON the order admitting the will to probate was beyond the jurisdiction of
the court and thus void because made without notice to petitioner- YES
2. WON the order should be set aside- NO
3. WON the will was executed in accordance with the statutes of the State of
Illinois- NO

Held/Ratio
Issue 1:
The SC ruled that from an inspection of the record of the proceedings in the
lower court, all the steps prescribed by law as prerequisites to the probate
of a will were complied with in every respect.
The proceedings for the probate of the will were regular and that the
publication was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to entertain the
proceeding and to allow the will to be probated.
o There was therefore, sufficient notice to Ebba of the probate
proceedings. She could have made an opposition to the order at any
time within six months from March 16, 1916, as provided by the Code
of Civil Procedure.
Emil H. Johnson, ruled the Court, was at the time of his death, a citizen of
the State of Illinois. His will is therefore provable under section 636 of the
Code of Civil Procedure in the courts of the Philippines, provided that the
instrument was so executed as to be also admissible to probate under the
laws of Illinois.
Issue 2:
The SC finds that upon the execution of the will, Emil was a citizen of the
State of Illinois and the will was executed in conformity with the laws of that
State.
That the testator was a citizen of the United States, naturalized in the State
of Illinois, should be taken to imply that he was a citizen of the State of
Illinois, as well as the United States.
The naturalization laws of the United States require, as a condition
precedent to the granting of the certificate of naturalization, that the
applicant should have resided at least five years in the United States, and
6
 for one year within the State or territory where the court granting the
naturalization papers is held; and in the absence of clear proof to the
contrary it should be presumed that a person naturalized in a court of a
certain State thereby becomes a citizen of that State as well as of the
United States.
It is noteworthy that Ebbas petition to annul the probate does not assert
that the testator was not a citizen of Illinois at the date when the will was
executed. The most that the petition said was that Emil was never a
resident of the State of Illinois after the year 1898, but became and was
resident of the City of Manila.
o But residence in the Philippine Islands is compatible with citizenship
in Illinois; and it must be considered that the allegations of the
petition on this point are wholly insufficient.
The evidence adduce to prove the fact of citizenship of the testator consists
of the certificate of naturalization granted upon January 10, 1913, in the
Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, in addition to facts contained in the
oral evidence.
o Emil took up his abode in the State of Illinois and remained there until
he became a soldier in the US Army and was stationed in the
Philippines.
o Although Emil remained in the Philippines for sometime after
receiving his discharge, no evidence was adduced showing that at the
time he returned to the US he had then abandoned Illinois as the
State of his permanent domicile and on the contrary, the certificate of
naturalization itself recites that at the time he claimed to be a
resident of Illinois.
There is no law in force by virtue of which any person of foreign nativity can
become a naturalized citizen of the Philippine Islands; and it was, therefore,
impossible for the testator, even if he had so desired, to expatriate himself
from the US and change his citizenship.
o The Court held that it would be a novel doctrine to Americans living in
the Philippines to be told that by living here they lose their citizenship
in the State of their naturalization or nativity.
The proof adduced before the trial court must therefore be taken as showing
that, at the time the will was executed, the testator was, as stated in the
order of probate, a citizen of the State of Illinois. This, in connection with the
fact that Ebbas petition does not even deny Emils citizenship,
demonstrates the impossibility of setting the probate aside for lack of the
necessary citizenship on the part of the testator.
Issue 3:
The SC ruled that the trial court erred in admitting the will to probate
because the trial judge merely relied on a reading of Section 1874 of the
Revised Statutes of Illinois, and he may have assumed that he could take
judicial notice of the laws of Illinois under Section 275 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
o The trial court did not examine any witness with reference to the laws
of Illinois on the subject of the execution of the will.

7
 NEVERTHELESS, even if the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the
law of Illinois, such claim of error is not now available to Ebba because of
the following reasons:
o The petition for annulment of probate does not state any fact from
which it could appear that the Illinois law is different from what the
trial court found, and because the assignment of error raises no
question as to the trial courts supposed error of taking judicial notice.
o The affidavits by which the petition is accompanied contain no
reference to the subject, and the petitioner did not cite any authority
(jurisprudence) which might tend to raise a doubt as to the
correctness of the conclusion of the trial court.
3. Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 (1930)
*WARNING: Sobrang barok ng Court sa case na ito.
Action: Petition for Probate
CHARACTERS OF THE CASE:

Deceased: Edward Hix

Special Administrator: A.W. Fleumer (petitioner)
Ex-Spouse: Annie Hix (respondent)
FACTS:
The special administrator, Fluemer, of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix
appeals from a decision of Judge of First Instance Tuason denying the
probate of the document alleged to be the last will and testament of the
deceased.
A. Hix, the ex-wife of E. Hix, contends that the appellant Fluemer, as a
mere special administrator, is not authorized to carry on this appeal.
Yan lang talaga yung facts huhu.
ISSUE:
W/N Fluemer is authorized to carry this appeal? YES (real issue in the
case)
W/N Judge Tuason erred in denying probate of the will of E. Hix? NO (its
not an issue in the case but the probate of the will was discussed in
detail sa latter part ng case and I think ito lang yung related to COL)
HELD:
YES, Fleumer is authorized to carry this appeal. The appellant, who
appears to have been the moving party in these proceedings, was a
"person interested in the allowance or disallowance of a will by a Court
of First Instance," and so should be permitted to appeal to the Supreme
Court from the disallowance of the will.
NO, Judge Tuason was correct in denying probate. Fleumer claims that
the will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by
Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West
Verginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg, Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p. 1690, and
as certified to by the Director of the National Library, will apply. But this
was far from a compliance with the law.
The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in PH courts.
Remember, local courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws. (Evid)

8
 The PH courts are not authorized to take American laws to automatically
apply. Such laws must be proved as facts.
o First, the requirements of the law were not met.
No printed or published copy under the authority of the
State of West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate
of the officer having charge of the original, under the sale of
the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from
the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the
alleged will was executed.
o Second, the due execution of the will was not established. The
only evidence on this point is to be found in the testimony of the
petitioner.
o Third, there was nothing to indicate that the will was
acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two competent
witnesses, of that these witnesses subscribed the will in the
presence of the testator and of each other as the law of West
Virginia seems to require.
On the supposition that the witnesses to the will reside
without the Philippine Islands, it would then be the duty of
the petitioner to prove execution by some other means
(Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 633.)
o Fourth, it was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the
testator had his domicile in West Virginia and not establish this
fact consisted of the recitals in the will and the testimony of the
petitioner.
While the appeal pending submission in this court, the attorney for the
appellant presented an unverified petition asking the court to accept as
part of the evidence the documents attached to the petition. The
following documents disclose:
o a paper writing purporting to be will the was presented for probate
on June 8, 1929, to the clerk of Randolph Country, State of West
Virginia, in vacation, and was duly proven by the oaths of Dana
Wamsley and Joseph L. MAdden, the subscribing witnesses and
ordered to be recorded and filed
o another document that, in vacation, on June 8, 1929, the clerk of
court of Randolph Country, West Virginia, appointed Claude W.
Maxwell as administrator of the estate of E. Hix
Note that the application for the probate of the will in the
Philippines was filed on February 20, 1929, while the
proceedings in West Virginia appear to have been initiated
on June 8, 1929
These facts are strongly indicative of an intention to make
the Philippines the principal administration and West
Virginia the ancillary administration
9
 However, no attempt has been made to comply with Civil Procedure, for
no hearing on the question of the allowance of a will said to have been
proved and allowed in West Virginia has been requested.
There is no showing that the deceased left any property at any place
other than the Philippines and no contention that he left any in West
Virginia
Reference has been made by the parties to a divorce purported to have
been awarded E. Hix from A. Hix on October 8, 1925, in the State of West
specific pronouncements on the validity or validity of this alleged
divorce.

4. WILLIAMETTE IRON & STEEL WORKSv. A.H. MUZZAL

RECIT READY:
Defendant Muzzal (former resident of California but now residing in the
Philippines), being a stockholder of Meyer-Muzzal Company, was being held
accountable for the obligations that the company incurred.
Plaintiff Williamette invoked Section 322 of the Civil Code of California (see
provision below), which holds stockholders jointly and severally liable with
their companies.
CFI of Zamboanga ruled in favor of plaintiff. Appeal is thereafter filed before
the Supreme Court.
Defendant was claiming that the foreign law was not sufficiently established;
and even assuming it were, the local courts cannot impose the liability in
accordance with the California Law because they are inconsistent with the
Philippine Corporation laws (which do not provide the same solidary liability
to stockholders).
SUPREME COURT RULING: CFI judgment affirmed. The foreign law
was sufficiently established by the testimony of Mr. Arthur Bolton
(attorney in San Francisco since 1918) and Raglands Annotated
Civil Code of California, which was presented as evidence. This is
consistent with Articles 300 and 301 of our Code of Civil Procedure.
Finally, being a stockholder of the company in 1928 and in fact
being one of its incorporators, defendant cannot escape liability by
alleging that the California law is unjust and different from and
inconsistent with the Philippine Corporation Law.
FACTS:
There were no other circumstances provided as to the liability, etc. Ito na lahat
yon.
Defendant Muzzal is a former resident of the State of California, and is now
residing in the Philippines.
He was a stockholder of a California company at the time obligations were
contracted by that company with herein petitioner Williamette Iron & Steel.
This case involves his liability for those obligations.
Plaintiff was seeking to recover using Section 322 of the Civil Code of
California, which reads:
SEC. 322. Each stockholder of a corporation is individually and
personally liable for such proportion of all its debts and liabilities contracted
10
 or incurred during the time he was a stockholder as the amount of stock or
shares owned by him bears to the whole of the subscribed capital stock or
shares of the corporation. Any creditor of the corporation may institute joint
or several actions against any of its stockholders, for the proportion of his
claim payable by each, and in such action the court must (1) ascertain the
proportion of the claim or debt for which each defendant is liable, and (2) a
several judgment must be rendered against each, in conformity therewith. If
any stockholder pays his proportion of -any debt due from the corporation,
incurred while he was such stockholder, he is relieved from any further
personal liability for such debt, and if an action has been brought against
him upon such debt, it must be dismissed, as to him, upon his paying the
costs, or such proportion thereof as may be properly chargeable against him.
The liability of each stockholder is determined by the amount of stock or
shares owned by him at the time the debt or liability was incurred; and such
liability is not release by any subsequent transfer of stock.
After the CFI of Zamboanga ruled in favor of plaintiff, ordering defendant to
pay the sum of P2,837.34 for the first cause of action and P1,590.63 for the
second cause of action, as well as P500 attorneys fees, an appeal was filed
before the Supreme Court.
One of the contentions of the defendant (#3 issue below) is that since the
law of California as to the liability of stockholders is different and
inconsistent with the Philippine Corporation Law, the courts here should not
impose liability upon a Philippine resident who is a stockholder of a California
corporation.
ISSUES:
1) W/N the lower court erred in holding that the defendant was the holder of
1,432 shares of the capital stock of the Meyer-Muzzal Company NO ERROR
2) W/N the lower court erred in finding that plaintiff has proven the existence of
the foreign law involved in this action NO ERROR
3) W/N the lower court erred in enforcing the law of California NO ERROR
HELD:
1. No. A.H. Muzzal is a stockholder at the time the company incurred
the obligations.
o By referencing to the working papers in his possession, witness
Stanley H. Hermann (a CPA and auditor employed in October,
November, and December 1929) testified that Meyer-Muzzal Company
is a corporation and that defendant A.H. Muzzal is a stockholder of the
company on November 5, 1928 and December 22, 1928 owning
1,433 shares of capital stock; par value of $10 each).
2. No. The existence of such foreign law was sufficiently established.
o Mr. Arthur Bolton (attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California since
1918) quoted Section 322 verbatim and state that said section was in
force at the time the obligations were incurred. According to the Court,
this evidence sufficiently established the fact that the section in
question was the law of the State of California on November 5 and
December 22, 1928.

11
 oFurther, Sections 300 and 301 of our Code of Civil Procedure do not
exclude the presentation of other competent evidence to prove the
existence of a foreign law.
o Aside from Boltons testimony, Raglands Annotated Civil Code of
California was also presented as evidence, which contains that
States Civil Code as adopted March 21, 1872, with the subsequent
official statute amendments to and including the year 1929.
3. No. Defendant is chargeable with notice of the law of California as
to the liability of stockholders in view of the fact that he was one
of the incorporators of the Meyer-Muzzal Company in 1924, and was
still a stockholder in 1928.
o Exhibit 10: certified copy of the articles of incorporation show that A.H.
Muzzal, Leo Meyer, and James Rolph, Jr. were the companys
incorporators and that all were residents and citizens of the State of
California.
DISSENT: J. Butte
I think that the appellant's first assignment of error is well taken. See sections
284 and 321 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
5. CIR v. FISHER
RECIT READY
FACTS:
The case relates to the determination and settlement of the estate of Walter
Stevenson (born in the Philippines , of British parents, married in the City of
Manila to Beatrice, British also). Walter instituted his wife as the sole heiress to
the following real and personal property, which they acquired while residing in
the Phils:
Real Estate in Baguio:
Shares of stock from Mindanao Mother Lode Mines
Shares of stock Canacao Estate
Cash and credit from Canacao Estate
Cash, with the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China
(Only the first two are relevant to the case)
Ancillary administration proceedings were instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Manila for the settlement of the estate.
- Ancillary administrator submitted a preliminary estate and inheritance
tax return with the reservation of having the properties declared therein
finally appraised at their values six months after the death of Stevenson.

- Beatrice Stevenson assigned all her rights and interests in the estate to
the spouses, Douglas and Bettina Fisher, respondents herein
- Basically, the case tackles disputes regarding considerations in making
deductions, exemptions, valuation of property and the property regimes
for alien spouses residing in the Phils.
COL related Issue/s:
1) WON in determining the taxable net estate of the decedent, one-
half () of the net estate should be deducted therefrom as the
share of tile surviving spouse in accordance with our law on
12
 conjugal partnership and in relation to section 89 (c) of the National
Internal revenue Code?
YES
2) WON the estate can avail itself of the reciprocity proviso embodied
in Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code granting
exemption from the payment of estate and inheritance taxes on the
210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines Inc.
NO
COL related Held:
1) YES. Since both parties are English subjects, the law applicable to Stevenson
is the English law not the conjugal partnership in our Filipino law. Article 16
of the Civil Code also speaks only of amount of successional rights NOT
property relations.
2) NO. Since the California laws only exempt inheritance tax, therefore there is
no reciprocity between Philippine and California. This puts Filipinos at a
disadvantage.
Facts:
This case relates to the determination of the hereditary estate of the
deceased Walter G. Stevenson.
o Mr. Stevenson was born in the Philippines from two British parents.
o He got married in Manila to another British subject
o He lived and died in Francisco, California, U.S.A.
o The probate proceedings were also done in California
Stevenson instituted his wife Beatrice as his sole heiress to the following real
and personal properties acquired by the spouses while residing in the
Philippines which are the following:
Gross Estate
Real Property 2 parcels P43,500.00
of land in Baguio
Personal Property
177 shares of stock of 1,770.00
Canacao Estate at P10.00
each
210,000 shares of stock of 79,800.00
Mindanao Mother Lode
Mines, Inc. at P0.38 per
share
Cash credit with Canacao 4,870.88
Estate Inc.
Cash, with the Chartered 851.97
Bank of India, Australia &
China

13
 Total Gross Assets P130,792.85

On May 1951, ancillary administration proceedings were instituted in the CFI

of Manila for the settlement of the estate in the Philippines.
Stevenson's will was duly admitted to probate by our court and Ian Murray
Statt was appointed ancillary administrator of the estate.
On July 1951, Mr. Statt filed preliminary estate and inheritance tax return
with the reservation of having the properties declared therein finally
appraised at their values six months after the death of Stevenson.
o The preliminary return was made to secure the waiver of the
Collector of Internal Revenue on the inheritance tax due on the
210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines Inc.
which the estate then desired to dispose in the United States
After allowing the deductions claimed by the ancillary administrator for
funeral expenses in the amount of P2,000.00 and for judicial and
administration expenses in the sum of P5,500.00, the Collector assessed the
state the amount of P5,147.98 for estate tax and P10,875,26 or inheritance
tax, or a total of P16,023.23.
o Both of these assessments were paid by the estate on June 6,
1952.
In the meantime, on December 1952, Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson
assigned all her rights and interests in the estate to the spouses,
Douglas and Bettina Fisher, respondents herein.
Ancillary administer filed an amended return the valuation of the 210,000
shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. was reduced from
0.38 per share, as originally declared, to P0.20 per share, or from a total
valuation of P79,800.00 to P42,000.00.
o This change in price per share of stock was based on the market
notation of the stock obtaining six months from the death of
Stevenson
In addition, the ancillary administrator made claims for more deductions
The ancillary administrator filed a SECOND amended estate and inheritance
tax return. It contained the same deductions asked with the following
additions:
o Deduction in the amount of P4, 000.00 from the gross estate
of the decedent as provided for in Section 861 (4) of the U.S.
Federal Internal Revenue Code which according to him was
allowable by way of the reciprocity granted by Section 122 of the
NIRC.
o Exemption from the imposition of estate and inheritance taxes on
the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode
Mines, Inc. also pursuant to the reciprocity provision of Section
122 of the NIRC.
The estate claimed that it was liable only for the amount of P525.34 for
estate tax and P238.06 for inheritance tax and that, as a consequence, it
had overpaid the government.

14
 o They requested a refund of the amount of P15,259.83, allegedly
overpaid
Action was commenced in the CFI of Manila by respondents, as assignees of
Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson, for the recovery of said amount.
CTA1 rendered the following decision:
o One-half () share of the surviving spouse in the conjugal
partnership property as diminished by the obligations properly
chargeable to such property should be deducted from the net
estate of the deceased Walter G. Stevenson.
o The intangible personal property belonging to the estate of said
Stevenson is exempt from inheritance tax
o For purposes of estate and inheritance taxation the Baguio real
estate of the spouses should be valued at P52,200.00 (note: this
was from P43,500.00), and
o 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc.
should be appraised at P0.38 per share
o Estate shall be entitled to a deduction of P2,000.00 for funeral
expenses and judicial expenses of P8,604.39.
Both parties appealed from such decision

COL related Issues:

1) WON in determining the taxable net estate of the decedent, one-
half () of the net estate should be deducted therefrom as the
share of tile surviving spouse in accordance with our law on
conjugal partnership and in relation to section 89 (c) of the
National Internal revenue Code?
YES
2) WON the estate can avail itself of the reciprocity proviso embodied
in Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code granting
exemption from the payment of estate and inheritance taxes on the
210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines Inc.
NO

TAX related Issues:

3) WON the estate is entitled to the deduction of P4,000.00 allowed
by Section 861, U.S. Internal Revenue Code in relation to section
122 of the National Internal Revenue Code;
NO
4) WON the real estate properties of the decedent located in Baguio
City and the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode
Mines, Inc., were correctly appraised by the lower court;
NO
5) WON the estate is entitled to the following deductions: P8,604.39
for judicial and administration expenses; P2,086.52 for funeral
expenses; P652.50 for real estate taxes; and P10,0,22.47

1 Pursuant to RA No. 1125, the case was forwarded to CTA

15
 representing the amount of indebtedness allegedly incurred by the
decedent during his lifetime; and
PARTIALLY YES. Except the indebtedness of P10,022.47.
6) WON the estate is entitled to the payment of interest on the
amount it claims to have overpaid the government and to be
refundable to it.
NO
COL related Held:
1) YES. Since both parties are English subjects, the law applicable to
Stevenson is the English law not the conjugal partnership in our
Filipino law. Article 16 of the Civil Code also speaks only of amount
of successional rights NOT property relations.
o A well-known doctrine in our civil law that in the absence of any ante-
nuptial agreement, the contracting parties are presumed to have adopted
the system of conjugal partnership
o The CIR however contends that the national law of the decedent husband,
in this case, the law of England should be followed.
o CIR claims that Article 16 of the New Civil Code states that in testate and
intestate proceedings, the amount of successional rights, among others, is
to be determined by the national law of the decedent.
English laws do not recognize legal partnership between spouses,
but their regime of property relation states that properties acquired
during the marriage pertain and belong exclusively to the
husband.
o Since the marriage of the Stevensons in the Philippines took place in
1909, the applicable law is Article 1325 of the old Civil Code and not
Article 124 of the New Civil Code which became effective only in 1950.
Both articles adhere to the so-called nationality theory of
determining the property relation of spouses where one of them is a
foreigner and they have made no prior agreement as to the
administration disposition, and ownership of their conjugal
properties. In such a case, the national law of the husband becomes
the dominant law in determining the property relation of the
spouses.
The difference however is that Article 1325 of the old Civil Code is
limited to marriages contracted in a foreign land unlike Article 124
that is applicable regardless of whether the marriage was
celebrated in the Philippines or not.
o It must be noted, however, that what has just been said refers to
mixed marriages between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. In the
instant case, both spouses are foreigners who married in the
Philippines.
LAW APPLICABLE TO STEVENSON is ENGLISH LAW
Additionally, although respondents did not prove that English laws
should apply, in the absence of proof, the Court is justified,
therefore, in indulging in what Wharton calls "processual
presumption," in presuming that the law of England on this
matter is the same as our law.
16
 o Also, a reading of Article 16 of the New Civil Code shows that it does not
encompass or contemplate to govern the question of property relation
between spouses. Said article distinctly speaks of amount of
successional rights.
Art. 16 refers to the extent or amount of property that each heir is
legally entitled to inherit from the estate available for distribution.
o It needs to be pointed out that the property relation of spouses, as
distinguished from their successional rights, is governed differently by the
specific and express provisions
o We, therefore, find that the lower court correctly deducted the half of the
conjugal property in determining the hereditary estate left by the
deceased Stevenson.
2) NO. Since the California laws only exempt inheritance tax, therefore
there is no reciprocity between Philippine and California. This puts
Filipinos at a disadvantage.
o CIR questions the exemption from inheritance tax the stocks in the
Mindanao Mother Lode Mines. CIR contends that:
The said proviso of the California Revenue and Taxation Code has
not been duly proven by respondents
The reciprocity exemptions granted by section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code can only be availed of by residents of foreign
countries and not of residents of a state in the United States
There is no "total" reciprocity between the Philippines and the state
of California in that while the former exempts payment of both
estate and inheritance taxes on intangible personal properties, the
latter only exempts the payment of inheritance tax.
o It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of them. However, a reading of sections 300 and 301 of our Code
of Civil Procedure (now section 41, Rule 123) will convince one that
these sections do not exclude the presentation of other competent
evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law. We find no error,
therefore, on the part of the Tax Court in considering the pertinent
California law as proved by respondents' witness.
o Section 13851 of the California Inheritance Tax Law states
SEC. 13851, Intangibles of nonresident: Conditions. Intangible
personal property is exempt from the tax imposed by this
part if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident
of a territory or another State of the United States or of a
foreign state or country which then imposed a legacy,
succession, or death tax in respect to intangible personal
property of its own residents, but either
(a) Did not impose a legacy, succession, or death tax of any
character in respect to intangible personal property of
residents of this State, or
(b) Had in its laws a reciprocal provision under which
intangible personal property of a non-resident was exempt
from legacy, succession, or death taxes of every character if
17
 the Territory or other State of the United States or foreign state or
country in which the nonresident resided allowed a similar
exemption in respect to intangible personal property of residents of
the Territory or State of the United States or foreign state or country
of residence of the decedent.
o In the Philippines, upon the death of any citizen or resident, or non-resident
with properties therein, there are imposed upon his estate and its settlement,
both an estate and an inheritance tax. Under the laws of California, only
inheritance tax is imposed. On the other hand, the Federal Internal Revenue
Code imposes an estate tax on non-residents not citizens of the United
States but does not provide for any exemption on the basis of reciprocity.
Applying these laws in the manner the Court of Tax Appeals did in the instant
case, we will have a situation where a Californian, who is non-resident in the
Philippines but has intangible personal properties here, will the subject to the
payment of an estate tax, although exempt from the payment of the
inheritance tax. This being the case, will a Filipino, non-resident of California,
but with intangible personal properties there, be entitled to the exemption
clause of the California law, since the Californian has not been exempted from
every character of legacy, succession, or death tax because he is, under our
law, under obligation to pay an estate tax? Upon the other hand, if we
exempt the Californian from paying the estate tax, we do not thereby
entitle a Filipino to be exempt from a similar estate tax in California
because under the Federal Law, which is equally enforceable in
California he is bound to pay the same, there being no reciprocity
recognized in respect thereto.
In both instances, the Filipino citizen is always at a disadvantage.
We do not believe that our legislature has intended such an unfair
situation to the detriment of our own government and people.
o We, therefore, find and declare that the lower court erred in exempting the
estate in question from payment of the inheritance tax.
TAX related Held:
3) NO. We uphold and adhere to our ruling in the Lara case that the amount of
$2,000.00 allowed under the Federal Estate Tax Law is in the nature of a
deduction and not of an exemption regarding which reciprocity cannot be
claimed under the provision of Section 122 of our National Internal Revenue
Code. Nor is reciprocity authorized under the Federal Law.
4) NO. For the property in Baguio, it is not impossible that the value of the
property appraised to P52,200.00 from P43,500.00. For the Mindanao Mother
Lode Mines, Inc., the situs of taxation is in the Philippines thus the fair
market value should be taxed on the basis of the price prevailing in our
country.
5) NO. PARTIALLY YES. The Court believes that the probate court was correct in
allowing some of the items as deductions. The P652.50 is really an allowed
deduction however it was already included in the deduction through some
oversight. Funeral expenses worth 2,000 should be added since this was
omitted only by oversight. Lastly, the P10,0,22.47 indebtedness cannot be
allowed there was no evidence of a return made and California court findings
are not conclusive to Philippine courts.
18
6) NO. There is no provision of law granting interest.

6. In the matter of the petition of Vicente Rosal Pardo to be admitted

a citizen of the Philippines. VICENTE ROSAL PARDO vs. THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES
[Again, another weird and short case so no need for recit ready]
Facts: Vicente Rosal Pardo, a Spanish citizen born in Spain in 1895, and
residing in the Philippines since 1905, where he married a Filipino woman. He
is at present employed, in Manila, with an annual salary of P4,800, has been
adjudged by the Court of First Instance of Manila entitled to become a Filipino
citizen.
The Republic in this case is alleging that Pardo does not know how to speak and
write any of the principal Filipino languages. Here, Pardo testified that he knows
enough Tagalog to be understood in that language. Lino Gutierrez, a
respectable citizen who has intimately known the applicant for 27 years, having
had business relations with him, conformed the applicant's testimony. And the
trial judge, who has heard the applicant translate into Tagalog, "He venido
residiendo en Filipinas por el periodo de 36 aos," appears to have been
satisfied with the correctness of translation (which was not transcribed).
Issue/s: (1) WON Vicente Pardo should be admitted as a citizen of the
Philippine despite the contentions of the Republic YES
(2) WON evidence on evidence on whether the laws of Spain grant Filipinos the
right to become naturalized citizens of that country is sufficient - YES
Held:
(1) The fact that the applicant arrived in the Philippines when he was only ten
years old and has lived here 44 years continuously except for a few months
visit in Spain, mingling and dealing by reason of his work with people who use
Tagalog in their daily intercourse, lends credence in his testimony that he has
acquired a good working knowledge of that language. At one time, according to
the evidence he owned or managed two stores successively on the Escolta, and
lately he has been a foreman and warehouseman at Soriano & Co.
(2) The applicant introduced a certificate signed by the Consul General of Spain
in the Philippines, stating that in accordance with articles 17 and 225 of the
Spanish Civil Code, among other Spanish legislation, Filipinos are eligible to
Spanish citizenship in Spain. Article 17 provides that foreigners who have
obtained a certificate of naturalization and those who have not obtained such
certificate but have acquired domicile in any town of the Monarchy are
Spaniards. No discrimination being made in these provisions; they apply to
persons of any nationality.
As the Spanish Civil Code has been and still is "the basic code in force of the
Philippines," articles 17 et seq. thereof may be regarded as matters known to
judges of the Philippines by reason of their judicial functions and may be
judicially recognized by them without the introduction of proof.
[There is an MR in this case, so Ill just include it to be safe]

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION dated 28 April 1950: DENIED.

We realize that a copy of a foreign law certified only by the local consul of the
applicant's country does not conform to the requirement concerning the
19
certification and authentication of such law (sec. 41, Rule 123). But the case at
bar and the cases cited therein as precedents are not governed by the Rules of
the Court. Rule 1342, entitled "Applicability of the Rules," provides that "These
rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases,
naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided
for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable
and convenience. By reason of this provision, literal adherence to the Rules of
Court, which include rules of evidence, is not obligatory in a proceeding like
that under the Philippine law is judicial in character, and strict compliance with
the process prescribed by statute, if there were one, would be essential, yet
when, as here, no specific procedure is indicated in the premises, it is only
necessary that the merits of the petition be passed on and a decision reached
on a far consideration of the evidence on satisfactory proof. Accordingly,
evidence of the law of a foreign country or reciprocity regarding the acquisition
of citizenship, although not meeting the prescribed rule of practice by section
41 of Rule 123, may be allowed and used as basis for a favorable action if, in
the light of all circumstances, the court is satisfied of the authenticity of the
written proof offered.
7. Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Venicio Escolin
Recit-Ready:
Action: Petition to annul the decision allowing Magno to continue as
administratrix.
Facts: Linnie and Charles Hodges are US citizens from Texas and were
married. Linnie died and in her will bequeathed everything to Charles
provided that after his death the estate should pass to her siblings.
Charles was appointed as executor. About 5 years later Charles died,
and Magno took his place in administering the estate as special
administratrix. PCIB eventually became the administrator for Charles
estate. The two administrators eventually had disputes on the
property that makes up each estate. PCIB maintains that the provision
in Mrs. Hodges' will instituting her brothers and sisters in the manner
therein specified is in the nature of a testamentary substitution, but
inasmuch as the purported substitution is not, in its view, in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, it is
ineffective and may not be enforced. Mango maintains that the
applicable law to the will of Mrs. Hodges is that of Texas under which,
she alleges, there is no system of legitime, hence, the estate of Mrs.
Hodges cannot be less than her share or one-half of the conjugal
partnership properties.
Issues: WON Texas Law applies in this case? YES
Held: The contested provision is not a substitution, but a valid
conditional simultaneous institution of heirs, where the passing of the
title depends upon the resolutory condition of Charles death.
However the case as remanded back to the trial court to determine
the proper application of the renvoi principle and the proper
distribution of the respective conjugal estates.
Facts:
On May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City leaving a will
executed on November 22, 1952. She left everything to her husband
20
Charles Newton Hodges during his lifetime, and provided that after his
death everything should be divided equally among her siblings.
Charles was appointed as executor.
Charles died on Dec. 25 1962, and the next day his counsel, Atty.
Gellada filed a motion for the appointment of Avelina Magno as special
administratrix. She was allegedly the most trusted employee of the
spouses Hodges who had been employed for around 30 years. The
court granted her administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
and as Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges,
in the latter case, because the last will of said Charles Newton Hodges
is still kept in his vault or iron safe and that the real and personal
properties of both spouses may be lost, damaged or go to waste,
unless a Special Administratrix is appointed.
Although, soon enough, on December 29, 1962, a certain Harold
K. Davies (representative of heirs, who was from the US) was
appointed as her Co-Special Administrator, and when Special
Proceedings No. 1672, Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, was
opened, Joe Hodges(nephew of decedent from the US) was in due time
appointed as Co-Administrator of said estate together with Atty.
Fernando P. Mirasol, to replace Magno and Davies, only to be in turn
replaced eventually by petitioner PCIB alone.
At first the probate proceedings appear to have proceeded
jointly and each administrator acted with together with the other, but
eventually differences arose and they began acting independently.
PCIB acted as though the properties of Charles belonged solely to his
estate to the exclusion of Linnies siblings. On the other hand, Magno
acted as though some of the properties in Charles estate correspond
to the estate of Linnie. Eventually, the differences reached a point
wherein Magno, who was more cognizant than anyone else about the
ins and outs of the businesses and properties of the deceased spouses
because of her long and intimate association with them, made it
difficult for PCIB to perform normally its functions as administrator
separately from her.
PCIB wants to annul the lower courts decision allowing Magno
to continue acting as adminstratrix. PCIB maintains that the provision
in Mrs. Hodges' will instituting her brothers and sisters in the manner
therein specified is in the nature of a testamentary substitution, but
inasmuch as the purported substitution is not, in its view, in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, it is
ineffective and may not be enforced. It is further contended that, in
any event, inasmuch as the Hodges spouses were both residents of
the Philippines, following the decision of this Court in Aznar vs.
Garcia, or the case of Christensen, 7 SCRA 95, the estate left by Mrs.
Hodges could not be more than one-half of her share of the conjugal
partnership, notwithstanding the fact that she was citizen of Texas,
U.S.A., in accordance with Article 16 in relation to Articles 900 and
872 of the Civil Code. Initially, we issued a preliminary injunction
against Magno and allowed PCIB to act alone.

21
 At the same time PCIB has appealed several separate orders of
the trial court approving individual acts of appellee Magno in her
capacity as administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, such as,
hiring of lawyers for specified fees and incurring expenses of
administration for different purposes and executing deeds of sale in
favor of her co-appellees covering properties which are still registered
in the name of Hodges, purportedly pursuant to corresponding
"contracts to sell" executed by Hodges. The said orders are being
questioned on jurisdictional and procedural grounds directly or
indirectly predicated on the principal theory of appellant that all the
properties of the two estates belong already to the estate of Hodges
exclusively.
Regarding substitution, Magno claims that what was given by
Mrs. Hodges to her husband under the provision in question was a
lifetime usufruct of her share of the conjugal partnership, with the
naked ownership passing directly to her brothers and sisters. Anent
the application of Article 16 of the Civil Code, she claims that the
applicable law to the will of Mrs. Hodges is that of Texas under which,
she alleges, there is no system of legitime, hence, the estate of Mrs.
Hodges cannot be less than her share or one-half of the conjugal
partnership properties. She further maintains that, in any event,
Hodges had as a matter of fact and of law renounced his inheritance
from his wife and, therefore, her whole estate passed directly to her
brothers and sisters effective at the latest upon the death of Hodges.
Issues: WON Texas law will apply?
Held:
o We overrule PCIB's contention that the provision in Mrs. Hodges'
will in favor of her brothers and sisters constitutes ineffective
hereditary substitutions. But neither are We sustaining, on the other
hand, Magno's pose that it gave Hodges only a lifetime usufruct. We
hold that by said provision, Mrs. Hodges simultaneously instituted her
brothers and sisters as co-heirs with her husband, with the condition,
however, that the latter would have complete rights of dominion over
the whole estate during his lifetime and what would go to the former
would be only the remainder thereof at the time of Hodges' death. In
other words, whereas they are not to inherit only in case of default of
Hodges, on the other hand, Hodges was not obliged to preserve
anything for them. Clearly then, the essential elements of
testamentary substitution are absent; the provision in question is a
simple case of conditional simultaneous institution of heirs, whereby
the institution of Hodges is subject to a partial resolutory condition
the operative contingency of which is coincidental with that of the
suspensive condition of the institution of his brothers and sisters-in-
law, which manner of institution is not prohibited by law.
o We also hold, however, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited
by her brothers and sisters could be more than just stated, but this
would depend on (1) whether upon the proper application of the
principle of renvoi in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code and the
pertinent laws of Texas, it will appear that Hodges had no legitime as
22
contended by Magno, and (2) whether or not it can be held that
Hodges had legally and effectively renounced his inheritance from his
wife. Under the circumstances presently obtaining and in the state of
the record of these cases, as of now, the Court is not in a position to
make a final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of these two
issues, and We, therefore, reserve said issues for further proceedings
and resolution in the first instance by the court a quo, as hereinabove
indicated. We reiterate, however, that pending such further
proceedings, as matters stand at this stage, Our considered opinion is
that it is beyond cavil that since, under the terms of the will of Mrs.
Hodges, her husband could not have anyway legally adjudicated or
caused to be adjudicated to himself her whole share of their conjugal
partnership, albeit he could have disposed any part thereof during his
lifetime, the resulting estate of Mrs. Hodges, of which Magno is the
uncontested administratrix, cannot be less than one-fourth of the
conjugal partnership properties, as of the time of her death, minus
what, as explained earlier, have been gratuitously disposed of
therefrom, by Hodges in favor of third persons since then, for even if
it were assumed that, as contended by PCIB, under Article 16 of the
Civil Code and applying renvoi the laws of the Philippines are the ones
ultimately applicable, such one-fourth share would be her free
disposable portion, taking into account already the legitime of her
husband under Article 900 of the Civil Code.
o The case as remanded back to the trial court to determine the
proper application of the renvoi principle (i.e. whether Texas law,
although applicable, will refer the matter back to Philippine courts)
and the proper distribution of the respective conjugal estates.
8. Zalamea v. CA
9. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. vs. Guerrero
Action: Complaint for damages
RECIT READY
FACTS:
Guerrero filed a case for damages against the petitioners for: (1) illegally
withholding taxes against interests on his checking account with the
Bank; (2) a returned check worth $18K due to signature verification
problems; and (3) the unauthorized conversion of his account.
The petitioners moved for partial summary judgment, presenting the
affidavit of Walden, a NY attorney, to prove that the law that governs is
the NY law, and under the said law, no claim for damages, except for
actual damages, are allowed
ISSUE: W/N the affidavit serves as proof of NY law NO
HELD: Under our laws, courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws, and
thus, such must be proven as any other fact. Our laws provide for a procedure
in proving foreign law:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred
to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may
be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested
by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
23
 deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If
the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in
the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
In this case, the affidavit did not follow the proper procedure laid out by
our rules, thus, the NY law which does not allow the recovery of damages
except for actual damages, was not proven.
Moreover, a partial summary judgment cannot be granted if there are
issues of fact that are involved. In this case, the resolution of whether
a foreign law allows only the recovery of actual damages is a
question of fact, since as mentioned, foreign laws are not a matter of
judicial notice.
FACTS:
Guerrero filed a complaint for damages against Manufacturers
Hanover Trust and/or Chemical Bank (Bank) in the RTC of Manila
o Guerrero sought for damages allegedly for (1) illegally withheld
taxes charged against interests on his checking account with the
Bank; (2) a returned check worth US$18,000.00 due to signature
verification problems; and (3) unauthorized conversion of his
account.
The Bank in its Answer, stated that the bank account is governed by NY
law, and that the NY law does not permit any claims for damages, except
for actual damages. It then filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
seeking the dismissal of other claims, and contending that the trial
should be limited to the issue of actual damages.
The Bank presented the affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a NY attorney.
The affidavit stated that the bank account is to be governed by NY law
and that this law bars all of Guerreros claims except for actual damages.
o The Philippine Consular Office in NY authenticated the affidavit.
RTC: denied the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
CA: affirmed the RTC
o The affidavit does not serve as proof of the NY law and
jurisprudence
o To prove foreign law, Sec. 24, Rule 132 must be followed:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that
such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is
kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of
24
 the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
ISSUE: W/N the affidavit serves as proof of the NY law NO
HELD:
The Bank filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The court can
grant such to settle expeditiously a case if, on motion of either party,
there appears from the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits
that no important issues of fact are involved, except the amount of
damages. The main question in a Motion for Summary Judgment is
whether or not there is a genuine issue.
The Banks contention is that the agreed foreign law to govern the
contractual relation (NY law) bars the recovery of damages other than
actual damages. The Bank used the affidavit of Walden to support its
motion. However, there can be no summary judgment where
questions of fact are in issue. In this case, the resolution of
whether a foreign law allows only the recovery of actual
damages is a question of fact, since foreign laws are not a
matter of judicial notice.
o Moreover, the Bank never proved that Guerreros petition did not
have a genuine issue, or the issues he presented were a sham or
fictitious.
According to our laws, the record of public documents of a sovereign
authority or tribunal may be proved by (1) an official publication
thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must be
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof.
The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine
embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of
the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be, and must be
under the official seal of the attesting officer.
The Bank used the affidavit to prove NY laws, however, it failed to
comply with the requirements of our law in proving such. Thus, the RTC
and CA were correct in not granting the Motion for Summary Judgment.
Other notes:
The rule on Sec. 24 of Rule 132 provides for exceptions (according to
jurisprudence quoting the case of Asiavest)
o Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal -- the Supreme
Court considered the testimony under oath of an attorney-at-law
of San Francisco, California, who quoted verbatim a section of
California Civil Code and who stated that the same was in force at
the time the obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to
establish the existence of said law.
o CIR v. Fisher -- the counsel for respondent testified that as an
active member of the California Bar since 1951, and he is familiar
25
 with the revenue and taxation laws of the State of California; the
witness cited Article 4, Sec. 13851 (a) & (b) of the California
Internal and Revenue Code as published in Derrings California
Code, a publication of Bancroft-Whitney Co.; and as part of his
testimony, a full quotation of the cited section was offered in
evidence by respondents.
But the SC said that the Bank cannot rely on these cases because in
these cases, the lawyers testified in open court during trial in the
Philippines, quoting the foreign laws. In the case at bar, the
affidavit was taken abroad ex parte and Walden never testified in open
court.
The affidavit cannot be considered as proof of NY law on damages not
only because it is self-serving but also because it does not state the
specific NY law on damages.
10. CRESCENT PETROLEUM, LTD., petitioner, vs. M/V LOK
MAHESHWARI,
Action for a sum of money with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ
of preliminary attachment
M/V Lok Maheshwari (Vessel) INDIA Halla (South Korea) Transmar (Canada)
Portserv (Canada)
Portserv (request to deliver marine fuel oils) Crescent (Canada) Marine
Petrobulk (Canada) Vessel
Respondent M/V Lok Maheshwari (Vessel) is an oceangoing vessel of
Indian registry that is owned by respondent Shipping Corporation of India
(SCI), a corporation organized and existing under the laws of India and
principally owned by the Government of India.
o It was timechartered by respondent SCI to Halla Merchant Marine
Co. Ltd. (Halla), a South Korean company.
o Halla, in turn, subchartered the Vessel through a time charter to
Transmar Shipping, Inc. (Transmar).
o Transmar further subchartered the Vessel to Portserv Limited
(Portserv). Both Transmar and Portserv are corporations organized
and existing under the laws of Canada.
Portserv requested petitioner, Crescent Petroleum, Ltd. (Crescent), to
deliver marine fuel oils (bunker fuels) to the Vessel.
o Crescent is corporation organized and existing under the laws of
Canada and is engaged in the business of selling petroleum and
oil products for the use and operation of oceangoing vessels
Petitioner Crescent granted and confirmed the request through an advice
via facsimile.
As security for the payment of the bunker fuels and related services,
petitioner Crescent received two (2) checks in the amounts of
US$100,000.00 and US$200,000.00.
o Thus, petitioner Crescent contracted with its supplier, Marine
Petrobulk Limited (Marine Petrobulk), another Canadian
corporation, for the physical delivery of the bunker fuels to the
Vessel.

26
 Marine Petrobulk delivered the bunker fuels at the port of Pioneer Grain,
Vancouver, Canada.
The Chief Engineer Officer of the Vessel duly acknowledged and received
the delivery receipt. Marine Petrobulk issued an invoice to petitioner
Crescent for the US$101,400.00 worth of the bunker fuels. Petitioner
Crescent issued a check for the same amount in favor of Marine
Petrobulk, which check was duly encashed.
Having paid Marine Petrobulk, petitioner Crescent issued a
revised invoice to Portserv Limited, and/or the Master, and/or
Owners, and/or Operators, and/or Charterers of M/V Lok
Maheshwari with instruction to remit the amount on or before
December 1, 1995.
o The period lapsed and several demands were made but no
payment was received. Also, the checks issued to petitioner
Crescent as security for the payment of the bunker fuels were
dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
o As a consequence, petitioner Crescent incurred additional
expenses of US$8,572.61 for interest, tracking fees, and legal
fees.
While the Vessel was docked at the port of Cebu City, petitioner Crescent
instituted before the RTC of Cebu City an action for a sum of money
with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
attachment against respondents Vessel and SCI, Portserv and/or
Transmar.
o The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioner Crescent.
o Respondents Vessel and SCI appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Respondents attached copies of the charter parties between respondent
SCI and Halla, between Halla and Transmar, and between Transmar and
Portserv.
o Claiming that Portserv was a time charterer and that there is a
clause in the time charters between respondent SCI and Halla, and
between Halla and Transmar, which states that the Charterers
shall provide and pay for all the fuel except as otherwise agreed.
o They submitted a copy of Part II of the Bunker Fuel Agreement
between petitioner Crescent and Portserv containing a stipulation
that New York law governs the construction, validity and
performance of the contract.
o They likewise submitted certified copies of the Commercial
Instruments and Maritime Lien Act of the United States (U.S.),
some U.S. cases, and some Canadian cases to support their
defense.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court for want of
jurisdiction.
o The Court also denied the MR explaining that it dismissed the
action on the ground of forum non conveniens considering that
the parties are foreign corporations which are not doing business
in the Philippines.

27
ISSUE: WON Crescent is entitled to a maritime lien under PH laws? NO. So
under which law should petitioner Crescent prove the existence of its maritime
lien? CANADIAN LAW.
HELD:
The case is for the satisfaction of unpaid supplies furnished by a
foreign supplier in a foreign port to a vessel of foreign registry
that is owned, chartered and sub-chartered by foreign entities.
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended by Republic Act No.
7691, RTCs exercise exclusive original jurisdiction (i)n all actions in
admiralty and maritime where the demand or claim exceeds two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000) or in Metro Manila, where such
demand or claim exceeds four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000).
Two (2) tests have been used to determine whether a case involving a
contract comes within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of a court
the locational test and the subject matter test.
o Locality Test
Place where the contract is made and is to be executed
o Subject Matter Test
Nature and subject matter of the contract, making the true
criterion a maritime service or a maritime transaction.
The English rule follows the locational test while the American rule
follows the subject matter test.
o In International Harvester Company of the Philippines v. Aragon
the Court adopted the American rulesubject matter test.
A contract for furnishing supplies like in this case is maritime and within
the jurisdiction of admiralty.
Petitioner Crescent bases its claim of a maritime lien on Sections 21, 22
and 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1521 (P.D. No. 1521), also known as
the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978.
o Sec. 21. Maritime Lien for Necessaries; persons entitled to such
lien.Any person furnishing repairs, supplies, towage, use of dry
dock or maritime railway, or other necessaries, to any vessel,
whether foreign or domestic, upon the order of the owner of such
vessel, or of a person authorized by the owner, shall have a
maritime lien on the vessel, which may be enforced by suit in rem,
and it shall be necessary to allege or prove that credit was given
to the vessel.
Petitioner Crescent submits that these provisions apply to both domestic
and foreign vessels, as well as domestic and foreign suppliers of
necessaries. It contends that the use of the term any person in Section
21 implies that the law is not restricted to domestic suppliers but also
includes all persons who supply provisions and necessaries to a vessel,
whether foreign or domestic. It points out further that the law does not
indicate that the supplies or necessaries must be furnished in the
Philippines in order to give petitioner the right to seek enforcement of
the lien with a Philippine court.

28
 Respondents Vessel and SCI, on the other hand, maintain that Section 21
of the P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 does not apply
to a foreign supplier like petitioner Crescent as the provision refers only
to a situation where the person furnishing the supplies is situated inside
the territory of the Philippines and not where the necessaries were
furnished in a foreign jurisdiction like Canada.
P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 is patterned closely
from various U.S. Ship Acts; hence, U.S. jurisprudence finds relevance to
determining whether P.D. No. 1521 applies in the present case.
The various tests used in the U.S. to determine whether a maritime lien
exists are the following:
1. Scotia Case: The court has or will exercise jurisdiction depending on
the law of the country where the supplies were furnished, which must
be pleaded and proved.
2. In Lauritzen v. Larsen: The multiplecontact test to determine, in the
absence of a specific Congressional directive as to the statutes
reach, which jurisdictions law should be applied. The following
factors were considered: (1) place of the wrongful act; (2) law of the
flag; (3) allegiance or domicile of the injured; (4) allegiance of the
defendant shipowner; (5) place of contract; (6) inaccessibility of
foreign forum; and (7) law of the forum.
o The principles enunciated in these maritime tort cases have been
extended to cases involving unpaid supplies and necessaries
3. The factors provided in Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law
have also been applied, especially in resolving cases brought under
the Federal Maritime Lien Act. Their application suggests that in the
absence of an effective choice of law by the parties, the forum
contacts to be considered include: (a) the place of contracting; (b) the
place of negotiation of the contract; (c) the place of performance; (d)
the location of the subject matter of the contract; and (e) the
domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties.
The submission of petitioner is not in keeping with the reasonable
expectation of the parties to the contract. Indeed, when the parties
entered into a contract for supplies in Canada, they could not have
intended the laws of a remote country like the Philippines to determine
the creation of a lien by the mere accident of the Vessels being in
Philippine territory.
In light of the interests of the various foreign elements involved, it is
clear that Canada has the most significant interest in this
dispute.
o The injured party is a Canadian corporation,
o The subcharterer which placed the orders for the supplies is also
Canadian,
o The entity which physically delivered the bunker fuels is in
Canada,
o The place of contracting and negotiation is in Canada, and
o The supplies were delivered in Canada.
29
 The arbitration clause contained in the Bunker Fuel Agreement which
states that New York law governs the construction, validity and
performance of the contract is only a factor that may be considered in
the choiceoflaw analysis but is not conclusive.
It is worthy to note that petitioner Crescent never alleged and proved
Canadian law as basis for the existence of a maritime lien. To the end, it
insisted on its theory that Philippine law applies. Petitioner contends that
even if foreign law applies, since the same was not properly pleaded and
proved, such foreign law must be presumed to be the same as Philippine
law pursuant to the doctrine of processual presumption.
It is wellsettled that a party whose cause of action or defense depends
upon a foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law. By
erroneously claiming a maritime lien under Philippine law instead of
proving that a maritime lien exists under Canadian law, petitioner
Crescent failed to establish a cause of action.
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption, the result will
still be the same. Under P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of
1978, the following are the requisites for maritime liens on necessaries
to exist: (1) the necessaries must have been furnished to and for the
benefit of the vessel; (2) the necessaries must have been necessary
for the continuation of the voyage of the vessel; (3) the credit must have
been extended to the vessel; (4) there must be necessity for the
extension of the credit; and (5) the necessaries must be ordered by
persons authorized to contract on behalf of the vessel.
These do not avail in the instant case.
1. It was not established that benefit was extended to the vessel. It was
the sub-charterer Portserv which placed the orders to petitioner
Crescent. Hence, it is incumbent upon petitioner Crescent to prove
that benefit was extended to the vessel. Petitioner did not.
2. Petitioner Crescent did not show any proof that the marine products
were necessary for the continuation of the vessel.
3. It was not established that credit was extended to the vessel. It was
the sub-charterer Portserv which requested for the delivery of the
bunker fuels. The issuance of two checks amounting to US$300,000
in favor of petitioner Crescent prior to the delivery of the bunkers as
security for the payment of the obligation weakens petitioner
Crescents contention that credit was extended to the Vessel. Also,
when copies of the charter parties were submitted by respondents in
the Court of Appeals, the time charters between respondent SCI and
Halla and between Halla and Transmar were shown to contain a
clause which states that the Charterers shall provide and pay for all
the fuel except as otherwise agreed. This militates against petitioner
Crescents position that Portserv is authorized by the shipowner to
contract for supplies upon the credit of the vessel.
4. There was no proof of necessity of credit. A necessity of credit will be
presumed where it appears that the repairs and supplies were
necessary for the ship and that they were ordered by the master. This
presumption does not arise in this case since the fuels were not

30
 ordered by the master and there was no proof of necessity for the
supplies.
5. The necessaries were not ordered by persons authorized to contract
in behalf of the vessel as provided under Section 22 of P.D. No. 1521
or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978the managing owner, the
ships husband, master or any person with whom the management of
the vessel at the port of supply is entrusted. Portserv, a subcharterer
under a time charter, is not someone to whom the management of
the vessel has been entrusted. A time charter is a contract for the use
of a vessel for a specified period of time or for the duration of one or
more specified voyages wherein the owner of the timechartered
vessel retains possession and control through the master and crew
who remain his employees. Not enjoying the presumption of
authority, petitioner Crescent should have proved that
Portserv was authorized by the shipowner to contract for
supplies. Petitioner failed.
A discussion on the principle of forum non conveniens is unnecessary.
11. EDI v. NLRC
Recit-Ready:
Action: Underpayment of salary and illegal dismissal filed with the NLRC
Facts:
EDI is a corporation engaged in recruitment and placement of OFWs.
(domestic)
ESI (domestic corp) is another recruitment agency which collaborated with
EDI to process the deployment of Eleazar Gran (private respondent) to
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
OAB (the Saudi Arabian company) selected Gran to be its Computer
Specialist and offered a monthly salary of 2,250 saudi riyal or 600 USD.
Gran signed an employment contract granting him a monthly salary of 850
USD for 2 years.
Upon arrival in Saudi, he questioned the discrepancy as his employment
contract stated 850 USD while the POEA information sheet indicated 600
USD only. OAB agreed to pay 850 USD.
After working for 5 months, he was terminated for:
o Non-compliance to contract requirement by recruitment agency
regarding salary and duration;
o Non-compliance to pre-qualification requirements (not qualified due
to insufficient knowledge in programming and lack of knowledge in
ACAD system); and
o Insubordination or disobedience (did not submit a single activity
report).
Gran received his final pay of SR 2,948 and executed a Declaration
releasing OAB from any financial obligation.
Upon his arrival in the Philippines, he filed a complaint against EDI/ESI,
OAB, et. al. with the NLRC for underpayment of salary and illegal dismissal.
LA: No underpayment as info sheet shows 600 USD and he was validly
dismissed.

31
 NLRC: The transfer of Grans contract to ESI is reprocessing which is
prohibited. Gran did not commit any act that constituted a legal ground for
dismissal.
CA: EDI failed to prove that Gran was terminated for a valid cause. The law
requires OFWs to take trade tests before deployment, thus, Gran is
presumed to be qualified. EDI failed to show that the submission of the Daily
Activity Report was part of Grans duty. The two notice rule was also not
observed.
Issue: WON Grans dismissal was justified.
Ruling: NO
The employment contract states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters
not provided for in the contract.
Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones), Saudi laws
should govern. However, petitioner was not able to prove the pertinent
Saudi laws on the matter. Thus, we apply the Philippine labor laws based on
the presumed-identity approach or processual presumption (where a foreign
law is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours).
EDI failed to prove that the dismissal was legal and just. The burden is on
the employer. It only showed 2 letters as evidence (the termination latter
and the letter to EDI/ESI)
Gran was not afforded due process. Our laws and rules on the requisites of
due process relating to termination shall apply.
o The two notice requirement was not followed
Apprise the employees of their fault (this was not given to
Gran) and
Communicate to the employees that they are being terminated
In between the two, there should be hearing or opportunity to
defend himself (this was also lacking).
Gran was notified and his employment was terminated on the
same day.
Gran is entitled to backwages despite the Declaration.
o The Declaration/quitclaim is not valid. Gran was forced to sign it.
o The amount is lower than his salary. If it were really a quitclaim, it
should be much higher.
o The declaration purporting to be a quitclaim and waiver is
unenforceable under Phil. laws in the absence of proof of the
applicable law of Saudi Arabia. To be valid, it should contain the ff:
A fixed amount as full and final compromise;
The benefits of employees with the amounts which the
employees are giving up in consideration of the fixed amount;
A statement that the employer has clearly explained to the
employee in English, Filipino, or in a dialect known to the
employees that by signing the waiver or quitclaim, they are
forfeiting their right to receive the benefits due them;
A statement that the employees signed and executed the
document voluntarily, and had fully understood the contents of
the document and that their consent was freely given without
any threat, violence, intimidation, duress, etc.
32
 There should be 2 witnesses to the execution of the quitclaim
and it should be subscribed and sworn to under oath preferably
before an official of the DOLE, NLRC, BLR, or labor attach in a
foreign country.

33